The Nineteen-Sixties
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
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The Editor's Choice
by Florence Mischel,
Director of the Audio-Tape Program

The tape department of the Center started out tentatively in the Fall of 1961. The equipment often broke down; myself was tentative. Hired as writer-editor-producer-engineer, I had never seen a tape recorder before I took over the new job. "Dialogue" had not yet appeared in the language as a verb, and no one was certain that radio audiences would tune in to hour-long programs of uninterrupted talk.

Now, almost a decade and 391 produced tapes later, four persons work full time with first-rate equipment. Programs originally heard only over the Pacifica stations in Los Angeles, Berkeley, and New York are now regularly broadcast over radio stations in Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, Chicago, Seattle, and Minneapolis; some thirty-five thousand copies of tapes have been purchased by schools and private organizations. Here are some of my favorites.

11. THE WILL OF ZEUS

"Barr," said Scott Buchanan, "practices the dialectic by telling stories." This tape was my first introduction to Stringfellow Barr's wit and erudition as he related the early Greek experience to world problems today. Listening to him I understood for the first time the difference between a dialectic and an eristic dialogue and what a good conversation should be.

105. AND WHAT ABOUT NOODLE?

An animated discussion of the article by John Wilkinson (reprinted in the last issue of The Center Magazine) in which he suggests that as technology advances we may soon need to establish sanctuaries for humans as we now have refuges for whooping cranes.

473. THE TEACHER

Scott Buchanan was a Socratic teacher all his life. Listening to this tape, composed from conversations recorded during the last two years of his life, one understands as never before what a teacher is, or should be.

428. ARNOLD TOYNBEE, HISTORY, AND THE HIPPIES

A conversation with the distinguished historian and the late Scott Buchanan, Raghavan Iyer, and John R. Seeley about the unlearned lessons of history, the futility of patriotism, and the hippies. The hippies, circa 1967, enchanted Toynbee.

7A. WHERE HAVE ALL THE CUCKOOS GONE?

With characteristic wit and urbanity, the late Aldous Huxley is here heard warning about the risks of upsetting the ecological balance. Unhappily, this tape proves Mr. Huxley an all too accurate prophet.
The Barbarian Cometh

Barbarism threatens when men cease to live together according to reason, embodied in law and custom, and incorporated in a web of institutions that sufficiently reveal rational influences, even though they are not, and cannot be, wholly rational. Society becomes barbarian when men are huddled together under the rule of force and fear; when economic interests assume the primacy over higher values; when material standards of mass and quantity crush out the values of quality and excellence; when technology assumes an autonomous existence and embarks on a course of unlimited self-exploitation without purposeful guidance from the higher disciplines of politics and morals; when the state reaches the paradoxical point of being everywhere intrusive and also impotent, possessed of immense power and powerless to achieve rational ends; when the ways of men come under the sway of the instinctual, the impulsive, the compulsive. When things like this happen, barbarism is abroad, whatever the surface impressions of urbanity.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY [in this issue]

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Center members — about 100,000 strong — help keep the rule of reason alive. Membership contributions range from $10 to $1,000 or more a year. They receive THE CENTER MAGAZINE and other Center publications.
The Children's Crusade  
Milton Mayer  

The Center in the Sixties — and Seventies  
Robert M. Hutchins  

Selections From Ten Years of Center Dialogue  

The New Anti-Americanism  
William Lee Miller  

Crises of Affluence  
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Media and Messages  
Joseph P. Lyford  

The Disappointing Decade of Development  
Denis Goulet  

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John Courtney Murray  

An Embattled Hypothesis  
An Interview With Arthur R. Jensen  

A Center Report/Vanishing Liberals?  

Aftermath: Letters to the Editors  

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William Dole  

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Time Marches On  
The life of the Center and the nineteen-sixties closely coincide. The decade that began with John F. Kennedy’s promise to “get this country moving again” and ended with an American walking on the moon’s surface has been more turbulent and revolutionary than anyone suspected it would be when the Center set up shop in Santa Barbara in September, 1959. Several authors in this issue try to make sense out of its crisscrossing trends.  

William Lee Miller, taking an aerial view of cultural changes, chooses to sum them up as a new kind of anti-Americanism (page 39). Michael Harrington, whose book The Other America had a significant influence on the social policy of the decade, writes of the crises of affluence the nation faced in the later years of the sixties (page 47).  

Denis Goulet (page 62) turns his attention to the inadequacies and failures of what was supposed to be a decade of development. Joseph P. Lyford (page 53) surveys the performance of the mass media during the period when “the medium is the message” became a cliché.  

On page 8 the President of the Center gives his accounting of the institution’s first ten years and suggests what turn it might take in the years ahead. To recall some of the issues with which the Center was concerned, we have quoted liberally (beginning on page 15) from statements made by a wide variety of participants in Center-sponsored dialogues. Scattered throughout this issue are more up-to-date opinions from such people as Sander Vanocur, Milton Mayer, Murray Kempton, Bernard Nossiter, Michael Novak, Seymour Martin Lipset, Arthur R. Jensen, and Robert Brustein.
I am of two minds about this country's present convulsions. My heart is in the highlands with the hellers. But my head tells me... It's an old head, mine, without much wool on the top of it in the place where the wool ought to grow. Let me tell you what it is like to be old in the United States of America at the tail end of the nineteen-sixties.

My generation accepted the precepts of its parents, and they were the same precepts our parents had accepted from theirs. We violated the precepts, naturally; but we accepted them. The new generation rejects them. We were wrong and the new generation is right. Our precepts were good precepts, but still the new generation is right. They are right because preceptorial is as preceptorial does. We were — and, of course, are — pious frauds. They are impious Abelards.

That's the one big change. Another one is this: except for the remnantal remains of Gopher Prairie, the America of my youth is vanished without a trace; Spurlos versunken. In its perfectly splendid isolation, the rest of the world, being out of sight, was out of mind. My father didn't know whether Korea was in the Caribbean or the Mediterranean, or whether the Congo was a Spanish dance, a Hindu god, or a chocolate bar; he didn't care, and he didn't have to care.

It was an unjust America, of course. Blacks were Negroes, Negroes were niggers, and niggers were ineducable and would therefore always be menial. Jews knew their place and did not take forcible possession of the boardroom of the college or country club that refused to practice participatory democracy. It was an uncouth America, but a generous America and a visionary America. Its golden door was open and the lamp was bright beside it. Its very existence was a terror to tyranny everywhere, lest its spirit be infectious. In its pre-scientific and anarchic ardor it cultivated the techniques, if not the arts and institutions, of peace. In the first eight years of my life in Chicago, I never once saw a soldier. America was still, as it was intended to be, a refuge from chauvinistic horrors. If someone had told my father that he had to take a loyalty oath, he would have said, "What do you think this is — Russia?"

Gone, all gone now, to be replaced by the garrison state and the last best hope of preserving the status quo ante all over the world. If, then, you can understand what it is to be old in this country at the tail end of the nineteen-sixties, you will be able to understand why I am of two minds about the present convulsions: on balance, the changes I have seen in my time have been for the worse. I am afraid. But about certain aspects of the situation I am of one mind.

First: The revolution of the young blacks, formerly Negroes, is nothing but the Jim Crow branch of the American Children's Crusade. What the American Negroes are saying to the American whites is what the American young are saying to the American old: "I don't dig you. I don't love you. I don't honor you. I don't obey you." Whether it's Vietnam and "Hell, no, we won't go," or the ghetto and "Hell, no, we won't stay," the message is the same. The parochial concern of the Negro should not obscure the common cause against an America whose promises were made with its fingers crossed.

Second: The revolution of the young Americans — white, black, red, or pink — is nothing but the American branch of the world revolution of the rising generation — and the American branch is behind the times. The French branch has pulled down de Gaulle.
Some advice to the black and the young: there is no substitute for intelligence

The Spanish and Japanese branches have driven Franco and Sato up the wall. The Italian branch has made it impossible to govern Italy. The German branch has paralyzed Prussianism, and the Czech branch has immobilized communism. In our characteristic American provincialism we suppose that we have something special going here. The only thing that is special, indeed unique, is the elders' effort to persuade the young to call themselves kids in the hope that they won't take themselves seriously.

Third: The revolution is overdue — the revolution which Jeremiah and Jefferson invoked when they said that God's justice would not sleep forever. The evils that were containable under kings are no longer containable under politicians. A world that spends more on war than it does on health and education combined is not susceptible of reform. It calls for revolution. But revolution is not the same thing as rebellion. The aftermath of the Russian Revolution instructs us that revolution is not a matter of systems but of men; as the men are, so will the revolution be.

John Locke never heard of law and order, but he had heard of divine right. “When men are miserable enough,” said Locke, “they will rebel, cry up divine right how you will.” I think he should have said “desperate enough” instead of “miserable enough.” The difference between submissive misery and desperate rebellion is hope. And the difference between rebellion and revolution is intelligence. The young everywhere, black, white, poor, rich, have the desperate certitude of hope along with the adolescent possibility of intelligence. The young don't need God or the big battalions on their side. All they need is the actuarial table, and they've got it. My object here is to persuade them to win a revolution instead of a rebellion — to make their victory stick. No revolution — not the French, not the American, and not the Russian — has ever stuck.

What is wanted is intelligence. That the status quo is unintelligent is superbly self-evident. But the revolution against it is not ipso facto intelligent. If it strikes with the wrong weapons at the wrong people for the wrong reasons, it will prove to have been unintelligent. If it assumes that there is nothing wrong with power and that a transfer or redistribution of power will improve the human condition, it will prove to have been unintelligent. He who says, “This ruler is a fool, but when I am a ruler I will not be a fool” is already a fool. It is not power that corrupts, but the unintelligent belief that power is not necessarily corrosive.

The revolution has to be intelligent, and the Negro's revolution has to be especially intelligent because he is its natural leader and is fighting in an exposed position. If he acts unintelligently he will go down faster than the white revolutionary whose pallor restrains (though it does not disable) the counter-revolution. To ask the Negro to be more intelligent than the white is only to ask him to use the intelligence he already has. But if all he has learned through his suffering is how to burn, baby, burn, he hasn't learned anything more than the white man, whose technological triumph consists of burning babies.

If the Negro does not use his superior intelligence, he is lost, because an ignorant little man cannot beat an ignorant big one. Whitey has overkill; blackie has underkill. The inference is inescapable. Along toward the end of 1941 — but prior to December 7th of that year — Professor Morris Cohen listened while a Jewish colleague said, “I just want to bash in a few Nazi heads before I die.” Somebody turned to Cohen and said, “And what do you think?” “I think,” said Cohen, “that bashing heads is for the ninety-six per cent — not for the four per cent.”

Even the ninety-six per cent cannot win that way now. It took the winners of the First World War fifteen years to realize that they had lost it. It took the winners of the Second World War only five. What keeps the winners of the third world war from launching it is the suspicion that they have lost it in advance of its launching. They can't bash in a few Russian or American heads without being bashed back. Their unintelligent alternative, as every schoolboy knows, is a balance of terror which is ruinous in any terms and
in its own terms unreliable. Their only hope is to save their faces: It is an open secret that the Americans will agree to surrender to the Vietcong if the Vietcong will agree to proclaim an American victory. Old whitey seems to be at the end of the road. The inventor of the lynch bee at Calvary, the auction block at Charleston, and the shoot-out at Verdun seems to have no more inventions.

The young — above all, those who are non-Caucasian and therefore preconditioned to use their intelligence — are called upon to go out and turn the world upside down. Like the Apostles of Jesus, they do not need any baggage. They do not need black studies, because intelligence is not absorbed through the epidermis. They do not need black dormitories, because intelligence is not contracted by sleeping with people. They do not need black awareness, because intelligence is aware of itself and everything else. They need the intelligence they acquired in the course of their suffering, nothing more.

It is not enough for them to do their thing; the thing has to be the sensible thing to do. The sensible thing to do is to demand a debased education on the ground that a debased education is what the young, and especially the Negro young, are fit for. The sensible thing to do is to demand a good education plus the compensatory qualifications of which they have been deprived.

A good education is not vocational training. The purpose of education is human freedom. We don't want Dow Chemical or R.O.T.C. off the campus; we want everything off the campus that has nothing to do with education for human freedom. That takes care not only of Dow Chemical and R.O.T.C. but also the placement office, home economics, physical education, business administration, journalism, speech, fraternities, and all the other goodies with which the old have tricked out higher learning in the hope of keeping the young quiet in a rest home for rich adolescents. We don't want war research off the campus; we want everything off the campus that has nothing to do with education for human freedom — including war research and industrial and commercial and labor research. We don't want theology, law, medicine, and engineering off the campus, but across the street where we can take advantage of pure research without diverting it from its purity.

Their motto has to be the motto of my alma mater, and it has to be properly parsed. The motto of my alma mater is, "Let knowledge grow more and more, that human life may be enriched." My alma mater abandoned the enrichment for the knowledge, the end for the means, and achieved the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction; the enrichment of human life in Hiroshima astonished the world.

There is nothing the young can do to disrupt the American college campus that hasn't been done by their elders. They should not connive with their elders in its disruption. They should revolutionize it — revolutionize it intelligently on the intelligent ground that it has forfeited its legitimacy and prostituted its independence. A university fifty per cent of whose budget is provided by the producers of overkill is monopolized by them and every one of its procedures tainted. (The Supreme Court once held that control of six per cent of the market for automobile magnetos was enough to constitute a monopoly in the industry.)

Education has always presupposed authority — the rightful authority, in respect of teaching, of those who know over those who don't know. It has lost its authority because its practitioners have lent themselves to the production and perpetuation of deadly error. Authority stripped of its rightful is authori-

The Negro does not have to be superhuman or saintly...
about Martin Luther King was his intelligence. He would not lift a finger to save one man or one country. His race was the one race, man, without regard to the amount of melanin in his skin. He knew the perdurable agony of man in his own person. Persecution was his teacher, and he learned from his teacher how to speak for man.

Who else will speak for man? Not whitey. Whitey has battened on partiality — on racism, on nationalism, on the exploitation of his brother, black and white. Whoever fights for partiality is playing whitey's game and playing into whitey's hands, perpetuating the intolerable separation of man into species. Separatism is for the birds; there is only one surviving species of the class Homo, and that is Homo sapiens. Whoever speaks for man must refuse to let any man be segregated by anybody — even by himself.

Just as there must be one world or none, so there must be one culture or none. That culture is man's. Asian and African and European studies in America are justified only by the American's ignorance of Asia, Africa, and Europe; that is, they are not justified at all. The black culture of the African-descended American, like the Irish culture of the Irish-descended American, is an atavism that denies the common manhood and asserts a tribalism which is always and everywhere barbarian. If I cannot understand the writings of Eldridge Cleaver because of my skin color, then Eldridge Cleaver cannot understand the writings of Shakespeare because of his. Everybody, and not just the Nazis, will burn the books.

R

What is wanted here is unanswerable argument. Attack education for its present debasement, and you are unanswerable. Assert your right to live without killing, and you are unanswerable. Demand justice and not advantage, and you are unanswerable. Demand justice and not advantage, and you are unanswerable. Call upon the church, not for five hundred million dollars in special reparations for the Negro but for five hundred billion dollars in general justice for the poor, and you are unanswerable. Call policemen "pigs" and you are answerable by those who remember the Nazis calling the Jews Schweinehunde. Call public officials "fascists" and you are answerable by those who remember the Nazis calling the Jews Schweinehunde. Call public officials "fascists" and you are answerable by those who remember the Caesars and the Hapsburgs and the Romanovs. Call for black faculties and black curricula and you are answerable by those who call for humanistic faculties and humane curricula. Call for separatism and you will have on your side — though they kill you — the supremacists who have the necessary overkill to maintain the separatism you call for. Do you want separate but equal opportunity? You will get the separate opportunity and suffer the inequality that follows ineluctably from the separation of the minority from the majority.

The Negro racist, like the white racist, bases his racism on dignity. But men cannot shoot or burn or brawl their way to dignity; if they could, the American white man would be the most dignified man on earth. Does it make the young feel good to occupy an administration building and horrify the straights and terrify the timid and license the governor to turn on the tear gas? Do they want to feel good or to be intelligent? Do they want a rebellion or a revolution? Dignity is not a matter of feeling good — of the mumbo-jumbo of "black is beautiful" or "America the beautiful." America is no more beautiful than Africa and black is no more beautiful than blue.

I wish that the young could make their demands negotiable, but I don't see how they can if they make them intelligent. I don't see how overkill can be negotiated. I don't see how a ghetto or nerve gas research or the C.I.A. can be negotiated. But properly non-negotiable objectives cannot be achieved by throwing a rock through a window on the ground that the owner of the window understands nothing but force. He understands force, all right, and he has it. His level of intelligence has to be raised to the point where he can comprehend that the travesty of the campus and the ghettos and the battlefield is finished. A generation which elects a Lyndon Johnson or a Richard Nixon has no visible intention to negotiate. It will pay lip service to negotiation, provided that the shape of the table is right and as long as it doesn't have to stop doing the only thing it knows how to do.

Harvard University had three hundred years to clean house on the basis of negotiable demands. The people who rightfully deplore the claim of the riotous young to amnesty have amnestied themselves since the world began. There may be those who recall Cain's general demurrer to the complaint that he had failed to discharge his responsibility to his brother.

Old whitey may be unintelligent and out of steam, but he still has his pristine cunning. If he is persistently pushed he will propose gradualism, by which he means gradually wearing blackie down. Whitey isn't wicked. He is unconcerned. His unconcern is not immoral. It is unintelligent. By power possessed, he cannot understand what Paul meant by saying that we are all members one of another. He cannot under-
stand what Jesus meant by saying that he who takes the sword will perish by it. He cannot understand what the prophet meant by proclaiming the greater damnation of those who devour widows' houses and make long prayers for a pretense. He didn't mean to be like this. Power benighted him, and he walks in the noonday as in the night. If I may paraphrase an eminent Harvard alumnus — a hundred generations of people like us is enough. If the new generation turns out to be the hundred and first, it is lost.

The old have torn down Vietnam and kept the ghettos in their place, and now they say that the young want to tear things down without having anything to put in their place. The old are not competent to complain, and the complaint is an empty one anyway. The young don't have to have anything to put in the place of the present shambles. The Lord God Jehovah did not tell their ancestors and mine what to put in the place of Sidon and Tyre; he told them, "You shall walk in My path and I will show you My way." It is easy to think up the right thing.

Anarchy is the second worst condition of society

What is hard is to stop doing the wrong one. The Lord did not tell their ancestors and mine to do good. He told them, "Cease to do evil — learn to do good." They need only to be intelligent.

If they are intelligent, the totalitarian spirit — which unintelligently obeys all laws — will call them anarchists. But they should not be dismayed. True, anarchy is the second worst condition of human society. The worst is tyranny. He who, like the intelligent founders of this republic, will not have tyranny, must take his chances on anarchy. The Nuremberg decision of the International Military Tribunal in 1946 requires anarchy of the soldier who is ordered to perform inhuman acts. Disorder is no worse than injustice, which is the institutionalization of disorder. When the laws are rooted in violence and maintained by violence, they must not be obeyed. Socrates was right, not wrong, when he said, "Men of Athens, I love you, but I shall obey God rather than you." John Brown was right. Mohandas Gandhi was right. Martin Luther King was right. And Thomas Aquinas was right seven centuries ago when he said that an unjust law is no law and does not bind a man in conscience.

There is a higher law. The higher law does not have to be very high to be higher than the Selective Service Act or the Internal Revenue Act, only more intelligent. The young should study the German experience of the nineteen-thirties, when the most literate nation on earth, mistaking literacy for intelligence, elevated ignorance to power and cut its own head off. They should study the German experience and learn that neither the government nor the majority is by definition a good judge of justice. Civil disobedience may be treasonable. It is not necessarily unpatriotic. A patriot will set his country right if he can, but in no case will he contribute to its continued delinquency.

I am one of the elders of whom I speak. The young terrify me. They terrify me because I have mine, which I got by the exercise of the good precepts I learned from my parents plus being white and landing on my feet every time I fell on my face. The young do not terrify me with their popguns; I have ten machine guns for every one of their popguns. They terrify me because they show some small sign of social maturity, of civic responsibility and human concern. Their elders, like me, are nice people, but they did not mature. The young have seen them playing cops and robbers at home and overkill in their worldwide playpen. Television reveals the infantilism of the adults' attention span. They cannot talk; they can sit mesmerized, or they can shout or mumble. They made the young mumble, "One nation, indivisible," and after they had mumbled it a few thousand times, some subversive told them that five per cent of the American people have twenty per cent of the nation's income and twenty per cent have five per cent of it, and they began to become what their elders call cynical; that is, intelligent. The day the young complete the process their elders will fall off the stage of history; they won't even have to be pushed.

The President of Notre Dame says that "we need a rebirth of academic, civic, and political leadership — a sharing of those youthful ideals and dreams, whether they are impossible or not." The President of Notre Dame is right. But whose fault is it that we need such a rebirth? How did we come to be so needy, with so rich a heritage and so profligate a land? How are we to be reborn? What does "a sharing of those youthful ideals and dreams" mean? What
have the elders got to offer as their share? Not youth or ideals or dreams.

The ideals of the elders are money, fame, and power, and they dream of bigger and better sugar-plums. They are starved for soul food, and chicken every Sunday has not filled them. They are obese, but unfilled. Now they have run out of time. They have run out of time to choose to free the Negroes or to fight a civil war to enslave them. All they can do now is cry up the divine right of law and order and shudder for themselves as they see it in action and observe the lawlessness and disorder it brings in its train.

Our black brethren are freeing themselves impatiently. For three centuries they waited patiently — so patiently that whitey, who takes impatience for manliness, took them for sheep who look up to be fed and look down when they aren't. They waited at the end of the line, and no matter how short the line got they were still waiting. They waited at the back of the bus, and no matter how empty the bus was they were still at the back. Their patience is beginning to be exhausted.

Whitey had no intention of living up to his profession that all men are created equal. As this country's sovereign he could not and can not pass the buck for its derelictions. What the country was his doing; was, and is. His tragic flaw was his possession by power and the consequent corruption of his intelligence. He did not understand that no man can free another because no man can enslave another. Whitey wanted blackie to act like a freedman. But blackie isn't a freedman; no man is. He is a free man, and a free man because he is a man. Therein lies his dignity — not in the grace of his master — and he loses it not by being in chains but by chaining himself to the humiliating values of his master. Whoever would want to be and do and have what the American white man is and does and has is not a man but a slave and, like the American white man, an unhappy slave at that.

The only hope of the old is the intelligence of the young. Their intelligence may be undeveloped, but it is not yet corrupted. They are still young. They have been forced by the American educational process to undertake their own education. They are not to be put down or put off, because they have been set to wondering. What set them to wondering was, I suppose, the two victorious world wars their elders waged and lost in the process of winning them. Coming in the wake of these wingless victories, they would have had to be catatonic epileptics not to have wondered. Wonder is the beginning of wisdom. The young are wising up. All they have not to do is what e. e. cummings called up-grow and down-forget.

Their intelligence tells them that the only solution to racialism is miscegenation. There was a time when an Irishman could not be elected President. There was a time when a Catholic could not be elected President. There was a time when a fighting Quaker couldn't be elected President. The change in our national attitude was the result of what we Dixiecrats call mixing. Hybrid corn and hybrid pigs are of higher quality than the original stocks, and there is no evidence whatever that hybrid man is not. Since seventy per cent of all the American "blacks" are part "white" and millions of American "blacks" have passed unknowingly into the so-called white race, the racist who says he wouldn't want his daughter to marry a Negro — or a white man — has no way of knowing whether she does or doesn't and neither has she or her fiancé. As long as pigmentation provides our society with the one discernible other, and as long as whitey is ineducable by anthropology, psychology, and theology, the only solution is to make indiscernible others of us all.

Five hundred years would do it. But then five hundred years of education for freedom would make intelligent human beings of us and it wouldn't matter anymore what color we were. But we have run out of time. It isn't the future that's dark — it's the present. If the young do not bring light to the world, if they spurn a little suffering undergone for the sake of intelligence, the wave of the present will roll over them and, like their elders, they will be heard of no more.

Mr. Mayer, a Consultant to the Center since 1963, has frequently served abroad as a representative of the American Friends Service Committee. He is Professor of the Humanities at Windham College in Vermont.
In 1959 the Board of Directors of the Fund for the Republic established the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions with a mandate to "clarify the basic issues and widen the circles of discussion about them." The Board's decision followed two years of study that had led to the conclusion that the original purpose of the Fund, to advance understanding of civil liberties and civil rights, could best be carried out in the context of an effort to advance understanding of democratic institutions.

In 1959 the financial future of the Fund was obscure. The Center was perforce made up of part-time consultants, with the staff of the Fund in support. Each of the Center's studies was under the supervision of one or more of the consultants; a member of the staff acted as director of each study. The original projects dealt with the corporation, A. A. Berle, consultant, W. H. Ferry, staff director; the labor union, Clark Kerr, consultant, Paul Jacobs, staff director; war and peace, I. I. Rabi, consultant, Walter Millis, staff director; religious institutions, Reinhold Niebuhr and John Courtney Murray, consultants, John Cogley, staff director; the mass media, Eric Goldman, and later Harry S. Ashmore, consultants, Frank Kelly, staff director; the political process, Eugene Burdick, consultant, Hallock Hoffman, staff director. George N. Shuster and Harrison Brown were consultants-at-large.

The difficulties of bringing the consultants together led to a gradual shift as the projects on which they worked came to an end. The Center decided to avail itself of the consultants' advice on an individual and ad-hoc basis. Thus the staff became the Center.

The generosity of Chester F. Carlson, who gave the Center almost five million dollars over five years and left it another five million at his death, had a dual effect: it made it possible to foresee a future in which the Center would not be dependent on annual money-raising, and it permitted the Center to take a step that had been debated for many years, expansion of its limited publication program to include a magazine. THE CENTER MAGAZINE has been successful beyond expectations. The one hundred thousand members it has brought the Center have served still further to reduce financial anxiety about the future, and to provide an important national and
Sixties—and Seventies

international audience for the Center’s deliberations.

Until the Center has an endowment that relieves it of any conscious or unconscious desire to please and that enables it to deal with any issue as it sees fit, it will not be ideally situated. But the Board of Directors decided in May, 1969, that the organization now had a sufficiently firm and independent basis to enable it to attempt in the nineteen-seventies what it wanted to do in the sixties.

The Board authorized the President to refound the Center according to a procedure in which the Senior Fellows, beginning with the President and one appointed by him, would elect their associates. A total of seven were selected. They will choose others. They are under instructions from the Board to elect the most highly qualified persons to be found.

Harvey Wheeler pointed out in a paper written in 1961 that the early projects of the Center were at that date approaching completion or stalemate. Solutions currently recommended for the problems with which they dealt were seen to be inadequate, because no solutions can be adequate unless they are sought in the widest possible context. Economics and politics, for example, remain unintelligible except in terms of a general conception of social order. The over-arching theme of studies of the social order now has to be the nature of world order and the universe of man in its most fundamental aspects. The Board of Directors last May removed any limitations found in the American background of the Fund for the Republic and any restrictions that might be thought inherent in “the study of democratic institutions.” What the Board decided to do was to establish an international community of scholars.

The phrase “community of scholars” is inapplicable in varying degrees to all modern universities. In a recent issue of the Universities Quarterly, H. T. Betteridge, of the University of Glasgow, remarks that “learning for its own sake has now become just laughable, for it leads neither to riches nor to power or influence.” Academic institutions all over the world are increasingly dedicated to training in narrower and narrower fields of specialization. They can hardly be called intellectual communities, or communities of any kind. The demands upon them by industry and the state have made the university, as
the former president of Cornell once boasted, "the great pumping heart" of the industrial state.

The isolation of the specialties is such that there is no way of taming the pretensions of any one of them. One cannot shed light on another, and they cannot come together to focus on the basic or urgent problems of civilization.

The desperate attempts to meet this situation by meetings, conferences, and symposia are laudable but unsuccessful. The problems require systematic and continuous attention, which, by definition, sporadic gatherings cannot give them.

In America academic careerism and foundation funds as well as governmental and industrial grants direct the vast but scattered resources of the multiversity into a network of pipelines leading to the military-industrial complex and other agencies of national power and prosperity.

A recent issue of *Science* reported that one agency, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, was financing the research of more than a thousand Doctoral candidates and of many more Master's candidates. The report added: "The over-all impact is apparent from the observation that these graduate students rank at the top of the nation's younger generation of scientists and are developing their expertise in areas particularly relevant to Department of Defense interests."

Yet the multiversity may be obsolescent in the sense that the problems lie elsewhere. The revolutions we hear so much about may make the multiversity an anachronism. Nobody can deny the value of discovery and invention, but a most pressing question is how we can live with science and technology. Nobody would care to reduce the prosperity of the advanced industrial nations, but we may be coming to a point at which the issue is not how to produce and distribute goods but how to live human lives, not how to strengthen and enrich the nation-state but how to make the world a decent habitation for mankind. The causes of the present worldwide unrest among students are complicated, but one of them seems to be a growing conviction among young people that contemporary institutions, especially the university, cannot in their present form deal with the dangers and opportunities of the present and future.

Against this background, the Board of Directors of the Center has decided that it is desirable to organize a small center of independent thought and criticism, made up of men and women highly qualified in their specialties who are prepared to devote a major part of their time to a common effort to understand the contemporary world. During the coming year the Center will try to discover whether this can be done. A series of meetings will be held with scholars from all over the world. The present Fellows will seek their advice and their coöperation as resident, visiting, or corresponding members of the Center.

One question the Senior Fellows will have to decide is whether the refounded Center should have students. Their present view is that younger people should be associated with them as collaborators or junior partners. Since the number of Senior Fellows is unlikely to be large, the number of students will be small.

Looking back over the sixties, one can see that the developments are a natural result not only of the improvement in the Center's financial position but also of reflection upon its program. The staff was systematically engaged in such reflection for a year and a half before the Board acted in May. No one who took part in those discussions could escape the conclusion that the academic affairs of the Center should be in the hands of a small number of qualified Senior Fellows. The number should be no larger than might be required to provide a continuing nucleus for the dialogue.

The method of the dialogue, though difficult, was seen to be the only one that encouraged the kind of interdisciplinary criticism in which the Center has been engaged. The dialogue had to be about subjects selected by the participants. It had to be frequent enough to build up continuity — meetings should not be so far apart that what went on in one was forgotten by the time the next took place. On the other hand, the dialogue had to be infrequent enough to permit the participants to prepare and at the same time to get on with their own studies. These studies would be the basis of later meetings led by them.

Frequent, but not too frequent, dialogue on subjects chosen by the group, accompanied by work of one's own that was to be brought ultimately to the table — this was the method that was carried to some degree of perfection by the Center and that will be employed by the refounded organization.

Center Fellows, and often visitors as well, soon get out of the habit of referring to themselves as lawyers or political scientists or whatever they happen to be. They talk to the problem under consideration, bringing their own special knowledge to bear on it, at the same time recognizing that no single discipline can
have the final word on the kind of issue with which the Center deals. For example, the last discussion in June of this year took place with Arthur Jensen, Professor of Educational Psychology, University of California at Berkeley, on the inheritance of intelligence. The staff had had three previous meetings on Professor Jensen’s views, one of them with him. The final conference on the topic was attended by two visiting political scientists and a visiting psychologist. The question of the inheritability of intelligence as set forth by Professor Jensen in the *Harvard Educational Review* has become a cause célèbre in the academic world; subsequent issues of the *Review* are devoted entirely to critiques of Jensen’s thesis and to his reply. These scholarly exchanges have spilled over into allegations of latent racism and angry charges that Jensen’s researches support the anti-integration political faction outside the academy. The controversy has spread to include the methods and responsibilities of scientists; the proportions are approaching those of the great Lysenko imbroglio that divided the academic community in the Soviet Union a few years ago.

If the Jensen affair has attracted so much attention, it might be asked what special contribution the Center can make to the discussion. The answer lies in the central thesis of the Center, that it is impossible to explore such issues within the limits of a single academic discipline, or a cluster of related disciplines. Professor Jensen has raised prime questions of psychology that must be dealt with by specialists, but attending them are grave matters of public policy for which the same specialists may have no particular competence. It is the Center’s contribution to take the discussion into multi-disciplinary territory, and to insist that the issues must be appraised finally in terms of human values. We believe the same thing is true of most of the major issues that confront mankind.

The work of the Center has shown that all these issues are interrelated. Whether we think of how to live with science and technology or how to advance the idea of world community or to remedy the economic disparities that plague the world, we notice at once that, though solid work must be done by all the disciplines bearing on the problem, there must also be some way of bringing them together if the issue is to be seen in the round, without distortion.

Rexford G. Tugwell’s new constitution for the United States is now in its thirty-fourth draft. The Center entered upon this project without any notion that the eventual document might be considered by the people. The Center’s intention was to use these constitutional drafts as a focus for its work, to give concreteness to its speculations, and to force it to think carefully about the kind of charter a modern democracy ought to have. Now I am not so sure. If the present demand for a constitutional convention persists, it may be well to have before the country a carefully worked out plan to which those interested in freedom and justice can repair. The motives of those who are urging a convention seem to have little to do with freedom and justice.

The Tugwell study of the Constitution has to embrace all the new conditions and considerations that characterize the new world. It would obviously be absurd to have it criticized by constitutional lawyers alone, for they are frequently unfamiliar with the conditions with which a constitution must deal. By the time Governor Tugwell’s final draft is published it will have been inspected from every point of view by experts in all the fields that it impinges upon.

So it is with the problem of world organization, which overlaps the question of controlling technology, that of economic development, and even that of the American Constitution, for America is the most powerful country in the world. Wherever this problem is touched, it immediately calls for the collaboration of specialists.

The seabed, for example, once thought to be the common property of mankind, now appears to have economic and military value. Only a cooperative effort by statesmen, businessmen, and scholars in many fields can lead to a political framework in which the interests of the peoples of the world can be safeguarded. Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s project on world organization, which can be traced back to the world constitution framed by a committee at the University of Chicago in 1947, is closely linked to the struggle for the seabed. Officers of and ambassadors to the United Nations have recognized the importance of this work and have assisted in making plans for an international meeting to be held in Malta in 1970, at which a program for a regime of the sea will be presented and discussed.

Throughout the last decade the Center has been concerned with science and technology. An Occasional Paper by Donald Michael on cybernation, published by the Center in 1962, was an attempt to indicate the nature and consequences of the technological revolution. A number of international conferences have been held at the Center on this subject...
since that date and many publications have resulted from them. A continuing study under the direction of Harvey Wheeler is called the Constitutionalization of Science; it is concerned with the control of the applications of science in the public interest. While the advanced nations have been turning their attention to other planets, this one is being made uninhabitable by the unexpected side effects of scientific progress. The problem now is literally how to save the world. What is going on in the seabed is an example of what may happen, and the relationship of this study to the others is clear. It is also clear that no system for the control of the applications of science can be devised without the type of collaboration among the disciplines that is characteristic of the Center’s work.

Building on the studies of war and peace conducted in its early days, the Center in 1964 decided to arrange a convocation to call attention to the papal encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, a document that seemed to suggest paths toward peaceful coexistence among men of different nations and ideologies. The object was to see whether the understanding and interchange advocated by Pope John XXIII was possible. Two thousand people from many countries assembled in New York, and interchange between East and West did occur. The addresses of the representatives of what was then called the Soviet bloc were conciliatory. Positions that had seemed fixed became less rigid. The meeting showed that East-West dialogue could take place.

Encouraged by this result, the Center held another meeting, *Pacem in Terris II*, for three hundred and fifty invited guests in Geneva in 1967. The effort was to broaden the dialogue. In one way it conspicuously failed, for the Soviet Union, citizens of which had eagerly cooperated in plans for the meeting, withdrew at the last minute because of the war in Vietnam, and many Arab representatives declined or disappeared because of the Six Day War with Israel. From many other points of view, on balance, the meeting succeeded — the Germans, East and West, discussed in public for the first time their points of difference and agreement; the countries of Southeast Asia came together to request a conference among themselves looking toward the neutralization of the region; and many public persons speaking in a private capacity discussed the international relations of their countries with surprising candor.

The virtue of the kind of private peacemaking in which the Center has engaged lies in its flexibility. When public positions are frozen, private groups can establish private relations that may influence public attitudes. When representatives of the Southeast Asian countries asked the Center to invite them to a conference under its auspices, the Center put the natural question, why do you need us? The reply was that the official relations among these nations were such that no one of them could take the initiative.

In private meetings under private auspices, where everybody is speaking in his private capacity, plans can be put forward that a government would hesitate to present because they might be thought signs of weakness. It is a rule of official diplomacy that one must always seem to be negotiating from strength. Hence the difficulties of the U.N., an organization of sovereign states. Having undertaken to formulate a program for the seabed, and having assembled a large committee for this purpose, the U.N. finds itself unable to move. Meanwhile, the member states with access to the oceans are proceeding to stake out their claims.

The risk in private peacemaking is considerable. Although the Center has never made a move of this kind without the knowledge of the government of the United States, it has not been able to count on the sustained support of that government, even when such support has been promised. For example, during the planning for *Pacem in Terris II*, the Soviet delegation proposed that the Center try to see what private peacemaking could accomplish with regard to the war in Vietnam. With the concurrence of the State Department, the Center established connections with Hanoi; Harry S. Ashmore and William Baggs, with Luis Quintanilla, an experienced Mexican diplomat and consultant to the Center, went there. Discussions with Ho Chi Minh and other North Vietnamese officials were so promising that Ashmore and Baggs returned for a second visit. Significant proposals did emerge. However, confusion in the State Department and the White House rendered these overtures abortive. The story is told in the special Center Report by Ashmore and Baggs, *Mission to Hanoi*.

