

# **Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983**

Bonnie Cordes, Bruce Hoffman,  
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**Rand**

The research described in this report was sponsored by Sandia National Laboratories under Contract No. 96-0228.

**Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data**

Main entry under title:

Trends in international terrorism, 1982 and 1983.

"R-3183-SL."

1. Terrorism. 2. Terrorism—Prevention.

3. Terrorism—United States. 4. Terrorism—Europe.

I. Cordes, Bonnie, 1951- II. Sandia Laboratories.

III. Rand Corporation.

HV6431.T725 1984

303.6'25'09048

84-17705

ISBN 0-8330-0594-4

The Rand Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation

R-3183-SL

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August 1984

Prepared for  
Sandia National Laboratories





## **PREFACE**

This report was prepared as part of a continuing research effort sponsored by Sandia National Laboratories to analyze the potential threat to U.S. nuclear and other strategic energy facilities from a variety of adversaries. The report analyzes incidents recorded in The Rand Corporation's chronology of international terrorism for 1982 and 1983. This chronology contains data on international terrorist incidents since 1968, derived from the open literature—newspapers, journals, and the foreign press. It provides a comprehensive database with which trends in various aspects of terrorism can be analyzed.

A selected bibliography of Rand publications on terrorism is included as an appendix to this report.



## SUMMARY

In 1982 and 1983, government authorities in several countries scored impressive successes against international terrorist groups. Governments have become more proficient at combatting terrorism, and physical security around likely terrorist targets also has increased greatly. It is harder now, but nonetheless possible, to smuggle weapons aboard airliners. Embassies have become like fortresses. Diplomats and top executives often travel in armored limousines with armed bodyguards. Specialized tactics and skills have been developed for use in hostage situations and for combatting terrorism in general. Italy has been particularly successful in exploiting "repentants"—apprehended terrorists, primarily members of the Red Brigades—who have taken advantage of a new law providing reduced sentences in exchange for information. German police captured the operational heads of the most notorious and dangerous group in West Germany, the Red Army Faction, in December 1983. Eleven members of the FALN, a Puerto Rican separatist group, were apprehended in Illinois three years ago, and one of the most wanted Puerto Rican separatist bombers was recently captured in Mexico.

Yet, despite the continuing government successes, the total volume of terrorist activity worldwide has increased during the last ten years.<sup>1</sup> The bloodiest year yet for terrorist activity was 1983, when the human cost of terrorist actions was 720 fatalities and 963 injuries. Even though one-third of the 1983 fatalities occurred in a single attack, the October 1983 truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, the year's figures are substantially higher than those of the previous year, when 221 fatalities and 840 injuries were recorded. Although fewer incidents were recorded for 1983, the number of incidents with fatalities was more than three times the number in 1982. Large-scale, indiscriminate attacks have become more common. In 1982, six terrorist bombings alone killed over 80 persons and injured more than 400. It could be said that 1983 was the year of the car bomb: Car bombs killed over 500 and injured more than 600 persons. The devastation caused by such large-scale bombings has focused attention on the threat from suicidal terrorists.

This trend of increasing lethality in international terrorist activity is confirmed by another statistic: The number of terrorist attacks

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<sup>1</sup>For the first time since 1977, there was a slight decline in 1983 compared to the year before, but this is not regarded as significant. (Data used throughout this report are from The Rand Corporation's chronology of international terrorism.)

directed against ordinary citizens—bystanders who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time—has increased by 68 percent. As terrorism becomes more lethal, it also becomes less discriminate.

Although there has been little terrorist activity within the United States, American diplomats, businesses, and facilities remain the most frequent targets abroad. Indeed, the massive terrorist bombings in Beirut created unprecedented fear in the United States and led to the construction of antiterrorist defenses around several government buildings.

The greater part of the international terrorist activity continues to occur in Europe, particularly in France. Although activities have declined in some countries, they have increased in others. Terrorism declined sharply in Italy in 1982 and 1983 but escalated in France. Indigenous terrorist organizations in Italy and West Germany have not yet recovered from the blows inflicted on them by authorities during 1982, although the Revolutionary Cells in Germany remain active, and the remnants of the Red Brigades in Italy have carried out a few operations. The number of terrorist incidents in Israel dropped sharply after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but the number of attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad increased. Only Latin America, continually taxed by internal struggles, experienced reduced attacks on foreign targets during the period under review.

Notably, a number of events during 1982 and 1983 had a significant impact on the organization and planning of international terrorist activity. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon disrupted a crucial part of the infrastructures of several terrorist groups. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has not recovered from the effects of the invasion and has been largely exiled from Lebanon. Moreover, internal disputes have absorbed the group's energies for several months, while radical and moderate elements vie for power. The Armenian terrorist group ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), previously based in Beirut, was also presumably disrupted by the Israeli invasion. The need of these groups to relocate and, in some instances, to replace leaders and sources of funds has resulted in a temporary lull in worldwide terrorist activity. It appears that this disruption has spawned internal tensions for some groups, however, leading on occasion to escalation in terrorist activity as factions vie for leadership, and hardliners and moderates clash.

Modern-day terrorists have not succeeded in attaining their stated long-term goals. Yet they continue their clandestine struggle, persisting in their attempts to achieve maximum publicity. Undoubtedly, some terrorists engage in violent activity for its own sake, with little commitment to an unattainable goal. But those who have gone

underground have distorted perceptions as a result of the conditions in which they live, and dissension inevitably develops within the groups. The result is often an escalation in violent activity: A bloodier, more sensational attack reaffirms the group's purpose and existence. It is difficult to argue for restraint in an organization composed of extremists who have already taken up arms, especially if things are not going well. Terrorists are by nature not easily disciplined. Those with too many scruples drop out, are removed, or go along with hardliners to maintain their positions of leadership.

Thus, despite enormous progress made by authorities in various countries toward combatting terrorism, it remains a worldwide problem which continues to show no sign of abating and every sign of becoming less discriminate and more bloody.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to express their appreciation to Karen Gardela and Geraldine Petty, whose research assistance is reflected in each of the report's chapters. Christopher Bowie and John Winkler served as technical reviewers and provided the authors with detailed comments and suggestions which greatly improved the final product. Janet DeLand skillfully reconciled the individual writing styles of six authors to create a single, cohesive entity. Bernadine Siuda deserves special thanks for tirelessly typing and retyping successive drafts of the various chapters in the report.



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## I. TRENDS IN TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW

Worldwide, terrorism has increased and has become increasingly bloody. What do we mean by terrorism? The term, unfortunately, has no precise or widely accepted definition. The problem of definition is compounded by the fact that *terrorism* has become a fad word that is applied to all sorts of acts of violence. Some governments label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while antigovernment extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one's point of view.

In Rand's continuing research on this subject, *terrorism* is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violations of the rules of war, if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is often directed against civilian targets. The motives of most terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group, and unlike other criminals, they often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage they cause.

The present study of trends in terrorism is concerned with *international terrorism*, defined here as incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g., diplomats, foreign businessmen, offices of foreign corporations), or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel, and equipment. It excludes violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own citizens. For example, Irish terrorists blowing up other Irishmen in Belfast would not be counted, nor would Italian terrorists kidnapping Italian officials in Italy. Of course, such attacks may lead to actions that could imperil foreign nationals, be carried abroad to other countries, be imitated by other groups, affect the stability of nations individually and collectively, or strain relations between nations. Thus, while our study focuses on international terrorism, we inevitably cross over into areas of domestic political violence. The study distinguishes between international and domestic terrorism but recognizes that the two are often related and at times may overlap.

In the past three years, the total volume of international terrorist activity has grown by more than 50 percent, and the total number of fatalities has risen steadily. Indeed, 1983 was the deadliest year in the annals of terrorism. Especially alarming is the growing number of large-scale terrorist bombings; car bombs and truck bombs destroyed the Iraqi, French, and American embassies in Beirut, the American embassy in Kuwait, and the headquarters of the French paratroopers and the U.S. Marines in Beirut. This is not merely a trend in the Middle East, where state sponsorship of terrorism and religious sanction have permitted terrorism on a grand scale. During the same period, large-scale terrorist bombings also took a heavy toll in Paris, London, Pretoria, Port-au-Prince, and Rangoon.

These large-scale bombings have focused attention on the threat posed by suicidal terrorists. The possibility of renewed assaults is still very much in the minds of U.S. military planners and government officials. American naval vessels of the Sixth Fleet stationed off the coast of Lebanon were placed on alert in 1983 because of reports that Islamic terrorists were planning to make "kamikaze"-type attacks in planes loaded with explosives. Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz and to attack the vessels of any country attempting to thwart the blockade or reopen the waterway caused similar fears. Moreover, concern over suicidal attacks by Islamic fanatics has not been confined to the Middle East, as evidenced by the concrete barriers that were erected outside the White House, the Department of State, the Pentagon, and other government and military facilities in the United States.

### **TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES**

One pattern of international terrorism established in the 1970s continued in the 1980s: The United States remains the number one target. However, the growing volume of international terrorism was not matched by any increase in terrorist activity *inside* the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation recorded 29 incidents of terrorism in 1980, 42 in 1981, 51 in 1982, and 31 in 1983. Depending on their perspective, observers saw this as either an alarming gain or a positive decline; in fact, the numbers are too small to permit any sort of statistical inference, particularly when one considers that this is a country with a population of 234 million. Terrorism continues to make only a miniscule contribution to the total volume of violent crime in this country, and the level of politically motivated violence remains well below that of the industrialized nations of Western Europe. The United Kingdom, with its continuing conflict in Northern Ireland,

Spain, with its continuing struggle by Basque separatists, and France, which faces a deadly combination of indigenous and international terrorism, remain far ahead of the United States.

The reasons for the comparative lack of terrorist activity in a country so heavily armed and, judging by our homicide rate, so prone to violence are not difficult to discern. The United States lacks the two major engines that drive terrorism elsewhere: This is not an ideologically oriented society (although specific contentious issues may occasionally motivate ideological violence), and it does not have geographically discrete, ethnic minorities with separatist tendencies (with the exception of the Puerto Rican separatist movement, which indeed has been a continuing source of terrorist violence for more than 30 years).

There are essentially two types of terrorist activity in the United States. One is the issue-oriented violence carried out by indigenous groups. Although some of these groups, particularly those on the left end of the political spectrum, communicate in a language pervaded with Marxist rhetoric, they could be called ideological only in the broadest sense of the term. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they were motivated by opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, violence associated with antiwar protest declined. Antiwar violence has recently revived, however, as a result of opposition to growing U.S. involvement in Central America and the Middle East.

The second, and far more extensive, type of terrorist violence in the United States is carried out by extremist elements within ethnic or émigré communities on behalf of foreign quarrels. Two-thirds of the terrorist activity in the United States is carried out by Puerto Rican, Jewish, Cuban, Armenian, and Islamic extremists. Even excluding attacks that have occurred on the island of Puerto Rico, violence on behalf of Puerto Rican independence continues to be the most serious problem, in terms of the number of terrorist incidents claimed by various separatist groups. Their targets include U.S. government buildings and corporate offices.

The Jewish Defense League (JDL) and associated or similar groups (e.g., Thunder of Zion and *Hatikva Leumi*) rank second, although several incidents for which persons have claimed credit on behalf of the JDL have been denied by JDL spokesmen. This suggests that the JDL may have some difficulty controlling the violence-prone extremists within its ranks. In recent years, attacks by Jewish extremists have been directed primarily against Soviet targets to protest the Soviet Union's treatment of Soviet Jews.

Anti-Castro Cuban extremists, primarily Omega-7, are the third most active terrorist groups in the United States. They operate in

both the Miami and New York areas and direct their actions against Cuban representatives at the United Nations, corporations that do business with Castro's Cuba, and members of the Cuban émigré community who disagree with their views.

Terrorist violence by Armenian extremists, the fourth major terrorist element in this country, is a more recent phenomenon. It reflects the new wave of Armenian emigration from the Middle East during and after the civil war in Lebanon, as well as the developing national consciousness of younger Armenians. The extremist attacks are concentrated almost exclusively on Turkish targets. Most of the Armenian extremist violence has taken place in Southern California, although some incidents have also occurred in New York and Massachusetts.

Islamic extremists of various types comprise the fifth major terrorist element in the United States. This is an eclectic collection of pro-Khomeini and anti-Khomeini Iranians, "hit men," assassination teams (allegedly in the employ of the Libyan government), and warring American Moslem factions.

