John Locke as a Reader of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*: A New Manuscript*

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In the summer of 2019, several newspapers announced the discovery of John Milton’s personal copy of Shakespeare’s first folio. The copy, preserved in the Free Library of Philadelphia, had previously attracted attention for its remarkable annotations in the hand of an unidentifiable early owner. But it was only when a scholar noticed the similarity of the annotator’s hand with Milton’s that the association was wagered. As the Milton scholar William Poole noted in *The Guardian*: “It was, until a few days ago, simply too much to hope that Milton’s own copy of Shakespeare might have survived.” Yet it had survived, and in plain sight.¹ The implications of the discovery are now the product of considerable scholarship by specialists in early modern literature, but its repercussions can be felt in neighboring disciplines, where scholars could reasonably ask whether other figures could be placed in dialogue by a similar discovery. This has remained an object of fascination for students of John Locke’s political thought since the 1950s, when Peter Laslett recovered the master catalog of Locke’s library from the moldering hunting lodge of Locke’s descendants, the Lovelace family of Torridon in Ross-shire.² The catalog listed a copy of the first edition of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651), but the copy itself—traceable by a line of descent to the possession of the Lovelaces—had disappeared.³ It

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remains one of the great snarks in the scholarship of Locke’s political thought, rivaling the lost “middle” portion of his *Two Treatises of Government*.\(^4\)

The present article provides something like a surrogate for this copy: a previously unnoticed source bearing remarkable new evidence of Locke’s interest in *Leviathan*. The evidence derives from the collection of manuscripts amassed by the historian Thomas Birch (1705–66), the author of *The History of the Royal Society of London* (1756–57). Within this collection are several documents that had belonged to Pierre Des Maizeaux (1672/3–1745), the Huguenot journalist and biographer.\(^5\) In the summer of 1699, Des Maizeaux left the Netherlands for England, carrying a letter of introduction addressed to Locke from Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736), the literary factotum.\(^6\) Des Maizeaux soon befriended a number of Locke’s acquaintances, including the “freethinker” Anthony Collins (1676–1729) and Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671–1713), the third earl of Shaftesbury.\(^7\) Through these connections, in 1718–19, Des Maizeaux conceived of an edition of Locke’s previously unpublished writings: *A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Locke*. Des Maizeaux appears to have approached members of Locke’s circle for reminiscences of their late friend’s temperament and conversation, and he drafted several versions of a preface to the edition, in French. At some point, an assortment of papers deriving from Des Maizeaux’s edition was acquired by Birch, whose entire collection of manuscripts was left to the British Museum in 1766.\(^8\) Inside this collection, there is a single copy of a one-thousand-word memoir in Des Maizeaux’s hand, recording several incidents from Locke’s

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life and an extraordinary reference to Locke’s obsession with Hobbes’s *Leviathan* in Oxford, between ca. 1658 and 1667. Readers should consult the text of the memoir and a translation below now (App. 1) in order to understand the discussion that follows.

The memoir, as they will see, is curious. It draws upon the confidences of one of Locke’s friends, who is anonymized—alternatingly—as “Mr . . .” and “Mr T . . . .” It maunders through a selection of discontinuous anecdotes: Locke’s days as a student and tutor in Oxford; his employment by Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621–83), the first earl of Shaftesbury; his friendship with Thomas Sydenham (1624–89), the physician; and his flight from England shortly after the failure of the remarkable attempt to assassinate Charles II and James, duke of York in April 1683, the so-called Rye House Plot. In the context of Locke’s early biographical tradition, the memoir is an outlier. In many respects, it is the most unusual record of Locke’s life that we now possess—not merely as a critical portrayal of Locke’s character, but also as the only unambiguous evidence of his interest in Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, or in Hobbes himself. The purpose of this article is to contextualize the memoir and to explain its implications. The article begins by reconstructing the composition of the memoir, in the context of Des Maizeaux’s work on *A Collection of Several Pieces*, before contrasting the memoir’s claims with the other surviving records of Locke’s life from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The article then turns to the identity of Des Maizeaux’s anonymous source (“Mr . . . ,” “Mr T . . . .”) before examining the place of the memoir within the long-standing debate over Locke’s intellectual debts to Hobbes’s philosophy and political thought.

I. THE MEMOIR IN CONTEXT

Although the date of its acquisition by Birch is indeterminable, the memoir presumably entered his collection after Des Maizeaux’s death in 1745. In 1782, the memoir was cataloged by the British Museum within Additional MS 4222, a guard book of miscellaneous biographical material collected by Birch in the course of his myriad researches.9 Only a subset of the pages in Additional MS 4222 is devoted to Locke (ff. 223r–62v), and these pages bear no obvious connection to the remainder of the volume.10 Yet the position of the memoir

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10 The subset includes a note by Birch on Locke’s presence in the archive of the Royal Society (f. 223r); a short genealogical pedigree of Locke’s family by his close friend Edward Clarke (1649/51–1710), endorsed June 23, 1737 (ff. 224r–25v); a copy of the same document (f. 226r); two complete drafts, in French, of Des Maizeaux’s preface to *A
within the subset is suggestive: it bears a similar underlined heading (“Jean Locke,” “Locke”) to four pages of drafts, in French, of Des Maizeaux’s preface to *A Collection of Several Pieces* (ff. 227r, 235r, 248r, 251r). It is a reasonable conjecture that the memoir was written soon before or soon after the drafts, as a contribution to the same project. This would date the memoir to 1718–19, when Des Maizeaux commenced his work on assembling *A Collection of Several Pieces* for the press.

Prior to this date, Des Maizeaux had dedicated his career in England to various literary endeavors: biographies of Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) and Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (1636–1711), editions of the work of Charles de Saint-Evremond (1613–1703), and articles for British and European periodicals. The idea of publishing an edition of Locke’s works was not Des Maizeaux’s alone: it had originated with Anthony Collins. Des Maizeaux’s preface was addressed to Collins’s future brother-in-law, Hugh Wrottesley (d. 1725), and a subtitle that Des Maizeaux inserted in a 1739 reprint of *A Collection of Several Pieces*—“Publish’d by Mr. Desmaizeaux, under the Direction of Anthony Collins”—was a measure of posthumous recognition for Collins’s support and assistance in 1718–19. Philip Milton has detailed the substance of this narrative in a separate article, but it is important to summarize its principal events. The first edition of Locke’s unpublished works after his death, the *Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke* (1706), was produced by the London publishers Awnsham

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*Collection of Several Pieces* (ff. 227r–34v, 235r–44v); the memoir itself (ff. 245r–47r); an incomplete draft, in French, of the same preface to *A Collection of Several Pieces* (ff. 248r–51v); a bibliographical note by Des Maizeaux about Samuel Thomas’s *The Presbyterians Unmask’d* (1676) (f. 252r–v); a bibliographical note by Birch about Henry Lee’s *Anti-Scepticism or, Notes Upon Each Chapter of Mr. Lock’s Essay Concerning Humane Understanding* (1702) (f. 253r); a bibliographical note by Des Maizeaux about Robert Ferguson’s *The Third Part of No Protestant Plot* (1682) (f. 254r); and a fragmentary draft, in French, of Des Maizeaux’s response to three reviews of *A Collection of Several Pieces* (ff. 255r–58v, 259r, 260r–62v): *Bibliothèque Anglaise* 7, pt. 2 (1720): 285–96; *Bibliothèque Ancienne et Moderne* 13, pt. 2 (1720): 444–59, and *Mémoires Littéraires de la Grande-Bretagne* 3 (1720): 241–50.

The paper of the memoir differs in stock from those of the subset. The first page of the memoir (f. 245r–v) has faint chain lines and a shield watermark, which does not appear in Edward Heawood, *Watermarks, Mainly of the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Hilversum, 1950), W. A. Churchill, *Watermarks in Paper in Holland, England, France* (Amsterdam, 1967), or the Gravell Watermark Archive (www.gravell.org); the second page (f. 246r–v) has a barely visible countermark; and the third page (f. 247r–v) has an unidentifiable watermark, obscured by repairs to the paper.

For an abbreviated list of Des Maizeaux’s publications, see Broome, “An Agent,” 493–94.

(1658–1728) and John Churchill (ca. 1663–ca. 1714) with the help of Peter King (ca. 1663–1714) with the help of Peter King (ca. 1663–ca. 1714) with the help of Peter King (ca. 1663–1728) and John Churchill (ca. 1669–ca. 1714) with the help of Peter King (ca. 1669–1734), Locke’s cousin and heir. In 1708, King and the Churchills published an edition of Locke’s correspondence, *Familiar Letters Between Mr. Locke, and Several of His Friends*. In 1714, they incorporated the *Posthumous Works* and the *Familiar Letters* into a three-volume collection of Locke’s publications, *The Works of John Locke*.14

It is difficult to establish when Des Maizeaux and Collins first turned their minds to *A Collection of Several Pieces*. Collins had met Locke shortly before May 1703, and they had formed an immediate and close friendship for the remaining months of Locke’s life.15 Collins’s first contact with Des Maizeaux appears to have taken place in 1704.16 The pair maintained a regular correspondence between ca. 1707 and 1729, but the first reference to Locke in their extant correspondence occurs only in February 1717.17 In that month, Collins reported that Pierre Coste (1668–1747), a Huguenot journalist and translator, had criticized Locke’s philosophy in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*.18 Coste himself had lived with Locke in the home of Damaris Masham (1658–1708) and Sir Francis Masham (ca. 1646–1723) at Oates in High Laver, Essex, after moving there in September 1697 to serve as a tutor to the Mashams’ son.19 While residing with the Mashams, Coste acted as a literary assistant for Locke. He translated the third edition of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1695, first edition 1689) into French, and he helped Locke revise the third edition of his *Two Treatises of Government* (1698, first edition 1689).20 Notwithstanding this collaboration, Coste’s relationship with Locke appears to have been difficult: he was omitted from Locke’s will, excepting an apparently modest sum that Locke had bequeathed for a prospective translation of the *Two Treatises* into French. This did not inhibit Coste’s publication of a fulsome *éloge* of Locke in February 1705,21 but it nourished his tendency, in later years, to disparage

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14 For these publications, see Jean Yolton, *John Locke: A Descriptive Bibliography* (Bristol, 1998), 347, 361, 385, 399–403.
16 British Library, Add. MS 4282, ff. 245r–46v; *CAC*, 28 n. 38.
17 *CAC*, 246–51 (92).
Locke’s character and philosophy. In a French translation (1715) of Locke’s *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), Coste would deride Locke’s ambiguities on the question of virtue, innatism, and Christian revelation. Coste’s letter to the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* was similar in tone, and it typified his sympathy for the criticisms of Locke’s philosophy propounded by the third earl of Shaftesbury, who had befriended and supported Coste after the latter’s departure from Oates in 1705. In his letter of February 1717, Collins described Coste as a “calumniator” who had vitiated his *éloge* of 1705 and betrayed Locke’s trust.

