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# AI and Compute

How Much Longer Can Computing Power  
Drive Artificial Intelligence Progress?

CSET Issue Brief



## AUTHORS

Andrew J. Lohn

Micah Musser

## Executive Summary

For the last decade, breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have come like clockwork, driven to a significant extent by an exponentially growing demand for computing power (“compute” for short). One of the largest models, released in 2020, used 600,000 times more computing power than the noteworthy 2012 model that first popularized deep learning. In 2018, researchers at OpenAI highlighted this trend and attempted to quantify the rate of increase, but it is now clear this rate of growth cannot be sustained for long. In fact, the impending slowdown may have already begun.

Deep learning will soon face a slowdown in its ability to consume ever more compute for at least three reasons: (1) training is expensive; (2) there is a limited supply of AI chips; and (3) training extremely large models generates traffic jams across many processors that are difficult to manage. Experts may not agree about which of these is the most pressing, but it is almost certain that they cannot all be managed enough to maintain the last decade’s rate of growth in computing.

Progress towards increasingly powerful and generalizable AI is still possible, but it will require a partial re-orientation away from the dominant strategy of the past decade—more compute—towards other approaches. We find that improvements in hardware and algorithmic efficiency offer promise for continued advancement, even if they are unlikely to fully offset a slowdown in the growth of computing power usage. Additionally, researchers are likely to turn to approaches that are more focused on specific applications rather than the “brute-force” methods that undergirded much of the last decade of AI research. The release of AlphaFold, which made incredible progress on a long-standing problem in the field of biology without the need for record-breaking levels of computing power, may be an example of this new shift in focus.

These findings lead to a few recommendations for policymakers:

- If continued AI advancement relies increasingly on improved algorithms and hardware designs, then policy should focus on attracting, developing, and retaining more talented researchers rather than simply outspending rivals on computing power.
- As a specific example of the above, we suggest that institutions such as the National AI Research Resource should not view computing power alone as the primary way to support AI researchers. These institutions should also invest in providing researchers with the skills to innovate with contemporary AI algorithms and to manage modern AI infrastructure, or should actively promote interdisciplinary work between the AI field and other subfields of computer science.
- Finally, policymakers should take proactive steps to ensure that researchers with small or moderate budgets can effectively contribute to the AI research field. Concentrating state-of-the-art technologies among the small number of research centers possessing extremely large compute budgets risks creating oligopolistic markets and shrinking the talent pool and opportunities for researchers.

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## Introduction

In the field of AI, not checking the news for a few months is enough to become “out of touch.” Occasionally, this breakneck speed of development is driven by revolutionary theories or original ideas. More often, the newest state-of-the-art model doesn’t rely on any new conceptual advances at all, rather just a larger neural network and more powerful computing systems than were used in previous attempts.


In 2018, researchers at OpenAI attempted to quantify the rate at which the largest models in AI research were growing in terms of their demands for computing power (often referred to as “compute” for short).<sup>1</sup> By examining the amount of compute required to train some of the most influential AI models over the history of AI research, they identified two trend lines for the rate of compute growth.

They found that prior to 2012, the amount of compute used to build a breakthrough model grew at roughly the same rate as Moore’s law, the long-standing observation that the computational power of an individual microchip has tended to double every two years. In 2012, however, the release of the image recognition system AlexNet sparked interest in the use of deep learning methods—the computationally expensive methods that have been behind most of the AI advances of the past decade. Following the release of AlexNet, the compute demands of top models began to climb far faster than the previous trend, doubling not every two years but rather every 3.4 months between 2012 and 2018, as visualized in Figure 1.

The largest models in the early years of deep learning were devoted to image classification, where researchers quickly realized that increasing computing power reliably led to better performances.<sup>2</sup> After image recognition systems began to surpass human-level performance on some tasks, research shifted to new priorities even as the same trend in rising compute needs continued. Around the middle of the 2010s, larger AI models were playing games like Atari or Go using reinforcement learning algorithms.<sup>3</sup> Then, the emergence of a new architecture known as

the transformer shifted attention again—this time to language tasks.<sup>4</sup> Over the past few years, the largest AI models have been text generators like OpenAI’s GPT-3.<sup>5</sup> Even with improvements to algorithms and architectures enabling them to do more learning with fewer calculations, the computing demands continued to expand. That same 3.4-month doubling time for compute needs has continued more or less uninterrupted from AlexNet to GPT-3.

Figure 1: Growth in compute demands over the past decade far outpaces the historical norm



Source: OpenAI and CSET.

This compute demand trend only considers the most compute-intensive models from the history of AI research. The most impactful models are not necessarily the largest or the most compute-intensive. Most AI projects are much smaller than these large efforts, and even some famous breakthroughs, such as AlphaFold, used more modest computing power. However, several of the most well-known breakthroughs of the last decade—from the first AI that could beat a human champion at Go to the first AI that could write news articles that humans mistook for human-authored text—required record-breaking levels of compute to train.

These massive models tend to be adaptable in addition to being capable, which means they can form the foundation for a wider

range of applications and studies because of their general purpose nature. Some researchers have begun referring to models like these as “foundation models” and have suggested that the next wave of AI research will emphasize such approaches.<sup>6</sup> Whether or not this framework is accepted, however, it is clear that with sufficient compute, models can be developed that acquire skills far beyond what they were explicitly trained to do. GPT-3, for instance, not only learned how to write realistic-looking text—it also learned how to generate passable programming code and even rudimentary music compositions, despite not having been explicitly intended to do so.

While we believe that the computing used in future models will continue to grow, the current growth rate for training the most compute-intensive models is unsustainable.<sup>7</sup> We estimate that the absolute upper limit of this trend’s viability is at most a few years away, and that, in fact, the impending slowdown may have already begun. The implications of this finding are significant, as it means that the future of AI progress will likely rely more on algorithmic innovation and applications than simply scaling-up compute usage. If correct, this projection could affect the tools at policymakers’ disposal for promoting AI development.

