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# CLIC PAPERS

**THE ROLE OF MILITARY WORKING DOGS  
IN  
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**

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Langley Air Force Base, Virginia**

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THE ROLE OF MILITARY WORKING DOGS  
IN  
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

By

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<u>DTIC AD#</u>	<u>DLSIE LD#</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>
A185 972	073892A	Operational Considerations in LIC
A185 973	073893A	Logistical Considerations in LIC
A185 974	073894A	Security Assistance and LIC
A185 975	073896A	The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
A185 976	073895A	LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I
A185 977	073897A	Army Medical Department Roles and Functions
A185 978	073899A	Operational Art in LIC
A186 280	073898A	LIC Imperatives for Success
A193 702	077085A	LIC Logistic Support Air Force Perspective
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A209 072		Liberation Theology, Two Views
		Key LIC Speeches, 1984-1989
		Counterinsurgency in the Philippines

## PREFACE

Low intensity conflicts pose a particular problem to us as members of the United States military in that they are fought primarily in the developing countries (frequently referred to as the "Third World") whose industrial, political, and military infrastructures are ill prepared to conduct operations either on a sustained scale or at a level that we perceive as being effective. These conflicts are fought within a foreign political and cultural environment that often renders the technological and military sophistication of the United States both irrelevant and ineffectual.

There is a need for the United States military, when looking at low intensity conflicts in which we are or may become involved, to consider the level of technological advancement of the society we are trying to assist. Much too often our security assistance program provides standard United States military and civilian equipment far above the technical ability of the host nation to service, maintain, or repair. The resultant frustrations on both our part and on the host nation's part is counterproductive to the mutual goals that we share and are attempting to attain.

This paper will examine a neglected low-technology United States military capability that has a role to play in low intensity conflict military operations both in support of our forces, and when needed, host nation forces. This capability has at times existed within our force structure, but since the end of the Vietnam conflict has withered. This capability is that of the military working dog (MWD).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current MWD program, its historical roots, and the possibility for expansion of the program in the future. Current service MWD programs will be discussed, as well as possible models for change.

The primary focus of this paper will be on the potential roles that MWDs may perform in helping the United States armed forces and those of our friends and allies engaged in low intensity conflict situations/environments. It must also be in mind, that as our service manpower and strengths decline military missions will remain. This requires careful examination of all resources and combat multipliers available, include MWDs.

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## THE ROLE OF MILITARY WORKING DOGS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

### The LIC Environment

Low intensity conflict is political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

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Low intensity conflict (LIC) has achieved recognition as a major threat if, indeed, not the major threat to the United States and to our friends and allies. As the definition indicates, LIC is a broad-based term that describes an environment of protracted low-level struggle. Since the term reflects the United States' perspective, it definitely is, to a degree, a misnomer. To peoples more directly affected, the threat is immediate and vital. To us, it is subtle, indirect, and long-term, but potentially it is just as serious.

According to the operational definition of LIC, there are four categories within the overall LIC umbrella. These are: contingency operations, peacekeeping operations, combatting terrorism, and lastly, insurgency/counterinsurgency. Military operations and activities are conducted within the parameters of these four categories as the senior US official in charge deems appropriate. This official may either be an ambassador as head of a specific country team, or a military commander when conditions so dictate.

### The Salvadoran Case

Within the LIC environment, applications of appropriate levels of technology present themselves as important and sometimes vital concerns. They are particularly important when the technologies are being employed by our friends and allies

either by themselves, or in a coalition warfighting effort such as was the case in Vietnam. Few of our friends and allies undergoing the rigors of LIC possess advanced technologies. They are primarily developing countries (also at times inappropriately referred to as Third World) poised on the brink of modernization. Indeed, the stresses of the modernization process are the major reason these nations find themselves embroiled in what we call LIC.