The Center does seem to have a certain attraction for those who see places where private peacemaking might work. I have already mentioned the instance of the crisis about the ocean bottom. Another example is that of American-Japanese-Chinese relations. Through Harrop Freeman, Professor of Law at Cornell and a consultant to the Center, a group in the Liberal Party of Japan approached the Center with a request for a conference in Santa Barbara about the policy the United States and Japan should adopt toward Communist China. Ten leaders of the
Japanese group attended the meeting, held in January, 1969. The Center invited four leading U.S. senators of both parties and other public figures and experts on the Far East. The exploration of the issues was as thorough as time permitted. The Japanese indicated satisfaction with the results and have suggested further conferences in Tokyo to which they would invite citizens of mainland China. A book-length report, Asian Impasse, will be published in October; there will also be an edition in Japanese.

The project known as the Civilization of the Dialogue, under the direction of John Wilkinson, carries private peacemaking to a more profound level. It is an attempt to understand the conditions of cross-cultural, international, and inter-ideological communication and to test that understanding by efforts at intellectual cooperation. Relations have been established with the Neues Forum group in Vienna, which has many connections with individuals and groups in the Soviet Union and other countries in eastern Europe. Professor Fred Warner Neal, a consultant to the Center, has been helpful in putting the Center in touch with scholars in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. A steady stream of these scholars has flowed through the Center. There is a Rumanian Visiting Fellow, Ileana Marculescu, now in residence, and Academician N. Inozemtsev, a Russian social scientist, is a consultant. Joint publishing arrangements have been made with the Neues Forum group and with the Institute of American Studies in Moscow.

At the instance of the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Justice Douglas, the Center will hold in Mexico City this month the first of a series of Pacem in Terris seminars designed to carry the dialogue into one region of the world after another. The Mexico City meeting will deal with the obstacles to economic development in Latin America and methods of overcoming them. It is being organized by Raúl Prebisch, a leading authority on the subject, and will bring together experts from all the Latin-American countries, including Cuba.

At the rate of about four meetings a week throughout the calendar year for a decade the Center has touched upon the major issues that have arisen or that seem likely to arise in the contemporary world. Some of them, as I have indicated, it has selected for continued study. Others it has dealt with more summarily, thinking that it has made its contribution by calling attention to them. Where it has felt that novel or heretical views deserved consideration it has not hesitated to provide a forum for them. For this reason the Center has had some utility as an early-warning system.

Its first projects adumbrated the course the organizations under study—religious institutions, the corporations, the mass media, and the unions—might take or ought to take. As long ago as 1958 a paper written by John Graham and published by the Center recommended that conscription be abolished, and added that if this recommendation could not be adopted, selection should be by lot. These suggestions are now a commonplace of political discussion.

A symposium on the Negro as an American, which was conducted in 1963, one on a free press and a fair trial in 1965, one on the opinions and aims of radical youth in 1967, and one in 1967 in which the present Chief Justice set forth somewhat unorthodox views of the administration of criminal justice illustrate the value of an independent institution bent on trying to discover and understand what is going on in the world. I could extend this list almost indefinitely to include, for example, the city, the university, bureaucracy, ecology, and ghetto education.

In general, the Center has tried to avoid the burning issues because by definition they are already receiving attention. The Center has thought its main function was to bring to the surface those issues which had not yet come to public notice but which seemed likely to become the burning issues of the future. The Center has not tried to tell people what to think; it has on occasion ventured to suggest what they ought to be thinking about. It has also on occasion, where it has thought that a fair presentation of all sides of a burning issue was unlikely, arranged for such a presentation. The most recent example is the Occasional Paper on the anti-ballistic missile, which preceded the public controversy.

As the first ten years of the Center draws to a close, as one era ends and another begins, I look back with some satisfaction at the successful attempt to found a center of independent thought and criticism, to learn how to gain comprehension through dialogue, to clarify the basic issues—and some burning ones—and widen the circles of discussion about them. I am grateful to all the colleagues and collaborators who have brought the Center to its present distinction and to all the friends, members, and supporters who have made their work possible. I am confident that by building on its experience the Center will go from strength to strength in the next decade.

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Our future depends upon our appreciation of the reality of the inner life
— ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL

The Religious Message

Little does religion ask of contemporary man. It is ready to offer comfort; it has no courage to challenge. It is ready to offer edification; it has no courage to break the idols, to shatter the callousness. The trouble is that religion has become “religion”—institution, dogma, securities. It is not an event anymore. Its acceptance involves neither risk nor strain. Religion has achieved respectability by the grace of society, and its representatives publish as a frontispiece the nihil obstat signed by social scientists.

There is no substitute for faith, no alternative for revelation, no surrogate for commitment. This we must remember in order to save our thought from confusion. And confusion is not a rare disease. We are guilty of committing the fallacy of displacement. We define self-reliance and call it faith, shrewdness and call it wisdom, anthropology and call it ethics, literature and call it Bible, inner security and call it religion, conscience and call it God. However, nothing counterfeit can endure forever.

It is customary to blame secular science and anti-religious philosophy for the eclipse of religion in modern society. It would be more honest to blame religion for its own defeats. Religion declined not because it was refuted but because it became irrelevant, dull, oppressive, insipid. When faith is completely replaced by creed, worship by discipline, love by habit; when the crisis of today is ignored because of the splendor of the past; when faith becomes an heirloom rather than a living fountain; when religion speaks only in the name of authority rather than with the voice of compassion, its message becomes meaningless.

Religion today has lost sight of the person; religion has become an impersonal affair, an institutional loyalty. It survives on the level of activities rather than in the stillness of commitment. It has fallen victim to the belief that the real is only that which is capable of being registered by fact-finding surveys. By religion is meant what is done publicly rather than that which comes about in privacy. The chief virtue is social affiliation rather than conviction. Inwardness is ignored. The spirit has become a myth. Man treats himself as if he were created in the likeness of a machine rather than the likeness of God. The body is his god, and its needs are its prophets. Having lost his awareness of his sacred image, he became deaf to the command: to live in a way which is compatible with his image.

Religion without a soul is as viable as a man without a heart. Social dynamics is no substitute for meaning. Yet, the failure to realize the fallacy of such substitution seems to be common in our day.

Perhaps this is the most urgent task: to save the inner man from oblivion, to remind ourselves that we are a duality of mysterious grandeur and pompous dust. Our future depends upon our appreciation of the reality of the inner life, of the splendor of thought, of the dignity of wonder and reverence. This is the most important thought: God has a stake in the life of man, of every man. But this idea cannot be imposed from without; it must be discovered by every man; it cannot be preached, it must be experienced.

ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL
1959
On Meddling

The public, in and out of church, does not allow the clergyman to be like other men, to have opinions, to make mistakes; it does not allow him to speak for himself but only for God or the church. A similar pseudo-reverence afflicts the public attitude toward religion and the church: its place is high, but it should stay in its place; it is to be revered, honored, treated with respect, but it is not to be taken seriously outside the confines to which it is assigned. Or it is taken too seriously. If a clergyman, or a church group, or a religious person, speaking explicitly from the basis of his speaking, should deal with public affairs, this creates either an awe or an anger that is unjustified: an assumption that the pronouncements necessarily have some elevated authority, or an assumption that they illegitimately claim such authority.

What is desirable is for the churches to be more aware that they have no special competence in the technical work of politics and economics, to be more conscious of the differences among their members on these matters, to be more aware that they probably cannot say anything unique, distinct, or peculiar to themselves on actual decisions in social policy (and that being unique is not really the point), and yet more willing to examine the ethical problems of society.

It would be better if the churches were more modest formally but more aggressively actually; more modest with respect to competence and claims to truth and value but more penetrating with respect to the concerns and interests in society. It may sound contradictory that the religious groups should be asked to be more cognizant of their limitations when they deal with society and at the same time be asked to deal with society more eagerly than they have. Actually, there is no contradiction but a positive connection, especially if we think not so much of that “action” with which the “social-gospel” tradition was primarily concerned as of the understanding, analysis, and criticism that precedes, or should precede, such “action” (though, of course, understanding, analysis, and criticism are themselves “action” of a kind, too). The greater recognition by religious folk of their limitations in treating public affairs might lead not to an abandonment of any effort directly to deal with such affairs but to an effort to overcome some of the limitations. Then, when the religious communities explicitly deal with the concrete situation, the moral content that had seemed abstract and irrelevant and platitudinous may begin to take on meaning.

WILLIAM LEE MILLER
1960

Secular Saints

The quest for human values in our society has moved outside the churches. If one wishes to be radically religious in our society—that is to say, radically committed to a vision of human brotherhood, personal integrity, openness to the future, justice, and peace—one will not, commonly, seek an ecclesiastical outlet for one’s energies. One will, instead, find community under secular auspices, create one’s own symbols for community and integrity, and work through secular agencies for social and political reforms. The saints of the present (and perhaps of the future) are no longer ecclesiastics, churchgoers, or even, necessarily, believers in God. The saints of the present are, in the word of Albert Camus, secular saints.

Dostoevski had feared that atheism would mean nihilism: “If there is no God, everything is permitted.” But his fears have not been realized. In America, atheists retain the chief moral imperatives of Judaism and Christianity; they sometimes become the most serious and imaginative leaders in the attempt to realize these values in society. Judaism and Christianity have succeeded so well in commending basic human values that perhaps churches are no longer necessary. In the childhood of our culture, they instructed us; in our adulthood, we are on our own. However, the chief problems in our society have once again become theological. For a time, while many people believed that knowledge is power and
Goethe's Faust was altering St. John's Gospel from "In the beginning was the Word" to "In the beginning was the Deed," it seemed that theological problems were no longer real. Men galloped ahead in the pursuit of knowledge and technical mastery. But, suddenly, the technical power of the human race has become immense. The leading problem for biological scientists, geneticists, psychologists, engineers, chemists, and others is not so much "Can we do X?", the vexing problem has increasingly become: "Of course we can do X; but should we?"

The value-free discourse of the last generation no longer suffices. When men turn to imagine the cities of the future, they find themselves asking: "What do we think man is like, this man for whom we are building the city? Which things are important to him? What, in the long term, are the basic human imperatives, the fundamental priorities? Which arrangements of a city most allow for the development of human potentialities?"

We have moved from what Péguy called politique to what he called mystique. We have moved from technical considerations to considerations of values. We have moved from value-free discourse to discourse that is, in the largest sense, theology: a vision of man and his ultimate commitments.

Many people, of course, will dislike the connotations of the word "theology"; they are, after all, atheists. But "ideology" has even less pleasing connotation. It implies, as Daniel Bell has argued, a rigidity of program and vision, combined with a passionate dedication that borders on fanaticism. It is bad enough to be called a theologian; it is worse to be called an ideologue. But a more important consideration is that the astute reader of theological discourse will soon discover that every sentence in such discourse, however obliquely, refers to human actions, dispositions, or programs. Both Judaism and Christianity insist that men must labor to prepare the way for that future. The "kingdom of God" is the prototype of utopia. Often this "kingdom" also has an other-worldly, apocalyptic concomitant; yet, in its own right, it is a concrete, historical this-worldly ideal.

MICHAEL NOVAK
1968

"However good or bad the times, the university is the place where discussion between the generations is possible"

— ROSEMARY PARK

Salvation for the University

Let us force ourselves to state minimum requirements for our degrees, not in terms of academic bookkeeping but in terms of substance. Let us reduce the teaching year for the student, leaving him to work by himself, to read by himself, as is standard practice in other lands. Let us insist that it is a privilege to be a student, not a right, that the university is no welfare state open to all but only to those who will develop an intellectual conscience and accept the discipline which comes from specialized knowledge.

The administrator today, as I see him, must be a kind of Socrates, wandering about the capitals of the academic world and asking the hurrying faculty what they mean by truth, justice, decency, even academic freedom. And we must ask the students why they learn so well what they maintain is useless, what they mean by integrity and how they recognize it, and, most important of all, what they think is going on. These questions should be asked at the heart of the university, not in some peripheral civil-rights meeting or coffee shop. If the administrator asks them first, the faculty will follow and the student will discover that, however good or bad the times, the university is the place where discussion between the generations is still possible.

Perhaps this is enough of a purpose to begin with. It will not totally satisfy the student, who hopes for grander things. It will not restore the cohesiveness of the ivory tower under Alma Mater but, aided by the conscience of the faculty, it can produce a critical center in which questions of general import are continually and naturally raised. By endeavoring to discover priorities it will begin the creation of a moral core, as Socrates' questions sought to clarify the will of Athens. If we do not strive to restore some of the genuine elevation of thought and manner which characterized higher education in simpler days, we shall witness the disintegration of the university into a technological center for specialists and their apprentices. Goals for the society will then be determined, not as the result of free discussion, but by manipulation of the majority, no matter how educated it may claim to be.

ROSEMARY PARK
1966

University: Beacon or Mirror?

It is true the university is dependent on society, that the attitude of society is decisive, but what determines society's attitude? It is the courage and clarity of educational leaders. I believe that the American people will accept any rational definition of a university that can be offered to them. As the present conception is the work of educational leaders, not one that simply grew up in the society and was then imposed from outside on the university, a new conception could also be the work of educational leaders. It is the business of educational leaders to work out the conception and enlighten the public. They have not done so. The reason lies in the timidity and shortsightedness of those who have the responsibility. My conclusion is that a university can be a beacon and not a mirror, and that it is our business as interested citizens.
to try to find out what a university would have to be in order to be a beacon. Being a mirror is a cinch.

If the university is to be a beacon, there must be some principle of selection among its activities. It can't simply respond to any demand. The definition of purpose is decisive. And my definition of purpose is that a university is an autonomous intellectual community thinking together about matters both speculative and practical. This changes everything except one thing: it does not change the needs of society. It merely asserts that many needs must be met, if they are to be met at all, outside the university. Among these needs, for example, is the training of technicians. England proposes to establish training schools, research institutes, organizations immediately responsive to immediate public needs, but it does not propose to call them universities. It proposes that the universities should continue to be autonomous and that the training schools which would be responsive to immediate needs are under the control of those who feel these needs.

It may be that the process of change could be expedited by a model. Such a new university would be composed of teachers and students interested in and qualified for independent thought. There would be no more than, say, 2,999 in this community. The administration would be elected by the permanent members of the faculty for a three-year term and would be ineligible for re-election. The institution would be organized on the federalized basis, or what Clark Kerr calls the "cluster college" scheme, and each major discipline would be represented in each one of the federal colleges. The faculty would be the corporation. But it would be equipped with a Board of Visitors, rather than a Board of Regents or Trustees, who would be distinguished laymen dedicated to the purposes of the institution. Their task would be to hold the faculty to its duty, and this duty would be independent thought and criticism. The Board of Visitors would accomplish its task by private and public appraisals of the performance of the faculty at regular intervals. The object of this institution would not be training but understand-

The Business of the Campus

Everybody knows what has happened to the university as an institution since the last war. It has moved from wherever it was to the center of the marketplace. Through its individual members as well as through its official undertakings, it has come to take a direct part in the work of government, industry, and foreign affairs. Because of the rising population and its rising demands for higher education, because of the lengthening and thickening of professional training, the university, public or private, has taken on the task of fitting the ambitions of young and old to the needs of the day, these needs being defined in worldly terms. Higher education is now supposed to lead directly into practical life. In a word, the university is now a place for making precision instruments, and both the institution and the world keep telling each other that the future of the country depends on such production being maintained. Self-congratulation about this new importance exists on the campus, and a subtle flattery arises from the new connection in the minds of businessmen and civil servants. The studious and abstracted air of the scholar is now the preoccupied one of the man catching a plane and administering a quarter-million-dollar grant.

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS
1966

The University as Rebel

What is the obligation of the university in a world in which one nation is reducing the people of another to the most primitive functions of its existence; when the very rudiments of civilization are being extinguished and the orders of life upon which reason grows are being destroyed by systematic violence? In such circumstances it is the obligation of the university to rebel against the violation of man and align itself in public witness with humanity. Today, the university is required to condemn the government of the United States for its barbaric crusade against the life and spirit of the people of Vietnam. A university that will not speak for man, whatever tasks it continues to perform, has ceased to be a human enterprise.

The university can deny its times because, like any human agency, it is not wholly absorbed in its social context, it has a special capacity to transcend its social constraints because it embodies a tradition of intellectual diversity and articulate criticism and because, of all human functions, thought is the most difficult to curtail. But while the university is uniquely promising, it is also uniquely threatened by the pressures of ideology to which we have already referred. The university is in constant tension between its ideal critical capacity and the powers of secular service that delimit its hope. Therefore, while the protest movement is centered in the university, the activity of protest is not central to the university.

It is possible to act to change the world because we are not totally imminent in it; it is necessary for us to change the world because we do not very much transcend it. Here is the point of truth in the conception of the multiversity. The sheer understanding that society is corrupt does not place one outside corruption. For we do not experience social existence at a distance, we ingest it. The act by which the university affirms its humanity and denies American barbarism does not constitute the cure of the university.
Adlai Stevenson (right) at the Center's first Pacem in Terris convocation in New York.

Linus Pauling (below) at Pacem II in Geneva.
It may be, as Hegel has noted, that the hand that inflicts the wound is the hand that cures it. But it does so only through an anguished labor. One cannot throw off the effects of having been molded in the density of the social world with a simple shrug of understanding. Plato knew this truth two thousand years ago. We are still bound by it. The university has been molded by current powers and we have been formed and malformed in our turn. The alienation of society has become our apathy and fragmentation; its anti-intellectualism and glorification of technology, our play at neutralism in an inversion of ends and means; its crude devotion to wealth and power, our imbalance and intellectual prostitution.  

RICHARD LICHTMAN  
1968

The Open Truth

The school is expected to do what the community cannot do and that is impossible. In the end, we will have to change far more than the schools if we expect to create a new coherence between the experiences of the child and the needs of the community. We will have to rethink the meaning of childhood; we will begin to grant greater freedom and responsibility to the young; we will drop the compulsory-schooling age to fourteen, perhaps less; we will take for granted the “independence” of adolescents and provide them with the chance to live alone, away from parents and with peers; we will discover jobs they can or want to do in the community—anything from mail delivery to the teaching of smaller children and the counseling of other adolescents. At some point, perhaps, we will even find that the community itself—in return for a minimum of work or continued schooling—will provide a minimal income to young people that will allow them to assume the responsibility for their own lives at an earlier age and learn the ways of the community outside the school; finally, having lowered the level of compulsory schooling, we will find it necessary to provide different kinds of schools, a wider choice, so that students will be willing voluntarily to continue the schooling that suits their needs and aims.

All these changes, of course, are aimed at two things: the restoration of the child’s “natural” place in the community and lowering the age at which a person is considered an independent member of the community. Some of them, to be sure, can be made in the schools, but my sense of things, after having talked to teachers and visited the schools, is that trying to make the changes in schools alone will be impossible.

One problem, put simply, is that in every school I have visited, public or private, traditional or “innovational,” the students have only these two choices: to drop out (either physically or mentally) or to make themselves smaller and smaller until they can act in ways their elders expect. One of my students picked up a phrase I once used, “the larger and smaller worlds.” The schools we visit together, he says, are always the smaller world: smaller at least than his imagination, smaller than the potential of the young. The students are asked to put aside the best things about themselves—their own desires, impulses, and ideas—in order to “adjust” to an environment constructed for children who existed one hundred years ago, if at all. I wonder sometimes if this condition is simply the result of poor schooling; I am more inclined to believe that it is the inevitable result of mass compulsory schooling and the fabrication of artificial environments by adults for children. Is it possible at all for adults to understand what children need and to change their institutions fast enough to keep up with changes in culture and experience? Is it possible for children to grow to their full size, to feel their full strength, if they are deprived of individual volition all along the line and forced to school? I don’t know. I know only that during the Middle Ages they sometimes “created” jesters by putting young children in boxes and force-feeding them so that, as they grew, their bones would warp in unusual shapes. That is often how the schools seem to me. Students are trapped in boxes of pedagogic ideas, and I am tempted to say to teachers again and again: more, much more, you must go further, create more space in the schools, you must go deeper in thought, create more resonance, a different feeling, a different and more human, more daring style.

Even the best teachers, with the best intentions, seem to diminish their students as they work through the public-school system. For that system is, at bottom, designed to produce what we sometimes call good citizens but what more often than not turn out to be good soldiers; it is through the schools of the state, after all, that we produce our armies. I remember how I was teaching at a state college by the number of boys who wanted to oppose the draft but lacked the courage or strength to simply say no. They were trapped; they had always been taught, had always tried, to be “good.” Now that they wanted to refuse to go, they could not, for they weren’t sure they could bear the consequences they had been taught would follow such refusal: jail, social disgrace, loss of jobs, parental despair. They could not believe in institutions, but they could not trust themselves and their impulse and they were caught in their own impotence: depressed and resentful, filled with self-hatred and a sense of shame. That is a condition bred in the schools. In one way or another our methods produce in the young a condition of pain that seems very close to a mass neurosis: a lack of faith in oneself, a vacuum of spirit into which authority or institutions can move, a dependency they feed on. Students are encouraged to relinquish their own wills, their freedom of volition; they are taught that the value and culture reside outside oneself and must be acquired from the institution, and almost everything in their education is designed to discourage them from activity, from the wedding of idea and act. It is almost as if we hoped to discourage them from thought itself by making ideas so lifeless, so hopeless, that their despair would be enough to make them manipulable and obedient.

PETER MARIN
1969
"To permit politics and ethics to be divorced from one another is fatal."
—ROBERT GORDIS

The Ethical Claim

If politics, the art of the possible, can never, or almost never, represent total and uncompromising adherence to ethical standards but must reckon with the stubborn data of the environment, which are beyond the control of the actors, it is not on that account different from the application of the principles of morality to the life of the individual.

A distinction all too often ignored in our day is that between expediency and prudence. Expediency may be defined as the temporary suspension of a moral principle because of the demands of necessity. Prudence is the reconciliation of two valid moral principles which under given circumstances stand in conflict with each other. Both expediency and prudence have their place in ethically motivated political affairs. It is, however, a fatal flaw to fail to recognize the difference. What is merely expedient should be modified as soon as possible. A prudential policy may remain valid for a considerable period or even permanently.

To permit politics and ethics to be divorced from one another is fatal to the future of society. It may simplify the task of the religious believer who wishes to wrap himself in the mantle of piety and mystic contemplation and turn his back on the world. It may ease the task of the cynical manipulator of the political process by freeing him from any moral check or discipline. But the basic insight of the Biblical world-view remains true—a society divorced from morality must perish. In the words of the Old Testament, "Where there is no vision, the people perish, but he who observes the Law, happy is he" (Prov. 29:18) and "Righteousness exalts a nation, but sin is the shame of the peoples" (Prov. 14:34). In the words of the New Testament, "The wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23).

Always politics and ethics may seem to diverge, but it is the task of the leaders and the citizenry of the free society to strive perpetually to bring them into harmony. In the words of the Talmud (Aboth 2:16), "It is not for you to complete the task, but neither have you the right to desist from it." ROBERT GORDIS 1961

Revolution—Permanent Possibility

A common principle underlies both revolts and politics. If we have lost the rationale of revolutions, we have also lost the reasons that support genuine political life. Stated simply, perhaps too simply for quick comprehension, the principle is that every human being has a responsibility for injustice anywhere in the community. Governments—that is, the laws and the institutions that the laws establish—are the proper political means for discharging that responsibility. But, no matter how well conceived and founded, governments may gradually or suddenly, depending on the rates of change in the community, become functionless, overloaded, or positive hindrances to the processes of justice. The ordinary processes of government, lawmaking and repealing, administration and adjudicating, are elastic and capable of adjusting themselves to the course of history; but they may also become rigid and cumbersome when the issues are heavy and when the rate of change is high, as in the British, French, and American Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In such times the will to maintain the legalistic details of custom and tradition and the consequent failure to adjust and invent may lead to the rapid accumulation of injustices. The will to create laws and institutions is replaced by the habit of domination on the part of the beleaguered authorities. Reason gives way to force and legality takes on the sinister meaning of the phrase "law and order." It is in such circumstances that the individual, or some fraction of the public, rediscovering not only the right but the duty of revolution, is moved to grasp the means at hand and to invent new methods for discharging the basic responsibility for restoring justice. This amounts to the recognition that the permanent possibility of revolution is a necessary condition of responsible government.

If we are to extend our public intelligence to comprehend, tolerate, and use both the domestic and foreign incipient revolutions of our time, we would do well to conceive of our task in terms of membership in a permanent constitutional convention, first on a national scale and then later on a world scale. If we are to deal with revolutions and wars responsibly, we would do well not to suppress their causes by police or military force. This is no longer a matter of nineteenth-century liberal sentiments of decency and idealism; it is, strictly speaking, a matter of life and death for any government.

As parliamentary government, with its systems of representation, deliberation, and voting, comprehended incipient revolutions of the eighteenth century and turned into what we now call democratic self-government, so we must provide constitutional conventions that will turn current causes of war and revolution into institutions and laws. We should extend the due processes of law to the deeper processes of justice which revolutions present to communities that exist because they respect justice, peace, freedom, and order.

SCOTT BUCHANAN 1967
The Courts

Under the American system of constitutional government, there are areas in which the courts do have an obligation to make an independent, and binding, decision that governmental power may not be exercised in certain cases, regardless of the fact that legislative approval has been given. Here we get into the difficult problem of judicial review, with all it implies as a qualification of the principle that the majority, acting through its elected representatives, ought to be able to effectuate its desires.

I have no wish to enter the debate over the justifications to be found for this peculiarly American institution of judicial review, which has been the subject of discussion in recent years by such giants of the courts as Robert Jackson, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Learned Hand, and such scholars as Eugene Rostow, Herbert Wechsler, Charles L. Black, and Alexander Bickel, among others. Let me simply say that, like all these men, I believe that the propriety of federal judicial invalidation of state legislation is unassailable as a matter of constitutional logic, textual exegesis, and history. It would be impossible to maintain a system of supreme federal law, demanded by Article VI of the Constitution, without a means of ensuring a uniform interpretation of that law throughout the states. The only practical way of assuring this is by providing access to a federal forum which can finally resolve questions of interpretation.

It is precisely this aspect of judicial review which is under attack in the most vocal manner. I find it difficult to believe that any of the opponents have ever given even slight attention to the consequences of their position. If any have, I find it difficult to believe that their arguments are made in good faith. With regard to judicial review of federal enactments, I feel that its legitimacy, if not absolutely assured, is certainly strengthened by the fact that both the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights contain express prohibitions of certain laws.

The problem resolves itself into discovering the essence of the democratic creed, the function of bureaucracy in a modern society, the particular characteristics that make bureaucracy efficacious, and how these can be modified to harmonize them with the tenets of democracy without thereby reducing the special aptness of bureaucracy for certain tasks that must be done.

Madison appears to have contributed most to the resolution in our political system of the conflict between individual liberty and civilized social living. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, he analyzed the nature of the right of freedom of conscience guaranteed in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, which he himself had drawn. It was absolute, he argued, and precluded any legislative action touching even remotely on religious matters. This was a right, he said, which is not lost because "a man enters civil society." And again, "No man's right [of conscience] is abridged by the institution of civil society."

Here and elsewhere he drew with great clarity a distinction between rights that men must sacrifice in order to obtain a government that will enable them to live together in peace and prosperity, and rights that are not or should not be sacrificed since they are an intimate part of man as a human being. This distinction between alienable and inalienable rights is perhaps the greatest American contribution to the concept of democracy as a viable system of government. It erects a fence around the private realm of the autonomous citizen from which government is excluded, or, at any rate, into which it may enter only via the slow, cumbersome amending process.

In a modern society bureaucracy is unavoidable. It is a kind of government though limited to a single purpose. In a vital part of their lives it rules people who work within the bureaucracy and it rules them in a wholly undemocratic way. It is a system for organizing social power antipodal to democracy, as the etymology of the words indicates.

In democracy the locus of power is in the people. They may exercise it directly, as in the "pure" democracies of antiquity where citizens took turns acting as magistrate, judge, soldier. Or they may delegate it to persons

Democracy and Bureaucracy

The juxtaposition of democracy and bureaucracy calls attention to their antithetical characteristics. It raises the question of whether they can coexist without adversely affecting each other; or, rather, since we are committed to a free and democratic society, whether bureaucracy can be smoothly integrated into democracy.

If these are to be regarded as anything more than mere exhortations, the courts have a strong claim to be able to give them the force of law in appropriate instances. This process will inevitably result in some instances of so-called "judicial supremacy," not strictly compatible with the usual pattern of representative government. But where the power is exercised in the name of personal liberty, the price is not too high to pay. Protection of the great values set down in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as they have come to be interpreted is a task of sufficient importance in our society that some interference with the will of the legislature, done in a prudent and principled manner, can and should be tolerated and expected.

The record of the federal judiciary in the area of criminal law enforcement, both federal and state, is the most striking example of its greatest function, which is the protection of individual liberties against the encroachments of governmental power. One of our highest achievements is surely that we have seen fit to establish and further this institution of deliberate self-restraint within the governmental process. It is most important for the courts to continue this work in an era when, both at home and abroad, individual freedoms are placed in increasing jeopardy by the pressures of a mass society.

THURGOOD MARSHALL
1964
elected for public office, as in modern "representative" democracies — congressional or parliamentary. In either case, public officials are agents of the people and accountable to them for their public acts.

Viewed as a closed system — that is, without reference to outside control over the organization — bureaucracy has its locus of power in the top official, who is supreme within the bureaucracy. The bureau head assigns work and authority to those subordinate in rank to him. Commands are transmitted from the top down through clearly defined levels of authority; accountability is from the bottom up through the same channels. The final decision lies with the bureau head, and he is accountable to no one within the organization.

Obviously, as a power system bureaucracy is the twin of absolute monarchy and the obverse of democracy. It thus cannot but have some of the deleterious effects on the people who work in it that J.C. Mill attributed to absolute monarchy. "Their passivity is implied," he wrote, "in the very idea of absolute power." And he asks, "What sort of human beings can be formed under such a regimen?" This to me is the major problem in any effort to integrate bureaucracy into our democratic society.

Implicit in democracy is the correlation of liberty and responsibility. A citizen is a person with private rights and public duties. In an oversimplified way, one could say that he safeguards his private liberties by conscientiously attending to his public responsibilities. Democracy will not function well unless at least a majority of citizens recognize this correlation and act accordingly. Individual rights will be lost unless they are, as it were, earned by each generation through active and intelligent participation in public affairs. The very qualities in man that are needed in the citizen of a democracy tend to be stunted by life in and under bureaucracy.

The existence of bureaucracy in the midst of a democratic society raises a further question. How can persons outside the bureaucracy, who depend on its services or are just subject to its regulations, exert the influence that under our political philosophy inheres in the sovereign people, especially now that the bureaucracy is armed with public-relations techniques that can be misused to hide the truth from the people? Bureaucracy thus often becomes extraordinarily resistant to public criticism and unresponsive to any public demand that it alter its practices or otherwise reform itself. It can be made accountable to the people only through the general government. The manner in which the general government controls the bureaucracy is thus crucially important. Since the growth of bureaucracy was not foreseen by the Constitution-makers, they made no provision for its relationship to the general government.

It is left to us to strike a new balance between individual liberty and the requirements of a society now dominated by bureaucracy in the public and the private sphere.

Democracy is not merely a political system; it partakes of the elements of a faith. Its first commandment may be expressed in the Kantian imperative: "Every man is to be respected as an absolute end in himself; and it is a crime against the dignity that belongs to him as a human being to use him as a mere means for some external purpose."

As it is structured, bureaucracy all too easily permits men to be used for the ends of the organization in ways that diminish the liberties they are supposed to enjoy in our free society. Not infrequently, these ends may in fact be merely the personal predilection of the man at the top who come to think of the organization as their property. This is the crime par excellence of pure administrators whose sense of worth comes from their position in the hierarchy alone. It is less prevalent among men who are true professionals, who are allowed to function as professionals, and who owe their status to their own merit. The more we professionalize bureaucracy, the more democratic it will become. A hierarchy based purely on merit diminishes no man.

The right to be judged only by one's own peers is or should be "inalienable." This could be our own distinctive contribution to the problem of fitting bureaucracy into democracy.

HYMAN G. RICKOVER
1964

"Under the veils of corporate law there is potentially another branch of the public government"
—SCOTT BUCHANAN
James Roosevelt, Secretary General of Peacem in Terris II.

Below, Sir Zafrulla Kahn, Pakistan, and Chief S. O. Adebo, Nigeria, participants in the convocation.

Bottom, the opening of a dialogue in Center’s conference room.
area where one can see only shadowy lines of research and study, lines that at present pass through knots of paradoxes. What about the lines of authority, responsibility, loyalty, and consent that pass from the Defense Department to the General Electric Company or General Motors, from them to the International Union of Electrical Workers and the United Automobile Workers, and from them to the citizen worker? These lines are the traces of contracts made by corporate bodies, and their junctures are conflicts of laws that reach constitutional foundations, economic conflicts that are loaded with weights of welfare and security, and moral dilemmas to paralyze citizens. We have watched congressional committees test these lines at various points and trespass on fundamental law in their attempt to find new statutes. Then there are the tax courts that cast doubt on all charitable corporations because tax evaders have invented corporate labyrinth for the charity that begins at home.

These are the deeper, almost invisible processes that work behind corporate veils; and the individual sees a conspirator in every neighbor and suspects himself when he looks in the mirror because he does not know the underground network that he joins when he buys, contracts, or gets a job. It is no wonder that we project this habitual suspicion on the giant public corporations with which we fight cold and hot wars.

It was from a like suspicion and an accompanying fear of civil war that Thomas Hobbes in seventeenth-century England made two prophetic observations on the new-style corporations that were then exploring and organizing the new world. He said they were "worms in the body politic," and that they were "chips off the block of sovereignty." By the first he meant that they were private associations that were taking on a kind of spontaneous autonomy in their parasitical way of life; by the second he meant that they were no longer mercantile arms of the state, but had taken some of the power of the government into their own management. He was foreseeing what we have come to recognize as the corporate veils and legal fictions under which corporations carry on their vital private governments. Our courts have become familiar with certain procedures in corporation law which they call "piercing the corporate veils." The purpose of this procedure is to discover and designate the individual responsibility for obscure and puzzling corporate behavior which may be touched with public interest.

Now that we have realized many of the possibilities that Hobbes only suspected, it might be well if we looked through the corporate veils to the political realities that have been developed in private corporate operation and have filled the empty spaces and thickened the lines of our public constitutional liberties. The analogy between public and private governments suggests the application of two principles of federal government as criteria for judging the legitimacy and health of corporate bodies. The Constitution says that the federal government assures to each constituent state a republican form of government. It may be recalled that this was the alternative chosen in place of the direct exercise of police power as a check on undue growth or irresponsible use of state and factional powers against the federal government. In effect this constitutional provision implies that the justice and freedom not only of the individual state but also of the whole community will be secured if the orderly processes of republican government are assured to the constituent parts. It would be important to find out whether republican forms of government are assured to and upheld by our respective corporations.

The other principle is the now much misused principle of state rights, that the states retain all rights not explicitly delegated to the federal government. The principle might better be stated and understood as the principle of federation; namely, that there should be explicit formal recognition of the separate powers, rights, and duties of the parts of government. It is the chief genius of our government that this principle has been honored in the original allocation of powers and that it has been extended beyond its original meaning in the discovery and recognition of the implied powers. On the other hand, we have not been able to see the principle working under the veils of corporation law, where there is potentially another branch of the public government.

The charters of private corporations are remarkably reticent concerning the rules required for their internal government; each corporation improves its bylaws and its table of organization beyond the minimal requirement that there be a president, a vice-president, a treasurer, and a secretary. When charitable corporations grow in size and function they tend to differentiate their organs and function more or less in the pattern of their predecessor and mother, the Church. They provide for executive, legislative, and even judicial divisions. The business corporation shows, on the other hand, the pattern of an amoeba increasing to the size of a whale, but with no sharp differentiation of organs—either this or a series of fissions and fusions into colonies, such as the parts of General Motors, each with strong oligarchic control within and weak federal connections with each other. It may be that there is still the implication of oligarchy in a plutocracy, and an incompatibility with democracy, but it would be interesting to see if replacing the Sherman Anti-trust Act by the assurance of a republican form of government to all private corporations would not take the strain off the heavily pressed executive and hasten the present tendency of the business corporation to accept more community responsibilities.

SCOTT BUCHANAN 1965

Interference With Business

B

usiness has brought on itself most of the intervention of government. The income tax started out as a very simple tax. Now it is bewildering, because businessmen discovered a lot of loopholes and these had to be plugged. We didn't have a pure food and drug agency in this country until somebody started putting out bad food. We didn't have an anti-trust law until business started to misuse monopoly. We didn't have restrictive
ties are received from a paternalistic class has forsaken such a commitment. Political participation, and the middle class has not been notable in defending the liberties: the middle class, while tolerant in informal social relationships, has been unable to exercise the decision-makers accountable. If the corporation is ever to be considered a “representative” institution, it will have to be clear who is representing whom by doing what. A prison warden does not represent the seals because he responds to their need for fresh fish. A prison warden does not represent the inmates because he consults them on recreational activities. Similarly, the corporation community is not internally democratic. The middle-class corporate employee must live with the hope and faith that he will be provided for, especially because he has no union.

Third, impersonal corporate interests are replacing personal interests. The continuance of government is not dependent on the existence and participation of a propertied middle class. Government in America will carry on despite the weakening of political parties and the indifference of citizens. But while the constitutional forms will remain the same, such a government may not be democratic in the traditional sense. For, as the participation of individual members of the middle class declines, the participation of the corporation for which these people work increases. As the corporation gives its middle-class employees a community to identify with, and an immunity from politics, it is itself obtaining even more direct access to the higher reaches of the parties and the government. And corporate interests are real interests in the Madisonian sense. Corporations know what kind of legislation, what kind of political officeholder, and what kind of social environment help or hinder their operations. Today the spokesman of the corporation in the political arena is the ambassador from one government — in this case a private government — to another.