## Modern Compute Infrastructure

In order to understand the sustainability (or unsustainability) of the compute growth trend, it is helpful to understand the current compute landscape.

GPT-3 and similar models such as the Chinese PanGu-alpha, Nvidia's Megatron-Turing NLG, and DeepMind's Gopher are the current state of the art in terms of computing appetite.<sup>8</sup> Training GPT-3 in 2020 required a massive computing system that was effectively one of the five largest supercomputers in the world.<sup>9</sup>

For large models like these, compute consumption is measured in petaFLOPS-days. One petaFLOPS-day is the number of computations that could be performed in one day by a computer capable of calculating a thousand trillion computations (specifically, floating point operations) per second. For comparison, a standard laptop would need about a year to reach one petaFLOPS-day.<sup>10</sup> That laptop would need several millennia to reach the 3,640 petaFLOPS-days it took to train GPT-3. On the world's hundredth-fastest supercomputer, GPT-3 could be trained in two and a half years, and even on the world's fastest supercomputer, training would still take over a week.\*

High-end AI supercomputers require special purpose accelerators such as Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) such as Google's Tensor Processing Units (TPUs) or Huawei's Ascend 910. These accelerators are specialized hardware chips that are optimized for performing the mathematical operations of machine learning. They are managed by many general purpose computer chips (primarily Central Processing Units, or CPUs) and data is passed using high bandwidth interconnections.<sup>11</sup> The accelerator chips are common for training even relatively small models, though inference—using the model after it is trained—is a much simpler task that typically

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\* At the time of writing, the world's fastest supercomputer (Fugaku) can compute 442 petaFLOPS. The tenth and hundredth fastest can compute 23.5 and 4.1 petaFLOPS respectively. "TOP500 List – June 2021," *TOP500*, accessed December 4, 2021, <https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/list/2021/06/>.



uses fewer special accelerators or uses accelerators that are specialized for low power, including another class of chip called Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).<sup>12</sup> All of this hardware can be purchased outright, or—as is common for AI research—rented through cloud services such as Google Cloud, Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, or IBM Cloud.

Cloud services offer economies of scale by sharing maintenance personnel, building space, cooling, and other operational necessities across many projects. Because these expenses are all included in the cloud computing costs that researchers pay, we use cloud computing costs to estimate how expensive the compute demand trendline is both today and in the future. Given the price of purchasing compute through the cloud, how much longer can this growth trend continue, and when will the exponential growth trend in compute demand become non-viable?

Table 1: A basic comparison of AI processors

Processor Type	Uses in the AI Pipeline	Other Uses
Central Processing Unit (CPU)	Small models can be directly trained or fine-tuned on CPUs; necessary in larger models as a means to coordinate training across GPUs or ASICs. Sometimes needed to generate or manipulate training data.	Central unit of every computing device; at least one CPU is necessary for every computer, phone, smart appliance, etc.
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)	Optimized to perform certain mathematical operations that are also common in machine learning; can train models far quicker than CPUs	Used for video game systems to render 3D graphics; commonly used for cryptocurrency mining
Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)	Designed specifically for AI, to perform the types of matrix operations that are the bedrock of machine learning; can train models far quicker than CPUs	If designed specifically for AI algorithms, no major uses beyond the AI pipeline
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)	Primarily used for model inference using AI models that have already been trained	Used in a wide variety of applications, particularly in embedded systems

Source: CSET.

## Projecting the Cost and Future of AI and Compute

One possible constraint on the growth of compute is expense. Throughout this paper, we do not consider the compute needed to generate or prepare the data, instead restricting analysis to the training process itself. We use Google's TPUs as a baseline to calculate the expected cost of compute. These TPUs are among the most cost-efficient accelerators being advertised at the time of writing, though we obtain similar results when using state-of-the-art GPUs in our calculations.<sup>13</sup> For these calculations, we make two simplifying assumptions here that we will relax in the next two sections: for now, we assume that (1) the cost of compute remains constant, and (2) the only constraint on GPU and ASIC access is willingness to pay (and not the number of physical chips that actually exist in the real world).

With these assumptions in place, we can begin to make some rough estimates. At the advertised maximum performance of a Google TPU v3, it would take approximately 57 hours and cost approximately \$450 to reach one petaFLOPS-day of training. GPT-3 required approximately 3,600 petaFLOPS-days to train, which works out to a cost of around \$1.65 million if trained on TPUs performing continuously at their maximum speeds.\* Even that was somewhat less than the 20,000 petaFLOPS-days that the compute demand trendline anticipated for the largest model as of the day GPT-3 was released, which would cost \$9.4 million at current prices. By the end of 2021, the trendline predicted several more doublings, for an anticipated model of just over one million petaFLOPS-days. Training such a model at Google Cloud's current prices would cost over \$450 million.

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\* OpenAI did not release the actual costs, but estimates are typically higher than ours because we have made conservatively low pricing assumptions and assumed 100 percent accelerator utilization. An estimate of about \$4.6 million is probably more accurate. We use conservatively low cost estimates to ensure that we do not overstate the rising cost of training models and the impending slowdown in compute growth. Chuan Li, "OpenAI's GPT-3 Language Model: A Technical Overview," *Lambda Labs*, June 3, 2020, <https://lambdalabs.com/blog/demystifying-gpt-3/>.