The difficulty that the US military has in dealing with many of the host nation militaries of the world is that our level of technological sophistication is not compatible to that of many nations we are attempting to help. Providing standard US systems to nations which lack both the fiscal and technological base needed to utilize such systems fully is, at best, an inappropriate effort on our part, and at worst, it comprises an intellectually defunct policy which only worsens the difficulties faced by our friends and allies. Examples of this inappropriate transfer of equipment to allies unable to support its use abound, especially in programs involving the provision of both helicopters and aircraft. Each of these systems has repeatedly overburdened the logistical and maintenance (not to mention the fiscal) resources of the recipients to the point that the equipment ends up rusting as a memorial to failed US security assistance policy and hence fails to achieve its purpose.

The United States is today actively supporting several nations in their efforts to defeat insurgencies. Combat operations, as a portion of the internal defense and development efforts of the host nation, are being supported with a combination of advice and material transfers. In traditional tactical battles, the host nation forces have been successful in nearly all cases. This success has led the insurgent forces to focus on classical guerrilla tactics, including the effective use of mines and booby traps.

Mines are an inexpensive, relatively risk-free means to produce casualties, deny terrain, provide security to base camps and logistics bases, canalize troops, and delay and disrupt pursuing forces. Antipersonnel mines of the blast and fragmentation types present the major threat in the LIC environment of Central America because of the high proportion of dismounted operations conducted.

El Salvador provides a case in point. In 1983, the US became heavily involved in that nation at a time when battlefield casualties were primarily caused by small arms fire and mines. To combat the mines, the US provided a number of standard Army AN/PSS-12 metal detectors. These proved to be expensive, cumbersome, and not fully reliable. These detectors could not locate certain types of mines that the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas were implanting. A US program

was instituted to find a replacement detection system which resulted in a less costly device, essentially a coin detector, which was both less sophisticated, used commercially available batteries, and was at least as effective as the AN/PSS-12.

The casualties represented in the following figure show solely those suffered by military personnel. On average, about 20 civilians and 60-70 soldiers per month have been injured by mines/booby traps in the contested, rural areas of the country.

Mine Casualties: El Salvador	
YEAR	NUMBER
1984	340
1985	480
1986	725
1987	950
1988	1070

Such mine casualties in El Salvador, the Philippines, and along the Thai-Cambodian border have been the primary casualty generators of these conflicts. Not only has the use of mines and booby traps caused a marked decrease in the host nation forces' ability to conduct mobility operations, it has also caused a major strain on both the morale of these forces and their nations' abilities to support medical treatment and rehabilitation of the casualties, civilian and military alike.

As a result of the Salvadoran conflict, the United States has embarked on a set of major technological programs designed to field a series of very sophisticated detection devices. These detector programs range from a new family of mine detectors which have increased electromagnetic sensitivities to known threat mines to a series of vapor detectors able to detect the presence of explosive compounds based on electrochemical reactions. Indeed, many of these research programs are appearing to be quite successful and promising when viewed from the United States perspective. However, there is a vast degree of difference between lengthy laboratory development and optimal field testing, and the realities of the world in which our friends and allies, and for that matter our own soldiers, operate. An improved large-scale multimillion dollar explosive detector able to sense minute hidden quantities of Semtex in the relative pristine

environment of an international airline terminal does little to assist a combat patrol leader in El Salvador. His requirement is more basic. He needs a readily available detector that is portable, cheap, and reliable.

For this reason, military working dogs (MWDs) present themselves as a viable option for many of the needs we see in the mine detection arsenals of our friends and allies. Dogs are readily available, they are certainly as foot mobile as host nation ground and security forces, easily transported, require little logistical support, and, when used properly, they have a high reliability rate. Effective use of trained MWDs in combination with metal detectors and associated equipment could significantly reduce the mine/booby trap threat. This represents only one role for MWDs within the LIC environment, others will be discussed later.

The lesson here is, wherever possible, the level of the host nation's industrial and technological base must receive careful consideration in any attempts to provide meaningful assistance, and this consideration must include means other than high technology solutions alone. These other means include such traditional (read old-fashioned) methods as the use of horses and mules for pack/transport (a proven system for the Afghan Mujahadeen) and without doubt, the MWD as a combat multiplier and sensor system.