By all outward appearances the emerging middle class is content with corporate citizenship and is not being bothered by the fact that political affairs are in the hands of others. Yet is this really the case? Certain studies of the new suburb, such as that of a Toronto development by John R. Seeley and his colleagues, show that the incidence of neurosis, the conflict in values, and the feeling of helplessness are endemic; a sense of isolation and powerlessness is having profound social and psychological effects on the members of the middle class. No one will claim that problems of mental health can be cured by political participation, but the democratic assumption has always been that self-government can create the conditions in which mental and moral health are most likely to flourish. The middle class, in divorcing itself from politics and in making itself dependent on the largess of corporate institutions, has weakened itself immeasurably. If a crisis arises, even a relatively mild one, can we be sure that this group will continue to adhere to democratic values?

In the final analysis, however, it is the development of characteristic institutions which most deeply affects human behavior in societies. At one time the institution might be the church, at another it might be the military; it might be the rising city or the opening frontier. In our time the characteristic institution is the corporation. The emerging middle class is a corporate creation. The corporation has raised these people from a lower stratum and has endowed them with a middle-class self-image and middle-class expectations. The corporation has transformed the small town and has brought the suburb into being. It has ironed out sectional differences and made us into a nation. But national citizenship remains an unworkable concept because the individual requires a smaller group setting if he is to achieve a sense of community. Therefore the corporation, pragmatically and hesitantly, is devising its own substitutes: the corporate community and corporate citizenship. These have erased the need for political participation on the part of the very people who have always been the prime participants in the political process. The corporation has certainly not set out to weaken the foundations of democratic politics, but its growth as the characteristic institution of our time is having this consequence.

J. IRWIN MILLER
1962

Corporate Citizenship

There are several dangers inherent in the renunciation of politics. First, if the emerging middle class is unable to fill the role in politics that has been traditionally assigned to it, we will be confronted with a vacuum in political leadership. This void will be most apparent, at the outset, at the state and local level. Certainly this has been the tragedy in the South. The moderate and law-abiding people are members of the middle class, and an increasing number of them are corporation employees. Because they want to remain respectable and avoid controversy, because they have no real interest in the outcome of the conflict over segregation, because they are ill-suited to play any role of consequence in party politics, they have been unable to exercise an influence for freedom and justice in a critical situation. The same may be said of the North in the area of civil liberties: the middle class, while tolerant in informal social relationships, has not been notable in defending the freedom of dissident groups and individuals. Such a defense would require political participation, and the middle class has forsaken such a commitment.

Second, the idea of corporate citizenship is non-democratic. The bounties are received from a paternalistic organization which is responsive to the
The effect of advanced technology on human beings is better observed in the United States than anywhere else.

— GERALD SYKES

The New Salvation

Man rushes first to be saved by technology, and then to be saved from it. We Americans are front-runners in both races. The United States led the world away from small wheat fields and toward big ones, away from outhouses and toward toilets, away from the virgin forest and toward the pulp mill, away from scarcity and toward abundance, away from a few loaves of bread that were nutritious and toward many loaves of bread that are not, away from the peasant and toward the factory worker, away from the child of nature and toward the quiz kid. Now a few Americans want to go not in the other direction but toward an intelligent use of their new advantages that permits them to find abundance in their personal lives, lives that have not been processed out of genuineness or fulfillment. It seems like a reasonable wish. Actually, it is a presumptuous wish, which may never be granted, even to the most intelligent. The many catches to progress are not very easily shaken off.

The effect of advanced technology on human beings is better observed in the United States than anywhere else, because Americans have been exposed to it more nakedly, more eagerly than anyone else. Most people relish their opportunities and do not ask difficult questions about them. The vast majority are as pleased and as thoughtless as a child with a candy bar. A few of them, however, look for ways to be saved from their savior. And then they, too, are offered a new salvation by the many. And most of the specially gifted few accept it.

Americans have not been protected against improved technique by traditional culture; they have been uprooted, in a manner that has not yet been put into the language of ideology, by the real revolution of our time, and they have had to develop insights and resources that are quite new. There are many ethical dilemmas in every American's life. One of them is that the American can now have more power than he or his ancestors ever had before—power to cure disease, to live longer, to be rich, to travel, to acquire more knowledge, to transform himself from provincial to world citizen, at least in information. But if he obtains this new power—and it is all but impossible for him, if he has talent, to avoid obtaining it—a social demand will be put upon him. He will be required (all quite impersonally, of course; no pact between Faust and Mephistopheles, or anything medieval like that) to use symbols—verbal symbols, words—in a way that his society desires. His society is committed to turnover, to production and consumption in ever-increasing amounts. And words are more important now to turn over than things. Merchandising is of greater value to the economy than manufacture, which can be handed over to robots or semi-robots. Craftsmanship has become vestigial.

The gifted American, then, must learn how to merchandise his talents. His talents must be bought, or else he will "starve"—get enough to eat perhaps but share none of the prestige or excitement of the new society. Today we do not live Platonically off slave labor, or Benedictinely on a feudal farm, or Jeffersonianly next door to wilderness; we live Madisonianly by the sale of our wits. And our wits must be packaged attractively or they go unnoticed. Our wits express themselves in symbols, but the symbols must seem real if anyone is to pay real dollars for them. If this means that symbols must be aimed at customers, at the worst and weakest in customers, so that a steady stream of real dollars may be obtained (and it does mean just this, with mathematical precision), we begin to understand an inherent ethical catch in the new technical order, its obligation to rely on the misuse of symbols.

This catch is most obvious in politics and commerce, but it also exists in art and science. In academic life it usually takes discrete forms: excessive specialization, excessive avoidance of value-judgments, and similar devices of shrewd hedging and unnoticed secession from the concerns of other men. These evasions of responsibility become inevitable as soon as morality becomes social, not personal. In a highly technicalized society morality becomes more and more social and less and less personal. It is easier to fool society than one's inner voice, as long as that anachronism remains audible.

GERALD SYKES
1966

The Ecological Problem

My own view is that only by shifting our collective attention from the merely political to the basic biological aspects of the human situation can we hope to mitigate and shorten the time of troubles into which, it would seem, we are now moving. We cannot do without politics, but we can no longer afford to indulge in bad, unrealistic politics. To work for the survival of the species as a whole and for the actualization in the greatest possible number of individual men and women of their potentialities for good will, intelligence, and creativity—this, in the world of today, is good, realistic politics. To cultivate the religion of idolatrous nationalism, to subordinate the interests of the species and its individual members to the interests of a single national state and its ruling minority—in the context of the population explosion, missiles, and atomic warheads, this is bad and
the best nation? The best religion? The best political theory? The best result of arguments about such foresting a denuded mountain. But ing wheat in a cold climate or of re-
tionalistic idolatry. There may be those violent passions always associ-
problems of ecology, on the other hand, admit of a rational solution and can be tackled without the arousal of three billion men, women, and children, who will soon be six billion, to lead a tolerably human existence without, in the process, ruining and befouling their planetary environment.

Power politics in the context of nationalism raises problems that, except by war, are practically insoluble. The problems of ecology, on the other hand, admit of a rational solution and can be tackled without the arousal of those violent passions always associated with dogmatic ideology and nationalistic idolatry. There may be arguments about the best way of raising wheat in a cold climate or of reforesting a denuded mountain. But such arguments never lead to organized slaughter. Organized slaughter is the result of arguments about such questions as the following: Which is the best nation? The best religion? The best political theory? The best form of government? Why are other people so stupid and wicked? Why can’t they see how good and intelligent we are? Why do they resist our beneficent efforts to bring them under our control and make them like ourselves?

To questions of this kind the final answer has always been war. “War,” said Clausewitz, “is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relationships, a carrying out of the same by other means.” This was true enough in the eighteen-thirties, when Clausewitz published his famous treatise; and it continued to be true until 1945. Now, pretty obviously, nuclear weapons, long-range rockets, nerve gases, bacterial aerosols, and the “laser” (that highly promising, latest addition to the world’s military arsenals) have given the lie to Clausewitz. All-out war with modern weapons is no longer a continuation of previous policy; it is a complete and irreversible break with previous policy.

Power politics, nationalism, and dogmatic ideology are luxuries that the human race can no longer afford. Nor, as a species, can we afford the luxury of ignoring man’s ecological situation. By shifting our attention from the now completely irrelevant and anachronistic politics of nationalism and military power to the problems of the human species and the still inchoate politics of human ecology we shall be killing two birds with one stone — reducing the threat of sudden destruction by scientific war and at the same time reducing the threat of more gradual biological disaster.

Aldous Huxley
1963

Breathless Achievement

The very principle of economic calculus leads us to persistent understatement of the role of natural forces. National accounting, as well as private accounting, pictures financial transactions occurring between human beings. It follows that all human procurement from nature figures in accounting at the mere labor cost of such procurement. This is equivalent to the accounting of a pirate economy. The goods filched from captured ships are taken into account only at the cost of capture.

Not only does this underestimate the role played in our gain in productivity by the increasing recruitment of natural forces but it also blinds us to the vast difference between the ways in which we have resorted to natural forces. We can use natural agents in such a way as to leave their flow unimpaired, as, for example, the natural impetus of a river providing the power for a mill. Or we can use them in such a way as to cause their degradation, but with the assurance that an equilibrating process will restore them to their former state, as, for example, when we use an inflow of oxygen and give out carbonic oxides which, however, are broken down again by the inverse operation achieved by photosynthesis. Finally, we can draw upon a resource in such a way as to transform it into an “anti-resource.” This is what we do when we delve into coal or oil; we obtain energy from them and change them into atmospherically polluting products or by-products.

The question is frequently asked: How many years of rapidly increasing consumption can be met from the earth’s easily accessible stores of combustible materials? But another question can be asked: How bad will the atmosphere become by the conversion of these stores? Each of us has his dreams and his nightmares about the future of mankind. One of my nightmares is the result that can come from wasting the store of oxygen that the work of vegetable nature has accumulated for us throughout millions of years.

Perhaps the most profitable outcome of our ventures into space is to drive home the problem of maintaining for the venturers, within their capsule, a livable environment against the deterioration of that environment by the mere metabolic processes of the cosmonauts. It may be hoped that the problem will suggest the idea that the cosmonauts’ capsule is a miniature of the immensely larger capsule in space that our earth and its atmosphere constitute. Within the former — the micro-capsule — the volume of
the environment stands in such a ra-
tio that the rudest transformations of
it by the natural metabolism of its
population would possibly make the
capsule unlivable unless regenerative
processes were organized to preclude
such a deterioration as would bring
about suffocation. In the case of the
macro-capsule, the problem of at-
tending to regenerative processes has
not been faced. It did not hitherto
have to be faced because of the rela-
tion of the environmental capacity to
the population. For example, it is an
easily solved problem for the Eskimo
to get the smoke out of his igloo and
he need not worry where the smoke
goes after it escapes. In some ways
we still think like the Eskimo, be-
cause the problem that fumes create
in the Los Angeles agglomeration
could be thought of as satisfactorily
solved if powerful blowers could be
set up to expel the fumes away from
the area in which they originate. But
as we come to realize that all forms
of life upon earth take place within a
macro-capsule, we also realize that all
the noxious by-products of metabo-
lism accumulate unless broken down.
And this accumulation promises us
ultimate suffocation.

BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL
1966

Idiot Efficiency

The most critical charge I would
level at technological pessimists is
that for them, “technique” is the one
efficient way of doing things which
leads, irresistibly and finally, to a
single technical solution. Efficiency is
thus a purely quantitative and unam-
biguous measure. But I would call
such efficiency by a different name:
“idiot efficiency.”

In economics and social engineer-
ing, efficiency is a weasel word which
tends to obscure a multitude of hu-
man values. When is any social or
economic system “efficient”? No
doubt the idiot technician will answer:
when every factor is organized ac-
cording to an expert plan and im-
plemented by an omniscient command
and control center. But as working

men have recognized for generations,
“working to rule” is one of the best
ways to gum up an economy. When
everybody works to rule — no more,
no less, and no differently — the sys-
tem falls apart. So, in the West, we
have learned the value of seeking ef-

ciency by way of consensus, by way
of encouraging a sense of participa-
tion, initiative, and high morale
among citizens, as producers, con-
sumers, or voters. To be sure, gov-
erning elites, by and large, still seek to
engineer consensus and, in a variety
of clever ways, to render freedom and
initiative illusory. But why bother
with the whole intricate hypocrisy of
manipulated consensus unless one
recognizes that the illusions meet real
human needs and that it is actually
more “efficient” to cater to those
needs than to crush them?

A truly efficient social system—
one that is stable, enduring, secure,
productive — works with the grain of
human needs and not against it. Thus,
efficiency is not a purely quantita-
tive measure, but a profoundly qualita-
tive one. An efficient technological
society, like an efficient machine shop
or office, is ultimately one that cares
for the quality of life, for the free-
dom, initiative, and playfulness of
the human animal that participates in
the enterprise. The fact that idiot ef-
ficiency crushes these qualities is un-
deniable and tragic. But there is also
the fact — perhaps the only fact from
which one can take consolation and
inspiration — that idiot efficiency stagn-
ates and frustrates, subverts and
destroys, the systems it creates. Ulti-
mately, those who play forbidden
games lose them, and the ruins their
loss frequently leaves us with invari-
ably offer an opportunity to rebuild
a more natural and livable society.

While one would have to be a fool
to believe that all is bound to turn out
for the best, it may be the case that
(for better or worse, and usually for
the better) the world is really a great
deal less organized and under control
than its official leadership would have
us believe. There is apt to be an
immense difference between the way a
society really works and the way in
which its domineering elite believes it
works and wants it to work.

THEODORE ROSZAK
1966

“The vast fuss
today about
improvements in
blacktown is not
aimed at
integration”
— W. H. FERRY

Farewell to Integration

My proposition is that racial in-
tegration in the United States is im-
possible. I set forth this proposition
without qualification. There are no
hidden unlesses, buts, or ifs in it. I
shall not deny that — in some remote
future — integration may come about.
But I do not see it resulting from the
actual present trends and attitudes in
American society. It can only be pro-
duced by some event overturning these
trends. There is no denial in this
proposition that there will be a steady
betterment in the material situation
of blacks. This is even likely. My prop-
osition does, nevertheless, contradict
the words of President Johnson that
“the promise of America” will be ex-
tended to all races and peoples in
the nation’s slums.

My proposition is sad. Like tens of
thousands of other Americans I have
supported, organized, and taken part
in reformist projects, with integration
always beckoning at the end of weary
labors. Now such activities must be
seen as nothing more than acts of
good will, rather like Peace Corps ex-
peditions into an undeveloped country
that look toward the welfare and ma-
terial progress of the natives but not
to their integration with the homeland.

My proposition, in short, smashes the liberal dream. It eliminates the democratic optimistic claim that we are finding our way to a harmonious blending of the races. It changes the words of the marching song to "We Shall Not Overcome," for what was eventually to be overcome was hostility and non-fraternity between black and white. My proposition dynamites the foundations of the N.A.A.C.P., the Urban League, and similar organizations. It asserts that blacktown U.S.A. and whitetown U.S.A., for all practical purposes and with unimportant exceptions, will remain separate social communities for as long as one can see ahead. I am not sure, but it may also mean that blacktown will become a separate political community.

The proposition, I am aware, lends support to Southerners who have been acting on it for hundreds of years. It would seem to place me in the camp of the bigots and locate me with the racists. It does not concern me very much that those despairing whites now want to play Jove and punish their fellow-whites. What bothers me is the temerity of those whites who, in order to gratify whatever is eating them, are willing to prescribe for blacks — in some instances, to prescribe surrender of any hope of black betterment through measures short of violence, or to prescribe self-genocide for blacks, which is precisely how unremitting black-versus-white violence must end. If a Negro wishes to say farewell to integration or desegregation, or welcome Black Power or violence, then that is the prerogative of that individual — and not just because he is a black individual, but because he is an individual, either, but not just because he is a black individual.

No one has the right to give up on behalf of another man, least of all when the man giving up is white and the man he is giving up for is black. Blacks in this country have been sold out in a million ways, but this is a new, even less forgivable, fashion. Vicarious sympathy, empathetic rationalization, and the most faithful parroting of Negro expressions are no substitute for actually being black. White good will helps. White approximation of Negro sentiment helps. None of it — not even white precise imitation of Negro sentiment — is good enough.

Whites probably have as much business looking into the crystal ball as anyone, and if the subject of white-black relations is kept in the area of prognostications I am prepared to listen to whites as well as to blacks. In fact, I have no reluctance to do some predicting of my own. It must be obvious that two things, on the surface diametrically opposed, are going on today. Desegregation is taking place. Blacks are entering white America, in greater numbers and in greater percentages. To discount all that is happening, before the eyes of any who are willing to see, as nothing more than blacks turning into whites because they have made it into white America, is to forfeit the claim to serious consideration. At the same time, black separation is going on.

Those blacks entering white America are making it that much easier for other blacks to follow. Those who remain in the ghetto are, I predict, going to produce some very desirable citizens — desirable to both black and white America, for they will be stronger, more self-assured human beings. With this sort of dual process going on, I have to ask how dare anyone raise a white staying hand to the possibilities of integration? No white has the right to say to a black that he can or cannot, must or must not, enter white America. The black man, and only he, is entitled to decide.

JOHN L. PERRY
1968

Black Power

What is now happening in Detroit, I think, is typical in at least one way of black communities throughout America: it represents the determination of the black people to control their own community. This marks a new day for black people. Wherever the black revolution is in progress, specific steps have to be taken to structure a transfer of power from the white community to the black community. The white community apparently finds this painful and distasteful, but it is a necessity if there is to be any peaceful resolution of the kind of conflict that shook America last summer and the two preceding summers. The black community is growing increasingly determined that it must control its own destiny. In the simplest terms this means political control of all areas in which black people
are a majority — control of community services, police services, and all the things that go to make up a community and that black people do not now control in Detroit or in any other urban center.

The idea that I would advocate a racist approach to a solution of the black man's problems seemed unthinkable to many respectable, responsible black leaders. But this feeling has grown less and less as the years have gone by. In Cleveland, which is much less organized and much less militant and much less black-conscious than Detroit, all but four per cent of the black community supported a black candidate without any feeling that they were in any way negating the basic principles of American good government.

This indicates to me that something basically important is happening to the black community throughout America: black people have tended to sever their identification with the white community and to become alienated from America. They no longer want to be part of the white man's society; they have ceased to accept the white man's standards of what is good or bad. This is a total rejection of integration as an ideal or an objective. Instead, the black man is trying to recapture a sense of identification with his own cultural heritage. This involves the rediscovery of Africa, the development of black consciousness, black pride, black unity, and at least the beginning of the development of black power.

White people killed the myth and the dream of integration, about which Dr. King spoke so eloquently. Black people listened, but then the dream what we do not have power enough we have power enough to take, and nurture their own past, their own culture, their own history, and to put the race issue on the basis of a power struggle pure and simple.

We will take in this country what we have power enough to take, and what we do not have power enough to take we will stop dreaming about. We will try to build power to take the things we have to have. This is the only kind of equality there is — an equality based on power. We are concerned primarily with our own black community. We are not trying to invade white communities, or take over white communities. But we do insist that white people cannot enjoy the luxury of separating us into black ghettos and also enjoy the privilege of exploiting us in these ghettos they have forced us into.

ALBERT CLEAGE
1968

Guilt and Forgiveness

From time to time we hear that one Negro spokesman or another is obsessed, or unbalanced, or hysterical in his approach to the race problem. I have no doubt that there are such cases. But all of us are more or less guilt-ridden, lacking in health, our characters corroded by living in a caste society. If it is hard to be black in such a society, it is also hard to be white. For to be a white man in a segregated society, at least today, is to live in nameless fear and isolation and withdrawal from a whole sector of one's fellow-citizens. Segregation means that the holding back of friendship has become institutionalized. The spiritual unhealthiness in it derives from the fact that it is easier in such a society to withhold love than to give love. This is the definition of a serious sickness. It afflicts all of us.

We are schizophrenic about the claims put forth as our "American" philosophy. Our deed does not match our creed; our history does not fit in with our doctrine; our moral claims do not jibe with our actual traditions. If in textbooks there is a kind of man known as an American who lives in a land where freedom and equality are the heritage of all, the fact is that no such man has ever lived, North or South. This much we have to admit.

But now that the moment of truth has arrived, what will be our reaction? We whites can perhaps learn to live in fear of the violence that may spring up at any hour — and in time our fear will inevitably turn to hate. Negroes can perhaps live with resentment eating away at their natural friendliness. They may even learn to comfort themselves with the strange, foreign doctrines of a reverse racism. They can perhaps learn to live without hope, but with a certain fierce private pride, in a land peopled by "white devils" and satanic forces. But who calls that living? Hatred can be swollen on both sides. We can, both groups, learn to live with each other in a state of permanent hostility. We can, in a word, exist in a kind of racist hell. "Hell is not to love any more" (George Bernanos).

But what, in our best moments, do we seek? The status quo is clearly unacceptable. A return to the ugly past is out of the question. We have no choice but to change. How such a change will take place, and what the nature of it will be, depends on leaders, black and white, working together to lead the people, black and white. It is not easy for the dominant whites to acknowledge their ancient guilt, a guilt borne more or less by all. It is not easy for the oppressed blacks to forgive. But what other choice do we have?

JOHN COGLEY
1963

Breaking the Law

I do not believe that one ever has the right to civil disobedience. Rather, one has something much more profound, and that is the duty to be a civil disobedient with the objective of revealing inconsistencies in the society and of correcting them. The willingness of a civil disobedient to accept suffering cheerfully is one of the most important ways of getting other people to think about the wrongs of society. Therefore, those who have engaged in civil disobedience have asked their people most of the following questions and have expected a "yes" to each.

Number 1: Are you attempting, rather than merely to break a law, to adhere conscientiously to a higher principle in the hope that the law you break will be changed and that new law will emerge on the basis of that higher principle?

Number 2: Have you engaged in the democratic process and exercised the constitutional means that are
available before engaging in the breaking of law? One cannot possibly say that Negroes a hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation have no right to engage in civil disobedience when every Negro leader for at least fifty years has been struggling to get some semblance of justice for his people, and until the last ten years struggling unsuccessfully. When Negroes engage in civil disobedience they cannot truthfully answer this question with, "Yes, we have not only used but exhausted every possibility under the law to establish justice."

For the young rebels today a variation of the question must be posed: Is what you conceive so monstrous that you do not believe there is time for dealing with it by constitutional means? Their answer to this question is "yes" because they say that they do not want to see American boys dying who do not understand what is happening in the Far East; they do not want to see American boys burning huts with women and children in them. I have said to these young people that they make too much of American brutality. The Vietcong is the battling Pakistanis and Indians, equally brutal. Whether one is among the law of violence is such that each side becomes equally vicious. To try to distinguish between which is more vicious is to fail to recognize the logic of war. It is war that is the evil, not the Vietcong, not the United States.

**Number 3:** Have I removed ego as much as it is possible to do so? That is to say, am I on this march because I want to get my picture in the paper, or because I'm just mad at society, or because my mother doesn't want me to do this and I'll show her? Or am I here for impersonal, objective reasons?

**Number 4:** Do the people whom I ask to rebel feel there is a grievous wrong involved, and does my own rebellion help them to bring to the surface the inner feelings that they have not previously dared to express?

**Number 5:** Am I prepared to accept the consequences of my acts? Throughout the civil-rights struggle I myself have fought against lying in the streets and being carried off by the police. When the policeman taps me on the shoulder and says, "You are under arrest," I believe I strengthen my ability to educate the people in the South who disagree with me by answering, "Yes, officer, I have broken the law because I believe it is wrong. I am perfectly willing to go with you. I do not want you to carry me." And when I get to the judge I want to say to him, "I have done what society feels is wrong. I accept the punishment."

**Number 6:** Am I attempting to bring about a new social order by my rebellion, or a new law that is better than the one that now exists?

And the seventh and final question that one must ask springs from Kant's categorical imperative: Would the world be a better place if everybody, not just in my country and not just those who are black, but everyone in the world did likewise? Obviously, if everyone in the world were prepared to burn his draft card, war would not be possible.

Bayard Rustin 1966

**To Live as Men**

Hannah Arendt has observed that violence occurs where there are no politics. In the present circumstances the great likelihood is indeed just that — that whites will respond with ugly violence to the Negro struggle. They cannot respond politically or philosophically, much less spiritually, because they have nothing to say about who they themselves are or what they want as free men.

The great, the urgent need is to create a genuine political movement among whites that has the passion of the Negro movement. What the whites need to do is to go into their own communities and organizations and there clash with other whites over the issues, freeing themselves of their whiteness — that peculiar complex of guilt, anger, and fear that few whites recognize in themselves and even fewer have begun to explore. Until this happens, the Negro struggle must remain one of Negroes against whites.

Grace Lee 1963

"It is said that one cannot love another nation... but it is not true with respect to the people of another nation."

— Paul Tillich

Most differences about the problems of peace are rooted ultimately in different interpretations of human nature and consequently of the meaning of history. At this point I must speak both as a Protestant theologian and as an existentialist philosopher. I see human nature determined by the conflict between the goodness of man's essential being and the ambiguity of his actual being, his life, under the conditions of existence. The goodness of his essential nature gives him his greatness, his dignity, the demand, embodied in him, to be acknowledged as a person. On the other hand, the predicament in which he finds himself, the estrangement from his true being, drives him in the opposite direction, preventing him from fulfilling in actual life what he essentially is. It makes all his doings, and all that which is done by him, ambiguous, bad as well as good. For his will is ambiguous, good as well as bad. And one should not appeal to "all men of good will" as the papal encyclical *Pacem in Terris* does. One should appeal to all men, knowing that in the best there is an element of bad will.
Senator William Fulbright meets the press at Center's University in America convocation (left).
Walter Lippmann and Justice William Douglas (below) at same convocation.
Center Fellows at dialogue (bottom).
and that in the worst will there is an element of good will. This view of the ambiguity of man's moral nature has direct consequences for the way a peace conference should look at the chance for a future state of peace.

It should distinguish genuine hope from utopian expectations. The bearers of hope in past and present had and have to learn this, mostly the hard way. The classical book of hope, the Old Testament, is a history of broken and revived hope. Its foundation was in the first place the belief in divine act, in the second, the confidence in man's right response to it. In both respects it was disappointed. "My ways are not your ways," says God, through the prophet, to the disappointed; and nothing is more often expressed in the prophets than the unreliable character of the people, who turn away from the covenant which justified this hope. Nevertheless, a genuine hope remained in Israel up to today and kept the nation alive.

There is a profound analogy between the history of the religious hope in Israel and the history of the secular hope in the Western world from the great utopias of the Renaissance up to our day. In the movements which were striving for a state of peace and justice in modern times, hope was partly based on the belief in a universal law of progress, partly on the belief in man's growing reasonableness. Both hopes were disappointed, perhaps most profoundly in the first half of our century. We cannot close out longer to the fact that every gain produced—for example, by scientific and technical progress—implies a loss, and that every good achieved in history is accompanied by a shadow, an evil which uses the good and distorts it. And we know just through our better understanding of man's personal and social life that human reason is not only determined by the natural laws of reason but also by the dark elements in his total being which struggle against reason. In view of the two main examples for this predicament of man, the ambiguity of blessing and curse in the scientific penetration into the atomic structure of the universe, and the well-reasoned outbreak of destructive anti-rationality in Hitlerism and Stalinism, it is understandable that hopelessness has grasped large masses in the Western nations, especially the youth.

But there are not only utopian expectations, there is also genuine hope in our time and in what we are trying to do—here and now—just as in the men of the Old Testament. A realistic view of man and history need not lead to cynicism. But it may often ask for hope against hope, and certainly it demands the courage to risk, even if failure is more probable than success.

Where then lies the difference between utopian expectations and genuine hope? The basis for genuine hope is that there is something present of that which is hoped for, as in the seed something of the coming plant is present, while utopian expectations have no ground in the present. So we must ask: Which are the seeds out of which a future state of peace can develop?

The first basis for genuine hope is something negative, which, however, can have and partly has had positive effects—the atomic threat and the fear of mutual destruction. The limited peace forced upon us by the threat is in itself merely negative. But it does something which is somehow positive; it makes the conflicting groups of mankind feel that there is mankind with a common destiny. This experience of "community of fear" is still weak and easily overwhelmed by a stronger feeling of national and ideological conflict. But it does exist.

A second basis of genuine hope for peace is the technical union of mankind by the conquest of space. Of course, nearness can intensify hostility; and the fact that the first manifestation of the technical oneness of our world was two world wars proves this possibility. But nearness can also have the opposite effect. It can change the image of the other as strange and dangerous; it can reduce self-affirmation and effect openness for other possibilities of human existence and, particularly as in the encounter of the religions, other possibilities of genuine faith.

A third basis of genuine hope for peace is the increasing number of cross-national and cross-ideological fields of cooperation, some of them desirable (as, for example, exchange in the humanities and religion), some of them essential (as, for example, collaboration in the sciences), some of them necessary for the future of mankind (as, for example, the problems of food, medicine, overpopulation, conservation of nature).

A fourth basis of genuine hope is the existence and effectiveness, however limited, of a legal roof for all these types of limited groups. Man can extend the realm of hope, which nature cannot. He can establish a legal structure which guarantees peace among those who are subject to it—not absolutely but to a certain degree; not absolutely, for everyone subjected to the legal structure can break through it for his own interest or his conviction.

Therefore something more than the legal structure for peace is needed. Some have called it consensus. But it is not something as intellectual as this word indicates. It is communal eros, that kind of love which is not directed to an individual but to a group. It is said that one cannot love another nation. This may be true in relation to a national state, but it is not true with respect to the people of the other nation; one can have eros toward them in their uniqueness, their virtues, their contributions, in spite of their shortcomings and vices. It seems that no world community is possible without this eros which trespasses interest as well as law.

What can we hope for? First of all: we can only hope. We cannot calculate, we cannot know. The uncertainty remains. All the seeds of hope mentioned can be destroyed before they come to fulfillment. Further, there is no hope for a final stage of history in which peace and justice rule. History is not fulfilled at its empirical end, but history is fulfilled in the great moments in which something new is created, or, as one could express it religiously, in which the Kingdom of God breaks into history conquering destructive structures of existence, one of the greatest of which is war. This means that we cannot hope for a final stage of justice and peace within history; but we can hope for partial victories over the forces of evil in a particular moment of time.

PAUL TILLICH
1965
The tools with which we can evolve a “rule of law” into a more mature system are at hand. There lacks only the will to use them. Why do nations hold back? Why are we not willing to take the lead in inaugurating a truly golden age for international law? We could, I think, do it if we asserted the moral leadership of which we so often boast. We need more commitment and less lip service. World opinion is ready to be marshaled. Small nations quiver on the sidelines as they watch giant rivals spar, threaten, and shake their nuclear fists. The world is filled with such a sense of insecurity that for the first time in history solid foundations for a “rule of law” can be laid.

There are, of course, great gulfs between the law, customs, and mores which we of the West accept as normal and which other parts of the world practice. One of our major errors, as we emerged from a century and a half of isolationism, was to think of the world as if it were made in our image; at times we even thought that the non-conformists should be remade in our image.

The vast gulfs that exist between various world cultures mean that the common ground for world law will be narrow and selective. It starts, of course, with the rule against aggressive war, and it proceeds from there to all the stuff which treaties, contracts, commercial engagements, investments, travel, communication, and the like shape up into controversies. There are only limited areas where today we can rightfully say common ground can be found. Yet they are important, indeed critical ones; and they will expand as the peoples of the world work with their newly emerging institutions of law and gain confidence in them.

The arrival of disarmament and the end of war would not, of course, mean the advent of peace in the sense that there would be a disappearance of conflict. Great antagonisms would persist, disputes would continue, nations would press their claims for justice. Clash and conflict are present in every community. They exist in every community. They exist in every community. They exist in every community. They exist in every community. They exist in every community. They exist in every community. They exist in every community.

One of our most important tasks today is to clear the atmosphere so that men can understand their plight without hatred, without fury, without desperation, and with at least a minimum of good will. A humble and objective seriousness is necessary for the long task of restoring mutual confidence and preparing the way for the necessary work of collaboration in building world peace. This restoration of a climate of relative sanity is perhaps more important than specific decisions regarding the morality of a particular strategy or pragmatic policy.

In Pope John’s encyclical Pacem in Terris relatively little is said about war itself. The greater part of the encyclical concentrates on basic principles: the dignity of the human person and the primacy of the universal common good over the particular good of the political unit. Above all, Pope John realized that his main job was one of “clearing the air” morally, psychologically, and spiritually. To a world lost in a pea-soup fog of exhausting and intricate technicalities about law, economics, politics, weaponry, technology, and such, the Pope did not offer a series of casuistic solutions to complex and detailed questions. He recalled the minds of men to the fundamental ideas on which peace among nations and races must always depend. In other words, he tried to re-create for them the climate of thoughts in which they could see their objectives in a human and even a hopeful light, and invited them at least for a moment to emerge from the obscurity and smog of arguments that are without issue.

The world was grateful for this moment of fresh air. In political life, especially on the international level, the smallest gestures and advances toward peace should be accepted with gratitude. Many such gestures followed the publication of Pacem in Terris in 1963, so many in fact that there has been a significant relaxation of tensions, at least between the United States and Soviet Russia.

A weather map is necessarily very superficial. The storm areas in thought and opinion are not all concentrated on one side or the other of the Iron Curtain. On both sides extremists, characterized by negativism, distrust of the other side, suspicion, fear, hate, and the willingness to resort to force, are very outspoken and have access to the mass media so that their opinions often take on the appearance of quasi-dogmatic finality and are uncritically accepted, with a few unspoken reservations perhaps, by the majority of the population. Not that most men want war, or even willingly face the possibility that certain trends might lead suddenly to war, but they assume, in a guarded and more or less resigned silence, that the most menacing voices are probably right and that what is printed in most of the papers and shouted from most of the rooftops quite probably represents a more or less coherent interpretation of political reality.

They know that total war is always possible, yet they blindly and confusedly hope that what they refuse to think about is so “unthinkable” that it will never occur, and so they busy themselves with the absorbing rush of life and unconsciously withdraw from any kind of dissenting commitment that would leave them exposed to ostracism. They submit and conform, and trust to the protective coloring that conformity provides in a mass society. The current moral climate is one of more or less resigned compliance with the world-view popularized by the mass media.

Where there is a deep, simple, all-embracing love of man, of the created
world of living and inanimate things, then there will be respect for life, for freedom, for truth, for justice, and there will be humble love of God. But where there is no love of man, no love of life, then make all the laws you want, all the edicts and treaties, issue all the anathemas, set up all the safeguards and inspections, fill the air with spying satellites, and hang cameras on the moon. As long as you see your fellowman as a being essentially to be feared, mistrusted, hated, and destroyed, there cannot be peace on earth. And who knows if fear alone will suffice to prevent a war of total destruction? Pope John was not one of those who believe that fear is enough.

THOMAS MERTON
1965

The New Inequality

If institutional freedom could guarantee peace and welfare, we should be celebrating mankind’s golden age. On the eve of independence, independence appears to be a climax, the culmination of a dream. On the next day, on the morrow of the independence celebration, in the cold, hard, blue, hang-over atmosphere of dawn, it emerges that independence is simply a beginning and not an end. The flags are not enough. The coins and the stamps and the constitutions and the parliament and the embassies—all the glittering façade of institutional freedom—are not accompanied by any parallel liberation of peoples from their social and economic ills. Behind the new emblems of institutional freedom, millions continue to languish in squalor, exploitation, social backwardness. Men awaken to learn that they can be free in every institutional sense and yet lose the essence of their freedom in the throes of famine and want. The juridical equality between nations turns out to be an idle pretense. As the old inequality between sovereign nations and subject nations passes away, new emphasis is given to the existing new inequality between nations that have inherited the new abundance and those that merely see the promise without sharing in its fulfillment.

A few figures will illustrate how little the political equality between states is reflected in any other aspect of their lives. In the advanced Western countries the average life expectancy has reached sixty-seven to seventy-one; in Africa and Asia it stands at twenty-nine to thirty-six. In the United States the average per capita income was estimated a few years ago at twenty-five hundred dollars; in Western Europe it ranges from three hundred to one thousand; in Asia and Africa it is between forty to fifty dollars. In the West, industrialization goes forward in swift momentum. In the new states, it is impeded by a lack of basic technical skills, of power, of transport, and of the economic and social infrastructure necessary for fruitful investment. In few African or Asian territories has local industrial production begun to meet the requirements of the domestic market for consumer goods. The production of capital goods is in its infancy. None of the newly liberated territories has a balanced, diversified economy. Most of them still live in predominantly agricultural communities, held back by a lack of specialization and by primitive technology. Natural resources remain inadequately developed. The lack of momentum in the educational movement presents a wider acquisition of technical skills. Debilitating diseases continue to enfeeble the people and set a limit to production.

Today across Asia and Africa the leaders of new nations suddenly find themselves charged with a responsibility at once inspiring and forbidding. The problems they face cannot await the kind of solutions that evolve across many generations. The urgencies are acute; swift communications—radio, cinema, television—have brought the achievements and standards of Western societies to the knowledge of broader masses of the awakening people. The impulse to emulate, the unwillingness to make do as before, the tendency to abandon resignation and determinism, are increased by the new insight which these peoples have into the existence of a different way of life.

This also has its political effects. Most of the new nations—I confess to my surprise—have put their faith in democratic methods of government. In places where there is no literate electorate and no background of corporate social responsibility, with religious traditions that tend to be hierarchical, places where you would expect an authoritarian approach to government, there is an insistence on the forms, and sometimes on the content, of parliamentary government. Even the insistence on the form is significant. But unless democratic institutions can prove themselves responsive to the challenge of economic welfare they will fall into discredit and eclipse.

