

THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES
OF CHINESE RACISM:
A Strategic Asymmetry for the United States

Draft Report

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This is the first of two deliverables.

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[REDACTED] University also was a great help to me in numerous discussions about race and the Chinese worldview, Chinese attitude toward racial and religious minorities in China and outside of it, particularly their perspectives on Christians and Christianity, and their perception of the United States, Europe, India, and Russia.

[REDACTED] aided me time and again with translations, broadening my understanding of Chinese racism and racial ideas, China's conception of strategy and *shi* [勢], while permitting me to

comprehend how ancient many of these beliefs are and how woven they are in Chinese history and culture, and why they remain.

Lastly, any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those views of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Net Assessment.

**Chinese Dynastic Chronology:
Major Periods in Imperial China**

Legendary Sage Emperors B.C.	2852-2255
Xia	2205-1766
Shang	1766-1045
Zhou	
Western Zhou	1045-770
Eastern Zhou	771-256
Spring and Autumn	722-481
Warring States	403-221
Qin	221-207
Former Han (Western Han)	206 B.C.-A.D. 8
Later Han (Eastern Han)	23-220
Three Kingdoms	168-280
Six Dynasties	222-589
Sui	589-618
Tang	618-907
Five Dynasties	907-959
Northern Song	960-1126
Southern Song	1127-1279
Yuan (Mongols)	1279-1368
Ming	1368-1644
Qing (Manchus)	1644-1911

Executive Summary

Whether China and the United States are destined to compete for domination in international politics is one of the major questions facing DoD. In a competition with the People's Republic of China, the United States must explore all of its advantages and all of the weaknesses of China that may provide an asymmetry for the United States. This study examines one such asymmetry, the strategic consequences of Chinese racism. After having examined the literature on China extensively, this author is not aware of a single study that addresses this important topic.

This study explores the causes of Chinese racism, the strategic consequences of Chinese racism, and how the United States may use this situation to advance its interests in international politics.

In **Chapter One**, the study finds that xenophobia, racism, and ethnocentrism are caused by human evolution. These behaviors are not unique to the Chinese. However, they are made worse by Chinese history and culture.

Chapter Two considers the Chinese conception of race in Chinese history and culture. It finds that Chinese religious-cultural and historical conceptions of race reinforce Chinese racism. In Chinese history and contemporary culture, the Chinese are seen to be unique and superior to the rest of the world. Other peoples and groups are seen to be inferior, with a sliding scale of inferiority. The major Chinese distinction is between degrees of barbarians, the "black devils," or savage inferiors, beyond any hope of interaction and the "white devils" or tame barbarians with whom the Chinese can interact. These beliefs are widespread in Chinese society, and have been for its history.

Modern Chinese views on race are no better than they were in the past. The study reviews the racist views of major Chinese political thinkers and the Communist Party. Racism remains a key component of how the Chinese see the world, their central place in it, and the world's other, inferior inhabitants. The chapter concludes with the recognition that China has been and remains

a racist state, where racists and eugenicist beliefs inform the Chinese worldview.

Chapter Three evaluates the nine strategic consequences of Chinese racism.

First, virulent racism and eugenics heavily inform Chinese perceptions of the world. United States decision-makers must recognize that China is a racist state, much closer to Nazi Germany than to the values upheld in the West. Most often, [the Chinese do not even recognize their racism as a problem. They believe that racism is a Western phenomenon and that Westerners are obsessed with race. This obsession is seen by the Chinese to be a strategic vulnerability of the West, whereas China is not affected by racism.](#)

Second, racism informs their view of the United States. From the Chinese perspective, the United States used to be a strong society that the Chinese respected when it was unicultural, defined by the centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture at the core of American national identity aligned with the political ideology of liberalism, the rule of law, and free market capitalism. The Chinese see multiculturalism as a sickness that has overtaken the United States, and a component of U.S. decline.

Third, racism informs their view of international politics in three ways. First, states are stable, and thus good for the Chinese, to the degree that they are unicultural. Second, Chinese ethnocentrism and racism drive their outlook to the rest of the world. Their expectation is of a tribute system where barbarians know that the Chinese are superior. Third, there is a strong, implicit, racist view of international politics that is alien and anathema to Western policy-makers and analysts. The Chinese are comfortable using race to explain events and appealing to racist stereotypes to advance their interests. [Most insidious is the Chinese belief that Africans in particular need Chinese leadership.](#)

Fourth, the Chinese will make appeals to Third World states based on “racial solidarity,” that is, the need of non-white peoples to unite against Western imperialism and racism. Racial solidarity claims are easy for Chinese to

accomplish since the Chinese can make strategic racist claims. For example, they can frame international politics in terms of a “racial balance of power,” and cast appeals to the Third World along the line of: now is the time for non-whites to dominate international politics.

Fifth, Chinese racism retards their relations with the Third World. Chinese racism makes it difficult for China to advance a positive message in the Third World, especially Africa, but also in Latin America and the Middle East. The Chinese have a hierarchical representation of looking at other groups, darker skin is lower class, and race matters. In this sense, the racial stereotypes of the Africans commonly found within Chinese society suggest that this population is backward and dirty, and prone to crime, particularly violent crime. These beliefs surface regularly in China’s relations with the Third World and these beliefs, coupled with clannish and ruthless Chinese business practices, generate enormous resentment in the Third World.

Sixth, Chinese racism, and the degree to which the Chinese permit their view of the United States to be informed by racism, has the potential to hinder China in its competition with the United States because it contributes to their overconfidence. This overconfidence is a result of ethnocentrism and a sense of superiority rooted in racism. The Chinese commonly believe that they are cleverer than others, and so may shape events in an oblique manner or through *shi* [勢], the strategic manipulation of events. This conceit among the Chinese that they can manipulate others is supremely dangerous for Asian stability. At the same time, it is a great advantage for the United States to play upon that overconfidence. An overconfident China will continue to make the mistakes it is presently in the South China or East China Sea disputes. That is, making threats, issuing demands, heavy-handed shows of force, are generated by China’s overconfidence.

Seventh, as lamentable as it is, Chinese racism helps to make the Chinese a formidable adversary. There are three critical consequences that result from this. The first is the sense of unity the Chinese possess. Second, it allows the Chinese to have a strong sense of identity, which in turn permits them to weather adversity, and to be focused and secure confidence that the rest of

the nation is with them. Third, China is not plagued by self-doubt or guilt about its past.

Eight, the Chinese are never going to go through a civil rights movement like the United States. This is because, first, they have no freedom of the press, freedom to petition their government, freedom to assemble, all of which are necessary to support a civil rights movement. Second, there is no political drive or consciousness for equality in Chinese thought. Equality is associated with Maoism and rejected in today's China, where inequality is accepted and celebrated. In addition, there is no notion of civil rights in Chinese political thought or, practically, in jurisprudence.

Ninth, China's treatment of Christians and ethnic minorities is poor. The government recognizes that religion is able to do many positive acts in a society, and they do see the need for people to have a moral, religious grounding provided by religion since a moral framework may be lost in the demands of a market economy. The current debate is an echo of the one they had in the 1800s, how do they preserve the essence of what is Chinese in an era dominated by Western ideas. Yet, the government is fearful of religion in the sense that uncontrolled religion may be a threat; a challenge to Beijing's authority. Not surprisingly, the treatment of ethnic minorities is equally bad.

Chapter Four considers the five major implications for United States decision-makers and asymmetries that may result from Chinese racism.

First, Chinese racism provides empirical evidence of how the Chinese will treat other international actors if China becomes dominant. One of the key insights into Chinese future behavior is its behavior in the past. Analysts do have insight into how China will behave in the future based on its behavior in the past, when it was the hegemon of Asia, the known world as far as China was concerned. China sees itself as the center of the universe, all others are inferior, with varying degrees of inferiority. That is not an attractive model of winning allies and influence.

United States Defense decision-makers might draw upon the following themes as asymmetrical messages to weaken China's influence in the world. The first of these themes should be to advance a "reality check" to the global community: "how do Chinese words match Chinese deeds when it comes to treating people fairly and equally."