That is a large sticker price, to be sure, but not unobtainable. Governments have, in the past, paid much more to fund basic scientific projects. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is said to have cost \$3.5 billion, finding the Higgs Boson was estimated to have cost \$13.25 billion, and the Apollo program's annual expense of 2.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) would be about \$450 billion today.<sup>14</sup> But the trendline that described the growth of AI models over the past decade quickly blows past these benchmarks too, costing as much as the NIF by October 2022, the search for the Higgs Boson by May 2023, and surpassing the Apollo program in October of 2024. In fact, by 2026, the training cost of the largest AI model predicted by the compute demand trendline would cost more than the total U.S. GDP (see Figure 2, below).\*

Actually spending a U.S.-GDP-worth of money to train a single mega-powerful AI model is highly unlikely. Indeed, even spending as much as the entire search for the Higgs Boson to train a single model seems improbable in the near term. This suggests that the compute demand trendline should be expected to break within two to three years at the latest, and certainly well before 2026—if it hasn't done so already.

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\* Our calculations for reaching this conclusion, along with our calculations for other figures in this and the next two sections, can be found in our GitHub repository: [https://github.com/georgetown-cset/AI\\_and\\_compute\\_2022](https://github.com/georgetown-cset/AI_and_compute_2022).

## The Cost of Compute

While this projection seems pessimistic, the reader might object that the cost of compute is not fixed in the way that we have assumed. To explore the extent to which falling computing prices can extend the viability of AI's compute demand trendline, we consider the historical trends in cost of computing.

The price of computations in gigaFLOPS has not decreased since 2017.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, cloud GPU prices have remained constant for Amazon Web Services since at least 2017 and Google Cloud since at least 2019.<sup>16</sup> Although more advanced chips have been introduced in that time—with the primary example being Nvidia's A100 GPU, released in 2020—they only offer five percent more FLOPS per dollar than the V100 that was released in 2017.\*

During this period, manufacturers have improved performance by developing chips that can perform less precise computations rather than by simply performing more of them. A full floating point operation, or FLOP, uses 32 bits for each number, but deep learning methods do not always need that much precision and can run faster without it. For example, GPT-3 only used half-point precision, which requires half as much memory and can be computed faster. Nvidia has used techniques to further reduce precision that have allowed their newest processors to train two to three times faster than in 2017. Nonetheless, only so much precision can be shaved off of these calculations before AI performance degrades, and these techniques are quickly reaching practical limitations.


As for price per computation, there is a surprising dearth of quantitative research. Some sources, however, suggest that the amount of compute that could be purchased for a dollar (as measured in FLOPs) has doubled roughly every 2.3 years on average since the 1940s, with a slower doubling rate of between three and five years over the past decade.<sup>17</sup> Figure 2 shows that if

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\* For single precision, the A100 advertises 19.5 teraFLOPS and costs \$2.939 per hour on Google Cloud. The V100 costs \$2.48 per hour and advertises single precision at between 14 and 16.4 teraFLOPS.

we assume that compute per dollar is likely to double roughly every four years (solid line), or even every two years (lower bound of shaded region), the compute trendline still quickly becomes unsustainable before the end of the decade.

Figure 2: Extrapolated costs will soon become infeasible



Source: CSET. Note: The blue line represents growing costs assuming compute per dollar doubles every four years, with error shading representing no change in compute costs or a doubling time as fast as every two years. The red line represents expected GDP at a growth of 3 percent per year from 2019 levels with error shading representing growth between 2 and 5 percent.

Without any changes in the price of compute, the cost of a cutting-edge model is expected to cross the U.S. GDP threshold in June of 2026. If the amount of compute that can be performed for a dollar doubles every four years, this point is only pushed back by five months to November of 2026. Even if compute per dollar doubled at the rapid pace of every two years, this point is only delayed until May of 2027, less than a year after it would be reached with no changes in the price of compute. Relaxing the assumption that compute per dollar is a stable value, then, likely buys the original trendline only a few additional months of sustainability.

## The Availability of Compute

Rather than fall, price per computation may actually rise as demand outpaces supply. Excess demand is already driving GPU prices to double or triple retail prices.<sup>18</sup> Chip shortages are stalling the automotive industry and delaying products like iPhones, PlayStations, and Xboxes, while creating long wait lists for customers across the board.<sup>19</sup> Whether budgets grow fast enough to continue buying them does not matter if there are not enough chips to continue the trend.

Estimates for the number of existing AI accelerators are imprecise. Once manufactured, most GPUs are used for non-AI applications such as personal computers, gaming, or cryptomining. The large clusters of accelerators needed to set AI compute records are mostly managed in datacenters, but many of those accelerators are better suited for low-power inference than high-performance training.<sup>20</sup> In what follows, our estimates attempt to count the accelerators managed across all cloud datacenters without separating inference chips from training chips, an approach that likely overstates the number of accelerators actually available for AI training.

Overall, 123 million GPUs shipped in the second quarter of 2021, with Nvidia accounting for 15.23 percent of the total, which suggests Nvidia sells approximately 75 million GPU units per year.<sup>21</sup> Thirty-seven percent of Nvidia's revenue came from the datacenter market, and if we likewise assume that approximately 37 percent of its units went to datacenters, this translates to about 28 million Nvidia GPUs going to datacenters annually.<sup>22</sup> Nvidia GPUs are not the only AI accelerators going into datacenters, but they reportedly make up 80 percent of the market.<sup>23</sup> Based on all these figures, we estimate the total number of accelerators reaching datacenters annually to be somewhere in the ballpark of 35 million. This figure is likely a substantial, but it does not need to

be precise.\* As in the previous section, large errors in estimating the total available supply only result in small changes in the dates at which large-scale models on the compute demand trendline become unattainable.

Following the conventional three-year lifespan for accelerators, we find that by the end of 2025, the compute demand trendline predicts that a single model would require the use of every GPU in every datacenter for a continuous period of three years in order to fully train.<sup>†</sup> Since such a model would need to begin training at the end of 2022 with the full utilization of all accelerators already in cloud datacenters at that time, it would need to use all datacenter accelerators produced since 2019. Just over two years have passed since then, so it is natural to wonder: is the compute demand trend even still alive today, and how much more compute growth is possible if it is not?