It is in this situation that the new leaders of new nations look around for a key to accelerated progress. Their eyes fall in expectancy on the contemporary scientific movement, with its record of immeasurable triumphs and its more radiant promise for future years. This is the point of intersection between the problems of new nations and the problems of scientific and technological development. It is fundamentally the exclusion of half the world from the industrial and scientific revolutions that is responsible for the disparity. It follows that if the disparity is to be corrected, a bridge must be built between the two worlds, the Western world of science and technology and the Eastern world of awakening nationalism.

The confusion is that the scientific and technological movement of the West holds the secret of those processes which are necessary for the economic, social, and cultural development of the new nations. What has happened, however, is that there are no two movements further apart than these two great movements which dominate our lives—the scientific movement of the West and the national movement of Africa and Asia. The contemporary movement of science and technological progress is not aware of having a special vocation to pursue in Africa and Asia. It can justly be said that science and technology today are mainly engaged in making the rich countries richer and the strong countries stronger.

ABBA EBAN
1966
THE NEW ANTI-AMERICANISM

In the nineteen-sixties, especially in the latter part of the decade, several forms of American protest, dissent, and radicalism came simultaneously into public view. They reinforced each other, and created a new spirit of native anti-Americanism—a heresy against the American creed in culture, politics, and economics—that seems to me to go beyond anything I have read about in our past.

I said the "American creed." Perhaps I should use instead the vague and rather fatuous phrase that was widely heard in the very different decade that preceded this one, and say that in the nineteen-sixties there was a new level of both serious criticism and nose-thumbing directed against the American Way of Life. A predominant mood of the sixties kicked the national pieties of the fifties in the seat of the pants. A significant part of the protest movement of the sixties also took up serious social reform and national self-criticism, again in contrast to the comparative complacency of the years that had gone before. And then toward the end of the decade there developed, on the Left, something else: a movement that went beyond irreverence, reform, and national self-criticism in the direction of what it called revolution. It stood in opposition not only to the national failings but also to the national ideals and established procedures. It was in protest not just against the fifties but against the whole sweep of the American experience, at least according to its most ferocious spokesmen. It stood in opposition not to particular injustices, not to the excesses of capitalism, not even precisely to American capitalism as a whole, but to the entire system, the entire, vaguely defined and virtually all-inclusive "Establishment"; in other words, not only to the specific faults of America but to America itself, including its moral core, constitutional procedures, and liberal democracy. As I write, the division between the reformers and these new revolutionaries is still taking shape, and meanwhile a reaction on the part of ordinary citizens against all this anti-Americanism is gathering strength. I write this on July 4th, with decals of the American flag on every other car that passes by.

Some of the feeder streams that flow into the flood-tide of dissent, protest, and radicalism in the sixties may be identified, at least symbolically, with decades of the past. To start with, we may say that the sixties saw the simultaneous return of the cultural protest of the twenties and the political-economic protest of the thirties.
the great stage of history came near the break of the Frederick Lewis Allen or Life magazine mode of history—may still come back tenaciously to the division of recent American experiences into decades. But an amateur—even though he has no stake in history if one looked at particular parts of the culture. In the Zeitgeist, and how differently one would divide through the years without reference to supposed shifts in the Zeitgeist, an historical rerun out of the fifties.) Norman Mailer advertised himself as strenuously in the fifties as in the sixties; one sign of the flavor of the sixties is that Mailer, who was the hero only of a peripheral best-seller in the middle fifties he was forgotten in the sixties. (It is more than a little unsettling to see him bobbing up again now, along with Billy Graham and of course Mr. Nixon himself; in the early days of the Nixon Presidency one felt, with a slight headache, that one might be witnessing an old movie on television, an historical rerun out of the fifties.) Norman Vincent Peale has bubbled the same tune continually, but whereas he was a stupendous best-seller in the middle fifties he was forgotten in the sixties. (It is more than a little unsettling to see him bobbing up again now, along with Billy Graham and of course Mr. Nixon himself; in the early days of the Nixon Presidency one felt, with a slight headache, that one might be witnessing an old movie on television, an historical rerun out of the fifties.)

I suppose a professional historian who wanted to could show how complex these decades really are—how many unnoticed aspects are contradictory to the standard generalizations, how many threads run out this way and that beyond the arbitrary dates, how small a part of the population participates in the supposedly typical attitudes and activities, how large a part of the population goes steadily plodding on through the years without reference to supposed shifts in the Zeitgeist, and how differently one would divide history if one looked at particular parts of the culture. But an amateur—even though he has no stake in the Frederick Lewis Allen or Life magazine mode of history—may still come back tenaciously to the division of recent American experiences into decades. It just does happen that certain very large events on the great stage of history came near the break of the decades, and that these large events threw their weight on the culture of the time: the end of World War I and the Crash set off the twenties, the descent into the Depression and the beginning of World War II define the thirties. The symbolic fifties may be identified more conventionally by Presidential elections (except for the beginning of the forties, changing parties in Washington—that is, in the White House—have, since World War I, loosely coincided with changing decades, adding to their symbolic coherence). But in this case as in others there are additional events to be grouped together to mark the change in the spirit of the times. One might have to strain a little to give unity to the forties, with their enormous freight of history and the sharp break in 1945, but the whole period is war-darkened and preoccupied with international events.

I said that in the sixties several kinds of protest and revolt, out of the past, came back into American public life simultaneously and in force. These older rivers of protest, damned or diverted by preoccupation, now burst over the dams, return to their channels, and flow together into the floodtide of radicalism in the delta of the late sixties.

One of these streams comes from the twenties. It has mainly to do with culture, higher and lower: with items of behavior and attitude, of manners and morals, of values and leisure activities.

The affinities of the twenties with the sixties have been noticed fairly often by now. I believe there has even been a popular song on this subject, one sexy, prosperous era of short skirts and youthful revolt calling out to another. If you reread Only Yesterday you will find much that reminds you of the sixties: endless discussions about the Younger Generation, with middle-class young people in rebellion against the middle-class standards of their middle-class parents; endless discussions of sex, with a rapid change in the role of women and in mating mores and morals; endless fascination with popular culture: the Jazz Age, radio, Paul Whiteman's orchestra playing "It's Three O'Clock in the Morning." The standard word for the twenties, as we have noted, is "disillusionment"; there is an important aspect of the later sixties to which that word applies, too. In both periods there are widespread and visible evidences of escapism, hedonism, frivolity, dropping-out: the hip-flask and
the speakeasy in one period, the drug culture, the hippies, the pot party in another. In both periods it is not only the young who reject the authority figures and mock the representative national characters; celebrated intellectual leaders do the same. It marks quite a shift in national mood when H. L. Mencken supplanted William Dean Howells as the literary arbiter. In both decades the most talked about of the intellec-tuals mock, criticize, deplore, and satirize national institutions and prevailing national standards. One might say that the most vocal of the youth and the intellectuals of the twenties, interrupted by historical distractions, had to leave George Babbitt standing there half beaten, and only in the sixties were their counterparts able to pick up the clubs and start in again on this — as he would now be called — this up-tight square.

The nineteen-twenties saw a rebellion against the middle-class family; a “revolt against the village”; a rejection of what was rather mistakenly called “puritanism.” These dissenting movements opened fissures in the national culture that were then more or less papered over during each of the three decades that followed, for reasons which each of the decades provided. Then in the sixties the cultural divisions burst open again.

Both these decades saw the city asserting its values against those of the small town and countryside; each has seen the old stock and conventional cast of American characters lose visibility and prestige. In the twenties they were called puritans or the booboisie or tiresome spokesmen for gentility; Mencken assaulted, among all these others, the “Anglo-Saxons,” whose heritage had been celebrated by some during World War I. It is probably in the twenties that, in the phrase of the senior Arthur Schlesinger, the sturdy yeoman turns into the hick. In the sixties there came into widespread and not flattering use a tag for the hitherto predominant ethnic-religious group—the WASP—as well as the ubiquitous pejorative for the putative rulers of the nation, the Establishment.

Although the Ku Klux Klan was strong in the early twenties and a force at the Democratic Convention of 1924, the Democratic Convention of 1928 nominated an unequivocally urban figure, a Wet, an Irish-Catholic, a man whose higher education, as he said, had taken place at the Fulton Fish Market. Although in 1959-60 there was much somber discourse about whether the nation could survive a Catholic President, by 1968 that discussion seemed as remote as Moses and the fact that two of the three Spring contenders for the Democratic nomination were Irish-Catholics passed virtually unnoticed. The Harvard-Catholic - Boston - sophisticated figure of John F. Kennedy, who of course is immensely important for the spirit of the sixties, was not only the first President born in this century but perhaps the most remote in all recent American history from the ethos of Main Street. He calmly explained to a farm audience on his Western tour in the Fall before his death that he was a city boy who had never milked a cow or plowed a furrow, straight or crooked.

In the twenties American literature completed its break with Protestant propriety; in the sixties white Northern Gentiles no longer wrote novels. The writers of the nineteen-twenties who came from that kind of a background were fleeing it or attacking it: Sinclair Lewis satirizing Sauk Center; Willa Cather preferring European immigrants and Southwestern Spanish to decaying Anglo-Saxon Midwesterners; Ernest Hemingway staying a million miles away from his mother's Congregational Church in Oak Park, Illinois. In the sixties the Protestant Middle West just vanished from sight. In the twenties there was a distinctive Negro cultural movement, with some whites paying attention to Harlem's cultural riches; in the sixties black became beautiful.

In these two decades the urban variety of the real United States made itself felt against the uniformities of the mythical United States of Main Street, the New England Yankee, and suburbia. In these two decades American culture seemed livelier, richer, more heterogeneous than in the rather stuffy periods that preceded them. At the same time there came—especially in the late sixties—a sweeping repudiation of authority and of standards that may not prove as welcome a development as the other one.

As with the sixties and the twenties, there is also a connection between the sixties and the thirties, when the Depression brought quite another kind of criticism of the nation's institutions.

The characteristic protesters of the twenties had not been much concerned with politics and economics. They went to Paris. They read H. L. Mencken and laughed at the American boob. They satirized Main Street. They may have laughed at Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, but not out of any very clear-cut contrary political judgment. They were contemptuous of the nation's Babbitts, but not out of any very clear-cut
contrasting economic ethic. If you reread The Great Gatsby you will find a good deal in it that reminds you of the sixties (of the motion picture phenomenon “The Graduate,” for example), but except for some incidental disapproval of the reactionary opinions of Tom Buchanan you won’t be able to make out Fitzgerald’s political and economic views. He disapproves of the behavior of Tom and Daisy, who smash things and retreat back into their money, but his attitude toward Jay Gatsby is an undefined sentimental mixture. Fitzgerald himself was later to say that he did not then have any developed political and economic views of his own. Neither, apparently, did the Hemingway of the twenties. Sinclair Lewis was a social and cultural satirist who really did not give big Republicans and big bankers very much to worry about; even the people of Zenith themselves seemed to read his books without much pain. Some of the figures of the twenties turned out to be unalloyed political conservatives: Willa Cather and, in his own way, of course, Mencken. The itch for political and economic reform was, in fact, an expression of the “bilge of idealism” of people like the “Archangel Woodrow,” and then in the thirties of a certain Presidential “radio crooner” that Mencken and the supermen of The American Mercury looked down upon.

The Crash, the coming of the Depression, the “American earthquake,” as Edmund Wilson was to call it, changed all that. In the spring of 1932 Wilson looked back at the attitudes of the twenties, which he said already “seemed a long way off”; from the thirties, he said, “we can see how superficial they were.” The first of these attitudes was that of the “Menckenian gentleman, ironic, beer-loving, and ‘civilized,’ living principally on the satisfaction of feeling superior to the broker and enjoying the debauchment of American life as a burlesque show or a three-ring circus....” Further along in his article Mr. Wilson said that it could now be seen that all the suddenly outdated attitudes from the twenties “represented attempts on the part of the more thoughtful Americans to reconcile themselves to a world dominated by ‘salesmen and brokers’...that they all involved compromises with the salesman and the broker, Mencken and Nathan laughed at the broker, but they justified the system which produced him and they got along with him very well, provided he enjoyed George Moore and had pretensions to a taste in liquor....”

In the thirties these “more thoughtful Americans” no longer made any compromise with “the salesman and the broker”; before the decade was over too many made compromise instead with the hard-line revolutionaries of the Communist Party. Many others hoped for a democratic socialism; what they got instead was — so to speak — the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. But during this decade the criticisms of America did turn to a sober examination of politics and economics.

C. Vann Woodward wrote about this period: “In the thirties and well into the following decade there occurred the most thoroughgoing inquest of self-criticism that our national economy has ever undergone — not even excepting that of the muckraking and Progressive Era. No corner nor aspect nor relationship of American capitalism was overlooked, and no shibboleth of free enterprise went unchallenged. The prying and probing went on at every level from the sharecroppers to holding companies and international cartels. Subpoenas brought mighty bankers and public-utility empire-builders to the witness stand. Nor was this activity merely the work of the wild-eyed and woolly-haired, nor the exclusive concern of one of the major parties. It was a popular theme of the radio, the press, the theater, and even the pulpit. ... Universities hummed and throbbed with it.... Then in the mid-forties something happened. It happened rather suddenly. The floodstream of criticism dwindled to a trickle and very nearly ceased altogether. It was as if some giant sluice-gate had been firmly shut.”

The shutting of that sluice-gate by the celebrational atmosphere of the forties and fifties perhaps helped to make the backed-up floodstream more of a torrent when the sluice-gate opened and that criticism flowed out again in the sixties, as it certainly did.

That the American economy is again the object not only of criticism but of attack in the sixties is evident in every one of the institutions Professor Woodward mentions, and also in television and especially in books and magazines. He referred to muckraking and the Progressive Era, which might stand as the next previous historical antecedent to the thoroughgoing criticism of capitalism in the thirties. The muckraking magazine article reappeared everywhere in the sixties, including publications in which it was quite incongruous: in The New Yorker, that prestigious survivor of the spirit of the twenties (“not for the Old Lady from Dubuque”), which ran long columns of social criticism side by side with advertisements for two-thousand-dollar diamond clips from Van Cleef & Arpels; in such an all-American entry as that hinterland Bible, the Saturday Evening Post, in its last days; and even in the flagship of the American Century, Henry Luce’s Life magazine. Crusaders
and crusading books and articles tumbled over each other. Church and university had a new leftward flavor. As to the theater, the cinema, and books—I have already suggested that one reason for the severity of the rebellion of the late sixties may be the coinciding of different kinds of protest, anti-puritan and anti-capitalist. In the legitimate theater of the sixties one gets them at once, at full whistle, and it has to be said that what has happened there is beyond the power of the present writer to comment on. The same is almost true of movies and books. I remember that George Bernard Shaw somewhere tells the story of the man, famous for his swearing, who when he saw all of his worldly goods spilling out of the wagon down the hill into a river had to say, after a pause, "I cannot do justice to this situation." So also one has to say about the state of these arts at the end of the sixties, and pass on without another word.

IV

I have come this far without mentioning the most obvious, important, and widely discussed of the causes of the moral-political mood of the sixties: the black man's movement; the Vietnam war; and the "unrest," as it is called, with comic inadequacy, on the part of college students. I assume these ubiquitous topics have been enough commented upon elsewhere.

"Unrest" of contemporary students around the world suggests the parochial limitation of the remarks I have been making: the protest of the sixties may be a part of a worldwide phenomenon. But the United States, as the heaven of the bourgeoisie, the leader of technological development, and the only nation so far to have used nuclear weapons, may be the object of a distinct antagonism, from within and without, that goes beyond that directed toward other nations. In a way, what has happened in the late sixties is that a worldwide anti-Americanism has developed a powerful local branch.

The Vietnam war is the most important single cause, among white citizens at least, of the protest of the sixties, but it is not the only one; there are aspects that preceded the enlarged American participation in the war, and presumably will continue after that is ended. In line with my remarks about the decades, and with all those fluvial metaphors I used, we may observe that there was another stream of dissent that was dammed in 1939 or 1941—the protest against war and the military. The revulsion against "merchants of death" in the aftermath of World War I, and the very strong pacifist and isolationist movements of the thirties, were thoroughly discredited by Munich, Pearl Harbor, the unity of the nation fighting Hitler, the revelations about the concentration camp and then after the war by Stalin's activities in the developing Cold War. The debacle of Vietnam has made a kind of anti-war view intellectually and morally respectable again, and has made it politically possible seriously to challenge the military.

Anti-militarism, anti-puritanism, anti-capitalism—and anti-racism. When you speak of America's treatment of the black man you have to deal, alas, not in decades but in centuries. I think this stream of reform was dammed in 1876. That does not mean one should ignore or deprecate—as some of the fierce new fellows do—the long steady battle by (for example) the N.A.A.C.P., through almost all of this century, for Negro rights; but it is true that the battle has not been in the center of the nation's politics. In the nineteenth century, of course, it was—from the abolitionism of the eighteen-thirties to the end of Reconstruction. But then it was dropped, even by reform movements. After a brief interracial beginning Populism did not help the Negro's cause, and finally some of the worst racist demagogues came from a Populist background.

The Progressive movement doesn't seem to have had much to say for the Negro beyond Theodore Roosevelt's entertaining of Booker T. Washington in the White House; during Woodrow Wilson's Presidency social segregation was instituted in federal government buildings in Washington, and the early years of the century—the Progressive Era—are sometimes called the nadir of the struggle for Negro rights since Emancipation. Certainly the cultural critics of America during the twenties did not make any serious campaign for racial equality; Mencken, who regretted that he missed a chance to report the lynching of a "blackamoor," surely would not have regarded such a campaign as a suitable occupation for gentlemen. The New Deal does not have as impressive a record on racial equality as one might expect; F.D.R., won over the votes of the traditionally Republican Negro electorate primarily on economic issues. I think it can be said that racial equality was not a chief feature of any progressive movement that played a large role in American politics from 1876 until 1948 or 1954. (I say 1948 because of the Truman civil-rights program, the partial desegregation of the armed services, and the fight over the civil-rights plank in the 1948 Democratic Convention.)

It is as though the nineteenth-century trauma over
this moral paradox at the heart of American democracy exhausted the nation, exhausted even the reformers, some of whom quite explicitly checked off slavery on their list of “social questions,” and turned to other matters like the labor question, the woman question, the temperance question. It is as though Americans, during this “lost century of civil rights,” looked back upon the Emancipation Proclamation in something of the way they look at the Declaration of Independence, as a complete declaratory accomplishment that made real its objectives at a stroke. For whatever the reasons may be, the broad white American public, from the end of Reconstruction until these past few years, has suppressed the truth about the treatment of the black man. As the civil-rights movement and the Black Power movement force this historic injustice upon the attention of the white Americans, they raise also in the minds of the young and the critical other questions about a nation that could so long have tolerated so manifest an evil. The Vietnam war and the Negro movements have had the side effect of making more plausible the criticisms of the nation in other fields. In the eyes of some, America is morally discredited, and the national evils are not particular, separable items but a general condition.

Among many other criticisms of the nation, those directed against “conformity” and “mass society” and big bureaucratic organization, which became very common in the fifties, are now still present, along with all these other themes, in the sixties. Now they have a sharper anti-American edge than they did fifteen years ago: the ills of technological society, too, are the faults somehow of “America” and of the “Establishment.”

V

I suppose the way one groups and interprets and makes distinctions about these disturbing and significant years represents a kind of ideological test. If I may dramatize my own evaluation (that of a liberal, if you want to say so), I would describe the first part of the decade as the best period in American history that I have lived through, and the last part of the decade as potentially the worst. I say “potentially” because the full results of the late sixties have not yet been felt. This period is not yet worse than that dominated by Senator Joseph McCarthy; it might soon become so. But it must be added that the dangerous trends of these last years—the trends toward nasty, closed-minded, anti-democratic attitudes, toward new levels of violence, toward polarization—are still accompanied to some extent by a continuation of the healthy developments of the earlier years of the decade in social reforms and national self-criticism. So as the decade ends it is a confusing period, with the stakes all raised. Where it will end, knows God.

The two parts of the decade that I have graded up and down in this rather simplified way actually overlap. The first extended from the sit-in movement in the Spring of 1960 and the election of John Kennedy in the Fall, more or less down to the congressional elections of 1966. Its high points came after the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962, President Kennedy’s American University speech in the following June, and then the ratification of the nuclear test-ban treaty in the late Summer, changing the international atmosphere. In that same June the civil-rights movement for the first time had the full moral support of the Presidency; in August came the most remarkable of demonstrations, the “I Have a Dream,” Jobs-and-Freedom march in Washington; during Kennedy’s Presidency the Keynesian economic outlook was consolidated in governmental policy (a much more significant development than is realized by the young radicals, who are subsidized by the prosperity
The early sixties saw a new “dialogue” among the religious communities; the remarkable civil-rights coalition of the Spring of 1964, and the enactment of the laws of 1964 and 1965; a new national interest in, and legislation for, the poor and the cities; and in the period from the assassination in November, 1963, until the elections of November, 1966, the most remarkable outpouring of social legislation in recent political history.

But meanwhile the Berkeley outburst and Harlem disorders of 1964 had been the first big signs of something else; the escalation of the Vietnam war and the Watts riot of 1965 brought it fully into American politics, and it reached what is so far its worst expression in the terrible period of 1967-68, from the Newark and Detroit riots through the march on the Pentagon in the Fall, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy and the Columbia riots of the Spring, to the Chicago confrontation in August. This phenomenon—not new, of course, but now expressed at a new level of intensity—was the politics of violence, provocation, confrontation, the polarizing and potential unraveling of the nation. The ideological accompaniment of this phenomenon on the far Left (if it makes sense still to use the ancient spectrum of Left and Right) was a hard-line and explicit anti-Americanism that rolled all the objections to different parts and aspects of American society into one big ball and saw in it one evil plan of an “Establishment.” Ironically this new anti-Americanism was very “American” in its style: moralistic, anti-political, anti-intellectual, contemptuous of the past, a simplistic crusade against a conspiracy. It is especially difficult to deal with because the cultural revolt is joined with the political one. There is a repudiation of authority, a defiance of standards of behavior, an elite contempt for the common man, a rejection of received values, which give to the present a dimension going beyond mere political reform.

A liberal like the present writer, who rejects this New Left, might object not only—as is commonly said—to the tactics sometimes employed (violent, illegal, coercive, defamatory) but also to the underlying social analysis, the cultural revolt, and the political objectives; in my view, America, despite all its particular ills, is not as they have pictured it. Moreover, I do not want this nation to be made over according to their goals, whatever they may be (one may assume them to be implicit in the methods they employ and the attitudes they exhibit).

I have to admit that the inadequacy of the heritage of liberal reform is one cause of the present American distress. And I accept as accurate most of the particular criticism of American society. But I certainly do not believe the evils in it will be corrected by a holistic rejection of that society or by tactics of violence and abuse.

Meanwhile, there are those decals on the windshields. Perhaps they represent in some cases just a critical patriotism of a kind that I share. But I don’t think they do in most cases. I’m afraid they represent a gathering repressive reaction against the outbursts of these last years.

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The nineteen-sixties were ten years of ambiguous transition in the world's economy. And they produced unprecedented, paradoxical kinds of social problems in America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. One might call them the crises of affluence.

The decade began with certitudes. In the advanced West, there was supposed to be an end of ideology. The welfare state, it was said, had so muted the bitterness of the class struggle that progress required only an intelligent, technocratic divvying up of an ever larger gross national product. The wealthy countries were going to finance modernization in the Third World through the United Nations Development Decade. And there was hope that communism would, out of the sophisticated self-interest of its rulers, continue its evolution from terror to liberal authoritarianism.

As the sixties end, there is an ideological din in America, Europe, and the communist nations as people question basic priorities and debate structural change. The Development Decade never took place; as cool an administrator as Robert McNamara therefore talks of an impending Malthusian catastrophe. The rich Communists are torn by the need to rationalize their economies and by the democratic dangers that even totalitarian reform might involve.

The poor Communists of the globe's South have turned on their comrades of the North with a vituperation that even exceeds their denunciations of American imperialism. So the unthinkable has been thought and there are speculations about a new Cold War in which one of the communist camps will ally itself with the United States against the other.

In short, the sixties were hard on prophets and will appear in retrospect as a turning point in modern history. The struggle between America and the Soviet Union that polarized the world and strengthened Joe McCarthyism in the United States and Stalinism in Russia no longer exists in the old way. As both cause and effect of this change, the internal contradictions of the rival systems have become acute.

Yet, even though it is clear enough that massive transformations are taking place, this brief survey of some of the economic trends of the last ten tumultuous years will have to end on a note of chastened uncertainty. The sixties posed problems, but the solutions to them were left up in the air. The seventies will deal with them, or else.

It is fitting to begin this analysis with the United States. For America pioneered more than any other nation in defining the crisis of affluence. Up until 1965 it seemed that the American economy was
obeying the precepts of the end-of-ideologists. The Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts were a textbook exercise in the Keynesian management of a nation and increased both production and federal revenues while they reduced unemployment. A measure of what was accomplished can be seen in the contrast between the almost trillion dollars of annual G.N.P. with which the sixties end and Joseph Schumpeter’s belief, in 1950, that a two hundred billion dollar G.N.P. would make it possible to abolish poverty with an extra expenditure of only ten billion from Washington. There, precisely, is the rub. For even though the economy achieved prodigies, poverty persisted, the new crisis of affluence emerged, and the tragic intervention in Vietnam unplanned much more than the White House planned.

In 1969 L.B.J. made his last, proud economic report to the Congress with a Marxist description of the capitalist past and a free-enterprise vision of its future. “No longer do we view our economic life as a relentless tide of ups and downs,” Mr. Johnson said. “No longer do we fear that automation and technology will rob workers of jobs rather than help us to achieve greater abundance. No longer do we consider poverty and unemployment permanent landmarks on our economic scene.” It is interesting that Mr. Johnson thus agrees that the classic socialist description of capitalism (“a relentless tide of ups and downs”) was accurate up until the New Economics took over in 1961. But more important is his erroneous assumption that by smoothing out the business cycle the Golden Age has been inaugurated. In paradoxical point of fact, the very achievement which Johnson lauded has been the source of new troubles.

By saying this, I do not want to belittle the Keynesian accomplishment of the sixties. Eisenhower’s old-fashioned budget-balancing orthodoxy cost America, and particularly its poor, a high price. There was chronic unemployment, intensified poverty, and industrial stagnation in the fifties. It is of some moment that John F. Kennedy was persuaded that these evils were not fates but man-made social products which could be reversed. The boom which the Kennedy-Johnson policy then incited has now lasted so long that it has made neo-Keynesians out of almost every politician in America.

Even while this remarkable development was taking place, however, there were portents of problems to come. At the very outset, J. Kenneth Galbraith, Leon Keyserling, and the A.F.L.-C.I.O. economists had tried to convince Kennedy that he should invest in social spending to stimulate the economy rather than cut taxes. (The latter course, they rightly predicted, would distribute the bulk of the benefits to the rich individuals and corporations—seven-eighths of the total went to the wealthiest one-eighth of the nation, Keyserling once computed.) Kennedy refused their advice for political reasons—he didn’t feel that he had the congressional strength to win a massive investment in the social sector—and the result was one of the first intimations of how lopsided and contradictory prosperity can be.

The Kennedy-Johnson pump priming never really achieved full employment or even John Kennedy’s goal of a three per cent jobless rate on the official (understated) figures. Before that could happen, the threat of inflation intervened and suggested another one of the difficulties of success.

In The New Industrial State, Galbraith theorized that this inflationary threat might be a strong tend-
be a characteristic of the kind of Keynesianism we adopted in the sixties. But in addition to these long-run economic factors there was, of course, the effect of the particular horror in Vietnam. It was not just that the expenditure of human life, wealth, and political energy in that terrible conflict diverted precious resources from the fight against poverty. That was true enough, but, in addition, the over-optimistic assumptions of Johnson and McNamara in 1965 about the course of the war caused a federal spending miscalculation of more than ten billion dollars. So at a time when there was a need for fine tuning, Vietnam led to this sudden, gross, and unconscionable increase in federal outlays. Things have not been the same since.

Even if there had been no Vietnam, there would have been other problems arising from the federally generated and misshapen affluence. For the sixties show that where there are unused plant capacity and idle men it is politically possible, and even popular, for the government to spend money or cut taxes in order to fuel a boom. But when the problems of nearly full employment appear, Washington must either cut back on expenditures or raise taxes. Liberals and radicals are rightly against the first alternative, conservatives wrongly are against the second. In Johnson's waning years in office, and in the first months of Nixon's Presidency, the Right clearly prevailed.

These difficulties—the inequities of the tax cut, inflation, and the problems of damping rather than igniting a boom—are familiar enough. But looking back at the sixties, I would put them in a context which is not quite so obvious. They are, I would suggest, particular instances of the general crisis of affluence. As the quotation from Mr. Johnson's last economic report indicates, the former President did not grasp the character of our unprecedented plight. He stuck much too close to Marxist orthodoxy. In the Marxian analysis, pre-capitalist economic crises were always due to scarcity. Because of the weather, plant disease, war, or some other calamity, there was simply not enough to go around and some people starved. Under capitalism, Marx rightly observed, there occurs for the first time in history the crisis of glut. At the peak of the business cycle, the system produces "too much," i.e. more than there is effective demand for. So there are "too many" shoes and bare-foot people and jobless employees from the shoe factory all at the same time. The neo-classical econo-
by the declaration of "an unconditional war" on poverty, did not passively accept this contradiction between federal rhetoric and slum reality. Their anger was one of the many unrests created by prosperity.

Since I have already faulted Marx, along with Lyndon Johnson, for not having anticipated the crisis of affluence, I should give him his due for a remarkable premonition of this particular aspect of it. In 1849, Marx published an article in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in which he spoke of the way in which good times make people radical. "The rapid growth of productive capacity," he said, "brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments. Thus although the enjoyments of the workers have risen, the social satisfaction they have has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalists, which are inaccessible to the worker, and in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature." This Marxian insight can be used to understand the spirit of revolt among three different groups as the sixties end: the poor, the affluent college students, the workers. The dispossessed, above all the blacks among them, were clearly more agitated by prosperity than by depression. It is one thing to share the general misery and another to be excluded from the general happiness. In part, this simply corroborates the general proposition that defeat makes people passive and gains make them militant. It is, for instance, significant that in the Summer of 1969 a Louis Harris Poll for Newsweek reported that black radicalism thrives among the better educated and more economically advanced, while indifference is still pervasive at the very bottom of the ghetto. But, in part, the activist frustration of the blacks was also the culmination of a mass civil-rights movement which had been building since the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955. When Lyndon Johnson began to renege on his promises the marchers and demonstrators, now doubly bitter because of the contrast between black want and white plenty, became even more insistent about their rights.

The student rebels were another expression of the crisis of affluence. As a 1969 Fortune survey showed, they were not limited to the highly visible handful on the fringe but amounted to forty per cent of the collegiate generation between eighteen and twenty-four — or more than three million youths.

The workers have participated in the crisis of affluence, too. On the one hand, the awareness that business was claiming such a healthy percentage of the publicly generated wealth drove the unions to increase their wage demands. To sharpen this antagonism, it was the younger workers without memories of the thirties who often rejected the settlements made by the older leaders. Bad times make men prudent as well as radical; good times agitate as well as satisfy. On the other hand, many workers believed, quite wrongly, that the government was doing "too much" for the poor. This turned a significant number of them toward George Wallace and his movement. In 1968 a vigorous campaign by the unions and the perennial identification of the Republican Party with the great Depression kept the blue-collar vote on Hubert Humphrey's line. Here again, however, the divvying up of affluence did not turn out to be, as the end-of-ideologists predicted, a quiet, technocratic affair.

The sixties previewed the crisis of affluence. America discovered that a booming G.N.P. could create more difficulties than one could have imagined in the days of scarcity. Indeed, there was even the possibility that the unplanned, but federally stimulated, creation of more and more wealth might lead to an ecological crisis of the civilization in which the fundamental environment of humanity — air, water, weather, space — would be irresponsibly, and perhaps tragically, transformed. The answer to this challenge is not, as Herbert Marcuse sometimes suggests, to persuade the masses to become ascetic. It requires a vast increase in democratic planning so that the quality, as well as the quantity, of the national product will become a subject of political decision-making.

Even if the seventies would make such a radical departure, that would not be enough. For while America was facing up to the futuristic crisis of affluence, the Third World was suffering even more
bitterly from immemorial poverty. One might even say that a domestic trend was really international. For just as the poor and the students within the United States were outraged by the contrast between the social potential of our resources and the anti-social uses we make of them, so were the poor and students of the globe affronted by the sight of a fat America in a hungry world. Even here, as Gunnar Myrdal has demonstrated in his brilliant study *The Poverty of Nations*, not the starving but the better-off were most outraged. It is relative deprivation, i.e. deprivation in contrast to affluence, that seems to move people. However, something more than social psychology was involved in this development. For many of the emergent nations did not really advance during the United Nations Development Decade of the sixties. There were many complex reasons for this failure. Some of the reasons were external to the poor measured by a man's removing himself from the labor market altogether, an attitude almost exactly contrary to that Faustian restlessness which motivated Western entrepreneurs in the era of capitalist takeoff.

It would be appealing to make a Gandhian idealization of these non-commercial attitudes. If they persist, however, the outcome will not be an idyll of village industry but the horror of famine. The Communists in the Third World have their answer to this problem—to carry out a cultural revolution and extirpate the old habits of thought by totalitarianism and violence. This may, or may not, work, i.e. increase G.N.P. (the Chinese evidence is still ambiguous), but it exacts an inhuman price for change. And there are aspects of India's attempt to modernize democratically that are most depressing (Nye Bevan once remarked that, had there been universal suffrage at the time, the British workers would never have allowed the Industrial Revolution to take place).

Whatever the uncertainties within the Third World, one thing is plain: the United States has been acting to forward the worst anti-developmental trends. This has not simply meant support of anti-modernizing oligarchs or dictators. More subtly it has taken the form of economic policies (in both trade and aid) which, as Gabriel Valdes of Cuba told Richard Nixon on behalf of the Latin nations at the Vina del Mar conference, have resulted in the developing countries' giving more than they get to the United States. Through "tied" aid (which is really an export subsidy to American business), the repatriation of American profits, the interest on public and private loans, and the systematic inequities of the world market, the affluent exact a tribute from the hungry.

Mr. Nixon listened to Valdes and replied that he would put even more of an emphasis on private investment in the area—that is, he would make the problem worse. This attitude may have encouraged the Chileans to nationalize Anaconda Copper and the Peruvian junta to declare a land reform that will affect big corporate holdings like those of the W. R. Grace & Company.

What the sixties prove is that the departures in world economic policy must be even more radical than the domestic measures. Aid has to be internationalized and planned globally. The free-trade myths have to be abandoned, above all the absurd premise that the world market facilitates an exchange between "equals" and that hungry lands must therefore make
reciprocal tariff concessions to the wealthy. But it is likely under a Nixon Administration that present trends will continue. As John Kennedy feared when he proposed the round of tariff negotiations named after him, the West will become more and more of a rich man's club. In the seventies, that could well mean that the advanced countries will bear moral responsibility for starvation.

Finally, the one communist country which has overcome its underdevelopment, the U.S.S.R., is now facing its own crisis of affluence (or, more precisely, of semi-affluence).

When Joseph Stalin began the terroristic modernization of Russia, the country was the most backward of European powers, but it was not nearly as far behind as India and China after World War II. Moreover, there was no great Malthusian problem in the Soviet Union, either then or now, and there is an abundance of natural resources. In such circumstances, Stalinist "planning" was gross, brutal, inefficient, and effective. But in the post-Stalin era, and emphatically in the sixties, the Soviet economic program had to go far beyond sweating (or beating) a surplus out of workers and peasants.

In this setting, demands arose for modifying the centralized, bureaucratic mode of planning and using market prices so as to at least get an idea of the actual costs of production and consumer preferences. This approach was not new — it had been proposed by Oskar Lange and A. H. Lerner in the thirties — but it was a most radical reform for the Soviets. It did not mean, as some American conservative ideologues in America, Chinese Communists, and Fidel Castro thought, that the Russians were going back to free enterprise. For no one was proposing to dismantle the totalitarian state which, through its elite and dictatorial "ownership" of the means of production, ruled the entire society in a most uncapitalistic (and unsocialistic) way.

Yet there was a most positive aspect to this reform. If the omniscience of the central authority was being questioned in the economic sphere — if there was a contradiction between the Stalinist-structured bureaucracy and the needs of a modern Russia — then the old ways could be challenged in politics, art, and other areas of social life. The best of the younger generation, who, like their counterparts in the West, refuse to live according to the old rules, seized on this analogy. The rulers responded by taking a few steps back toward Stalin and by imprisoning the boldest of the oppositionists, like Sinyavsky and Daniel.

It was, of course, in Czechoslovakia that the freedom movement under communism made the boldest advance. It sought to move from bureaucratic collectivism on the Russian model to democratic socialism. The conservatives in the Kremlin rightly regarded such an idea as subversive of their own power since political democracy in such a society could transfer the ownership of the economy from the elite to the people. So the Soviets acted in the classic style of capitalist imperialism. They sent in troops to end the most ambitious experiment with freedom in communist history.