#### History of the Military Working Dog

History records the use of dogs by armies throughout the world. Assyrian soldiers used trained mastiffs as early as 2300 BC. Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman armies all employed dogs. Their uses included guard duty, attack and combat roles, and to carry messages. Armies continued to use dogs during the Middle Ages, and throughout the 19th Century as well. The 20th Century has witnessed a greatly expanded use of MWDs.

European countries on both sides during World War I utilized large numbers of MWDs, with estimates for the Germans being placed at 30,000, and for the French, 20,000. The United States military forces did not have their own dogs but did employ some MWDs provided by the French and Belgians.

Both sides utilized large numbers of MWDs during World War II. The United States entered the conflict with no war dogs but, with British assistance, established a MWD program shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack. The United States procured approximately 20,000 MWDs and actually trained and used about 10,000 with the armed forces.

In World War II, MWDs successfully filled the following roles:

- sentry
- scout
- sled dog
- pack animal
- messenger
- mine detection

The Korean War saw limited use of MWDs. Records do reflect their use by the Army and Air Force in sentry and scout roles, as well as in prisoner of war (POW) control. The 26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon was highly decorated for its more than 500 combat patrols.

#### Military Working Dogs in Vietnam

- O Sentry - Military Police, Security Police
- O Scout - Infantry, Military Police
- O Tracker - Infantry
- O Mine/Tunnel - Infantry
- O Narcotics - Military Police, Security Police

The United States used MWDs in many different roles throughout the Vietnam conflict. They served sentry, patrol, scout, tracker, and various detection roles. When properly employed, their abilities to detect mines and booby traps, tunnels, and contraband (including narcotics) proved quite effective. Initially introduced into Vietnam in 1965 by both the Army and the Air Force to perform sentry missions, MWDs provided valuable security for general storage yards, airfields, ammunition supply points, petroleum storage areas, food storage areas, docks, and even a major convalescent center. At the height of the conflict, the United States had some 6,000 MWDs in its world-wide inventory of which over 1,100 were in Vietnam.

The sentry dogs, especially effective against intruders, served as a major psychological deterrent to intrusion in Vietnam. Their use as an economy of force measure was emphasized in physical security programs as they could be used in lieu of men for fixed-facility perimeter security missions, thus freeing soldiers for other combat duties. One of the problems with sentry dogs, however, was their propensity to attack anyone except their handler, and sometimes they even forgot that rule. This problem, basically one stemming from the temperament and training of the sentry dog, led to their eventual replacement by the patrol dog, an animal which may be used either on or off leash and hence more versatile in its utility.

Scout dogs, of proven value to ground troops in both World War II and the Korean Conflict, were employed by US forces in Vietnam (Army and Marine Corps), as well as by the Vietnamese Army. These dogs generally served as the lead elements in small infantry maneuver units. They were also used as flank and rear screens in support of outposts and ambush sites, as members of reconnaissance teams, and in the search of hamlets. Scout dogs were also trained to detect trip wires, booby traps, and mines.

The need for tracker dogs to assist US combat units in maintaining contact with the Vietcong in jungle areas was recognized early in the war. We turned to the British for assistance in developing this tracker dog capability and received their support in training some 14 Army tracker dog teams in Malaysia beginning in October 1966. The training of Labrador Retrievers through this program was later transferred to Georgia when additional tracker dogs were purchased. These tracker dogs were a vital part of the tracker teams utilized for a variety of missions in Vietnam.

Specialized mine and tunnel MWDs were successfully used by both the Army and the Marine Corps in Vietnam. They were, however, not a foolproof detection system. Their use did prove to be a valued supplement to other detection and neutralization procedures.

With the end of the Vietnam conflict, general interest in the combat utilization of MWDs faded. The focus of the military's attention returned to heavy combat between major conventional forces on the European continent. The roles of MWDs so laboriously developed and nurtured during the war were ill-suited to the large mechanized and armored combat forces envisioned for the future. What interest remained in MWDs was retained by the military law enforcement agencies based on their traditional missions. This is the point at which the US military remains today.