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\* For this calculation we assumed that 37 percent of Nvidia's revenue coming from the datacenter market implies that 37 percent of its units are shipped to datacenters, but high-end AI processors are more expensive than most consumer GPUs, which means that fewer Nvidia accelerators likely end up in cloud datacenters each year than what we have calculated.

<sup>†</sup> Specifically, December 2025. Even if our estimate for the number of accelerators available in the cloud to train on is off by an order of magnitude, this breaking point would still be reached by December of 2026. The reality may even be more pessimistic than we claim here, because for our calculations we assume that every accelerator in the cloud is capable of operating continuously with a throughput of 163 teraFLOPs per second, a figure that has been obtained experimentally on Nvidia A100 GPUs but that likely overestimates the average performance of all accelerators available in the cloud. See Deepak Narayanan et al., "Efficient Large-Scale Language Model Training on GPU Clusters Using Megatron-LM," *arXiv [cs.CL]* (April 2021): arXiv:2104.04473.



## Managing Massive Models


The only major increases in model size since GPT-3's release in 2020 have been a 530 billion parameter model called Megatron-Turing NLG, which was announced in October 2021, and a 280 billion parameter model called Gopher, which was announced in December 2021. The developers of Megatron-Turing NLG reported the size of their compute infrastructure, but they did not report how long the model was trained for, making it impossible to infer a total compute requirement for the model's training process.<sup>24</sup> A useful estimate for how much compute such a model might require to train came five months earlier, when the same developers outlined a similar approach for training models with up to one trillion parameters and included estimates for total training time.<sup>25</sup> They concluded that training a trillion parameter model would take 42,000 petaFLOPS-days, which we conservatively estimate would cost \$19.2 million dollars on Google's TPUs training continuously at maximum performance. Had such a model been released in October 2021, it would have fallen a year behind the projected compute demand trend line. This, combined with the fact that GPT-3 likewise fell below the curve, suggests that the compute demand trend may have already started to slow down.

In other research from 2020, OpenAI derived a series of mathematical equations to predict the minimum amount of compute needed to train a variety of models, based on factors like their number of parameters and dataset size.<sup>26</sup> These equations factor in how machine learning training requires the data to pass through the network several times, how compute for each pass grows as the number of parameters grows, and how the data needs to grow as the number of parameters grows.

The blue line in Figure 3 shows OpenAI's equation representing the minimal amount of compute required to effectively train language models of various sizes extrapolated to very large models.<sup>27</sup> The green squares show the amount of compute that was used to train several smaller versions of GPT-3—each of which used larger training datasets than the optimal minimum, and which therefore used more compute than the theoretical minimum. Nvidia's projection for a one trillion parameter model is

shown as a purple diamond along with projections for GPT-4 and a 100 trillion parameter model. For now, assuming that developers can achieve near optimal efficiency, the equation estimates that building GPT-4—which we define as one hundred times bigger than GPT-3 (17.5 trillion parameters)—would take at least 450,000 petaFLOPS-days. That would require 7,600 GPUs running for a year and would cost about \$200 million. Training a 100 trillion parameter model would need 83,000 GPUs running for a year and would cost over \$2 billion.<sup>28</sup>

Figure 3: Anticipated compute needs for potential AI milestones




Source: OpenAI, Nvidia, and CSET.

83,000 GPUs represents only 0.2 percent of the 35 million accelerators we estimate go into the cloud every year, and \$2 billion is a very high sticker price, though well within the budgetary capacity of a nation-state. But for models over roughly one trillion parameters to be trained at all, researchers will have to overcome an additional series of technical challenges driven by a simple problem: models are already getting too large to manage. The largest AI models no longer fit on a single processor, which means that even inference requires clusters of processors to function. This requires careful orchestration on a technical level to

ensure that multiple processors can run in parallel with one another.

Parallelization for AI is not new. In prior years, AI training often used data parallelization methods, in which many processors worked simultaneously on separate slices of the data, but each processor still stored a full copy of the model. Despite increases in processor memory, this is no longer possible. To train these cutting-edge models, the layers of a deep neural network are held on different processors and even individual layers may be split across processors, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Representation of highly parallelized model training



Source: CSET.

As one example, the 530 billion parameter Megatron-Turing model used 4,480 GPUs in total. Eight different copies of the model ran simultaneously on different slices of the data, but each copy of the model was so big that it was stored across 280 GPUs. The layers of the neural network were split across 35 servers, with each layer itself being spread across eight GPUs.<sup>29</sup> This example shows the complexity of the problem, which only gets more

difficult as the size of the model increases. Moreover, coordinating all of this activity places additional compute requirements on the training process while also requiring significant technical expertise to manage.

Splitting the training process across multiple processors means that the results of computations performed on one processor must be passed to others. At large enough scales, that communication can take significant time, and traffic jams arise. Managing the flows so that traffic does not grind to a halt is arguably the main impediment for continuing to scale up the size of AI models. Some experts question whether it is even possible to significantly increase the parallelization for transformer models like the one used in GPT-3 beyond what has already been accomplished.<sup>30</sup>

## Where Will Future Progress Come From?

If the rate of growth in compute demands is already slowing down, then future progress in AI cannot rely on just continuing to scale up model sizes, and will instead have to come from doing more with more modest increases in compute. Unfortunately, although algorithms have been exponentially improving their efficiency, the rate of improvement is not fast enough to make up for a loss in compute growth. The number of computations required to reach AlexNet's level of performance in 2018 was a mere 1/25th the number of computations that were required to reach the same level of performance in 2012.<sup>31</sup> But over the same period, the compute demand trend covered a 300,000 times increase in compute usage. Although algorithms improved dramatically over the last decade, the growth in compute usage has in general been a larger factor in improving the performance of cutting-edge models.<sup>32</sup>

Estimating the rate of improvement in algorithmic efficiency is much harder than estimating the growth in compute usage because it varies across applications, with many major architectures or subfields having only become popular recently.<sup>33</sup> Over short time periods, some domains have improved at nearly the same rate as the compute growth trend.<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, an end or even partial slowdown to the historical rate of increase in compute usage would require major and continual improvements to algorithmic efficiency in order to compensate. Additionally, efficiency improvements have already been happening throughout the deep learning boom. Making up for a reduced ability to simply scale up compute usage would require not only finding major additional gains in efficiency, but doing so at a rate that is faster than researchers have already been doing. These improvements would need to increase substantially from an already impressively high rate.

