- See Also
- Gwern
-
Links
- “A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure”, Palmer et al 2023
- “Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature”, Ali et al 2023
- “Bayesian Regression Markets”, Falconer et al 2023
- “Goodhart’s Law in Reinforcement Learning”, Karwowski et al 2023
- “Learning from Corporate Governance: First Conceptualization of a Liability for Political Decision-Making”, Follert 2023
- “The Order of Move in a Conversational War of Attrition”, Decker 2023
- “Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes”, Srinivasan et al 2023
- “Trust Intermediary in a Cryptomarket for Illegal Drugs”, Andrei et al 2023
- “All-Way Stops”, Li 2023
- “Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation”, Guthmann & Albrecht 2023
- “Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members”, Cornelisse et al 2022
- “Human-Centered Mechanism Design With Democratic AI”, Koster et al 2022
- “Early Refund Bonuses Increase Successful Crowdfunding”, Cason et al 2021
- “The Private Mint in Economics: Evidence from the American Gold Rushes”, White 2021
- “When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, Wentsworth 2020
- “Skeb Artwork Commissioning Website: Review: Commission Your Favourite Japanese Artists With Auto-Translation”, Worboys 2020
- “Blockchain Enabled Carbon Credit Markets: Real Considerations to Make When Tokenizing Carbon Credits”, Greenfield 2019
- “Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design”, Kamenica 2019
- “When Matching Markets Unravel? Theory and Evidence from Federal Judicial Clerkships”, Chen et al 2019f
- “Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems”, Hubinger et al 2019
- “The Limits of Reputation Signaling in Adversely Selected Markets: Applications to Dark Net Cocaine Markets”, Chun 2019
- “Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment”, Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield 2018
- “The Design and Price of Information”, Bergemann et al 2018
- “Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform”, Peterson 2018
- “Teams vs. Crowds: A Field Test of the Relative Contribution of Incentives, Member Ability, and Emergent Collaboration to Crowd-Based Problem Solving Performance”, Riedl & Woolley 2017
- “Revenue Maximization With an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer”, Chawla et al 2017
- “The Performance Pay Nobel”, Tabarrok 2016
- “Mechanism Theory”, Jackson 2014
- “A Prediction Market for Macro-Economic Variables”, Teschner et al 2011
- “The Relationship between Quantum and Classical Correlation in Games”, Brandenburger 2010
- “Online Labor Markets”, Horton 2010
- “Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review”, Merrifield & Saari 2009
- “Quantum Auctions: Facts and Myths”, Piotrowski & Sladkowski 2007
- “The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets”, Segal 2007
- “Quantum Auctions”, Hogg et al 2007
- “Communication in Economic Mechanisms”, Segal 2006b
- “Quantum and Classical Correlations between Players in Game Theory”, Shimamura et al 2003
- “The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail”, Allen 2002
- “Are CEOS Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are”, Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001
- “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Prendergast 1999
- “Quantum Strategies”, Meyer 1998
- “Essays in Learning and the Revelation of Private Information”, Noah & Hirshleifer 1998
- “Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles”, Meyer 1991
- “The Bazaar Economy or How Bizarre Is the Bazaar Really?”, Fanselow 1990
- “Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, Drexler & Miller 1988
- “The Competitive Allocation Process Is Informationally Efficient Uniquely”, Jordan 1982
- “The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing”, Geertz 1978
- “The Informational Size of Message Spaces”, Mount & Reiter 1974
- “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation”, Cheung 1973
- “A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly”, Oi 1971
- “On Stake”
- “Proof of Stake FAQs”
- “From Kyoto Protocol to Klima Protocol (🌳,🌳)”
- “‘On Radical Markets’, Vitalik Buterin”
- “In the Sublet Economy, You Can Turn Anything into Extra Cash: Your House, Your Car, Your Boat, or Your Backyard.”