In February 1719, Collins wrote to Des Maizeaux and announced his plan of approaching Peter King to secure Locke’s manuscripts for publication. With this in mind, Collins wrote to Awnsham Churchill, reporting—in the following month—that Churchill had conveyed his intentions to King in person. But Collins’s request was rebuffed. In October 1719, Collins reported to Des Maizeaux that Churchill “would have no body to print any of Mr Locke’s works but himself”; King had declined to provide the manuscripts and Churchill had refused to help. The matter appears to have bothered Collins for three more years. Yet he pressed forward, unfazed, in assembling material for a volume of Locke’s works. A draft table of contents suggests that this material was to have included Locke’s *Epistola de Tolerantia* (1689), but the volume ultimately comprised items that were previously unpublished, or unattributed to Locke himself, including *A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country* (1675), *Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman* (1703), and a series of letters written by Locke to friends and acquaintances, thirty-two of which were addressed to Collins himself. Prefixed to this text was Des Maizeaux’s laudatory preface, an English translation of Coste’s *éloge*, and an


25 *CAC*, 246–51 (92).

26 *CAC*, 295 (113).

27 *CAC*, 297 (114–15), 300–303 (117), 308 (121).

28 *CAC*, 314–15 (125), 335 (133).

29 British Library, Add. MS 4224, f. 226r.
anonymous letter—by Collins, in all probability—criticizing Coste’s recent behavior and “vindicating” Locke’s memory.30

The basis of the several attributions in the volume have proved controversial. In the case of A Letter from a Person of Quality, a political tract produced by the Shaftesbury circle in 1675, it appears that Des Maizeaux had investigated the matter with the third earl himself, a member of the Shaftesbury household, or an intermediary, such as John Toland (1670–1722), who was close to the third earl and Collins.31 In a similar manner, Des Maizeaux appears to have secured a copy of Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman from Locke’s acquaintance Samuel Bold (1650–1737).32 Des Maizeaux’s preface to A Collection of Several Pieces took pains to emphasize these efforts and the subjection of his findings to the judgment of Locke’s acquaintances, including “persons, very good judges, whom I have taken the liberty to consult about the impression of some pieces in this Collection.”33 The preface was dated March 23, 1720, but Collins would acknowledge his receipt of printed sheets from the volume earlier, in December 1719.34 It was during this period—or shortly before it—that Des Maizeaux must have transcribed the memoir below.

In addition to chiding Coste and enlarging Locke’s published Nachlass, a separate impetus for Des Maizeaux’s work was the exiguous state of Locke’s early biographical tradition. Before Locke’s death in October 1704, his work had formed the subject of serious published criticism. He had engaged some of these critics in debate, including Edward Stillingfleet (1635–99), the bishop of Worcester, and Jonas Proast (ca. 1642–1710), the Church of England clergyman and religious controversialist, but he typically preserved an equable silence or sedulously anonymized his published responses.35 Although he was exposed to slander about his residence in Oates with Damaris Masham and her

30 For the controvertible authorship of this letter, see CAC, 246–51 (92); Dybikowski, “‘Aspers’d and Blacken’d,’” 1–3, 20–23; Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters, 1680–1750 (London, 1995), 124.
32 British Library, Add. MS 4290, ff. 11r–14v.
34 CAC, 310 (122).
husband, the majority of his critics reproached his ideas, rather than his character or personal conduct. Locke’s treatment by biographers reflected the status that he had enjoyed in the first decade of William III’s reign as a renowned author and state functionary, with powerful friends in Parliament.

In 1705, the first memoir of Locke’s life appeared in Jeremy Collier’s English-language re-edition of Louis Moréri’s *Le Grand Dictionnaire Historique* (1674): an anonymous, brisk account of Locke’s life, testament, and publications, terminating with an anodyne recollection of his good character. With the exception of Coste’s *éloge* and a small number of derivative obituaries or reviews of Locke’s posthumous publications, readers were reliant on Jean Le Clerc’s “Éloge de feu Mr. Locke,” first published by Le Clerc’s *Bibliothèque Choisi* in 1705.40 Le Clerc’s “Éloge” profoundly shaped the literature that grew around Locke’s memory in the eighteenth century, and it remains a significant witness to his immediate reception post mortem.41 Indeed, it was the only comprehensive reconstruction of Locke’s life until 1829, when Peter King’s *The Life of John Locke* provided a detailed biography on the basis of original manuscript sources.42

In compiling his “Éloge,” Le Clerc turned to his own recollections of Locke’s character, but he also actively solicited first-hand information from Locke’s acquaintances. In January and February 1705, he received letters from Damaris Masham and the third earl of Shaftesbury, responding to his request for any

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41 Peter King, *The Life of John Locke: With Extracts from his Correspondence, Journals and Common-Place Books* (London, 1829).

information that they conserved about Locke’s life. Both obliged with generous accounts of Locke’s conduct as a friend: Masham described Locke’s early life and retirement, and Shaftesbury focused, in particular, on Locke’s service to his grandfather, the first earl. Their responses furnished Le Clerc with many of the claims in his “Éloge,” which gave its readers a minute account of Locke’s upbringing, education, and writings, without the slightest suggestion of his friend’s misbehavior or heterodoxy.

In contrast to Le Clerc’s “Éloge” and every other published recollection of Locke’s life and behavior in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the memoir below is extraordinary. Early critics of Locke had long associated his thought with irreligion, dismissed his claims to philosophical ingenuity, or alleged his sympathy for the political, moral, and theological doctrines of Thomas Hobbes. Yet these were the grievances of critics who never pretended to a close or lasting acquaintance with Locke himself. The memoirist below, however, insisted on “grandes liaisons,” and it is difficult to imagine why Des Maizeaux would have recorded the allegations if he had disbelieved their source—or why he would have anonymized the memoirist if the latter’s recollections were patently spurious. On the basis of the same presumptions, the memoir acquires particular credibility, since its claims conform strikingly with the life and resentments of James Tyrrell (1642–1719), the Whig historian and propagandist.

II. James Tyrrell, Memoirist

The significance of this identification is difficult to overstate: Tyrrell was closer to Locke than virtually any other member of his circle. Locke stayed in Tyrrell’s home for several weeks between 1679 and 1683, entrusted Tyrrell with the care of many of his possessions and papers when he entered into exile between 1683 and 1689, and corresponded with Tyrrell for most of his adult life. Their connection was so well known that Tyrrell was believed by one contemporary to have authored the anonymous, fawning obituary in Collier’s re-edition of Moréri’s


From Des Maizeaux’s perspective, Tyrrell was one of the last close friends of Locke who was still alive in 1718–19, and possibly the only reliable source of lesser-known information about Locke’s life and character. In attempting to break the Churchill–King monopoly over Locke’s literary remains, it would have made sense to approach Tyrrell, if only to supplement the attributions and other novelties that A Collection of Several Pieces could promise its readers. Yet Tyrrell’s recollections were too splenetic to incorporate within a work whose purpose was to defend Locke against the slander of his posthumous critics. In anonymizing his source and suppressing the memoir, Des Maizeaux succeeded in hiding this encounter for three centuries—creating a significant, but surmountable, difficulty in identifying the memoirist as Tyrrell.

A starting point for overcoming this difficulty is the memoirist’s reference to “Oxford,” or Locke’s period in residence at Christ Church (1652–67), before he departed the college in April 1667 to enter the employment of Lord Ashley in London. Published memoirs of Locke’s life from these years were limited until 1829 to Le Clerc’s “Éloge” and its use of the written recollections that Damaris Masham had provided regarding Locke’s early reputation in Oxford. As Masham had noted to Le Clerc, the source of her information on these matters was Tyrrell, whose memory of Locke’s character she transcribed for Le Clerc’s use, underlining phrases that had presumably derived, ad litteram, from a document supplied by Tyrrell himself:

Mr Tyrrel . . . tells me that he became acquainted with Mr Locke in Oxford in the yeare 1658 and that Mr Locke was then look’d upon as one of the most Learned and Ingenious young men in the Colledge he was of. . . . Whatever esteem was had of Mr. Locke for his Learning when Mr Tyrrel first knew him, I have understood from the same Gentleman that he gain’d it not by Disputation, a thing then much in Vogue in the Universitie; for he says, That Mr. Locke never lov’d the trade of Disputeing in Publick in the Schools, but


47 Locke appears to have returned to Oxford for only two (short) visits between April 1667 and February 1675. He departed for France in November 1675 and returned in April 1679, when he moved to Ashley’s (now Shaftesbury’s) home in Thanet House, Aldersgate Street; he remained in London, with occasional visits to Oxford, until late August 1683, when he left for the Netherlands. The memoirist’s reference to “Oxford” may refer to Locke’s sporadic residence in the city after 1667, but the use of “il n’etudioit point” to describe Locke’s activities presumably refers to the period before his employment by Ashley.
was always wont to Declaim against it as being rather invented for wrangling or Osten-
tation than to discover Truth.48

Le Clerc incorporated the better part of Masham’s letter in his “Éloge” and he attributed these recollections to Tyrrell by name.49 He also compared Locke’s style as a letter writer to the works of Vincent de Voiture (1597–1648), the poet and belletrist, echoing a comparison used by Masham. In her letter to Le Clerc, Masham had expressed “doubt” about whether “Voiture excell’d him [sc. Locke] in that kind of writing.”50 In Le Clerc’s memoir, without referring to Masham, he had made a similar observation.51 Le Clerc’s obituary was translated into En-

English in 1706,52 and it is conceivable that it supplied Des Maizeaux’s memoirist with the idea of Locke’s interest in Voiture.53 Yet this was not the substance of Le Clerc’s comparison, which merely referred to Locke’s prose as “n’étoit point inferieur à Voiture.” The fact that Locke owned several copies of Voiture’s works, including a 1657 English translation of Voiture’s Lettres, suggests that Des Maizeaux’s source was not simply refashioning Le Clerc’s praise, but refer-
ung to Locke’s confided enthusiasm for the Lettres.54 The emphasis placed upon the language of the edition (“La Traduction Angloise”) suggests—in the same manner—that Des Maizeaux’s source knew that Locke could not read French before ca. 1676. This was a fact that Tyrrell would have known, since he had entered Locke’s friendship within a year of matriculating at Queen’s College, Oxford in April 1657.55 It would also accord with the symmetry of

48 Woolhouse, “Lady Masham’s Account,” 172–73. For Masham’s receipt of in-

formation on Locke’s life from another of his acquaintances, Philipp van Limborch (1633–1712), see Luisa Simonutti, “Religion, Philosophy, and Science: John Locke and Limborch’s Circle in Amsterdam,” in Everything Connects: In Conference with Rich-


50 Woolhouse, “Lady Masham’s Account,” 173.


52 Jean Le Clerc, The Life and Character of Mr. John Locke, author of the Essay Con-

cerning Humane Understanding (London, 1706).