#### The Military Working Dog Program Today

Military Working Dogs. Dogs that are required by the using DOD Component for a specific purpose, mission, or combat capability. These include scout, sentry, patrol, tracker, narcotic, contraband, explosive, and tunnel detector dogs. The dogs may be used with or without handlers under policies established by the DOD Component or federal agency concerned.

DOD Directive 5200.31  
7 September 1983

This definition was extracted from Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5200.31, which designated the Air Force as the single manager for the Services' Military Working Dog Program. This directive also designated the DOD Dog Training Center as the primary training facility for MWDs.

The Air Force designated the Office of Security Police (AFOSP) as its Service proponency office. Similarly, proponency for MWDs was established by the other Services within their law enforcement channels. This program alignment has had major limiting effects on the overall MWD program in terms of its application to military operations outside of the traditional law enforcement arena.

The DOD also established a dog panel comprised of a representative with each of these proponency offices and an additional AFOSP member as the panel chairman. This panel's purpose is to set overall DOD MWD policy. The panel's focus has remained largely on the MWD law enforcement mission. Their focus, however, is due to the lack of service based needs substantiated by formal requirements documentation.

The DOD Dog Training Center, located at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, is charged with training all service MWDs. By policy, all dogs are currently being trained to dual qualification standards, first as patrol dog, and secondly as either narcotics or explosives detectors.

In theory, dual qualification would seem to optimize MWD usage. In practice, however, this appears not to be the case. Dual qualification has resulted in an extremely high rejection/failure rate for the candidate dogs, and an animal less well trained in each area. This has also resulted in a significant cost increase in both the training and procurement of MWDs.

Department of Defense Dog Center

- O Trains - All MWDs
  - All MWDs dual qualified
    - .. Patrol Dog/Narcotics
    - .. Patrol Dog/Explosives
- O 98% of MWDs currently being trained are procured in Europe
- O 45% rejected following training
- O 430 MWD shortfall based on current requirements
- O Large breed focus

It must be noted at this point, that the Dog Training Center lacks the resources to train against all the missions listed within the DOD Directive. The training program for the dual qualified patrol dog alone overtaxes assigned personnel and assets. Any expansion of the current MWD program would necessitate an adjustment in Service funding priorities.

There have been several attempts during the past two years on the part of the Marine Corps and the Army Veterinary Corps to propose review of the current MWD program with a view to expand the scope of the program to include combat oriented roles. These efforts have not been entirely successful. Not until recently was the topic included on the agenda of the DOD Dog Panel.

The Marine Corps, in particular, is prepared to broaden the use of assigned MWDs. The Corps has provided to both the DOD Dog Panel and to the Dog Training Center its wartime mobilization requirements for scout dogs to be used within its divisional military police structure. These scout dogs will remain within Marine Corps law enforcement channels under the concept that all Marines are trained as combat soldiers first and foremost, including military police. The retention of combat MWDs within law enforcement channels during wartime by the Marine Corps represents a Service unique employment concept. A pilot scout dog training program is being jointly developed at this time.

The Army Academy of Health Sciences, as a result of a Medical Systems Program Review with the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, conducted a MWD meeting at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in May 1989, to fully examine potential roles that MWDs could perform beyond those of the law enforcement field. Several of the conclusions of this meeting are shown in this figure:

#### Leavenworth MWD Meeting Conclusions

1. MWD program is broken and cannot meet existing requirements.
2. DOD executive agent has not acknowledged need for MWDs to perform functions outside law enforcement and security missions.
3. Support of LIC operations is the most urgent requirement and an area in which the appropriate MWD involvement can contribute immediately.

Initial coordination with the staffs of the regional combatant commands indicated both an appreciation of the capabilities inherent in combat oriented use of MWDs and a large degree of support for review of the current MWD program.

Military Working Dogs. Dogs that are required by the using DOD Component for a specific purpose, mission, or combat capability. These include scout, sentry, patrol, tracker, narcotic, contraband, explosive, and tunnel detector dogs. The dogs may be used with or without handlers under policies established by the DOD Component or federal agency concerned.