These five are the leading, but certainly not the only, sources of terrorism in the United States. Terrorist activity has also been carried out by Croatian separatists, Taiwanese separatists, persons opposed to President Marcos in the Philippines, and others. Ethnics, expatriates, and émigrés accounted for approximately three-quarters of all U.S. terrorist activity in the 1980s. These extremists are extremely persistent, and they appear to create new generations of entrants more easily than do the issue-oriented groups, which seem unable to go beyond a single generation. The ethnic and émigré groups, however, have somewhat limited potential growth, because of their narrow popular base.

Bombings remain the primary mode of expression for political extremists in the United States. Most of the bombs have been small devices, detonated at places or times that would not result in casualties. The preponderance of bombings reflects both a worldwide pattern and the low level of terrorist organization in the United States. Little skill is needed to assemble an explosive device, and there is little risk attached to planting one—it can be, and frequently is, a one-man job.

Hijackings have been a frequent terrorist activity, primarily involving flights from Florida which are diverted to Cuba. Security precautions that make it difficult to smuggle guns aboard airliners have decreased the frequency of hijackings, but hijackers have turned to bluff, claiming to have bombs, or have smuggled aboard jars of gasoline which they threatened to light. This latter technique, used several times in the early 1980s, illustrates how a simple innovation can overcome elaborate and expensive security precautions.

Terrorism has been less lethal in the United States than in other parts of the world. For the most part, it is symbolic violence. What, then, explains the current administration's emphasis on the threat of terrorism, its deployment of countermeasures, and its consideration of preemptive actions? Part of the answer lies in the dramatic overall increase in international terrorist activity, and its concomitant impact on governments and public sentiment. The Beirut bombing of the American peacekeeping force showed the suddenness and brutality of terrorist warfare; it also demonstrated that such "anonymous" activity could have an impact on American foreign policy. As long as Americans and their interests continue to figure prominently as targets of terrorism abroad, U.S. officials must take measures to anticipate and defend against terrorism.

### WORLDWIDE TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Between 1980 and 1983, there was unprecedented growth in the total volume of international terrorist activity (see Fig. 1). The increase in the number of incidents recorded was approximately 30 percent per year. In 1983, the upward trajectory tapered off for the first time since




Fig. 1—International terrorist incidents, 1968–83

1977; the 400 incidents recorded in 1983 represented a slight decrease from the 1982 peak of 440 incidents.

This decrease reflected the increasing effectiveness of governments in combatting terrorist activity on their own soil, as well as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its subsequent disruption of key terrorist organizations. However, there is no reason to believe that this is the beginning of an overall decline in such activity. Examples of the adaptability of groups to changes in the environment abound. Momentary defeat at the hands of authorities has not prevented the remnants of groups from renewing themselves and carrying on the struggle. Most terrorist groups felt the impact of certain events in 1982 and 1983, but most of them have been only temporarily diverted from their activity and show every sign of rebuilding their organizations.

### The Increasing Lethality of International Terrorism

There is no question that terrorism has become increasingly lethal; 1983 was the bloodiest year yet for terrorist activity, with 720 fatalities and 963 injuries (see Fig. 2). Even though one-third of the 1983 fatalities resulted from the October 1983 truck bombing of the U.S. Marine




Fig. 2—Fatalities in international terrorist incidents

headquarters Beirut, the year's figures are still substantially higher than those of 1982. In that year, terrorist incidents produced 221 fatalities and 840 injuries. Despite the smaller number of incidents recorded for 1983, the number of fatalities more than tripled.

Since 1977, the number of international terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has increased each year (see Fig. 3). Terrorists seem to be less and less reluctant to inflict casualties, demonstrating an increasing willingness to kill; they also have the realistic perception that bloodier attacks usually purchase more media exposure. As the public becomes inured to certain types of violence, the terrorist must escalate the intensity of his activities or become more innovative in his tactics.

Although the percentage of terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has varied only slightly from year to year since 1980 (18 percent of the incidents in 1983 produced fatalities, compared with 16 percent in 1982, and 19 percent in 1981), the proportion of incidents with *multiple* fatalities has risen dramatically (see Fig. 4), from 33 percent in 1982 to 59 percent in 1983.




Fig. 3—International terrorist incidents with fatalities




Fig. 4—International terrorist incidents with multiple fatalities

This trend is even more alarming when we look at the growing number of terrorist incidents involving 10 or more fatalities (see Fig. 5). In 1982, there were 4 such incidents, making a total of 11 since 1980. There were 14 such incidents in 1983 alone, including the October suicide bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, which resulted in 241 fatalities, and the May attack against the American embassy in the same city, with 57 fatalities. The number of terrorist attacks directed against ordinary citizens, bystanders who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, has also increased, by 68 percent. If acts of terrorism grow in scale, this figure will continue to grow, for as terrorism has become more lethal, it has also become less discriminate. Victims are an important ingredient of a successful terrorist attack. Diplomats and businessmen still rank high among the terrorists' preferred targets, but as facilities and important people are increasingly protected, ordinary citizens and bystanders become attractive as "soft" targets.




Fig. 5—International terrorist incidents resulting in 10 or more fatalities

There are few changes in the tactics of terrorists: Bombings continue to account for more than half of all terrorist attacks, in other countries as well as in the United States, and continue to produce most of the fatalities. Airline hijackings and kidnappings have increased. Barricade-and-hostage situations have declined as the physical security of potential targets has improved. A greater inclination on the part of governments to use force in response to hostage situations reflects a growing confidence in special antiterrorist units and a perception that the public is more willing to accept the possibility of fatalities in such a struggle.

### Regional Trends in International Terrorism

The greater part of international terrorist activity continues to take place in Europe, particularly in France, where more incidents have occurred than in any other European country every year since 1980. In 1982, nearly half of the recorded incidents of international terrorism occurred in the Western European countries, and the area accounted for about one-third of this activity in 1983. International terrorism declined sharply in Italy in the first eight months of 1983, but the activity in France increased. In spite of great gains against domestic terrorism, European officials have found themselves confronted with imported activity, much of it spilling over from conflicts in the Middle East. This peculiar blend of declining indigenous terrorist activity and increased international activity in response to external events is examined in detail in subsequent sections.

In some respects, the terrorist situation in Latin America seems to be the inverse of that in Europe. Continuing internal upheavals give the region an air of turmoil and instability, in spite of a slight reduction in the proportion of international terrorist activity.<sup>1</sup> The number of international terrorist events recorded in Latin America increased somewhat in 1983, yet was only slightly above the average for the area since 1980, and there is continued heavy emphasis on the targeting of American businesses and diplomats. Another significant factor is the amnesty package for terrorists that has been introduced in Colombia.

International terrorist activity in the Middle East more than doubled in the past year, from 43 incidents in 1982 to 92 incidents in 1983. (Presumably because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1982 figure was lower than the 1981 figure of 56.) Terrorism has long been a means of political expression in the Middle East. Moreover, it has often been carried out by suicidal zealots, following a tradition of self-punishment and personal sacrifice evident in the Shi'a culture. The willingness to surrender one's life in the name of religion has been demonstrated repeatedly on the battlefields of the Iraq-Iran War.

The suicide attacks in Lebanon are not isolated incidents but appear to be a part of a broader phenomenon of anti-Western, Islamic fundamentalist violence. Following a conference held in Tehran in March 1982 by Iranian clergymen on "The Ideal Islamic Government," the Khomeini regime decided to establish a special program to train Muslims from throughout the world as "messengers of true Islam." After receiving instruction in Iran, these militants were to return to their home countries to foment unrest and create a climate amenable to the adoption of fundamentalist Islamic precepts. Whether these

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<sup>1</sup>Guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua and El Salvador is not considered here.

same persons are presently active in Lebanon is unclear. However, Lebanese intelligence sources estimate that there are as many as 3,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards stationed right over the border in Syria, who regularly shuttle back and forth between their forward headquarters in Baalbek, in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, and their general headquarters in the Syrian village of Zebdani.

These area analyses do not indicate any decline in international terrorism. The slight drop in the number of recorded incidents in 1983 compared with that in 1982 suggests only a temporary lull.

### SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Nonetheless, there were a number of events in 1982 and 1983 that had a significant impact on the organization and planning of some international terrorist activity. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon disrupted the infrastructures of several terrorist groups. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has not recovered from the effects of the invasion and has been largely exiled from Lebanon. Moreover, internal disputes have absorbed its members' energies for several months, as radical and moderate elements vie for power. The Armenian terrorist group ASALA, which had also been based in Lebanon, was likewise disrupted. The need to relocate and, in some instances, replace leaders and sources of funds led to internal tensions for this group as well. In July 1983, in a demonstration of power and determination, the radical wing of the group escalated their activity to the realm of indiscriminate violence with the bombing of the Turkish Airlines counter at Orly Airport in Paris, in which eight people were killed. Armenian extremists are currently the most active terrorists on the international scene. In 1983 alone, they carried out attacks in Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Berlin, Istanbul, Tehran, Lisbon, Marseille, and Beirut; additional Armenian terrorist attacks in London, Lyon, and Stockholm were aborted.

Indigenous terrorist organizations in Italy and West Germany have not yet recovered from the blows inflicted on them by authorities in 1982, although the Revolutionary Cells in Germany remain active, and remnants of the Red Brigades have carried out a few operations. The deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles late in 1983 offered opportunities for spectacular attacks by terrorists seeking constituents among the widespread antinuclear groups, but these opportunities were not taken. Whether this was due to a lack of desire or to a shortage of capabilities is open to question.

The remaining sections of this report examine the activities of the major international terrorist groups and analyze several geographical areas that have experienced particularly heavy activity in 1982 and 1983. Finally, the report concludes with some reflections on the characteristics of terrorists and terrorist activity revealed in earlier research and outlines some of the implications of the trends that have been identified in the present study.

## II. PALESTINIAN TERRORISM

The period from June 1982 to December 1983 was an especially traumatic time for the PLO. Events during these 18 months left the organization battered, if not enfeebled, its operational capacity further undermined by internal strife and reduced funding. The PLO has stagnated since then, for several reasons: the loss of Lebanon as a central operations and political base; the demise of the PLO's hopes of becoming a conventional as well as a nonconventional military power; renewed and intensified policy disputes and attendant internecine power struggles; and new, and unaccustomed, financial difficulties. Thus, it is not surprising that there has been a significant decline of Palestinian terrorist activity.

The PLO's troubles ostensibly began on June 3, 1982, when members of a renegade splinter group known as "Black June"<sup>1</sup> attempted to assassinate Israel's ambassador to Great Britain. The shooting provided the justification for Israel's invasion of Lebanon three days later. The Israeli force overwhelmed PLO strongholds along the coast in Sidon and Tyre in rapid succession, and by June 9, the Israelis had advanced to the outskirts of Beirut. There they waited, preparing for a massive assault against the remaining 2,100 PLO fighters and senior officials trapped in the city. International pressure on Israel, however, delayed the attack, and finally, on August 19, an agreement was reached between the Israelis and the PLO governing the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut. Shortly afterward, the guerrillas began to leave the city, en route to one of the eight Arab countries that had agreed to accept them.

During the months immediately following the evacuation, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat maneuvered to parlay the PLO's military defeat into a political victory. For a time, it appeared that the dispersal of the organization's forces would benefit the "moderate" wing of the PLO, led by Arafat, rather than the more radical, so-called

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<sup>1</sup>"Black June," also known as *Asifa* or the "Fatah Revolutionary Council," was founded in 1976 by Sabri al-Banna, alias Abu Nidal. Nidal joined *Fatah* (the original group founded and led by Yasir Arafat) in 1967 and quickly rose to a senior position within the organization. He remained a leading figure until he became disenchanted with the PLO's moderate policies in general and with Arafat's prohibition of international terrorism in particular. Nidal assailed the PLO for pursuing a "defeatist" strategy and formed his own renegade splinter group, "Black June." The group generally operates outside of the Middle East, primarily in Western Europe. Its targets have included PLO officials, Israeli diplomats, European Jews, and Gentiles sympathetic to Israel, as well as non-Palestinian Arabs.

“rejectionist” factions, associated with George Habash, Nayef Hawatmeh, and Ahmad Jabril. But this proved to be either illusory, ephemeral, or both. In retrospect, Arafat’s diplomatic efforts were doomed to failure. The only accomplishment that he could possibly have attained that would provide a political victory would have been the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But this would have been anathema to the “rejectionists,” who uncompromisingly press for the destruction of Israel as an essential precondition to the reestablishment of the Palestinian homeland.

