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[–]guzeysci acc[S] 23 points24 points  (14 children)

I think this is one of Gwern's most brilliant and important essays.

Summary:

The “expanding circle” historical thesis ignores all instances in which modern ethics narrowed the set of beings to be morally regarded, and assumes its conclusion.

Some excerpts (emphasis always mine):

when one compares modern with ancient society, the religious differences are striking: almost every single supernatural entity (place, personage, or force) has been excluded from the circle of moral concern, where they used to be huge parts of the circle and one could almost say the entire circle. ... the gods were immanent and not transcendent. Their expressed wishes were respected and honored, as were their avatars, possessions (Herodotus’s pages are as crowded with artwork given to Delphi as the temple precincts must have been), slaves, and food.

​

Is there any consistent trend here? If one accepts the basic premise that a fetus is human, then the annual rate (as pro-life activists never tire of pointing out) of millions of abortions worldwide would negate centuries of ‘moral progress’. If one does not accept the premise, then per C.S. Lewis, we have change in facts as to what is ‘human’, but nothing one could call an “expanding circle”.

​

More dramatically, we dishonor our ancestors by neglecting their graves, by not offering any sacrifices or even performing any rituals, by forgetting their names (can you name your great-grandparents?), by selling off the family estate when we think the market has hit the peak, and so on.

[–]AnythingMachineFully Automated Luxury Utilitarianism 18 points19 points  (3 children)

I don't agree with this. Leaving aside the dubious ethical claims ('can we really say that our use of incarceration is that superior to our ancestors’ use of *metered-out torture?'* means: Is the current US prison system worse or better than the '''''''metered-out torture''''''' of the Spanish Inquistion, per capita? Come on, that isn't a hard question to answer.) ('If the US were genuinely under threat, I suspect this ethical record would disappear like the proverbial snowball in hell' means; If there was another world war, would the USA intern their Asian citizens, firebomb cities with zero strategic value, or execute deserters without a trial? I know we're dumb, but we aren't that dumb.) I don't think the argument against Singer's view works.

If you were to start from a completely morally neutral standpoint of 'entities that could be subjects of moral concern', then the trend has been a bit uneven, a 'shifting circle'. But Singer doesn't care about most of those - what he argues is that we have been getting, by fits and jumps, more Utilitarian and so closer to the true answers about moral questions, as we expand the range of sentient beings preferences we care about and throw out everything else. As for why the trend only became consistent and started accelerating over about the last 500 years - maybe for the same reason that scientific progress did?

This seems inspired by Robin Hanson's voldemortian argument against moral realism, a variation of the classic moral realism debunking argument which basically claims that other factors (economic, biological and social ones) explain the convergence of our moral beliefs over time at least as well as the theory that says those beliefs were getting closer to the truth.

Hanson/Gwern never tire of pointing out that any moral realist argument which says 'moral beliefs steadily got closer to their current state over time, and followed some consistent direction, therefore they approached the truth' is circular. It assumes current moral beliefs are true and constructs a model where we have made more and more moral discoveries over time.

But similarly, any attempt to argue against moral realism by pointing out an alternative is also circular. If you have (independent) reasons to think realism is plausible, then the realist explanation for the convergence of our moral beliefs is not even necessarily a competitor to the alternative (economic, social) explanations. Moral realists today tend to see moral truths as something a bit like game-theoretic principles (though not the same thing as them!), the kind of abstract truth that economic and social progress might discover.

What the historical evidence does show is that our moral beliefs have not drifted around randomly but pursued a consistent trend (focussing more and more on the experiences and preferences of sentient beings and less on everything else), and that where that trend has taken us would only have been partly predictable in advance. This piece of evidence may or may not favour moral realism. Let me explain why I think it is good evidence for realism, despite what Hanson says here:

the usual social science story that increasing wealth causes certain predictable value changes fits the value variation data a lot better than the theory that the world is slowly learning moral truth.

Hanson thinks that (following the analogy with scientific progress), we should expect moral beliefs to look like a random walk that is impossible to anticipate in advance if we were truly making original moral discoveries.

Despite Hanson and Gwern's claims to the contrary, I think that moral progress sometimes does look a little like that. Jeremy Bentham's hard-headed utilitarian beliefs just looked weird to his contemporaries, not outrageous or evil - in exactly the same way that a new scientific discovery seems weird of laughable at first. But moral progress doesn't look quite as random as scientific progress because moral progress isn't like scientific progress - the majority of it probably is being pushed around by predictable economic and social changes like Hanson says, but there is some moral discovery mixed in, especially more recently.