- Sort By Magic
- Wikipedia
- Miscellaneous
- Link Bibliography
See Also
Gwern
“Miscellaneous”, Gwern 2009
“Startup Ideas”, Gwern 2017
“CO2 Coin: Decentralized Carbon Capture Blockchains”, Gwern 2021
“Silk Road 1: Theory & Practice”, Gwern 2011
Links
“A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure”, Palmer et al 2023
A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure
“Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature”, Ali et al 2023
“Bayesian Regression Markets”, Falconer et al 2023
“Goodhart’s Law in Reinforcement Learning”, Karwowski et al 2023
“Learning from Corporate Governance: First Conceptualization of a Liability for Political Decision-Making”, Follert 2023
“The Order of Move in a Conversational War of Attrition”, Decker 2023
“Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes”, Srinivasan et al 2023
“Trust Intermediary in a Cryptomarket for Illegal Drugs”, Andrei et al 2023
“All-Way Stops”, Li 2023
“Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation”, Guthmann & Albrecht 2023
Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation
“Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members”, Cornelisse et al 2022
Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members
“Human-Centered Mechanism Design With Democratic AI”, Koster et al 2022
“Early Refund Bonuses Increase Successful Crowdfunding”, Cason et al 2021
“The Private Mint in Economics: Evidence from the American Gold Rushes”, White 2021
The private mint in economics: evidence from the American gold rushes
“When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation”, Wentsworth 2020
When Hindsight Isn’t 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation
“Skeb Artwork Commissioning Website: Review: Commission Your Favourite Japanese Artists With Auto-Translation”, Worboys 2020
“Blockchain Enabled Carbon Credit Markets: Real Considerations to Make When Tokenizing Carbon Credits”, Greenfield 2019
Blockchain Enabled Carbon Credit Markets: Real considerations to make when tokenizing carbon credits
“Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design”, Kamenica 2019
“When Matching Markets Unravel? Theory and Evidence from Federal Judicial Clerkships”, Chen et al 2019f
When Matching Markets Unravel? Theory and Evidence from Federal Judicial Clerkships
“Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems”, Hubinger et al 2019
Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems
“The Limits of Reputation Signaling in Adversely Selected Markets: Applications to Dark Net Cocaine Markets”, Chun 2019
“Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment”, Hadfield-Menell & Hadfield 2018
“The Design and Price of Information”, Bergemann et al 2018
“Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform”, Peterson 2018
Augur: a Decentralized Oracle and Prediction Market Platform
“Teams vs. Crowds: A Field Test of the Relative Contribution of Incentives, Member Ability, and Emergent Collaboration to Crowd-Based Problem Solving Performance”, Riedl & Woolley 2017
“Revenue Maximization With an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer”, Chawla et al 2017
“The Performance Pay Nobel”, Tabarrok 2016
“Mechanism Theory”, Jackson 2014
“A Prediction Market for Macro-Economic Variables”, Teschner et al 2011
“The Relationship between Quantum and Classical Correlation in Games”, Brandenburger 2010
The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games
“Online Labor Markets”, Horton 2010
“Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review”, Merrifield & Saari 2009
Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review
“Quantum Auctions: Facts and Myths”, Piotrowski & Sladkowski 2007
“The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets”, Segal 2007
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
“Quantum Auctions”, Hogg et al 2007
“Communication in Economic Mechanisms”, Segal 2006b
“Quantum and Classical Correlations between Players in Game Theory”, Shimamura et al 2003
Quantum and classical correlations between players in game theory
“The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail”, Allen 2002
The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail
“Are CEOS Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals Are”, Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001
“The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Prendergast 1999
“Quantum Strategies”, Meyer 1998
“Essays in Learning and the Revelation of Private Information”, Noah & Hirshleifer 1998
Essays in learning and the revelation of private information
“Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles”, Meyer 1991
Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles
“The Bazaar Economy or How Bizarre Is the Bazaar Really?”, Fanselow 1990
“Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, Drexler & Miller 1988
Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management
“The Competitive Allocation Process Is Informationally Efficient Uniquely”, Jordan 1982
The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
“The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing”, Geertz 1978
The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing
“The Informational Size of Message Spaces”, Mount & Reiter 1974
“The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation”, Cheung 1973
“A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly”, Oi 1971
A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly:
“On Stake”
“Proof of Stake FAQs”
“From Kyoto Protocol to Klima Protocol (🌳,🌳)”
“‘On Radical Markets’, Vitalik Buterin”
“In the Sublet Economy, You Can Turn Anything into Extra Cash: Your House, Your Car, Your Boat, or Your Backyard.”