The second theme is to introduce fault. "Why do the Chinese refuse to change their racist views of the rest of the world?" Or more succinctly, "Why don't the Chinese like black people; or Indians; or South East Asians; or Latin Americans?" Attention needs to be called to its eugenics policies as well. "Why do the Chinese support eugenics generations after it was discredited in the West?" Likewise, explicit ties to the policies of Nazi Germany may be made since both Berlin and Beijing embraced eugenics. Beijing continues to do so long after it has been discredited.

A third theme is to suggest that there is something profoundly wrong with China's worldview: "Why are the Chinese unable, or unwilling, to change their racist views?" Or that there is something deeply iniquitous with China itself, that is to say there is something profoundly wrong with the Chinese people, or with their elite: "Why is China a racist state?" "Racism has been confronted and defeated worldwide, why is it celebrated in China?"

These themes allow the United States and other countries to challenge China's projected image of an oppressed victim of racism with actual empirical reality: China is a racist superpower. It practices discredited eugenics policies. It does not equal the horrors of Nazi Germany, but it is far closer to Nazism than it is to a free, open, and tolerant society.

Second, it allows the United States to undermine China in the Third World.

The essence of the Chinese message to Third World states is a straightforward rhetorical query: Has the United States or the Europeans ever treated you as equals? In contrast, China portrays itself as an apolitical rising superpower that does business in your country, pays a fair price for your commodities, and builds your infrastructure with no string attached.

The United States needs to counter the expansion of Chinese influence by tying in to the messages stated above, but adding the important point that there is no culture of anti-racism in China, and so there is little hope for

change. Messages may be advanced along the following line: “The West confronted racism and developed a strong culture of anti-racism, China has not, nor is it likely to do so.”

Second, the United States should highlight that Chinese business practices are destructive. There often is considerable resentment toward the Chinese due to their ruthless business practices, which undercut and destroy African businesses. The combination of the two messages, “China is racist with no culture of anti-racism, and their businesses practices are destructive for the locals,” would be most effective in making appeals to the Third World.

Third, it is an obvious point, but it must be made: the Chinese are hypocrites when it comes to race and racial equality. For all of their rhetoric on Africa and their “African brothers,” the cold facts of Chinese racism triumph paeans to “Third World solidarity.”

Fourth, the message of the United States should be: We are better than the Chinese for Africa. We will assist you with economic aid to offset what you receive from China. In sum, culturally, socially, and politically, the United States is better, citizens are equal, racial equality, and civil rights are recognized.

Third, it permits a positive image of the United States to be advanced in contrast to China.

The direct fact is, when compared with China, it is easy to convey to the rest of the world the message that the United States is open and inclusive, whereas China is not. This is because to do so is completely in accord with the principles of the United States and its history.

The messages should be, first, the United States seeks the best from around the world, and will permit them to come to the country so that they may prosper, fulfill themselves as individuals, innovate, and, in turn, aid economic growth and innovation in the United States. Second, the United States opens its society, educational system, Universities, military, and economy to immigrants as countless examples demonstrate. Third, it has in place Affirmative Action policies as a matter of state policy that benefits immigrants from racial minorities and/or those who are women. In sum, the

United States is one of the most transparent societies in the world for immigrants.

Fourth, calling attention to Chinese racism allows political and ideological alliances of the United States to be strengthened. Political alliances particularly with Third World states are an obvious benefit. Equally important are the ideological alliances that the United States may augment. Intellectual circles in Europe, Canada, and the United States value multiracial and multicultural societies.

Journalists and media opinion-makers frequently share a multiracial and multicultural vision of their societies as well. Yet, thus far, they have not treated the problem of Chinese racism with the attention it deserves. The “China is a racist state” message of the United States will help win allies in global, popular culture, which is heavily influenced by ideals rooted in Western, left wing political thought, including strong currents of anti-racism. Popular cultural figures from film, music, television, and sports, will be far better able to call attention to China’s racism for younger audiences worldwide than will official or semi-official Washington.

It is to the advantage of the United States to have the world consider the costs of Chinese dominance in order to grasp what will be lost. This is an exercise that most of the world has not done, and as a result there is no appreciation of what will be lost; or how hypocritical, domineering, and imperialistic China will be.

Fifth, United States defense decision-makers must recognize that racism is a cohesive force for the Chinese. Racism does benefit the Chinese in four major ways. First, the Han Chinese possess a strong in-group identity with a polarized and tightly defined out-group. This allows the Chinese government to expect sacrifice as well as support from a considerable majority of the Chinese people.

Second, based in this identity, the government has the ability to focus with great willpower on the demands of the state. All governments make patriotic appeals, but the Chinese government is able to do so effectively because any entreaty is based on patriotism as well as nationalism. When we reflect on the tools the Chinese government has to extract support and

resources from the population, only one conclusion is possible, they are formidable.

Third, they have strong societal unity and purpose, which supports Chinese power. The Chinese do not have a culture that is self-critical or one that ponders its fundamental faults.

Fourth, China's racism and ethnocentrism serves China's teleological worldview. History, in the Hegelian sense, is moving in China's direction and the future belongs to it, China's political beliefs, civilizational culture, and economic might triumphed over the West.

While racism can be a great strength for China, it also gives the United States an advantage. The lack of any desire by the Chinese to self-reflect on the profound faults of their society means that there is no motivation to solve these faults. Accordingly, a powerful message may be that China will not change because it has no desire to do so. In essence, with China, "what you see is what you get." The country is a civilization, and that yields them great strength.

At the same time, there cannot be fundamental change. China is not an open society, transparent and porous for new ideas that would challenge its core beliefs. For those states and peoples whom the Chinese see as inferior, dissatisfaction with core Chinese beliefs is certain to increase as Chinese power expands. Thus, the United States may tap into that "market of dissatisfaction" by calling attention to China's lack of flexibility and flexibility, contempt for, and dismissal of the rest of the world.

Finally, the United States may make appeals to those actors in international politics that do not desire China to be at the center of the world either, first, because their interests directly conflict with China's, like India, Japan, Russia, and Vietnam; second, because they resent being excluded from consideration, treated equally, or with respect; or third, because they reject China's values and worldview.

The study's fundamental conclusion is that endemic Chinese racism offers the United States a major asymmetry it may exploit with major countries, regions like Africa, as well as with important opinion makers in international politics. The United States is on the right side of the struggle against racism

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and China is not. The United States should call attention to this to aid its position in international politics.

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Introduction

Whether China and the United States are destined to compete for domination in international politics is one of the major questions facing the United States Department of Defense. In a competition with the People's Republic of China, the United States must explore all of its advantages and all of the weaknesses of China that may provide an asymmetry for the United States. This study examines one such asymmetry, the strategic consequences of Chinese racism. After having examined the literature on China extensively, this author is not aware of a single study on this important topic. It appears that most Sinologists do not deem the topic worth studying, or simply accept Chinese racism as a given.

This study explores the causes of Chinese racism, the strategic consequences of Chinese racism, and how the United States may use this situation to advance its interests in international politics.

The study finds that Chinese racism is caused by human evolution and Chinese history and culture. In Chinese history and contemporary culture, the Chinese are seen to be unique and superior to the rest of the world. Other peoples and groups are considered to be inferior, with a sliding scale of inferiority. The major Chinese distinction is between the "black devils," the savage inferiors beyond any hope of interaction, and the "white devils," the

tame barbarians with whom the Chinese can interact. These beliefs are widespread in Chinese society, and have been for its history. China has always had a history of discrimination against minorities and foreigners. This history of discrimination and view of the inferiority of racial minorities is as strong today as ever, and has existed even in the communist period with its alleged universalism and ideological opposition to racial discrimination, which also was stressed by the “Third World solidarity” of Maoism. Indeed, the eminent Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen said that the “greatest force” for China is “common blood.”

Most often, the Chinese do not even recognize their racism as a problem. They believe that racism is a Western phenomenon and that Westerners are obsessed with race. This obsession is seen by the Chinese to be a strategic vulnerability of the West, whereas China is not affected by racism.