DOD Directive 5200.31  
7 September 1983

The use of MWDs as trackers, scouts and tunnel detectors are those mission tasks referenced in the Combatant Command message traffic as being of the most interest. It should be noted that these tasks are from the DOD Directive but are not currently trained/taught at the DOD Dog Training Center. As previously discussed, the Marine Corps has provided its requirements for scout dogs, and a pilot program is being developed to support their needs.

#### Foreign Military Working Dog Usage

Unlike the United States, the armed forces of many other nations have maintained very active MWDs programs during both peace and war. Military working dogs are currently serving in combatant mission areas in the armed forces of several Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Switzerland, Sweden, and others.

Several of these nations extensively use MWDs assigned to their Engineer/Sapper units specifically for the detection of mines and booby traps. Among the nations so doing are Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Nearly all these nations have gained their MWD expertise through association with the British.

The British have found MWDs to be effective in military operations throughout the world. They have continued to train and equip MWD units extensively for field, jungle, and urban roles, and in fact used MWDs with success in the cleanup phase of the Falklands campaign. Their dogs are regionally oriented in training to one of four geographical areas in which they will serve continuously. Thus, a jungle dog will remain oriented on jungle operations as long as it remains on active service.

The British program is both much more intensive in training and extensive in scope than any conducted by the United States. The following figure details the types of dogs currently in use by British forces:

Protection Dogs:

- Guard Dog
- Security Dog

Specialist Dogs:

- Arms and Explosives Search Dog
- Mine Detection Dog
- Drug Detection Dog

Specialist Dogs (Human Scent):

- Tracker Dogs
- Infantry Patrol Dog
- Casualty Detection Dog

Miscellaneous Dogs:

- Police Dog
- Messenger Dog
- Pack Dog

Interestingly, these dogs are procured primarily through donation from within the United Kingdom. Rarely does the British MWD system require purchase of an animal for service with the armed forces. Support within the civilian community meets and frequently exceeds the military requirement for dogs of all breeds. Community relations programs and advertisement play a major role in this relationship.

Within the British system, procurement, training and maintenance of the working dogs is the responsibility of the Royal Veterinary Corps. The employment, i.e., tactical mission, of an animal is within the operational commander's purview. Thus, a commander will notify his supporting dog detachment of the type of mission for which a dog is needed, and the specific dog for the job will be selected by the detachment personnel.

Key to the use of dogs within the British military system, is that MWD operations are fully integrated into peacetime training programs. Accordingly, commanders at all levels have a solid knowledge of the utility of MWDs and an appreciation for the tactical applications and limitations involved in dog use.

British experience has shown that the functions that commanders may reasonably expect MWDs to perform in combat situations are those for which the animals have been adequately trained, just as it is for soldiers. One cannot expect a dog to be better at adjusting to situations not normally encountered, nor any better able to operate in unfamiliar surroundings, than is a soldier. Additionally, dogs trained by the British Army have a single role, i.e., one dog - one job. Dual qualification of MWDs is not authorized, nor desired.

British Experience has shown that  
Military Working Dogs are proven performers

#### Expanded Roles for Military Working Dogs

At this point the question must be addressed, what capabilities of MWDs make them important?

No measure of the extent of a dog's sense of smell, hearing and visual detection of movement over those of persons has ever been accurately made. Accurate measurement of the degree of superiority is really not important outside a laboratory because we know, that under almost any set of circumstances, a properly trained dog can smell, hear, and visually detect movement infinitely better than a person.

This quote, which aptly sums up the case for the use of dogs, is extracted from DA PAM 190-12, Military Police, Military Working Dogs.

Military working dogs offer a flexibility of operational employment and capability that is superior to any other single type of sensor system, which is after all, precisely what a MWD is: a living, four-footed, mobile sensor capable of detecting people, objects, sounds, and odors with its highly developed senses.