Sort By Magic
Annotations sorted by machine learning into inferred 'tags'. This provides an alternative way to browse: instead of by date order, one can browse in topic order. The 'sorted' list has been automatically clustered into multiple sections & auto-labeled for easier browsing.
Beginning with the newest annotation, it uses the embedding of each annotation to attempt to create a list of nearest-neighbor annotations, creating a progression of topics. For more details, see the link.
game-theory
auction-theory
market-design
Wikipedia
Miscellaneous
-
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/HFBJMyCiuPyshRvWq/impact-certificates-on-a-blockchain: -
https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=131C917701ED2B3A571305F2B2CC37F7:View External Link:
https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=131C917701ED2B3A571305F2B2CC37F7 -
https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/retroactive-public-goods-funding-33c9b7d00f0c -
https://priceonomics.com/the-spectrum-auction-how-economists-saved-the-day/ -
https://slate.com/culture/2001/02/the-first-one-now-will-later-be-last.html -
https://theoryclass.wordpress.com/2013/06/06/a-mechanism-design-approach-to-peer-review/ -
https://truthonthemarket.com/2023/05/23/how-much-information-do-markets-require/ -
https://twitter.com/dissproportion/status/1722847859505017303: -
https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2021/11/16/retro1.html#should-badge-holder-votes-be-secret-ballot -
https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2023/08/16/communitynotes.html -
https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/impact-markets-the-annoying-details -
https://www.filfre.net/2023/09/magic-and-loss-part-1-magic-in-the-cards/ -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/CwgHX9tbfASqxjpsc/the-economics-of-the-asteroid-deflection-problem: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Eu6CvP7c7ivcGM3PJ/goodhart-s-law-in-reinforcement-learning -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QG2ZQm2Fxq8ET22sT/strategyproof-mechanisms-possibilities: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dzjQLJA4GamTyny6f/update-to-dominant-assurance-contract-platform: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wE3CRBTpSSBXf9EHK/strategyproof-mechanisms-impossibilities: -
https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/mechanism-design:View External Link:
-
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2007/popular-information/ -
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/advanced-economicsciences2007.pdf: -
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/maskin_lecture.pdf: -
https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/myerson_lecture.pdf: -
https://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/biggestpaper.pdf#page=2 -
https://www.overcomingbias.com/p/office-by-combo-auctionhtml -
https://www.quantamagazine.org/mark-braverman-wins-the-imu-abacus-medal-20220705/ -
https://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2021/EECS-2021-207.pdf#page=3
Link Bibliography
-
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-analysis/article/partisan-solution-to-partisan-gerrymandering-the-definecombine-procedure/B0792DD0A49332944F2AF5FF6828E275: “A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define-Combine Procedure”, Maxwell Palmer, Benjamin Schneer, Kevin DeLuca -
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176523002069: “The Order of Move in a Conversational War of Attrition”, Christian Decker -
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/10/performance-pay-nobel.html: “The Performance Pay Nobel”, Alex Tabarrok -
2010-brandenburger.pdf: “The Relationship between Quantum and Classical Correlation in Games”, Adam Brandenburger -
2002-allen.pdf: “The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail”, Douglas W. Allen -
https://papers.agoric.com/papers/incentive-engineering-for-computational-resource-management/full-text/: “Incentive Engineering: for Computational Resource Management”, Eric Drexler, Mark S. Miller -
1973-cheung.pdf: “The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation”, Steven N. S. Cheung