

# The Jedi Packet Trick takes over the Deathstar

(or: "taking NIC backdoors to the next level")

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# Previously on Project Maux

- ⦿ 2006-2007 “the early years”
  - ⦿ find out by accident about NIC offloading of checksum routines...  
⇒ can we hook something to that?
  - ⦿ Broadcom's Tigon firmware says it is based on MIPS, the firmware is downloadable from the Internet, there is no firmware installation security and I happen to have a DECstation 3000 in the basement...  
⇒ dbx and go!
  - ⦿ transform a few cards into doorstops and eventually hook the IP checksum...  
⇒ 5 second sniffer in a circular buffer

# Previously on Project Maux

- 2007-2008 “Mummy, mummy, I want a shell!”
  - nVidia releases the CUDA development toolkit  
⇒ the GPU becomes interesting
  - PCI-to-PCI transfers are not marshalled by the OS  
⇒ PCI-to-PCI between the NIC and the GPU
  - the NIC gets to see the packets first  
⇒ we use the checksum hook to interpret and forward
  - a PCI card has DMA over the whole RAM  
⇒ we can play in memory and the OS shall never know

root, firmware, OS-independent


# Previously on Project Maux

- 2007-2008 net result:

- nicssh

- no installer

- no GPU persistence



```
archimede:~/nicssh$ nicssh 10.4.4.233
Connecting to 10.4.4.233
ICMP Echo Reply from OS - no nicfw
archimede:~/nicssh$ nicssh 10.4.4.234
Connecting to 10.4.4.234
ICMP Echo Reply from nicfw (Windows system)
Requesting tcp/80 with cloaking
nicssh> ?
help memory* sniff* send* reboot cleanup
quit
nicssh>
```

*stop press: it is called ASF/RCMP and is  
shipped by default with Broadcom cards!  
Allez Loic!*

# Previously on Project Maux

- ⌚ 2007-2008 “now what?”
  - ⌚ **Jedi Packet Trick**: if I have two (vulnerable) NICs in a card what can I possibly do? How about sending packets between them over the PCI bus?
  - ⌚ **Driver Takeover** aka “attack from below”: drivers tend to assume that NICs will not attack them...
  - ⌚ **Installation and Persistence**: “hey, click here to use my new firmware” only works a few times, not at every boot...

# “I have a cunning plan” (once again)

- ⦿ **Jedi Packet Trick:** “easy”
  - ⦿ take over NIC1, inject nicssh, use nicssh to take over NIC2
  - ⦿ magic packets travel between NIC1 and NIC2 over the PCI bus
- ⦿ **Driver Takeover:** OS-dependent, not for me
- ⦿ **Installation:** remote factory diagnostics
- ⦿ **Persistence:** EFI module

# Some preliminary notes

- ⦿ This is still **not** a funded project but personal curiosity driven what-if research,
- ⦿ I am using the old stock of NICs I bought back in 2008 to replace the doorstops,
- ⦿ The old motto still holds:  
**Given no prior knowledge, “the Internet”, a cheap 10-pack of NICs and a PC can we develop the ultimate rootkit?**

# Deathstar Mk.I design

- EAL level  $1 \cdot 10^{23}$  firewall with two NICs
  - NIC1 is the external interface
  - NIC2 is the internal interface
- nVidia GPU
  - But of course, all firewalls have gaming GPUs!
- EFI BIOS
  - ... and an EFI BIOS!

# Jedi Packet Trick

- ⦿ nicssh extended with:
  - ⦿ “**findnic**” to find other NICs on the system by scanning the PCI bus (lifted code from BSD)
  - ⦿ “**grabnic**” to take it over by injecting the modified firmware into the other card simulating an OS pushing new firmware
  - ⦿ “**forward**” to set up forwarding: like good old overlays it never returns... this turns nicssh into a two-way pipe between NICs.  
All magic packets are forwarded between NICs.
- ⦿ nice but... it requires a suitable GPU