An interesting paradox regarding the MWD as a type of sensor system occurs when the dog's requirement for food, water, medical care, and rest become the rationale for not using them. Their procurement and training costs are considered high. However, in comparison to any other sensor system, including night vision goggles, motion detectors, ground radars, and the numerous experimental vapor detectors, these costs are negligible. It is rather easy to determine the relative life cycle costs involved in the research and development, operational test and evaluation, procurement, fielding, storage, and maintenance of such sensor systems vice the cost of MWDs to perform portions of the same mission. The dogs will prove to be more cost effective in virtually every case.

### Why Dogs?

- Superior sense of smell
- Superior day and night vision
- Superior sense of hearing

History and our own experience shows that the time has come to reexamine our MWD program.

The expanded roles below reflect those most consistent with LIC operational requirements not already addressed through the current MWD program:

### Proposed Expanded LIC Operational Roles

- Mine/Booby Trap Detection Dog
- Scout Dog
- Tracker Dog
- Search and Rescue Dog

A description of the minimum capabilities required for each of these types of MWDs follows. Training regimens/programs needed to produce fully qualified MWDs will not be addressed. It is sufficient to say that the length of time needed to train the various MWDs is dependent on the skills desired and the individual breed of dog involved. There is a significant difference in the time required to train a narcotics detector dog and a tracker dog; a time difference of several months in this particular case. Breeds of dogs will also not be discussed. It should be noted, however, that many of the capabilities needed by dogs to fill the requirements of the expanded roles for MWDs that are being proposed can be met by breeds outside those usually considered as appropriate to military duty. The expanded roles do not absolutely require a large breed dog, and in several cases, a smaller breed dog is better suited in terms of its transportability, temperament, and sense development. For example, in some circumstances, a Chesapeake Bay Retriever or German Shorthaired Pointer could prove a better tracker than the more commonly used Labrador Retriever.

### Mine and Booby Trap Detection Dog

- Detect metallic and nonmetallic mines buried or concealed
- Detect trip wires
- Detect firing wires and controls
- Detect devices concealed in areas where conventional detectors do not work
- Nonaggressive

The presence of mine fields and booby traps will always cause considerable restriction of movement both in the forward and rear areas of the battle zone. The mine and booby trap detection dog, although not offering a complete solution to the problem, has certain advantages over mine detection equipment. It is more versatile in its range of detection. It is capable of detecting all types of metallic and nonmetallic mines and booby traps and can locate them buried to depths beyond the range of metallic detectors. Dogs can also detect mines in ground so covered with shell fragments and other pieces of metal that conventional detection equipment is of little use.

This concept has particular relevance given the foot-mobile operations which are the rule within the Light Infantry Divisions of the Army and the Marine Corps. It also has major application as a security assistance tool/capability for our friends and allies currently engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

A nonaggressive dog is required to fill this type mission in order to prevent injuries to friendly personnel should the dog become overly excited and trigger a device. For the same reason, a smaller breed of dog may be preferred to the standard German Shepherd or Labrador normally found within MWD ranks.

#### Scout Dog

- Excellent ability to silently detect the enemy
- Day/night capable
- All weather capable
- Will work in varied terrain
- Nonaggressive

The success of small infantry reconnaissance patrols depends on their ability to locate the enemy without being detected themselves. The scout dog, trained to use its highly developed senses of sight, hearing, and smell to detect and silently indicate the presence of an individual or group of people in the patrolled area, renders valuable aid to the patrol in accomplishing this mission. Scout dogs may be worked day or night in all kinds of weather. A nonaggressive dog is best suited to this silent alert mission. In addition, scout dogs can also be used defensively to prevent surprise attack or infiltration in much the same way as a patrol dog.

British experience has shown that dog enhanced patrols rarely if ever are fired upon by the enemy first.

#### Tracker Dogs

- Follow people moving on foot
- Determine enemy direction of movement or routes used
- Locate firing points, sniper positions, observation and other enemy positions
- Locate discarded, dropped or concealed enemy equipment/personnel on movement route
- Nonaggressive

The tracker dog follows the track of humans moving on foot and can render valuable assistance in the successful location of enemy personnel. Even if the quarry is not run to ground, the direction he has taken may be of intelligence value. Location of equipment, enemy positions, or personnel may also result.