A major strategic consequence of Chinese racism is that it heavily informs their view of the world. The Chinese believe that states are good to the degree that they are unicultural. They have a strong, implicit, and racist view of international politics, and an equally dominant view of the racial balance of power. Most insidious is the Chinese belief that Africans in particular need Chinese leadership because they are too childlike to care for

their own needs. [The United States should expect that China will make appeals to the Third World based on “racial solidarity.”](#)

This provides a significant opening for the United States to advance its interests at China’s expense. Washington may explain why its open policies and specific policies to combat racism make it a more attractive ally. [The United States can take advantage of Chinese racism in its foreign and defense policies](#), as well as in the global public sphere. Most of the world’s opinion makers in the media and popular culture are sensitive to the dangers of racism, and so are more favorably inclined to Washington’s policies than Beijing’s. Chinese racism also provides the world with important insights into how international politics will look when China is dominant. These insights should add further support for Washington. In sum, [Chinese racism offers the United States specific asymmetries it can exploit](#), specifically the ability [to hinder China’s appeal in the Third World](#).

[The conclusion is that endemic Chinese racism offers the United States a major asymmetry it may exploit with major countries, regions like Africa, as well as with important opinion makers in international politics.](#)

The straightforward message is that [the United States is on the right side in the struggle against racism and China is not](#). [The United States should call](#)

[attention to this to aid its position in international politics.](#) This study specifically explains how this may be achieved.

[Moreover, the asymmetry identified may be used in other contexts for future Office of Net Assessment research on China and other](#) peer and near-peer competitors in international politics.

The Assumptions of the Study

This study makes three assumptions. The first is that China will not waiver in its desire or ability to confront the United States. This is a solid assumption. As I have shown in previous work, the desire to confront the United States is so strong as to be unyielding. There is greater doubt about the ability of China to confront the United States due to likely economic downturn as a result of domestic causes such as economic bubbles and structural and environmental problems in its economy. China's economic growth is slow, but due to its hegemonic ambitions, the reduced growth is only likely to extend the time needed to equal, and then surpass, the economic, diplomatic, and military power of the United States.

The second is that the Chinese will not change their racist views. As the study will reveal, this is a reasonable assumption due to the evolutionary origins of racism, how difficult it is to defeat, and the historical and cultural attitudes toward race in China. I maintain that they will not change, even

when the Chinese government, as it surely will do, recognizes that it is a significant problem for China's image abroad and the attractiveness of its soft power. Change is unlikely due to the cultural force of the racist beliefs and the ethnocentrism and self-identity of the Chinese. No doubt, the Chinese will make token gestures and invite numerous African leaders for lavish state visits, but the reality of Chinese views about race, their ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and pride, conspire to form a reality that will trump any sustained contact with the Chinese.

The third assumption is that United States decision-makers will have the confidence to identify, call attention to, advance, and sustain messages designed to counter Chinese racism. This is difficult to do because race is a controversial and loaded topic in the United States. Understandably, decision-makers may be weary to call attention to or use in a global ideological struggle, the obvious fact of Chinese racism. In part, this is due to the difficult racial history of the United States.

However, they should take heart, and recognize a clear and transparent virtue. To its great credit, the United States identified and addressed racism from the 1950s. The Chinese have not, and will not. The United States' political system is open to change to redress its faults. The

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Chinese system is much less flexible. In contrast to China, the United States is a much more open and welcoming society for all races of people.

Chapter One

The Evolutionary Origins of Xenophobia, Racism, and Ethnocentrism

This study begins with the recognition that racism is a problem in every society and in every culture throughout history.¹ For present purposes, racism is defined as the belief or doctrine that race is the primary determinant of human abilities and capabilities, of an individual or group, and, second, that racial differences produce inherent superiority of a particular race. Racism is almost always twinned with ethnocentrism, a close, but not identical idea that one's own people, or race, is superior to the others, and comprises the right of, or justification for, dominating or ruling over them.² Racism may be institutionalized, that is, defined and accepted formal—governmental, cultural, economic, and social—patterns that have the desired effect of imposing oppressive or otherwise negative conditions against identifiable groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, or caste.

¹ An excellent introduction to the problem of racism and its theoretical explanations is Michael Banton, *Racial Theories*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

² Just as it does imply what many academics term “hypernationalism,” the belief that other ethnic groups should be dealt with harshly, including extermination. For an elaboration of hypernationalism, see Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Contemporary societies have mixed records addressing the problem. Historically, it was a problem for all societies. That is far less the case today, as there is considerable variation in the degree of racism throughout the world. In general, East Asia ranks very high in the degree of racism tolerated, and explicitly voiced, within society. Racism, particularly with respect to caste prejudice remains very high in South Asia. Racism is common at every level of Russian society and is at times explicitly voiced in Russia. In Latin America, we find racism consistently high in societies with Indian populations.³ Discrimination against darker skinned Indians by descendants of Europeans remains an unfortunate characteristic of those societies.

The exception is the West. Broadly, the West has performed admirable work in combating racism in Western societies. Most Western societies have made prodigious efforts, first, by considering racism as a major social and civil problem, if not *the* major social and civil problem in their societies.

Second, having identified the problem, these societies have taken steps in every aspect of life to combat racism. It is no exaggeration to state that these societies have undergone a revolution with overturning how racial

³ Laura A. Lewis, "Spanish Ideology and the Practice of Inequality in the New World," in Benjamin P. Bowser, ed., *Racism and Anti-Racism in World Perspective* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995), pp. 46-66.

and other minorities were perceived in the public sphere. Governmental policies have changed to support and advance the rights of racial minorities. Corporations spend billions on ensuring diversity, donating to the right institutions and universities, and in promoting workspace that is free of any suggestion or patina of racism. In the academic realm, universities spend many billions supporting minority faculty and student recruitment, ethnic studies programs, and affirmative action and outreach programs. Like its counterparts in the West, the United States military has labored since the Truman administration to integrate the services and to combat racism, especially in the wake of the racial incidents that plagued the services near the end of the Vietnam war and in its aftermath.⁴ In this light, the work of Generals Creighton Abrams and Donn Starry to reform the army, one is tempted to say “save” the army, may be fully appreciated.

In the public sphere, the changes have been more profound. The news media are particularly sensitive to racism in corporations, governmental policies, or even individuals. Recall the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, denouncing a pensioner as “a bigoted woman” because she complained about Polish immigration to the UK. Popular

⁴ Indeed, helped to spawn such works as Cincinnatus, *Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam Era* (New York: Norton, 1981); and Edward L. King, *The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972).

culture, Hollywood, television, magazines, and, more recently, blogs, take the issue of racism very seriously. Anti-racist messages are common in film and television, while positive images of racial minorities are heavily emphasized. Hollywood and television take their monitoring and policing of the public sphere seriously and work to identify violators, and punishing them through ridicule or through expulsion from the community and acceptable company.

Former *Seinfeld* comedian Michael “Kramer” Richards discovered this fact when he criticized black members of his audience who were heckling him as he performed his act. His remarks used racist language and cost him his career. The days of a Don Rickles performance, long on ethnic jokes and characterizations, are at least a generation past in the West.

The primary and secondary educational system has been completely remade since 1970s to emphasize the contributions of racial minorities and the dangers of racism. The students receive instruction about the evils of prejudice and bigotry from K-12, while positive education about minorities is heavily emphasized. For the American student today, anti-racism and minority history months are as much a part of his primary and secondary education as instruction in mathematics, government, or physical education.

Despite prodigious efforts made in the West to combat racism, it still remains. The fundamental reason why it is so difficult to erase such behavior

is because the trait, found in all humans across all cultures, is rooted in human evolution. The trait of racism is an unfortunate consequence of living in a hostile and dangerous world, where resources were scarce and the need to identify family members, whether close or more distantly related, was essential for survival.

We may think of racism as being a product of the human evolutionary past. And it is not the only unfortunate trait that evolution has bequeathed to humanity today. The central traits related to racism are groupishness, the human ability to create in-groups and out-groups, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism.

In order to understand why racism is such a problem in human affairs, it is critical to approach the issue from an evolutionary perspective.

