Tominaga our Contemporary

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Introduction

Just supposing that the British Council were able to offer lecture tours by the world’s great minds of the past, I am sure that names like Aquinas, Chu Hsi or Dōgen would be able to pack an auditorium even now. But in the pub afterwards we would probably find them less easy company, not quite at home in our own times. Reading Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–46), however, one gets the extraordinary but quite palpable feeling of encountering an intelligence every bit as alert and critical as any product of a modern university education – no doubt precisely because by the standards of his own day he was largely self-educated. To find the entire surviving slim corpus of the writings of this remarkable genius rendered into English by the head of one of our most respected departments of Religious Studies is gratifying indeed, and one hesitates to qualify praise of such a welcome achievement with a note of criticism, especially when the translation is prefaced by a lengthy introduction giving within a limited compass a more than adequate account of Tominaga’s all too brief life.¹

But translating the work of a Japanese thinker whose chief concerns were with Indian and Chinese intellectual traditions always imposes some hard choices which are unlikely to find universal favour. Michael Pye devotes a couple of eminently reasonable pages (pp. 188–9) to defending his own choice of romanising the many Indian and Chinese names and terms in his text primarily in the Japanese forms which Tominaga himself used. As far as concerns Tominaga’s analysis of the development of Buddhism this decision cannot readily be faulted: most students of East Asian Buddhism will at least be aware of the Japanese versions of the titles of its main texts. Rather, it is Tominaga’s less prominent (but still extremely interesting) forays into Chinese thought which are bound to suffer, since in the West we simply do not ever refer to those two Chinese philosophers, the Ch’eng brothers, as ‘Ni Tei’ (p. 166), just to cite one example.

The overall effect of reading Tominaga on China in Pye’s version is therefore very much that of coming across him at the end of a long evening in the pub, still discoursing as brilliantly as ever, but speech slurred beyond all recognition by several hours of

conviviality. The aim of the following translation of a section (the twenty-fourth and penultimate) on the “Three Teachings of China” from Tominaga’s Shutsujō kōgo is simply to restore to our long-lost Japanese colleague a measure of sinological sobriety sufficient to enable his talents in this field to be more widely appreciated. It may perhaps be a sign that I am living in the wrong time myself, but to my taste only a somewhat old-fashioned sinological rendering of his work brings out the startlingly contemporary quality of his thought. Heedful of Pye’s strictures on the interpretative nature of modern Japanese translations (p. 185), I have consulted only the Nihon shisō taisei reading of the text, plus that of Yoshikawa Entarō, whose annotations have influenced more recent editors, while working mainly from the printing of the plain text included in Washio Junkei’s series Nihon shisō tōū shiryō. Washio’s compilation contains in the same volume most of the writing stirred up in praise or blame during the Tokugawa period by Tominaga’s work. Details of these publications, plus a full bibliography of secondary literature on Tominaga, are included, along with a biography and some essays on his thought, in a recent collection of studies by Mizuta Norihisa and Umetani Fumio. This most useful handbook unfortunately seems to have appeared after the research for Pye’s volume was completed, since it is not listed in his bibliography.

The Three Teachings

The three teachings have been in conflict for a long time, but over what? The Confucians defend their ceremonial distinctions, the Taoists promote their macrobiotics and the Buddhists seek to escape the cycle of birth and death: each tradition explains the Way on the basis of its own doctrines. If we attempt a ruling on this we will find that the Confucians go to excess over refinement, the Buddhists go to excess over illusion, while the Taoists base their thought on “Heaven” (t’ien/ten). Some of this last group say that there are dwelling places of the immortals beyond the seas, which is pressing on with illusion, so they are of the same type as the heterodoxies of India. Their conception of the Way is of the lowest, certainly not in the same class as the Buddhists or Confucians, while their scriptures and their contents are all derivative. The Hsi-sheng ching, the Hua-hu

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2 Mizuta Norihisa and Arisaka Takamichi (eds), Tominaga Nakamoto, Yamagata Bantō (Nihon shisō taisei, 43) (Tokyo, 1973); Yoshikawa Entarō (ed.), Shutsujō kōgo (Osaka, 1943); Washio Junkei (ed.), Nihon shisō tōū shiryō, iii (Tokyo, 1930).