Accordingly, Arafat attempted to steer a middle course, hinting, on the one hand, of the prospect of the PLO accepting the Reagan peace plan (which had been announced on September 1, 1982, and which called for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip confederated with Jordan, in return for PLO recognition of Israel) while warning, on the other, that should diplomacy prove fruitless, he would “become the biggest terrorist of them all.” But this was a rather treacherous middle course to steer, and ultimately Arafat’s efforts foundered on his own hesitancy and uncertainty alongside the intransigence of the PLO radicals and the insurmountable opposition of Syria. Serious though this setback was, it did not appear to be fatal as far as Arafat and the moderates were concerned. But the weeks of irresolution and doubt had provoked dissident forces not only among the radical elements in the umbrella organization, but within *Fatah* itself. Six months later, these disgruntled factions, with Syria’s approval and encouragement, openly challenged Arafat’s leadership of the PLO.

On May 7, 1983, a *Fatah* detachment stationed in the Bekaa Valley mutinied. Although the insurrection, according to its two leaders Abu Musa and Abu Saleh, was prompted by Arafat’s appointment of two incapable, but loyal, officers to senior command positions, along with the alleged corruption and personal aggrandizement of certain senior *Fatah* officials, the real issue was far less parochial. As Abu Musa explained, “There is a basic issue on which we [Arafat and the mutineers] differ: it is the confederal plan, which means annexing the Palestinian communities in the West Bank and the [Gaza] Strip into the Jordanian regime.” Arafat, he continued, “put aside the military option and chose the political solution,” but it was a solution, Musa pointed out, that would not lead to the sovereign Palestinian state encompassing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as Israel, mandated by the PLO’s 1964 charter. He succinctly defined the dissidents’ position toward Israel as “no reconciliation, no recognition, no negotiation.” The determination of Musa and his followers to press their grievances was manifested on May 28, when they seized four PLO

supply and fuel depots near Damascus. Nine days later, the mutineers clashed with forces loyal to Arafat. Eight men were killed and 17 were wounded; on June 12, two more were killed and 12 others wounded. An assassination attempt was reportedly made by the rebels against two of Arafat's top aides, Salah Khalaf and Khalil al-Wazir. Then, on June 24, after accusing Syria of encouraging and abetting the revolt, Arafat was unceremoniously expelled from Damascus and barred from reentering the country.<sup>2</sup>

Arafat initially discounted the revolt and refused to accede to any of the rebels' demands. On July 6, however, he offered a conciliatory gesture, announcing the reorganization of two key PLO committees into collegially, rather than individually, led entities. But this was as far as Arafat would go. Two days later, he again rejected demands for a 50-50 sharing of power in *Fatah* between himself and the dissidents. Throughout the summer, Arafat stubbornly refused to negotiate with the rebels directly. His confidence was bolstered by the widespread support he continued to receive from the Palestinian community (a *Jerusalem Post* poll reported that 92 percent of the Palestinians on the West Bank still supported Arafat) and by a resounding 81 to 2 vote of endorsement of his leadership and calls for unity from the PLO's Central Committee. In addition, Arafat continued to receive the support of PLO radicals like Habash and Hawatmeh, who, despite their differences with him, nevertheless beseeched the dissidents to end their revolt. These factors convinced Arafat, one observer noted, "that he [could] deal with the rebels and the Syrians from a position of strength since he is clearly in no danger of being repudiated."

This strategy, as events would subsequently prove, was little more than wishful thinking. Although Arafat's position at the head of the PLO may have been politically secure, it was militarily vulnerable. This was demonstrated on September 22, when Syrian units rounded up the 1,000 or so Arafat loyalists still in the Bekaa Valley and forcibly removed them to an isolated corner of northeast Lebanon. They eventually made their way to Arafat's only remaining stronghold in the country, the Baddawi and Nahr al-Bared refugee camps outside Tripoli. For a month, there were no new developments. Then, on November 2, *Fatah* and other PLO dissidents, supported by Syrian artillery, attacked the camps.

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<sup>2</sup>Arafat's accusations were not unfounded. The mutiny had erupted in territory under Syrian control and had in fact been assisted by the Syrian army, which dispatched tanks to seal off the loyalists' supply lines while maintaining those to the dissidents. Syria's motive in supporting the mutiny, the *Economist* observed, was undoubtedly not so much to overthrow Arafat as "to break his resistance to Syria's would-be control over the PLO. This would include forcing him to follow an anti-Jordanian, anti-American policy that would reject all peace moves, above all the Reagan plan."

Both camps were quickly overwhelmed and their defenders routed. Arafat and his men withdrew to Tripoli and, in a scenario reminiscent of the Israeli siege of Beirut 18 months before, were trapped with their backs to the sea. Like the Israelis, the Syrian-backed dissidents did not attempt to storm the city, but instead subjected its inhabitants and refugee *fedayeen* to debilitating artillery and rocket fire. Once again, an ad hoc grouping of Arab and European states attempted to find a way to extricate Arafat and his followers from their predicament. An agreement was reached whereby Syria and the dissidents would allow Arafat and his 4,000 loyalists to leave Tripoli on ships provided by Greece. On December 17, the evacuation began; it was completed three days later. In a stunning development, the evacuation fleet stopped in Egypt, where Arafat was greeted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Not since Anwar Sadat's historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem had Arafat met with an Egyptian head of state. Not surprisingly, the meeting further ruptured what unity remained in the PLO. Arafat was excoriated not only by long-standing radicals like Habash and Hawatmeh, but also by some of his closest associates, including Salah Khalef.

In addition to this internal strife, the PLO's operational capacity was weakened by the organization's financial problems. For years, the PLO had been accustomed to receiving huge sums from oil-rich Arab states. But the general decline of world oil prices led to a commensurate decrease in contributions. In 1982, Saudi Arabia reduced its largesse from \$300 million to \$50 million per year, pointing out that as the PLO no longer had an army to maintain, it no longer required as much money. Libya similarly slashed its contribution, a move that was related as much to the political and personal differences between Qaddafi and Arafat as to the price of oil. This was a particularly heavy blow to the PLO's budget: Qaddafi is reputed to have given so much money to the PLO in the past that nearly half of the weapons it used in Lebanon were purchased with Libyan funds. Qaddafi, however, has not completely shut off Libyan funding; contributions have subsequently been *selectively* parceled out to those member-groups who both reflect Libya's "hardline" policy on Lebanon and were willing to sign a pledge promising to carry on the struggle against Israel. In 1982, the PFLP, DFLP, and PFLP-GC<sup>3</sup> did so and were given a total of \$9.5 million. The Iraq-Iran war has also had an adverse effect on the PLO's finances. It is estimated that Iraq is some \$37 million in arrears in its contribution because of the unresolved war with Iran.

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<sup>3</sup>The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.

As a result of these factors, PLO terrorist activity significantly declined during 1982 and 1983. In 1982, there were nine verified PLO terrorist operations; in 1983, there were only four.<sup>4</sup> These figures do not, however, include attacks perpetrated either by "Black June" or by non-Palestinian terrorist organizations operating at the behest of the PLO. If these attacks are taken into account, there were 14 attacks against Israeli or Jewish targets between January and June 1982, but in the six months following the invasion there were 46 such attacks. In 1983, however, there was indeed a decline in unsanctioned or proxy operations against Israeli or Jewish targets; only 12 attacks of this nature (six of which were directed against Israeli troops in Lebanon) were recorded.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, there was a decline in terrorist activity by "Black June" in 1983. During 1982, the group claimed responsibility for seven assassinations or attempted assassinations. The only operation of this type in 1983 was the assassination of top Arafat advisor Isam as-Sartawi, a well-known PLO "moderate," in Portugal on April 10.<sup>6</sup> In the fall of 1983, however, a number of Jordanian diplomatic, consular, and security officials throughout the world suddenly became the targets of terrorist gunmen. The first attack occurred in India on October 25, when Jordan's ambassador to that country, Mohammad Ali Kourme, was shot seven times by an unknown (Arab) assailant armed with a machine gun. The following day, gunmen in Rome seriously wounded Jordan's ambassador to Italy, Taysir Alaedin Toukan, and his

<sup>4</sup>The PLO claimed responsibility for a grenade attack against a Tel Aviv bus on January 11, 1983, in which 12 persons were injured; for the bombing of a bus in Jerusalem on December 6, in which six persons died and 45 were injured; and for two separate attacks against Israeli forces in Lebanon on April 29 and July 11.

<sup>5</sup>On February 26, 1983, a bomb was defused that had been placed at the site of a Jewish holiday celebration in Marseille. On March 8, two men were killed in Marseille when a car carrying explosives blew up near a synagogue; it appears that the men were preparing to attack the synagogue. On April 4, the Israeli embassy in Quito, Ecuador, was strafed by machine-gun fire. On May 10, an Israeli civilian was shot to death in Gaza by an unknown assailant. On August 31, a bomb damaged an office of Israel's Bank Le'umi in London. And on December 25, an unidentified gunman fired on the Israeli chargé d'affaires in Malta as she sat in her car outside a shop in Valetta (she suffered only minor cuts from flying glass).

<sup>6</sup>On August 20, 1983, however, a senior PLO military official and close confidant of Arafat, Colonel Mamoun Muraish, was assassinated by two unknown assailants. The assassination was claimed by the "Corrective Movement of Fatah" (a previously unheard-of group, probably linked to the *Fatah* mutineers). Other terrorist attacks by Arabs against Arab targets include the bombing of the offices of the Syrian Arab News Agency, *Sana*, in Beirut by the so-called "Martyrs of Saad Sayel" (Sayel was a slain PLO commander, so the group was probably connected with the PLO itself) on February 4, and the May 17 bombing of a car belonging to the Syrian embassy in Athens and a nearby school attended by the children of Lebanese diplomats. These attacks were claimed by both the "Group for Martyred Isam as-Sartawi" and "The Army for Iran's National Liberation." Actual responsibility for the bombings has not been determined.

driver. On November 11, a lone assassin killed an administrative official attached to the Jordanian legation to Greece and wounded another official in Athens. The final attack of the year occurred in Spain on December 23, when an employee of Jordan's embassy there was shot to death on a Madrid street corner. Only one of the attacks was claimed: The Rome shooting was allegedly perpetrated by a hitherto unheard-of group calling itself the "Front for Syrian Struggle," which is believed to be a pseudonym for the Abu Nidal organization.

Because of the PLO's continued internal instability, it is impossible to predict whether current levels of terrorist activity will remain the same, increase, or decrease still further. One disquieting possibility is that without Arafat's moderating influence, the organization may renew international terrorist activity and may even expand its targets to include U.S. citizens or interests abroad or in the United States itself. Unconfirmed Israeli intelligence reports indicate that the idea of mounting operations in the United States was put forth at a PLO Central Committee meeting in late 1982. Although the moderates were able to prevent its implementation, the Israeli analysts noted that the fact that the matter had even been raised, let alone seriously considered, was an ominous development.

### III. ARMENIAN TERRORISM

Armenian terrorists have attacked Turkish targets since 1975, when two previously unheard-of groups, the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), assassinated Turkey's ambassadors to Austria and France. The shootings, in Paris and Vienna, were only two days apart. Turkish authorities at the time suspected Greek or Turkish extremists, but today there is no mistaking the threat from militant Armenians. Since the 1975 attacks, 26 Turkish diplomats or members of their families have been murdered; five of the victims were ambassadors. Armenian extremists have perpetrated over 200 bombings, the takeover of a Turkish consulate, and three extremely violent attacks which were indiscriminate with regard to civilian casualties.

Armenian demands for Turkish acknowledgment of guilt for the 1915 massacre and forced exodus of Armenians from Turkey have been consistently met with Turkish refusals. It is generally believed that Armenian terrorist activity has arisen in response to this and is intended to draw worldwide attention to the "Armenian cause." Some analysts, however, have identified the groups, particularly ASALA, as instruments of the Soviet Union whose purpose is to destabilize Turkey and thereby weaken the eastern flank of NATO. (The extremist activity has in fact had no noticeable effect on the stability of Turkey.) Meanwhile, the terrorism persists, and scholars and historians sympathetic to one side or the other continue to debate the Armenian genocide controversy.

