to make European masonry more earthquake resistant and ultimately by adopting ferro-concrete after the turn of the century. Meanwhile, Milne's students, who included the first professional seismologists in the world, would reinforce their mentor's claim for the tenacity of traditional Japanese buildings.

The book is impressive in its multidisciplinary approach, as the author draws on the insights of architecture, engineering, art history, and cultural studies alike. Especially engaging are Clancey's discussion of how the Conder-designed Rokumeikan—"a temple to cross-dressing of every kind" (p. 92), which the government used for extravagant masquerades—became a symbolic focus for the mid-Meiji backlash against Westernization, and his analysis of the way in which wood-block-print depictions of the destruction that the Nobi earthquake wreaked on the new Western-style landscape "nearly reversed colonizing tropes so common in Meiji discourse over the previous two decades" (p. 122). The author makes a compelling case for the cultural and political significance of the Nobi earthquake, which has been almost totally absent from English-language histories of Japan. He notes, for example, that the earthquake, in drawing nationwide press coverage and spurring national mobilization for disaster relief led by the imperial family, prefigured the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 “as a landmark ‘nationalizing’ event and a crucial moment in the popular representation of the Imperial institution” (p. 131).

Clancey's work challenges standard interpretations of Japan’s emergence as a modern nation. We have numerous studies in English of the foreign employees (oyatoi gaikokujin) like Conder and Milne, whom the Meiji government hired by the thousands to assist in the official modernization drive, and of Meiji Japan’s importation and adaptation of Western ideas, institutions, and technologies, but nothing that complicates the narrative of Japanese development after 1868 quite like this study does. The story of the Nobi earthquake would seem to stand East and West on their heads or, as the author puts it, to represent “the mirror-image twin to classical histories of Japanese technology and industrialization” (p. 2). At the very least, the book will encourage students of modern Japan, as of other late developers, to take a far more critical view of such conventional and seemingly straightforward notions as “technology transfer.”

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The invitation to review this book came as a pleasant surprise, because it treats a fascinating topic: the last of Japan’s ancient court aristocrats remaining in Kyoto, where they have preserved family traditions for eight centuries—or many more, if one starts with their Fujiwara ancestors—down to the present day. The book does not disappoint. Historians of Japan, early or modern, will learn much from reading it. Yet I was also surprised that the AHR chose to review it, since the Reizei are a family of poets and Steven D. Carter a professor of literature. My impression is that historians of Japan, certainly in America, are apt to give only passing attention to classical poetry. Although Carter may not convince all such scholars to study poetry, he shows that they could learn much from studying a family of poets.

Despite the family’s staid appearance today, the origins of the Reizei can be traced back to an unseemly dispute. Their lineage derives from one of early Japan’s most admired poets, Fujiwara no Teika (1162–1241). In his grandsons’ generation, his descendants quarreled over their inheritance. The mother of one, a literary figure herself, had possession of the family’s manuscript collection, the key to its poetic legitimacy. She sued to have her son, born late in her husband’s life, named heir. After losing her case in the ancient capital, she went to the shogun’s court in Kamakura to try her luck. The case dragged on for years. A key defeat came in 1286, three years after her death, when her son was ordered to hand over the library to his elder half-brother. Instead, he turned to deceit, giving up a few texts of little value and keeping the best for himself. His branch of the family came to be known as the Reizei. It is revered today as Japan’s last bastion of orthodox poetic tradition in large part because of its cultural capital, the precious manuscripts kept by illegitimate means.

The modern Reizei may view their history as one of remarkable continuity, but Carter shows how change played its part. Even if that may surprise no one, specific examples challenge familiar clichés concerning traditional elite culture, both civilian and military. Japanese aristocrats may have valued hereditary status, but noble birth guaranteed only the opportunity for success at court; actual success required the right combination of skill and luck. Although the modern Reizei remain in Kyoto, their ancestors occasionally chose to live elsewhere, sometimes because civil war drove them from their home, but other times simply because they could earn a better living, for example, in the warrior capital of Kamakura. That, in turn, reminds us that members of Japan’s military elite continued to admire the civilian culture of the ancient court. The warriors of one sort or another who dominated Japan through virtually all eight centuries of Reizei history protected both the family and its poetic livelihood. This pattern persisted, albeit in very different form, even into the first half of the twentieth century, World War II, however, brought unwanted change. The last Reizei trained in its poetic tradition was drafted in 1944 and killed on the China front. After Japan’s defeat, the occupation authorities abolished the estate rights that had provided the family’s income. Eventually, like Gilbert and Sullivan’s impetuous Duke of Plaza Toro, the family chose to incorporate itself and market its tradition to middle-class enthusiasts.