5 W’en/bun is a key term in Tominaga’s thought, and is far broader in scope than any possible English equivalent. For some of its overtones in the East Asian tradition see David McMullen’s discussion on pp. 321–6 of his “Historical and literary theory in the mid-eighteenth century”, in A. F. Wright and D. C. Twitchett (eds), Perspectives on the T‘ang (New Haven and London, 1973), pp. 307–42.

6 Huan/gén; again, a technical term in Tominaga’s vocabulary, defying easy translation. Some notion of his reasons for associating the term with Buddhism may be gleaned from V. H. Mair, T‘ang Transformation Texts (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 66–72, though this discussion is actually directed towards another, related term.


8 Cf. Rolf Stein, The World in Miniature (Stanford, 1990), p. 64 and notes, for some early sources on this theme and its religious context.

9 This text has been translated by Livia Kohn, Taoist Mystical Philosophy: the Scripture of the Western Ascension (Albany, 1991): she assigns it to the fifth century a.d., and notes (p. 80) some Buddhist borrowings.
ching, the thirty-six heavens and the Ta-lo thearch’s realm — in sum, they are illusions added on top of Buddhism, and since they are not transmitted to Japan, I will not discuss them.

Scholar Liu Ching-chai (Liu Mi; Yuan period) wrote the P'ing-hsin lu, in which he evaluated the three teachings. When I took it up and read it, I found it to be judging relative merit entirely on the basis of illusion. What is more, it has someone asking Li Shih-ch'ien the relative merit of the three teachings, to which he replies “Buddhism is the sun, Taoism is the moon and Confucianism is the planets”. People of his day considered his judgement definitive, but this remark corresponds to nothing in reality: I do not see the point of it, nor do I see wherein lies the definitiveness of his judgement. These types are all mediocrities; what would they know of the great Way?

Someone asked of Master Wang of Lung-men (Wang T'ung) concerning the Buddha. He said “He was a sage”. What of his teachings? He said “They are teachings for Western regions; for China they are a quagmire”. That captures it! Why should Buddhism constitute a quagmire for the Chinese? Because what the Buddhists esteem consists of illusion. Someone might ask me concerning Confucius and the other Confucians. I would say “They were sages”. What of their teachings? “They are teachings for Western regions; for this place they are a quagmire.” Why should Confucianism constitute a quagmire for us? Because what Confucians esteem consists of refinement. Clearly, discourse is conditioned by external factors, which cause the parting of the Way, while different lands have their various cultures, which cause the Way to differ. So if the Confucian teachings constitute a quagmire for us, how much the more so should the teachings of the Buddha, which come from the West of our West? So the Buddhists go to excess over illusion, the Confucians go to excess over refinement; when we abandon them, we will be close to the true Way.

Of old Ho Ch'eng-t'ien (370–447) wrote the Ta-sheng lun attacking the Buddhist way, and Yen Yen-chih (384–456) composed letters refuting him; the (ex-)monk Hui-lin