Although these results may seem bleak, AI progress will not grind to a halt. The trend in growing compute consumption that drove many of the headlines for the past decade cannot last for much longer, but it will probably slow rather than end abruptly. We should also not discount ingenuity and innovations that could lead

to new breakthroughs in algorithms or techniques, particularly when financial incentives are so large. Indeed, the focus on parallelization that enabled the compute explosion in the first place is largely a byproduct of the looming end of Moore's law and the resulting fears of stagnating compute growth. Some current and future theoretical approaches offer promise for advancing AI research.

Leading algorithms—like the transformer—may be losing training efficiency at the largest sizes, but other architectures are starting to sustain larger models. For instance, Mixture of Experts (MoE) methods allow for more parameters by combining many smaller models together (which may themselves be transformers), each of which are individually less capable than a single large model. This approach permits models that are larger in the aggregate to be trained on less compute, with Google and the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence both releasing trillion-parameter models in the past year trained using MoE methods.<sup>35</sup> MoE approaches offer some advantages but are not as capable in any one area as the largest single models. Both compute and parameter size are critical ingredients for increasing the performance of a model under the current deep learning paradigm, and there are diminishing returns associated with scaling up one without the other.

More importantly, not all progress requires record-breaking levels of compute. AlphaFold is revolutionizing aspects of computational biochemistry and only required a few weeks of training on 16 TPUs—likely costing tens of thousands of dollars rather than the millions that were needed to train GPT-3.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, the current top performing image classifier only needed two days to train on 512 TPUs.<sup>37</sup> In part, these relative efficiencies are due to using algorithms and approaches that have become more efficient over time.<sup>38</sup> But in part, these efficiencies come from simply focusing more on application-centric problems (like protein folding) and tailoring the approach to the task rather than simply throwing more compute at the problem.

Major overhauls of the computing paradigm like quantum computing or neuromorphic chips might one day allow for vast

amounts of plentiful new compute.<sup>39</sup> But these radically different approaches to designing computing chips are still largely theoretical and are unlikely to make an impact before we project that the compute demand trendline will hit fundamental budgetary and supply availability limits. In the meantime, progress will likely involve more incremental improvements to the algorithms and architectures that already exist.

In the nearer term, where the extremes of compute power are needed, that investment can be shared. It may take years, centuries, or millennia of computing time to train a very generalized model, but far less time is needed to fine-tune such a model for newer, more specific applications.<sup>40</sup> This provides an alternate explanation for why GPT-4 has been slow to arrive: rather than simply training a newer, bigger model, OpenAI appears to have shifted its attention to adapting GPT-3 for more carefully scoped, financially viable products such as the code-generating program, Codex.

This shift from a focus on training massive “foundation” models to fine-tuning and deploying them for specific applications is likely to continue.<sup>41</sup> But this type of shift in focus mainly benefits a privileged few if such foundation models are kept as the carefully guarded secrets of a small handful of companies or governments. There may be some security benefits to having these models controlled by a trusted few organizations, which would make it more difficult for malicious actors to misuse models or develop methods of attacking them.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, if continued AI research requires access to the largest models and those are held by only the wealthiest or most powerful organizations, then AI research will become increasingly difficult for the larger part of the AI community.



## Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

For nearly a decade, buying and using more compute each year has been a primary factor driving AI research beyond what was previously thought possible. This trend is likely to break soon. Although experts may disagree about which limitation is most critical, continued progress in AI will soon require addressing major structural challenges such as exploding costs, chip shortages, and parallelization bottlenecks. Future progress will likely rest far more on a shift towards efficiency in both algorithms and hardware rather than massive increases in compute usage. In addition, we anticipate that the future of AI research will increasingly rely on tailoring algorithms, hardware, and approaches to sub-disciplines and applications.

This is not to say that progress towards increasingly powerful and generalizable AI is dead; only that it will require a partial re-orientation away from the dominant strategy of the past decade—more compute—towards other approaches. If correct, this finding has a number of implications for policymakers interested in promoting AI progress. We discuss a few of these implications below:

**(1) Shift focus towards talent development, both by increasing investment in AI education at home and by actively competing to attract highly skilled immigrants from abroad.** Improving algorithmic efficiency and overcoming parallelization bottlenecks in training are difficult problems that require significantly more human expertise than simply purchasing more compute. This suggests that the path towards continued progress in the future rests far more on developing, attracting, and retaining talent than merely outspending competitors. Correspondingly, policymakers who want to encourage AI progress at home should invest significant resources in (a) bolstering AI and computer science education, (b) increasing the number of H1-B visas available for AI researchers specifically, and (c) striving to make the United States a more attractive destination for immigrants generally. CSET already has publications addressing each of these topics.<sup>43</sup>



**(2) Support AI researchers with technical training, not just compute resources.** The National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource (NAIRR) Task Force is currently exploring the types of support that it can provide to bolster AI research in the United States, especially in the broad categories of “computational resources, high-quality data, educational tools, and user support.”<sup>44</sup> Compute remains an extremely important factor in AI progress, and the NAIRR should take steps where possible to expand the access of researchers to compute resources—especially academics, students, and those without access to multi-million-dollar budgets.