Adopting such a lens to study this issue allows us to understand that racism, and the allied traits of groupishness, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism, are anchored in human evolution, and are thus a part, regrettable as it is, of what makes us human. As the great evolutionary theorist E.O. Wilson argues, “the human condition is an endemic turmoil rooted in the evolutionary processes

that created us. The worst in our nature coexists with the best, and so it will ever be. To scrub it out, if such were possible, would make us less human.”⁵

Applied to the topic of this study, these insights allow us to perceive that endemic Chinese racism is wrong, to be sure, but is also understandable. It is shared with other cultures and civilizations in the past as well as the present day. Indeed, it would have been common in Western societies, even in academic and other elite circles, a generation ago. It takes a great effort to combat racism. Once launched, these efforts must be maintained by governmental and economic actors, twinned with those in civil society and popular culture. We must recognize a difficult truth: thus far the Chinese have not done so; nor have they yet to find the courage and energy necessary to do so.

It is not the place of this study to blame the Chinese. It is regrettable that they have not followed the lead of the West in combating racism. Acknowledging this regret, it also opens the opportunity of the West, and for the United States in particular to call attention to this fact, and to use this unfortunate condition for the advantage of the United States in its competition with China. Succinctly put: the causes of the Chinese attitudes towards race are human evolution coupled with Chinese history and culture.

⁵ Edward O. Wilson, *The Social Conquest of the Earth* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), p. 56.

This chapter considers the evolutionary origins of xenophobia, racism, and ethnocentrism. The next chapter will consider racism in Chinese thought.

I. Evolutionary Origins

In addition to advancing our understanding of racism, evolutionary theory also provides important insights about the in-group/out-group distinction commonly made by anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists.⁶

The study now turns to a discussion of the origins of “groupishness,” or why humans, universally, divide the world into we, ourselves, those of our group, and the others, those that comprise outside groups. In benign circumstances, this may be a simple and harmless division, a Green Bay Packers fan versus a Bears fan; a San Francisco Giants loyalist against a Detroit Tigers zealot. In more serious cases, it is no exaggeration to identify this as a matter of life and death, as it has been for countless people throughout recorded time.

Of the many biases unearthed in the so-called “cognitive revolution” in psychology, the in-group/out-group bias is one of the most significant,

⁶ S. T. Fiske, “What We Know about Bias and Intergroup Conflict, Problem of the Century,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, Vol. 11 (2002), pp. 123-128; M. Hewstone, M. Rubin, and H. Willis, “Intergroup Bias,” *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 53 (2002), pp. 575-604. A classic anthropological account is Raymond Firth, *We, The Tikopia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957).

widespread, and pervasive. The fundamental point of this division is that humans divide the world into an “Us,” the in-group, versus “Them,” the out-group, worldview.

Psychologists refer to the in-group as one’s own group, to which one is positively biased. They argue that in-groups develop from a need for self-definition. This in-group identity helps to define one both positively and negatively, and it provides one with meaning and purpose, knowing one is a part of a community with common interests, values, and goals. Most importantly, one knows what one is not—a member of the out-group. In contrast, the out-group is stereotyped and homogenized as the “Other.” Among the many different categories of an in-group, the most common and significant ones are family, friendship, age, race, sex, class, nationality, and citizenship.

Psychologist Henri Tajfel’s famous in-group/out-group experiments demonstrate the force of these distinctions.⁷ Tajfel used as his subjects unrelated individuals to whom he assigned casual, trivial, or random categories; almost all of them formed groups on the basis of each of these

⁷ Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour,” *Social Science Information*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1974), pp. 65-93; and Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For its relation to ethnic conflict see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 144-147.

categories, and discriminated against other groups on the basis of their new group identity.

Tajfel's further experiments had interesting results. He gave his subjects three choices: one, they could maximize the joint profit of both in-group and out-group; two, maximize the total profit of the in-group; or three, maximize the difference between the profit of the in-group and the profit of the out-group. He found that the outcome that had the most appeal was the maximal differential between groups, which might also be called relative gains, even if this meant less in absolute terms for the in-group.⁸ Decades of research have replicated and confirmed the central finding: even strangers assigned into arbitrary groups very quickly display a strong favoritism towards their own group, and a strong dislike of other groups.

Tajfel's findings bring to mind the Russian parable about the peasant and the genie. When a peasant finds a bottle and uncorks it, a genie appears and promises the peasant a wish. He replies, "Well, my neighbor has a cow and I have none. So, I wish for you to kill my neighbor's cow."

Individuals often appear to value relative differences or gains much more than absolute differences or gains, especially in inter-group conflicts.

⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 145. Also see Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in W. G. Austin and S. Worchel, eds., *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1979).

Nine surveys of “contentedness” in U.S. citizens between 1946 and 1970 show that the level of “happiness” is not linked to absolute income levels—the distribution of responses did not change even though national per capita income rose during this period by 56 percent.⁹ Thus, a constant proportion of people remain unhappy despite being absolutely better off. The best explanation for this is that those same proportion of people continue to recognize that another proportion has more than they do. This effect was consistent between various advanced and less developed countries, and supported by data that people’s perception in the U.S. of minimum acceptable wage grew roughly at the same rate as the national income—even though it was much higher than inflation.

The ubiquity of the in-group/out-group distinction across human cultures and across time suggests that it is an evolutionary adaptation. But rather than simply relying on ubiquity of behavior, evolutionary theory provides an ultimate causal explanation of the in-group/out-group distinction made by humans: it explains why such a mechanism would evolve. There are three major reasons why this is so.

⁹ These results are detailed in Robert H. Frank, *Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

First, given the paucity of resources in the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene environments of human evolution, cooperation with groups beyond one's own was probably rare, given the necessity of satisfying one's own, and one's relatives, needs. Rather, considerable evidence points to intensive inter-group conflict in our evolutionary past, from both archeological and ethnographic evidence on pre-industrial societies.¹⁰ Male deaths from warfare averaged around fifteen percent of the population—and in some societies were considerably higher—compared to the one percent of the western population during the so-called “bloody” 20th century.¹¹ Competing human groups are commonly the most dangerous threat in the environment.¹²

Second, in the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene environments, our human ancestors faced varied and great threats, in the form of other animals

¹⁰ Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jean Guilaine and Jean Zammit, *The Origins of War: Violence in Prehistory* (London: Blackwell, 2004); Lawrence H. Keeley, *War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Steven LeBlanc with Katherine E. Register, *Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003); and Richard W. Wrangham and Dale Peterson, *Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence* (London: Bloomsbury, 1996).

¹¹ Samuel Bowles, “Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism,” *Science*, Vol. 314 (2006), pp. 1569-1572; and Keeley, *War Before Civilization*.

¹² Richard D. Alexander, *The Biology of Moral Systems* (New York: Aldine, 1987).

and other humans, as well as natural dangers such as disease, infections, complications from injuries, and the surrounding environment. Rivers posed the risk of drowning, terrain posed the risk of falling, and weather could cause freezing or dehydration. Even something as simple as falling or slipping on a rock could cause a fatal injury. For example, the preserved remains of "Ötzi", tell us that he was first wounded and then probably froze to death as he rested in the Italian Alps. As a result of these dangers, humans and other animals needed the ability to rapidly assess threats and react quickly.

The in-group/out-group distinction may be thought of as the human brain's immediate threat assessment: in sum, no threat/threat. Is the outsider a threat to oneself or to one's family? As psychologist Robert Bolles writes: "What keeps animals alive in the world is that they have very effective *innate* defensive reactions which occur when they encounter any kind of new or sudden stimulus."¹³ These reactions vary, he says, "but they generally take one of three forms: animals generally run or fly away, freeze, or adopt some type of threat, that is, pseudo-aggressive behavior."¹⁴

¹³ Robert C. Bolles, "Species-Specific Defense Reactions and Avoidance Learning," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (1970), pp. 32-48, 33. Emphasis in original.

¹⁴ Bolles, "Species-Specific Defense Reactions and Avoidance Learning," p. 33.

These reactions are elicited by the appearance of a predator, and also by innocuous, but unfamiliar, objects or animals. Bolles continues: “These responses are always near threshold so that the animal will take flight, freeze, or threaten whenever any novel stimulus event occurs....The mouse does not scamper away from the owl because it has learned to escape the painful claws of the enemy; it scampers away from anything happening in its environment.”¹⁵ Likewise, he argues, the gazelle “does not flee from an approaching lion because it has been bitten by lions; it runs away from any large object that approaches it, and it does so because this is one of its species-specific defense reactions.”¹⁶

He concludes: “The animal which survives is the one which comes into the environment with defensive reactions already a prominent part of its repertoire.”¹⁷ As a result, over the course of human evolution, strangers were first likely to fear one another, at least until they became familiar.¹⁸

Third, strangers might pose an important immediate threat. Given scarce resources, our human ancestors would have used their intelligence

¹⁵ Bolles, “Species-Specific Defense Reactions and Avoidance Learning,” p. 33.