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10 This notorious work is discussed in E. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden, 1959), pp. 288–320.
11 The latter name is translated “Great Envelope” in E. H. Schafer, Facing the Void (Berkeley, 1977), p. 38. The earliest reference to the “thirty-six heavens” in Taoism would seem to be Wei Shou, Wei Shu 114 (Peking, 1974), p. 3052, describing Taoist doctrine in the fifth century A.D., well after the introduction of Buddhism.
12 Again, “adding on” is one of Tomina’s technical terms describing the accretion of doctrines in a situation of sectarian competition, attributed to progressively more exalted or ancient authorities: see Mizuta and Umetani, Tomina Nakamoto kenkyū, pp. 79–82.
16 Wang T’ung, Chung-shuo 4, p. 4b (Ssu-pu pei-yao edition): I am not sure if Tomina understands “mud”, with the commentary here, to stand for the homophone “drowning”, or whether he understands it as “sticky place”; “quagmire” represents an expedient compromise.
17 The relativity of discourse in accordance with time and place, and the general cultural relativity of values, are both important themes for Tomina: see, for a recent discussion, Umetani and Mizuta, Tomina Nakamoto kenkyū, pp. 83–9; there seems no point in avoiding modern terminology in translating Tomina here.
18 Recte, Ta-hsing lun, “On apprehending the nature” see Taishō Canon, lii, pp. 21c–22a.
19 Contained ibid., pp. 22a–27a (with Ho’s replies).
composed the *Pai-hei lun* ("On Black and White") and Tsung Ping (374–443) criticised him;20 these were all Buddho-Confucian conflicts. Under the (Chao-)Sung dynasty,21 Ou-yang Hsiu (1007–70) wrote the *Pen-lun*,22 Shih Chieh (969–1040) wrote the *Kuai-shuo*,23 and Hu Yin (1098–1156) wrote the *Ch'ung-cheng pien*,24 all of which attacked Buddhism. Then Ming-chiao ta-shih, Ch' i-sung (1007–72) wrote the *Fu-chiao pien* to reply to them.25 This was another phase of Buddho-Confucian conflict. When I took up his book and read it, in sum it too was no more than a conflict over illusion and refinement.

Ch'i-sung has a passage saying how can the Way of Buddhism be anything beyond the empire and the state? "It is merely that in origin it was not promoted through the servants of the state, and its principles of transforming society are hidden and not easily perceived, so the world has not been able without exception to find faith in it".26 He also says that Buddhism establishes its teaching through the Way of the spirit (*shen/shin*),27 working inwardly, which is why it is hidden and not easily perceived.28 When he speaks of the spirit working inwardly, this is referring to the principles of causality and karmic reward, which is what I term illusion; it is not the genuine part of Buddhism. It is regrettable that Ch'i-sung was unaware of this. Buddhists, moreover, constituted a type of Brahmin, in charge of the teaching of ordinary people, just as there were once Confucian scholars under the Lord Minister of Public Instruction.29 As for state and empire, they were under the control of the kṣatriyas; such is the custom in India. Yet now Ch'i-sung speaks of Buddhism being "nothing beyond" empire and state: this is lumping together the customs of separate cultures without being aware of the contradiction, which is also most regrettable.30

He also has another conciliatory theory which states that the ten types of good conduct and the five precepts are one with what is termed the five constants – humanity and