This theory is more complex, but it explains the mixture of expanding circle / shifting circle over the last few hundred years. And it would be decisively the best theory if we had other reasons to accept moral realism (I think we do, but that's another question).

Also, credit to Robin Hanson for fully biting the bullet on moral antirealism. He is fully aware that as a consequence of his beliefs, our society's current belief that killing people is wrong could easily be shifted if our economic/biological conditions change enough (as he describes in age of Em). And he is, in fact, perfectly fine with a future where we do, in fact, kill people (delete Ems) all the time for no good reason. I don't know if gwern would go that far.

[–]guzeysci acc[S] 8 points9 points  (0 children)

How do you distinguish consistent moral progress from consistent moral regress?

[–][deleted] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Moral realists today tend to see moral truths as something a bit like game-theoretic principles

Really? What game theoretical reason is there to care about animals, children, fetuses, etc.?

[–]ArkyBeagle -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Isn't the whole point of ems that they're not really people?

[–]AblshVwls 11 points12 points  (8 children)

Wow I can hardly even imagine how you would think that those quotes would speak to "brilliance."

If one accepts the basic premise that a fetus is human, then the annual rate (as pro-life activists never tire of pointing out) of millions of abortions worldwide would negate centuries of ‘moral progress’.

I question the premise that abortion is more morally accepted today than historically. Abortion may be more commonly performed, but that isn't the same thing at all (many medical procedures are more commonly performed now that medicine is much more advanced).

Past societies practiced infanticide. Modern societies have expanded the moral circle to the point where even late term abortion is horrifying, and infanticide is completely out of the question.

[–]sinxoveretothex 7 points8 points  (7 children)

During the Holodomor, people had the excuse that everyone was starving anyway.

I think one could even make a case for older civilizations like China killing off baby girls only say.

But if today abortion is viewed as an even greater moral wrong than before, what kind of justifications can people have? Not only that but the usual feminist slogan is "her body, her choice". It doesn't seem to leave that much space for arguing that abortion is ultimately a great moral wrong.

[–]AblshVwls 2 points3 points  (5 children)

But if today abortion is viewed as an even greater moral wrong than before, what kind of justifications can people have?

Probably the people who get abortions usually don't agree that it's a great moral wrong.

Not only that but the usual feminist slogan is "her body, her choice". It doesn't seem to leave that much space for arguing that abortion is ultimately a great moral wrong.

It's true that pro-abortion feminist slogans generally don't leave much room for abortion being a great moral wrong. If 100% of contemporary society believed those slogans it would probably show that contemporary society does not consider abortion a great moral wrong.

In reality, though, contemporary USA society is split about 50/50 on whether abortion should even be legal, which is a lower standard than being morally acceptable.

[–]sinxoveretothex 0 points1 point  (4 children)

You've shifted the topic a bit. I'm not arguing the case that nobody even thinks there's anything wrong with abortion today. Instead, I'm arguing against your objection that abortion could be seen, on the whole, as a greater wrong today than what it was seen as historically.

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (3 children)

That's still what I'm talking about too.

[–]sinxoveretothex 0 points1 point  (2 children)

Ah ok, I think I sort of get what you're going for.

The issue for me is that you haven't given evidence that in earlier times, more than 50% of the population thought it even should be legal for example.

To put this into context, the idea that people who are "unwilling to work" should receive UBI is a fringe opinion today. Would you agree that it's still likely that it is more acceptable today than it was in the past regardless?

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (1 child)

Sure, I haven't given any evidence, nobody has given any evidence.

I have the advantage of being the one who is doubting a public claim made by someone else, so my own failure to provide evidence would normally be considered acceptable ("burden of proof").

thought it even should be legal for example.

One thing we should not do is mistake the legal question for the moral one. The legal question involves the issues of enforceability and availability with varying abortion techniques across technological development. Also, even population levels (abortion might be banned to keep population up, etc). Another thing to remember is that democracy is recent, most people throughout history didn't form political movements to alter laws.

I'm just saying if you want to look at ancient attitudes you want to look at moral attitudes towards abortion not political attitudes toward abortion law, and certainly not law itself in undemocratic slave societies.

BTW I don't think those considerations work in my favor or anything. E.g., I don't think abortion was illegal in most of history, especially ancient history. But there were still moral arguments against it.

Anyway, read this article: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/legal/history_1.shtml

To put this into context, the idea that people who are "unwilling to work" should receive UBI is a fringe opinion today. Would you agree that it's still likely that it is more acceptable today than it was in the past regardless?