53 Locke’s only published reference to Voiture is in the second (1695) and subse-
quent editions of Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), commending his Let-

tres as models for “Letters of Complement, Mirth, Raylery or Diversion” (John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, ed. John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton [Oxford, 1989], 243 [§ 189]).

54 For Locke’s copies of Voiture’s works, see Harrison and Laslett, The Library of John Locke, 260 (3099–3102a). The master catalog of Locke’s library (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Locke 17.16, pt. II, p. 240) records that he donated his copy of Voiture’s Lettres (Amsterdam, 1657) to Damaris Masham. For Locke’s procurement of works by Voiture, see CIL, 1:674–78 (445), 8:210–11 (3468), 323–24 (3559).

55 For Tyrrell’s matriculation (April 25, 1657), see Oxford, Queen’s College Archive, Entrance Book 1340–1894, sub nomine, Oxford University Archives, SP 37, sub nomine
Des Maizeaux’s memoir and Masham’s letter to Le Clerc. Both mention Voiture in the course of recounting Locke’s reputation at Oxford. It is not hard to imagine that Tyrrell’s recollections to Masham—only portions of which, it would seem, she provided to Le Clerc—provided a basis for the comparison, through a similar reference to Locke’s early interest in Voiture.

The memoir next turns to the origins of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689). In 1704–5, Tyrrell would report to Masham that the physician David Thomas (1634–94), Tyrrell, “and other of his [sc. Locke’s] Friends” had desired that Locke commence writing on the understanding in 1670–71. Le Clerc’s “Éloge” later reproduced this claim, but it would have been familiar to any reader of the Essay’s preface of 1689, where Locke had described the germination of his masterwork: “five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, . . . it came into my Thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see what Objects our Understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.”56 In Tyrrell’s own copy of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, now in the British Library, he would also list himself, in a marginal annotation, as one of the “five or six Friends” who was present when Locke conceived of the Essay—an experience that he shared with the memoirist.57

Tyrrell’s first extant letter to Locke is dated 1677, twenty years after their first meeting. The tone is affectionate and familiar, and it persisted in subsequent letters during the early 1680s, when Locke was a frequent visitor to Tyrrell’s home at Oakley in Buckinghamshire. In early 1681, during one of Locke’s stays, the pair co-wrote a response to Edward Stillingfleet’s Mischief of Separation (1680) and Unreasonableness of Separation (1681),58 and—in all probability—influenced each other in responding to Sir Robert Filmer’s political writings:

57 British Library, C.122.f.14, sig. A4v: “This was in winter 1673 as I remember being myself one of those that then met there when the Discourse began about the Principles of morality, and reveal’d Religion.”

Tyrrell’s pseudonymous Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681) bears a striking resemblance to passages of Locke’s Two Treatises. When Locke left England for Holland in August–September 1683, he arranged for his books to be shipped from Oxford to Oakley, and it was there that a large part of his library resided for six years.

In time, however, their friendship deteriorated. The two never broke contact, but Locke’s letters were increasingly suspicious and disdainful, as Tyrrell prevaricated over an unpaid loan and mishandled the restitution of Locke’s belongings from Oakley—including Locke’s copy of “Les Oeuvres de Mr: Voiture.” In a letter of January 1686, for example, Tyrrell complained of Locke’s “half year’s silence” and lamented Locke’s request that he transfer a number of Locke’s manuscripts from Oakley to the home of a newer friend in Somerset, Edward Clarke, the addressee—with his wife, Mary (d. 1706)—of Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693). When Tyrrell suspected, twelve months later, that Locke had transmitted a draft of the Essay to Thomas Herbert (ca. 1656–1733), the earl of Pembroke, he contrived to read it. Yet Locke kept the manuscript from Tyrrell’s hands. When the Essay appeared in print, Tyrrell chronicled its reception at Oxford and provided a new stimulus for Locke’s misgivings. “Thinkeing men at Oxford,” Tyrrell reported, were complaining that Locke approached the principles of “Mr: Hobs; when he asserts that in the state of nature and out of a commonwealth, there is no moral good or evil: vertue, or vice but in respect of those persons, that practice it or thinke it so.” Locke had not adequately denied that “all vertue and vice” were simply determined by positive law, or “the praise, or dispraise that men give to certaine actions in several clubs or societeyes.” Writing again in July 1690, Tyrrell complained that Locke had failed to clarify what he had meant by the “divine law,” since he had distinguished it from “the divine, or revealed, law given by Moses and reinforced by Jesus Christ.” Tyrrell was convinced that the former was “the same with that which others call the Law of nature,” and he enjoined Locke to add a parenthesis to this effect, noting that he would have advised as much “if I had had the

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Locke, Edward Stillingfleet and Toleration” (PhD diss., University of Leicester, 2003), which erroneously describes Tyrrell as Locke’s “former pupil” (1:229).

59 For this resemblance, see John Locke, Political Writings, ed. David Wootton (London, 1993), 60; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge, 1979), 169.

60 Harrison and Laslett, The Library of John Locke, 17.

61 CILI, 4:286–87 (1403).

62 CILI, 2:765–69 (842).


64 CILI, 3:86–88 (885).

65 CILI, 4:100–102 (1301).

66 CILI, 4:100–102 (1301).

honour of having it [sc. the Essay] communicated to me before it had bin made publick.” Locke’s response of August 1690 was indignant and reiterated the Essay’s distinctions. Yet Tyrrell was dissatisfied. Two years later, he continued to urge Locke’s publication of a work against “the Epicurean Principles of Mr: Hobbs,” to supplement Tyrrell’s own translation (1692) of Richard Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae (1672). Locke, however, never conceded the criticism or rose to its insinuations. Instead, he maintained a variously distant and transactional relationship with Tyrrell for the next twelve years. When comparing these exchanges to the complaints of Des Maizeaux’s memoirist, the resemblances acquire a persuasive logic: Tyrrell was present at the Essay’s conception, closer to Locke before 1683 than during the “last twenty years of Locke’s life,” aware of Locke’s admiration for Voiure, frustrated in his attempt to read the final draft of the Essay in manuscript, and prone to suspect Locke’s sympathy for Hobbes.

Yet these do not exhaust the grounds for identifying Tyrrell as the memoirist. The memoirist refers to Locke’s “book on Money,” advertong ambiguously to Locke’s Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money (1692), Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money (1695), or Several Papers Relating to Money, Interest and Trade (1696). He notes that one of these works was plagiarized from “another,” and he refers to Thomas Mun’s Discourse of Trade (1621) or England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade (1664) and Sir Robert Cotton’s Speech Made Before the Lords of His Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, Touching the Alteration of Coyn (1626, republished in 1651, 1672, 1679, and 1690). Cotton’s name does not feature in Locke’s published works or extant manuscripts, although Locke did own the 1690 edition of his Speech. Mun does not feature in Locke’s published works either, although he appears in notes from Locke’s reading, and his writings would inspire passages of Locke’s Some Considerations, sustaining a contemporary accusation that Locke had recycled a misleading metaphor from Mun’s Discourse. Yet the association of Locke’s

68 CJL, 4:110–13 (1309).
69 CJL, 4:493–96 (1522).
73 Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter (London, 1696), 47.
theories with Mun’s or Cotton’s was not widely made in the seventeenth century. The only elaborate discussion of either writer within Locke’s works or correspondence was a letter of March 1696 to Locke from Tyrrell, in which Tyrrell reported on a challenge to Locke’s Further Considerations by Sir Richard Temple (1634–97) and enclosed a set of “Queries” about Temple’s critique: “not to teach you [sc. Locke] any thing you did not know before, but to have your opinion, whether I [sc. Tyrrell] rightly understand this Controversie.” In the same letter, Tyrrell boasted of his “answer” to a quandary posed by Temple and noted that he had found its formulation in “Mun of Trade”: “if you have not the book, (which is now hard to be had) I doubt not but your Masterly Genius comprehends all that need to be sayed on that subject; and does not require any supplies from others.” Yet Tyrrell was demonstrably familiar with the anthology that contained Cotton’s Speech, but his letter of 1696 alone suggests that he—like Des Maizeaux’s memoirist—viewed Locke’s monetary works as an inadequate surrogate for Mun’s.

Another parallel between the memoirist’s and Tyrrell’s relationship with Locke is especially suggestive. The memoirist describes several episodes during Locke’s employment by the first earl of Shaftesbury in a manner that betrays a limited familiarity with the episodes themselves. The claim that Locke had no “part” in the arrangement of the second earl’s marriage is demonstrably erroneous. Moreover, the passage referring to Shaftesbury’s flight into exile is tendentiously vague. Yet the memoirist makes clear reference to an event that Tyrrell himself experienced firsthand: Locke’s retirement to Oxford and Oakley in September–November 1682, shortly before Shaftesbury fled to the Netherlands. It was in Oxford and Oakley that Locke made the final preparations for his own exile, staying with Tyrrell again in June 1683 before departing for Rotterdam in late August. It was during this extended period, one imagines, that Tyrrell was struck by Locke’s fear of arrest, as the search for Shaftesbury’s co-conspirators in the Rye House Plot widened. Contemporary knowledge of

74 CIL, 5:585–87 (2053); De Beer identifies “Mun of Trade” as Mun’s England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, although it is possible that Tyrrell is referring to Mun’s Discourse.

75 For Tyrrell’s knowledge of Cotton’s Cottoni Posthuma, see [James Tyrrell], Bibliotheca Politica . . . Dialogue the Sixth (London, 1693), sig. A2r.

76 For Locke’s role in this affair, see CIL, 1:321–23 (234–36).

77 For Shaftesbury’s flight, see Philip Milton, “John Locke and the Rye House Plot,” Historical Journal 43 (2000): 647–68, 651–53. For contemporary reportage of Shaftesbury’s flight into exile, providing a possible source for the memoirist’s claims, see (inter alia) Thomas Sprat, A True Account and Declaration of the Horrid Conspiracy Against the Late King (London, 1685).