It is unlikely that the NAIRR can provide sufficient compute to researchers to keep the compute demand trendline alive, or even to compete with the quantities of compute already used by major research centers. Nonetheless, impactful results and educational experience can come from even moderately sized models. Significant attention should be paid to developing educational tools that can help researchers build the skills necessary to innovate with more efficient algorithms and better-scaling parallelization methods. Programs that promote interdisciplinary work between machine learning and other areas of computer science such as distributed systems and programming languages may be especially fruitful for generating broad efficiency gains.

**(3) Promote openness and access to large-scale models throughout the research community, especially for researchers who cannot train their own.** The future of AI research may come to focus heavily on the intermittent release of massive, compute-intensive “foundation models” that then become the basis for extensive follow-on research and development. If this general depiction is right, then the United States has an interest in ensuring that these foundation models are not monopolized by only a small handful of actors. There are likely to be other researchers or entrepreneurs who could contribute meaningfully to our understanding or application of these models even though they may lack the compute resources to build similarly sized models themselves.

Policymakers, where appropriate, should seek to encourage the owners of large foundation models to permit appropriately vetted researchers access to these models. In many cases, however, this must be balanced against the need to promote the security of the models themselves, especially those with potentially dangerous uses.<sup>45</sup> Regrettably, there are unlikely to be hard or fast rules that can govern when models should be made as public as possible or when they should be deliberately made difficult to access. At this stage, we limit ourselves to noting that efforts should be made to ensure that AI remains a field where researchers of many backgrounds can usefully contribute and where access to a few key models does not rest entirely in the hands of a coterie of powerful institutions.

## Authors

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Dario Amodei et al., “AI and Compute,” *OpenAI*, May 16, 2018, <https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/>.

<sup>2</sup> Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton, “ImageNet Classification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks,” *Communications of the ACM* 60, no. 6 (June 2017): 84-90.

<sup>3</sup> Volodymyr Mnih et al., “Playing Atari with Deep Reinforcement Learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.5602 (2013); David Silver et al., “Mastering Chess and Shogi by Self-Play with a General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.01815 (2017).

<sup>4</sup> Jacob Devlin et al., “BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.04805 (2018); Yinhan Liu et al., “RoBERTa: A Robustly Optimized BERT Pretraining Approach,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.11692 (2019); Colin Raffel et al., “Exploring the Limits of Transfer Learning with a Unified Text-to-Text Transformer,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.10683 (2019); Alec Radford et al., “Language Models are Unsupervised Multitask Learners,” *Papers With Code*, 2019, <https://paperswithcode.com/paper/language-models-are-unsupervised-multitask>; Tom Brown et al., “Language Models are Few-Shot Learners,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.14165 (2020).

<sup>5</sup> Brown, “Language Models.”

<sup>6</sup> Rishi Bommasani et al., “On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.07258 (2021).

<sup>7</sup> For this paper, we mean to say that this trend is unsustainable in the sense that the trend itself cannot continue. But it is worth mentioning that spiraling compute demands are also unsustainable in an environmental sense. Training GPT-3 released an estimated 552 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent into the atmosphere—the equivalent of 460 round-trip flights between San Francisco and New York. David Patterson et al., “Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training,” arXiv [cs.LG] (April 2021): arXiv:2104.10350. It is easy to overstate the importance of this value: even in 2020, roughly six times this many people flew between San Francisco and New York every day. “SFO Fact Sheet,” FlySFO, accessed December 4, 2021, <https://www.flysfo.com/sfo-fact-sheet>. This energy consumption is also miniscule compared to other emerging technologies that require enormous amounts of computing, most notably cryptocurrencies. In 2018, Bitcoin alone was estimated to have generated 100,000 times that volume of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and by 2021 the energy requirements of Bitcoin had nearly doubled relative to 2018. That is more electricity than the entire nation of

Finland and more than seven times as much as Google's worldwide operations. Christian Stoll, Lena Klaassen, and Ulrich Gellersdörfer, "The Carbon Footprint of Bitcoin," *MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research*, December 1, 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep34616>; Jon Huang, Claire O'Neill, and Hiroko Tabuchi, "Bitcoin Uses More Electricity Than Many Countries. How Is That Possible?" *The New York Times*, September 3, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/09/03/climate/bitcoin-carbon-footprint-electricity.html>. These caveats aside, the exponential trend we discuss here—were it to continue—would quickly make training a cutting-edge AI model an enormous expenditure, not only in terms of cost but also in terms of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions; Neil C. Thompson et al., "The Computational Limits of Deep Learning," arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.05558 (2020); Neil C. Thompson et al., "Deep Learning's Diminishing Returns," *IEEE Spectrum*, September 24, 2021, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/deep-learning-computational-cost>.

<sup>8</sup> Brown, "Language Models"; Wei Zeng et al., "PanGu- $\alpha$ : Large-scale Autoregressive Pretrained Chinese Language Models with Auto-parallel Computation," arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.12369 (2021); Paresh Kharya and Ali Alvi, "Using DeepSpeed and Megatron to Train Megatron-Turing NLG 530B, the World's Largest and Most Powerful Generative Language Model," Nvidia Developer Blog, October 11, 2021, <https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/using-deepspeed-and-megatron-to-train-megatron-turing-nlg-530b-the-worlds-largest-and-most-powerful-generative-language-model/>; Jack W. Rae et al., "Scaling Language Models: Methods, Analysis & Insights from Training Gopher," arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.11446 (2021).

<sup>9</sup> Jennifer Langston, "Microsoft announces new supercomputer, lays out vision for future AI work," *Microsoft AI Blog*, May 19, 2020, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/ai/openai-azure-supercomputer/>.

<sup>10</sup> "Apple unleashes M1," *Apple*, November 10, 2020, <https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/11/apple-unleashes-m1/>; Jon Martindale, "What is a teraflop?," *Digital Trends*, June 14, 2021, <https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/what-is-a-teraflop/>.