¹⁶ Bolles, “Species-Specific Defense Reactions and Avoidance Learning,” p. 33.

¹⁷ Bolles, “Species-Specific Defense Reactions and Avoidance Learning,” p. 33.

¹⁸ J. Sidanius and R. Kurzban, “Evolutionary Approaches to Political Psychology,” in D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis, eds., *Handbook of Political Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and D. Lieberman, J. Tooby, and L. Cosmides, “The Architecture of Human Kin Detection,” *Nature*, Vol. 44 (2007), pp. 727-731.

and ability to reason into the future to assess outsiders. Any outsider would be judged fairly quickly to determine whether his presence was a threat to their current and future resources. Would he compete for the scarce resources they needed to survive? Would he present competition for mates? Or would his presence threaten their position in the extended family or tribal group? In environments where resources were particularly contested, this could become extreme. For example, among the Inuit of the Arctic, “unfamiliar men would normally be killed even before questions were asked.”¹⁹

Consequently, as with the great majority of animals, humans rapidly assess threats posed by conspecifics or other animal and natural threats. Of course, the human ability to assess such threats is much more complex than it is in other animals. Thus, we may consider other variables, such as the possibility of immediate trade or trade and cooperation in the long run, given the constraints of Trivers’ reciprocal altruism argument. Trivers showed how animals can cooperate with unrelated individuals, as long as cooperation is reciprocated in the future with sufficient probability. Animals have the “flight, freeze, or fight” instinct, as do humans, but human

¹⁹ Richard W. Wrangham, *Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), pp. 168-169.

intelligence gives us a greater repertoire of behavior: flight, freeze, fight, or cooperate—with the expectation that cooperation will be reciprocated.

Nevertheless, the option of cooperating with outsiders is relatively new in human evolutionary history, and so the central point remains: humans and other animals need to be able to assess the threats posed by outsiders quickly, so they know how to behave to protect themselves and their relatives. Do they cooperate, flee, or attack? The in-group/out-group distinction is one solution that developed through evolutionary adaptation.

I. A. Xenophobia

Evolutionary theory allows us to explain why xenophobia evolved in humans. Xenophobia is also found in nonhuman animals. Indeed, most species aggress against conspecifics, and, as many dog and cat owners know from observation, most are territorial.²⁰ The near universality of these behaviors suggests that they evolved in animals in the distant past. The empirical

²⁰ A good introduction to xenophobia in animals is Charles H. Southwick, et al., “Xenophobia among Free-Ranging Rhesus Groups in India,” in Ralph L. Holloway, ed., *Primate Aggression, Territoriality, and Xenophobia: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 185-209. Also see Holloway, “Introduction,” in *Primate Aggression, Territoriality, and Xenophobia*, pp. 1-9, 7; and Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., “Evolution and Collective Intolerance,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (August 1977), pp. 667-684, 674-675. For explicit application to humans see Ralph B. Taylor, *Human Territorial Functioning: An Empirical, Evolutionary Perspective on Individual and Small Group Territorial Cognitions, Behaviors, and Consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

evidence for this is widely documented by ethologists and biologists and is so strong as to be overwhelming.²¹ In fact, the amygdala, one of the brain's most ancient neurological structures and common to many animals, is involved in fear-related behaviors. Ethologist David Barash has found in his study of humans and other animals that "both...tend to reserve their most ferocious aggression toward strangers."²² Biologist John Fuller concludes: "xenophobia is as characteristic of humans as of ants, mice or baboons."²³ Physiologist Jared Diamond argues that "xenophobic murder has innumerable animal precursors," and humans are unique in being the only species to have developed the weapons necessary for killing at a distance.²⁴ After a comprehensive review of xenophobia in animals, Johan van der Dennen concludes that it "is a widespread trait throughout the animal

²¹ For an excellent survey of this literature see Johan van der Dennen, "Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group Differentiation," in Vernon Reynolds, Vincent S.E. Falger, and Ian Vine, eds., *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 1-47, 20-22. Also see J.A.R.A.M. van Hooff, "Intergroup Competition and Conflict in Animals and Man," in J. van der Dennen and V. Falger, eds., *Sociobiology and Conflict: Evolutionary Perspectives on Competition, Cooperation, Violence and Warfare* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1990), pp. 23-54.

²² David P. Barash, *Sociobiology and Behavior* (New York: Elsevier, 1977), p. 219.

²³ John L. Fuller, "Genes, Brains, and Behavior," in Michael S. Gregory, Anita Silvers, and Diane Sutch, eds., *Sociobiology and Human Nature* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), pp. 98-115, 111.

²⁴ Jared Diamond, *The Third Chimpanzee: The Evolution and Future of the Human Animal* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 220-221.

kingdom,” one that helps to “maintain the integrity of the social group” and “ensures that group members will be socially familiar.”²⁵

While xenophobia is present in many animals, my central question is why the trait would also evolve and be maintained in humans. Why would fear of strangers and perceptions of them as threats exist in the repertoire of human behavior? Using inclusive fitness as a theoretical foundation, there are four reasons why evolving xenophobic behavior would contribute to fitness.

First, many anthropologists, archeologists, and historians surmise that humans lived in extended family bands that fought, and protected themselves, against rival human bands as well as against large carnivores or packs of them, such as wolves or hyenas. This behavior is well documented in humans and chimpanzees. This suggests that xenophobia was present in our common ancestor before humans and chimpanzees divided some four or five million years ago, although it has not yet been demonstrated since such evidence concerning our common ancestor is absent at this time.²⁶ However,

²⁵ Johan Matheus Gerradus van der Dennen, *The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy* (Groningen, Netherlands: Origin Press, 1995), pp. 457-458.

²⁶ See Frans B. M. de Waal, “Introduction,” in Frans B. M. de Waal, ed., *Tree of Origin: What Primate Behavior Can Tell Us about Human Social Evolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 1-8, 2; and Alison

in the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene conditions in which humans evolved, strangers were unlikely to be related to others living nearby, and were, instead, likely to be competitors for scarce resources and, perhaps, also a threat to group cohesion and survival.²⁷

Having thoughtfully reflected on the problem of xenophobia and conflict in human society, Diamond argues that competition for territory or other scarce resources is a central cause of xenophobia in humans: “Humans compete with each other for territory, as do members of most animal species. Because we live in groups, much of our competition has taken the form of wars between adjacent groups, on the model of the wars between ant colonies.”²⁸ He continues, “as with adjacent groups of wolves and common chimps, relations of adjacent human tribes were traditionally marked by xenophobic hostility,” which was “intermittently relaxed to permit exchanges of mates (and, in our species, of goods as well).”²⁹

Second, xenophobia would be a mechanism of defense against communicable diseases, often caused by contact with strangers as the

Jolly, *Lucy's Legacy: Sex and Intelligence in Human Evolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 159.

²⁷ Noting the importance of limited resources is Joel R. Peck, “The Evolution of Outsider Exclusion,” *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, Vol. 142, No. 4 (22 February 1990), pp. 565-571.

²⁸ Diamond, *The Third Chimpanzee*, p. 220.

²⁹ Diamond, *The Third Chimpanzee*, p. 220.

diseases they carried encountered a virgin population.³⁰ I do not argue that these humans understood modern epidemiology. Of course they did not. But, they were intelligent. They did recognize the powerful effect of disease, judging from the history of European encounters with the rest of the world during the Age of Discovery and after. Indigenous peoples in Africa, Asia, and the New World understood quickly that disease affected the Europeans themselves. They could comprehend quite easily that Europeans died in considerable quantities in Africa and Asia. In the New World, Native Americans comprehended rapidly that Europeans and their African slaves brought pestilence even if they did not realize how diseases were transmitted.