Since Carter covers a vast range of periods and top-

At the beginning of this carefully researched, richly informative survey of the politics of Japanese remembrance of World War II, Franziska Seraphim makes the astute observation that the Japanese government has served less as a leader than as a foil in the domestic political competition over war remembrance. Although individual and national war responsibility were always a part of Japanese discourse—no amnesia, to be sure—such questions were usually articulated by special interests contesting state support for, or infringement of, the prerogatives of war-bereaved citizens, Shinto shrines, and schools. Seraphim’s analysis of this competition relies on an organizational and ideological history of five social interest groups from across the political spectrum. The strength of her approach is that it conveys a broad picture of the contest even as it exposes political interests behind the various ideological positions.

Moving more or less from the right to the left side of the political spectrum, Seraphim’s first organization is the Association of Shinto Shrines. Shrine Shinto survived American occupation reforms separating church and state by asserting its own liberation from the control of the militarist state. At the same time, however, the shrine association bucked the trend of the times by asserting a continuity across the 1945 divide, embracing the emperor as the embodiment of the Japanese people’s essential spiritual unity (and perhaps war innocence), and eventually working with the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to re-institutionalize imperial ritual as official national policy.

The Japan Association of War-bereaved Families (known as the Izokukai) coalesced among supporters of war widows and bereaved families whose military pensions had been eliminated as a demilitarization measure. Although politically and organizationally diverse at first, after pensions were reinstated in 1953, the Izokukai increasingly worked to valorize the war dead as national heroes (eirei) rather than war victims. This revanchist shift, which included lobbying the ruling conservative LDP for state support of the deceased’s enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine, was highly controversial even among Izokukai members. Much of the association’s strength, however, resided in the ostensibly apolitical benefits membership provided, including pensions and connections to an established local social network of families.

The Japan-China Friendship Association has a diverse membership of businessmen, scholars, officials, and politicians with generally but not wholly progressive interests in promoting ties to China. It served as a liaison for repatriation and early trade and diplomatic relations and to this day continues to insist on official acknowledgment of Japanese war atrocities in China. Until the Cold War ended, the Friendship Association’s educational influence was limited by public suspicion of communism, but since the 1980s public support for its agenda has increased substantially.

The leftist Japan Teachers’ Union (JTU) arose as a true workers’ union, aided by a collective sense of blame for war complicity and a desire “never to send our students to the battlefield again.” In a fine chapter entitled “Forging Political Subjectivity,” Seraphim traces the JTU’s evolution as a vocal opponent of bureaucratic inroads in education and conservative efforts to reintroduce elements of the wartime imperial order. The JTU attributed the debacle of wartime Japanese complicity and victimization to systemic features of the imperial order. Both the JTU and the Izokukai understood the nation-state to be the proper locus of historical identity, but where the bereaved families’ association posited an organically linked relationship characterized by mutual obligation, the teachers’ union saw an antagonistic and oppressive relationship between citizen and state.

The pacifist Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in the War (generally known as the Wadatsumikai) coalesced around published writings of student-soldiers whose deaths symbolized the existential isolation of the intellectual in a society engaged in total war. Where the Shrine Shintoists validated an unchanging essentialist national community centered on the emperor, Wadatsumikai promoted universal humanist pacifism as the guiding principle for postwar Japan.

The middle chapters of Seraphim’s book address how each of these prominent interest groups interacted with and adapted to the changes in domestic political culture from the 1950s to the 1980s, including generational transition and the rise of civic activism regarding Viet-