Maintaining contact with enemy forces is of major importance in both counterinsurgent and counterterrorist operations. The tracker dog has great utility in assisting this effort.

Time is the single most critical element in tracking. Trackers must be on the trail at the earliest possible moment to obtain the optimal scent picture. This requires that the tracker dogs be centrally located within the operational zone, with rapid access to both ground and air means of transport. This requirement again lends itself to smaller, less aggressive dog breeds.

#### Search and Rescue Dog

- Locate battlefield casualties
- Day/night capable
- All weather
- All terrain
- Nonaggressive

Battlefield casualties can be manifold in both number and type. Soldiers can be wounded, buried in debris or earth, or injured in airborne insertions. The search and rescue dog can greatly enhance the chances of locating hidden, injured, or unconscious men. This is particularly true during night or in foggy weather.

It is a natural tendency for injured personnel to seek some hiding place into which they can crawl and thus protect themselves from further injury. These hiding places may be overlooked by medical search teams. Therefore, a trained dog may be of value in locating such injured personnel, both at night and in adverse weather, to include snow. Such dogs are particularly effective in mountainous or wooded terrain.

Search and rescue dogs also have a major humanitarian assistance role to play in the location of casualties resulting from such natural disasters as earthquakes and floods. Such support to civil authorities could prove of value in establishing improved relations between the host nation civil authorities and military departments.

#### Summary

It is clear that there are many roles and missions which MWDs can perform in the LIC environment. The recent military operation in the Republic of Panama, Operation Just Cause, provided a number of instances in which MWDs could effectively have been employed by United States forces to advantage. These include weapons cache detection/location, countersniper engagements and combat tracking missions.

There are several approaches available to "make it happen."

#### Avenues of Approach

- DOD Dog Panel
- Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) demonstration by the British
- Combatant Command support through the Intergated Priority List (IPL) process
- Joint service panel review
- Army Regulation 5-5 Study (TRADOC)

Each of these steps play a role in building consensus on the utility of expanding the MWD program. The issue of any expanded roles for MWDs must be addressed by the DOD Dog Panel. Support from combatant commands and Services should be reviewed within current guidelines and resources, and the capabilities of the DOD proponent agencies to meet any expanded program needs considered. Once this step has been taken, recommendations on future steps can be formulated.

A demonstration of the capabilities of well-trained dog teams in tracking and detecting mines and booby traps for senior US military leaders at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

could well provide the needed impetus. Such an event could spur interest within United States military channels concerning combat roles for MWDs.

Combatant command support through the Integrated Priorities List (IPL) process. This would assure attention at the highest military levels.

An Army Regulation 5-5 Study, conducted under the auspices of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), would lead to the identification of total MWDs required (by the Army) and the development of appropriate tables of organization and equipment (TO&E). Like programs, carried out by the other Services could provide the analogous information.

#### Unanswered Questions

- Propensity for combat operational MWD use
- Integration of MWDS into US security assistance efforts

Military working dogs have a wider role to perform within the military Services than solely that of a law enforcement asset. A number of combat, combat support, and combat service support missions are available that the MWD could perform which serve both as an economy of force operation and as a combat multiplier. This is particularly true for the LIC arena in which the technologies of the participants, both enemy and friendly, tend to be on the lower end of the technology scale. The United States military community needs to revisit the utility of MWDs in the conduct of future military operations and to identify the appropriate combat oriented propensity agent.

Military working dogs have utility to our friends and allies within the security assistance arena. This low tech approach to many of the military problems encountered by nations undergoing the rigors of insurgency/revolutionary warfare is appropriate to the systemic logistical support levels unilaterally available within the host nation. The cost to assist the development of a viable MWD program is considerably less than any other comparable sensor systems. Military working dogs could well represent an inexpensive and reliable addition to our security assistance program.

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