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20 Correspondence between Tsung and Ho on this topic may be found *ibid.*, pp. 176–216. This entire phase in Chinese interreligious polemic is treated in Kenneth Ch'en, "Anti-Buddhist propaganda during the Nan-ch'ao", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XV (1952), pp. 166–92.
21 The disputes mentioned so far date to the Liu-Sung dynasty; hence the mention of the ruling family of the later, better-known period.
24 Hu's work is incorporated in Huang Tsung-hsi, *Sung-Yuan hsüeh-an*, xli, pp. 11.3–17 (*Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* edition). It will be noted that Hu's inclusion here is anachronistic.
25 This famous work has been translated into Japanese by Araki Kenko, *Hogyōhen* (Tokyo, 1981) in the series *Zen no goroku*, xiv: p. 275 of Araki's rendering notes some further literature on Ch'i-sung, to which might particularly be added Ogisu Junō, "Sōsō Kaišō no Gozan Zensō ni oyooboseru shisōteki eikyō", *Ryökoku gakushū*, CCCXXX (1941), pp. 67–84, which comments on his popularity in Japan well before Tominaga's time.
26 The first sentence is a paraphrase, not verbatim, but it and the remainder of the quotation are drawn from *Fu-chiao pien* (as included in Ch'i-sung's *Collected works*), p. 650a in *Taishō Canon*, lii; cf. Araki, *Hogyōhen*, pp. 29 and 32.
27 The allusion is to the commentary on the twentieth hexagram of the *I Ching*: "Thus the holy man uses the divine way to give instruction", in R. Wilhelm, tr. C. F. Baynes, *The I Ching* (London, 1983), p. 486.
28 This paraphrases a further passage, p. 650b in the *Taishō Canon*, translated by Araki, *Hogyōhen*, pp. 37–9. Ch'i-sung points out specifically that in talking of *shen* he does not mean "gods", but "spirit" as used in the *Book of Changes*. This concept had already long proved its value in Chinese Buddhist polemic, as noted by R. H. Robinson, *Early Madhyamika in India and China* (Madison, 1967), pp. 104–8.
30 In other words, he has taken no account of the very different relationship between political and religious life in Indian and Chinese cultures.
righteousness, and so on. The sages may differ in their teachings, but they are alike in doing good." The transforming of the empire lies simply in goodness. Is not the Buddha's dharma good? Yet you gentlemen always reject it...I would that you gentle men would work for the public weal, and not for your own vanity." The teachings of the sage are goodness, and nothing more; the Way of the sage is correctness, and nothing more...one need not be a monk, one need not be a Confucian...monk and Confucian are 'traces', externals." "Of old there were sages, termed Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian. They were at heart one, though their 'traces' differed. As for their oneness, they all desired that men should do good; as for their differences, they were divided into separate schools and each produced its own teachings...the empire cannot be without Confucians, cannot be without Taoists, cannot be without Buddhists. If we lacked one of these teachings, then we would have lost one of the empire's Ways to goodness. If we were to lack one Way to goodness, then the evil within the empire would increase." "In my opinion, the three teachings support each other in bringing goodness to this world, but each of them is subject to the workings of fate in a way not readily discerned by men." In my own opinion, his argument comes down to saying that the three teachings are all good, so where one is lacking one force for the good is lost, but this is the working of fate. How stupid! If we are taking goodness as our yardstick, why limit it to the three teachings? The several tens of heterodoxies, the several tens of heresies - are they not all good, "at heart one, though their traces differ"? The only thing is, what are we to make of their causing people to become confused? That is worth thinking about. The teachings of Confucianism lie in goodness; the teachings of Buddhism lie in goodness: as far as their teachings lying in goodness are concerned, they are at one. The only thing is, what are we to make of their causing people to go to excess over refinement and illusion? This, equally, is worth thinking about.

Chen-tsung of the Sung (r. 998-1022) once said to Wang Tan (957-1017): "As for the establishment of the three teachings, their purport is at one. Generally speaking they all exhort the people to goodness. But only a gentleman of penetrating awareness is able to find the 'one thread' to them all. If one becomes immersed in one's emotions and sticks only to partial views, then one will end up even further from the Way". That this is another conciliatory theory goes, in short, without saying.

32 Fu-chiao pien 1, p. 649b; Araki, Hogyōhen, p. 23.
33 Fu-chiao pien 1, p. 652c; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 77-8.
34 Fu-chiao pien 2, p. 657a; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 146-9. For the significance of the term "trace" see my remarks at no. 8, p. 102, of T. Skorpuski, (ed.), The Buddhist Forum, i (London, 1990), and the references given there.
35 Fu-chiao pien 2, p. 660a, somewhat modified - for "Taoism" the original has the "hundred schools" of early Chinese thought; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 189-90.
36 Fu-chiao pien 1, p. 653a; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 79-80.
37 Allusion to Analects XV.2.3; Legge, Chinese Classics, i (Oxford, 1893), p. 295.
38 Tominaga probably derived this from Chih-p' an (1220-75) (comp.), Fo-tsu t'ung-chi 44, p. 405a in the Taishō Canon edition (xlix), where the conversation is dated to 1013. For Wang's failure to stand up to Chen-tsung's manipulative use of religious propaganda, see Ch'en Pang-chan, Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (Peking, 1977), pp. 162-74.
10 JRA
Hui-hung of Shih-men (1071–1128) has a poem on visiting the memorial pagoda of Ch’i-sung which says “When one compares our Way with Confucius/It is like a palm
and a fist/Extended or clenched, there is certainly a difference/But after all the hand is still the same”.\(^{39}\) He wrote thus because he believed in Ch’i-sung; he had no idea that
illusion and refinement are as far apart as the northern and southern borders of China.