I don't see what this has to do with anything. First of all, it isn't entirely or even a largely moral question. It has to do with the economic situation. Second, what do attitudes about UBI type policies over history have to do with attitudes about abortion?

Attitudes about labor and economics have changed radically over the course of recorded history (which began in slave societies). Attitudes about abortion don't seem to have undergone any such unified radical shift.

I just don't see why your question makes any sense here. I will answer it anyway though. I don't agree that the UBI idea would be more morally acceptable today than in all ancient societies (maybe some). I think it would be less economically feasible or sensible, but if you asked an ancient Roman about the idea of giving a UBI to people in our society, in our economy, I think probably he would be just as likely, if not more likely, to support the idea. He would have been exposed to considerably less propaganda about labor and economics designed to defeat social spending policies, so probably he'd be more naively receptive to the idea. (Also, are we asking the slaves or just free people?)

[–]sinxoveretothex 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Something being legal is evidence of it being seen as morally acceptable by at least a plurality of that society. It's evidence, not proof but evidence nonetheless.

Something being illegal is evidence to the contrary. Something having unclear legal status is evidence that it isn't a very great moral concern.

The idea is to try to get to the answer with the most convincing evidence possible. We can't do population survey of past societies so it's not like that should be the standard by which to change our minds: how did we both get to our current beliefs on the topic given that is unavailable)?

Interesting article btw. My take from it is that there isn't an interrupted trend in either direction... which is probably an argument in your favor.

As for UBI, I was talking about UBI for people unwilling to work, not UBI in general. The point was just to give an example of a belief that isn't held by the majority while still being more widespread than before, the specific example doesn't matter. The point is that something being 50/50 split today is not enough information to tell whether it is less or more prevalent than at another time or place.

[–]ArkyBeagle 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The nutshell version of the abortion debate depends on who is given agency. The fact that adoption exists is what gives it any moral charge/polarity at all.

[–]Hellestal 21 points22 points  (6 children)

I have similar feelings about Gwern that I do about Robin Hanson. There are sufficiently large numbers of intelligent admirers that there must be something there, but at the same time, I find much of the writing/logic personally incomprehensible.

[A]lmost every single supernatural entity (place, personage, or force) has been excluded from the circle of moral concern, where they used to be huge parts of the circle and one could almost say the entire circle.

No.

You live on an island. To the center of the island is the volcanic god Magmar, and to the shore is the tidal goddess Tsumimi. Most of your circle of moral concern are the gods' commands and sense of well-being: It is forbidden to tread on their respective territories without permission, and regular sacrifices to both are made. You don't do anything, at all, that might anger either god.

One day, you visit the domain of Magmar for an annual festival, and you discover that the sounds of divine magnificence that emanate from the mountain do not, in fact, come from Magmar. A human interloper discovered the dead god, took up residence in his corpse, and created a technological system of drums and fireworks to simulate Magmar's wrath, in order to live off your continued sacrifices.

You arrest him, and send a humble delegation to Tsumimi to ask what to do. She is content with Magmar's death (more sacrifices for her), but FURIOUS with the human impersonation. She manifests for the first time in living memory, her corporeal form rising from the waves to overshadow the entire island. She is very real. In a booming voice, she demands human sacrifice of the interloper. You and the rest of the islanders quickly comply.

From then on, you sacrifice only to Tsumimi, and not to poor dead Magmar.

A narrowing circle of "concern"? No. Not in the slightest. The issue is that Magmar does not exist. This is a completely different level of analysis. You and the other islanders are happy to continue to center your circle of concern on living gods. You are happy to continue your sacrifices to Tsumimi. If Magmar were alive, you would continue to sacrifice to him as normal. But he's not. So you don't.

This is not a moral issue.

Not directly, anyway. It's an ontological/epistemological issue. If the old Greek gods continued to manifest for us in the same way they did for Herodotus (one of Gwern's examples, and rightly so), then they would still be well within our circle of concern. We have stopped honoring them not because our moral rules for gods have changed -- they have not -- but because those gods quite obviously do not exist. We see the fireworks and drum machines now. For polytheism, at least, all of us can see through the charade.

For a split second, Gwern notices this...

This blind spot is partially based on different ontologies—different facts.

But then he gets the causation exactly backwards.

But even more, it is based on weaker, less virulent religions...

No.

The religions are different because the epistemology is different. Religions are less virulent because we've investigated Magmar's caldera with better tools, and less biased observers, and found it totally empty.

But we're still human beings.