# Jedi Packet Trick

```
archimede:~/nicssh$ nicssh 10.4.4.230
Connecting to 10.4.4.230
ICMP Echo Reply from nicfw (Linux system)
Requesting tcp/80 with cloaking
nicssh> ?
help memory* sniff* send* findnic* grabnic* forward*
reboot cleanup quit
nicssh> findnic 0 3 21
Hunting on bus0... nope
Hunting on bus3...
3:0:0: Tigon
5:0:0: Tigon
Hunting on bus21...
21:0:0: Intel 82571EB
21:0:1: Intel 82571EB
nicssh> grabnic 3:0:0
My man, it already runs nicfw!
nicssh> grabnic 5:0:0
Trying...done
nicssh> forward 3:0:0 5:0:0
Forwarding starting - shell being replaced now
I'm afraid. I'm afraid, Dave. Dave, my mind is going. I can feel it...
```

We want NIC-to-NIC!

# Jedi Packet Trick

- ⦿ NIC-to-NIC requires
  - ⦿ installation
    - ⦿ PCI bus scan to locate other NICs
    - ⦿ initiating a firmware update
    - ⦿ pushing firmware to the other NIC
  - ⦿ communication
    - ⦿ PCI-to-PCI device data transfer
    - ⦿ suitable marshalling of the above


# Jedi Packet Trick

- ⦿ The problems begin...
- ⦿ the space in the firmware is not huge so a PCI bus scanner is not really on the books
- ⦿ where do I get the firmware image from?
- ⦿ how do I efficiently push it?
- ⦿ (assuming we solve the above) how do we make sure our firewall bypass is not too obvious?

# Jedi Packet Trick

- ⦿ Firmware is small...

- ⦿ don't perform a true PCI bus scan but cheat: we are looking for cards which look like us so how about we restrict ourselves to the identifiers we want?
- ⦿ and the image is large...
- ⦿ so why don't we just copy our own image over since we are the same NIC as we only scanned for close relatives?



Type:	Ethernet Controller
Bus:	PCI
Vendor ID:	0x10de
Device ID:	0x0ab0
Subsystem Vendor ID:	0x10de
Subsystem ID:	0xcb79
Revision ID:	0x00b1


# Jedi Packet Trick

- ⦿ Now we need to push the image: this takes time and as it happens the NIC is non-responsive...
- ⦿ we could wait for a reboot and push it as part of our NIC initialisation routine?
- ⦿ wait for a quiescent time and then push it?
- ⦿ just make the firewall hang for 30 seconds and who cares!

# Jedi Packet Trick

- PCI-to-PCI transfer is simply a replacement of the nicssh channel with one to the other NIC, everything else stays the same.
- Stealth is our middle name so we cannot afford to have our NIC-to-NIC channel reduce the performance of the firewall:
  - rate-limit the NIC-to-NIC channel to approx. 64kbps. This is empirically slow enough that the kink during heavy load is not too noticeable.
  - if the transfer rate from the driver starts getting heavy simply shut the channel down.

# Jedi Packet Trick



# Jedi Packet Trick

- ⦿ So what?

- ⦿ complete bypass of any OS-based firewall as the OS is oblivious to the traffic being passed between the NICs

- ⦿ How do you catch it then?

- ⦿ timing analysis is one possibility: the hidden channel will rob your firewall of performance
  - ⦿ IDS on both sides testing the validity of the ruleset

# Installation

- Project Maux Mk. I & II suffered from a major drawback: installation required admin privileges to run the firmware update.
- At the same time looking at the firmware there were hints of a “remote update” capability (at least in the cards I have).

# Installation

- The “remote update” capability appears to be linked to some sort of factory testing. Once it completes it initiates a factory test on the firmware.
- The “remote update” works by sending a WOL followed by a UDP packet in a special format containing a header followed by as many UDP packets as needed for the firmware.

# Installation

- ⦿ UDP is good and bad...
- ⦿ easy to spoof: we could send our firmware updates from anywhere on the Internet
- ⦿ hard to confirm that the packet got there: how do we know that all the parts of the update got to the card?
- ⦿ Net result: it works in the lab.