But, if I may be permitted to end this very brief sketch of communist economic patterns on an optimistic note, the tendencies toward change may well be irreversible — for ironic reasons. The youth of all society rebel in the name of their elders' proclaimed values. The Students for a Democratic Society had be irreversible — for ironic reasons. The youth of all society rebel in the name of their elders' proclaimed values. The Students for a Democratic Society had

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JOSEPH P. LYFORD:

MEDIA AND MESSAGES

It was just ten years ago that Edward R. Murrow delivered a classic blast at the broadcasters. A re-reading of the statement leaves the general impression that in television nothing much changes except the quality of the picture tube. The broadcasters are still talking about their special rights under the First Amendment and their sacred responsibility to make as much money as possible; most of the shows are the same old plots dressed up with new titles; and the Federal Communications Commission is still busily supervising the buildup of the mass-media monopolies, mergers, and concentrations of ownership it is supposed to be heading off. At least we can be grateful that there are two commissioners, Nicholas Johnson and Kenneth Cox, who are needling the industry, and we have some highly literate press critics around in Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, and the Columbia Journalism Review. But the quality and frequency of the criticism drop off sharply from here. The fact is that with all the talk about the mass media these past years, we still have only the foggiest notion of what they are up to; this is partly because most of the criticism is neither systematic nor continuous and is either vague or centered on isolated cases. Confusion is also generated by the vast quantity of data graciously supplied by the people who run the media and hire researchers who tell us — to-use the vernacular of the tobacco industry — that there is no demonstrable link between television and the health of the people who smoke it. Any doubts as to the extent to which the broadcasters influence the character of the mass-media discussion should be dispelled by the F.C.C. chairman's recent admission that the Commission does "lean" rather heavily on the broadcasting industry for pertinent data. And the American Newspaper Publishers Association, to prove it isn't asleep at the switch, assured its members at one convention that while it doesn't have an official lobby in Washington, its suggestions about pending legislation affecting the press usually result in desirable modifications.

One of the main difficulties in trying to understand even the most basic facts about the mass media is that communications technology and the people making money out of it are moving so fast that by the time we get a full-fledged debate going on some problem, the problem is obsolete or has dwindled to secondary importance. While the F.C.C. fiddled around with ways of getting UHF receivers on sets to open up competition a little, cable television was already threatening to push UHF aside and American Telephone & Telegraph was getting an unbreakable hold on the satellite program for good. Now Congress has been ruminating about how to save failing newspapers when in fact it ought to be worrying about healthy ones like the San Francisco Chronicle, which has grabbed off a rich TV channel, set up a shady
Another weakness of the discussion about the mass media is the collection of wobbly assumptions on which much of the talk is based. One such assumption is the idea that commercial broadcasters, newspaper publishers, bank presidents, corporation board chairmen, and all the others who control communications properties will respond to vague threats or appeals to their corporate consciences. If there are going to be any revolutions in the communications business, they will come about because of changes in technology, not conscience.

Since we can’t very well get hold of exactly what is happening to the media, it seems more interesting to speculate what is happening to the consumers of the media. We are right back in the thicket of wobbly assumption here, too. Contrary to the widely held belief that TV and newspapers can change or modify our opinions, many respectable people who make a good living counting and analyzing public opinion cite “studies” which show the mass media have no influence whatever on our attitudes—that we are receptive only to those messages which reënforce our convictions. The ad men who spend all those millions on TV spots obviously don’t believe this, but it is quite unsettling to writers and teachers who adhere to the quaint idea that exposure to alleged facts and sales talks determines to some extent how a man feels about Volkswagens or about Richard Nixon after the Checkers extravaganza. Young people hearing an exchange between a journalist and a public-opinion expert are also confused. After two hundred and fifty Berkeley undergraduates listened in shocked silence to Harry Ashmore’s description of how Mr. Nixon packaged himself to the Presidency with twenty million dollars’ worth of mass-media plugs, they were advised by a Ph.D. in mass-communications research to forget it, that all those carefully contrived TV spots we saw during the Pat Brown-Ronald Reagan California gubernatorial campaign were a waste of money because we had already decided how to vote. There was a further acceleration of confusion some months later when, after pollster Donald Muchmore predicted most people had made up their minds to vote Tom Bradley in as Los Angeles mayor, election day turned out to be Sam Yorty Day. By this time the Ph.D. was safely off campus and unavailable for questions.

It might be good to get things right out on the table and say the mass-media researchers don’t know what they are talking about. Certainly some of their “scientific studies” have a peculiar ring to them; it is not convincing, for instance, to be told that because several days’ propaganda over Cincinnati’s TV stations did not increase U.N. popularity in the viewer sample, therefore TV didn’t change opinions. What other influences were at work during the test period that might have neutralized the U.N. messages, or simply redirected the viewer’s attentions? And how does a researcher calibrate the date of birth, or mutation, or the texture and shape of something as delicate as an opinion? A little delving into the literature of attitude measurement arouses a feeling that some aspects of the business come perilously close to shamanism — any professional body, for instance, that can take a book like Unobtrusive Measures in all seriousness needs some looking into.

Suspicious as one might be of the mind-inspectors, it has to be admitted that at least they have some evidence to present, while nobody on the other side has any airtight data proving that a blizzard of anti-smoking commercials has any effect on our thought processes. And there is some support for the idea that we are worrying too much about being exposed to large amounts of information. Reflecting on his experience with mescaline, Aldous Huxley wrote, in The Doors of Perception, that he found himself agreeing with the eminent Cambridge philosopher C. D. Broad that “we should do well to consider more seriously than we have hitherto been inclined to do the type of theory which Bergson put forward in connection with memory and sense perception. The suggestion is that the function of the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the main eliminative and not productive. Each person is at each moment capable of remembering all that has happened to him and of perceiving everything that is happening anywhere in the universe. The function of the brain is to protect us from being overwhelmed and confused by the mass of largely irrelevant and useless knowledge by shutting out most of what we should otherwise perceive and remember at any moment, and leaving only that very small and special selection which is likely to be practically useful.”

Huxley implied that the brain and nervous system perform involuntarily the censoring activity which McLuhan advises us all to do very self-consciously to protect our sanity against a bombardment of data. In Huxley’s view the whole universe of impressions is funneled through a mental reducing valve, and
what comes out at the other end is a “measly trickle of the kind of consciousness which will help us stay alive on the surface of this particular planet.” This should be of some comfort to those of us who try hard to keep up with everything that is supposed to be going on. But questions persist. How does Huxley’s reducing valve decide what is “likely to be practically useful” at any given time? Does the rejection process change as civilizations are revolutionized by technology? And if, as Huxley says, there are chemical ways of bypassing the reducing valve, may not psychological means for circumventing it or breaking it down be devised?

Huxley’s reducing valve will assuredly be tested by the techniques future communicators will develop to get their messages into our heads, come hell or high water. Past technical improvements in film, videotape, and sound will seem rudimentary by comparison. We may discover that the mass media can accomplish by mechanical and psychological means what Huxley felt was possible only by drug-induced changes in the supply of sugar to the brain. We have a very mild scent of what is to come in the vast realism of the film “2001,” which has even changed audience seating patterns. Despite the huge screen, many people like to sit in the front rows where they are swaddled in the action, projected into space along with the capsule. The illusion of participation will be enormously expanded by the introduction of such inventions as the living-history film envisioned by Leopold Godowsky, the inventor of Kodachrome, who has predicted that under controlled viewing conditions an audience will be unable to avoid the conviction it is actually confronting the subject of the film. Godowsky’s original purpose in developing the film was to use it in interviews with important world leaders, which would become the basis of visual-history archives, but its adaptation to television—and the technical changes TV can make to facilitate transmission of this visual reality—will be a radical step to erase what is left of the boundaries between fantasy and reality.

There can be little doubt that new visual information systems will have the power to subject individual or mass audiences to enormous, unpredictable shock—something film can do now but with much less intensity. We probably need not be as concerned about overt assaults as we are about subliminal or disguised attacks on our equilibrium. Added to the technical perfections of film, tape, and what displaces tape, will be radical new styles of treating subject matter to intensify reality. It seems likely that some of these new methods will be built on cinéma vérité, which abolishes the artificiality of staging; other methods will use sophisticated abstractions, and still others will use abstraction to hammer home a specific, tangible point. Another change which will enforce the illusion of reality is the magnification of the viewing surface. The enlargement of TV screens to the point where images are bigger than life size will not only increase the persuasive power of the film but it can work the sort of transformations suggested in Robert Snyder’s “Small World,” a documentary on insects in which the magnification brings the viewer to the edge of extreme revulsion. There is no way of knowing how far the impact of TV can be expanded once it breaks out of its present confines, but it is not difficult to imagine the mind penetration which could be accomplished by a twenty-first-century parallel to Leni Reifenstahl’s “Triumph of Will,” or by an on-the-spot piece of living history, full size and color, as it unfolds a sequel to Watts or Detroit. One might ask, then, what protections other than Huxley’s overworked filter are needed against overt or subtle distortions, or the subliminal effects that can transform opinion into truth. How is one to be defended against the overwhelming crash of reality?

Confronted with these and other riddles, what are the critics of the mass media to do if they want to keep their jobs? They follow the example of the man at the computer who assembles all the sense data and then transforms it into the logical base for all subsequent computations—the very act of faith that propelled early Christians into the Colosseum. The critic leaps over all the riddles in order to get on with the discussion. There is something very reassuring to such people about the current Senate investigation of violence on TV and how it affects children. In the course of such rambling inquiries it is impossible to detect whether any given remark has a bearing on the subject, what the subject precisely is, or whether the remark has any internal validity of its own. In such discussion, nobody should feel inhibited. The politician Senator Pastore, after taking a number of indistinct positions, concludes his investigation with a suggestion that “scientific studies” will provide the answers. At some distance from the hearing room, in California, the scientist Joshua Lederberg replies that this is nonsense, the entire scientific literature on the subject can be read in an afternoon and is shaky and inconclusive to boot. At this point some of those paying attention may remember psychiatrist Bruno
Bettelheim's announcement that violence on TV may be good for youngsters because it gives them a look at reality—to which educator Robert Hutchins responds (in the person of his synthetic philosopher Dr. Zuckerkandl)—that on television nothing is real because the function of television is to eliminate pain so that we can watch natural disasters and the massacre of subject peoples in our living room without the slightest feeling of discomfort. One escapes from the controversy over TV, violence, and children only by concluding that since all children are destined to be frightened out of their wits a good deal of the time, television might as well be doing the job as the local movie theater or parents who read them The Pit and the Pendulum and Grimm's Fairy-Tales.

It is, of course, no more possible to talk about the "effects" of television on children than on any other group. To the child deprived of an alternative the set can become the only source of daylight, and many deprived children, in both Westport and Harlem, adopt TV as a substitute parent at infancy. Children with a great many other resources seem to regard TV as just another piece of furniture. They are more selective than many adults who have had to "learn" television in middle age and they are sometimes better at getting the main, if not the most obvious, point of what they see. Otherwise how does one explain the insistence of a child, watching the funeral of President Eisenhower, on finding out who shot him? The fact that these children show a preference for imaginative commercials over "Gunsmoke" is a tribute to their taste and an indication that they may be growing up with the same contempt for regular television programming their parents have for the newspapers.

If increased familiarity with television does breed boredom and distrust, it might be worthwhile to think some more about the Paul Lazarsfeld-Robert Merton thesis that the mass media reinforce social norms and status symbols. A good many black children who have gone through their teens watching patriotic newscasts and the exploits of honest white policemen seem to have missed the point of all this folklore. One wonders whether television is promoting any norms. There is no question but that a great deal of air time is given to people who are criticizing the Establishment and not all of these critics are apoplectic black ministers. Last June, N.B.C. reporter Nancy Dickerson raked the American Medical Association over the coals in very explicit terms following the President's veto of Dr. John Knowles for a post in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and she seemed to feel quite at ease in doing so. Certainly Senator Hugh Scott did not feel C.B.S. was enforcing social norms when he attacked the network in 1967 (inaccurately) for featuring more Negro militants than moderates. And one could ask what norms were reinforced by C.B.S.'s coverage of the last Democratic Convention? The norms of politics-as-usual? Of Mayor Daley's Chicago?

When accepted norms have become an object of suspicion even to a white, blue-collar class, television has no choice but to tell us about it. Controversy, action, fury still are what makes a top news story on TV or in the papers, and the dissenters have learned how to exploit news media tied to these standards. Sometimes the result of the exploitation has been an oversupply of fake news-drama, but occasionally we have been given some splendid television reporting—on Martin Luther King in Birmingham, Selma, Washington, D.C., and Cicero, and in C.B.S.'s documentaries on migrant farm workers and on hunger in America. Television has as many possibilities as a theater of discontent as it does a forum for complacency. In the very process of illuminating, it affects the course of the history with which it is dealing. The stage, transferred to television, becomes a very different sort of theater, in which the effects of manipulating sound and light, of closeups, intercutting between cameras, selection of personalities, timing, a multiplicity of observation points can invent mythology or history for millions of people. It isn't necessary any longer for us to test and age our heroes, because television can manufacture and peddle them overnight. It has also cut to nothing the time lag between the conception of stereotype, its mass adoption, its elevation to the ultimate, and its quick replacement by something newer. Television's decisions about what is topical and significant have an immediate impact on public and private conversations. So there is always the question as to whether television enforces norms, or is contributing to an impression that whatever is in style today will be gone tomorrow.

It would be an injustice not to acknowledge that television has experimented with the arts many times during the past decade in a very creative way. One of the most exciting of these happenings was N.B.C.'s magnificent taping of the Boston Symphony's last 1967 Tanglewood concert. in which many cameras were so integrated with the music that they could have been part of the orchestra itself. Perhaps there will be an increase in these efforts in the future when audio-visual electronic technology approaches perfection in picture transmission. The possibilities of new
experiments with the fine arts are especially exciting. The new technology will make it possible to present painting and graphics with such spectacular reality that viewing fine art will even surpass the museum experience. If television takes advantage of the technical possibilities, for the first time painting and still photography can be brought within reach of mass audiences with the same fidelity as music, long ago liberated from the concert hall by recordings and television staging. Until now the fine arts have had to depend on book and magazine reproduction, which even at its best (in the Skira and Abrams books) loses the critical ten or twenty per cent of the texture and color of the originals, and which have not been able to approximate the originals in size. In addition to truer reproduction, music has had another advantage over the plastic arts, in that the production of musical sounds is a kinetic theatrical event of short duration—all of which has made the musical performance peculiarly suited to television. And music on TV has had such inspiring and lucid translators as Dmitri Mitropoulos and Leonard Bernstein—in contrast to the fine arts, desperately handicapped by the inarticulate verbal confusions of the Robert Motherwells and Elaine de Koonings. With magnification and perfect reproduction, television’s projection of painting might significantly promote the integration of the fine arts with modern life, greatly expanding their effect as a means of education and communication. The fine arts will never become popular, regardless of the excellence of transmission, but historically—notably in the Italian Renaissance—they have played an important part in the education of the spirit and the transformation of cultures.

Television’s preoccupation with ratings and entertainment shows is not the only reason we have not had more creative, significant reporting on television. Television news producers also have an unhealthy tendency to rate technical excellence ahead of significance of content. They are also convinced that unless something moves it isn’t news. Taken together, the obsessions with technique and motion mean that television reporting often misses what Henri Cartier-Bresson calls the “decisive moment” of a story—the single revealing picture which can be studied in its frozen state. Yet the documentary, created from a sequence of still photographs, which does not appeal to movie-minded TV producers, is an inexpensive and more focused way to get at the heart of the subject. An example is the televised photo-essay on Manolete, the bullfighter. Television’s “motion sickness” also accounts in part for a reluctance to deal with abstractions or invisible happenings like the technological invasion of the environment.

Television news coverage has also been hampered by internal disagreements over what constitutes “responsible” reporting. The Kerner Commission, as well as members of Congress, have criticized the networks for the way in which they covered the 1967 urban riots, suggesting that television actually contributed to the spread of the disturbance. C.B.S.’s Frank Stanton has said that any agreement or “consortium” between networks designed to suppress live coverage of potentially violent events would not serve the public interest, no matter how worthy the motive for such suppression might be. Yet not long after the 1967 disorders the three major television networks reached an informal understanding, according to The New York Times, that they would not give live coverage of the anti-war demonstrations at the Pentagon, the idea apparently being that such coverage might have inflammatory effects. In the wake of this decision, edited film reports on the Pentagon affair gave an extremely distorted picture of what happened and were accompanied (notably in Washington, D.C.) with vituperative commentaries attacking the demonstrators but ignoring the violence of sheriff’s deputies and soldiers.

It is certain that the sharp criticism of C.B.S.’s coverage of the Chicago Convention has added to the networks’ uncertain state of mind about live coverage of volatile demonstrations, and the networks are proceeding very cautiously. That this should not necessarily be a cause for rejoicing is shown by past cases where the mass media have exercised “restraint” in the national interest. The possibility that the hour-long TV embargo on reporting of the Detroit riot left the field open to dangerous rumor-mongering was conceded by the Kerner Commission.

Caution has been pretty much a life-style for the networks since the beginning. With television right behind automobiles and drugs as the biggest industrial moneymakers, there is little likelihood that the next decade will give the network new courage. But somewhere, usually out of sight, is the talent and imagination to be daring. The N.B.C. White Papers produced under Irving Gitlin, many of them directed by Arthur Zegart, made few compromises in its programs on the exposé of Newburgh, New York’s welfare practices (which resulted in a lawsuit against the network), studies of gambling, of state legislatures, and
of police corruption in Boston (which also brought N.B.C. into the courts). Also, to the credit of C.B.S., were the unvarnished and often unbearable reports on Vietnam which brought that war home in its full reality — reports finally softened as the result of protests by Americans who found it too hard to take. And while on the subject of television's better moments, one has to mention those one-hour UNICEF films of Danny Kaye's and Marian Anderson's visits with children around the world, David Brinkley's look at the Mississippi River, the memorable film of Nikita Khrushchev in retirement, and the documentary on the contrasting boyhoods of James Baldwin and Hubert Humphrey. Recently there have been the two excellent "magazine" shows: "First Tuesday," which has shown us the rituals of life and death in New Guinea, the Nigerian civil war, the massacre of sheep in Skull Valley by poison gas, and "Sixty Minutes" (Venice, the dying city, and an interview with Marshal Tito). In drama we had Lee J. Cobb in Death of a Salesman, the Shakespeare series of plays sponsored by Esso and produced by the B.B.C., and N.B.C.'s grand tour of the Louvre. Children's programs reached a high peak with the imaginative Sunday-night Disney films, the long-awaited cartoon appearances of Charlie Brown, the Christmas productions of "Amahl and the Night Visitors," and — every morning, except Sunday, for years — Captain Kangaroo with puppets, paintings, dancing, animals, and music, from Carousel to Beethoven. There were many more good things, but taken all together they weren't enough to make television a very satisfying experience for the young.

If speculation on the future technology of television, if not its quality, is a bit exciting, contemplation of the newspaper business, past, present, and future, is a depressing one. With the usual exceptions, the big daily newspapers are not getting any better, even in those cities where they no longer have to worry about a competitor (which means almost everywhere). The slippage is unmistakable from front to back. Local coverage is mainly the memorializing of pseudo-events, official announcements, and press releases; national and international stories are also slighted and when used are written in the uninformative and purposefully dull prose of the wire services. Many papers which do subscribe to The New York Times or the Washington Post-Los Angeles Times services ignore their most interesting offerings or gut the pieces unmercifully. Most depressing is the bad writing that we now associate automatically with the sight of newprint: no section of the newspapers from the columnists and critics to the feature writers is free of the blight. In a talk to Harvard's Nieman Fellows twenty years ago, the late A. J. Liebling declared that newspapers are specially devised for the destruction of style. Liebling echoed Van Wyck Brooks, who claimed that no writing talent can survive more than a year in a city room. A few years later, Professor Theodore Morrison tried again to plead the cause of the reader, with his attack on the "hugger-mugger sentences," the fake emotionalism of journalese, and reporters who cannot come face-to-face with an idea. But such outbursts are valuable only as collectors' items in a country where the newspaper business resolutely refuses to engage in self-criticism and is run by publishers who consider the classified advertisement as the ultimate in paragraph structure.

One prediction that can be made with some assurance about the bulk of existing dailies is that they will continue to resist change even if it means their extinction. Like service on the subways, they become shoddier as the price goes up. At some point, the newspaper will undergo a physical mutation at the hands of the electronics industry, which will put newsboys out of business forever: facsimile editions will unroll from our TV sets, thus making official the fact that newspapers are a tail on the television dog for most people. There is an irony to the fact that while TV news broadcasts adopted the very worst traits of the newspapers, the newspapers tried to compete with the newscasters at their own game — with neither medium able to match the other's peculiar talent for trivialization.

There are all sorts of reasons why per capita newspaper readership in America is declining, and runs well behind readership in many European and Asian countries, but the most important reason is that American newspapers are boring, petulant, distrusted, and run in the main by people who are milking them. Of course television competition for advertising has hurt the papers, but publishers and bad writing and third-rate reporters were killing newspapers long before TV was invented. The trouble with newspapers is that they are managed by the same sort of people who run railroads. For years conservative publishers have put out papers which, by opposing adequate financing of public education, have thereby ensured the decline of the literacy on which newspapers depend. By misreporting or under-reporting the extent and effects of urban and rural poverty and racial discrimination, they have accelerated the deterio-
tion of their cities and the departure of their advertisers and readers to the suburbs. Faced with vast population and economic changes in the cities, the newspapers have failed to adjust. There are exceptions—the Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun, for instance, are trying to replace their vanishing middle-class circulation by offering systematic coverage of the minority group communities. The New York Times, always a fine newspaper, has improved measurably in an effort to serve the needs of the world's most tortured city. But most of the urban dailies—and they include some of the traditionally "great" ones—see the ghetto mainly as a source of crime and riot stories.

It may be true that our biggest cities have become just as impossible to report on as they are to govern, and that newspapers, like government, ought to decentralize and assign reporters on a very different basis. The "storefront" reporter, visible in his neighborhood, could be a collector of volunteered information as well as a perennial observer on a new sort of beat. Despite its old reputation for gray impersonality, The New York Times has been doing a great deal of prospecting in the city's neighborhoods, on an irregular basis. There is an intimate and very appealing quality to some of its reporting as a result. Oddly enough, the same closeness to subject is frequently achieved in two newspapers thought of as being national rather than local in character—the Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Journal. When they examine a local situation the resulting story is well rounded, colorful, and quite personal in tone. But these are rare examples. A main contention of critics now is that the big dailies and urban TV stations are not in touch with the special problems of their own constituencies, and that they are behaving just like another centralized bureaucracy.

One effect of the urban news factory, heavily weighted with official events, pressure-group propaganda, and "national" stories, has been the raising of the trajectory of people's attention toward remote events, far from their immediate environment. Such material may combat provincialism, but too heavy a diet of it leaves the reader in ignorance about what is taking place next door. And with newspapers and television increasingly directing his attention to "big" issues over which he feels he has no control, his sense of helplessness grows and his inclination to intervene actively in the affairs of his community declines.

The big press and TV news factories are in direct contrast to the underground press, which has built up its circulation primarily by appealing to small and neglected communities, sometimes political, sometimes social. A former Berkeley Barb reporter, Stewart Glauberman, compares that newspaper to a sympathetic parent at the breakfast table listening to his son's account of being busted by the cops: what is important is not the facts, it is that in his own home the son is believed and his story will be told to the neighbors as gospel. But one has to look past the established examples of the underground press to find a true community newspaper—the Barb, the Express Times, and the East Village Other are so propagandistic that even their own readers can't afford to trust them. A good example of an insurgent newspaper that tries to serve an unrepresented community is the monthly Freedom News, which with volunteer help is flourishing as an antidote to the conservative dailies published in affluent Contra Costa County near San Francisco. Freedom News muckrakes, in factual and conversational style, gives the defendant's side of an arrest story, and even has its own columnist on what the Establishment is doing to the natural environment. Another newspaper that has kept its community flavor in spite of its success is the Village Voice, whose encouragement of debate, reporting, and criticism has given it a respectably large citywide and national audience. El Malcriado, the organ of Cesar Chavez' United Farm Workers Organizing Committee in Delano, California, is something of a disappointment as a community newspaper. Published in Spanish and English, as the union's voice to its own membership, and supposedly as a plea for the attention of the outer community, the paper is a far cry from that classic community journal, Indian Opinion, founded in South Africa by Gandhi, whose philosophy deeply influenced Chavez. Of Indian Opinion, Gandhi wrote that it was "an open book to whoever wanted to gauge the strength and the weakness of the community, be he a friend, an enemy, or a neutral. The workers had realized at the very outset that secrecy had no place in a movement where one could do no wrong, where there was no scope for duplicity or cunning, and where strength constituted the single guarantee of victory. . . ."

"One thing we [the staff] have endeavored to observe most scrupulously: namely, never to depart from the strictest facts, and in dealing with the difficult questions that have arisen . . . we hope that we have used the utmost moderation possible under the circumstances. We should fail in our duty if we wrote anything with a view to hurt. Facts we would place before our readers, whether they be palatable or not, and it is by placing them constantly
before the public in their nakedness that the misunderstanding between the two communities in South Africa can be removed."

*Indian Opinion* had a far different historic and political role to play than the newspaper of a contemporary American city, but the words Gandhi used to describe the standards and community responsibilities of his journal might serve as a text for modern publishers who consider their newspapers primarily as business properties. The failure of their newspapers to speak directly to their readers and to report about local life in a systematic and credible manner has contributed to the general distrust of the press. If a newspaper does not cultivate familiarity with the problem of that great majority of individuals who are "unimportant," it will not have the capacity to understand them when their actions suddenly become "important" — that is, disruptive, eccentric, or tragic.

The coverage of campus disturbances is a good example of how the press has distorted the nature of those fragile communities and what problems the universities face as they resist suffocation by the larger society. The TV or newspaper reporter casually assigned to a confrontation is no more equipped to understand the bare essentials of violence than he was when dispatched to the rioting in Newark and Detroit. Like a fixed camera, he does not view things in the round, and he is intellectually immobile as well. The fragments he offers his papers as the comprehensive truth will contradict the experience of any reader who has had personal contact with the event; thus the level of distrust is raised again and again. The trend is not likely to be reversed, because newspapers and TV are fascinated with the characteristic rather than the typical, the spectacular rather than the intangible, and the easily categorized rather than the complex. To operate with such criteria means, obviously, that the most important information about almost everything is lost. On very few newspapers are reporters or editors permitted to become students of the society they tell us about. We are being educated by a professional secretariat, and the notion that reporters are supposed to record only "the facts" is, of course, an old notion, but it is not an old-fashioned one.

Only a few months ago, the executive head of the United Press International observed that the purpose of reporting is to "hold a mirror to the world." With such a philosophy, it is not surprising that in all echelons of the mass media there is suspicion of any young journalist who displays a minimum of creative vitality in his writing or in his way of approaching a subject. Such young people can complicate the life of an editor who wants people who can get the gist of anything in an hour, and who can be deployed quickly to trouble spots, like policemen. It is no wonder, then, that the mass media have turned out in force to cover the various wars, declared and undeclared, that are ripping up the world, from Watts to Vietnam, while we are left in ignorance about what is happening across town. Or that hundreds of correspondents every day jam Washington press conferences while the side effects of "scientific progress" that are destroying our air, water, and land have gone largely unreported until recently. And there should be nothing mysterious about the fact that, despite all the newsprint devoted to college riots, Americans understand their educational system no better than they did in 1900.

All of the above observations are questionable, of course, because they are generalizations. Nobody can overlook the diversity of a newspaper press that includes a *New York Times* and a *Daily News* in the same city, or a TV medium which can invent a *Newspaper of the Air* (KQED-TV, the San Francisco educational station) along with the sleek newscasts of its neighboring KRON-TV (owned by the *San Francisco Chronicle*). Also, if pressed, a critic can pick out of the record of the past ten years some examples of change for the better. *Time* and *Newsweek* have both improved their vision as well as their English. *The New Yorker* magazine is giving us all sorts of penetrating insights into life all over the country in the best journalistic prose around. Washington, D.C.'s *Star* and *Post* are getting better all the time. Some individual TV stations are doing a good job of local coverage (KCRA-TV, Sacramento, is a good example). Interesting people like Joan Baez pop up on the "Today" show as well as fusty congressmen. But the hopeful signs are scarce. While the range is great, the overwhelming weight of television is as riddled with blah as it was when Ed Murrow took it to task for its unadulterated commercialism. And a cross-country reading tour of our city newspapers shows them to be at least as trivial, if less plentiful, as they were when the Commission on a Free and Responsible Press issued its criticisms twenty-two years ago. The saddest fact of all about our newspapers and our TV programs is that there is nothing new to say about them.

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THE DISAPPOINTING DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT

In 1961 U Thant proclaimed a Development Decade in the name of the United Nations. He called for a massive effort, from rich and poor nations alike, to achieve world development, which he defined as economic progress plus social reform. As we approach the end of the decade, however, disillusion reigns. Notwithstanding a multitude of plans, programs, projects, and aid operations, the world is perhaps no closer to a victory over misery than before. Indeed, for most of the world's people development remains a distant dream if not a nightmare. What has gone wrong in the process?

Four questions are central to the quality of life in developed and underdeveloped societies alike. Can worldwide misery be abolished? Is global austerity — imposed and voluntary — necessary? Can cultural diversity be saved in the face of standardization? Is world ecological control indispensable?

These questions are important because the good society requires more than a combination of political democracy, industrialization, and the mass consumption of goods. This is not to say that political democracy is not good, but that it is meaningless in the absence of other freedoms. Moreover, its historical existence in a Western cultural matrix distorts its possible appeal elsewhere. The same holds true with industrialization, some measure of which is probably necessary in most societies. The real issue is how free can these societies be to devise modes of industrialization in harmony with their own values and preferences. As for the mass-consumer economy, one cannot exorcise the fear that it represents an alienating form of social organization. A major task of development planners in non-industrialized countries may well be how to devise ways of achieving economic modernity without at the same time creating a mass-consumer society. According to Paul Ricoeur: "The triumph of consumer culture, universally identical
and integrally anonymous, would represent the zero point of a creative culture; what would result is skepticism on a planetary scale, absolute nihilism in the triumph of well-being. One must admit that this peril is at least as great and perhaps even more probable than that of atomic destruction.”

The conventional view of the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries sees the former as “saving” the latter from misery, disease, and stagnation because of their superior knowledge and technology. At the deepest level, however, it may be necessary to reverse the roles. Perhaps the “developed” nations must be “saved” from meaninglessness and servitude to means by creative options yet to be made in “underdeveloped” societies struggling to “modernize” in a human mode. The agonizing questions that perplex developed countries — questions regarding ends and the quality of human life — lie at the heart of the underdeveloped countries’ own choices of their futures. A few Third World leaders have understood this: Julius Nyerere by choosing self-reliance, Mao Tse-tung by subordinating economic growth and institutional modernization to the creation of a new Chinese psyche. But unless all Third World developers understand that their own drive toward development is concerned with the same questions faced by the developed societies, they will not achieve a humane form of development. Moreover, the dangers of global war and ecological suicide will persist unless successful answers to such questions are found in the Third World. Accordingly, the inquiry into the good life and the good society is meaningless unless it is worldwide. It must also be rooted in history and present reality, not merely in logic or ritual. To pose it in contemporary terms is to recognize a world in which technology holds sway, in fact and in desire; in which widening disparities between rich and poor are growing increasingly abhorrent; in which political and economic domination remains a stubborn fact. Because Third World consciousness is alerted to the dangers of cultural as well as political and economic imperialism, there is some slight hope that perhaps, somewhere in that world, a new wisdom can be forged to match that of the modern sciences. Yet, the Third World’s pressing material needs must be met quickly. The answers one gives to these basic questions can reveal, at least in general terms, what constitutes a “human” form of development.

There is a candid warning in Pakistan’s twenty-year perspective plan that “massive improvement will still leave living standards far below the level of developed countries. It will, however, eliminate poverty and ensure that at least the basic minimum of necessities of life are available to everyone.” The Delphic oracle’s message to the Third World is: “If your goal is to match the economic levels of those now developed, you are not going to make it.” This is a harsh message unless it is accompanied by two more: “Don’t complain; we who have ‘made it’ are only now beginning to taste the bitter fruits of our dehumanizing affluence. You are the lucky ones.” The other, and more important, is: “The developed world has no moral right to transmit the first two messages unless it practices voluntary austerity.” As seen through Third World eyes, the rich world is one of the major obstacles to their “making it.” Realists doubtless recognize that even if all the maleficient activity of the rich world could be suppressed, the Third World would still not “make it.” But it is no less true that it is the rich world which has tampered with the poor man’s desires and made him desperately want to “make it.” It is time for the rich world to tamper with its own desire mechanisms, this time to moderate acquisitive desires, not to arouse them, if it expects others to practice restraint. The “affluence” image of the good life is probably irreversible in underdeveloped as well as in developed lands. Development economists say privately that poor countries have not had the image of affluence shoved down their throats; they are hell-bent on getting it. J. Kenneth Galbraith has said, “No other social goal is more strongly avowed than economic growth; no other test of social success has such nearly unanimous acceptance as the annual increase in the gross national product. And this is true of all countries, developed or undeveloped; communist, socialist, or capitalist. . . . Similarly, it is now agreed that ancient cultures — India, China, and Persia — should measure their progress toward civilization by their percentage increase in G.N.P. Their own scholars are the most insistent of all.”

Yet it is a mistake to judge civilization, or even development, in terms of G.N.P. Affluence for the masses is impossible except on terms demeaning to Third World societies themselves. Wisdom dictates that a more modest goal be set, i.e., the elimination of misery. The poor masses can achieve abundance quickly only if technologically advanced countries concentrate all their productive potential on producing consumer goods for everyone in the world. With automation and cybernetics, this is possible. But such a promise rests on several unreal assumptions: that the rich world is willing to harness its productive
forces to meeting the rest of the world’s priority needs, that poor nations accept being mere beneficiaries, and not creative agents of their own development, and that such a course is possible without transforming the human race into a gigantic social engineering laboratory.

These conditions are demeaning to the Third World’s dignity. They are incompatible with the values that dominate the rich world. They are also morally repugnant. The only argument, then, is technical feasibility. Of course, it is also technically feasible to destroy all life on the planet.

Inhuman poverty cannot be wiped out unless the world as a whole chooses to eliminate poverty rather than obtain affluence. The unrealistic quest for affluence generates forms of determinism, exploitation, and social privilege which are abhorrent to the world’s poor. Given present population trends and densities (and all imaginable alternative projections), affluence for the few is the only form of affluence possible. But affluence for the few — namely, for rich countries or rich classes in poor countries — is precisely what the Third World has rejected. To pursue the development dream of general affluence, misery is ipso facto imposed on all who do not enjoy privileged positions. In order to be meaningful, austerity must entail the acceptance of privation for the sake of overcoming some crisis, enhancing one’s future position, or achieving greater equity in the distribution of goods. This is qualitatively different from the austerity which is the by-product of social injustice, permissive entrepreneurship which rewards those most astute at making profits, or the failure to mobilize potential energies around urgent collective tasks. In poor countries austerity is the refusal to waste, or to practice ostentation, or to allow potential resources to lie idle. One kind of imposed austerity perpetuates underdevelopment; the other kind combats it.

The principle of austerity is readily acknowledged in underdeveloped countries, although political obstacles to its implementation are enormous. But the greatest obstacles lie in the way of introducing voluntary austerity in countries already developed. One difficulty is that the importance of frugality is not as apparent as it is in poor countries. Nevertheless, voluntary austerity is vital to the moral health of prosperous societies.

Homeopathy is not confined to medicine, it also applies to ethical life. There is, in addition to qualitative cures for the ills of quantitative societies, a therapy of quantity. As in every treatment of like by like, an important problem is dosage. Against the ailment of compulsive consumption, voluntary austerity in the use of material goods is prescribed if one’s goal is to achieve fullness of good rather than mere abundance of goods. Men in want have too little to become human, but satiated men must strive to become human because they have too much. In developed countries to be has come to mean to have. Patriotism and social duty enjoin men to want more so that the national productive apparatus can be fed without interruption. As it does in non-developed countries, austerity in rich lands would urge men to forego immediate gratification for the sake of some greater good. Once general affluence has become possible, however, austerity can only be voluntary.

One pitfall of optional austerity is that those who engage in it can easily transform their righteousness into self-righteousness. But the truly poor man is as immune to this temptation as he is to that of narcissism. Rarely can he escape his plight and, as he reflects upon his own misery, his options are usually confined to resigning himself to his lot in life or denouncing (probably in vain) those responsible for it. Whoever assumes austerity voluntarily, on the contrary, is protected in dire moments by his talents, by his earning capacity, even by the Social Security law.

Voluntary austerity is dictated by two compelling human reasons of crucial importance to the success of world development efforts. The first is freedom: men must free themselves from slavery to their own
desires. Individuals living in societies that goad them to consume relentlessly must assert by their actions the primacy of their personality over things and over forces which powerfully and insistently violate their desire. A high wall should be erected against the strategy employed by profit-seekers, backed by dollars and brains, who prostitute psychology’s findings and brainwash men into spending, accumulating, wasting, and throwing away.

The second reason for voluntary austerity on the part of the affluent is that it would forge a bond of solidarity between them and the masses of people upon whom austerity is imposed. Unless one has psychologically “tuned in” on the wavelength of the poor, one cannot imagine what it means to be underdeveloped. Austerity must be based on inner detachment from egocentric pursuits and on genuine respect for others. Social and political activists further require that it be efficacious. Before seeking efficacy, however, the practice must acquire authenticity, and it cannot be genuine unless it is free. Only thus can it begin to make its practitioners aware of the grim asperities of underdevelopment everywhere in the world. Although it must remain free, austerity must be severe enough to awaken the man who practices it to the true dimensions of hardship outside his own world of sufficiency.

The ethical significance of choosing austerity resides in staying the contagion of greed. If it is widely successful in the rich world voluntary austerity might help to reduce wastefulness, release the stranglehold of advanced economies over underdeveloped ones, and render disinterested financial coöperation possible. Above all, it would prod men to greater collective responsibility and fraternal community. No one can deny that material objects bring great psychological, emotional, and other satisfactions, but the viciously circular automatisms of acquisitiveness must be shattered if men are to become sensitive to absolute want in others.

Voluntary austerity and the elimination of needless waste and superfluous consumption do not constitute economic regress but progress. The major economic effect of widespread voluntary austerity would be to bring the level of production into line with conscious choices of individuals and communities. It would also contribute to halting the trend toward absolute quantification of human conduct in all its spheres.