Moreover, the cultural histories of many societies are rife with stories about a stranger or groups of strangers bringing pestilence. In these traditions, a stranger or strangers were associated with harm or evil that affected the community. No doubt this was accurate on occasion because a stranger would bring disease to a virgin population, which occurs even today. Primitive peoples with no understanding of disease and its prevention would associate illness with malevolent spirits acting through the stranger, or witchcraft. Of course, strangers would also be affected by diseases from the

³⁰ The powerful effect of disease on human society is documented in William H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1976).

populations they encountered, but being new to a community and perhaps transient, their suffering would less likely be recorded or included in an area's folklore or cultural history.

Third, because humans are the only species to kill conspecifics at a distance, fear of strangers may have been accelerated or become especially important as warriors introduced weapons of ever-increasing technological sophistication: the spear, the atlatl, and ultimately the bow and arrow. Armed with such weapons, even a single individual, to say nothing of a group, would greatly increase the threat posed to another individual, especially if he were separated from his group. Weapons probably brought about the first revolution in warfare by allowing one human to kill another, even a stronger one, with less risk to himself since he no longer had to engage the other in close proximity with his fists or even a club. Given this technology and the necessity of hunting and foraging for survival, it would be beneficial to stay in one's group if possible so the members could help fight off an attack. It would be equally useful to be able to recognize group members and extra-group members quickly and from as far away as possible.³¹

³¹ Donald L. McEachron and Darius Baer, "A Review of Selected Sociobiological Principles: Application to Hominid Evolution II. The Effects of Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Social and Biological Structures*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1982), pp. 121-139, 134.

Fourth, a stranger might also pose a threat to one's position in the dominance hierarchy. As discussed above, most social mammals organize themselves in such hierarchies. Ethologists argue that these hierarchies evolve because they aid in the defense against predators, promote the harvesting of resources, and reduce intragroup conflict.³² Hierarchies are needed largely because a species that lives communally has two choices: it can either accept an organization with some centralization of power, or engage in perpetual conflict over scarce resources, leading to potential injury and depriving the group of the benefits of a communal existence such as more efficient resource harvesting. The ubiquity of this social ordering strongly suggests that it contributes to fitness. Donald McEachron and Darius Baer suggest that strangers would have to find a place in the dominance hierarchy, which might entail conflict especially among those displaced by the inclusion of the new member.³³ Such readjustments are

³² See James L. Boone, "Competition, Conflict, and the Development of Social Hierarchies," in Eric Alden Smith and Bruce Winterhalder, eds., *Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992), pp. 301-337; and K.E. Moyer, "The Biological Basis of Dominance and Aggression," in Diane McGuinness, ed., *Dominance, Aggression and War* (New York: Paragon House, 1987), pp. 1-34, for a summary of the ethological argument on this point.

³³ Donald L. McEachron and Darius Baer, "A Review of Selected Sociobiological Principles: Application to Hominid Evolution II," pp. 134-135.

certainly possible, although cleavages or internecine conflict in the group might lead some to seek the stranger as an ally.

Given these conditions, humans would consider other humans a threat and thus would rarely tolerate strangers. This low tolerance of strangers, or xenophobia, contributed to fitness and thus spread. As human communities grew larger, multiple groups would have reproduced, some of which containing genotypes that resulted in an increased suspicion of strangers. These genotypes would increase fitness by increasing the survival of the group over time. Like warfare, however, and indeed like much of human behavior, xenophobia may be augmented or weakened by psychological and cultural forces.

For these reasons, xenophobia contributes to fitness and thus explains why humans may react negatively to people with different morphological features, such as facial traits or skin color. If the genetic difference is physical, then identification of difference is obvious, such as that between Africans and Europeans but, as Richard Alexander and Vincent Falger suggest, xenophobia can be triggered even by small differences between neighboring tribes or populations.

They argue that the ontogenetic flexibility of humans, such as morphological differences, even slight ones, is sufficient to cause

xenophobia.³⁴ While Alexander acknowledges that the causes of intense xenophobic reactions are complex, he explains, “it is possible that morphological differences alone make different countenances more or less communicative.”³⁵ Then, the “differences between individuals of populations that diverged” because of geographic isolation or other factors that prevented exogamy, “could lead to xenophobic reactions.”³⁶

For example, Slavs typically have broad faces and Anglo-Saxons narrow ones; Tutsis tend to be tall, and Hutus short. Both Gérard Prunier and Christopher Taylor studied the 1994 genocide and found that the physical differences were tragically important because they allowed easier identification of Tutsis by the radical Hutus who were responsible for the genocide.³⁷ These differences facilitate a type of discrimination that could not exist between people who are morphologically very similar such as Irish

³⁴ Richard D. Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979), pp. 126-127.

³⁵ Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs*, p. 127.

³⁶ Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs*, p. 127.

³⁷ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 5-9, 249; and Christopher C. Taylor, *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994* (New York: Berg, 1999), pp. 40-41. Also see Pierre van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York: Elsevier, 1981), pp. 73-74. Despite the physical differences, there were some cases of mistaken identity: “during the genocide some persons who were legally Hutu were killed as Tutsi because they looked Tutsi.” Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 33.

Catholics and Protestants or Norwegians and Swedes, all of whom would likely have to listen to each other to determine who is who.

Still, visible or auditory cultural differences even between similar groups might provoke a xenophobic reaction. As Diamond explains, “xenophobia comes especially naturally to our species, because so much of our behavior is culturally rather than genetically specified, and because cultural differences among human populations are so marked.”³⁸ As a result, “those features make it easy for us, unlike wolves and chimps, to recognize members of other groups at a glance by their clothes or hair style” and react negatively to them.³⁹

I. B. Racism

From the evolutionary origins of xenophobia, we can understand the origins of racism. As Diamond observes, humans are experts at recognizing in-groups and out-groups due to our evolution in dangerous and resource-deprived conditions. The ability to recognize those genetically related, and those not, and to do so in an instant, is one of the sources of racism.

Before the advent of advanced neural imaging techniques, it was extremely difficult, or in some cases impossible, to identify the mechanisms

³⁸ Diamond, *The Third Chimpanzee*, p. 220.

³⁹ Diamond, *The Third Chimpanzee*, p. 220.

underlying automatic biases that produce stigmas and stereotypes. Due to advances in brain imaging and neuropsychological methods, we are now able to “explore the role of specific neural regions and systems in complex social psychological phenomena such as a person’s perceptions and racial prejudice.”⁴⁰ Through an examination of the cognitive, affective, and behavioral structures associated with stereotyping and xenophobic responses, we can begin to build a more accurate theory of how these structures influence people’s beliefs and expectations about out-groups.

According to Princeton professor of psychology, Susan Fiske, in order to understand the automatic behavior that can lead to intergroup conflict, such as prejudice, discrimination, fear, and mistrust, it is necessary to uncover the neural and biological mechanisms that trigger automatic biases. Implicit Association Tests combined with brain imaging studies of the amygdala have shown that intergroup bias occurs automatically under minimal conditions among relatively unprejudiced people.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Belle Derks, Michael Inzlicht, and Sonia Kang, “The Neuroscience of Stigma and Stereotype Threat,” *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2008), pp. 161-181, 164.

⁴¹ Fiske, “What We Know About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century,” pp. 123-128; L. Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, C. I., and Monteith, M. J., “Implicit Associations as the Seeds of Intergroup Bias: How Easily Do They Take Root?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (2001), pp. 789-799; J. Ronquillo, Denson, T. F., Lickel, B., Lu, Z. L., Nandy, A.,

Bias in intergroup relations is an automatic response across populations because, as University of California Santa Barbara evolutionary theorists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides point out, coalitional aggression and prejudice—against different racial and ethnic groups—are evolutionary traits that improved overall fitness by enabling members of a coalition to gain access to competitive “reproductive enhancing resources” and detect coalitions and alliances.⁴²

Furthermore, evidence from brain imaging studies suggests that the amygdala plays a role in perception and behavioral responses to individuals of a different race or ethnicity. In a study by Amherst College professor of psychology Allen Hart and his colleagues on how perceptions of out-group members differ from in-group members, white and black participants viewed photographs of unfamiliar white and black faces while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). For all participants, “the rate of

and Maddox, K. B., “The Effects of Skin Tone on Race-Related Amygdala Activity: An fMRI Investigation,” *SCAN*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007), pp. 39-44.