If Magmar or Tsumimi shows up tomorrow, almost all of us will be on our knees, banging our heads on the ground in reverence, in half a second flat. The moral concern is right there, ready and waiting for them to show up. It hasn't gone anywhere. It has not "narrowed", not even by a single inch.

Some of the other examples in the essay are better -- especially "Ancestors" (who definitely exist at one time, and many claim still do exist...), and "Judicial Torture" -- but a similar criticism can still be levelled against these arguments.

You have to control for epistemology/ontology before you make statements about morality. And when you do that, I think an extremely strong argument can be made that the circle of moral concern has, in fact, broadened quite a lot.

Maybe that's wrong. But I personally would want to see a better argument for it. For instance, how many people exactly are outside the US criminal justice system (their bread on the table does not come from the way things work now), but still understand how the system works, and are not at all appalled? I would guess: not very many. To understand the system is to be disgusted by it. That's the sort of evidence I'd want to see in this kind of argument. I want to see some sort of control for "understanding" if we're going to evaluate change in the circle of morality.

[–]withmymindsheruns 8 points9 points  (3 children)

But isn't that his argument: morality isn't substantially different, you've just excluded an element from consideration so the moral shift isn't a function of expansion but of narrowing? Magmar is no longer part of the moral landscape, just like witches aren't.

Like you say if magmar showed up tommorrow he would immediately become integral, it's his exclusion that shifts everything.

I think that's the point with the justice system example. Not that people wouldn't care but that it's been excluded from the 'facts' that constitute the moral landscape in the same way that the gods (or communalism in the case of christianity) have been excluded from modern day religion.

[–]Hellestal 0 points1 point  (2 children)

But isn't that his argument: morality isn't substantially different, you've just excluded an element from consideration so the moral shift isn't a function of expansion but of narrowing? Magmar is no longer part of the moral landscape, just like witches aren't.

That's not at all how I read it.

Like I said, I often have trouble understanding some writers. Including this writer. But the current intro says:

modern ethics narrowed the set of beings to be morally regarded, often backing its exclusion by asserting their non-existence, and thus assumes its conclusion

That rubs me entirely the wrong way. I, for one, am not assuming my conclusion. I don't think the others are either. I could easily be wrong about whether the circle has narrowed, but I'm not at all assuming away the possibility of a narrowing circle. I can easily imagine a narrowing circle.

But that's a much different idea from the circle being just as big as it always was, with parts of it now being perceived as empty.

The difference, of course, is that any beings who show up in that seemingly empty space are immediately going to accrue onto themselves enormous moral authority, for extremely large segments of the population. They'd accrue that moral authority, without any delay, precisely because the circle is large in precisely that empty area where they would be showing up. It didn't "narrow". Or at least, I don't think it did.

That still strikes me as contrary to the argument in the essay.

[–]withmymindsheruns 1 point2 points  (1 child)

IDK, I'm losing you a bit there. I think you skipped over some background that I don't have.

I think you might be misunderstanding the assumed conclusion bit though, I think s/he's basically saying that in a way it's a form of circular reasoning, anything that comes into the circle we note as an expansion of the circle whereas anything that drops out of it disappears and so everything looks like moral progress.

But that's a much different idea from the circle being just as big as it always was, with parts of it now being perceived as empty.

This is the bit I don't get. Are you saying the essay says this or is that your view?

I think you're right about things showing up in those spaces though, that's pretty much what Jordan Peterson is IMO. But thinking about things as being empty or outside just seems like getting stuck on the mechanics of the metaphor to me. I think you're essentially talking about the same thing. Please correct me if I'm wrong, I'm not super informed about this stuff.

[–]Hellestal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is the bit I don't get. Are you saying the essay says this or is that your view?

This is my view.

I don't believe this is the essay's view.

I would not, however, bet a large amount of money on my interpretation of the essay being correct. It's very easy to mis-read some people. I could have easily done that. And I certainly have not put nearly as much effort into defending my own position.

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 4 points5 points  (1 child)

If we do go your route, might we not also say that apparent widening is also really a change in factual believes? Animal rights activists make a lot of effort arguing about the brain functioning of animals. A lot of past progress is attributed to refuting bigoted beliefs.

[–]Hellestal 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's an excellent argument.

Given changing factual understanding, it's definitely possible that the circle of concern has not actually expanded all that much, just as it has not much narrowed. I think it would take a long essay (that I'm not in the position to write) to try to tease out that difference.