78 For Locke’s movements, see Milton, “John Locke and the Rye House Plot,” 657, 663.
Locke’s movements in 1682–83 was limited, and an account of his preparations for exile did not feature in biographies of Locke until the publication of the second edition of Anthony Wood’s *Athenae Oxonienses* in 1721, which would implicate Locke in the Rye House Plot, noting that he had “conveyed away” from Oxford “several Letters and Writings, without being search’d.” Only a small group of individuals would have known that Locke had traveled to Oxford before August 1683 and only Tyrrell, among them, had there acted as his “host.”

This would explain the exactitude of the memoirist’s particular recollection and the imprecision of its political context: Tyrrell had no known affiliation with Shaftesbury and no access to his circle’s inner workings, aside from what Locke chose to vouchsafe.

Nonetheless, difficulties remain in identifying Tyrrell as Des Maizeaux’s memoirist. It is hard, inter alia, to understand why Tyrrell would offer such a derisive account of Locke’s behavior, particularly after the apparent praise that he had conveyed to Damaris Masham in 1705. The extant correspondence between Locke and Tyrrell provides no intimation of this contempt, although—as we have seen—its tone could be insinuating and its praise backhanded. The disappearance of Locke’s side of the correspondence, save for four largely uninformative letters, deprives us of a crucial insight into the pair’s friendship, but it has

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81 A reconstruction of Locke’s movements in June–August 1683 shows Locke visiting Oakley on June 23 and 27, after which, for eleven weeks, he neglected his normal practice of recording his daily movements in a diary. Locke appears to have stayed in Oxford intermittently, residing in his rooms at Christ Church; he traveled to Somerset in late July–early August and to Salisbury by late August, before fleeing to Rotterdam, where he arrived on September 7/17 (Milton, “John Locke and the Rye House Plot,” 663–65).
never been claimed that Tyrrell viewed Locke with such profound contempt. This could suggest that Des Maizeaux’s memoirist was another individual: one who had known Locke in Oxford and who was present at the conception of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke himself had numbered “five or six friends” within his chamber when the idea of the *Essay* was first discussed, and scholars have subsequently identified only two of these individuals (Tyrrell and David Thomas). It is possible that another one of these “friends” had lived long enough to air his disapproving recollections to Des Maizeaux between 1704 and 1719, but the problem with this hypothesis is the complete absence of an alternative candidate who fits the memoirist’s self-description, leaving aside the initial letter (“T”) of his surname. Locke numbered a large group of acquaintances between 1650 and 1672, but among these individuals only Tyrrell outlived 1704 and had interacted with Locke, at Oxford, in 1652–67 and 1682–83. In response, it could be said that the memoirist was merely a fantasist whose distortions Des Maizeaux transcribed but quarantined from *A Collection of Several Pieces*. Yet this would have us believe that an individual was versed enough in Locke’s biography that he could confect an accurate account of its major episodes—enfolding arcana about Locke’s literary taste and exile—in a manner that only coincidentally aligned with Tyrrell’s experiences.

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82 For a purely speculative attempt to identify the remaining members of the group, see Marshall, *John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility*, 78, and John Marshall, “John Locke in Context: Religion, Ethics and Politics” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1991), 316–17. It should be noted that only Tyrrell and Des Maizeaux’s memoirist have identified themselves—in extant documentation—as members of the “five or six Friends” who met in Locke’s “Chamber.”

83 Locke’s extant letters are addressed to thirty-one individuals between 1650 and 1672; extant letters addressed to Locke are from sixty-five individuals over the same period. Only nine of these individuals were alive when Des Maizeaux arrived in England (1699): John Hoskins (ca. 1640–1717), Sir Joseph Williamson (1633–1701), John Mapleton (1631–1721), Dennis Grenville (1637–1703), Charles Berkeley (ca. 1649–1710), Richard Davis (1618–93/1700), Johann Schard (1660–1727), Robert Huntington (1637–1701), and William Glanville (ca. 1618–1702). Only two of these individuals were alive when Des Maizeaux began work on *A Collection of Several Pieces* (1718–19): Schard, who can be ruled out categorically, and Mapleton, who had known Locke since childhood, but had no documented contact with him at Christ Church (1652–67), or after 1679. Among Locke’s twenty-two identifiable pupils at Christ Church (J. R. Milton, “Locke’s Pupils,” *Locke Newsletter* 26 [1995]: 95–118), only Charles Berkeley, John Pickering (1645–1703), George Walls (1645–6/1727), and Edward Pococke (1648–1727) were alive in 1699, and only Walls and Pococke were alive in 1718–19; Walls was in Hamburg in 1682–83 and Pococke’s connection to Locke, although in evidence in 1690 (*C.J.L.*, 4:35–37 [1267]), was tenuous. This survey does not exhaust the membership of Locke’s circle; it is provided only to suggest that a reasonable alternative to Tyrrell cannot be posited without serious difficulty.
A further piece of evidence makes this theory even less plausible. An eighteenth-century biographical error, uncorrected by his entry in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, dates Tyrrell’s death to June 1718. Yet Tyrrell died one year later, exactly during Des Maizeaux’s compilation of the preface to *A Collection of Several Pieces* and Anthony Collins’s efforts on its behalf. Three facts are important in this connection. The first is that the corrected date of Tyrrell’s death provides an occasion for him to have met and conversed with Des Maizeaux when the latter was preparing *A Collection of Several Pieces* for the press. The second is that Tyrrell and Anthony Collins were friends. The two had met in April 1703, during a coincidental visit to Locke at Oates, and they maintained a correspondence until at least 1710, when Collins’s *Priestcraft in Perfection* (1710) printed an anonymized letter from Tyrrell discussing the twentieth of the Thirty-Nine Articles. The third is that Tyrrell composed a letter to Jean Le Clerc in October 1718, in which he commented on Locke’s *Essay* and made a pointed reference to Le Clerc’s “Éloge”: “As for what you add concerning your not thinking it fit to add any thing further to the Accoun[t] already given of Mr. Lock’s Life, I think you have very good Reason not to concern your self any further about it, altho’ I sh’d be glad to know from your self in what Points your Sentiments are different from those of that Author, since I my self cannot be of his Opinion in divers Points in


86 [Anthony Collins], *Priestcraft in Perfection* (London, 1710), 20, 26; CAC, 213–15 (78). For Tyrrell’s defense of Collins, see Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Rawl. 10.142, ff. 494r–95v. Tyrrell might alternatively have met Des Maizeaux through John Toland. Des Maizeaux was familiar with Toland (British Library, Add. MS 4282, ff. 118r, 139v), and edited *A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Toland* in 1726. Tyrrell’s friendship with Toland is documented in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ballard MS 38, f. 2r, printed in Mark Goldie, “The Earliest Attack on Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government*,” *Locke Newsletter* 30 (1999): 73–84, 82.

87 Le Clerc’s letter to Tyrrell is not extant. His “Éloge” of Locke was reprinted in a 1710 edition of Locke’s *Oeuvres diverses* (Rotterdam, 1710), i–xcix, and the English translation (n. 46 above) was reprinted in 1713 and 1714 as *An Account of the Life and Writings of Mr. John Locke*. 
his Essay of humane understanding, as I also let him understand some Time before his Decease.”88 This passage provides a strong reaffirmation of the conclusions we have reached so far: Tyrrell’s recollections of Locke, in later life, were susceptible of the memoirist’s contempt. Although the memoirist is more critical of Locke’s failures in the Essay and Le Clerc’s errors in his “Éloge” (“Tous les faits raportés dans cette Piece sont ou faux ou mal rapportés”), the sense of Tyrrell’s letter is not so dissimilar, with its indifference to the republication of Le Clerc’s “Éloge” and its fixation on the inadequacies of the Essay. A considerable distance still separates the memoirist’s criticisms from Tyrrell’s complaints, but it is possible that Des Maizeaux’s assurance of anonymity filled the gap, thereby allowing Tyrrell to voice his concerns more freely.

III. Locke, Hobbes, and Leviathan

If we accept that Tyrrell was Des Maizeaux’s memoirist, it raises several important questions about Locke’s biography and the historiography of one of his best-known friendships. In another respect, however, it may signal a profound shift in how we approach Locke’s early intellectual development, particularly where it concerns the influence of Hobbes’s Leviathan. Until the appearance of Peter Laslett’s 1960 edition of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, it was a shibboleth that Locke’s work was a response to Leviathan.89 Laslett’s answer to this tradition was strident and conjoined with his revisionist demonstration that the Two Treatises were written during the “Exclusion Crisis” (1679–83), and not the “Glorious Revolution” (1688–89).90 For Laslett, the Two Treatises were an exigent response to Filmer’s patriarchal absolutism, recently revived as the orthodoxy of “the established order”: the Tories and hierocratic churchmen who defended the succession of James, duke of York, against the maneuvers of Locke’s patron, the first earl of Shaftesbury. Locke was “impelled to write” against Filmer’s work in defense of Whig parliamentarianism at a time when a response to Hobbes would have struck its readers as dated or extraneous: “There would have been no point whatsoever for the intellectual champion of the Whig exclusionists [sc. Locke] to produce one more criticism of Hobbes.”91

The strength of Laslett’s case turned on his failure to detect any meaningful evidence of Locke’s interest in Hobbes’s work: Locke’s library included

90 Locke, Two Treatises, ed. Laslett, 67.
91 Locke, Two Treatises, ed. Laslett, 67.
Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, *De Mirabilibus Pecci Carmen* (1666), and *Problemata Physica* (1662), but Locke’s voluminous papers and publications conserved only a handful of references to Hobbes’s books, or Hobbes himself. Subsequent research has raised the number of these references to thirteen, all of which are transcribed in Appendix 2 below. From Laslett’s perspective, the imprecise and dismissive quality of these references strengthened his case for the insignificance of Hobbes to Locke’s intellectual development: Locke was reluctant to acknowledge Hobbes’s works in print and diffident about excerpting Hobbes’s work in his letters or manuscripts. Only four references date irrefragably before or during the Exclusion Crisis (App. 2: 2, 4, 5, 6), and not one reveals a prolonged engagement with Hobbes’s thought or publications. Laslett allowed that there were “phrases and whole arguments” in the *Two Treatises* “which recall the Hobbesian position, and must have been intended in some sense as comments upon them.” In §§ 97–98 of the Second Treatise, for example, Locke compared a state in which majoritarian resolutions did not “conclude” or oblige every inhabitant to a “*Leviathan* of a shorter duration, than the feeblest Creatures.” Yet these resemblances were difficult to distinguish from a misremembered paraphrase of Hobbes’s philosophy; indeed, as Laslett purported to demonstrate, Locke could not have read *Leviathan* during the Exclusion Crisis, since he had lent his only copy to Tyrrell between 1674 and 1691.