#### ASALA AND JCAG

The two main Armenian terrorist groups, ASALA and JCAG, differ little in their stated aims—revenge for the 1915 massacre, recognition of the genocide, and reparations to survivors and kin. They also differ only slightly in their methods; but they differ significantly in their ideology. JCAG is nationalistic, to the right of ASALA, and it restricts its attacks to Turkish targets. It is not innovative in tactics, preferring assassination of Turkish officials and small, symbolic bombings. ASALA, on the other hand, has a Marxist-Leninist outlook, condemns "imperialism," and has attacked countries that support Turkey. Like JCAG, ASALA engages in assassinations and bombings, but it has also carried out more elaborate operations, such as a 15-hour takeover of

the Turkish consulate in Paris in 1981 and violent assaults within Turkey and at Orly Airport. Both groups have operated in numerous countries, but only ASALA has staged retaliatory attacks against nations holding Armenian terrorists in prison.

Overall, Armenian terrorist activity declined in 1982 and 1983 in comparison to 1980 and 1981. Ninety-four incidents occurred in the earlier period, compared with 56 in 1982 and 1983. One reason for this decline was that Beirut-based ASALA was under siege along with the PLO during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and thus had to move its headquarters elsewhere. (Since then, ASALA communiqués have frequently come out of Athens, but there is also speculation that Syrian guidance and support have led the group to relocate in Damascus.) In addition, reports from Lebanon in late summer 1982 announced the death of ASALA's leader, Hagop Hagopian, after an Israeli bombing raid on Beirut. However, the group is so secretive that this has been difficult to verify. Some reports simply deny that Hagopian (probably a *nom de guerre*) is dead, and others allege that he is alive and involved in a power struggle within the group. French authorities claim he was recently sighted in France, presumably planning renewed activities there. There are also indications that the group suffered a split when the members left Lebanon, with leadership and tactics at the heart of the debate. The character of its activity in 1983 indicates that the more militant faction has prevailed.

In any case, despite these disruptions, the group's terrorist activity has been regular, with only slightly longer intervals between actions, and the geographic variety of the operations has been maintained. Only a careful comparison of current trends with previous activity reveals the decline in 1982-83. The ability to sustain an organization with such widespread activity under such circumstances reveals an intrinsic, persevering organizational capacity.

The impact of Armenian terrorism has not reflected the decline in the number of incidents; if anything, its impact has increased. So widespread are the actions of the Armenian terrorist groups that nearly every Western country has experienced them. Their geographic scope is unmatched by any other terrorist group. Attacks have occurred in over 20 different countries; in 1982-83 alone, operations were staged in 16 different nations, including four that experienced Armenian extremism for the first time—Canada, Portugal, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. (The Bulgarian and Yugoslavian incidents were the first terrorist attacks carried out in Eastern bloc nations.) It appears likely that the groups' mobility plays knowingly upon the tensions between nations and has made more apparent than ever the need for increased international cooperation when dealing with terrorist activity. The changing

nature of the Armenian operations has captured world attention and has intensified the debate over the Armenian question.

### **Armenian Terrorism in the United States and Canada**

France, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain had previously experienced the largest proportion of the Armenian terrorist activities. But in 1982–83, six attacks occurred in the United States, two of which resulted in the deaths of Turkish diplomats.

On January 28, 1982, the Turkish consul-general in Los Angeles, Kemal Arikian, was assassinated by two young gunmen, as he drove from his home. The assassins waited until the diplomat's car came to a halt in traffic, then approached the car on either side, emptied their revolvers in the direction of the driver, and fled on foot. An Armenian extremist named Hampig Sassounian was charged with the murder. His accomplice reportedly escaped to Beirut and died in the fighting there. Portions of the Armenian community became visibly active in support of the incarcerated Sassounian, but in spite of their efforts, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The honorary Turkish consul-general in Boston, Orhan Gunduz, was killed on May 4, 1982, in an attack similar to that against Arikian. A lone gunman in a jogging suit approached the consul's car at an intersection and fired through the window before fleeing. Both attacks were claimed by the JCAG. Gunduz's killer was never apprehended.

On April 8, 1982, Kani Gungor, a commercial counselor at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa, was seriously wounded by gunmen. (He is now permanently paralyzed.) ASALA, in a call to the media from Beirut, assumed responsibility. Four arrests were made in March 1984. Then Turkey's military attaché in Canada, Colonel Atilla Altikat, 45, was shot to death by a gunman of the JCAG, on August 27, 1982, in Ottawa.

In mid-May 1982, Toronto police arrested an Armenian on charges of attempted extortion; three more Armenians were picked up two days later on the same charge. They allegedly demanded \$4,000 from one Armenian businessman and \$5,000 from another to support the "Armenian cause." The home of one of the extortion victims was fire-bombed less than a day after he refused to comply. Los Angeles police, among others, had been alerted to the danger of retaliatory activities on the part of ASALA; thus, increased vigilance of Canadian facilities foiled another bombing attempt, this one at Canadian Airlines in Los Angeles, 12 days later. Then in October 1982, members of JCAG threatened to bomb the offices of the Turkish consul-general in Philadelphia. This attack was also aborted.

Armenian groups have continued to support the accused terrorists, and thousands of dollars have been raised to cover legal fees for their defense. There have been no incidents of Armenian terrorist activity in the United States or Canada since October 1982.

### **Armenian Terrorism in France**

France has long been an attractive arena for international terrorist activity and has likewise been the scene of a disproportionate number of Armenian terrorist attacks. A large Armenian community, a government and people generally sympathetic to the Armenian cause, and porous borders contiguous to five major European nations make France an attractive site for Armenian operations. France rarely extradites political offenders and has been quite lenient in sentencing. Max Kilnajian, held for the attempted assassination of the Turkish ambassador to Switzerland on February 6, 1980, was tried in France in January 1982 and sentenced to two years. He was released almost immediately because of time already spent in jail awaiting trial. Four other ASALA members held since the September 1981 takeover of the Turkish consular offices in Paris went to trial in January 1984 amid great publicity and emotional demonstrations by members of the French Armenian community. Even though the operation had resulted in the death of a Turkish guard and the wounding of the Turkish consul-general, the militants received sentences of seven years imprisonment each. Considering time already spent in jail awaiting trial and a liberal system of parole, the sentences are just as lenient as those handed down in the earlier cases.

There have been 57 incidents of Armenian terrorist activity in France since 1975, 45 of which have taken place since 1980. Five Turkish officials have been murdered in Paris by Armenian assassins. There have been no assassinations or attempts since mid-1981, but other activity, primarily bombings, has continued. Nineteen Armenian terrorist operations were carried out in 1982-83, the latest and most extreme being the bombing at the Turkish Airlines check-in counter at Orly Airport in July 1983. Eight persons were killed and 56 were injured in the attack, making it the most serious terrorist incident yet to take place in France. The bomb had been planted in a suitcase as checked baggage for a Turkish Airlines flight to Istanbul. ASALA claimed that the bomb was meant to go off once the plane was airborne. Whether this is true or not, the number of casualties and the timing of the bomb (either on the plane or at a peak congestion period in the airport) indicate a noteworthy increase in the group's determination and willingness to harm innocent bystanders in the course of their campaign against Turkey.

Eleven Armenian activists are being held as a result of the Orly bombing: One 29-year old has reportedly confessed to the crime. It is too soon to tell whether the French have been successful in breaking up the cell of Armenian militants based in their country. In any case, the most serious problem at the moment will be the expected ASALA reprisal attacks: Two Air France offices and the French embassy in Tehran have already been bombed in retaliation for the arrests.

### **Armenian Terrorism in Turkey**

ASALA and JCAG have consistently operated internationally, that is, outside of Turkey. JCAG claimed to have set off several bombs in Turkey during 1977-78, but all but one were denied by Turkish authorities. In 1982-83, two large-scale assaults were launched by ASALA within Turkey, and despite Turkish censorship of the media, both resulted in worldwide coverage. Armenian terrorism had finally come home.

The first event occurred in August 1982. In a bomb and machine-gun shootout with Turkish security forces, two Armenian terrorists attacked the Esenboga Airport in Ankara. Nine people were killed and 78 were injured. ASALA claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that it was against the "Turkish fascist occupation of our land." It also warned of impending "suicide" attacks in the United States, Canada, England, Sweden, and Switzerland if 85 prisoners held in those countries were not released within seven days. The group maintained that two assault teams had mounted the attack and that the first unit had assaulted the headquarters of the Turkish military police near the airport, while the other took over the passenger terminal. ASALA exaggerated the number of casualties, claiming that the operations had resulted in more than 30 fatalities and 102 injuries. One commando, Levon Ekmekjian, who had been wounded and captured, was later given extensive publicity in Turkey as he remorsefully admitted his foolishness and admonished other ASALA members to give up their violent ways while they still had time. Ekmekjian was sentenced to death and was later executed by hanging.

The Grand Bazaar in Istanbul was the scene of ASALA's second major attack inside Turkey. On June 16, 1983, a commando unit of at least two gunmen exploded several bombs, threw hand grenades, and opened fire with automatic weapons on a crowd of shoppers and tourists. Once again, there were discrepancies between Turkish reports and ASALA claims. The wire services at first indicated that two commandos were involved in the raid on the busy market, but the reports did not immediately implicate Armenian terrorists, stating only that

Turkish leftists or Kurdish separatists were suspected. A news blackout made it difficult to determine the number of fatalities, but the Turkish media later reported that there were four deaths and 27 injuries. ASALA, however, claimed that as many as 25 people were killed, including three high-ranking Turkish officers, and that a still larger number were injured.

### **THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TURKISH DIPLOMATS**

The Armenian terrorists have waged a relentless campaign of assassination against Turkish diplomats. These officials have been singled out for both cathartic and publicity reasons. Cathartic, because such attacks assuage Armenian longing for revenge; and publicity-minded because of the maximum exposure afforded the Armenian cause. JCAG believes that assassinating Turkish diplomats is the only justified form of revolutionary violence for the Armenian cause, while ASALA feels that any activity against any target which may further the cause is justifiable. There are currently strong indications that future strategy and tactics are being hotly debated within ASALA itself, with certain factions calling for escalation of terrorism, while more moderate members want to demonstrate restraint and concentrate on Turkish targets. In any case, the assassination of Turkish diplomats and members of their families goes on worldwide. Of the 26 killed since 1975, 16 have been murdered since 1980, 9 of them during 1982-83.

These operations, usually involving two or three gunmen stalking the official in his car traveling between home and work, have had a high rate of success. During 1982-83, there were 12 assassination attempts on the lives of Turkish officials. Five of them "failed," in that the victims were merely wounded, but in every case, the bullets met their target. The assassins are rarely apprehended, although in 1982-83 the authorities were more successful in this regard than they had been in the past. Arrests have been made on three occasions, and four suspected Armenian assassins have been captured—one in Los Angeles, recently sentenced to life imprisonment; one in Rotterdam, sentenced to 6 years in prison; and two in Belgrade, each sentenced to 20 years.

### **THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMY**

In the very last days of July 1983, a newly announced group, the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), stunned Europe and the world

once again with an incomprehensible suicide-style operation. There had been some speculation that this group may be the losing side of the power struggle known to have taken place within ASALA, particularly in view of the indiscriminate attack at Orly Airport only a few days before. Others find that the ARA's rhetoric mirrors that of JCAG, and they consider the short-lived appearance of this group as merely a tactical move on the part of JCAG to gain attention while so many trials of Armenian extremists were taking place. Five Armenian commandos stormed the Turkish embassy in Lisbon; when their attack was rebuffed by Portuguese guards and one of their members was killed, they took over the adjoining embassy residence and held hostage the wife and son of the Turkish chargé d'affaires. The terrorists established radio contact with outside authorities and announced no demands. Their intention was to "sacrifice themselves on the altar of freedom" by blowing up the building with all its occupants. This they did within the hour, setting the complex on fire. Portuguese antiterrorist commandos met no resistance when they charged the building after the explosion. The five charred bodies of the four terrorists and a Portuguese policeman were discovered inside. The chargé d'affaires escaped the brunt of the blast, his son was wounded, and his wife was killed. The terrorists were later determined to be young Armenians, all aged 19 to 21. The impact of this attack was striking. While the Orly Airport attack had unleashed harsh condemnations from even the silent, ambivalent Armenian communities, the Lisbon event became a symbol of the continuing martyrdom of the Armenian people in the face of Turkish denials.