[–]theStork 11 points12 points  (13 children)

This entire article seems to be an exercise in metacontrarianism to me. Gwern is attacking a strawman version of Singer's expanding circle hypothesis. Singer's expanding circle is explicitly limited to conscious beings that are capable of having concerns about their own welfare. Gwerns sections in religion, ancestors, and estates completely miss the mark for me. If you are a materialist atheist (as I am), then God's and ghosts don't exist and deserve no recognition. As Gwern admits, this is a question of belief not morality, so I don't at all understand why he tries to make this a moral claim. To the extent that modern believers may have less reverence for God, it's entirely possible this derives from increased reverence for other humans. Is someone who switches from tithing 10% to the church and instead gives to secular charities somehow less moral?

This same argument applies to infanticide; modern support for abortion is usually upheld as a matter of increasing respect for the bodily autonomy of women. It's not a matter of removing a being from the circle; rather its just a shifting of priorities on how we should weight different moral concerns.

Gwern tries to bring up the positive impacts of religion on animal welfare, but conveniently ignores how Christianity, Judaism and Islam all explicitly places animals outside of moral consideration.

On the subject of punishment, my response to Gwern is simple; would you rather be arrested for violent crime in the modern day US or in medieval Europe? Greece or Rome? How about biblical times? The reason our ancestors had no Supermax prisons is because criminals were just summarily executed. Of course things aren't perfect, but I'd still prefer being charged in our current judicial system to anything existing 200 years ago.

[–]guzeysci acc[S] 5 points6 points  (2 children)

The reason our ancestors had no Supermax prisons is because criminals were just summarily executed

https://www.britannica.com/topic/exile-law

[–]theStork 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Exile began as a humane alternative to capital punishment in Britain for felony crimes, but you may recall that a huge number of offenses were considered to be felonies worthy of capital punishment. For your benefit, here is a list of crimes considered potentially worthy of capital punishment, including stealing over $50 worth of goods or forgery.

https://www.mylearning.org/stories/prison-and-penal-reform-in-the-1800s/380

For the most part, murderers still were still sentenced to death; exile was for the lesser felonies.

[–]MaxChaplin 5 points6 points  (0 children)

"Conscious beings that are capable of having concerns about their own welfare" is just the latest commonly accepted group of morally significant individuals (among philosophers and such). The fact that many of its members weren't attributed with morally significance in the past and gradually received it as history went on is almost tautologically true. All it says is that the circle didn't strictly shrink.

[–]j9461701Birb woman of Alcatraz 12 points13 points  (8 children)

This entire article seemsime an exercise in metacontrarianism to me. Gwern is attacking a strawman version of Singer's expanding circle hypothesis.

This was my reaction as well. I'd add:

The burning of witches I think actually illustrates the opposite of his point. Medieval Europe burned witches alive, and his arguement is if we believed in witchcraft and these witches really did what they were accused of doing we'd "howl for their blood". Except we wouldn't, no more than we set Jeffery Dahmer on fire for the horrific things he did. Even executing him as painlessly and humanly as possible is considered a grave moral sin by most of the civilized world, and America stands somewhat alone in that practice.

Or consider treason: In 1998 the UK passed the Crime and Disorder Act that changed the penalty for treason to life imprisonment. France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, basically most of the civilized world has moved to similar punishment as part of a general move away from capital punishment. Meanwhile a century ago we'd have young men lined up and shot if they refused to march headlong into a machine gun.

Turning to animals: The medievals might protect rats, sometimes, but they'd also sometimes tear off their legs and watch them twitch and bleed to death for a laugh. They'd make an entire evening out of torturing bears to death. As far as we can tell, chickens were originally bred because we enjoyed watching them fight each other - only millenia after we'd started doing that did we realize they were pretty tasty.

Meanwhile, factory farms are held to strict standards about minimizing suffering and 'clean kills'. We don't want animals to suffer, even if we're not yet morally developed enough to go all the way and stop farming them entirely. This is a huge leap forward from how things used to be, when animal suffering was not only not considered bad but used as a form of wholesome family entertainment.

[–]Oecolamp7 3 points4 points  (7 children)

Medieval torturous executions were often considered good for the victim, since the finite torments on earth would save them from the infinite torment of hell.

[–]SlightlyLessHairyApe 2 points3 points  (6 children)

Medieval torturous executions were often considered good for the victim

That's a heck of a passive voice. They were considered good for the victim by some, but I imagine not by the victims . . .

[–]Oecolamp7 2 points3 points  (5 children)

If you're interested in this kind of thing, Dan Carlin has a good podcast on this subject. He talks about how, in fact, there definitely were medieval torture victims who believed their torture would save them from hell. They, too, were Christian after all.

You're right that medievals definitely tortured people who didn't think it was for their own good, but that's what Gwern's whole essay is about: medievals' behavior was influenced by the kinds of things they included in their moral universe, of which they included immortal souls, but which we generally do not.