⁴² John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, *The Evolution of War and Its Cognitive Foundations*, Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Reports 88-1 (1988); John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides, “Groups in Mind: The Coalitional Roots of War and Morality,” in Henrik Høgh-Olesen, ed., *Human Morality and Sociality: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 191-234; and Robert Kurzban, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides, “Can Race be Erased? Coalitional Computation and Social Categorization,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, Vol. 98, No. 26 (2001), pp. 15387-15392.

response habituation within the amygdala to face stimuli [was] dependent upon an interaction between the race of the subjects and the perceived race of the face stimuli.”⁴³

These results suggest that the amygdala exhibits greater responses to unfamiliar, and possibly threatening, faces, than to familiar faces. Given the amygdala’s role in what has been called a “relevance detector,” which includes, but is not limited to, fear-related stimuli, the prejudice and anxiety that occurs between in-group and out-group members during initial interactions can lessen over time through prolonged exposure.⁴⁴ Indeed, as a study by University of Pennsylvania psychologist Robert Kurzban and his colleagues found, by manipulating coalition formation and reestablishing coalition membership across racial cleavages, a person’s identification can be changed to some degree.⁴⁵

Additional research has provided considerable evidence for the related disease-avoidance hypothesis. To avoid disease, people should

⁴³ A. J. Hart, Whalen, P. J., Shin, L. M., McInerney, S. C., Fischer, H., and Rauch, S. L., “Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli,” *NeuroReport*, Vol. 11, No. 11 (2000), pp. 2351-2354, 2353.

⁴⁴ D. Sander, Grafman, J., and Zalla, T., “The Human Amygdala: An Evolved System for Relevance Detection,” *Reviews in Neuroscience*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2003), pp. 303-316.

⁴⁵ Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides, “Can Race be Erased? Coalitional Computation and Social Categorization.”

maintain close ties with in-group members but maintain distance from out-group members who may possess novel pathogens. Consistent with this disease-avoidance hypothesis, pathogenic stimuli, as well as increased personal vulnerability to disease, are associated with ethnocentric, xenophobic, and racist attitudes. One study has found that accents are a key cue to group membership, and that individuals with a high degree of disease avoidance also have a strong reaction to foreign-accented English spoken in psychological tests. These studies strongly suggest that one reason racism evolved is for stranger-, and thus, pathogen-avoidance.⁴⁶

In the West, great countervailing pressure through governmental and educational policies, film, media, blogs, and other elements of popular culture has been placed on individuals to combat racism. These measures have been very successful. However, in China not only are they absent, but governmental and educational policies along with popular culture emphasize the superiority of the Chinese people to the detriment of other races and ethnicities. As a consequence, the evolutionary drive of xenophobia,

⁴⁶ Scott A. Reid, Jingquang Zhang, Grace L. Anderson, Jessica Gasiorek, Douglas Bonilla, Susana Peinado, "Parasite Primes Make Foreign-Accented English Sound More Distant to People Who Are Disgusted by Pathogens (But Not by Sex or Morality), *Evolution and Human Behavior*, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2012), pp. 471-478.

augmented by ethnocentrism as I will demonstrate below, translates directly into racist thought and action in China.

I. C. Ethnocentrism

Like xenophobia and racism, inclusive fitness explains why ethnocentrism would contribute to fitness in human evolutionary history, and thus evolve in humans.⁴⁷ Ethnocentrism is commonly defined as a belief in the superiority of one's own ethnicity. Yet, defined this way, ethnocentrism would seem to have no evolutionary foundation as a belief. After all, one may hold many beliefs—that the earth is flat or that it is round, or that Vladimir Putin is good for Russia or not—and these beliefs have no effect on fitness. So, it might seem that evolutionary theory has little explanatory traction for ethnocentrism.

Ethnocentrism is a collection of traits that predispose the individual to show discriminatory preference for groups with the closest affinities to the self. Now, the contribution of evolutionary theory becomes clear.⁴⁸ Here

⁴⁷ Excellent accounts are found in van der Dennen, "Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group Differentiation," in *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism*, pp. 8-17, 37-47; Robin I. M. Dunbar, "Sociobiological Explanations and the Evolution of Ethnocentrism," in *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism*, pp. 48-59; and van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, pp. 18-36.

⁴⁸ Ian Vine, "Inclusive Fitness and the Self-System," in *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism*, pp. 60-80. More formally, ethnocentrism is comprised of four discrete aspects of group behavior: In-group integration, the hyper-

evolutionary theory can explain why ethnocentrism is common among people: because it stems from inclusive fitness. Thus the phenomenon of ethnocentrism has its origins not merely in one's random beliefs or opinions, but in human evolution. Of course, even with its foundation in human evolution, ethnocentrism—like xenophobia and almost all behavior—is open to considerable environmental manipulation. It may be either suppressed or supported by cultural, religious, or political beliefs and authorities.⁴⁹

I made this the basis for discussing the evolution of xenophobia, but will briefly restate the central arguments here. Since our genus *Homo* first evolved in the Pliocene, humans have favored those who are biologically related. In general, the closer the relationship, the greater the preferential treatment. The vast majority of animals behave in this way, and humans are no different. In a world of scarce resources and many threats, the evolutionary process would select nepotism, thus promoting the survival of the next generation. However, this process is relative. Parents are more willing to provide for their own children than for the children of relatives, or rarely for those of strangers.

evaluation of the in-group, hostile relations between in-group and out-group, and derogatory stereotyping of out-group individuals and characteristics.

⁴⁹ Also making this point is Dunbar, "Sociobiological Explanations and the Evolution of Ethnocentrism," in *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism*, p. 56.

The essence of an inclusive fitness explanation of ethnocentrism, then, is that individuals generally should be more willing to support, privilege, and sacrifice for their own family, then their more distant kin, their ethnic group, and then others, such as a global community, in decreasing order of importance. That people are more willing to sacrifice for their family than for strangers or a larger community is obvious. In contrast, an individual like Mother Theresa is saintly. Her willingness to suffer and sacrifice for strangers throughout her lifetime is both noble and lamentable because her actions illustrate what we already know: few people are willing to sacrifice to help strangers who require great care due to endemic poverty and debilitating illness.

The in-group/out-group division is also important for explaining ethnocentrism and individual readiness to kill outsiders before in-group members. Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt draws on psychologist Erik Erikson's concept of "cultural pseudospeciation," and says that in almost all cultures humans form subgroups usually based on kinship; these "eventually distinguish themselves from others by dialect and other subgroup characteristics and go on to form new cultures."⁵⁰ As an unfortunate result of

⁵⁰ Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, "Us and the Others," in Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Frank Kemp Salter, eds., *Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare: Evolutionary Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), pp. 21-53, 41.

this process, such in-groups tend to perceive the out-groups as increasingly distant, from distant cousins to foreigners with strange customs and languages. Ultimately they may even see them as less than human, as another species: animals.⁵¹

Distinguished Harvard biologist Edward Wilson also argues that ethnocentrism has a strong in-group/out-group component. Ethnocentrism is the “force behind most warlike policies,” and he notes: “primitive men divide the world into two tangible parts, the near environment of home, local villages, kin, friends, tame animals, and witches, and the more distant universe of neighboring villages, intertribal allies, enemies, wild animals, and ghosts.”⁵² This “elemental topography makes easier the distinction between enemies who can be attacked and killed and friends who cannot. The contrast is heightened by reducing enemies to frightful and even sub-human status.”⁵³

Of course, while few scholars would doubt that ethnocentrism is a powerful force, we should not overestimate its power. It obviously can be

⁵¹ Eibl-Eibesfeldt, “Us and the Others,” pp. 42-46. Also see Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, “Warfare, Man’s Indoctrinability and Group Selection,” *Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1982), pp. 177-198.

⁵² Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 111.

⁵³ Wilson, *On Human Nature*, p. 111.

offset or mitigated by other environmental pressures. In many examples from military history, men of the same ethnicity killed each other readily. Ethnic ties did not keep Confederate Gen. Cobb's mostly-Irish Georgia regiments (the 18th and 24th) from firing on and decimating the Union "Irish Brigade" (the 28th Massachusetts) at Marye's Heights during the battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862.

Naturally, it is equally true that ethnic hatred may be suppressed or even reconciled. The animus between the Scots and the English is well known; their shared history is filled with great conflicts that still resonate today in calls for Scottish independence. Nonetheless, for much of modern history, the Crown has repressed that hatred. Indeed, Scots have readily served the Crown even after its repression.