In spite of an overall decline in Armenian terrorist activity in 1982-83, the scope and impact of that activity continue to increase. Assassinations continue and appear to be the most effective activity, with only a minimal rate of failure. Redoubled security for Turkish diplomats and the increased vigilance of foreign authorities to protect Turkey's representatives may thwart future attempts and may result in a switch to less protected targets. Bombings continue to be the most prevalent tactic, but they have become more lethal and their targeting less discriminate. Dissension within ASALA points the way to escalation in activity, as the more militant members break away from the more moderate and find fewer restraints on themselves as a group. The Orly Airport bombing is ominous in its implications, and reports of commando-style assaults on targets within Turkey support the contention that Armenian terrorists are more determined and deadly than ever.

## IV. TERRORISM IN FRANCE

International terrorism has become a serious problem for the Mitterand government in France. Not only has the incidence of terrorist activity increased, but the French public's perception of it has been heightened both by the growing lethality of the attacks and by the continuing international debate and criticism concerning French policy on the subject. This change in perception is not unfounded. During 1982 and 1983, 111 terrorist incidents occurred, causing 45 deaths and nearly 400 injuries.<sup>1</sup> Although terrorist activity in France, particularly in Paris, is not unprecedented, this does reflect a distinct increase over past years. For example, in 1980 and 1981, there were 71 incidents causing 23 deaths and 65 injuries. A substantial amount of activity in its own right, the events during this earlier period were not regarded with the concern shown by the current government in Paris. The current situation coincides with a depressed economy, attempts at an "economic austerity program," and the lowest popularity poll rating ever for a French president—at one point in late 1983, only 28 percent of the French public registered approval or support for Mitterand's policies.

France cherishes its heritage of political consciousness and maintains its right to refuse the extradition of persons suspected of committing politically motivated crimes. During the "honeymoon period" of the Mitterand government in 1981, these traditions were reiterated and quiet official contacts were made with terrorist groups. The socialist government intended to soften the traditionally conservative lines of the previous regime and declared an amnesty for political prisoners, abolished the death penalty, ended the 18 year-old State Security Court, and announced a program of decentralization and increased autonomy for overseas departments. France's loose border policy and grants of right to asylum, however, have often been abused by political activists at both ends of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, the new socialist administration's policy was less one of appeasement than of literally issuing an open invitation for continued activity.

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<sup>1</sup>These figures represent the total of those incidents considered international by the definition used in Rand's chronology of international terrorism. They do not include the considerable amount of terrorist activity taking place in France's overseas departments (e.g., over 1,000 bombings were perpetrated by Corsican separatists during the same period). Nor do they include such separatist actions conducted on the French mainland. A discussion of separatist activity is presented later in this section.

Traditionally a haven for political refugees, France has always attributed the bulk of its political violence (and rightly so) to the imported grievances of foreign political exiles. Previously this sporadic violent activity rarely disturbed or was seriously considered by French society. Since a tumultuous summer in 1982, however, when 12 people died in a short period of time as the result of terrorism, the government has instituted several policy changes in the hopes of regaining public confidence and suppressing terrorism. These measures included the formation of a Ministry for Public Security; a Terrorism Council; the start of a centralized antiterrorism databank; heavy reinforcement of the police; and promises of closer cooperation with other European security forces. In addition, more attention has been focused on the activities of diplomatic personnel and political exiles.

Indigenous and imported terrorist activities plague France. Indigenous terrorism includes separatist activity from such groups as the *Front de la Liberation National de Corsica* (FLNC) and the Guadeloupe Liberation Army, both of which advocate self-government and independence for various French territories. Indigenous terrorism also includes militant ideological activity deriving from the fringes of French society (extreme left and right), as exemplified by groups such as *Action Directe* and the Charles Martel Group. Imported terrorism, on the other hand, is the overflow of political unrest from other states; more often than not, it originates from strife in the Middle East. Even this division between indigenous and imported terrorist activity, however, is not clear-cut. In the case of *Action Directe*, particularly, indigenous activity has reflected a growing involvement in Middle East events.

### **ACTION DIRECTE**

Extreme left-wing activists have operated under numerous names in France, but in 1979 *Action Directe* (AD) was created from the remnants of previous groups weakened by repeated arrests. Since its formation, AD has attacked French, American, Israeli, and Jewish interests in its self-declared campaign against "imperialism and capitalism." Members have also been involved in both violent and nonviolent protests and demonstrations on issues as diverse as nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, squatters' rights, workers' rights, the environment, and just about anything that could be called antigovernment. Their early actions were directed mainly against government buildings in Paris. After the massive arrests and convictions of members in March and April of 1980, AD was believed to have been neutralized, but when the socialist government came to power in May 1981, the incarcerated

activists benefited from the presidential amnesty for political crimes. Shortly after they were freed, in August 1981, they set about to reorganize the group, refocus their efforts, and internationalize their cause. The group began to attack not only French, but American and Israeli targets as well. The focus on the latter gained particular impetus from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.

There have also been persistent indications of links between AD and various other transnational organizations. In addition to the ties known to exist with Spanish, Italian, and German groups, AD has been developing even closer relationships with mysterious actors from the Middle East. Speculation on their identity has included Carlos,<sup>2</sup> the Syrians, the Iranians, the PLO, and even PLO rejectionists. To date, the activities of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), a group active only in France, have provided the hardest evidence of these links, for there are cases of possible dual membership in AD and LARF. AD has strong ideological ties with this group, has provided logistical support, and has participated in its actions. For example, in 1982, a machine-gun attack against an official Israeli arms-purchasing mission and a similar action against the Israeli consulate in Paris were both claimed by LARF, but authorities using ballistics tests later traced the Sten gun used in both attacks to AD. LARF had earlier claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of U.S. chargé d'affaires Christian Chapman in November 1981, and the murder of Charles Ray, a U.S. military attaché, in January 1982. Later attacks in 1982 included the assassination of an Israeli diplomat, Yacov Barsimantov, in April, the attempted car-bomb assassination of the U.S. commercial advisor, Roderick Grant, in August (which resulted in the deaths of two French bomb-disposal experts); and a similar attempt on the life of the Israeli commercial officer in September. AD continued its own low-level bombings concurrently with the activities of LARF, and occasionally claimed, then promptly disclaimed, the LARF actions. A police crackdown in August literally incapacitated the group; no further activity was carried out by AD or by LARF during 1982, although AD's leader, Jean-Marc Rouillan, and other key members were still at large.

Further successes were reaped by police in October 1982, when Frederic Oriach was arrested carrying evidence of his involvement in the activities of both AD and LARF. The ties between the two groups were further illustrated by acts of vandalism and graffiti expressing

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<sup>2</sup>Also known as Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, or simply "the Jackal," Carlos is well known for his activities as an international terrorist for hire. He has operated with members of the German Red Army Faction, the PFLP, and the Japanese Red Army. He is often rumored to be at one time or another in the employ of Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya.

solidarity with Oriach. In June 1983, Oriach was condemned to six years in prison for his supposed participation in the previous year's terrorist actions. Authorities felt confident that AD and LARF were finally incapacitated.

Late 1983, however, witnessed something of a revival of AD with a full complement of new "causes" for the "struggle." Numerous actions took place from August through December of 1983. Government and national defense buildings in Paris were bombed to protest French troops in Chad; churches and other religious buildings were bombed because "if the Catholic church wishes bombs, it will get them."<sup>3</sup> In mid-December, the group claimed the bizarre theft from a basilica in Paris of a tunic believed by French Catholics to have been worn by Christ, the purpose of the theft being to extort a ransom of \$35,000, to be paid to Poland's Solidarity union.

AD, in chameleon fashion, rapidly refocuses on the most attractive antigovernment issues and remains vulnerable to outside suggestions or interventions in its activities. Indeed, LARF resurrected itself with a claim of responsibility for a fatal bombing of the U.S. and Algerian stands at the International Trade Fair in Marseilles in October. The Armenian Orly Group and the Charles Martel Group also took credit for the attack, which left one dead and 26 wounded.

## SEPARATIST TERRORISM

The socialist government's promises of decentralization and increased regional autonomy were instrumental in bringing about an informal moratorium on separatist activity for most of 1981. But when progress toward autonomy was not deemed satisfactory, militants from Corsica, Guadeloupe, Martinique, New Caledonia, and French Guiana took up or resumed terrorist activity in 1982 against symbols of French "colonialism." Corsican separatist terrorism, most fiercely enunciated by the FLNC, has resulted in no less than 1,300 bombings on that island since the beginning of 1982.<sup>4</sup> The bombings are generally small and rarely cause casualties, but they can number as many as 20 in an evening. February 11-12, 1982, was a particularly bad night of bombing: After 24 attacks, one soldier was dead, another was wounded, and several towns had suffered considerable damage. The FLNC targets the so-called "French occupation forces" and French-owned property in Corsica.

<sup>3</sup>This was presumably in response to the French Bishops' letter advocating the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal.

<sup>4</sup>*International Herald Tribune*, June 17, 1983.

Since May 1981, the Mitterrand government has tried to quiet the nationalist violence in Corsica through a series of political reforms and the creation of an island parliament with self-rule. However, Mitterrand also pledged "to keep Corsica French." After the wave of bombings in 1982, the FLNC was officially outlawed in January 1983 and a special police force was sent to curb the militants.

A small percentage of these bombings have occurred on the French mainland. An example of FLNC activity in continental France came in April 1983 when the group exploded 14 bombs throughout the country. The blasts occurred in police stations, train depots, banks, and airline offices, causing considerable damage but no injuries. In its communiqué to *Agence France Presse* (AFP), the group declared: "The ceasefire has ended on French soil."

Corsican nationalists are by far the most active of the separatist groups, but other overseas departments have experienced similar rumblings of impatience with the desire to be independent from the mainland. In late May 1983, there was an attempt at some sort of coordinated action by the Caribbean independence groups. Seventeen nearly simultaneous bombs exploded in public buildings in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, causing extensive property damage and killing one person. In June 1983, these nationalist bombings were carried to the mainland as well. Four bombings in Paris were the work of the Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance. Elite police units sent to the islands have their hands full: The groups are small, very secretive, and hard to penetrate.

## IMPORTED TERRORISM

Transnational terrorism, that is, terrorism carried out by foreign political extremists and imported into France, accounts for only 41 of the 111 incidents in the country during 1982-83, but for 43, or 95 percent, of the 45 fatalities. This activism has always been intimately linked to Middle Eastern groups, and activity during this period was no exception. Violence has been generated by pro- and anti-Khomeini groups, Armenian militants, Iranians and Iraqis, Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians, and PLO rejectionists.

The complexity of this activity—its ideological ties to several groups or states, and the possible involvement of state entities working through diplomats in the country with immunity—has hampered French counterterrorist efforts. Several serious incidents were not even claimed, while others were claimed by various groups, adding to the mystery as to the roots of the attacks. In March 1982, the Paris-

Toulouse express was bombed, killing five people and injuring 27. Five groups took credit, but none of the claims were credible. The bombing coincided with the passing of a deadline set one month earlier by the notorious Carlos. In a letter to members of the French government, he had demanded the release of two compatriots recently arrested for carrying arms and explosives. Their exact connection with Carlos was unknown, but the letter appeared to be authentic, and because of Carlos' reputation, the threat was taken seriously. Many suspected the Paris-Toulouse express bombing to be his work; indeed, one of the claims was from a group calling itself Friends of Carlos.

Two other serious incidents were equally as deadly and still remain unsolved. In April 1982, a car bomb exploded during the morning rush hour in Paris, killing one woman and injuring 63 passersby. Syria's involvement was suspected, and its diplomatic offices were quickly closed down in Paris, as were France's in Damascus. In August 1982, an attack was made on the well-known Goldenberg's restaurant in Paris. Four men firing submachine guns indiscriminately sprayed the Jewish-owned and frequented establishment, leaving six dead and 22 wounded. The lack of police success in arresting any suspects in this case or in the case of the October 1980 Rue Copernic synagogue attack has led to an upsurge in discussion of the prevalence of anti-Semitism in France, in spite of the fact that there is strong circumstantial evidence that both of these attacks were perpetrated by Middle Eastern elements.