[–]SlightlyLessHairyApe 1 point2 points  (4 children)

medievals' behavior was influenced by the kinds of things they included in their moral universe, of which they included immortal souls, but which we generally do not.

I mean, in the sense that I include my bank account in my assessment of my total assets but not my super-yacht or personal jet.

[–]Oecolamp7 1 point2 points  (3 children)

Are you saying that we're right to not include immortal souls in our moral universe because immortal souls do not exist? I don't disagree with you there, but the whole point is that the difference between moderns and medievals is a difference in beliefs about facts, e.g. the literal existence of immortal souls. Not, as is popular to suggest, the moral superiority of moderns over medievals.

[–]SlightlyLessHairyApe 3 points4 points  (2 children)

Thanks, actually, that line of questioning helped me crystalize my thoughts :-)

IMO, casting it as a mere factual difference understates the moral importance of epistemic humility and the burden of proof required for different types of action. The shocking thing isn't so much that a medieval person could believe in the immortal soul or other things, they believed all kinds of unfounded things. Rather it's that they could be so confident in that belief as to justify torturing another unwilling human being.

An individual who believes so strongly in animal rights that they forego meat or fur can be morally confident that they are entitled to this action since they are the author of their own diet/wardrobe. One that bombs a factory farm, on the other hand, must be pretty damned sure about it.

[–]Oecolamp7 1 point2 points  (1 child)

Super agree with everything you said, and it's a big reason I don't support a lot of harm-based arguments for radical changes/revolutionary action. You need to not only be confident in the factual beliefs that led you to condemning the current system, but also the prediction that your system would be better.

Of course, this argument can be extended to the principle: "don't do things that might harm people on the belief that you're saving more harm in the long run," which, I'm not sure is a bad thing.

[–]SlightlyLessHairyApe 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Up to some limit right? I'm fine doing harm to the Confederacy to save more harm from slavery in the long run, but that largely rests (as you suggests) on the dual conclusions that slavery is a moral harm and that the war will result in less of it.

So the principle is perhaps not as you stated, but more like "radical action requires confidence both in the moral and practical dimensions in proportion to its radicalness". It's a bit of the "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" mantra as applied to moral justifications -- extraordinary action requires extraordinary confidence.

[–]tailcalled 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Excellent essay.

With regards to the Fukuyama thesis, I'm not sure I agree about China inevitably becoming more western, though. Between Chinese technology like Sesame Credit, greater worries in the west about free speech ("fake news", etc.) that seem to be turning into demand for institutional solutions for information control, new copyright regulations, the likelihood of seeing tech further regulated, and the likelihood of non-democracies growing more, I think long-term the strongest case is for the world to end up more China-like.

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 4 points5 points  (17 children)

I worry a bit, I wrote this a month ago, and now I see a far more detailed version in the rational sphere. I dont remember having read it before. Just one of those slightly schizophrenic experiences.

More substantively, I think the part about factual beliefes changing is overplayed. I doubt that belief in religion was ever non-Hansonian for significant numbers. More to the point, I dont think "fetii arent human" is a change in factual beliefes. People disagreeing whether they are dont seem to make any different predictions, and "human" in this sense really just means "being in the moral circle".

[–]wnoise 7 points8 points  (0 children)

fetii

The standard English plural of "fetus" is "fetuses". If it were a second-declension Latin noun, the Latin plural would then be "feti", with one "i", and no duplication -- the base term wasn't "fetius".

I believe it is actually fourth declension, however. While e.g. "wiktionary" (and the source it cites) has listings for both second and fourth declension, the second declension is actually an adjectival form, not a noun. In the fourth declension the plural retains the same spelling, but the pronunciation of the "u" shifts to a long "u" sound, similar to "moose".

[–]seventythree 4 points5 points  (1 child)

He probably didn't crib it from me

And then travel back in time to 2012? Probably not ;)

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Huh, it has two dates, I read the „last modified“.

[–]AblshVwls 1 point2 points  (10 children)

I doubt that belief in religion was ever non-Hansonian for significant numbers

What does "Hansonian" mean?

NB. parents and churches tell children religious doctrines as literal truths.

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 1 point2 points  (8 children)

This is a good introduction to Hansonian belief. Its consistent with teaching the beliefs as literal truths.

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (7 children)

Its consistent with teaching the beliefs as literal truths

Consistent with teaching them as literal truths, sure.

But is it consistent with learning them as literal truths as 4-year-olds?