<sup>11</sup> Saif M. Khan and Alexander Mann, "AI Chips: What They Are and Why They Matter" (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2020), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20190014>; Albert Reuther et al., "Survey of Machine Learning Accelerators," arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.00993 (2020).

<sup>12</sup> Colby Banbury et al., "Benchmarking TinyML Systems: Challenges and Direction," arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.04821 (2020).

<sup>13</sup> No accelerator is ever as efficient as its advertised full-utilization speeds would suggest. Although our calculations assume that models are trained continuously at the theoretical peak performance of the accelerators, AI

researchers typically expect that reaching 30 to 50 percent of the full-utilization speed of an accelerator represents roughly the upper bound on practically attainable speeds. For this reason, all of our estimates in this section underestimate the cost that models of various sizes would require on current accelerators. Some expense might be saved by purchasing the chips directly rather than through the cloud, but cloud providers operate at fairly narrow margins and most major AI research projects have historically chosen to use cloud services, which bolsters the claim that cloud compute prices are an effective means of evaluating how expensive current AI approaches are.

<sup>14</sup> “FAQs,” National Ignition Facility & Photon Science, accessed December 4, 2021, <https://lasers.llnl.gov/about/faqs>; Alex Knapp, “How Much Does It Cost to Find a Higgs Boson?” *Forbes*, July 5, 2012, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/07/05/how-much-does-it-cost-to-find-a-higgs-boson/?sh=38b3b9e13948>; Deborah D. Stine, “The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and Federal Energy Technology R&D Programs: A Comparative Analysis” (Congressional Research Service, June 2009), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL34645.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Wikipedia has a historical account of lowest cost to performance ratios over many years showing decades of rapidly falling prices that have stalled since 2017. See “FLOPS,” Wikipedia, last modified December 4, 2021, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS#Hardware\\_costs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS#Hardware_costs).

<sup>16</sup> Compare Web Archive captures of “Amazon EC2 P2 Instances,” Amazon Web Services for February 10, 2017 (representing the earliest available capture) and November 23, 2021 (representing the latest available capture at time of writing) at <https://web.archive.org/web/20170210084643/https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/p2/> and <https://web.archive.org/web/20211123064633/https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/p2/>, respectively. For Google Cloud pricing, compare Web Archive captures of “GPUs pricing,” Google Cloud for August 26, 2019 (representing the earliest available capture) and November 17, 2021 (representing the latest available capture at time of writing) at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190826211015/https://cloud.google.com/compute/gpus-pricing> and <https://web.archive.org/web/20211117225616/https://cloud.google.com/compute/gpus-pricing>, respectively. Of all GPUs available at both times, only the Nvidia T4 has declined in price since 2019. It is not among the most powerful GPUs offered by Nvidia and is not commonly used for training large models.

<sup>17</sup> See “Trends in the cost of computing,” AI Impacts, accessed December 4, 2021, <https://aiimpacts.org/trends-in-the-cost-of-computing/>. Much of the data discussed in this research is either outdated or of dubious quality. A historical doubling rate of roughly two years with a more recent slowdown is nonetheless

consistent with conventional wisdom in the AI community. Because our analysis is robust to even very significant changes in this variable, we use these figures in our analysis. Even if compute per dollar were to reliably double every single year, the compute demand trendline would predict a model that would cost more to train than the U.S. GDP by the end of this decade.

<sup>18</sup> Sean Hollister, “The street prices of Nvidia and AMD GPUs are utterly out of control,” *The Verge*, March 23, 2021, <https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/23/22345891/nvidia-amd-rtx-gpus-price-scalpers-ebay-graphics-cards>.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen Wilmot, “The Great Car-Chip Shortage Will Have Lasting Consequences,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 27, 2021, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-great-car-chip-shortage-will-have-lasting-consequences-11632737422>; Stephen Nellis, “Apple says chip shortage reaches iPhone, growth forecast slows,” Reuters, July 27, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/apple-beats-sales-expectations-iphone-services-china-strength-2021-07-27/>; Paul Tassi, “PS5 and Xbox Series X Shortages Will Continue Through 2023, Most Likely,” *Forbes*, September 4, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2021/09/04/ps5-and-xbox-series-x-shortages-will-continue-through-2023-most-likely/>; Abram Brown, “The War Between Gamers and Cryptominers—and the Scarce Global Resource that Sparked It,” *Forbes*, May 24, 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2021/05/24/gamers-cryptocurrency-cryptominers-gpu-microchip/?sh=33f44052dbf8>.

<sup>20</sup> Although a single inference usually requires markedly less computation than training a model, inference can be much more computationally demanding over the long run than the initial computational cost of training a model. Nvidia has claimed that as much as 80–90 percent of compute used in AI applications is used for inference, not training. George Leopold, “AWS to Offer Nvidia’s T4 GPUs for AI Inferencing,” *HPC Wire*, March 29, 2019, <https://www.hpcwire.com/2019/03/19/aws-upgrades-its-gpu-backed-ai-inference-platform/>. This provides another reason to think that our predictions here represent overestimates of the amount of time left in the compute demand trendline—we are focused only on the growing cost of training, but if the demands of inference are factored into these equations, the overall cost of these AI models would become even higher, and the supply of AI accelerators available specifically for training would become even more strained.

<sup>21</sup> Aleksandar Kostovic, “GPU Shipments Soar in Q2 with 123 Million Units Delivered,” *Tom’s Hardware*, August 27, 2021, <https://www.tomshardware.com/news/jpr-gpu-q2-vendor-share>.

<sup>22</sup> Jim Chien, “Nvidia, AMD see rising sales from server sector,” *DigiTimes Asia*, June 30, 2020, <https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20200630PD213.html>.