For sympathetic readers of Leo Strauss’s *Natural Right and History* (1953), Laslett’s attempt to discover the traces of Hobbes in Locke’s works or manuscripts was misguided: Locke had prudentially suppressed his references to Hobbes’s works, and any expectation of their appearance neglected to acknowledge the esoteric character of his political philosophy, which was only Hobbes’s in later Stuart dress. Variations on this response have appeared in the past six decades, and they have issued in suggestive readings of Locke’s philosophy in the light of Hobbes’s surmised influence. Yet the majority of responses to Laslett have tended to embrace his conclusions, in sympathy with the contextualism

93 Locke, *Two Treatises*, ed. Laslett, 74.
96 Locke, *Two Treatises*, ed. Laslett, 71 n. †. For a record of this loan, see Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke f. 13, p. 9, MS Locke f. 17, f. 6r, MS Locke b. 2, f. 124r.
of the “Cambridge School” in the history of political thought. John Dunn’s *The Political Thought of John Locke* (1969) would devote a chapter to the issue of Hobbes’s influence on Locke, defending Laslett against those who had denied his case for Hobbes’s insignificance. Scholars, Dunn reported, were congenial to Laslett’s re-dating of the *Two Treatises*, since this only “meant rewriting one lecture”: a shift of focus from the Glorious Revolution to the Exclusion Crisis. But the notion that the *Two Treatises* were not a response to *Leviathan* “had altogether more sinister implications”: “If it were correct, it did not just mean the rewriting of one lecture; it meant a significant revision of the entire way in which the history of political theory was conceived.” Dunn posited an “admirable” reason to dissent from Laslett’s thesis, in a manner that Laslett himself had allowed: “[Is it conceivable historically that a man with Locke’s philosophical ambitions could have written such a work . . .] without his intellectual course being powerfully deflected by [Hobbes’s] magnetic pull . . .?” Yet Dunn rejected this counter-suggestion and argued instead that the purposes of the *Two Treatises* and *Leviathan* were impossible to align: no matter how “sympathetic one were to the picture of Locke’s intellectual life as lived in a conscious tension with Hobbes,” the “focus” of the tension could not “conceivably be located in the . . . Treatises.” “In them, the Hobbesian arguments are not answered,” Dunn insisted. “They are merely and blandly ignored.” Laslett’s emphasis on the recoverable vestiges of Locke’s interest in Hobbes was thus misplaced, since the discovery of any such interest could never coordinate the “central premise” of the *Two Treatises* and *Leviathan*. The irony of Dunn’s position was its quasi-Straussian derision of Laslett’s researches as tautological or inane: either over-determining a case for Hobbes’s irrelevance or supplying nugatory exceptions to it. If evidence could emerge that Locke had read *Leviathan* eagerly, according to this argument, it would have no effect on the “historical comprehension” of the *Two Treatises.*

Dunn’s interpretation has not met with uncritical endorsement, but it has served to reinforce the tendency of Laslett’s revisionism in banishing the shadow of Hobbes from recent scholarship of Locke’s political thought. Yet the risk is one of overcorrection, in which Locke’s indifference to Hobbes in the *Two Treatises* comes to describe his publications in general, or licenses the assertion that Locke “never read” *Leviathan* at all. Notwithstanding Locke’s denial of familiarity

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100 Locke, *Two Treatises*, ed. Laslett, 74–75.
102 Laslett entertains and dismisses the possibility that Locke “never read *Leviathan*” (Locke, *Two Treatises*, ed. Laslett, 73), but subsequent interpretations have misrepresented
with Hobbes’s work (App. 2: 12 and 13), it is clear that he turned to Hobbes repeatedly as a resource for his contentions. The reference could be neutral or admiring (App. 2: 1, 2, 3); in some cases, it could be a matter of clarifying Hobbes’s doctrines, in the apparent service of Locke’s own philosophy or exegesis (App. 2: 7, 8, 9). It would be insupportable to describe these references as extensive, but they suggest an interest that exceeds acquaintance en passant. Through the prism of the memoirist’s claims, the references acquire a quality of self-conscious detachment, fortifying a well-established narrative in reconstructions of Locke’s intellectual biography in which he progressed from a youthful flirtation with Hobbes’s “authoritarianism” to the mature “liberalism” of the Two Treatises and Epistola de Tolerantia.

The nature of Locke’s early “Hobbesianism,” however, has remained a matter of debate. In the contending judgments of Jeffrey Collins, Jon Parkin, and Jacqueline Rose, the notion that Locke had confined his interest in Leviathan to his friends or colleagues at Oxford ca. 1658 is unsurprising. Hobbes had acquired a connection to Christ Church in this period through a member of the college, Henry Stubbe (1632–76), deputy keeper of the Bodleian Library, who had commenced a Latin translation of Leviathan prior to 1656. In correspondence with Hobbes between April 1656 and October 1659, Stubbe encouraged Hobbes to respond to the Presbyterian critic of Independent ecclesiology in Oxford, John Wallis (1616–1703), and dutifully presented copies of Hobbes’s work to Thomas Barlow (1608/9–81), the Provost of Queen’s College (1658–77) and Stubbe’s superior as Bodley’s librarian (1652–60). Hobbes’s obliging response,
an attack on Wallis’s *Mens sobria* (1657), encouraged Stubbe’s hopes of brokering a rapprochement between Hobbes, who had seemingly endorsed Independence in chapter 47 of *Leviathan*,106 and John Owen (1616–83), the Dean of Christ Church (1651–60) and the head of a contingent within the college that reportedly numbered scholars, like Stubbe, Edward Bagshaw (1629–71), and Locke himself, who had attended Westminster School.107 Bagshaw would write an approving letter to Hobbes in 1658, praising his “Excellent Tract *Of Libertie and Necessitie* (1654).108 In 1659, Locke had privately commended the *politique* tolerationism of Stubbe’s *Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause* (1659).109 In his own *Two Tracts on Government*, composed at Christ Church between 1660–62 and addressed to Bagshaw’s *The Great Question Concerning Things Indifferent in Religious Worship* (1660), Locke defended an ecclesiology that was, in Rose’s terms, “remarkably reminiscent” of Hobbes’s: confuting Bagshaw’s argument for freedom of conscience in *adiaphora*, or religious practices about which no positive injunction could be found in the Scriptures.110 In leaving the determination of *adiaphora* to the magistrate, Locke would adopt a “distinctly Hobbesian-sounding contractarian argument,” and a position that “shade[d] into a profoundly Erastian understanding of the magistrate’s control of the external characteristics of the church,” as a means to ensure civil peace against a revival of religious sectarianism.111 Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke would insist that the laws of God and nature were “binding independently” of magisterial authority, and he declined to invest his sovereign with sacramental powers. This “quasi-Hobbesian model”—a “game,” Parkin claims, “with the followers of Hobbes at Christ Church”—could “defeat Bagshaw with the sort of argument he had used himself,” and it marked a turning point in the association of Erastianism with the “broadly tolerant” regime of the 1650s.112 The subsequent association of Anglican Erastianism with Hobbes would force its exponents to place a distance between their arguments and Hobbes’s religious heterodoxies, and this partly explained why Locke “was careful to avoid any references” to “his intellectual


112 Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*, 210.
ancestor” in the Two Tracts. But this avoidance stemmed simultaneously from Locke’s principled reluctance to collapse obligation into the dictates of Hobbes’s “sovereign.”

For Collins, Locke’s ambiguous relationship with Hobbes reflected the latter’s strained connection with Owenite Independency after 1656. In Of Schisme (1657), his answer to Wallis’s Mens sobria, Owen himself had endorsed an ecclesiology that was “strongly Hobbesian in flavour,” but he tempered the endorsement by refusing publicly to acknowledge any association with Hobbes himself, or his ideas. This form of “public disapprobation alloyed with a measure of private approval” revealed why Stubbe, in a response to Richard Cawdrey’s Independence Further Proved to be a Schism (1658), could deny that he had ever served as “Mr. Hobbs’s advocate.” For Parkin and Rose, any suggestion that the Independents and Hobbes were engaged in a “mutual” courtship, beyond Stubbe’s fantasy of conciliation or Hobbes’s “unidirectional” sympathy, “overstates the case”: Hobbes was “an undesirable fellow-traveller” for Owen, who did not approve of Stubbe’s project to translate Leviathan and remained incapable of offering Hobbes “unqualified praise, even privately.” The memoirist’s recollection of Locke’s interest in Leviathan, and Locke’s reluctance to acknowledge Hobbes in his Two Tracts, suggests the same combination of “private enthusiasm with nervous public reserve.” Yet it clarifies, in a remarkable and otherwise unattested form, the intensity of this enthusiasm.

As a protégé of Barlow at Queen’s, Tyrrell might have viewed Hobbes with the same circumspection that had marked Barlow’s receipt of Stubbe’s overtures. In 1661, Tyrrell reissued his grandfather James Ussher’s The Power Communicated by God to the Prince (1661), but the extent of his adherence to Ussher’s royalism is difficult to establish, as practically no manuscripts or letters survive from this period of his life. Tyrrell evidently felt comfortable in forming a friendship with an admirer of Hobbes’s Leviathan, suggesting a shared intellectual affinity, a tolerance for acquaintances with objectionable taste, or some measure of the “ambiguous and minimalist formulae” that made Hobbes’s

113 Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, 210; Rose, “John Locke,” 619.
pronouncements “available, adaptable, and useful” to groupings with otherwise disparate religio-political commitments.119 In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell would inveigh against Hobbes by name, in a way that Locke’s Two Treatises would pointedly avoid.120 In his translation of Cumberland’s De Legibus Naturae, Tyrrell would expressly criticize Hobbes.121 Yet Tyrrell’s judgment of Hobbes was not always negative. In a letter to Locke of early 1684, he commended Hobbes’s Human Nature, or: The Fundamental Elements of Policie (1650) as the only work that resembled Locke’s Essay “on that subject.”122 In the memoir itself, Locke’s disdain for “Science and Erudition” is contrasted “nonetheless” (neanmoins) with his interest in Leviathan—a work that Tyrrell was evidently interested in possessing for himself. Borrowing Locke’s copy of Leviathan between 1674 and 1691, Tyrrell would—in Laslett’s reconstruction—deprive Locke of access to Hobbes’s work during the composition of the Two Treatises (1679–83). Although it is possible that Locke could have procured a copy from elsewhere, or simply retrieved it from Tyrrell in the intervening period, only then to lend it serially, Laslett resisted both alternatives with appeals to Locke’s exactitude as a diarist: if Locke had failed to docket the return of his copy of Leviathan until 1691, it must have remained with Tyrrell. Aside from its disputable faith in the consistency of Locke’s diarizing, Laslett’s argument erred in its supposition that a work by “Hobbes”—listed as a part of Locke’s library in 1681—was not Leviathan, but “another copy” of the Problematia Physica, a second example of which Locke never claimed to possess.123 For Laslett, the supposed loss or loaning of Leviathan constituted


120 [James Tyrrell], Patriarcha non Monarcha (London, 1681), sigs. H5r, Lr, N5v, O4r, P1r, Q4v, Q6v, R8v, S1r.