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 0 points1 point  (6 children)

I can certainly feel to the learner just like any other literal truths they learn. You can of course quibble with the definition whether this really counts as belief.

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (5 children)

So you think that 4-year-olds who are being told about how the world works by their parents and are told about the "afterlife" already have a model of the world somewhere that allows them to know it would be socially advantageous to believe this?

How do young children determine which of the things that their parents tell them are in the "socially advantageous" category and therefore must not be subjected to scrutiny?

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 0 points1 point  (4 children)

How do young children determine which of the things that their parents tell them are in the "socially advantageous" category and therefore must not be subjected to scrutiny?

They can differentiate between things they are told, and things they are shown. Initially, they will talk about things only when you told them about it, and do things only when they were shown. This shouldnt be surprising. Talking is a behaviour like all others, and learned like them. For example, they might learn verbally that "electrical sockets are dangerous", and youll still have to pull them away a few times before they learn to avoid them themselves. It is only after exhortations of danger and pulling away have been observed in constant conjunction for some time, that they learn to avoid things upon merely being told. When they are told to [sermon of the mount], and their parents dont observe it, and they arent punished for not observing it, there doesnt need to be a special note saying to ignore this belief. The connection between speech and behaviour just isnt intrinsically there, and for this part of speech never formed.

If you think about it, even many things that arent religious or political at all work like this. Arguably most of what we learn in highschool science, we never really connect to any non-verbal behaviour.

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (3 children)

Initially, they will talk about things only when you told them about it, and do things only when they were shown. This shouldnt be surprising

It's not true.

They begin talk with babbling in random syllables. They begin doing things by randomly grabbing things and putting them in their mouths.

Talking is a behaviour like all others, and learned like them

The generally accepted view is actually that talking is a specially evolved capability and very much distinct from other behaviors.

When they are told to [sermon of the mount], and their parents dont observe it, and they arent punished for not observing it, there doesnt need to be a special note saying to ignore this belief

Parents don't read the sermon on the mount to kids who haven't already been brought into the religion by telling them mundane religious "facts" like the one I mentioned (the afterlife) for years.

I specifically asked you about the afterlife. How do they distinguish the afterlife from what they're told about an uncle who went on vacation for a week and will come back? How do they distinguish stories about creator gods from being told the name of someone who did something, e.g. "your grandfather built this house with his own two hands" or "George Washington was the first president of the USA"?

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 0 points1 point  (2 children)

It's not true.

OK, better wording: They will learn to talk a certain way after hearing it. They will learn to behave a certain way after seeing it.

The generally accepted view is actually that talking is a specially evolved capability and very much distinct from other behaviors.

Its likely that people are unusually well prepared to learn it. What matters to my argument is only that verbal beliefs arent automatically applied im praxis. Do you think my example of danger is realistic?

I specifically asked

I appreciate focusing on concrete examples.

How do they distinguish the afterlife from what they're told about an uncle who went on vacation for a week and will come back?

They actually see the uncle coming back, but have to guess about the afterlife. Their parents are sad when relatives die, but not when they go on vacation. They are still afraid of death.

How do they distinguish stories about creator gods from being told the name of someone who did something, e.g. "your grandfather built this house with his own two hands" or "George Washington was the first president of the USA"?

They dont. Those beliefs have mostly conversational use. See my link in the previous comment.

In fact, there are often cases where small children fail to notice that they should excuse some particular belief, for example this or prayer efficacy or theodicy when theyre a bit older. They usually learn not to do this again from adult reactions. Again, this isnt exclusive to religious belief.

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (1 child)

How do they distinguish the afterlife from what they're told about an uncle who went on vacation for a week and will come back?

They actually see the uncle coming back

I'm asking about the belief as it occurs during the week of absence.

Do you think my example of danger is realistic?

No, I don't think the way you talk about these things is realistic. What is its factual source?

A lot of safety behavior (and behavior generally) is not about belief at all but about habit. This applies even to adults. A kid can know it's dangerous to run in the street but forget to check for cars. Even an adult can do so, and will occasionally, sometimes even fatally. It is a matter of being distracted by some other focus so that you don't act on what you know. It doesn't demonstrate anything about knowledge or belief.

It takes a while to develop the safety habits into a form that overrides immediate focus. That's the source of the difficulty with outlets. Generally kids don't get electrical shocks, but sometimes they get burned, cut, scraped, or fall. These happenings (and their aftermaths) demonstrate that kids don't necessarily automatically stop doing the thing that hurt them, even though they definitely know that it can hurt them. Having the knowledge isn't the same thing as having the aversion needed to cause an emotional response that interrupts an intense focus. If you ask a kid whether some behavior is safe, in the calmness of their sitting at the dinner table bored, they will tell you an answer that is not (generally) some kind of linguistic performance but a reflection of their model of safety in the physical world. Their failure to actually behave that way when in a different mental state isn't what you make of it.