This recommendation of austerity for rich and poor is manifestly utopian; it cannot work if present trends and attitudes continue. But in a world grown irrational in its totality, although each of its parts is supremely rational, it is the only realistic road to success. To imagine that anything less can lead to a resolution of the agonizing tension between having enough and having too much is sheer illusion. To propose such a utopian measure, however, is not a gesture of optimism, since there is so little likelihood that men will accept hard solutions. They are more likely to continue devising palliatives and accommodations. In view of their near-incorrugible tendency to do so, one can only be pessimistic.

Development processes release social forces whose convergent effect is to standardize tastes, practices, and institutions. The promotion of cultural diversity ought to be a general objective of development planning. But is cultural diversity good?

There is a very strong reason for regarding cultural diversity as a positive good: the human species’ capacity for adaptation. Biologists and ecologists warn that the human organism will be stunted and many of its potentialities atrophied if its adaptive powers are, for long periods of time, challenged exclusively or predominantly by overspecialized artificial environments. The drive toward development — toward dense urbanization, social mobility based on occupational function, uniform socialization based on values of efficiency, manipulative rationality, and the objective equivalence of human experiences — is now occurring in a way which emphasizes man’s special adaptive capacities to artificial environments. What is needed in development is a deliberate and imaginative effort to promote diversity. Not only must surviving cultures be helped to adjust on their own terms to the impingements of proffered change but systematic restraints should be placed on the homogenizing tendencies in the “forces of modernization.” Standards used by many developers must be revised. They must refuse to assume that mass urbanization is the only developmental alternative to subsistence in stagnant rural areas.

A similar problem arises regarding “linguistic integration” of underdeveloped rural populaces to the lingua franca of an entire nation. This is the issue in Andean countries, African nations, India, and elsewhere. To presume that linguistic uniformity fosters development overlooks the profound desire of a people for cultural esteem. It would, therefore, be cruel to impose, in the interest of development, conditions that are tantamount to cultural suicide.
Some cultural traits will unavoidably disappear with modernization. Entire societies will perhaps lack survival value and vanish before the onslaught of industrialization. Sentimentality is a foolish guide in such matters. There is no warrant for adopting a museum-piece outlook on economically backward cultures, no valid reason for preserving in artificial societal mausoleums every folkloric vestige or cultural curiosity. Many picturesque and even some functional values will inevitably give way to standardized tastes and behavior. Yet, man's creative imagination needs to be taxed far beyond present bounds in order to invent a variety of forms of those values they now standardize as part of the development process. Adaptation to local conditions can be as innovative as original invention. Full opportunities must be afforded backward countries to actualize what Keynes called the "possibilities of things." This goal is unattainable, however, unless the characteristics of these countries are respected.

No clear universal directives exist to help us decide which diversities are worth preserving and which can be sacrificed. Unless societies maintain distinct cultures, their members cannot develop the self-awareness and self-esteem necessary for full creativity. One cannot demonstrate that cultural diversity is indispensable to over-all human growth. The contrary assertion, that standardization is a greater good, can be refuted only by appealing to the general sense of all peoples in history, to the survival of multiple traditions, and to every society's self-declared interest in a specific identity of its own. No one culture incarnates every important human value. Consequently, even if it were possible to reduce all men to a single homogeneous pattern, it would still be desirable to foster diversity.

Unless deliberate and systematic measures are taken by planners to safeguard environmental and cultural diversity, massive uniformities will continue to impose themselves throughout the world as power lines are laid in its open spaces, as tractors and mechanical harvesters supplant rudimentary farm implements, as food processing and packaging become more prevalent, as airports, highways, supermarkets, and drugstores continue to spring up in remote hinterlands. In a word, the external environment of the entire world runs the risk of becoming too homogeneous. If societies exercise full mastery over the technological processes, they can withstand a considerable degree of standardization of external conditions. The crucial point of defense is to resist the homogenization of social mores or life patterns. René Dubos cites the Indian tribes in the American Southwest to illustrate the principle that even under similar physical environments, different societies can achieve quite different kinds of civilization. "The Hopis live a sedentary and agricultural existence in crowded adobe settlements, carefully husbanding the scarce water to raise a few crops. In contrast, the Navajos move... from one isolated family hogan to another, maintaining... a pastoral type of culture based on the herding of sheep and goats. Man in some way is the product of his environment, but he can also take advantage of his environment to create a pattern of life of his own choice."

In the face of great external similarities, therefore, the important dimension is in the realm of meanings and values man attaches to what takes place about him. Although consumer patterns may acquire great uniformity, or look-alike industrial plants fill every empty landscape, different societies remain possible because the meaning and relative importance attached to these outward realities can vary. Several years ago, Alberto Moravia, the Italian novelist, returned from a trip to the Soviet Union. His remarks indicated that he understood for the first time the intimate tie between a society's spiritual values and the material objects with which it surrounds itself. Moravia concluded that it is catastrophic for any system of production to eliminate variety in consumer goods. More significantly, he discovered that variety can symbolize not only wastefulness, prodigality, or even the liberation of the person but the affirmation by a people of its creative spirit. "The borderline separating the work of art from a product of handicraft or from the product of light industry cannot be traced with any certitude. One can even affirm in this regard that the identical creative spirit lies at the origins of a monument, a novel, a rug, or a crystal vase. On the other hand, we can locate the exact dividing line between these objects and a tractor, a truck, or any other product of heavy industry. In the former category what is expressed with more or less talent is taste, artistic sense, and imagination; whereas in the latter what is revealed is rational utility. The former objects manifest the profound diversities in traditions, national genius, and particular characters. The second category, on the other hand, is based on the precepts of universal necessity."

Although economic and social development are not absolute values, it does not follow that they do not enjoy precedence over other values. Certain entrenched cultural values and practices impede development and cause positive harm to men. Gandhi
could anticipate with equanimity the future abolition of the sacred-cow institution as a parasitical vestige which could no longer be tolerated in a nation grown conscious of its backwardness and the alarming protein deficiencies of its population. The African practice of accumulating cattle herds as prestige symbols may likewise constitute a form of cultural diversity which is doomed to disappear. Yet one must beware of facile solutions in these matters. Conceivably, large numbers of Indian people might, if consulted, prefer to keep their sacred cows even at the price of remaining on a starvation diet. Similarly, African communities might prefer not to slaughter their animals for food or transform their pasture lands into agricultural plots. Nevertheless, where the general level of life-sustenance is extremely low or precarious, as in India, responsible leaders are justified in imposing solutions even when these are contrary to the expressed value preferences of the people.

True alternative choices do not lie between keeping the old or choosing the new. Rather, novel combinations of the new and the old, as yet undetermined, must be devised experimentally. The central issue is control over destinies.

In the Third World and in developed nations alike, restraints on technology are required if man is to use technology to reach human ends. The mobilization of people in underdeveloped lands on behalf of wise resistance to technological determinism has some chance of succeeding if it appeals to the preservation of cultural values already cherished.

For practical purposes, if not in theory, our planet must be treated as a closed system. Inputs of energy are still received, it is true, by the planetary ecosystem and biosphere from outer space, and men can leave the planet for short periods by carrying a fabricated life-support system with them. Nevertheless, according to Lynton Caldwell, “The constraints of the biosphere are those of a closed system. Until the twentieth century, men and nations could act as if the system were infinite. But now that possibility is gone forever.” For the first time in history, survival, health, and creativity now require that major human efforts be devoted to protecting the “dynamic stability” and the perpetual regenerative powers of the world’s ecological systems. Technological inroads have reached a point of no return: it is no longer possible for natural balances to reestablish themselves independently of human intervention. Ecological issues are central. Development is an eminently ecological matter in both senses of the word “ecology”: biology, dealing with relations between organisms and their environment, and sociology, concerned with the spacing of people and institutions and resulting interdependencies. The preservation of life and the quality of society itself are at stake.

Development experts claim to act rationally when they justify the exploitation of nature for economic purposes. Many experts believe that such rationality has enabled the “developed” world to reach the summit of material achievement and that, consequently, this rationality ought to be disseminated to the Third World. The words uttered by the Chairman of O.E.C.D.’s Development Assistance Committee are typical in this regard. According to him, global development strategy “should promote feelings of capacity to dominate one’s environment and to improve one’s economic and social position.” Scientific and technological knowledge endow men with the power to dominate their environment, but they do not confer the wisdom men need to avoid violating that environment beyond repair. To pursue technological advance without ecological wisdom in the twentieth century is to threaten life itself on this planet or, at the very least, to diminish vitality so greatly as to inflict irreparable genetic damage on all living organisms.

At present, ecological health centers around two relationships between living beings and environment: dynamic stability and ecological renewal. Ecological stability is not static; on the contrary, it is the capacity of an environmental system to compensate for the injurious disturbances it suffers. Since our world system is, for all practical effects, closed, a pathological state results if interference goes beyond the limits of compensation or adjustment. Ecological renewal, in turn, signifies the absolute necessity of preserving or reconstituting elements required for vitality. Ecologically irresponsible development will create social densities, conflict intensities, and determinisms that will stunt countless human qualities.

For centuries Western societies have tampered with nature for human purposes. Greek rationalism, the Roman engineering mentality, Biblical injunctions urging man to “subjugate” nature, and the post-Enlightenment mystique of technological progress have all contributed to reinforcing Western man’s disposition to transform nature to suit his own ends in the belief he could do so with impunity. And although eminent scientists such as a Bertrand Russell or Albert Einstein may profess reverence for the cosmic mysteries, the dominant spirit of scientists and
technologists has been to cajole, pressure, or even violate nature. As long as Western societies were tapping unspoiled and seemingly inexhaustible resources, the ecological ravages wrought by their interference with nature proceeded unnoticed or remained within tolerable bounds. This is no longer the case, however, and a serious problem arises. Development leaders must learn to distrust their own impulse to manipulate environment. This is no plea for inertia, stagnation, or the surrender of gains already made, but a summons to reflect on the consequences of man's interventions in the total cosmic system. Men would have to possess a clear synthesis of all their fragmentary knowledge in order to appraise the disruptive effects of their technology. This synthesis is precisely what they lack; and no further measure of progress in science or statistical correlations can give it to them. What is required is not to abdicate science, technology, or the effort to develop, but to subordinate them to ecological values. Even when development programs are limited, the conceptual framework in which they are planned and implemented ought to be comprehensive. The question, for example, of an optimum population for the world or any given unit thereof can be determined only with reference to biological and sociological ecology.

Some form of over-all world ecological control is urgently needed. It must embrace many spheres of activity besides population. It will be necessary to limit the amounts of radioactivity allowed to circulate in the atmosphere, the troposphere, and the stratosphere. New problems of protection against disease and of environmental regeneration will arise once space travel becomes commonplace. Urgent need also exists for international control over the ocean, over polar regions, and over artificial weather control. These are but a few of the domains wherein long-range protection of the regenerative powers of ecosystems must take precedence over the exploitation of natural resources or technological applications even for legitimate development purposes.

Civilizations reveal the nature of their goals and values in the environmental conditions they create. According to Lynton Caldwell, “The development process itself — whatever its scope or complexity — is inherently ecological. It is a process of purposeful change in the systematic interrelationships of living and inanimate things as they have evolved and continue to evolve in a biosphere dominated by human society.” Some environmental disruption is no doubt unavoidable, but harmful effects could be minimized by careful planning and preliminary ecological studies. Planning and study must be accompanied by controls over practice. And it is generally recognized that only through a worldwide system of control and enforcement may we hope to deal with the problem.

The United Nations has understood the importance of ecological health. In 1968, UNESCO held a conference on the rational use and conservation of the biosphere. Later that year, the U.N. General Assembly agreed to convene, in 1972, a conference on the human environment. More than discussion is needed, however. Even in the realm of theory greater enlightenment must come from the application, if only in a single sphere, of sound principles of world ecological management. Practical regimes of the seas, of the atmosphere, of space, of polar regions, of river systems, and of the total ecological welfare of the planet need to be worked out in detail, step by step. Imaginative model-building will have to take place. The ethicist's task is not to design the model but to justify its normative necessity.

What kind of development, then? Development that will include general austerity and wisdom in the use of goods, whether these are scarce or abundant; the positive fostering of cultural diversity even in the face of standardizing forces; and a comprehensive effort to safeguard the dynamic stability and renewal capacities of the world's ecological systems.

Mr. Goulet recently concluded six months at the Center as a Visiting Fellow. He has lived and worked in Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the Third World.
The Free Society seems to be a phrase of American coinage. At least it has no comparable currency in any other language, ancient or modern. The same is true of the phrase free government. This fact of itself suggests the assumption that American society and its form of government are a unique historical realization. The assumption is generally regarded among us as unquestionable.

However, we have tended of late to pronounce the phrase, the free society, with a rising interrogatory inflection. The phrase itself, it seems, now formulates a problem. This is an interesting new development. It once assumed that the American proposition, both social and political, was self-evident; that it authenticated itself on simple inspection; that it was, in consequence, intuitively grasped and generally understood by the American people. This assumption now stands under severe question.

What is the free society? Is the idea of it being successfully realized in the institutions that presently determine the pattern of American life, social and personal? The web of American institutions has altered, rapidly and profoundly, even radically, over the past few generations. Has the idea of the free society perhaps been strangled by the tightening intricacies of the newly formed institutional network? Has some new and alien idea subtly and unsuspectedly assumed the role of an organizing force in American society? Do we understand not only the superficial facts of change in American life but also the underlying factors of change — those variable constants that provide the dynamisms of change in human life?

The very fact that these questions are being asked makes it urgent that they be answered. What is at stake is America’s understanding of itself. Self-understanding is the necessary condition of a sense of self-identity and self-confidence, whether in the case of an individual or a people. If the American
people can no longer base this sense on naive assumptions of self-evidence, it is imperative that they find other more reasoned grounds for their affirmation that they are uniquely a people, uniquely a free society. Otherwise the peril is great. The complete loss of one’s identity is, with all propriety of theological definition, hell. In diminished forms it is insanity. And it would not be well for the American giant to go lumbering about the world today, lost and mad.

I suggest that the immediate question is not whether the free society is really free. This question may be unanswerable; it may even be meaningless as a question, if only for the reason that the norms of freedom seem to have become lost in a welter of confused controversy. Therefore, I suggest that the immediate question is whether American society is properly civil. This question is intelligible and answerable, because the basic standard of civility is not in doubt: “Civilization is formed by men locked together in argument. From this dialogue the community becomes a political community.” This statement, made by Thomas Gilby in Between Community and Society, exactly expresses the mind of Thomas Aquinas, who was himself giving refined expression to the tradition of classic antiquity, which in its prior turn had given first elaboration to the concept of the “civil multitude,” the multitude that is not a mass or a herd or a huddle, because it is characterized by civility.

The specifying note of political association is its rational deliberative quality, its dependence for its permanent cohesiveness on argument among men. In this it differs from all other forms of association found on earth. The animal kingdom is held together simply by the material homogeneity of the species; all its unities and antagonisms are of the organic and biological order. Wolves do not argue the merits of running in packs. The primal human community, the family, has its own distinctive bonds of union. Husband and wife are not drawn into the marital association simply by the forces of reason but by the forces of life itself, importantly including the mysterious dynamisms of sex. Their association is indeed founded on a contract, which must be a rational and free act. But the substance and finality of the contract is both infra- and supra-rational; it is an engagement to become “two in one flesh.” The marital relationship may at times be quarrelsome, but it is not argumentative. Similarly, the union of parents and children is not based on reason, justice, or power; it is based on kinship, love, and pietas.

It is otherwise with the political community. I am not, of course, maintaining that civil society is a purely rational form of association. We no longer believe, with Locke or Hobbes, that man escapes from a mythical “state of nature” by an act of will, by a social contract. Civil society is a need of human nature before it becomes the object of human choice. Moreover, every particular society is a creature of the soil; it springs from the physical soil of earth and from the more formative soil of history. Its existence is sustained by loyalties that are not logical; its ideals are expressed in legends that go beyond the facts and are for that reason vehicles of truth; its cohesiveness depends in no small part on the materialisms of property and interest. Though all this is true, nevertheless the distinctive bond of the civil multitude is reason, or more exactly, that exercise of reason which is argument.

Hence the climate of the City is likewise distinctive. It is not feral or familial but forensic. It is not hot and humid, like the climate of the animal kingdom. It lacks the cordial warmth of love and unreasoning loyalty that pervades the family. It is cool and dry, with the coolness and dryness that characterize good argument among informed and responsible men. Civic amity gives to this climate its vital quality. This form of friendship is a special kind of moral virtue, a thing of reason and intelligence, laboriously cultivated by the discipline of passion, prejudice, and narrow self-interest. It is the sentiment proper to the City. It has nothing to do with the cleavage of a David to a Jonathan, or with the kinship of the clan, or with the charity that makes the solidarity of the Church. It is in direct contrast with the passionate fanaticism of the Jacobin: “Be my brother or I’ll kill you!” Ideally, I suppose, there should be only one passion in the City — the passion for justice. But the will to justice, though it engages the heart, finds its measure as it finds its origin in intelligence, in a clear understanding of what is due to the equal citizen from the City and to the City from the citizenry according to the mode of their equality. This commonly shared will to justice is the ground of civic amity as it is also the ground of that unity which is called peace. This unity, qualified by amity, is the highest good of the civil multitude and the perfection of its civility.

If, then, society is civil when it is formed by men locked together in argument, the question rises, what is the argument about? There are three major themes.

First, the argument is about public affairs, the res publica, those matters which are for the advantage
of the public (in the phrase as old as Plato) and which call for public decision and action by government. These affairs have their origin in matters of fact; but their rational discussion calls for the Socratic dialogue, the close and easy use of the habit of cross-examination, that transforms brute facts into arguable issues.

Second, the public argument concerns the affairs of the commonwealth. This is a wider concept. It denotes the affairs that fall, at least in decisive part, beyond the limited scope of government. These affairs are not to be settled by law, though law may be in some degree relevant to their settlement. They go beyond the necessities of the public order as such; they bear upon the quality of the common life. The great “affair” of the commonwealth is, of course, education. It includes three general areas of common interest: (1) the school system, its mode of organization, its curricular content, and the level of learning among its teachers, (2) the later education of the citizen in the liberal art of citizenship, and (3) the more general enterprise of the advancement of knowledge by research.

The third theme of public argument is the most important and the most difficult. It concerns the constitutional consensus whereby the people acquire identity as a people and the society is endowed with its vital form, its sense of purpose as a collectivity organized for action in history. The idea of consensus has been classic since the Stoics and Cicero; through St. Augustine it found its way into the liberal tradition of the West.

The state of civility supposes a consensus that is constitutional — its focus is the idea of law, as surrounded by the whole constellation of ideas that are related to the ratio iuris as its premises, its constituent elements, and its consequences. This consensus is come to by the people; they become a people by coming to it. They do not come to it accidentally, without quite knowing how, but deliberatively, by the methods of reason reflecting on experience. The consensus is not a structure of secondary rationalizations erected on psychological data (as the behaviorist would have it) or on economic data (as the Marxist would have it). It is not the residual minimum left after rigid application of the Cartesian axiom that everything should be held in doubt. It is not simply a set of working hypotheses whose value is pragmatic. It is an ensemble of substantive truths, a structure of basic knowledge, an order of elementary affirmations that reflect realities inherent in the order of existence. It occupies an established position in society and excludes opinions alien or contrary to itself. This consensus is the intuitional a priori of all the rationalities and technicalities of constitutional and statutory law. It furnishes the premises of the people's action in history and defines the larger aims which that action seeks in internal affairs and in external relations.

The whole premise of the public argument, if it is to be civilized and civilizing, is that the consensus is real, that among the people everything is not in doubt, but that there is a core of agreement, accord, concurrence, acquiescence. We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. Mutatis mutandis, this is true of scientific, philosophical, and theological argument. It is no less true of political argument.

On its most imperative level the public argument within the City and about the City's affairs begins with the agreement that there is a reality called, in the phrase of Pope Leo XIII, the patrimony of mankind, a heritage of an essential truth, a tradition of rational belief, that sustains the structure of the City and furnishes the substance of civil life. It was to this patrimony that the Declaration of Independence referred: “We hold these truths. . . . ” This is the first
The first truth to which the American proposition makes appeal through the Declaration of Independence is a truth that lies beyond politics; it imparts to politics a fundamental human meaning. I mean the sovereignty of God over nations as well as over individual men. This is the principle that radically distinguishes the conservative Christian tradition of America from the Jacobin laicist tradition of continental Europe. The Jacobin tradition proclaimed the autonomous reason of man to be the first and the sole principle of political organization. In contrast, the first article of the American political faith is that the political community, as a form of free and ordered human life, looks to the sovereignty of God as to the first principle of its organization. In the Jacobin tradition religion is at best a purely private concern, a matter of personal devotion, quite irrelevant to public affairs. Society as such, the state which gives it legal form, and the government which is its organ of action are by definition agnostic or atheist. The statesman as such cannot be a believer, and his actions as a statesman are immune from any imperative or judgment higher than the will of the people, in whom resides ultimate and total sovereignty (one must remember that in the Jacobin tradition “the people” means “the party”). This whole manner of thought is altogether alien to the authentic American tradition.

From the point of view of the problem of pluralism this radical distinction between the American and the Jacobin traditions is of cardinal importance. The United States has had, and still has, its share of agnostics and unbelievers. But it has never known organized militant atheism on the Jacobin, doctrinaire socialist, or communist model; it has rejected parties and theories which erect atheism into a political principle. In 1799, the year of the Napoleonic coup d'état which overthrew the Directory and established a dictatorship in France, President John Adams stated the first of all American first principles in his remarkable proclamation of March 6. . . . It is also most reasonable in itself that men who are capable of social arts and relations, who owe their improvements to the social state, and who derive their enjoyments from it, should, as a society, make acknowledgements of dependence and obligation to Him who hath endowed them with these capacities and elevated them in the scale of existence by these distinctions. . . .

President Lincoln on May 30, 1863, echoed the tradition in another proclamation:

Whereas the Senate of the United States, devoutly recognizing the supreme authority and just government of Almighty God in all the affairs of men and nations, has by a resolution requested the President to designate and set apart a day for national prayer and humiliation; And whereas it is the duty of nations as well as of men to own their dependence upon the overruling power of God, to confess their sins and trespasses in humble sorrow, yet with the assured hope that genuine repentance will lead to mercy and pardon. . . .

The authentic voice of America speaks in these words. And it is a testimony to the enduring vitality of this first principle — the sovereignty of God over society as well as over individual men — that President Eisenhower, in 1952, quoted these words of Lincoln in a proclamation of similar intent. There is, of course, dissent from this principle, uttered by American secularism (which, at that, is a force far different in content and purpose from Continental laicism). But the secularist dissent is clearly a dissent; it illustrates the existence of the American affirmation. And it is continually challenged. For instance, as late as 1952 an opinion of the United States Supreme Court challenged it by asserting: “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Three times before in its history — in 1815, 1892, and 1931 — the Court had formally espoused the same principle.

Clinton Rossiter, in Seedtime of the Republic, gave a scholarly account of the “noble aggregate of ‘self-evident truths’ that vindicated the campaign of resistance (1765-1775), the resolution for independence (1776), and the establishment of the new state governments (1776-1780).” These truths, he added, “had been no less self-evident to the preachers, merchants, planters, and lawyers who were the mind of Colonial America.” It might have been added that these truths firmly presided over the great time of study, discussion, and decision which produced the federal Constitution. “The great political philosophy of the Western world,” Rossiter wrote, “enjoyed one of its proudest seasons in this time of resistance and revolution.” By reason of this fact the American Revolution, quite unlike its French counterpart, was less a revolution than a conservation. It preserved (by giving newly vital form to) the liberal tradition
of politics, whose ruin in Continental Europe was about to be consummated by the first great modern essay in totalitarianism.

The force for unity inherent in this tradition was of decisive importance in what concerns the problem of pluralism. Because it was conceived in the tradition of natural law the American Republic was rescued from the fate, still not overcome, that fell upon the European nations in which Continental liberalism, a deformation of the liberal tradition, lodged itself, not least by the aid of the Lodges. There have never been “two Americas,” in the sense in which there have been, and still are, “two Frances,” “two Italys.” “two Spains.” Politically speaking, America has always been one. The reason is that a consensus was once established, and it still substantially endures, even in the quarters where its origins have been forgotten.

Formally and in the first instance this consensus was political; that is, it embraced a whole constellation of principles bearing upon the origin and nature of society, the function of the state as the legal order of society, and the scope and limitations of government. Free government—perhaps this typically American shorthand phrase sums up the consensus; “a free people under a limited government” puts the matter more exactly.

To the early Americans, government was not a phenomenon of force, as the later legal positivists would have it. Nor was it an “historical category,” as Marx and his followers were to assert. Government did not mean simply the power to coerce, though this power was taken as integral to government. Government, properly speaking, was the right to command. It was authority. Its authority derived from law. By the same token its authority was limited by law. In his own way Tom Paine put the matter when he said, “In America, Law is the King.” But the matter had been better put by Henry of Bracton (d.1268) when he said, “The king ought not to be under a man, but under God and under the law, because the law makes the king.” This was the message of Magna Carta; this became the first structural rib of American constitutionalism.

Constitutionalism, the rule of law, the notion of sovereignty as purely political and therefore limited by law, the concept of government as an empire of laws and not of men—these were ancient ideas, deeply implanted in the British tradition at its origin in medieval times. The major American contribution to the tradition—a contribution that imposed itself on all subsequent political history in the Western world—was the written Constitution. However, the American document was not the constitution octroyée of the nineteenth-century Restorations—a constitution graciously granted by the King or Prince-President. Through the American techniques of the constitutional convention and of popular ratification, the American Constitution is explicitly the act of the people. It embodies their consensus as to the purposes of government, its structure, the extent of its powers and the limitations on them, and so forth. By the Constitution the people define the areas where authority is legitimate and the areas where liberty is lawful. The Constitution is therefore at once a charter of freedom and a plan for political order.

Here is the second aspect of the continuity between the American consensus and the ancient liberal tradition. I mean the affirmation of the principle of the consent of the governed. Sir John Fortescue (d.1476), Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench under Henry VI, had thus stated the tradition, in distinguishing between the absolute and the constitutional monarch: The secounde king [the constitutional monarch] may not rule his people by other laws than such as thai assetten to. And therefore he may set upon thaim non imposicions without their consent. The principle of consent was inherent in the medieval idea of kingship; the king was bound to seek the consent of his people to his legislation. The American consensus reaffirmed this principle, at the same time that it carried the principle to newly logical lengths. Americans agreed that they would consent to none other than their own legislation, as framed by their representatives, who would be responsible to them. In other words, the principle of consent was wed to the equally ancient principle of popular participation in rule. But, since this latter principle was given an amplitude of meaning never before known in history, the result was a new synthesis, whose formula is the phrase of Lincoln, “government by the people.”

Americans agreed to make government constitutional and therefore limited in a new sense, because it is representative, republican, responsible government. It is limited not only by law but by the will of the people it represents. Not only do the people adopt the Constitution; through the techniques of representation, free elections, and frequent rotation of administrations they also have a share in the enactment of all subsequent statutory legislation. The people are really governed; American political theorists did not pursue the Rousseauist will-o’-the-wisp: how shall the individual in society come to obey only himself? Nevertheless, the people are governed because
they consent to be governed; and they consent to be governed because in a true sense they govern themselves.

The American consensus therefore includes a great act of faith in the capacity of the people to govern themselves. The faith was not unrealistic. It was not supposed that everybody could master the technical aspects of government, even in a day when these aspects were far less complex than they now are. The supposition was that the people could understand the general objectives of governmental policy, the broad issues put to the decision of government, especially as these issues raised moral problems. The American consensus accepted the premise of medieval society — that there is a sense of justice inherent in the people, in virtue of which they are empowered, as the medieval phrase had it, to "judge, direct, and correct" the processes of government.

It was this political faith that compelled early American agreement to the institutions of a free speech and a free press. In the American concept of them, these institutions do not rest on the thin theory proper to eighteenth-century individualistic rationalism, that a man has a right to say what he thinks merely because he thinks it. The American agreement was to reject political censorship of opinion as unrightful, because unwise, imprudent, not to say impossible. However, the proper premise of these freedoms lay in the fact that they were social necessities. “Colonial thinking about each of these rights had a strong social rather than individualistic bias,” Clinton Rossiter wrote. They were regarded as conditions essential to the conduct of free, representative, and responsible government. People who are called upon to obey have the right first to be heard. People who are to bear burdens and make sacrifices have the right first to pronounce on the purposes which their sacrifices serve. People who are summoned to contribute to the common good have the right first to pass their own judgment on the question, whether the good proposed be truly a good, the people's good, the common good. Through the technique of majority opinion this popular judgment becomes binding on government.

A second principle underlay these free institutions — the principle that the state is distinct from society and limited in its offices toward society. This principle, too, was inherent in the Great Tradition. Before it was canceled out by the rise of the modern omniscient society-state, it had found expression in the distinction between the order of politics and the order of culture, or, in the language of the time, the distinction between studium and imperium. The whole order of ideas in general was autonomous in the face of government; it was immune from political discipline, which could only fall upon actions, not ideas.

The American proposition, in reviving the distinction between society and state, which had perished under the advance of absolutism, likewise renewed the principle of the incompetence of government in the field of opinion. Government submits itself to judgment by the truth of society; it is not itself a judge of the truth in society. Freedom of the means of communication whereby ideas are circulated and criticized, and the freedom of the academy (understanding by the term the range of institutions organized for the pursuit of truth and the perpetuation of the intellectual heritage of society) are immune from legal inhibition or government control. This immunity is a civil right of the first order, essential to the American concept of a free people under a limited government.

A free people: this term too has a special sense in the American proposition. America has passionately pursued the ideal of freedom, expressed in a whole system of political and civil rights, to new lengths; but it has not pursued this ideal so madly as to rush over the edge of the abyss — into sheer libertarianism, into the chaos created by the nine-
teenth-century theory of the “outlaw conscience,” the conscience that knows no law higher than its own subjective imperatives. Part of the inner architecture of the American ideal of freedom has been the profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free. It is not an American belief that free government is inevitable, only that it is possible, and that its possibility can be realized only when the people as a whole are inwardly governed by the recognized imperatives of the universal moral law.

The American experiment reposes on Acton’s postulate that freedom is the highest phase of civil society. But it also reposes on Acton’s further postulate, that the elevation of a people to this highest phase of social life supposes, as its condition, that they understand the ethical nature of political freedom. They must understand, in Acton’s phrase, that freedom is “not the power of doing what we like, but the right of being able to do what we ought.” The people claim this right, in all its articulated forms, in the face of government; in the name of this right, multiple limitations are put upon the power of government. But the claim can be made with the full resonance of moral authority only to the extent that it issues from an inner sense of responsibility to a higher law. In any phase civil society demands order. In its highest phase of freedom it demands that order should be imposed from the top down, as it were, but should spontaneously flower outward from the free obedience to the restraints and imperatives that stem from inwardly possessed moral principle. In this sense democracy is more than a political experiment; it is a spiritual and moral enterprise. And its success depends upon the virtue of the people who undertake it.

Men who would be politically free must discipline themselves. Likewise institutions which would pretend to be free with a human freedom must in their workings be governed from within and made to serve the ends of virtue. Political freedom is endangered in its foundations as soon as the universal moral values, upon whose shared possession the self-discipline of a free society depends, are no longer vigorous enough to restrain the passions and shatter the selfish inertia of men. The American ideal of freedom as ordered freedom, and therefore an ethical ideal, has traditionally reckoned with these truths, these truisms.

Initially, we hold the truths of the American consensus because they are a patrimony. They are a heritage from history, through whose dark and bloody pages there runs like a silver thread the tradition of civility. This is the first reason why the consensus continually calls for public argument. The consensus is an intellectual heritage; it may be lost to mind or deformed in the mind. Its final depository is the public mind. This is indeed a perilous place to deposit what ought to be kept safe; for the public mind is exposed to the corrosive rust of skepticism and to the incessant thieveries of forgetfulness. Therefore the consensus can only be preserved in the public mind by argument. High argument alone will keep it alive, in the vital state of being “held.”

Second, we hold these truths because they are true. They have been found in the structure of reality by that dialectic of observation and reflection which is called philosophy. But as the achievement of reason and experience, the consensus again presents itself for argument. Its vitality depends on a constant scrutiny of political experience, as this experience widens with the developing — or possibly the decaying — life of man in society. Only at the price of this continued contact with experience will a constitutional tradition continue to be “held” as real knowledge and not simply as a structure of prejudice.

However, the tradition, or the consensus, is not a mere record of experience. It is experience illumined by principle, given a construction by a process of philosophical reflection. In the public argument there must consequently be a continued recurrence to first principles. Otherwise the consensus may come to seem simply a projection of ephemeral experience, a passing shadow on the vanishing backdrop of some given historical scene, without the permanence proper to truths that are “held.”

On both of these titles, as a heritage and as a public philosophy, the American consensus needs to be constantly argued. If the public argument dies from disinterest, or subsides into the angry mutterings of polemic, or rises to the shrillness of hysteria, or trails off into positivistic triviality, or gets lost in a morass of semantics, you may be sure that the barbarian is at the gates of the City.

The barbarian need not appear in bearskins with a club in hand. He may wear a Brooks Brothers suit and carry a ball-point pen with which to write his advertising copy. In fact, even beneath the academic gown there may lurk a child of the wilderness, untutored in the high tradition of civility, who goes busily and happily about his work, a domesticated and law-abiding man, engaged in the construction of a philosophy to put an end to all philosophy, and thus put an end to the possibility of a vital consensus and
has its twofold Latin sense. It means living together and talking together.

Barbarism threatens when men cease to live together according to reason, embodied in law and custom, and incorporated in a web of institutions that sufficiently reveal rational influences, even though they are not, and cannot be, wholly rational. Society becomes barbarian when men are huddled together under the rule of force and fear; when economic interests assume the primacy over higher values; when material standards of mass and quantity crush out the values of quality and excellence; when technology assumes an autonomous existence and embarks on a course of unlimited self-exploitation without purposeful guidance from the higher disciplines of politics and morals; when the state reaches the paradoxical point of being everywhere intrusive and also impotent, possessed of immense power and powerless to achieve rational ends; when the ways of men come under the sway of the instinctual, the impulsive, the compulsive. When things like this happen, barbarism is abroad, whatever the surface impressions of urbanity. Men have ceased to live together according to reasonable laws.

Barbarism likewise threatens when men cease to talk together according to reasonable laws. There are laws of argument, the observance of which is imperative if discourse is to be civilized. Argument ceases to be civil when it is dominated by passion and prejudice; when its vocabulary becomes solipsist, premised on the theory that my insight is mine alone and cannot be shared; when dialogue gives way to a series of monologues; when the parties to the conversation cease to listen to one another, or hear only what they want to hear, or see the other’s argument only through the screen of their own categories; when defiance is flung to the basic ontological principle of all ordered discourse, which asserts that Reality is an analogical structure, within which there are variant modes of reality, to each of which there corresponds a distinctive method of thought that imposes on argument its own special rules. When things like this happen, men cannot be locked together in argument. Conversation becomes merely quarrelsome or querulous. Civility dies with the death of the dialogue.

Father Murray served as a Consultant to the Center from its founding until his death in 1967. This article, originally presented at Center meetings, was incorporated in essays appearing in We Hold These Truths (Sheed and Ward: 1960) and Natural Law and Modern Society (World: 1962).
An Interview With Arthur R. Jensen

An Embattled Hypothesis

Last winter, educational psychologist Arthur R. Jensen of the University of California at Berkeley set off a controversy with a 123-page article in the Harvard Educational Review, entitled "How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement?" The controversy, both within and outside the academic community, has centered on what Professor Jensen calls his "not unreasonable hypothesis" — that "genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence difference." Starting from undisputed facts — that intelligence is to some degree inherited and that Negroes test about fifteen I.Q. points below the average of the white population — Professor Jensen suggested that if some of the difference between Negro and white I.Q. test performance can be attributed to genetic factors, then there is a limit (perhaps a narrower limit than is generally recognized) to the extent to which compensatory education, as presently conceived, can overcome environmental and cultural deprivation and give an enduring boost to intelligence. Recently Professor Jensen discussed his paper at the Center and at that time recorded this interview.

Q: Mr. Jensen, were you surprised by the response to your paper?

JENSEN: Surprised, and shocked. And that is a long story in itself. Of course, I expected there would be some controversy about what I said because it is a controversial subject and I was presenting my views as hypotheses. I did not expect the tremendous public reaction that arose largely because the article was played up in the national press.

Q: What is your view as to how the press handled your article?

JENSEN: I was pleased with the way some papers handled it and very displeased with the way other papers and newsmagazines handled it. But overall I think the press publicity has had a good effect; it has emphasized the importance of the issues, it has brought them to a fairly wide audience, and it has caused them to be discussed by qualified persons. One would prefer that to happen than that such an article receive no attention whatsoever and just fade away.

Q: How has your article been received in the academic community?

JENSEN: I've received many letters from persons all over the world. In the academic community, the most favorable have come from persons in the biological sciences and in genetics. The least favorable have come from those in the social sciences, particularly from sociologists and anthropologists. The student newspaper at Berkeley ran letters on this issue at the rate of one to three a day for a month; it also published several articles dealing with it. These letters ran the gamut from expressions of support to demands that I be fired. Various dissident student groups on campus asked that I be fired. They picketed the building where I work and one day they sent a sound truck around Berkeley blaring "Fight Racism! Fire Jensen!" All of this came to a sudden halt when the People's Park issue erupted in Berkeley; I guess that issue made me a second-rate controversy on the Berkeley campus.

Q: What about the quality of the criticism?