122 C/JL, 2:609–11 (775).

123 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke f. 5, pp. 96–97; Harrison and Laslett, The Library of John Locke, 272. In the 1681 booklist, Locke classed two works by “Hobbes”/“Hobbs” in different formats; one quarto, another octavo, each with an approximated height of “8 [inches].” Harrison and Laslett identify both works as Hobbes’s Problematia Physica (London, 1662), the format of which is octavo; the identification rests on the fact that Locke’s later booklists report his ownership of one work by Hobbes in octavo (Problematia) and one in quarto (De Mirabilibus Pecci), although, confusingly, Harrison and Laslett identify both works in the 1681 booklist as the Problematia, a work which was only ever published in octavo. “Hobbes”/“Hobbs” in the 1681 booklist may refer to Locke’s copies of the Problematia and De Mirabilibus Pecci (purchased in June 1679: MS Locke c. 1, p. 101), but they may also refer to Hobbes’s Opera Philosophica (Amsterdam, 1668), which was published in quarto (Hugh Macdonald and Mary
an explanation for the indirect quality of Locke’s allusions to Hobbes throughout Locke’s life: “an acquaintance as much, perhaps, through literature about him [sc. Hobbes] as through direct reading.”124 Tyrrell, however, would have been certain of Locke’s familiarity with *Leviathan* during the period in which he had borrowed his friend’s copy, and a presumption of this familiarity should affect any subsequent historiography of Locke’s relationship with Hobbes.

As others have noted, the relationship might have been personal.125 Between 1667 and 1675, Locke resided with Shaftesbury on the Strand, not far from Hobbes’s residences with the Cavendish family at Little Salisbury House on the Strand, Bristol House on Great Queen Street, and Newport House in Leices-
ter Fields.126 A letter to Locke of February 1673 from John Aubrey (1626–97) recommended Hobbes’s unpublished *A Dialogue . . . of the Common-Laws of England* and *Behemoth* to Locke’s and Shaftesbury’s attention, and suggested that Locke visit Hobbes, his octogenarian neighbor.127 Two decades later, in a fit of mental instability, Isaac Newton accused Locke of being a “Hobbist,” striking “at the root of a morality in a principle you laid down in your book of Ideas.”128 How Locke received Aubrey’s invitation—and Newton’s allegation—is unknown, but both incidents provide a glimpse of the spectral quality of Hobbes’s presence in the decades after Locke’s departure from John Owen’s

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Christ Church. The nature of this presence is “one of the most enduring puzzles in early-modern intellectual history,” ranging from Locke’s interest in Hobbes’s theory of political obligation to Hobbes’s positions on experimentalism, religious toleration, and Christology. The memoir below may allow us to revisit these topics with a new and clarifying confidence: Locke was a reader—an obsessive reader—of Hobbes’s *Leviathan*.

**Appendix 1**

**British Library, Additional MS 4222, ff. 245r–47r**

The orthography, accentuation, punctuation, paragraphing, superscription, and deletions in the manuscript are transcribed as closely as possible. The layout of the manuscript suggests that its text was composed by Des Maizeaux in a state of hurriedness, in one sitting. The ink becomes fainter as the text progresses, possibly revealing a diminishing supply of ready ink, and the text is written in a cursive script, which differs from Des Maizeaux’s hand in items of formal correspondence. The grammar of the memoir and its disjointed style add to the sense that Des Maizeaux wrote the text in response to maundering dictation or in a rushed attempt to capture his memory of a verbal exchange. A translation appears below this transcription.

*Jean Locke*

M’a dit qu’il avoit connu particulierem’. M’. L, & avoit eû avec lui de grandes liaisons excepté aux dernières 20 années de sa vie. Lorsqu’il etoit à Oxford il n’etudioit point, paressesseux [sic] [deleted: jusqu’à] & nonchalent, il s’amusoit à des livres de bagatelles spirituelles. La Traduction angloise des Lettres de Voiture faisoit toutes ses delices & l’occupoit le plus. Il méprisoit la Science & l’Erudition. Il avoit neanmoins presque toujours le Leviatan de H. sur sa table, & il en recommandoit la Lecture à ses Amis. M’... l’acheta à sa recommandation; & cependant il affecta de nier dans la suite qu’il l’eût jamais lû. Il se piquoit d’être original, & meprisoit en faisoit peu de cas des [deleted: ce] qu’il ne pouvoit pas faire passer pour sien. Cette demangeaison lui a fait

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131 For examples of letters in Des Maizeaux’s hand, see Houghton Library, Harvard University, MS Hyde 76, 1.1.29.4, and Leiden University Library, Prosper Marchand Papers (MAR 5:4), facsimiled in Almagor, *Pierre Des Maizeaux*, 82–83 (Illustration 6).
souvent debiter avec apparat des choses très communes, & relever pompeusement des maximes triviales. Plein de la bonne opinion qu’avoit de lui même il n’estimoit que [illegible deletion] ses productions, & les personnes qui l’excensoient. Le Livre qu’il a écrit sur la Monnoye est une Copie d’un autre,\^ [written at the foot of f. 246v in the darker ink found on f. 245r: Muns of Trade Sr. Robert Cottons Discourse before ye King and Council concerning ye Coin] qu. soutenoit [deleted: de] n’avoir point lú quoi qu’l’eut fait acheter plusieurs années [f. 245v] auparavant à Mr. . . . . . . Ce dernier M’r. T. . . & quelques autres avoient des Conversations où étant un sieur tombé sur la Connoissance de l’homme ces Messrs. dirent qu. seroit bon que quelcun entreprît d’en [deleted: faire] bien marquer l’étendue & les bornes, & cela donna occasion a M’r. L. de faire son Essai, que M’r. . . . lui envoya ensuite en Hollande.

M’r. T. l’ayant prié de lire un Ouvrage qu. avoit dessein de publier il refusa de le faire, disant que peut etre il arriveroit quelque jour d’écrire sur cette matiere & qu’il ne vouloit pas qu’on cru qu’il devoit à autrui ce qui ne viendroit que de son fond.

[deleted: Il y a dans ce] Tous les faits rapportés dans cette Piece sont ou faux ou mal rapportés. Il s’en faut bien que M’r. L. osât parler familiermé. sur des choses importantes avec Myl. [deleted: tant s’en faut] & a plus forte raison n’etoit il pas sur le pied de lui donner des Avis. Il n’est pas vrai qu’il ait eû aucune part au Mariage de son fils.

Il etoit avaré, vain, envieux & reservé jusqu’à l’excès. S’enlevant le plus facilemé. du Monde. Lors que M’r. . . lui ayant dit la [f. 246r] raison (qu’il n’avoient [sic] souvent cherchée) pourquoi les peuples peuvent donner au Magistrat le Pouvoir de Mort qu’il [sic] n’ont pas pour eux memes, il lui demanda come faché, où il avoit pris cela, & l’a depuis inseré dans son traité du Gouvernement.

Il tiroit des autres ce qu. pouvoit & en profitoit, faisant toujours le mystérieux & le reservé avec eux, meme sur des bagatelles.

Il s’etoient [sic] enfi du D’. Sidenham, & le D’. Lower auprès de lui n’etoit qu’un cancre à qui il ne vouloit pas seulmé. accorder le sens Commun. Le D’ Thomas Med. de Salisbury n’admiroit pas moins le D’. Sidenh. & ils eussent bien voulu qu’il l’eût fait Medecin de la Reine, soutenant qu’il lui feroit avoir des Enfans. Cet Entemé. [interlined: ^les] faisoit souvent comparer par Myl. a 3. fanatiques qui alerent à Rome 2. disant que le 3e. etoit le S’. Espir. comme il le disoit lui meme surwi un Inquisiteur touché de pitié representa que [interlined: ^2] ces gens souffroient pour soutenir leur sentiment, & qu’il valoit mieux faire avouer au 3e. sa friponerie pour detromper les autres: ce qui reussit. Qu’aînés le meilleur Moyen de detromper ces 2. M’se. etoit de demasquer le sieur Sidenham de [f. 246v].

Myl. ne parut se detacher de la Cour que lorsque le Parlemé. etoit à Oxf. Quelque tems après lorsqu’il fallut elire des Cherifs à Londre, son parti etant le plus fort, [illegible deletion] en fit elire deux par les Aldermans; mais le Maire
ayant annulé le pouvoir des Cherifs, & voulu recevoir le poll lui-même, les Partisans de Myl. s’obstinerent à poller vers les Cherifs, & le parti oposé au Maire, de sorte qu’au lieu qui’ils l’auraient emporté s’il eût allé au Maire, ils le perdirent. Les voix étoient en plus grand nombre, & il disoit qu’il falloit soutenir leurs Cherifs; mais voyant que [illegible deletion] le Maire avoit proclamé les siens sans oposition, il [deleted: se cacha] craignoit qu’on ne lui intenta quelque affaire, & se cacha à Wapping. Il y eût fort inquiet, de ce que le D. de M. ou Myl R. ne reviennent point; il en disoit beaucoup de Mal, & il Changea 2. fois de logies parce q’ils l’avoient découvert. Enfin il partit pour la Holl., [illegible deletion] & ne voulut pas prendre avec lui M’. L. disant [interlined: ] il étoit trop sage pour lui. Peu de temps après M’ . . . ayant été mis à la garde d’un Messager & examiné par le Conseil, la peur prit à M’. L. [f. 247r]

J Locke
Il quita O. où il s’etoit retiré quelque temps auparavant, & se retira secretem’. en Hollande. Sa Timidité étoit si outrée, q’. se tint caché assez longtems, & souvent la Nuit le bruit d’une souris le faisoit lever & appeler son Hote.

Il croyoit que les Principes de Morale etoient relatifs aux divers Pays du Monde, & que ce qui étoit crime dans un endroit ne l’étoit pas dans un autre: ce q’. prouvoit à ses Amis par les relations des Voyageurs.

Q[uaere] Il avoit raisonne sur ce pied dans la 1er. Edition de son Ouvr: Mais il a retranche ou a denié cela dans les Autres.