Ch’i-sung also noticed that Chang Tsai, the two Ch’eng brothers and other Neo-
Confucians had a theory of returning to one’s true nature.\(^{40}\) So he thought: this comes
from the Fu-hsing shu of Li Ao (c. 772–836) of the T’ang, and his fu-hsing, “returning
to the true nature” came from the Ch’an master Wei-yen of Yao-shan (745–828), so this
theory of the Confucians is at base no different from that of the Buddhists.\(^{41}\) Now I read
through the Fu-hsing shu, and it says “If the emotions are not working, then the nature
achieves control.”\(^{42}\) “Do not ponder, do not think, then the emotions will not come forth.
When the emotions have not come forth, that is right thought.”\(^{43}\) He is taking the
emotions to belong to evil, and returning to the nature to be the non-production of the
emotions: this is a trite theory of Zennist derivation. But the theory of Chang and the
Chengs is entirely different. Chang and the Chengs’ theory assuredly does not take the
emotions to belong to evil, and furthermore assuredly does not require the emotions not
to be produced. When the nature returns to its original state the emotions, relying on the
nature, are good: that is what they call “returning to the nature”.\(^{44}\) Ch’i-sung has been
blinded by the identity at the verbal, “refined” level, reckoning that there is no difference
between the theories. He is wrong. In recent times Ito Jinsai (1627–1705) has done the
same,\(^{45}\) so it is not merely the Buddhists – the Confucians, too, become confused over verbal
refinement.

Ch’i-sung also says that “Han Yu (768–834) considered that in his day Buddhism alone
was flourishing and disliked the way in which it was the custom of his age to show
devotion to it beyond all reasonable bounds, but though he tried to keep it in check
through his writings, when it came to the fundamentals of the Way, even he gave it
considerable promotion”.\(^{46}\) Li P’ing-shan (1187–1231) likewise said “Liu Tzu-hui
(1101–47), Chang Shih (1133–80), Lü Tsu-ch’ien (1137–81) and Chu Hsi (1130–1200) were

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\(^{39}\) These are the opening lines of the poem, to be found in Taishö Canon, li p. 748a, appended to Ch’i-sung’s
Collected Works. Hui-hung, a key figure in the Sung rapprochement between Ch’ an and the literary world, is
the subject of ongoing work by Professor Robert Gimello.

\(^{40}\) For Chang Tsai (1020–77), see Ira E. Kasoff, The Thought of Chang Tsai (Cambridge, 1984); for the brothers
Ch’eng Hao (1032–86) and Ch’eng I (1013–87), see A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers (London, 1958);
for the theory in question in their works, see T. H. Barrett, Li Ao: Buddhist, Taoist or Neo-Confucian? (Oxford,

\(^{41}\) Tominaga’s reference is to Fu-chiao pien 1, p. 652c; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 74–6. For the whole question
of Li Ao’s relations with Wei-yen, see the second chapter of my Li Ao.

\(^{42}\) Li Ao, p. 95; a slight misquotation of the original, which reads “fullness” for “control”.

\(^{43}\) Li Ao, p. 112.

\(^{44}\) My own view is that the distinction between Li Ao and later Neo-Confucians came to be deliberately
overstated to defend against Buddhist insinuations. Tominaga, however, is following the traditional view as
formulated by Chu Hsi and propagated by his disciples: see Wing-tsit Chan (trans.), Neo-Confucian Terms

\(^{45}\) For Ito Jinsai on “returning to the nature”, see pp. 57–9 of my dissertation, “Buddhism, Taoism and
Confucianism in the thought of Li Ao” (Yale, 1978).

\(^{46}\) Fu-chiao pien 1, p. 652b; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 67–71. Ch’i-sung is presumably referring to Han’s essay
“Enquiry into the Way”, which is examined in Charles Hartman, Han Yu and the T’ang Search for Unity
all giants of recent times, who looked on this life as a dream and fortune and fame as so much dross, and who studied sagehood even though they never achieved it. Yet in discussing Buddhism and Taoism, they were their allies in fact even though verbally they were not; while they were overtly opposed, they were covert helpers — such is my humble opinion". These arguments are truly devious expedients, the practice of Indian illusionism, and they are all modelled on those of the Lotus Sutra devotees. If Han and Liu Tzu-hui, etc., were really like this, then they would be the philosophical equivalent of cat-burglars rather than Confucians. Han Yu's three letters to the Ch'an master Ta-tien (732–824) may be included in his Collected Works, but they are monkish forgeries, as Su Shih (1036–1101) correctly adjudged. It is his letter to Meng Chien (d. 824) which is the genuine article.