No discussion of "imported" terrorism in France can be complete without mentioning the persistent problem of Armenian terrorist activity in the country. France has a large Armenian community and has been very sympathetic to the Armenian cause; not surprisingly, this position has severely strained relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, since 1982, ASALA, in form with its past practices against other states, has targeted French facilities in retaliation for the arrests of its members.<sup>5</sup> More difficult to deal with is the move by Armenian terrorists toward indiscriminate attacks. The bombing of the Turkish Airlines counter at Orly Airport in Paris with its resultant casualties was the most serious yet for France. The government's reaction was swift and severe. Fifty-one suspected Armenian activists were promptly arrested. The French have been surprisingly tolerant, but hard and tough measures have been called for now. Hence it appears that the perpetrators of this action will be dealt with severely. Judicious sentencing of terrorists, however, will not be enough. Retaliatory ASALA bombings have already taken place in Iran against the French embassy

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<sup>5</sup>Armenian terrorism in France is discussed in detail in Sec. III.

and Air France offices. The upcoming trials of several incarcerated Armenian extremists promise to further focus criticism and debate on the Armenian question, as well as on French policy and international terrorism in general. The public outcry is disturbing, and the weak position of the Mitterand government is further undermined by these developments. Some serious rethinking of France's policy as a *terre d'asile* will undoubtedly continue.

## V. TERRORISM IN ITALY

### THE ANTITERRORIST CAMPAIGN

Between September 1982 and December 1983, law-enforcement agencies in Italy scored a series of decisive successes. They arrested top leaders of the Red Brigades (BR), *Prima Linea* (PL), and the neofascist right. They brought to trial a large number of leading brigadists and other terrorists. In fact, the leftist *Prima Linea* declared itself officially defunct in April 1983 after the arrest and convictions of 83 of its members. Although analysts were cautiously optimistic, a spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior said that his organization would relax only when all the terrorists were behind bars. Overall, terrorist activity showed a dramatic decline in both 1982 and 1983. In 1982, the BR murdered nine people. In 1984, only four incidents were attributed to them: two murders, one injury, and one barricade-and-hostage robbery.<sup>1</sup> There were a total of six actions in Italy in 1983, including one train bombing claimed by the right-wing Black Order and an unclaimed bombing in Milan at the site of a papal Mass. There were no injuries in either incident. These totals are significantly smaller than the 26 incidents recorded in both 1981 and 1980.

A closer examination of the facts and figures confirms the decrease. Many of the arrests between September 1982 and December 1983 were made possible by information provided by collaborating terrorists seeking reduced sentences. By May 20, 1983, the Italian government reported that 1,357 left-wing terrorists were in jail, while 274 were still at large; 480 right-wing terrorists were in jail, with 79 still being sought. The ratio of captured to wanted terrorists was thus about 6 to 1 (1,837 to 353).

The arrested terrorists included Pietro Vanzi, an important BR leader; the entire Naples column of the BR (11 members); Sergio Segio, a PL leader; Diego Forastieri, also a PL leader; and Susanna Ronconi, a former BR leader who later joined PL.

The success of the countermeasures of the state was also reflected in various trials throughout Italy: one in Rome, for the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro; one in Genoa, for various crimes committed in

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<sup>1</sup>On May 17, 1983, two gunmen barricaded a Rome post office and held the employees hostage from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. The attackers, suspected Red Brigadists, were both arrested (*Paris AFP*, in English, May 17, 1983).

that area by the BR; one in Milan, for the murder of *Corriere della Sera* correspondent Walter Tobagi; several in Tuscany, for various PL crimes committed there; and one in Cagliari, for the murder of a policeman by the BR in that area. Tony Negri, a professor of political science at Padua University and the leader of the autonomy movement in northern Italy, arrested in April 1979 for assisting in the planning of BR operations, finally came to trial in the spring of 1983.<sup>2</sup> The most impressive convictions from this series of trials were the life terms for 32 BR members in January 1983 for the Moro killing.

Not only were there signs that law-enforcement agencies thought the problem had abated, a report in *La Repubblica* in January 1983 quoted from a document in which Renato Curcio and the historic BR nucleus, now in prison, spoke of the "defeat of the armed struggle" and the "mourning" for leftist terrorism. In addition, *Io l'infame (I, the Scoundrel)*, the autobiography of repentant BR member Patrizio Peci, appeared in the summer of 1983. In it, the former Torino and Milan brigadist echoed the sentiments of another highly placed BR repentant, Enrico Fenzi: "The Red Brigades are finished."<sup>3</sup>

An amnesty law passed by the Parliament in May 1982, after a two-year debate, was largely responsible for the impressive increase in arrests. Although viewed as being possibly unconstitutional, the measure turned out to be a powerful law-enforcement tool. By the time of its expiration in January 1983, 389 terrorists had taken advantage of the law. Forty-eight had actively collaborated with police; 184 had confessed or provided some information; 177 had formally renounced their group. There were 450 arrests as a result of tips. The Justice Ministry, however, in January 1983, felt that the law had served its purpose and that "the brigades are no longer a sufficiently serious threat to warrant it."

The amnesty law produced four types of responses among brigadists and other captured terrorists to possible leniency in exchange for collaboration: those who became repentants provided information to police; the *dissociati* renounced their groups but would not collaborate with authorities; the *arresi* (the flexible ones) made no declaration; and the *irriducibili* remained dedicated to the armed struggle. (About 80 to 100 prisoners fell into this latter category, according to Italian authorities.)

<sup>2</sup>Toni Negri was elected to Parliament as a candidate of the Italian Radical Party in June 1983. Because members of Parliament have immunity, Negri was released from Rebbibia prison in July. In September, the Chamber of Deputies voted to strip Negri of his parliamentary immunity and thus subject him to arrest. Negri's trial was scheduled to recommence in September, but after the vote, it was reported that he had fled to France.

<sup>3</sup>Peci also cited the public's lack of sympathy for, or interest in, the domestic issues (e.g., factory issues) the BR was raising as a reason for the group's failure.

## PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Despite the impressive achievements of 1982-83, many observers anticipated a reemergence of the Red Brigades. In early 1983, four factions of the group were still operating: (1) the *movimentisti*, the surviving members of the Naples, Rome, and Milan columns and the "Prison Front" (known collectively as the "Guerrilla Party of the Metropolitan Proletariat"), who still want to bring about a civil war in Italy; (2) the *militaristi*, the survivors of the Rome and Venice columns, who want to adopt a defensive strategy, avoiding high-level actions until conditions for civil war improve; (3) the Walter Alasia column, the Milanese group that aspires to take over the organization; and (4) the "Steel Nucleus," the imprisoned brigadists who continue to work for civil war. In addition, new columns have been discovered by police in Ancona, Pisa, Florence, Bologna, Bari, Brescia, Bergamo, Sardinia, and Palermo. As of March 1984, three columns were reported to be active: the Roman column, the *Stella Rossa* column in Milan, and a column in Tuscany. At present, it is not certain how many brigadists are actually at large. Many have fled to France, and others have dropped out of terrorist groups without ever being hunted by the law.

With the Red Brigades in such an embattled condition in 1983, observers predicted that the group would have to make some uncomfortable accommodations, either with organized crime or with foreign terrorists by offering themselves as international mercenaries. Police are still keeping track of links between the Red Brigades and the Naples-based Camorra (northern Italy's equivalent of the Sicilian Mafia), which first emerged with the 1981 release of kidnapped regional government official Ciriaco De Mita. The February 1984 assassination of American diplomat Leamon R. Hunt, the director-general of the Sinai multinational force, suggested the possibility of an alliance between the BR and Middle Eastern elements, with the BR acting as mercenaries to gain financial assistance.

The Red Brigades also appear to have enlarged the range of their issues and targets in order to enlist public opinion. Until the Dozier kidnapping, they had never targeted NATO; and until the Hunt shooting, they had never killed a foreigner. These actions appeared to be intended to capitalize on anti-NATO sentiments. There are, in addition, reports that the Red Brigades wish to make alliances with hard-line members of the antinuclear and peace movement groups protesting the deployment of nuclear missiles in Comiso, Sicily.

## VI. TERRORISM IN GERMANY

Perhaps the most significant event related to terror and violence in West Germany during 1982-83 was the major blow dealt by the German authorities to West Germany's most notorious terrorist gang, the Red Army Faction (RAF). In November 1982, the gang's three leading members were arrested, and large amounts of weapons found in various caches were confiscated. This great success by the German authorities seems to have paralyzed the group for a while, although government sources warn that the estimated 18 to 20 RAF members who remain at large retain the capability to commit highly sophisticated and destructive terror attacks. The group itself has not been heard from since the November arrests; it neither tried—as was feared at the time—to kidnap some prominent people in order to blackmail the German state into releasing the RAF leaders from prison, nor did the remaining members at large commit, or try to commit, any of the violent actions they are said to have planned before their arrests.

Despite this enforced inactivity of West Germany's most dangerous group, terrorism as a whole by no means declined during 1982-83. On the contrary, according to official West German figures, the number of incidents either committed by terrorists or attributed to them by expert observers was 184 for 1982, a substantial increase over the 129 of the preceding year. In fact, 1982 was the peak year. Total incidents were only 52 in 1978, 41 in 1979, and 77 in 1980. The incidents in 1982 included 120 cases of arson or attempted arson; 63 attacks with explosives; and one bank robbery. Whereas arson attacks increased by only about one-fifth as compared with previous years, attacks with explosives almost doubled. Primarily responsible for this increase are the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), discussed in detail below.

### THE RED ARMY FACTION

The above-mentioned bank robbery, committed in November 1982 in the Rhineland city of Bochum, was the work of the RAF—in fact, it was the last known action of the group, whose leading members were arrested a short time later. The robbery was lucrative, netting more than \$50,000. But it was interpreted by observers as proof of the RAF's dire financial problems. Until that time, the group had been financing itself with the help of the estimated \$1 million brought into its coffers by a merger with another group some two years earlier.

Because bank robberies entail a high risk of apprehension by the police, this action was indicative of serious financial troubles. A further indication of the group's difficulties was a lengthy pamphlet—the first declaration of RAF aims and policies to appear in ten years—that was clandestinely distributed all over Germany. The pamphlet, which contains a great deal of self-criticism for past actions and a conciliatory posture toward other legitimate and illegitimate groups on the far left, was designed to tone down the “arrogant” attitude of the elitist RAF. But apparently it did not have positive repercussions. It received no endorsement in the ultra-leftist publications being distributed in Germany. Some observers conclude that the RAF's continuing call for an “anti-imperialist struggle” and “armed urban resistance” has lost its appeal. Even so, it is generally agreed that members who remain at large still could commit very severe actions.

### THE REVOLUTIONARY CELLS

The fact that terrorism as a whole in West Germany has been on the increase rather than the decrease, despite the sharp decline of the RAF, is a reflection of the growing importance of the so-called Revolutionary Cells. The RZs have been active in West Germany for a decade or so but were regarded by both the authorities and the RAF as lightweights. However, since early 1982, they have been in the process of assuming center stage.

The RZ has much less ideological ballast than the RAF, far more realistic aims, and a far less cumbersome organizational structure. There are many more RZ members, but the group's structure is financially much less demanding. The RAF always consisted, and still consists, of “full-time terrorists,” i.e., people who have gone underground and must forever evade the by now extremely efficient and well-financed police in Germany. This evasion is extremely expensive, as “conspirational” apartments must be rented at high cost and changed often for security reasons, and other expensive security measures must be observed. In fact, if even one RAF member is arrested or defects, *all* hideouts for personnel, weapons, etc., must be changed, new means of transportation must be acquired, and so on. It has been estimated that the maintenance of one RAF member might require as much as \$50,000 a year. Thus, maintaining the approximately 20 members still at large costs the RAF an estimated \$1 million a year.

The RZs, on the other hand, are mostly what is called in German *Freizeitterroristen* (“after-hours terrorists”). They may or may not have legitimate jobs, but in any event, they do not have to live an

expensive underground life, because they are either not known to the police or have not committed a particular crime for which they are being sought.

Moreover, the organization of the RZ is very loose and therefore more manageable. In fact, in many ways, it is not an organization at all; it consists of many cells in German cities. These cells operate largely independently but have common aims to which they are all attuned and which are also made clear in a central publication called *Der Revolutionaere Zorn* (Revolutionary Rage, or Anger). The RZs in the various cities can operate in this semiautonomous way because their ideology and policy are much simpler than those of the RAF, which is based on a great deal of Marxist and other theory and which also aims grandly at a transformation of the German state and indeed the entire capitalist world. The RZs, on the other hand, really aim at nothing but to impede the normal course of political events by demonstrations, stone throwing, and similar activities that are sporadic in character, but basically always extreme leftist in content. Observers have determined that the RZs are apparently quite successful in recruiting new members, partly because these political aims—simultaneous, occasional, violent interference with the aims of state and society in a variety of places, but without assassinations—appear attractive and realistic to many young people on the extreme left. Also, the RZs encourage bystanders to participate in whatever is happening at the moment—they do not require “professionals,” as the RAF does. Prime examples of RZ actions are the upheavals created in Berlin last year on the occasion of President Reagan’s visit and the recent attack on Vice-President Bush in Krefeld. Such attacks need little preparation or planning. In fact, they often are spontaneous, which distinguishes them from RAF actions, which are always meticulously prepared.