<sup>23</sup> “NVIDIA maintains dominant position in 2020 market for AI processors for cloud and data center,” *Omdia*, August 4, 2021, <https://omdia.tech.informa.com/pr/2021-aug/nvidia-maintains-dominant-position-in-2020-market-for-ai-processors-for-cloud-and-data-center>.

<sup>24</sup> Paresh Kharya and Ali Alvi, “Using DeepSpeed and Megatron to Train Megatron-Turing NLG 530B, the World’s Largest and Most Powerful Generative Language Model,” *NVIDIA Developer Blog*, October 11, 2021, <https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/using-deepspeed-and-megatron-to-train-megatron-turing-nlg-530b-the-worlds-largest-and-most-powerful-generative-language-model/>.

<sup>25</sup> Deepak Narayanan et al., “Efficient Large-Scale Language Model Training on GPU Clusters Using Megatron-LM,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.04473 (2021).

<sup>26</sup> Jared Kaplan et al., “Scaling Law for Neural Language Models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.08361 (2020); Tom Henighan et al., “Scaling Laws for Autoregressive Generative Modeling,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.14701 (2020).

<sup>27</sup> It is important to note that this scaling law applies specifically to the single-transformer architecture. There are other approaches—for instance, mixture of expert models, discussed a bit later—for which more parameters can be trained using less compute but sacrificing aspects of performance. We analyze the transformer architecture, as it is currently the favored approach for language models and is versatile enough to perform well across a number of other domains. Eventually, the transformer will likely be supplanted by other models, but this discussion helps to ground the amount of compute that would be required under the current paradigm to reach models of various sizes.

<sup>28</sup> Lower prices per GPU-hour are available for long term commitments, but long training times are less useful than splitting the model or increasing the batch size, so it is not clear that long term commitments are beneficial. See Jared Kaplan et al., “Scaling Law for Neural Language Models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.08361 (2020).

<sup>29</sup> Kharya and Alvi, “Using DeepSpeed.”

<sup>30</sup> Bommasani et al., “Opportunities and Risks.”

<sup>31</sup> Danny Hernandez and Tom B. Brown, “Measuring the Algorithmic Efficiency of Neural Networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.04305 (2020).

<sup>32</sup> Note that efficiency improvements can also be due to improvements other than those in the algorithms used to train models, such as improvements in



methods for data collection, curation, or usage. See Sebastian Borgeaud et al., “Improving language models by retrieving from trillions of tokens,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.04426 (2021) for an example of research in this area.

<sup>33</sup> There have also been some analyses of algorithmic efficiency improvements in fields beyond AI. See Yash Sherry and Neil C. Thompson, “How Fast do Algorithms Improve?,” *Proceedings of the IEEE* 109, no. 11 (November 2021): 1768-1777.

<sup>34</sup> Hernandez and Brown, “Measuring Algorithmic Efficiency.”

<sup>35</sup> Noam Shazeer et al., “Outrageously Large Neural Networks: The Sparsely-Gated Mixture-of-Experts Layer,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1701.06538 (2017); William Fedus, Barret Zoph, and Noam Shazeer, “Switch Transformers: Scaling to Trillion Parameter Models with Simple and Efficient Sparsity,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.03961 (2021); Alberto Romero, “GPT-3 Scared You? Meet Wu Dao 2.0: A Monster of 1.75 Trillion Parameters,” *Towards Data Science*, June 5, 2021, <https://towardsdatascience.com/gpt-3-scared-you-meet-wu-dao-2-0-a-monster-of-1-75-trillion-parameters-832cd83db484>.

<sup>36</sup> John Jumper et al., “Highly accurate protein structure prediction with AlphaFold,” *Nature* 596 (August 2021): 583-589.

<sup>37</sup> Hieu Pham et al., “Meta Pseudo Labels,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.10580 (2020).

<sup>38</sup> Hernandez and Brown, “Measuring Algorithmic Efficiency.”

<sup>39</sup> “The cost of training machines is becoming a problem,” *The Economist*, June 13, 2020, <https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2020/06/11/the-cost-of-training-machines-is-becoming-a-problem>.

<sup>40</sup> Danny Hernandez et al., “Scaling Laws for Transfer,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.01293 (2021).

<sup>41</sup> Bommasani et al., “Opportunities and Risks.”

<sup>42</sup> Andrew J. Lohn, “Poison in the Well” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, June 2021), <https://doi.org/10.51593/2020CA013>; Benjamin Buchanan et al., “Truth, Lies, and Automation: How Language Models Could Change Disinformation” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May 2021), <https://doi.org/10.51593/2021CA003>.

<sup>43</sup> Diana Gehlhaus et al., “U.S. AI Workforce: Policy Recommendations” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2021), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20200087>; Dahlia Peterson, Kayla Goode, and Diana Gehlhaus, “AI Education in China and the United States” (Center for Security

and Emerging Technology, September 2021), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20210005>; Zachary Arnold et al., “Immigration Policy and the U.S. AI Sector: A Preliminary Assessment” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20190009>; Tina Huang and Zachary Arnold, “Immigration Policy and the Global Competition for AI Talent” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, June 2020), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20190024>; Tina Huang, Zachary Arnold, and Remco Zwetsloot, “Most of America’s ‘Most Promising’ AI Startups Have Immigrant Founders” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2020), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20200065>; Remco Zwetsloot et al., “Keeping Top AI Talent in the United States” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 2019), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20190007>; Remco Zwetsloot, Roxanne Heston, and Zachary Arnold, “Strengthening the U.S. AI Workforce: A Policy and Research Agenda” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2019), <https://doi.org/10.51593/20190003>.

<sup>44</sup> “The Biden Administration Launches the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force,” *The White House*, June 10, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/06/10/the-biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-force/>.

<sup>45</sup> See, e.g., Buchanan et al., “Truth, Lies, and Automation.”