Il n’est jamais entré dans les Intrigues d’état avec Myl. Shaft. ni ne s’est méli de lui donner des avis, il étoit dans sa Maison comme une Conoissance. Quand Myl. fut fait Chancelier, il le fit Clerc des Representations (des Benefices.)

M. S. mit le delenda Cart. lui-même; & il n’est pa[s] vrai que M’. L. fut son souffleur &c

Translation

John Locke
Mr. . . has told me that he had particularly known Mr. L, and that he had preserved strong links with him, save for the last twenty years of his [sc. Mr. L’s] life. When he [sc. Mr. L] was at Oxford, he did not study at all; he was lazy and nonchalant, and he amused himself with trifling works of wit. The English translation of Voiture’s Lettres was all his delight, and occupied him the most. He despised Science and Erudition. Nonetheless, he almost always had the Leviathan by H. on his table, and he recommended the reading of it to his friends. Mr . . . bought it on his recommendation; however he [sc. Mr. L] later affected to deny, in the future, that he had ever read it. He prided himself on being original, and he scorned that which he was unable to pass off as his own. This inclination often made him reel off, with great ceremony, some very common claims, and
recite, pompously, some very trivial maxims. Being full of the good opinion that he had of himself, he esteemed only his own works, and the people who praised him. The book that he wrote about Money is a copy of another, [written at the foot of f. 246v in the darker ink found on f. 245r: Muns of Trade Sr. Robert Cottons Discourse before ye King and Council concerning ye Coin] which he claimed never to have read, although Mr . . . had incited him to buy the book several years earlier. The latter Mr. T . . . and some others, having held certain conversations where, one gentleman, having fallen on the subject of human knowledge, said that it would be good if someone undertook to mark its boundaries, provided the occasion for Mr. L to write his Essay, which Mr . . . later sent to him [sc. Mr. L] in Holland.

Mr T. having asked to read a work that he [sc. Mr. L] intended to publish, he [sc. Mr. L] refused to allow it, saying that perhaps it might one day occur to him [sc. Mr. T] to write on the same matter, and that he [sc. Mr. L] would not want anyone to believe that he [sc. Mr. L] owed to someone else something that had come only from himself.

All of the facts reported in that work are either false or badly reported. It is far from the case that Mr L. dared to speak familiarly about important matters with his Lordship [sc. Lord Shaftesbury], and it is still more incorrect that he

132 The phrase “auparavant à” is ambiguous; an alternative translation is “although he had incited Mr . . . to buy the book several years earlier.” Although Tyrrell borrowed Locke’s copy of Leviathan in 1674, he might have purchased a copy after 1657 only to lose it before 1674, among other possibilities.

133 The phrase “Ce dernier Mr. T . . . & quelques autres” is unusual; the antecedent of “Ce dernier” may be the “Mr . . .” that terminates the preceding sentence, in a manner which distinguishes an unidentified “Mr . . .” from “Mr. T . . .” and interposes a comma after “dernier.” Des Maizeaux’s clarification that “Ce dernier” refers to “Mr. T . . .” would otherwise be pleonastic, but his intention is difficult to establish.

134 Tyrrell appears to have preserved a manuscript of the Essay between ca. 1684 and 1692, which cannot be identified with an extant draft (CJL, 2:609–11 n. 4 [775]); as far as his surviving correspondence suggests, Tyrrell did not send a manuscript of the Essay to Locke in Holland. Rogers, Locke’s Enlightenment, 15, states that the manuscript of the Essay that Tyrrell preserved was “sent” to Tyrrell “soon after his [sc. Locke’s] arrival in Holland,” but it appears that the manuscript was left with Tyrrell before Locke’s departure into exile: Tyrrell describes the manuscript as “those notes you left in my hand” (CJL, 4:107–9 [1307]).

135 The pronouns in “ql. avoit,” “il refusa,” and “lui arriveroit” are ambiguous; the identifications used in the translation (“he [sc. Mr. L] intended to publish,” “he [sc. Mr. L] refused to allow it,” “might occur to him [sc. Mr. T]”) are conjectural.

136 The subsequent complaints of the memoirist in this paragraph indicate that “cette Piece” must refer to Le Clerc’s “Éloge,” which reported that Shaftesbury had consulted Locke “on all occasions” relating to the “business of a Minister of State,” and that Locke had assisted in the arrangement of the second earl’s marriage in 1669 (Le Clerc, “Éloge,” 6:356, 359). Both claims drew upon the memoir that the third earl had communicated to Le Clerc in his letter of February 1705 (n. 43 above).
[sc. Mr. L] was in a position to give him [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] advice. It is not true that he had any part in the marriage of his [sc. Lord Shaftesby’s] son.

He was avaricious, vain, envious, and reserved to excess. He lost his temper with the greatest ease. When Mr . . . having told him the reason (which they had often enquired about) why people are able to give to the magistrate the power of death, which they do not have for themselves, he [sc. Mr. L] asked him angrily where he had found the point; and, later, he inserted it into his own treatise on Government.137

He took from others whatever he was able to take, and he profited from them, remaining very secretive and reserved with them, even over trifling matters.

He had become obsessed with Dr Sydenham, next to whom Dr Lower was esteemed a dunce and was not even credited with common sense.138 Dr Thomas, the physician from Salisbury, did not admire Dr Sydenham any less, and they wished that he had been made the physician to the Queen, claiming that he would enable her to have children. This obsession made his Lordship [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] often compare them to three fanatics who travelled to Rome; two of them saying that the third was the Holy Spirit, upon which an Inquisitor, touched with pity, declared that these two men would suffer in order to maintain their belief, and it would be better to make the third confess his knavery in order to disabuse them: which succeeded. In this way, the best means of disabusing these two men was to expose Sydenham.139

137 Locke provides a complex rationale for the magistrate’s “power of death.” He allows for individuals to kill each other justifiably in the restricted case in which the parties are in a “State of War,” without a common “Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them.” Individuals must otherwise appeal to the magistrate, who is invested with “Political Power,” the “end and measure” of which is the preservation of the “Lives, Liberties, and Possessions” of his or her subjects. The magistrate may use penalties to remove “those Parts” of the community “which are so corrupt, that they threaten” its existence (Locke, Two Treatises, ed. Laslett, 381–82 [II § 171]). In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell offered a similar rationale (sig. I2v): “this power which a man in some cases hath over the life of another, is onely given him by God for the common good and preservation of Mankind, . . . and so this power conferred upon the supreme Magistrate is no more, nor extends higher than that. . . . And from hence do supreme Powers derive their Right of making positive Laws, and ordaining higher Punishments for Offences than the Laws of God or Nature do expressly appoint.”

138 Locke and Richard Lower (1631–91) had been colleagues at Christ Church; they appear to have collaborated in research on respiration and blood in 1664, but gradually parted ways over methodological disagreements, after which Locke “began to work more and more closely” with Thomas Sydenham (1624–89), as J. C. Walmsley notes in “John Locke and Respiration,” Medical History 51 (2007): 453–76, 474.

139 The substance of this claim is difficult to evaluate; there is no extant evidence that Locke or his friend David Thomas of Salisbury encouraged Sydenham to act as a physician to Queen Catherine of Braganza (1638–1705). Catherine’s physician, the Roman Catholic Sir George Wakeman (fl. 1685), was indicted for high treason, tried, and
His Lordship [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] appeared to detach himself from the court only when the Parliament was at Oxford. Sometime later, when it was necessary to elect some Sheriffs in London, his party, being the strongest, had two elected by the Aldermen. But the Mayor having annulled the power of the Sheriffs, and having wanted to receive the vote himself, the supporters of his Lordship [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] insisted on voting for the Sheriffs, and for the party opposed to the Mayor, as a result of which, those who would have won, being allied to the Mayor, lost. The votes were in greater number, and he [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] said that it was necessary to return their Sheriffs; but seeing that the Mayor had proclaimed his own Sheriffs without opposition, he [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] feared that they would bring some accusation against him, and he went into hiding in Wapping. He was there very anxious, since neither the D[uke] of M[onmouth] nor Lord R[ussell] had returned at all; he said many bad things about them, and changed his lodgings twice, since he knew that the D[uke] of M[onmouth] had been discovered. Finally, he departed for Holland, and did not wish to take Mr. L with him, saying, ironically, that he [sc. Mr. L] was too wise for him. A little time later, Mr. . . . having been put on alert by a messenger and examined by the Council, Mr. L took fright.141

acquitted in 1679. A letter from Edward Clarke Jr. (the son of Locke’s namesake friend) to his mother of April 4, 1692 (Taunton, Somerset Heritage Centre, DD/SF 7/1/46) notes that Clarke Jr. had given Locke “the Ill news” of Catherine’s permanent departure in that month for Portugal, “which I am very sorry for his sake”; there is otherwise no extant evidence of Locke’s acquaintance with Catherine. The word “de” terminates this page of the memoir (f. 246r) in a manner that suggests that Des Maizeaux has omitted a phrase.

140 This is a highly abbreviated summary of Shaftesbury’s involvement in the aborted rebellion that he coordinated with James Scott (1649–85), first duke of Monmouth, William Russell (1639–83), Lord Russell, and other radical Whigs in 1682. Following the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament (March 1681), Shaftesbury was arrested and charged with high treason (July 1681); the indictment failed, owing to the impaneling of sympathizers in a grand jury by sheriffs who were closely associated with Shaftesbury himself (November 1681). In anticipation of another indictment, the organization of Monmouth’s rebellion gathered pace. When Tory sheriffs were returned by a contested vote (July 1682) and installed in office (September 1682), in a process overseen by the Tory Lord Mayor John Moore (1620–1702), Shaftesbury went into hiding in different locations around London, including Wapping. He conspired in the Rye House Plot to assassinate Charles II and James, duke of York, but, with the failure of his co-conspirators to act, he fled to the Netherlands (November 1682), where he died shortly after his arrival (January 1683). For these events, see Philip Milton, “Shaftesbury and the Rye House Plot,” in Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, 1621–1683, ed. John Spurr (Farnham, 2011), 233–68; Gary S. De Krey, London and the Restoration, 1659–1683 (Cambridge, 2005), 254–61, 341–57.

141 The phrase “examiné par le Conseil” is difficult to explicate; no evidence survives of Tyrrell’s or Locke’s examination by a “Council” in this period.
J Locke

He left Oxford where he had retired some time earlier, and removed himself secretly into Holland. His timidity was so excessive that he remained in hiding for quite a long time; often, at night, the noise of a mouse made him get up and call out for his host.