Their parents are sad when relatives die, but not when they go on vacation

Some facts:

  • people are sad when their close relations are going to be absent, in proportion to the length of absence, whether or not they are dead

  • children don't necessarily experience a death of a relation close to their family (at any specific age), in fact it's somewhat rare to happen

Can we just talk about the case where nobody died? Then what's your answer?

The way I think of it is that children literally and earnestly hold beliefs that adults, as they grow older and start to see through more, transmute into less earnest forms of belief -- often as a step on the path toward not believing them at all anymore.

So yeah, observing how people act like death is final sometimes hints at some kind of conflict in them. This is what all the talk about "cognitive dissonance" is getting on about. (There are two dissonances here: you observe the dissonance of the other, which creates your own dissonance.) It doesn't inherently require a special kind of initial belief to explain.

We can say that at a certain point of cognitive dissonance, there is something like an intermediate state, a partial belief. Certainly. But that applies to a particular believer at a particular time, not a category of belief. And I don't think it applies to 4 year olds, in general. I think that religion relies on being able to get kids at a stage when they can really believe this stuff, and doesn't even propagate if it can't get the kind of belief that isn't partial.

A religion does rely on the older skeptics keeping their mouths shut and going along with things and maybe half-believing sometimes to help out with that. I think it's a mistake to claim that that is all that there is to the whole religion. The whole foundation is the simple earnest believers of less than average IQ who don't ask questions about anything (so there's no need to carve out exceptions). It's the existence of these that creates the social advantage for the rest in the first place.

How do they distinguish stories about creator gods from being told the name of someone who did something, e.g. "your grandfather built this house with his own two hands" or "George Washington was the first president of the USA"?

They dont. Those beliefs have mostly conversational use. See my link in the previous comment.

OK, you're expanding your claim, and this aspect of it is somewhere I consider it facially absurd. (Hence the use I made of it as a kind of counter-example.)

(In a sense, if you say there is no distinction between a young child's belief in religious creation stories and belief in simple historical facts, then we are agreeing. But I guess not really...)

I skimmed the "guessing the password" link just now and I don't see that as applying here at all. I'm talking about simple historical facts here. Kids know what the claims mean. Well, maybe not understand what the presidency is, but that's why I also gave the example of building a house.

I guess I could construct better examples, like, Mom fed the cat. Tell the kid that Mom fed the cat and they'll believe it in the same way as if they saw it happen. Yes, no?

[–]IIbc 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think it's referring to Robin Hanson, who would probably characterize religion in terms of its practical effects for adherents rather than theology or object level claims that the religion makes.

Searching "Robin Hanson" and "religion" will give you a better description than I can

[–]AblshVwls -3 points-2 points  (2 children)

The question is at which point does God inject the soul. So it's a factual one.

disagreeing whether they are dont seem to make any different predictions

Oh yeah? The immortal soul lives eternally in Heaven.

[–]Lykurg480The error that can be bounded is not the true error 1 point2 points  (1 child)

So christians expect to see fetus souls in heaven? Ive never heard of that before, including in my catholic-church-sponsored religious education, but ok.

[–]AblshVwls 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I meant "Heaven" as synecdoche. Official Catholic doctrine does not specify Heaven, Hell, or limbo. But the concept of Limbo historically was created as the place for innocent[*] children.

Here is an article on the matter which quotes Pope John Paul II telling women who have aborted, "You will also be able to ask forgiveness from your [aborted] child, who is now living in the Lord":

https://www.catholicherald.com/faith/your_faith/straight_answers/straight_answers__do_aborted_children_go_to_heaven_/

[*] Except of Original Sin.

[–]lunaranusmade a meme pyramid and climbed to the top -1 points0 points  (2 children)

People responding with "but they do not exist": neither do utils.

[–]theStork 6 points7 points  (1 child)

Do happiness and suffering not exist? Utils are just an abstraction to quantify these very real things. Unless we want to make the new agey claim that God is really the embodiment of goodness or something, I don't really buy the comparison.

[–]lunaranusmade a meme pyramid and climbed to the top 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Utils are just an abstraction to quantify these very real things.

There's a suspicious amount of argument about how many utils various things have, for the story to be so simple...why don't people just measure the utils, or the very real things that the utils are abstracting?