Until recently, the RZs made it a point not to kill people or even injure them, although by bombing they often took the chance of doing precisely that. In late 1981, they actually killed a public official but—quite credibly—attributed it to an accident. What they are aiming at, in their own words, is “violent resistance” against routine political actions by the authorities, especially if these actions are objectionable from the extreme leftist point of view. Thus, they have created many disturbances at the Frankfurt Airport, where they, along with other, legitimate groups, have violently protested the building of a new runway which, they say, is intended mainly to serve the American military. To date, their greatest activity occurred in the night of June 1, 1982, when they committed eight bombing attacks against American installations and organizations.

Although the RZs aim at inhibiting the actions of what they regard as American imperialism (and German actions along similar veins), the authorities see no connection of an operational type between the RZs and other terrorist groups in Germany.

It stands to reason that the RZs will continue to be active in West Germany and will probably stage actions in conjunction with the installation of Pershing II missiles. And their way of doing things and the volatile nature of their activities, plus the legal status of most of their members, will make them hard to catch or prosecute.

### OTHER GROUPS

Quite a few of the violent actions that occurred in West Germany in 1982 and 1983 were not the work of any of the known terrorist groups. These actions were mostly bombings, and most of them were directed against American targets.

One group that identifies itself as *Rote Zora* (Red Zora) seems to be a subgroup of the RZ. Zora is neither a German word nor a German name, but it is clearly meant to denote a relationship to the Red Cell (*Rote Zellen*). This group appears to be composed exclusively of women. Not much is known about them as yet.

A few other terrorist groups are active in West Germany, but the identity of their members is unknown. They engage mainly in bombings and arson, primarily directed against civil and military American installations, nuclear energy facilities, and activities the terrorists regard as detrimental to the ecology. These groups sometimes claim credit without identifying themselves, talking about their opposition to the capitalist system, NATO, and the "inhuman technocracy." So far, they have done little damage, but according to the German authorities, they bear watching.

### THE UMFELD<sup>1</sup>

The *Umfeld* group numbers about 200. Traditionally, it has supported the RAF with funds, transportation, hideouts, and strong propaganda efforts. Its members try to propagate the extremist leftist aims of the RAF at home and abroad in various legitimate and illegitimate publications, and they support RAF members in prison in one way or another. Traditionally, too, *Umfeld* has provided new recruits for the RAF. There were always only a very few recruits at a time, as

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<sup>1</sup>Literally, "surrounding area," meaning "legal supporters of illegal groups."

the RAF itself remained very small and needed few replacements for those killed or arrested.

So far, no connection has been established between these politically radical people and the RZ.

### **TERRORISTS OF THE RIGHT**

For the past several years, emphasis in terrorism research has focused on terrorism of the left. However, terrorism of the right has definitely also become a concern in the past few years in several countries, including Germany.

Statistically, the number of acts of violence committed by rightist terrorists in West Germany declined in 1982, as compared with 1981, from 108 to 64 incidents (figures for 1983 are not yet available). However, some of the actions were very severe: In Nuremburg, neo-Nazis murdered three foreigners; and in the Rhineland, three murder attempts with explosives against American soldiers were staged but failed. In addition, large quantities of weapons belonging to rightist terrorists have been found. Neo-Nazis distributed several million written tracts giving advice and instructions for civil war, and the number of threats of violence emanating from these tracts increased from 197 in 1981 to 241 in 1982. The German authorities point out that even though neo-Nazis are vigorously pursued, clandestine channels report that fanatical neo-Nazis continue to plot violent actions.

The neo-Nazis are very active in distributing blatantly Nazi propaganda, idolizing Nazism, and condemning present conditions. Unlike the leftist extremists, the rightist extremists do not attack the capitalist system as such. They attack the current government, but they aim most of their venom against two targets: the foreign workers in Germany and the American soldiers, businesses, and installations in Germany, which they call the "occupiers." It is noteworthy that both leftist and rightist extremists, despite vast differences in ideology and action, are aiming at U.S. targets.

The number of people involved in rightist terrorism and extremism does not seem to have increased over the past few years. The number of fully committed, strict neo-Nazis who practice violence has been estimated at around 1,000 for the past few years. However, depending on whom one includes as supporters and/or active sympathizers, German authorities estimate that about 20,000 people presently constitute an acute danger from the right.

## VII. TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA<sup>1</sup>

Continuing internal upheavals give Latin America an air of turmoil and instability, in spite of a slight decrease in its proportion of international terrorist activity during 1982-83.<sup>2</sup> The number of recorded international terrorist events in Latin America increased somewhat in 1983, yet was only slightly above the average for the area since 1980. Activity in the region is notable, however, for the continued heavy emphasis on targeting of American businesses and diplomats and the introduction of a significant amnesty package for terrorists in Colombia.

Chilean terrorists, who have used force to protest the government's economic as well as political policies, for the first time bombed foreign diplomatic facilities, including U.S. cultural institutes and businesses. In Argentina, terrorist violence also increased, with actions directed mainly against British residents (probably as a result of the Falkland Islands war). In Colombia, Peru, and Central America, terrorism was frequently directed against foreign business and diplomatic interests, showing a substantial rise in 1983.

### COLOMBIA

One of the most significant developments in the region was the liberal amnesty package, including economic incentives, introduced in Colombia. The new legislation, intended to entice terrorists and their supporters to end their activities, pardons all domestic terrorist activities, except the murder of defenseless citizens, wanton killings, and acts of violence such as rape, which do not have a political purpose. The amnesty package sought to embrace as many people as possible without, however, absolving criminals.

Although only 5 percent of the suspected terrorists accepted the offer, the Colombian government maintained that the amnesty succeeded in buying a few months of respite from terrorist attacks, that it created dissension within the terrorist ranks, and that it cast the government in a more favorable light than the terrorists as far as public opinion in Colombia was concerned.

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<sup>1</sup>Includes South and Central America.

<sup>2</sup>As noted earlier, the guerrilla wars in the the area do not fit within the definition of international terrorism used in this study and thus are not included in the discussion.

Several kidnappings of U.S. civilians took place, but all were for ransom and were therefore not necessarily terrorist acts. Nevertheless, some of the ransom undoubtedly was collected to finance further terrorist activities. The most infamous incident involved the seizure of Kenneth Bishop, an executive of Texaco Oil, who was taken from his car in February 1983 by members of the Organization of the People (ORP). Held for ransom for 38 days, he was released after one of his relatives reportedly paid approximately \$1 million in ransom.

Diplomats and diplomatic facilities remained a favorite target of Colombian terrorists. On January 18, 1982, the National Liberation Army (ELN) kidnapped a Honduran diplomat in Bogotá to protest Honduran involvement in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The following month, the ELN machine-gunned the Honduran consulate in Bucaramanga. On April 14, 1983, the Movement of April 19 (M-19) attacked the Honduran embassy in Bogotá. The ELN attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities in Bucaramanga on June 30, and other American corporations also suffered damage in July 1983. In addition, the ELN attacked the Salvadoran and Chilean consulates in Medellín on July 7, 1983.

Israel was also targeted in retaliation for the invasion of Lebanon. On August 23, 1982, M-19 attacked the Israeli embassy in Bogotá, and on December 3, 1982, unknown terrorists occupied and vandalized a synagogue in Medellín.

## PERU

Peru became the site of continuous terrorist violence with the emergence of the *Sendero Luminoso* (The Shining Path). This group was created in 1963 by a university professor, Abimael Guzman, when the Peruvian Communist Party split into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions. Elements supporting a Maoist line took over the leadership of the group, while those favoring the implementation of a campaign of armed violence began to attack public facilities and government officials in 1980.

Although they have selected a variety of targets, the terrorists have concentrated their efforts on destroying government offices, police barracks, and private businesses. They have been successful in disrupting communications networks and, by destroying power lines, blacking out important urban centers. *Sendero* terrorists have also assassinated government officials and members of local economic elites such as businessmen and farmers; to intimidate the lower-class populations, they have murdered numerous peasants. The government initially responded by relying upon the Civil Guard, but the Guard was unable

to stop the attacks. Therefore, Lima sent counterinsurgency units into the *altiplano*. These special units may have restricted *Sendero* activity, but they also antagonized the local populations.

*Sendero* has increasingly attacked foreign business concerns. On July 24, 1982, for example, the terrorists bombed the Coca Cola facilities, an Alfa Romeo car dealership, and a Swiss chemical company. On May 27, 1983, the group launched its most ambitious raid to date, destroying ten power pylons in Lima and leaving the city without light for over an hour. Under cover of the darkness created by the blackout, the terrorists struck again, detonating 40 bombs and attacking numerous foreign concerns, including the Sheraton Hotel and the Bayer chemical complex, causing over \$300 million in damage. On June 20, 1983, *Sendero* again attacked the Sheraton.

Foreign diplomats remain a favorite target. On July 24 and September 26, 1982, unknown terrorists bombed the official residence of the British ambassador and machine-gunned the embassy of the German Democratic Republic. On October 26, *Sendero* attacked the U.S. embassy and the Indian embassy in Lima. The authorities prevented the terrorists from bombing the U.S. ambassador's residence on June 24, 1983, but were unable to prevent the bombing of the North American Cultural Center in Arequipa.

## HONDURAS

Honduras, because it is considered by many to support the United States' anti-Sandinista and anti-Salvadoran rebel campaign, has become the focal point of Central American terrorism. The main protagonist is the Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary People's Command, a relatively new urban-based group that is an offshoot of the People's Revolutionary Front (FPR). On August 4 and 28, 1983, the group bombed a number of U.S.-owned concerns housed in the Pan Am building in Tegucigalpa, as well as the headquarters of a U.S. mining business. That same year, unknown assailants attacked the offices of Air Florida.

On April 21, 1982, the Zelaya organization also bombed the consulates of Chile, Argentina, and Peru, countries it considers repressive. In 1983, it bombed the Guatemalan consulate, for the same reason. The American embassy was attacked once, on April 5, 1982, by unknown assailants. Honduran authorities claim that they also uncovered a plot by the FPR to assassinate the Pope during his visit to Honduras in March 1983.

The only other episode of note in that country was the hijacking of a commercial airplane, on April 28, 1982, by terrorists demanding the release of 20 political prisoners. The government refused to capitulate although the airline company apparently paid some ransom and the hijackers left Honduras for Cuba.

The increase in violence in Honduras appears to be inspired by the terrorists' desire to protest the presence of U.S. troops (who participated in joint exercises with the Honduran army) and to punish the government for providing bases for the anti-Sandinista forces.

## **GUATEMALA**

In Guatemala, the level of violence declined dramatically during the period under review. Foreign missionaries, however, were murdered by right-wing terrorists on January 7, 1982, and unidentified assailants killed an American Catholic missionary on February 13, 1982. Government soldiers are accused of kidnapping a Belgian priest in January 1982 and shooting a German U.N. official on May 11, 1982. Two U.S. businessmen were murdered in separate incidents on April 15 and October 2, 1982. Diplomats remain at risk. The EGP launched a rocket attack against the American embassy on March 31, 1982. The Turkish consulate was attacked twice on October 22, 1982, and the Israeli embassy and Guatemala's only synagogue were attacked on August 12, 1982. Unknown terrorists blacked out Guatemala City, Antigua, and Amatitlan on February 9, 1982. Members of the Pedro Dias Command of the Ixim Peoples' Revolutionary Movement, protesting U.S. policy in Central America, kidnapped the daughter of the president of Honduras (who was living in Guatemala) on December 14, 1982. She was released after local newspapers published statements issued by the group condemning U.S. imperialism.

## **OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES**

In El Salvador, the only international terrorist event of note was the well-publicized assassination of Lieutenant Commander Albert Schaufelberger by the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN). Costa Rica, like Honduras, became an arena for elements fighting in El Salvador and Honduras. Nicaraguans, for example, bombed a Honduran airline office on July 3, 1982, and Salvadoran rightists attempted to assassinate a Cuban exile on August 4, 1982. In March 1982, the Costa Rican police arrested nine pro-FMLN Latin Americans from various nations, who were plotting to kidnap a U.S. diplomat. In

Nicaragua, international terrorist violence during 1982-83 consisted only of four hijackings involving Nicaraguans seizing planes in which to flee the country.