He believed that the principles of morality were relative to the different countries of the world, and that what was a crime in one place was not in another: which he proved to his friends with the reports of travelers.142

C[heck] He had reasoned on this basis in the first edition of his work, but he removed or denied it in the other editions.143

He never entered into political intrigues with Lord Shaftesbury, nor was he involved in giving him advice. He was in his house as an acquaintance. When his Lordship [sc. Lord Shaftesbury] was made Chancellor, he made him Clerk of Representations (for Beneﬁces).144 L[ord] S[haftesbury] included the “delenda Carthago est” himself, and it is not true that Mr L. was his prompter etc.145

Appendix 2

John Locke’s References to Thomas Hobbes

1. Locke’s transcription (1656–ca. 1675) of passages from Hobbes’s The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance (1656), found inside his


[143] In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke propounds a sociology of moral approbation that could be understood, misleadingly, in the terms used by the memoirist (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch [Oxford, 1975], 229 [2.20.2], 351 [2.28.5]); he does not endorse relativism on the basis of the disparate moral practices of “the different countries of the world” (ibid., 353–54 [2.28.10], 357 [2.28.12]). Locke altered his position on several matters after the first edition of the Essay, but the memoirist may be referring to 2.28.8, which Locke enlarged in the second and later editions—possibly in response to a criticism voiced by Tyrrell and others—to state that “Divine Law” was “the only true touchstone of moral Rectitude” (ibid., 362 [2.28.8]; Roger Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography [Cambridge, 2007], 290).

[144] Locke held the post of Secretary for Presentations between ca. November 1672 and November 1673, when Shaftesbury was dismissed as Lord Chancellor.

[145] This complaint responds to a claim in Le Clerc’s “Éloge” that Locke had acted as Shaftesbury’s prompter during a debate in February 1673 over the prospective spoliation of the Netherlands in the Third Anglo-Dutch War, when Shaftesbury, as Lord Chancellor, famously declared “Carthago delenda est” (Le Clerc, “Éloge,” 6:363; K. H. D. Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury [Oxford, 1968], 316). The claim was communicated to Le Clerc by the third earl in his letter of February 1705 (n. 43 above).
interleaved Bible at 1 Timothy 2.4, Isaiah 5.4, and Jeremiah 19.5, following a transcription of the relevant wording in Greek from separate copies of the New Testament and Septuagint:

“ὃς πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι. It is noe extraordinary kinde of language to call ye commandemts & exhortations & other significations of ye will by ye name of will. Though ye will be an internall act of ye soule, & commands are but words & signes externall of ye internall act soe ye will & word are divers things & differ as ye thing signified & ye signe, & hence it comes to passe, ye word & commandment of god namely ye holy scripture is usually cald by christians gods will, but his revealed will acknowledging ye very will of god, wch they call his Counsell & decree to be another thing, for ye revealed will of god to Abraham was y's Isaac should be sacrifised, but it was his will he should not And his revealed will to Jonas that Niniveh should be destroyd within 40 days but not his decree & purpose. His decree & purpose can not be known beforehand but may afterwards by ye event for from ye event we may infer his will. But his revealed will, wch is his word, must be foreknown, because it ought to be ye rule of our actions. Therefor when it is sd God will have all men to be saved it is not meant of his will internall, but of his commandemts, or will reveal as if it had been s'd. God hath given commandemts, by following of wch all men may be savd. Hobbs of Liberty. p 10. 56. v. Isayah. 5.4.”

“ᵗⁱ ποίησιν ἔτι τῷ ἀμπελῶνι μου καὶ οὐκ ἐποίησα αὐτῶν; If by these words be meant the almighty power, they might receive this answer, Men might have been kept by it from sinning. But when we are to measur god by his revealed will it is as if he had said: What directions what laws, what threatning could have been usd more, y's I have not usd. God doth not will & command us to enquire what his will & purpose is & accordingly to doe it, for we shall doe y's whether we will or noe; but to looke into his commandemts Hobs of Liberty p. 11. 56 v. 1. Tim. 2.4. Jer. 19.5.”

“οὐδὲ δεινοθηκὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου. Whosoever is done comes into gods minde i.e. into his knowledg, wch implies a certainty of y's future action, & y's certainly an antecedent purpose of god to bring it to passe. It cannot therefor be meant god did not will it; But y's he had [n]o[t] y will to command it. But by y's way it is to be noted, y's when god speaks to men concerning his will & other attributes, he speaks to them as if they were like to those of men to y's end he may be understood. And therefor to y's order of his work, y's world, wherein one thing follows another soo aptly, as noe man could order it by designe, he gives y's name of Will & Purpose, for y's wch we call Designe, wch is reasoning & thought after thought cannot be properly atributed to god in whose thoughts there is noe fore nor after. Hobs of Liberty p. 11. 56. v. Isayah 54.”

146 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Locke 16.25, pp. 500, 548, 829; the entry at 1 Timothy 2.4 is printed in Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. Higgins-Biddle, lxxvii

3. Locke’s transcription (1668–1704) of a passage from *Leviathan*, found inside his copy of Georgius Hieronymus Velschius’s *Sylloge Curationum et Observationum Medicinalium* (1668); the transcription does not identify the origin or author of the passage: “In wrong or noe definitions, lyes and first abuse of speech, from wch proceeds all false and uselesse Tenets; wch make those men who take their instruction from the authority of books, not from their owne meditation to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men indued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines Ignorance is in the middle.”148

4. Locke’s comparison (ca. 1670) of Samuel Parker’s position on magisterial authority in his *Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1670) with “Hobbes’s doctrine,” found in a set of notes on Parker’s work: “That the magistrate should restraine seditious doctrines who denys but because he may then has he power over all other doctrines to forbid or impose, if he hath not the argument is short, if he hath how far is this short of Mr Hobbs’s doctrine?”149

5. A passage in Locke’s journal, dating between March and May 1677, under the marginal heading “Study”: “An Hobist with his principle of self preserva- tion whereof him self is to be judg, will not easily admit a great many plain dutys of morality. The same must necessarily be found in all men who have taken up principles without examining the truth of them.”150

6. Locke’s commentary (1681) on Edward Stillingfleet’s *Unreasonableness of Separation* (1681), also in a set of unpublished notes: “for I can have no other Governour to prescribe to me what Church I shall be of but an infallible one, the Civill Magistrate, or my owne Conscience, & I desire the Dr [sc. Stillingfle]t as any one els to show me how anyone can talk coherently concerneing

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150 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke f. 2, p. 120.
Church Communion & separation without bottomeing terminateing [sic] in Popeish Hobbist or Phanatick Principles, for so being guided by a mans owne conscience is called. And since I beleive neither D [sc. Stillingfleet] nor any of the Church of England allow of Hobs’s principles I desire him to consider notwithstanding all the Advantages he thinks the liberty of mens useing their reason in the choise of what church they will be of will give to ye growth of popery."

7. Locke’s undated note (ca. 1687) in a pocket memorandum book, seemingly in reference to a drafted portion of book 4 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in which Locke described the fifth-century BCE philosopher Archelaus as a proponent of the doctrine that “Right and Wrong, Honest and Dishonest, are defined only by Laws, and not by Nature”: “Q. principia Sectar. phil: et hobbes v: Intell l.4. c.14. §5.” [“Enquire about the principles of the sects of the philosophers and Hobbes, see De intellectu, book 4, chapter 14, section 5.”].

8. Locke’s transcription (ca. 1687) of a summary of Hobbes’s moral philosophy from a review of Samuel Pufendorf’s Eris Scandica (1686) in the Bibliothèque Universelle et Historique (1686), 3:493, found inside a guard book of notes: “Hobbes tâcha de mettre la Morale en un ordre géometrique & d’établir l’hypothese d’Epicure, qui pose pour principes des societez la conservation de soi-même & l’utilité. En effet le but principal de Hobbes étoit d’étendre le pouvoirs des Rois sur le temporel & le spiritual, contre les séditieux & les fanatiques, ce qui lui a fait dire des choses qui ne s’accordent pas avec le repos de la Societé Civile, ni avec la Religion Chrétienne 493.” [“Hobbes attempted to place morality in a geometrical order, and to establish the hypothesis of Epicureanism, which claims for the origins of societies the conservation of one’s self and utility. Indeed, Hobbes’s principal aim was to extend the power of Kings over temporal and spiritual matters, against insurgents and fanatics, who made him say certain things that do not accord with the peace of civil society or the Christian religion.”]
9. Locke’s transcription (ca. 1687) of a summary of Hobbes on “the rights of the highest powers” (“summarum potestatum jura”) from a review of Ulrich Huber’s *De Jure Civitatis* (1684) in Pierre Bayle’s *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* (September 1684), 151: “Hobbes & quelques autres étendent si fort l’autorité du Souverain, qu’ils luy attribuent un droit sur les autres hommes presque semblable à celui que l’on exerce sur les bêtes. Maisceluy qui s’est caché sous le nom de Junius Brutus (on croit que c’est Hottoman) Althusius & quelques autres donnent au contraire tant de bornes à l’autorité de ceux qui commandent dans l’Etat, qu’ils n’en font à proprement parler que des Valets, des Commiss, ou des Procureurs du Peuple 151.”154 [“Hobbes and some others extend the authority of the Sovereign so strongly, that they attribute to him a right over men similar to that which we exercise over animals. Yet the person who writes under the name of Junius Brutus (which we believe is François Hotman), Althusius, and some others give, in contrast, so many restrictions to the authority of those who rule in the State, that they speak of them really as servants, clerks, or agents of the people.”]

10. Locke’s unpublished *Remarks Upon Some of Mr. Norris’s Books* (1693): “When man wills, he does something, or else God upon the occasion of something which he himself did before, produced this will and this action in him. This is the hypothesis that clears doubts and brings us at last to the Religion of Hobbs and Spinoza by resolving, all even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible fatal necessity.”155

11. Draft C of Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1685) and editions of the published *Essay*: “If a Christian . . . be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason: because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbist be asked why; he will answer: because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you, if you do not.”156

12. Locke’s *A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity* (1697): “I tell him, I . . . did not know those words, he [sc. William Hayley] quoted out of the Leviathan, were there, or any thing like them. Nor do I know yet, any farther than I believe to be there, from his quotation.”157

13. Locke’s *Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Second Letter* (1699): “For ’tis with such Candid and Kind insinuations as these, that you [sc. Stillingfleet] bring in both Hobbes, and

154 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke c. 33, f. 35v.
155 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke d. 3, p. 103.
Spinosa, into your Discourse here about God’s being able, if he please, to give to some parcels of Matter ordered as he thinks fit, a Faculty of thinking,” “I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza, as to be able to say, what were their Opinions in this Matter. But possibly there be those, who will think your Lordship’s [sc. Stillingfleet’s] Authority of more use to them in the Case, than those justly de-cried Names.”