Ch'i-sung also said "You say we vainly brag about charity and its karmic rewards in order to keep ourselves in food and clothes... don't you know that you followers of the former masters talk of virtue and righteousness with an eye to your own material advantage?". And he says "The monk repays the favour shown by his ancestors through pursuit of the Way and through his cultivation of Virtue ensures the continuity of his family Virtue. He may not marry, yet he provides support for his parents; he may disfigure himself through the tonsure, yet he wins salvation for his kin: did not T'ai-po disfigure himself, and did not Po-i and Shu-ch'i refuse to marry and depart for good?"

In these two instances Ch'i-sung's remarks are very fine indeed. That Confucians have always found occasion to blame Buddhists on these points is wrong of them. I am no Confucian, no Taoist and no Buddhist; I observe their words and actions as a bystander, and form my own judgements.

Conclusion

Tominaga ends this section on a typical note, asserting his own independence, and discounting culturally biased arguments over the effects of religion to concentrate on what he considers to be the main issue: the need to see through mystification and rhetoric ("illusion" and "refinement" in his terminology) in order to think clearly about religion

47 For Chu Hsi see the entry by Wing-tsit Chan in H. Franke, Sung Biographies, i (Wiesbaden), pp. 282–90, in which Liu is pointed out as one of his teachers, Chang and Lü as two of his best friends.
48 For Li P'ing-shan, see the entry by Jan Yün-hua in Sung Biographies, ii (1979), pp. 557–82. Tominaga is paraphrasing slightly, probably from Li as quoted in Nien-ch'ang (comp.) (1341), Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai 20, p. 699a in the Taihō Canon, xliv, though Li's collected writings in defence of Buddhism also circulated independently in Tokugawa Japan.
49 Tominaga's earlier discussion of this sutra makes it clear that he sees the work as the product of one group within a competitive sectarian environment, reshaping earlier doctrine to their own ends.
50 For these letters and the Sung controversy over them see Hartman, Han Yü, p. 94 and p. 306, n. 181, which cites several further studies.
51 Excerpted in Hartman, Han Yu, pp. 94–5; this indisputably genuine letter is concerned to quell rumours that he had fallen under the influence of Ta-tien.
52 Fu-chiao pien, 1, p. 651a; Araki, Hogyōhen, pp. 48–51. In his paraphrase Tominaga has substituted "former masters" for "former kings", and it is their followers of the remote past who are accused of acting out of self-interest. Tominaga, however, seems to read Ch'i-sung's remarks as a tu quoque response.
53 Debate over celibacy and the tonsure — both allegedly unfilial betrayals of the sacred trust of life bequeathed by the ancestors — forms one of the most prominent themes in Sino-Buddhist polemics: the counter-examples of the ancient worthy T'ai-po tattooing himself to follow the customs of his southern place of exile and of the Shang loyalists Po I and Shu Ch'i preferring starvation as hermits to serving a new dynasty are already adduced by Mou-tzu (?fourth century A.D.), the earliest Chinese Buddhist polemicist: see de Bary, Sources of the Chinese Tradition, i, pp. 275–6.
in its social and cultural context. I hope that some of the erudition he displays in this task is revealed in the foregoing translation. The reader will have noted that I have had cause to consult this section of his work on an earlier occasion, but even so I cannot claim to have spent enough time on its elucidation. It is no easy matter, for example, to decide whether Tominaga is quoting his sources directly or indirectly, and weighing the evidence can be a lengthy business, though important in order to grasp the context Tominaga would have seen to the material he quotes. More careful thought, too, would doubtless have produced a translation more faithful both to the grammatical structures of his text and to his nuances of meaning. In Washio Junkei's collection of materials the amount I have translated comes to no more than three pages. Yet the rest of Washio's ten volumes are, I would guess, just as relevant to understanding Japan's shift to modernity. I do hope that others will see the need to push on with this sort of work.