## VIII. SOME REFLECTIONS ON RECENT TRENDS IN TERRORISM

The fatal bombings in 1983 of the American embassies in Beirut and Kuwait, the headquarters of the U.S. Marine and French Army contingents of the international peacekeeping force in Beirut, and the Israeli military intelligence headquarters in Tyre dramatically illustrate both the success and the dilemma of those charged with security against terrorists. In the 1970s, seizing embassies and kidnapping diplomats were common terrorist tactics. With better security and growing resistance to meeting terrorist demands, embassy takeovers declined but assassinations and bombings increased. Overall, attacks on diplomats went up.

The dilemma is that terrorists can attack anything, while governments cannot protect every conceivable target against every possible kind of attack. If embassies cannot be seized, embassies can be blown up. And if terrorists cannot blow up embassies, they can blow up railroad stations, hotel lobbies, restaurants, or Horse Guard parades. The dilemma of security officials is part of a larger problem confronting those who must deal with terrorism.

Despite increasing government success in combatting terrorists, the total volume of terrorist activity worldwide has increased during the last ten years. It is a paradox that frustrates governments and confounds analysts.

Governments have become tougher in dealing with terrorists. More and more governments have adopted hardline, no concessions, no negotiations policies—a marked change from the situation in the early 1970s, when governments often gave in to the demands of terrorists holding hostages. Terrorists who seize embassies, a popular tactic in the 1970s, now face arrest and prosecution.

They also risk being killed, as more and more governments have demonstrated their willingness to use force whenever possible to end hostage episodes at home and abroad. When Arab separatists seized the Iranian embassy in London in April 1980, the British government refused to meet any of their demands and later sent in SAS commandos to rescue the hostages. All but one of the terrorists were killed in the assault. Terrorists who seek worldwide publicity and political concessions by barricading themselves with hostages now must also contemplate being shot.

Governments still occasionally make secret deals with international terrorist groups, offering freedom of movement in return for immunity from attack; but with some exceptions, governments appear less inclined to "parole" imprisoned foreign terrorists simply to avoid further attacks.

At the technical level, governments have become more proficient in combatting terrorism. They have skillfully used offers of reduced sentences, conditional pardons, new identities for key witnesses, and other inducements to persuade at least some terrorists to provide information about their organizations. Italy has been particularly successful in exploiting the "repentants"—apprehended terrorists who have taken advantage of a new law providing reduced sentences in return for information. The willingness of captured Red Brigades members to talk was one of the key factors in the rescue of General Dozier in 1982. The collection and analysis of intelligence have improved. International cooperation has increased.

Physical security around likely terrorist targets also has increased greatly. It is harder now, but nonetheless possible, to smuggle weapons aboard airliners. Embassies have become like fortresses. Diplomats and top executives often travel in armored limousines with armed bodyguards. Specialized tactics and skills have been developed for use in hostage situations.

Worldwide, thousands of terrorists have been arrested or compelled to go deeper underground. Some groups have been virtually destroyed. Others are hard-pressed by authorities.

Most of the Red Brigades now reside in prison. German police captured the operational heads of the Red Army Faction in December 1983. Eleven members of the FALN, a Puerto Rican separatist group, were apprehended in Illinois three years ago. One of the most wanted Puerto Rican separatist bombers was recently captured in Mexico.

But despite these undeniable achievements, the total volume of terrorist activity in the world has hardly diminished. Like the Hydra—the mythical monster that grew two heads each time one was severed—terrorism persists, even grows, despite defeats. Authorities are able to suppress terrorists at least temporarily, but thus far they have been unable to reduce terrorism appreciably without resorting to unacceptable methods of repression.

Old groups survive. New groups appear. The new groups are generally smaller, more tightly organized at the operational level, and harder to penetrate; they are sometimes less structured at the national level and harder to predict; they are almost always more violent.

Exact figures vary according to the source of information, collection criteria, and procedures, but the trajectory of terrorism continues

upward. While in some countries terrorist activity has declined, it has increased in others. Terrorism, as previously noted, declined in Italy last year but exploded in France. Similarly, the number of terrorist incidents in Israel dropped sharply after Israel's invasion of Lebanon, but the number of terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad went up.

Governments may be more able—and more willing—to pursue local terrorists than those who cross borders to carry out their attacks or attack targets connected to foreign governments. There has been a slight decline in the total number of incidents (local plus international) since 1980, but a 13 percent annual increase in the number of deaths caused by terrorists. In terms of international terrorism by itself, the picture is worse. The first three years of the 1980s witnessed an annual increase in international terrorism of approximately 30 percent—twice the rate of increase in the 1970s. Overall, terrorist activity has increased fourfold in the decade since the 1972 attack at the Munich Olympics.

This is not to say that terrorism has been a success. Nowhere this side of the colonial era have terrorists yet achieved their own stated long-range goals. No doubt terrorism did contribute to the success of colonial insurgents a generation ago. Certainly terrorist tactics figured prominently in the struggles for independence in Israel, Cyprus, Algeria, and Kenya; and after lengthy and debilitating military contests like those in Indonesia, Indochina, and Algeria, colonial governments appeared almost eager to abandon distant possessions which had become costly anyway. But the stakes are higher at home. Governments are not so willing to separate what is regarded as national territory—Northern Ireland, the Basque Provinces, Brittany, or Corsica—even if it means a fight. Nor will they yield before the onslaught of ideologically motivated terrorists on the left or right.

Terrorists are able to attract publicity to themselves and their causes. They create worldwide alarm. They create crises that governments are compelled to deal with. They make governments and corporations divert vast resources to security measures. Occasionally they win concessions. In several instances, they have provoked the overthrow of governments, usually by elements willing to use repressive tactics with less restraint. Some terrorists see this last achievement as an intermediate objective in their struggle to seize power; repression is supposed to arouse the masses to join the resistance. Historically, however, such Pyrrhic victories have been preludes to the terrorists' own destruction. In Uruguay, Argentina, and Turkey, rising levels of terrorist violence provoked military takeovers that led to harsh crackdowns, which local terrorists did not survive.

Terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains. Nor have they yet revealed a convincingly workable strategy that relates terrorist violence to positive political power. In that sense terrorism has failed. It is a fundamental failure—ironically, one recognized by early Bolshevik revolutionaries.

The paradox works on both sides. Despite their failure, terrorists persist in their struggles. Why? Are terrorists irrational or simply slow learners? Probably neither; but they are capable of self-delusion. Professor Franco Ferracuti, a noted psychiatrist who has studied Italy's terrorists, suggests that terrorists wage fantasy wars. The presumption of war permits violence that would otherwise be unacceptable. It is, however, fantasy, because the rest of society does not share the presumption.

In fact, cut off from most normal contacts with society, having only each other to talk to, terrorists live in a fantasy world. Their organizations are extravagant assertions. They imagine themselves to be armies and brigades. They believe themselves to have legions of supporters or potential supporters on whose behalf they claim to fight, but their constituencies, like their military formations, are largely imaginary.

Terrorists carry out operations they believe are likely to win widespread approval from these perceived constituents. But they do not always seem able to distinguish between a climate that is favorable to them because of what they do and a climate that just happens to be favorable to them. Terrorist groups, such as the Weather Underground Organization, that were active during the height of the protests against the Vietnam War mistook antiwar sentiments for pro-revolutionary sentiments.

Terrorists fall prey to their own propaganda. They overestimate their own strength, their appeal, the weakness of their enemies, the imminence of victory. And they continue to fight, for to quit is not simply to admit defeat. It is an admission of irrelevancy. It removes the justification for violence.

Some terrorists appear to be less concerned with progress toward distant goals. It isn't winning or losing, it's playing the game. They are action-oriented rather than goal-oriented. Terrorism becomes an end in itself—for some, because living a dangerous life underground, oiling weapons, building bombs, endlessly planning and occasionally carrying out acts of violence fulfills some inner psychological need; for others, perhaps because membership in a terrorist organization affords them status and offers them opportunities for the continued application of criminal skills they have developed as terrorists.

This suggests another reason why terrorist groups go on. These groups are sometimes collections of persons with otherwise unsalable skills. They have membership, hierarchy, management, specialized functions, a cash flow. Organizations are dedicated to survival. They do not voluntarily go out of business. Right now, the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed terrorist groups is the same as the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed corporations—that is, to continue operations.

They may restructure themselves to do so. They may revise their goals. They may alter their operations. But they will struggle to stay in business. It is an organizational imperative.

In the process of long-term survival, some terrorist groups are changing their character. It costs a great deal of money to maintain a terrorist group. Terrorists who do not receive financial support from foreign patrons must earn it through bank robberies, ransom kidnappings, extortion, smuggling, or participation in the narcotics traffic, all of which require criminal skills. Gradually, the criminal activities in support of terrorism become ends in themselves, as terrorist groups come to resemble ordinary criminal organizations with a thin political veneer.

If the world's major terrorist groups sank into common criminality, the problem of terrorism might diminish, but the terrorists' lack of progress and the methods necessary to achieve their goals remain issues within the terrorist ranks. As in war, when neither side prevails, there is a tendency toward escalation, and we see evidence of escalation in terrorism. At the beginning of the 1970s, 80 percent of terrorist operations were directed against things, 20 percent against people. By the 1980s, approximately half of all terrorist attacks were directed against people. Incidents with fatalities, as cited earlier, have increased by roughly 20 percent a year. Large-scale, indiscriminate attacks like the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut have become more common. In 1982, six terrorist bombings alone killed over 80 persons and injured more than 400. The year 1983 was the year of the car bomb; car bombs in 1983 killed over 500 and injured more than 600 persons. Civilian bystanders—people who just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time—are increasingly victims of terrorist operations, further evidence of growing indiscriminate violence.

There are several explanations for the increasing bloodiness of terrorism. In some cases, terrorists have been brutalized by long struggles, and the public has become numbed. Staying in the headlines in a world where incidents of terrorism have become common and recovering the coercive power they once exercised over governments who have

since become more resistant require the terrorists to commit acts of greater violence. Terrorists also have become more proficient; they can now build bigger bombs. At the same time, the composition of terrorist groups has changed, as harder men have replaced the older generations of ideological extremists who debated the morality and utility of actions against selected individuals.

Just how far terrorism will escalate remains a matter of debate within the inner circles of terrorist leaders and of conjecture by outside observers. We could see more of more of the same, no great change in tactics or targets, or the continued ragged increase of terrorism as we know it today. Or we could see escalation in the form of increasing events of large-scale violence. At the far edge of plausibility are the scenarios that fascinate journalists and novelists, in which terrorists acquire and use or threaten to use chemical or nuclear weapons to hold cities hostage. Almost every terrorist group probably has contemplated the utility of violence on a larger scale. For the most part, they have rejected it. Unless we are talking about high-technology terrorism, the constraints on terrorists are not technical, but rather are self-imposed and political.

If recent bombings in London, Paris, Beirut, Kuwait, and Pretoria are any indication, these constraints seem to be eroding. In hideouts of the Red Brigades, Italian police last year discovered a terrorist plan to attack the Christian Democrats political convention—an operation that could have resulted in the deaths of dozens of people. Smarting from his defeat and withdrawal from Beirut, PLO chief Yasir Arafat reportedly is under pressure from hardliners to abandon his current “moderate” course and permit the creation of a new Black September organization to wage a worldwide campaign of terrorism. The recent car bombing in Pretoria represents a new and significantly more lethal phase in the struggle of African National Congress guerrillas against white rule in South Africa.

Occasionally, intelligence sources, terrorist publications, and the testimony of defectors give us a glimmer of the arguments for and against such operations. The more moderate among the extremists argue that apart from being immoral, indiscriminate violence is counterproductive. It alienates perceived constituents (even if they are largely imaginary), causes public revulsion, provokes extreme countermeasures that the organization might not survive, and exposes the operation and the organization itself to betrayal by terrorists who have no stomach for slaughter. Harder men and women counter that wars (even fantasy wars) are won by the ruthless application of violence. Often the hardliners prevail.

It is difficult to argue for restraint in an organization composed of extremists who have already taken up arms, especially if things are not going well. Terrorists are by nature not easily disciplined. Those with too many scruples drop out, are removed, or go along with hardliners to maintain their position of leadership.

Governments grow tougher and more efficient. Terrorists persist and grow more savage. And terrorism increases.

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