JENSEN: Some of it is very responsible and thoughtful. Other criticism is not. I found, for example, that of six professors who wrote a joint letter to the student newspaper criticizing me none had yet read my article. Also, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues put out a statement of "rebuttal," but it has a long history of reprimanding persons who suggest that there are racial genetic differences. Ten years ago they censured Henry Garrett of Columbia University and later Frank McGurk, who was then at Villanova, for publishing articles along those lines. As I say, though, some of the criticism has been most thoughtful; the Harvard Educational Review has published half
a dozen solicited papers in response to my article, it plans to publish my reply to those critics, and it continues to solicit letters.

Q: The criticism has to do not so much with your evidence as with your hypotheses and conclusions, is that right?

JENSEN: The criticism is directed less against the evidence than against my interpretation of the evidence. Many critics hold that as long as a strictly environmental hypothesis remains plausible as an explanation of intelligence differences, one should not even raise the question of the genetic factor. They believe that as long as genetic differences are not proved one hundred per cent, they should not be discussed. I take issue with this. I believe that if hypotheses are not put forward, then one does not do the necessary investigation for establishing or disproving them. Of course, in science, hypotheses are only established to some degree of probability; they are not certainties. If you have a certainty, you are usually dealing with some kind of tautology, as in pure mathematics. But in empirical sciences all you can do is state inferences with a degree of probability. I think that the degree of probability with which racial genetic differences can be stated today is not adequate as a basis for policies to deal with racial issues. I think we need more and better research on the genetic aspects of racial differences.

Q: Your response, then, to the critics is that you have presented an hypothesis of racial genetic differences which needs much more study.

JENSEN: Yes, it needs further, more appropriate research. I think that science advances most efficiently if hypotheses are pitted against one another. Quite opposite kinds of hypotheses leading to different predications should be pitted against one another. If, on the other hand, one explains differences in intelligence only in terms of environmental hypotheses and never submits such hypotheses to competition from, say, a genetic hypothesis, you may never arrive at the truth of the situation.

You have to pit your hypothesis against other possibilities.

Q: Do you yourself present the genetic hypothesis as the only causal factor in intelligence differences?

JENSEN: By no means. By definition, a genetic hypothesis includes the possibility, even certainty, of environmental causation, in part, since we know that the variability of the intelligence of individuals is not entirely genetic; there is certainly an environmental component. One would expect that any group differences would have environmental components, too, as long as the groups are not perfectly equated for environmental variables. A perfect equation of environments is practically impossible.

Q: Do you think that there is a fear on the part of some of your critics that any acceptance of the idea of a genetic component to explain intelligence differences between racial groups would destroy all efforts to improve the cultural and environmental condition of disadvantaged peoples?

JENSEN: There may be that fear, yes, but I don't agree that it is well founded. I believe environmental factors can have genetic consequences. For example, in a simple agrarian society where there is no education, assortive mating patterns will be based on characteristics other than intelligence; people will get sorted out in terms of physical prowess, hunting ability, and so on, but not particularly for their intellectual ability. But a society with an advanced educational system makes individual differences in mental ability more salient and if these mental abilities are also geared to the occupational structures of the society, then assortive mating patterns will go along the lines of intelligence. We know that the trait most subject to assortive mating in Caucasian industrial societies is intelligence. As a consequence, this spreads people out: the offspring of assortively mated persons in a population are more spread out than would otherwise be the case. This puts more persons into the upper tail of the distribution of the high-level abilities needed to advance civilization. But it also puts more persons into the lower end of the distribution, and, since these persons are handicapped in competing in the society, they have less chance of marrying and reproducing; consequently their genes will be eliminated from the population. And that will raise the population's average intelligence. If that goes on for many hundreds of generations, the population average will be raised quite substantially. Whether this sort of thing is going on in the Negro population, we don't know. There are some indications that the reverse may be happening because of differential birthrates. That is, the birthrates of the poorest and least able of the people in the Negro ghettos may be increasing at a faster rate than that of the middle- or upper-class Negroes. If that is true, measures should be taken to try to reverse that trend because it is definitely a liability to the Negro community.

Q: Occasionally the suggestion is made that, because of the socially inflammable nature of the material you are handling in research of this kind, you should guard yourself against every conceivable kind of distortion that others may make of it, perhaps even suppress your findings altogether.

JENSEN: I think the scientist's responsibility is to present as truthfully and as accurately as he can what he finds and what he hypothesizes and the methods and forms of inference by which he arrived at his conclusions or hypotheses. As for guarding his statements, caution has to be exercised, but that is a part of the scientific method itself. That method embodies a certain degree of skepticism, the setting or indication of the limits to which the findings or results can be generalized, a statement of the degree to which one can have confidence in the findings in terms of statistical probability levels, and evaluations of the adequacy of the sampling procedures on which conclusions are based. I think I have done that in my research.

Q: Would you have done your article any differently in the light of the reaction it received?
JENSEN: Not essentially. My statement, which dealt with racial differences, for example, was prefaced with two or three pages of statements of my philosophy about the study of racial or group differences. I said that we must always treat people as individuals, that we must not accord any kind of treatment to a person because of his membership in a group but only in terms of his individual characteristics and his own merit.

Q: Does that kind of qualifying statement tend to get lost in the heat of public controversy and daily journalism?

JENSEN: It does, and I don’t think there is any protection against that. You can put it in there, but if a newspaper reporter doesn’t want to report it there is not a thing you can do about it. The only consolation is that we do have a free press in which many interpretations and many points of view can be expressed, so that at least in principle all sides of an issue can be heard.

Q: Do you think that the controversy surrounding your article has damaged your reputation as a responsible researcher or scientist?

JENSEN: No. I think one’s reputation as a scientist or researcher would be damaged if competent colleagues found signs of incompetence in one’s work itself. This has not been the case here, so I do not think I have suffered at all professionally. Many people may be angered by me, but usually it is because they know my position only through the press or by reading one-sided statements. I have had persons write me in a quite irate vein, persons to whom I then sent reprints of the Harvard Educational Review article, and they write to me again and tell me they have a very different impression of what I am saying and they apologize for their first statement. Lord Snow, for example, made a critical statement to the press about my article before he had read it. He made his first statement in response to a newspaper reporter’s inaccurate paraphrase of my position. I sent him a copy of the article and he wrote me a letter apologizing for what he had said about it. He wrote that he thought it was a good article.

Q: As you no doubt know, white racists have for years tried to justify their racism on the ground that they are inherently superior to blacks. What effect will your study have on their racist claims?

JENSEN: Racists usually don’t even recognize the overlap between racial groups. If there were no overlap, then one could judge persons by their group membership. But when fifteen per cent of the Negroes are superior on I.Q. tests to fifty per cent of the whites, then you simply have to treat people on the basis of their individual merit. It is just because there are racists, persons who would deny political and economic rights to certain groups, that I think we must have the strongest possible laws to stop them. We need laws that will enforce to the maximum the treatment of individuals as individuals — in jobs, in housing, in education. Everyone cannot go to the same kind of college or graduate school. There have to be selection procedures. But every effort must be made to make sure that the selection is based only on relevant criteria, not on such things as race, skin color, social class, or national origin. I am in favor of the strongest kind of enforcement of laws to ensure fair employment and all other institutionalized forms of opportunity in our society. As long as we take that stand, we are on fairly safe ground.

Q: Do you think our society places an undue amount of emphasis on simply one factor in a person’s life, his intelligence?

JENSEN: It probably does. And there are other important abilities not now stressed in our educational system and not measured by standard I.Q. tests but which can be used to accomplish some of the same goals we wish to accomplish for all schoolchildren. Without these abilities — the ability to read, write, and do arithmetic, for example — a person simply cannot compete in our society. I think that the vast majority of children of whatever group can learn these basic skills. Many are not learning them because their abilities are not being tapped by the present instructional program. School instruction today is based largely on this one type of ability that we call intelligence or I.Q., that is, abstract reasoning and problem-solving, but it leaves other mental abilities uncultivated. I advocate great diversity of instructional procedures, and great diversity in educational experiments. Some of this diversity and experimentation could have very rapid and practical consequences and could be easily instituted with present facilities. These experiments may be difficult to sell but only for social reasons; for example, instruction in certain school subjects should be delayed for some children until they reach a certain mental age, a readiness age, at which they can learn the subject easily.

I suspect that most Negro children have about the same readiness for reading in the first grade as most white middle-class children have when they begin kindergarten. Yet the majority of white middle-class children beginning kindergarten are not ready to learn reading, nor, if I am correct, are most Negro children ready in the first grade. The important point is that if you were to start the Negro child reading at age seven instead of at age six — that is, delay the beginning of his reading instruction for one year — he would probably be reading much better at age twelve. You see, a child who experiences difficulty at the beginning of a subject can get turned off very easily so that a year or so later, when normally he could have started to learn it without difficulty, he already has an emotional block to that type of learning.

I would advocate experiments of this kind. There would not necessarily have to be a massive internal public-relations job to convince parents and community leaders that this is a good thing. It could come about through, say, the Office of Education setting up an experimental program in which officials would simply go out and try this in two or three schools in a few communities and frankly label it as an experiment. And if the results are favorable, there would be no problem in selling the program. One can say: “Well, look, these children are read-
Q: Are you suggesting that if there are hereditary reasons for a child failing to achieve as much as others in school, this can be compensated for, to some extent, by varying the instructional methods, by, for example, inserting him into certain learning situations at times geared to his capacity, not to the requirements of a standardized school program?

JENSEN: I think our lock-step system in education now accentuates individual differences in performance. These differences are relatively small at the beginning of a child's education, and they would remain relatively small if the educational system geared its instruction to those differences. But the differences are actually accentuated by putting everyone through a system that is uniform or standardized. The system may work well for the majority of children; if it didn't, it probably would not be there today. But I think that the real advances in education will come when instructional techniques are geared to individual differences much more closely than they are now.

Q: But you do not advocate any a-priori judgment that, say, all black children should be given one type of instruction and white children another?

JENSEN: Oh, no. Every child must be studied as an individual. And one does not have to rely entirely on tests to determine what kind of instruction is best for a particular child. One can observe children in the classroom and vary one's style of instruction for certain children before they get turned off on particular subjects because of repeated failures. That takes a skillful teacher, but computer-assisted instruction, I think, will be a powerful instrument in this respect. I have observed a school in Palo Alto which has computer consoles fitted with seventy different tracks for instruction in such basic skills as reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic. Now, the most a teacher can usually handle in a classroom are three tracks—three different reading groups corresponding to the students' abilities. But with computers, you have seventy tracks for a hundred children. The track a child finds himself on is determined by his performance at any given stage of learning. He can jump from one track to another. It is not a track that he gets on and stays on. He is switched around, so that if he gets to a place where he has difficulty, he goes to another track that gives him training in the prerequisites for solving that problem. It gives him drill in something he is weak on and then he gets back on the more advanced track and continues to learn. It's very complex. It can only be done with computer-assisted instruction, or with a very expert private tutor, but that, of course, would be impossible; you can't have one tutor for every child in a school, it isn't feasible.

Q: What you are saying, then, is that, assuming that heredity is an important factor in intelligence, by proper individualized instruction an indeterminate but apparently substantial amount of the child's hereditary disadvantage or disability can be overcome?

JENSEN: Yes.

Q: But that it is too early to say how much of that disability can be overcome?

JENSEN: Yes. But I think that this is now the major hope of researchers in the field of educational psychology. This is the thing people are working on. They call it "aptitude by instruction interaction" or "aptitude by teaching-method interaction." It simply means finding the best teaching methods for different kinds or patterns of ability. We know that ability is not a unitary thing like height, so that one could arrange people in rank order of ability. It depends on what kind of ability you are talking about. There are many dimensions of ability. What one should try to do is to find out what an individual's profile of abilities is, what he's high on, what he's lower on, and then give instruction in terms of his strengths rather than his weaknesses; capitalize on the things he's good at. I think that on this whole issue one must go back and ask himself how he regards his own children. We know that within any one family there are large genetic differences. The average I.Q. difference between siblings is about twelve points. Some twenty per cent of siblings differ by more than twenty I.Q. points. But the parents love them all equally. And when a parent perceives large differences between his children, what does the good parent do? He cultivates the strengths of each individual child, he doesn't overemphasize the child's weaknesses. He tries to bring out the best in each child by accentuating his strong points and by helping him individually when he has problems that at the moment are too much for him to handle.

The average genetic difference in racial groups is probably even less than the difference between children in the same family. I often point this out to groups of parents who may have worries about integrated schooling. I tell them that their children are in school with other children who do not differ any more in ability than children differ among themselves even in the same family. A good teacher will treat the differences among children in a classroom the way a good parent treats differences among the children in his own family. You don't disfavor one of your children because he's less bright or less musically gifted than another child. You make the best of the situation and build up his strong points. But certainly you would also be wrong not to cultivate the gifts of the child who shows an intellectual talent or any other gift, even though that may accentuate the differences in certain kinds of performance between the children within the family. We sometimes find very large differences in families, for example, where there is one exceptionally outstanding child. By handling that situation wisely, one avoids giving his siblings an inferiority complex; one simply encourages them in their own interests and pursuits. In their system of values, people could well put more stock in appreciating the individual differences among them. In this respect, a good educational system should have much the same approach to human differences as good parents have to differences among their own children.
In the July, 1969, issue of THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Harry S. Ashmore asked, “Where have all the liberals gone?” Sharply distinguishing the liberal from the New Left radical and the self-proclaimed revolutionary, Mr. Ashmore identified the liberal as one committed to “the maintenance of an open society which accords all its members justice.” Recognizing that his ideal may be impossible to attain, the liberal understands that his “primary task may be to see that the necessary compromises are not fatal.” Although he is skeptical of the short-range results of democracy, the liberal sees no substitute for self-government as the only feasible check on the managerial and scientific/technological elites required to maintain an advanced society. The liberal “acknowledges the existence of power and distrusts it; he accepts the use of force only when it is allied with constituted authority and the rule of law.” He holds that “there can be no community without consensus” and that “an enduring consensus can only grow out of dialogue. Hence, tolerance is the liberal’s cardinal virtue and he cherishes civility as the literal and essential derivation of civilization.”

Thus, Mr. Ashmore contended, liberals cannot embrace the New Left because of its “mindless cruelty,” but they are “also bound to reject the self-righteous and punitive counteractions proposed in the name of law and order.” The current conflict on the campus inevitably involves him, since “the fallen university is his spiritual and often his actual home,” and if it is to be salvaged it will have to be through restoration of traditional liberal values. So, too, liberals are bound to reject the segregationist expediencies of Black Power and hold to their traditional commitment to “melioration of the black man’s agony in his transition into the larger white society.”

“If the shouting ever dies down,” Mr. Ashmore wrote, “the brief list of liberal verities may again become comprehensible to the young and the black, and perhaps even to the middle class as it swings between complacency and panic. The lessons to be drawn from the raucous action and reaction of the nineteen-sixties seem to me to confirm the traditional liberal view that innocence arbitrarily prolonged is ignorance; entry into the world of ideas requires apprenticeship; the senses are important but not
ASHMORE: The article reflects several personal judgments on the current unrest. First, I doubt that there will be, or can be, any effective conjunction between the black movement in this country, for which I have great sympathy, and the youth movement, which seems to me to have no more than symbolic significance.

Second, taken together, the protests do not seem to me to add up to the pre-revolutionary condition proclaimed by the more modest members of the radical movement, or to the actual beginning of revolution claimed by the more advanced members. While there are great dislocations on both fronts, which will likely continue and may get worse, I do not think the American culture can produce or sustain a revolution.

Third, I recognize the essential validity of the radical indictment of the older generation, and of the Establishment it has created and now maintains. The traditional Establishment may very well be coming to the end of the road in terms of its ability to establish political patterns and set the cultural style in this country, and it must do both if it is to exercise genuine authority. In my view, the educational system, which is the primary target of the rebellion, is in extraordinarily bad shape and almost everything the young say about it is probably true. Indeed, it is my conviction that all the institutions in this country are out of date and, further, that the political process on which we have always relied to communicate the desires and needs of the citizens to those who govern has been short-circuited.

In short, I am in agreement that the situation is about as bad as the radical Left says it is. But I am afflicted by the traditional, liberal concern—that an indictment does not necessarily point the way to the solution of our problems. I don’t hear anything from the radical Left that seems to me to have much relevance in this regard. Marx is as out of date as Adam Smith. The jargon is familiar, and it bothers me. I would like to think the young were putting me on when the recent S.D.S. convention in Chicago split over the question of whether or not Ho Chi Minh is a “bourgeois revisionist.” But the question was seriously debated, and the passion was genuine.

Fourth, I raise the question whether revolutionary rhetoric can long be divorced from physical violence. I do not believe it can be; nobody who is in charge of anything important ever passively gives up in favor of somebody who condemns him on moral grounds and declares his right to take over. When it comes down to that kind of confrontation, I do not believe the radicals can muster the means to bring about the massive transfer of power they are demanding.

Finally, there is involved in all this the proclamation of a new sensibility, which I confess I do not understand. It may very well be that what is wrong with the Establishment, and with the basic institutions of our society, is that our culture has been too rationally based, too dependent upon an abstract view of the processes of government that has never sufficiently taken into account the sensory part of man’s nature.
In this regard, I am certain the blacks tell us a great deal. They are telling us how it was for all those years to be invisible, suddenly to become visible, and then continue to be scorned. The blacks are telling us something from the gut we cannot ignore.

The young make a similar claim upon our emotions, but they have nothing like the case the blacks bring against society. I keep asking myself: Would all this self-proclaimed idealism have burgeoned among the young if it had not been for the idiocy that produced the Vietnam war? It seems to me that what must be bugging the young is that Vietnam is their war, and they can't be sure whether their protest is a matter of morality or personal convenience. So I have a great sympathy with them; it may be that, although they don't yet realize it, they are already in the same bag with the old squares they regard as compromising hypocrites.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN
Dean of the Yale School of Drama.

I discovered a few months ago that I was a liberal. All my life I thought I was a radical, and then my radical students informed me that I am really a liberal and that I am responsible for the Vietnam war, the Guatemalan adventure, presumably the Civil War, the extermination of the American Indian, and heaven knows what else. Obviously, the students have preempted radicalism at this point. I think it is incumbent on genuine radicals to try to recapture it from them; it is important not to have to accept their definitions of radicalism.

I do accept the statement that I am a liberal insofar as I do not accept violent overthrow of the existing government. I also have some distaste, from the aesthetic point of view, for the present student radical style.

Can we distinguish between liberals and radical liberals? I think there is a kind of liberal who is guilty of everything the students say he has been guilty of over the last twenty years. I'd like to call him the power liberal, the kind who loves the world and serves it in action, as Yeats put it. Those liberals went into politics to reform things, to make life better, but gradually they found themselves quite often giving high-sounding principles to low actions. Every President of the last twenty-five years, whether Republican or Democrat, has had that kind of liberal around him; some have had five or ten.

I would like to distinguish these liberals from those who make a radical critique of society and have a certain distaste for power and a necessary detachment from it but who do stop short of violent overthrow. The radical liberals ought to be further distinguished from the current radicals who are infatuated with power and who, as a result, will be at the mercy of compromise.

We did a play at Yale called "God Bless." Jules Feiffer wrote it. It was not a very good play but it did illustrate what I am saying here. The liberal in that play was a hundred and ten years old. He had gone through just about everybody's regime. He was very pragmatic. He supported the miners during the miners' strike but turned on the miners when society turned on them. He supported World War I during the war but was against World War I when it was over . . . and so forth. There were also two radicals or revolutionaries in the play who, to the great despair of the radical students at Yale, turned out in the end to be just as corrupt as the liberal. The play was almost disrupted as a result.

I think there is an element of tragic doubt missing from both the liberal and the radical critique of life. If this doubt doesn't come from the Greeks, it comes from Freud. It is based on the notion that our natures are biologically determined to be essentially imperfectible. The radical liberal, that is, the true liberal, can understand this about man and not be paralyzed by it. Radicals frequently say that this is merely an excuse on the part of the radical liberal for maintaining the status quo. I don't think it is. I believe it is essential that the tragic sense of life must be kept in mind at the same time that we try to reform life; otherwise the reformers will become as vicious as the thing they are trying to reform.

The university is the home of the radical liberal in the sense that it is and must remain the home of powerlessness. I want to make a plea to bring the university back to the ivory tower. I want to get the university away from the military-industrial complex. I want to get it away, as much as possible, from any kind of government connections whether in science, law, drama, what have you. I also want to be consistent and get it away from the students who want
to use it as a base for revolutionizing society. In that sense, the university must be kept out of the world. It must maintain its monastic beginnings; it has to cling to its religious quality. Only in those circumstances can genuinely radical ideas continue to be thought freely. I feel that student radicals, like power liberals, are now preventing genuine radical reform from taking place because they are preventing the ideas that might achieve this reform from being thought. There are really no ideas in the current radical movement. Unless someone starts thinking, the country is going to go down—liberal, radical, reactionary, and all.

JAMES WECHSLER
Editor of the editorial page, the New York Post.

I am not defensive about the notion of being a liberal in the modern context. I am also not defensive about the fact that I was born in 1915. The men I think most highly of were Norman Thomas, A. J. Muste, Reinhold Niebuhr, Morris Cohen, and Marvin Rosenberg. This has nothing to do with age. We have gotten into a kind of idiocy about age and radicalism. Norman Thomas at his death was a better fighting radical than Mark Rudd. A. J. Muste at his death was a far more significant figure than Stokely Carmichael.

There is no reason for liberalism to be on the defensive. In the large major crises of our time, what is called A.D.A. liberalism has turned out to be damned right. It defeated Lyndon Johnson. It is only an accident of history that Richard Nixon is President of the United States today. If Robert Kennedy had lived, he would have been the nominee of the Democratic Party and he would have been President. I am really weary of this notion that we are an old and tired group clinging to some ritualistic doctrine. I do not think we should sit here as if we were at a wake for liberalism. I do not believe we have been defeated.

We have two great issues in the world: to stop this mad war in Vietnam and to get this country to recognize that there can be no serenity unless we begin to feed the world even though it will mean high taxes. These are not complicated propositions. They are not issues for which we have to apologize. They are things we can and will do, not just because there are kids rising up in anger but because there is a common sense of justice and decency in this country that has not been lost.

WILLIAM THOMPSON, JR.
Graduate of Yale, 1969.

Students have a strong sense of history but they view history in the perspective of that which they have experienced. It’s a very experiential history, as I think almost all history has to be. I was thirteen years old when John Kennedy ran against Richard Nixon. That was probably the beginning of my political consciousness. When John Kennedy won there was an ascendance of hope. Even after John Kennedy’s death, Lyndon Johnson, who certainly would not be thought of as a liberal by most people, came up with some of the most progressive domestic programs this nation has seen. Yet today most students feel a real sense of despair and frustration engendered in large part by the war in Vietnam. But their despair covers a much broader area than that. Many students place a large portion of the blame for the present situation on the liberals, who have been justifiably identified with a great many of the problems our nation faces today.

It is difficult for a liberal to understand why students are not attracted to liberalism. One of the reasons is because liberalism is being asked by students to take on qualities for which it is not equipped, qualities that go beyond the political sphere and reach into the religious and metaphysical sphere. The students today are looking for a commitment to something that goes beyond the ideals they have seen within their history, ideals that seem only to exalt materialism over other values. I think students are seeking something that transcends themselves and that takes them out of this condition. They are looking within their politics for spiritual depth. That is why movements like S.D.S. and radicalism really have an appeal. They are not simply pragmatic. They demand that students make an act of faith. It is the espousing of revolution without having any idea of what is on the other side of the fence. That is exciting and challenging. It is something students can reach for almost blindly. Yet at the same time it brings a student out of society and out of himself.

At one time the church played a role here. It provided a spirituality within society. Today the church has fallen to pieces. For all practical purposes the church is, I think, irrelevant. So students are looking for something else. To some extent they have found it in the ideologies of the far Left. Some have found it in the ideologies and simplicity of the far Right.

I don’t know what this means for liberalism. Somehow liberalism has to remodel itself. Liberals must
offer themselves as true alternatives to the liberalism of people like Lyndon Johnson and others so enmeshed in the Establishment they cannot provide any creative, dynamic leadership. I also think liberals must somehow learn to deal with this spiritual or religious kind of emotion sweeping the university campuses.

MURRAY KEMPTON

It surprised me to hear Harry Ashmore say that students have no sense of history. Having read Dean Acheson, I thought that it was Secretaries of State who had no sense of history. The truth is that Americans have no sense of history.

After long and painful thought, I must say, not to shock but out of deep sadness, that I am a supporter of Ho Chi Minh in his venture against the people to whom I pay my taxes. Now this would not seem so curious to most Americans if they had a sense of history, if they remembered that marvelous letter that Charles James Fox wrote to Edmund Burke in which he said how lamentable it was that the American troops had not been able to defeat the British in New Jersey, or if they remembered that Byron supported Napoleon. I mean that Ho Chi Minh, “bourgeois revisionist” or not, has got to be better than Napoleon.

The Ashmore article opens with this quote from Joseph P. Lyford: "The view of some faculty liberals that one should not get uptight about the efforts of the super-militants because they have real grievances brings back memories of the people who defended Senator Joseph McCarthy on the ground that he had the right objectives." That to me reflects the difficulty of a country which continues in all discussions to compare apples with oranges. I would have thought that Lyford's sense of history would have made him remember the ancient Whig principle that you judge more harshly the actions of the king's men than you do the actions of private citizens. My objection to Joe McCarthy was not that he vituperated, but that he vituperated with subpoena power.

We live in a country where if a policeman shoots a suspect in the street he is almost never indicted, and, if indicted, never convicted. You see, when I finished reading the long section in Ashmore’s piece, quoting Dean Brustein on his unfortunate experience at the "Theatre or Therapy" symposium, the thing that got me was that nowhere did I see the same condemnation of the cops who broke into Aretha Franklin's father's church and shot the goddam place up—and that was an “act of government.”

Harry, can I ask you one question? A small question? In all fairness? God knows, who am I to talk about people's terminology being a little larger than their subject, but you did say about the American liberal: “Thinking, in his view, requires a degree of detachment, of self-doubt, even of self-irony, all of which are conspicuous elements in the liberal style and are conspicuously absent in that of the radical. The liberal’s habit of skepticism and his concession that his own human limitations embody the possibility of error apply even in the most weighty conditions of life and death.” Now, I read this and I think: What is something liberal that I read every day and that I can apply this to, and I thought of the editorials of John Oakes in The New York Times. And I thought to myself: “degree of detachment”? “self-doubt”? “habit of skepticism”? “concession that your human limitations embody the possibility of error”?

Harry, don’t say that to Stokely Carmichael. There’s a lot you can say to Stokely Carmichael, but don’t say that.

ASHMORE: I have a high regard for Ho Chi Minh, too. I am not sure that I have actually supported him against our government, but at least our government thought so on occasion. But, having gone to Hanoi—not once but twice—I would have to add that I could not live under Ho Chi Minh’s government, and I don’t think you could either, Murray. It is a fact that Ho Chi Minh is standing up against gross injustices being perpetrated against his country by our country. But it does not follow that this makes him tolerant of people like you and me. You are the original free-speech man; you couldn't function without it. We have all kinds of regression, violations of civil liberties and rights in this country, but they are aberrations; they are not matters of public policy, but failures of policy. In Uncle Ho's country it's the other way around. I think the difference is significant.

KEMPTON: Does the history of the American Indian suggest to you that that was only an aberration?

ASHMORE: Not necessarily. Of course, our country is hostile to free speech, but then people everywhere, whether they are Chinese or American, are hostile to free speech. It is a small American miracle that we have been able to keep it going as long as we have.
JOSEPH DUFFEY
National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action.

I didn’t find Mr. Ashmore’s article to be as satisfying as I had wished. I had hoped that a shoot-out between liberals and radicals could have been avoided. I’m a little unhappy with his defensive tone. I was charmed by what Mr. Brustein had to say, except that he ended up where liberals always end up—not confronting the problem of power.

My chief concern is with the relationship of liberals to politics and power, a relationship that may be saved by the thing Brustein wants, the element of tragic doubt. We may need to put the liberal and radical mottos together. The radical motto is “Never trust anyone over thirty,” but that is only half of what one needs. One also needs “Never trust anyone under thirty,” and most of all, “Never trust yourself.” That is kind of a rule for political activity.

I think that there are three important spheres of value, aspiration, and discontent, and that liberalism somehow has to relate itself to all three because all play upon the political scene.

The first has to do with the blacks and the poor. This is the old classical question about redistribution of income and power. Liberals should know how to relate to this problem, but they are now living with the awareness, if not guilt, that that problem has been stymied as far as this particular class is concerned. I think liberals can relate to those people struggling to become a part of the political and social system.

The second sphere is the problem of the young. There is a sensibility issue here. There is also the cry of the affluent here. Liberals have to relate to this by going beyond the question of the distribution of wealth and go to the question of the quality of life. That is the frontier of our society. Personally I can become quite excited about the prospect of creating an American society whose institutions are less repressive than ours are now, a society of greater feeling and openness.

Third is the problem of the sub-affluent, perhaps forty per cent of the American people, who live on less than ten thousand dollars a year. That is where the votes are, especially in the cities. Unfortunately for liberals, that is the group with which liberals are not only out of touch but out of sympathy. We have no populism relevant for that group. Among those people there is an enormous amount of social and economic insecurity.

Liberalism today has become a kind of abstract activity of the affluent. If a man wants to go into liberal politics today he must either be born into wealth or spend a great deal of time courting it. Our talk about the blacks and their struggle to get into the society has been incredibly abstract. And with the economically insecure we have no relationship whatever.

Liberals can go in one of two directions. Liberals can still score electoral victories by putting together certain elements in a kind of politics of power and intimidation and confrontation. But that would tear the country apart. On the other hand, liberals can search for the common tokens of a political philosophy or movement that somehow would relate these three groups: the blacks, the young, and the sub-affluent. What liberalism has had going for it, I think, has been its nerve and its verve, its indignation. Not its programs nor its philosophies, but its indignation over the war has become politically potent. I wish liberals today could become indignant over the problems of the ordinary working man who lives in Brooklyn or East Hartford.

STEWART MOTT
Member, Board of Directors,
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

When I read the article I was astonished. I thought Mr. Ashmore must have written this as a put-on, that he must have been deliberately contentious to get our backs up. But as I listened to him this evening, I gather that he was serious. The article sounded to me like the lament of an older liberal, like something from someone crawling beneath the covers under attack from the young revolutionaries, like someone shedding crocodile tears for the liberalism of the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, early sixties.

He said that a liberal is someone who is able to sustain simultaneously two points of view. I found not one point of view, or even two points of view in his article; I found so many points of view I did not quite understand what he was talking about.

Mr. Ashmore referred to revolutionaries on equal terms with American liberals. I think liberals in America are alive and well and living in all parts of the United States, and that they have not crawled under the covers as perhaps some have in Santa Barbara. I think liberals must outnumber revolutionaries about a hundred to one in the United States, but Mr. Ashmore gives them equal treatment, as if they
were equal partners in some kind of sparring match.

In his article, Mr. Ashmore seems to be painting revolutionaries as cardboard figures, highly emotional and sensuous characters. He devotes pages to Robert Brustein's experience with the Living Theatre people. I saw nothing significant relating to America in the demonstration by a few hecklers at that symposium. He says that liberals seem to have been brushed aside in the postwar years by the military-technology experts. I don't think the liberal is in such a sad plight.

Brustein's experience with the Living Theatre people. I have no lament for liberals and I am astonished at what Mr. Ashmore had to say about liberalism. I have no lament for liberals and I am much more optimistic about where liberalism is going.

Mr. Ashmore says the young ought to learn how to laugh again. The young are protesting the values they have encountered in their institutions and in their elders. I don't think the elders are very capable of laughing at themselves; if they were, they would not be so critical about what is going on in the university. Mr. Brustein expressed surprise because the students are addressing themselves to the universities instead of the napalm factories. I am not surprised. The universities are where the students are at. That is where they can express themselves, and they have plenty of injustices to redress in the universities. The students are deadly serious. The revolution, such as has begun, involves a small minority, but the revolution is launched and it is here to stay and it is going to grow.

ASHMORE: I suggested in my article that the young are anti-intellectual; Mr. Mott has just demonstrated that they can't read. He has also demonstrated that at the Center the generation gap begins at home.

Responding to Mr. Wechsler: I never thought my essay was particularly defensive or that I was bleeding for the fate of the old liberals. I thought I was saying that the liberals are about to come back because everybody else has loused up the situation to the point where rational people might again be heard. To Mr. Mott: I didn't think I was being beastly to the young; I thought I was being charitable, which may be even more offensive.

The tragedy of my generation, before, during, and after World War II, is reflected in this discussion here tonight. We were afflicted by the polar thesis that a man must be either Left or Right—a response to the Marxist theory that there are only two possibilities, revolution and counter-revolution, and a moral man has to choose his side. This is the mark that is upon A.D.A. and it is the inheritance of its impressive new chairman—a heritage from all the old battles between Communist and anti-Communist, the obsession that this is all there was to test a man's faith in the forties and fifties. I seem to be hearing a rerun of this dichotomy in the argument between young and old, and this seems to me even more absurd than the previous either/or. The young will not remain permanently young; the old will not remain permanently with us. I think the generational cleavage is logically spurious, however emotionally charged it may be.

There is something society must have if it is to function and that is civility. That is what we have lost. We have lost it not only on the campuses, and in the argument between the young and the old, we have lost it in politics at every level.

If some of you read sadness in the piece, it perhaps reflected my involvement in the great saga of changing race relations. At one point I briefly entertained the hope that our society, drawing on lessons taught to us by Gandhi and by the failure of force everywhere in the postwar world, could find a way to undertake massive social change without violence. We lost that chance with the deaths of John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert Kennedy. This is the great problem — how do we make the changes we've got to make, in time, without violence? I don't have the answer, and I do not hear it on the Left.

WECHSLER: I like Murray Kempton, but I must say his attack on John Oakes tonight seemed to me most improper, out of order, indefensible, and beyond belief. No man has fought harder for the things I think most of us here believe in than John Oakes.

BRUSTEIN: I think the whole argument between liberals and radicals is tragic and it deflects all of us from our primary purpose, which is to end the war in Vietnam and improve the lot of the black people here.

Also, the universities are in real danger now of being destroyed. I do not want to overestimate that danger, but I don't want to underestimate it either. From my experience, if the situation continues as it has for the last two years, you will see within a year or two a mass exodus from the university of the sensitive and intelligent faculty and students who
really cannot function in such a chaotic atmosphere.

Finally, there has always been tension in our society between individual freedom and social progress. Until now that tension was kept in balance. Now there is danger of that tension breaking down one or the other. If there is a generalization one can make about the militant radical movement, that is to say, about the S.D.S. movement, it is its genuine lack of interest and concern for individual freedom; it is even hostile to individual freedom, to free expression for the sake of genuine ideals. Among the radicals, as it was for Lenin, there is an assumption that a pair of shoes is worth all of Shakespeare. Those who love Shakespeare as well as believe in the importance of shoes cannot quite buy that argument. The question is how to maintain individual freedom without sacrificing social progress and how to achieve social progress without sacrificing individual freedom. That is the issue to which liberals and radicals ought to be addressing themselves, rather than going at each other the way we have been going at each other here on this dais.

SANDER VANOCUR (from the floor): I observed the first formative years of the Kennedy Administration and I say that the most dangerous thing you can do to a liberal is give him muscle. What he usually does is play war games. The liberals were bred on two theories: an expanding role for the federal government here at home, and an expanding role for the United States abroad. The worst excesses of the Vietnam war were committed by liberals in the Kennedy Administration. That includes Arthur Schlesinger, Kenneth Galbraith, McGeorge Bundy... in many ways, Walter Rostow was the most honest because he was bloody-minded from the beginning. The liberals are not used to muscle and they go too far with it; they misuse it because they always seem to have to prove that they are stronger with muscle than the average conservative.

I am afraid that young Mr. Thompson will leave tonight without any edification. What he usually does is play war games. The man who floored for Lyndon Johnson on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was William Fulbright. George McGovern voted for that resolution. When Gaylord Nelson tried to put up a proposal that said this is not the way to go, we must change policy on Vietnam, he was talked out of it by William Fulbright. This is not to say that William Fulbright is an evil man. It is simply—

WECHSLER: Oh, come on.

VANOCUR: The man who floored for Lyndon Johnson on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was William Fulbright. George McGovern voted for that resolution. When Gaylord Nelson tried to put up a proposal that said this is not the way to go, we must change policy on Vietnam, he was talked out of it by William Fulbright. This is not to say that William Fulbright is an evil man. It is simply—

WECHSLER: Well, why do you identify Senator Fulbright as the A.D.A.'s liberal spokesman?

VANOCUR: I'm simply saying that on the question of foreign policy, liberals, until recently, have seemed compelled to show that they were tougher on Communists than the Republicans.

KEMPTON: If the liberals made the mistake of supporting the peasants in Vietnam against their communist oppressors, that was a mistake. They never
sent the troops. The troops were sent by the people who have always sent troops all their lives. There are people who own property and there are people who work for a living. The confusion is that people who work for a living think they own property. Eight years ago, John Roche was chairman of the A.D.A. and we went through the Kennedy Administration and the Johnson Administration and that was the bloodbath of American liberalism. Then we got Galbraith as chairman of the A.D.A. Now we’ve got Duffey. I will tell you that, in terms of progress, American liberalism has done a lot better than the country has.

THOMPSON: Some people challenge youth to come up with solutions for the problems in our society. I don’t think the liberals have come up with solutions either. Liberals have as much responsibility as young people to come up with solutions. The war in Vietnam was an easy trap for liberals to fall into, and the liberals did play a major role in that war. Even today, liberals look at the war in Vietnam largely as it relates to our internal problems. I think it is time for the liberals to begin to take a worldwide view of society.