# Installation

```
archimede:~/nicssh$ sudo nicssh -i nicfw.bin 10.4.4.230
Sending UDP magic to 10.4.4.230...done
ICMP Echo Reply from nicfw (Linux system)
Injection successful
archimede:~/nicssh$ nicssh -gi gpussh.bin 10.4.4.230
Connecting to 10.4.4.230
Preparing to send GPU code
ICMP Echo Reply from nicfw (Linux system)
Requesting GPU RAM injection
Sending GPU code...done
archimede:~/nicssh$ nicssh 10.4.4.230
Connecting to 10.4.4.230
[...]
```

# Installation

- ➊ But is remote installation so important?
- ➋ probably not: we have plenty of remote vectors which can be used to push the firmware at the OS level
- ➌ once the initial install is done we can leverage the remote firmware update capability of the Jedi Packet Trick

# Persistence

(or “there’s a 2006 Intel iMac there doing nothing!”)

- ⦿ Intel iMacs come with EFI
- ⦿ EFI is modular
- ⦿ Apple has an EFI Dev Kit on their Developer Connection...
- ⦿ Why don’t I write an EFI module to load the NIC firmware and nicssh 2.0?
- ⦿ Why don’t I hide the EFI module on the IDE/SATA disk?

# Persistence

- ⦿ EFI module design
  - ⦿ responsible for loading NIC firmware
  - ⦿ responsible for installing nicssh in GPU
  - ⦿ responsible for maintaining hidden location on IDE/SATA disk
- ⦿ All of the above still under development

# Persistence

- ➊ What works?
  - ➌ EFI module which loads NIC firmware
  - ➌ EFI module which loads nicssh
- ➋ What doesn't work?
  - ➌ storing it on the IDE/SATA disk
  - ➌ loading the EFI module correctly
- ➌ Looking at PGP WDE for OS X design for ideas...

# Putting it all together

- ➊ A staged attack against a firewall
  - ➋ “remote update” over UDP to NIC1
  - ➋ firmware update of NIC2
  - ➋ push EFI module into SATA disk to defend against NIC reflashing (we reflash it too!)
- ➋ Initiate Jedi Packet Trick

# What now?

- ➊ Attack cards with proper firmware security:
  - ➋ crypto vulnerabilities
  - ➋ bad key management (OEMs come to mind)
  - ➋ remote management (nice one Loïc!)
- ➋ Go further... how about CPU  $\mu$ code?

# $\mu$ code

- ⦿ Yet another cunning plan...
  - ⦿ most modern CPUs have  $\mu$ code update functionality to patch errata in the CPU implementation
  - ⦿ there is often more than one  $\mu$ code update released during the lifetime of the CPU
  - ⦿ each CPU  $\mu$ code update has to contain the previous ones plus the new one
  - ⦿ each erratum is known as manufacturers publish them
  - ⦿ each  $\mu$ code update states which errata are fixed by it

# $\mu$ code

- Let's say that your family contains a former  $\mu$ code guru
  - then, in theory, he could figure out some  $\mu$ code for a given set of errata
  - you could then look at the  $\mu$ code before and after the errata and, in theory, you could have some known plaintext with which to attack the  $\mu$ code update...

# $\mu$ code

- let's say that with enough known plaintext you recover the encryption key... then you could start modifying  $\mu$ code for injection
- now you have to worry about reboots as  $\mu$ code updates are not persistent across reboots (which is good for testing!)
- EFI comes to the rescue there...

# $\mu$ code

## ⌚ The ultimate hack

- ⌚ modify the NIC firmware remotely
- ⌚ install nicssh for backdooring
- ⌚ push modified  $\mu$ code which blocks anything we believe hostile (e.g. using the GPU memory where our nicssh lives)
- ⌚ install EFI module for persistence of all the above

# Thanks

- ⦿ My family & their  $\infty$  patience while I play with my toys (and for having a  $\mu$ code guru in it),
- ⦿ Toby, Ryan and Brian for keeping the hard questions coming,
- ⦿ Maya for project naming,
- ⦿ lcars for being my ever-present simulacrum,
- ⦿ C<sub>8</sub>H<sub>10</sub>N<sub>4</sub>O<sub>2</sub>

# References

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