WECHSLER: I think you are a little unfair in not distinguishing among liberals. A few weeks ago, the A.D.A. in convention came out for withdrawal from the war in Vietnam. That is my brand of liberalism. And the A.D.A. fought against the Vietnam war for a long time. I guess it is a discredit on those of us in A.D.A. that you do not know we fought against it. So you identify us with John Roche, Walt Rostow, and the others. I have no apologies for them. They were liberals who rationalized the war. But in all fairness you ought to recognize that the resistance to the war in Vietnam was crystallized in Eugene McCarthy’s candidacy and that was a product of liberals, not of S.D.S. That was the work of the Al Lowensteins and of all the men who thought we could work within the system. I think we would have had the Vietnam war completely turned around except for something that happened when Robert Kennedy was killed.

MOTT: There are a lot of younger liberals who are optimistic and convinced that they do need power and who are committed and working substantively on issues. Many revolutionaries have fought for the same rights and issues. What distinguishes liberals from revolutionaries is their style. Revolutionaries like David Dellinger and Rennie Davis are willing to go to jail for the things they believe in. Liberals are somewhat more willing to work within the system, more willing to compromise. I see nothing wrong with that. Revolutionaries may be morally purer, but every man who is married knows that compromise is necessary.

WECHSLER: Do you think that any of us here has any dispute with David Dellinger? I regard his trial in Chicago for his part in the demonstrations last year as one of the most crucial in American history. I do not think there is any radical-liberal conflict here.

MOTT: I think the liberal and radical objectives may be identical but the style and the way each functions is very different.

KEMPTON: In a way we have been talking about an abstraction all evening. The revolutionary is an abstraction. Liberalism is an abstraction. When you talk about the S.D.S. kids, you forget about all the kids who have gone to jail for refusing to join the army but are not in S.D.S. We know all about how many packages of Shredded Wheat were sold last year in this country in relation to Wheaties, but I do not believe that anybody in this room, or anybody else, knows how many American kids went to jail for five years because they refused to take part in this Vietnam war. When we talk about the revolt of the young as being the revolt of the affluent who have no sense of survival, we are really talking about young people whose survival, whether moral or physical, is a tremendous problem to them. I went through a war in which I could feel I was engaged in a just war. These kids are being drafted today into a war that we regard as highly objectionable. I’m not talking about the S.D.S., I’m talking about these other kids. Goddam it, they have a right to make this kind of judgment.

VANOCUR: You and I accepted the system and all its defects and we thought we could change it for the better. The things we accepted are not being accepted by the young today. We have to listen to what they say, not agree with them but not put them down either. The young people are not buying the old bill of goods or following the same old standard. If liberalism does mean a generosity of spirit and the politics of civility, it seems to me we must get to the question Mr. Thompson is raising. Why does his generation not buy the same old bill of goods? If we can’t answer that, then liberalism will have meaning.
only to us, and the young are going to be the ones running things.

HARVEY FLEETWOOD (from the floor): S.D.S. is the only group in the country talking about the real issues affecting our lives. I don't like a lot of the S.D.S. people, and I don't like a lot of the things they say. But in 1965 S.D.S. had a march against the war in Vietnam in Washington. The march was red-baited by the New York Post, by The New York Times and by every other liberal organ in the country. S.D.S. was the only group to say, sure, Communists can march with us, they are ineffectual anyway. S.D.S. was the only group talking about the rights of blacks in this country. S.D.S. was the first group to begin talking about breaking up the large corporations, about going back to the neighborhood, and moving toward participatory democracy. They are the only ones who have brought the problems out in the open.

THOMPSON: I disagree strongly. I don't think S.D.S. is really bringing out the key issues. In the beginning, S.D.S. did have a feel for the issues; so did many liberals in the beginning. But in the last year or two, S.D.S. has obscured the issues. Last year, for example, the big S.D.S. controversy on the campuses was the R.O.T.C., but that was simply a tactical tool to provoke confrontation in the university, to create chaos, and frankly to destroy. The real issue that S.D.S. should have brought up and the one that needs to be discussed in the university is the war in Vietnam. But this was not brought up because it did not provide S.D.S. a base for an attack on the university.

DUFFEY: Adult political activity was, I think, driven out into the open by acts of resistance and by the movements of the S.D.S. I am quite willing to admit that. The real question concerns the transition from what our society is now to what it has got to become. I don't think that that transition will come about only through evolution or reform. There will have to be some dismantling. Some of it will be revolutionary. What we ought to pay attention to is what an adult political movement is and how it can address itself to social transition in a humane way.

ASHMORE: I tried to emphasize in my article that liberalism is based on two things: individual liberty and social justice. The two may not be inimical, but they are difficult to put together in practice. Most of the argument tonight has been about the successes and failures of liberalism as a political movement. That history does not interest me very much. I don't think the activist political movement that calls itself liberal has in fact been very liberal. Once you move into the area of political action you begin to make compromises with the doctrine; as Sander Vanocur said, the political liberals confused authority with power, and when that happens the theory of liberalism begins to diminish.

Of course, history does force choices. I remember when liberals, before the Second World War, were split down the middle between isolationism and interventionism. After the war, the liberals divided again, tragically it seemed to me, on the question of communism, and how best to counter it. Many, maybe most, opted for power. Perhaps there is no way to move toward political action without creating a division of this order. But I think liberals can always reunite on the basic concept of what they believe to be the human condition, what they believe to be the minimum requirements of human dignity in any society. That may be the only thing on which they can agree, but if they can hold to it, it may be enough.
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THOMPSON: Some people challenge youth to come up with solutions for the problems in our society. I don't think the liberals have come up with solutions either. Liberals have as much responsibility as young people to come up with solutions. The war in Vietnam was an easy trap for liberals to fall into, and the liberals did play a major role in that war. Even today, liberals look at the war in Vietnam largely as it relates to our internal problems. I think it is time for the liberals to begin to take a worldwide view of society.

WECHSLER: I think you are a little unfair in not distinguishing among liberals. A few weeks ago, the A.D.A. in convention came out for withdrawal from the war in Vietnam. That is my brand of liberalism. And the A.D.A. fought against the Vietnam war for a long time. I guess it is a discredit on those of us in A.D.A. that you do not know we fought against it. So you identify us with John Roche, Walt Rostow, and the others. I have no apologies for them. They were liberals who rationalized the war. But in all fairness you ought to recognize that the resistance to the war in Vietnam was crystallized in Eugene McCarthy's candidacy and that was a product of liberals, not of S.D.S. That was the work of the Al Lowensteins and of all the men who thought we could work within the system. I think we would have had the Vietnam war completely turned around except for something that happened when Robert Kennedy was killed.

MOTT: There are a lot of younger liberals who are optimistic and convinced that they do need power and who are committed and working substantively on issues. Many revolutionaries have fought for the same rights and issues. What distinguishes liberals from revolutionaries is their style. Revolutionaries like David Dellinger and Rennie Davis are willing to go to jail for the things they believe in. Liberals are somewhat more willing to work within the system, more willing to compromise. I see nothing wrong with that. Revolutionaries may be morally purer, but every man who is married knows that compromise is necessary.

WECHSLER: Do you think that any of us here has any dispute with David Dellinger? I regard his trial in Chicago for his part in the demonstrations last year as one of the most crucial in American history. I do not think there is any radical-liberal conflict here.

MOTT: I think the liberal and radical objectives may be identical but the style and the way each functions is very different.

KEMPTON: In a way we have been talking about an abstraction all evening. The revolutionary is an abstraction. Liberalism is an abstraction. When you talk about the S.D.S. kids, you forget about all the kids who have gone to jail for refusing to join the army but are not in S.D.S. We know all about how many packages of Shredded Wheat were sold last year in this country in relation to Wheaties, but I do not believe that anybody in this room, or anybody else, knows how many American kids went to jail for five years because they refused to take part in this Vietnam war. When we talk about the revolt of the young as being the revolt of the affluent who have no sense of survival, we are really talking about young people whose survival, whether moral or physical, is a tremendous problem to them. I went through a war in which I could feel I was engaged in a just war. These kids are being drafted today into a war that we regard as highly objectionable. I'm not talking about the S.D.S., I'm talking about these other kids. Goddam it, they have a right to make this kind of judgment.

VANOCUR: You and I accepted the system and all its defects and we thought we could change it for the better. The things we accepted are not being accepted by the young today. We have to listen to what they say, not agree with them but not put them down either. The young people are not buying the old bill of goods or following the same old standard. If liberalism does mean a generosity of spirit and the politics of civility, it seems to me we must get to the question Mr. Thompson is raising. Why does his generation not buy the same old bill of goods? If we can't answer that, then liberalism will have meaning
HARVEY FLEETWOOD (from the floor): S.D.S. is the only group in the country talking about the real issues affecting our lives. I don't like a lot of the S.D.S. people, and I don't like a lot of the things they say. But in 1965 S.D.S. had a march against the war in Vietnam in Washington. The march was red-baited by the New York Post, by The New York Times and by every other liberal organ in the country. S.D.S. was the only group to say, sure, Communists can march with us, they are ineffectual anyway. S.D.S. was the only group talking about the rights of blacks in this country. S.D.S. was the first group to begin talking about breaking up the large corporations, about going back to the neighborhood, and moving toward participatory democracy. They are the only ones who have brought the problems out in the open.

THOMPSON: I disagree strongly. I don't think S.D.S. is really bringing out the key issues. In the beginning, S.D.S. did have a feel for the issues; so did many liberals in the beginning. But in the last year or two, S.D.S. has obscured the issues. Last year, for example, the big S.D.S. controversy on the campuses was the R.O.T.C., but that was simply a tactical tool to provoke confrontation in the university, to create chaos, and frankly to destroy. The real issue that S.D.S. should have brought up and the one that needs to be discussed in the university is the war in Vietnam. But this was not brought up because it did not provide S.D.S. a base for an attack on the university.

DUFFEY: Adult political activity was, I think, driven out into the open by acts of resistance and by the movements of the S.D.S. I am quite willing to admit that. The real question concerns the transition from what our society is now to what it has got to become. I don't think that that transition will come about only through evolution or reform. There will have to be some dismantling. Some of it will be revolutionary. What we ought to pay attention to is what an adult political movement is and how it can address itself to social transition in a humane way.

ASHMORE: I tried to emphasize in my article that liberalism is based on two things: individual liberty and social justice. The two may not be inimical, but they are difficult to put together in practice. Most of the argument tonight has been about the successes and failures of liberalism as a political movement. That history does not interest me very much. I don't think the activist political movement that calls itself liberal has in fact been very liberal. Once you move into the area of political action you begin to make compromises with the doctrine; as Sander Vanocur said, the political liberals confused authority with power, and when that happens the theory of liberalism begins to diminish.

Of course, history does force choices. I remember when liberals, before the Second World War, were split down the middle between isolationism and interventionism. After the war, the liberals divided again, tragically it seemed to me, on the question of communism, and how best to counter it. Many, maybe most, opted for power. Perhaps there is no way to move toward political action without creating a division of this order. But I think liberals can always re-unite on the basic concept of what they believe to be the human condition, what they believe to be the minimum requirements of human dignity in any society. That may be the only thing on which they can agree, but if they can hold to it, it may be enough.
Aftermath

CRITIQUE OF LIBERALS

TO THE EDITORS: I could not from his article discern who Harry Ashmore’s liberals are [“Where Have All the Liberals Gone?” July, 1969]. He described them as having a “commitment to the maintenance of an open society which accords all of its members social justice.” Granted that this definition accurately excludes the Marcuse type of radical, it does include the well-meaning conservative. It is incumbent on Mr. Ashmore to reject the radical’s charge that the liberal has become conservative. Surely there must be some difference.

Mr. Ashmore’s failure to make the distinction, while emphasizing his differences — however valid — with the radical, points up one of the major weaknesses of the liberal in general. Too much energy over the years has been spent by the liberals in protecting their flank by fighting the radical. But the enemy is not the radical, even though he gets the headlines. The enemy is the conservative, the Establishment, and the entrenched powers, and it is their power (the radicals have none) that has created the problems and fissures that beset this country today. War, racism, economic inequity, environmental blight are not of the radical’s making. What has happened is that the conservatives have succeeded in dissipating the liberals, causing them, in turn, to zero in on the radicals, a purely reactive phenomenon. I am appalled at the space “liberal” publications devote to the wrong attack.

Again, who are the good guys? While implicitly including the conservatives, Mr. Ashmore tries to exclude “the managerial and scientific/technological elites.” But are not these the liberals? They are most of today’s academicians, especially in the social sciences. They are certainly the bureaucrats — not inconsiderable in terms of number or power. Yet Mr. Ashmore says the liberal was “easily brushed aside.” To repeat, liberals were too busy protecting their flank a decade or two ago. They became so militantly anti-communist that what they wanted to do took second place to what they wanted to prove they were against. In that virtuous fight, extremism was no vice. Berkeley, as a university under Clark Kerr, was sacrificed to serve the Pentagon. Tom Braden was “proud” to use the students for C.I.A. cover. Nothing needs saying about the way Vietnam and the pretense (kindly put) of not only the Johnsons but also the Goldbergs, the Harrimans, and the Scalapinos helped move this society away from an open to a less than open condition. The level of violence our country undertook as a result is shameful. What were easily brushed aside were not the liberals, but their principles.

It is this, then, that is the real gap in this country, the one between word and deed, the deviation from one principle after another. The radical young are not letting us get away with it, and they are right. That they are wrong in their own strategy and tactics has been sufficiently, even brilliantly, exposited; the liberal had best start looking to himself because it is he and not the radical who can muster the power to bring the necessary change.

Mr. Ashmore seems to deny that the liberal has possessed power in this country. He is both right and wrong. He is wrong in the sense that political office to the greater extent has belonged to the New Deal and its successors. Even at the state level, especially in the major states, this holds: Warren and Brown in California; Lehman, Harriman, and Rockefeller in New York. But, in the sense that Mr. Ashmore is right that the liberals did not possess the power, we must face a major criticism from the radical. While liberals have had political power in the electoral sense, they nevertheless have not possessed effective power. This latter power is diffuse; it is shared by the bureaucracy, the corporate world, and the military. The point is that this power has been beyond democratic reach. It is this phenomenon that the liberal should be fighting. Instead, in his own quest for power per se, the liberal has become part of it. Small wonder that radicals consider electoral politics irrelevant. Thus the politics of protest and confrontation. Thus four years of campus and street politics to give a McCarthy and a second Kennedy elbowroom. The liberal should have made that kind of politics unnecessary.

Mr. Ashmore’s description of the long-suffering liberals imputes to them a mood, mode, and attitude I am sure he does not intend, even though some of all that already exists. Paradoxically, the radical has assumed a parallel stance that has led to a cul-de-sac. He is oppressed, says the radical; he is manipulated; and he is the only one concerned with social justice. (Even Susan Sontag refutes this latter claim.) But Mr. Ashmore’s description of the liberal as possessing almost superhuman qualities of wisdom, rationality, and calm in the face of passion, torment, and scorn betrays the same self-righteousness that is ruining the radical movement. While that “morality” would never lead the liberal to the tactics of militancy he so abhors, it could force him
away from his asserted principles. My argument, in part, is that this has already happened to a great extent.

I am not deprecating the liberal position. I merely say that now, as well as over the long pull, it is the most difficult position of all from which to operate. Politics tends to be an either/or business. The liberal had better learn how easy it is, in the present mood of this country, to join the shift to the Right; for them, that is, not everybody else. Political polarization is too rapidly replacing the less broad political spectrum. The pace is likely to be accelerated if the liberal continues to concentrate his energies on the radicals rather than on our real problems. He helps spotlight the radical and then, when called upon to take a stance on that “problem,” he will have closed off the option of a truly liberal and principled approach to the problem.

STANLEY K. SHEINBAUM
Santa Barbara, Calif.

PROGRESS OF PEOPLES

TO THE EDITORS: I have just read “The Progress of Peoples” [Occasional Paper, Vol. II, No. 4]. Fine, but time is short. If we are to avoid our imminent self-destruction, we must very soon see ourselves as the astronauts have seen us from the moon: one small brown (not red, white, and blue) sphere spinning through space, captive of the sun, which in turn is captive of the delicately balanced forces of the universe. We must soon see how interdependently small we are against our universal environment.

Progress of Peoples? Toward the good life for all? There will be beginnings of this kind of progress when the various elites of this world recognize their common peril and embrace their common responsibilities and opportunities toward one livable world. Only the elites can lead; the masses only destroy when they despair of their leaders.

Population explosion? The globe reveals vast regions of overabundance of fresh water flowing to the salt seas. The globe reveals vast regions which lack only fresh water to become life-sustaining. The Romans moved fresh water from its sources via ducts to places where it was needed. The moderns possess technologies and power sources which can be used to make the deserts bloom. Of course, population growth must be controlled. But this is far into the ever briefer future. While we still have a little time we had better beat our military hardware into fresh-water ponds and lakes and ducts and, where necessary, pumping stations, so that the lands on which we stand will have water with which to produce our sustenance.

Expertise? Mankind’s sanity is being drowned in mounting floods of expert gobbledegook. We focus our attentions on things microscopic and on things macroscopic, losing sight of our selves, our individual selves.

Arms race? Which came first, the egg or the chicken? A feud is a ridge between two valleys, and two brothers, neither of whom has the idea of walking around or over to see the other fellow. Only one potential madman stands between sufficient deterrence and complete destruction. Who is the villain when madmen write the play? Which side of the feud is initiating and which side is responding? When are we to have the idea of walking around or over the ridge to see that the other fellow is our brother?

JOHN N. CARR
Chagrin Falls, Ohio

THE UNITED NATIONS

TO THE EDITORS: I found your conversation [“Whatever Happened to the U.N.?,” July, 1969] very stimulating. Although pessimistic, it was not as pessimistic as its title implied.

Twenty years’ reflection on the problem of strengthening the U.N. has led me to conclusions which are implicit — or explicit — in your conversation. Let me suggest three of them.

(1) The central problem is — and the indicated strategy must be — a moral and philosophic one. We must relearn and teach — that all men are brothers and that this brotherhood implies obligations to help one another achieve social and economic justice as well as to live in peace with one another. Of course, there is a problem of prudence. But you can’t begin to be prudent until you have a goal, in this case a U.N. with the power to keep the peace and to contribute significantly to the achievement of social and economic justice.

The paradox is that American people will respond much more generously to arguments for foreign aid based on duty than they will to arguments based on selfishness. As Barr suggests, our leaders must be eloquent teachers.

(2) “Functionalism,” i.e., building a sense of world community through economic and social work, has a central place in an over-all strategy. The Borgese et al. proposal for an “ocean regime” could play a key role here. There is a most fruitful analogy in the Ordinance of 1787, an exercise in functional cooperation which helped get the new American Constitution adopted and helped the new government practically, psychologically, and financially. With the Ordinance the Congress — still the Articles of Confederation Congress — agreed that the Northwest Territory would not be colonies of the eastern states but would become new states (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and that the land would be sold at low prices by the federal government, with some of the proceeds going to education.

Independent sources of revenue for the U.N. are, as Mrs. Borgese suggests, central. They may, like children’s allowances, be abused by the U.N., but the national governments must be willing to “take some risks for peace.”

(3) I believe that young people can play a central role in a strategy for strengthening the U.N. Many of them would be willing to make great personal sacrifices for peace, e.g., to enlist in a special U.N. volunteer force, such as recently proposed by Kingman Brewster and a special committee of the U.N.A.-U.S.A., or to put in a couple of years in a U.N. peace corps. The young people — and the rest of us — should use their energies to make their national governments take these risks for peace, to authorize and finance such a force — the Brewster proposal is for about forty thousand men — even though they cannot be positive they will ap-
prove the precise way in which the force is used.

The time is ripe for these and other initiatives. The humbling experience of Vietnam is making the American people more receptive to new ideas, e.g. that generals are not infallible. Disillusioned with "unilateral peace-keeping," à la Vietnam, they are tempted to return to isolationism. It is time for the U.N. — and its champions — to return to the center of the stage.

JOHN J. LOGUE
World Order Research Institute
Villanova University

POLLUTION

TO THE EDITORS: It is painful to find fault with Lord Ritchie-Calder's discussion of environmental pollution (May, 1969). I concur very strongly in his conclusions. However, it is my experience that those who attack the sacred privilege of exploiting the environment need to be at least as spotless as Caesar's wife, and our writing and speeches as free from error as an encyclical. (I recently gave a talk calling for the demise of the auto by the end of the century. I pointed out that the present practice of graduated taxes and license fees encourages retention of elderly cars, which contribute more than their share of pollution. A representative of the auto industry took me to task for using an incorrect term for these taxes, then sat down with the air of having demolished my entire argument.)

It is in this context, then, that I want to correct one point in an otherwise excellent paper. This concerns the "greenhouse effect" of carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is, as Lord Ritchie-Calder states, continuing to accumulate in the atmosphere, but the global mean temperature is not increasing but falling, and has been since the early nineteen-forties.

This fact was originally noted by J. M. Mitchell, Jr., a climatologist with ESSA. An explanation has been offered by R. A. Bryson of the University of Wisconsin which, while it cannot yet be proved, appears to account quantitatively for the cooling which has occurred. Simply, the atmosphere is getting dirtier, and the dirt prevents sunlight from reaching the earth to heat it. In short, so much pollution and so many jet contrails are being generated that the greenhouse effect is being more than compensated. If this is in fact the case, and if present trends can be extrapolated, temperatures like those of the Wisconsin glaciation will occur during the lifetime of people now living.

There seems to be considerable interest today in suppressing knowledge of this change in the climatic trends; it is hardly characteristic of the Center to join in the effort.

JAMES P. LODGE
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CONglomerates

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Jacoby's observations about conglomerate corporations (July, 1969) are comforting if not entirely convincing. From my own random conversations with officials of some conglomerates, I have the impression that the driving force behind the new merger wave is not any "new management science" but stock leverage, a curious investing public that somehow pays more for old shares in new bottles, and other stockmarket-related phenomena.

No doubt there is a new management science. But from the limited vantage point of Washington, where its main exponents turn up in the Pentagon and in its suppliers, the new science appears to have much less to do with rational decision-making than with elaborate ways of gaining access to the public funds. A striking case in point is Litton, a roaring success in defense ventures and a failure in many of its civilian activities. General Dynamics falls under the same rubric. Nor am I persuaded that the growth of assets in the hands of the one hundred leading corporations is completely harmless simply because the concentration ratios in Census Bureau-defined industries remains unchanged. Macro-concentration poses some political problems that Mr. Jacoby does not touch.

However, I am not ready to join Attorney General Mitchell in his crusade to protect existing corporate managements from all comers. The path of the outsider-raider is risky (Louis Wolfson) but certainly ought to be eased, rather than hindered. In view of the peculiar financing arrangements of many conglomerates, I would think that Mr. Jacoby's reporting recommendations are a minimum. I would also agree that watchful waiting is probably the indicated course for some of the political difficulties that the new conglomerates raise.

BERNARD D. NOSsITER
Washington Post
Washington, D.C.

SCHOLARS

TO THE EDITORS: I read Mr. Wolfe's article ["The Myth of the Free Scholar," July, 1969] with great interest. Although I find much that he says illuminating, I also think one can and should look on the university in other perspectives.

Although much is wrong with the university along the lines Wolfe suggests, it is a fact that as compared with other institutions and professions the university is the most critical one we have. The opposition to the Vietnam war stemmed largely from the campus. An analysis of the background of signators to advertisements by Everett Ladd protesting the war (as published in a recent issue of Science) shows that social scientists — sociologists first, then political scientists — at the more prestigious (more research-oriented and government-supported) universities were most likely to engage in public antiwar activity. I would hazard the estimate that no other institution in American society employs as large a proportion of the anti-Establishment Left (however defined) as the university. Of course, the large majority are not radicals, but this is a result of the way the society as a whole operates, not the university.

To argue with Mr. Wolfe about the nature of academe, the way in which men choose research problems, and the like would be futile. I know that many have had experiences of the sort he describes. But many others have succeeded by being independent. As a graduate student, I chose to study
a socialist movement in Canada because I wanted to explicate the conditions under which socialism could develop in North America. I got an S.S.R.C. grant to do the study, I published it, and I received a lot of job offers. I have had graduate students working under me in recent years who did the same thing with respect to studying the Cuban revolution or student movements in various countries, and who have had no trouble in getting good jobs and continuing their politically motivated research.

Scholars who are competent are as free as they choose to be. I agree there are many who let themselves be intimidated by a conception of the rules of the academic game, but the joke is on them. These men almost invariably fail.

I must disagree sharply with Mr. Wolfe in his comments about the pressures to cancel the Harvard Design School's seminar on riot control. Academic freedom, as I understand it, means that the obnoxious among us, as perceived by others, must have the right to teach and write obnoxious things. They must be protected from administrators, students, trustees, or politicians. To say one man's distaste is worse than others is to end academic freedom.

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
Harvard University

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Wolfe describes three types of unfreedom in the universities ["The Myth of the Free Scholar," July, 1969]. There are also others. With his analysis of what is wrong, however, I am in a rough sort of agreement. The books by Ridgeway and Chomsky are not sufficiently complicated or solid to prove what they set out to prove; nor does Wolfe's description of socialization in the academic professions — painful as the situation is — seem shocking, unless one expects major social institutions to be other than protective of their own status quo. Social scientists and common sense recognize that particular historical regularity. Still, major social institutions that span many cultures and many centuries have an uncanny capacity to heed the voice of prophets and to submit, more or less reluctantly, to renewal, reform, and revolution. For their aim, always somewhat out of focus, is to structure possibilities for life and not to strangle and petrify the forces of life. The question is not whether major social institutions need reform and revolution, but what at any historical moment constitutes fresh possibilities for life as opposed to mere reaction.

I would like to believe that Professor Wolfe's prescriptions do not have their roots in the impulse of reaction. But his article is not encouraging. It is disciplined as it destroys; it is careless as it builds. Certain kinds of radical thinking today are not radical but reactionary, and the proof lies in their employment of a double standard: to think critically about what is wrong with present arrangements but uncritically about what ought to supplant them. Judgment is complicated by the youth of many radical thinkers; one must allow for the awful ambivalence of youthful idealism, outrage, and political passion, which has ever made youths willing to march even to death in revolutionary armies committed to opposite ideologies.

Wolfe's prescription for a university based on "social change" manifests a profound ambivalence. "Social change" is a neutral, non-critical, and radically deficient criterion of selection. A rightist Putsch in the United States, for example, would constitute "social change." In some societies, efforts to establish freedom in which freedom means the freedom to deny God, the church, and natural law are considered steps toward "social change." Again, "social change" may involve the discipline of absolute loyalty to every command of revolutionary leadership, under pain of death. Some of us are not too young to remember that Hitler made German universities institutions of "social change." Those who were not for Nazi revolution were, according to criteria similar to Wolfe's, considered counter-revolutionary and deprived of the right to teach or to learn. "Law," Hitler said in ringing speeches filmed and played in every hamlet, "is obsolete; people who oppose the revolution are obsolete." Social change or death! Wolfe, in reaction against abuses in the pluralistic model of academic freedom, has not protected himself against abuses from the opposite direction. There are always people willing to volunteer to supplant their own context to "social change," and in the name of their own belovèd abstractions (as Camus wrote) to purify concrete human beings to death. A genuinely radical theory needs care precisely at this point. (Marcuse's word — "critical thought" — is not yet sufficient.)

Secondly, Wolfe's view that the liberal arts arose with liberalism is clearly false. The root meaning of liberal in ancient and medieval cultures was "liberating," and the precise form of liberation was from the necessities of acquiring food, shelter, and sustenance for self-preservation. Liberal arts were those arts which became relevant when, economically and politically, men had achieved a measure of affluence and therefore of leisure, and, in any given culture, only for men who had leisure. Only when fundamental bodily needs were safely met could men turn their energies to the "things of the spirit": music, geometry, rhetoric, grammar, and so forth. Periodically in Western history, poverty, plague, or the breakdown of social order meant the death of the liberal arts. Political stability and economic abundance provided occasions for their rebirth.

Under present circumstances, the preoccupation of many of our most intelligent and sensitive young people with the lot of millions of human beings in the Third World and in America convinces them of the "irrelevance" of the liberal arts. This is another way of putting the historical law that people whose basic political and economic needs have not been met find the liberal arts both a "meaningless" luxury and an insulting ideology. For it seems that liberal artists use their political and economic superiority to develop intellectual disciplines for which they claim a cultural superiority. This problem is complicated both by the biases of radical and liberal thinkers in the United States and by the biases of liberal artists. On the politically radical and liberal side, there is a tendency to imagine "political and economic needs" in terms derived from radical and liberal experience in the United States — autonomous selfhood, criti-
zal reason, a preference for economic goods over symbolic goods (an aqueduct rather than a cathedral), and a systematic insensitivity to the spiritual and artistic and communitarian achievements of peasant life. (Many peasants are—I write this from Mexico—highly developed in the arts of the human spirit, in sympathy, in concrete perception, in dignity, in the satisfactions of artistic and religious expression. They know secrets professors of the liberal arts in the United States know not of.) Peasant cultures are not utopian; but their versions of utopia may not be either American liberal or American radical.

On the other hand, liberal artists frequently forget the extent to which their own cultural enrichment (a) depends upon the labor and exertions of millions of the world’s poor; (b) is deficient by virtue of its isolation from the perceptions, feelings, and experiences of the major part of humanity; and (c) thus acquires a racial and class bias that has nothing to do with the liberal arts as an historical ideal but is a present and debilitating sickness and limitation of the liberal arts. At present, the liberal arts do not celebrate humanity in its varieties. They celebrate an essentially white, European, aristocratic, or (at best) middle-class set of perceptions, values, sensibilities, insights, judgments, achievements, and style of life.

Ironically, however, one reason for the present low condition of the liberal arts is entwined with the politically radical and liberal policy of universal education in the United States. Both slavery in the United States and industrialization in the United States brought about a degradation in the life of the poor that is not characteristic of economic or social poverty as such, but of such poverty under the impact of a nationalist culture. (Not all of the world’s peasants, though economically far poorer than their counterparts in the United States, have been so brutalized.) Precisely to such Americans, the liberal arts may well seem “irrelevant,” for two reasons: they do not cure the deep political helplessness of their people, and they present schemata of perception and experience that do not interpret the American experience of poverty, race, and brutalization. On the other hand, precisely the demand that American colleges should be open to all American citizens who are in any way fit has for the last forty years drastically watered down the quality of teachers of the liberal arts. There are legions who teach the liberal arts who are not liberated men or women. Often in history the liberal arts have become the opposite of liberation; now is such a time.

The degradation of the liberal arts in our time has arisen from several quarters, but two of the most prominent are amateurism and professionalism. Both these vices—the latter arising from specialization and a kind of scientism, the former arising from that well-meaning good will that so characterizes the soft side of the American character—end in exactly the same procedure. In the name of the liberal arts, students are fed forearranged patterns of perception, memory, and feeling; students are shocked out of their local and familiar “prejudices” and “superstitious” and indoctrinated into the tenets of our national liberal culture. They are taught to “think for themselves,” in standard liberal ways—authenticated, in a fashion, by the resistance to their newly found liberalism still prevalent in local conservative America. But this is a charade of liberation, a charade of authenticity, a charade of individuality and personal richness.

One dominant tenet of the national ideology proclaimed by even the best liberal arts schools is that of the “identity crisis” of young people. Students are taught to look for their own “identity,” as if it preexisted for them, already made, fashioned by psychologists, theologians, and American society as a whole. The “responsible” ones will come out of the crisis whole. They will be “well-adjusted” to the American reality, and manifest the capacity to “cope” realistically with the “real world of adulthood” and the “wisdom of age.” But many American college students read one hundred books a year. Their local and family prejudices are continually assaulted by the missionaries of enlightenment (liberal or radical, it is equal). Where do they have space, when do they have time, to recover the links to their own memory traces, to hear the voice of their own genuine experience, to learn to listen to the language both of the stomach, the heart, and the imaginative-creative intuitive personal intelligence? They are overlaid with a foreign culture. They are not liberated.

“Well-adjusted” to the overlaid culture and profoundly separated from their own silent voices and “prehistoric” emotions, many of our best students never develop a rich language system of their own. They try so hard to listen to “reason” and to “be objective” that they cannot discern the deep ebb and flow of profound emotion that passes between individuals even in the most casual situations. (I call out to my three-year-old son and tell him to “come here and listen to me; look me in the eye.” But he has long since caught from the emotions in my voice the precise message, and cannot understand this ritual of objective and verbal reasons. He squirms, because he thinks his father must be stupid not to understand what the emotions have already so clearly said.) Our students learn to speak a fraudulent language of reason and “group communication,” wholly determined by the sentiments, images, roles and purposes rationally (!) assigned to persons in our culture. Many radical students and thinkers suffer a parallel fraudulence, eagerly absorbing patterns of outrage, community feeling, ecstatic joy, depression, and political speech prearranged for them by their peers. Many do not so much speak as coerce one another, manipulating each other’s emotions by “sensitivity,” “honesty,” and “revolt.” Imagining themselves to be free, many add to the world’s weight of groupspoke.

The liberal arts are the arts of liberation. They require one to learn to distinguish one’s own personal memory, voice, instincts, judgment from the cacophony of inner sounds superimposed on the psyche by years of “education” and “youth culture.” That inner voice, however, cannot be perceived in one easy lesson; a long, slow, organic process is required—the acquisition and penetration of a modern consciousness and sensibility, the slow and patient building of a
system of metaphors and words for saying what one wishes to say, as one wishes to say it. The task is long and hard, not easy. Not everyone is up to it. The liberal arts are not for everyone.

Those men and women possess the arts of liberation who think, feel, imagine, sense, remember, evaluate for themselves, in unmistakably personal ways, and faithful to their own developing language systems. The social uses of such liberation are not direct but indirect; a “movement” of authentic persons is a contradiction in terms. Cheap revolutions thrive on slogans and televised emotions; they are not revolutionary but conventional, not liberating but group-bound. A genuine revolution proceeds by way of private languages, mutually participated in and acted on. It can proceed in and through some major social institutions; it must overturn, remake, or invent substitutes for others. It seeks to favor life, not merely to react, and that requires discernment and genuine prophecy.

“There is a shit-storm coming.” Norman Mailer writes. We live in an age of fraudulent revolutions and fraudulent promises. We are likely to perish in a sea of Dreck. I think that Professor Wolfe’s prescriptions are part of the problem, not of the solution, and that they lead not to life but to death.

My own proposals run as follows. The brutalized poor in the United States want a “relevant” education. Their theoreticians have often shown intuitive brilliance; they have also made mistakes and shown uncertainty. Liberal arts education in the United States at present does not liberate the children of the affluent or the middle class; how could it, then, liberate the poor? For a generation, we are probably going to have to tackle two tasks at once. On the one hand, some militant poor (blacks, Puerto Ricans and, increasingly, lower-middle-class whites) want an education “relevant” to a “social revolution.” They want to change the structures of society as soon as possible, so that the poor and the non-white especially attain power commensurate with their dignity. They have a right to a choice, and their choice is “education for social revolution.” Soon they will discover the Marxian law that education of its nature is not and cannot be directly relevant to “social revolution.” For the other institutions of society are much more powerful in shaping human life than schools are. If you want to change society, you cannot do it by changing the schools. If you want to change the schools, change the society. Consequently, the effort to bring more poor and especially non-white students into the colleges may help to broaden the students’ range of experience, to provide them with a social enclave, and to prepare many for better economic opportunities. It may even nourish leaders and allow the growth of a sophisticated ideology for social revolution. But if it leads directly to social revolution, other major institutions of the society will make their power felt — educational institutions are not more powerful in, or more primary to, a society than economic institutions.

A Marxian or a common-sense view of the role of universities vis-à-vis social revolution, therefore, sets before genuine liberal education a second task. Commonly in history, the liberal arts flourish under the impact of newly discerned bodies of human experience. In principle, the liberal arts intend the liberation of all humanity. In fact, the liberal arts as we know them in the West are confined to Western experience and to the experience, largely, of the aristocratic, upper, and middle classes in the West. It is no longer either necessary or desirable to endure these limitations upon our sense of the humanities. A genuine humanities program today must appropriate two new bodies of experience: the experience of other human cultures and traditions beyond those of Western (European-North American) culture, and the experience of the poor within Western culture. Many of our students already share these bodies of experience. They, and we, need to work out both personal and new social languages for enlarging our range of experience, imagination, understanding, judgment, and decision. Men in these cultures, classes, and races not presently represented in traditional “humanities” courses have a different sense of reality, different sensibilities and perceptual models, different emotional configurations, a different understanding of self and of community, different attitudes toward “progress,” a different capacity to endure suffering and hardship, a different wisdom. All these riches are proper to “humanity.” All afford ways to personal liberation and social reconstruction. The whole world need not be made over into the image of North America, nor need all persons adapt the life-style of affluent North American radicals, black or white.

The hard work of inventing fresh ways of speaking, seeing, hearing, and feeling is immensely “relevant” to a genuine revolution on this planet. For it is through affecting consciousness that one brings about the collapse or the reform of basic social institutions. Institutions gain their legitimacy and their effectiveness through their hold over consciousness. Schools are not the only, nor the most powerful, institutions which affect consciousness. But they do offer space and time for critical reflection, careful inquiry, and systematic criticism. There are many enemies of freedom surrounding and within universities, not just three. There are many kinds and varieties of “social change.” There are many levels of “relevance.” There are many stages of preparation for accurate and penetrating social analysis, cultural criticism, reflection on the course of consciousness in one’s time. These matters the university can attend to, and they are indispensable to a genuine and humane revolution, one which bequeaths its sons and daughters a social structure in which the arts of liberation are more widely and more profoundly practiced than before. To ask the university to be other than itself is to invite its destruction, from within and from without, and to leave the coming and necessary revolution shorn of the intelligence it will desperately need. The revolution requires systematic criticism, even of itself. Universities “committed to” the revolution are sectarian — and to be sectarian is to be neither revolutionary nor loyal to humanity, but all too human. Why should the coming revolution repeat all the mistakes of its enemies in the past?

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