However, where ethnocentrism is not suppressed but encouraged, as in Chinese media, popular culture, blogs, and its educational system, there is the real danger that it thrives and is reinforced among the population and elites. The twin of ethnocentrism is racism. Racism is a phenomenon we find all too often in Chinese popular expressions and social and political beliefs. Unlike in the West, racism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism are allowed to flourish in China, and are not offset by countervailing pressures as in Western societies.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the power of racism, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism. When an individual considers whether to support a larger group, several metrics are available. One of these—and I stress only one—is ethnocentrism, a continuation of one’s willingness to sacrifice for one’s family because of the notion of common kinship. As I discussed above, the ways humans determine their relations with unrelated individuals are complex, but the key factors are physical resemblance, as well as environmental causes like shared culture, history, and language.

All of these metrics are very significant in China. This is why we should expect the Chinese “family,” composed of broad groups of agnates, to think of itself apart from other nations in international politics while always favoring the “family” over outsiders.

In this section, I have shown that in-group/out-group distinctions like ethnocentrism and xenophobia are not quirks of human behavior in certain settings. Instead, they are systematic and consistent behavioral strategies, or traits. They apply to all humans, whether Chinese or American. These traits are common across mammals in general and primate species in particular, demonstrating deep evolutionary roots. They are widespread because they increased survival and reproductive success and were thus favored by natural selection over evolutionary history. The evolutionary origins and

cognitive mechanisms underpinning them were laid down in an environment very different from the one in which we now live, but they persist because our brains, which evolved over several million years, have not changed to keep pace with the rapid sociological and technological advances of the last few centuries.

Human decisions are not rational because they are not generated by a computer—purposefully built for objective decision-making. Human decisions are more like an ancient computer that has been permanently pre-programmed, sometimes in ways that seem obstructive or self-defeating to modern tasks. As much as we would like to install new, more efficient, software we cannot. Instead, we proceed using the pre-existing jumble of wiring that was laid down for different purposes, and with behavioral heuristics for implementing that wiring that were selected in another age. The only way to make predictions for the real-world outputs of our ancient brains is to understand the wiring and software that make it up, and that understanding can only come from evolutionary biology.

This study recognizes that humans are influenced by such significant forces as culture, norms, rational calculation, and morality. Nevertheless, overwhelming evidence shows that people *also* behave in ways predictable from the biological knowledge outlined above. These behavioral

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mechanisms will shine through culture and conscious thought with differing strengths depending on the context. My contention is that significant parts of political behavior, and specifically Chinese behavior, lack convincing explanations, analytical power, and predictive ability because basic but powerful, biological principles are currently ignored in the vast literature about China by Sinologists.

Chapter Two

The Historical and Cultural Causes of Chinese Racism

“Have you heard about the origins of the world’s human races? This is a story unique to us [Chinese] people. Before, when there was no trace of man on earth, Tai Bai [太白] decided to create mankind. He used clay, just as we make pottery or porcelain, and after having molded it into a human figure, he put it into the kiln. The first one was fired too long, and was badly burnt: it was all black! This was not so good, and Tai Bai threw it away, using all his strength, throwing it a long way. He threw it to Africa; hence afterwards everyone in Africa was black. As a result of this first failure, the second one was fired more carefully. It was allowed to bake only for a little while and then taken out of the kiln. Look: too white! This wasn’t very good either, and Tai Bai again threw it away. This time, he did not throw it so far. He threw it to Europe, hence afterwards everyone in Europe was white. Experience now allowed the third one to be baked to perfection: not too long, not too short. Pretty good! Neither black nor white, but all yellow. Tai Bai was very satisfied, and put it down on the ground. Hence afterwards everyone in Asia was yellow.”

(*Taiwan Kejia suwenxue* [台湾客家俗文学] [Folk literature of the Hakka in Taiwan], retold by Zhou Qinghua [周庆华] [Taipei: Dongfeng wenhua shuju, 1971], pp. 149-150.)

This chapter explains the Chinese attitude toward race and the proximate conditions of Chinese racism. Chapter One provided us with the understanding of why humans are often xenophobic, racist, and ethnocentric, and why these behaviors are easy to trigger. The environments in which humans evolved where ones of great resource scarcity, and so our ancestors

placed a premium on sharing with relatives rather than others. They also developed finely honed abilities to distinguish between those of the in-group, and those who did not belong. Thus, the racism, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism we find in the Chinese are not unique to them, but are common behaviors found worldwide and universally.

What is different are the social and cultural efforts made to combat the public occurrences and acceptance of these behaviors. Since the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, Western states have been at the forefront of combating them. The process has been difficult, to be sure, but the progress in this area has been impressive. With regret, the Chinese have been among the last of the great powers to recognize the problem of racism and the need to guarantee civil liberties for all, regardless of race.

This chapter first considers the Chinese conception of race by examining the major cultural-religious and historical factors that affect it. Second, it evaluates the modern Chinese view of race by illuminating the racist thought of major Chinese thinkers in the contemporary period, as well as the impact of the racist Western view of China, "The Yellow Peril," common in the past. Finally, and very importantly, it discusses why China must be seen as one of the few racist states in international politics today.

I. The Chinese Conception of Race

The concept of “race,” *zu* [族] (lineage, clan), *zhong* [种] (seed, breed, type, race), *zulei* [族类] (type of lineage), *minzu* [民族] (lineage of a people, nationality, race), *zhongzu* [种族] (breed of lineage, type of lineage, breed race), and *renzhong* [人种] (human breed, human race), in China has a long history. As London School of Economics historian Odd Arne Westad argues: “the Chinese had a value system they called “*Huayiguan* [华夷观 added by Thayer], meaning—in a cultural context—‘Chinese superior, others inferior.’ Over centuries this worldview had influenced the Chinese eye in seeing other peoples and their behavior. As a form of cultural ethnocentrism, it was probably stronger at the time than any similar European phenomenon, not least because it had been shared for half a millennium or more by large parts of the elites of China’s immediate neighbors.”⁵⁴

Westad demonstrates that the Chinese had a perception of foreigners that varied greatly.⁵⁵ In general, they represented the empire as being at the center of three concentric circles. Immediately outside the center were the peoples and countries on the edges of China—those colonized and those influenced by Chinese civilization. The second circle contained those who

⁵⁴ Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750* (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p. 31.

⁵⁵ Westad, *Restless Empire*, p. 31.

were outside Chinese culture, but still, at least occasionally, paid tribute to the emperor. The third included those who had no relationship with China and its civilization, unknown peoples of whom only a few accounts existed. Those farthest away from the empire were represented as the most strange and barbaric. Tales of madcap beliefs, sexual perversions, and cannibalism abounded. “Outer barbarians” smelled bad, dressed inappropriately, and were strange in appearance. In some cases these “wild men” were closer to animals than to humans. For such peoples, the Qing state believed in the ancient saying of “leaving them outside, not inviting them in, not governing or educating them, not recognizing their countries.”⁵⁶

Race has always had a central place for the Han Chinese. As foremost Sinologist Frank Dikötter argues, “race was the catalyst of [Chinese] group homogeneity; it created clear boundaries by binding the ingroup and distancing the outgroup.”⁵⁷ As nationalist leader Zhou Jung [邹容] argued in 1903, “When men love their race, solidarity will arise internally, and what is outside will be repelled. Hence, to begin with, lineages were united and other lineages repelled; next, villages were united and other villages repelled; thereafter, tribes were united and other tribes were repelled; finally, the

⁵⁶ Quoted in Westad, *Restless Empire*, p. 31.

⁵⁷ Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London: Hurst, 1992), p. 118.

people of a country became united, and people of other countries were repelled;” and he continued: “This is the general principle of the races of the world, and also a major reason why races engender history. I will demonstrate to my countrymen, to allow them to form their own impression, how our yellow race, the yellow race of which the Han race is part, and I refer you to the history of China, is able to unite itself and repel intruders.”⁵⁸

Although my focus is on the Han Chinese, Dikötter submits that there are no major racial differences between the Han and Manchus with respect to racial considerations of outgroups.⁵⁹ The phenotype of most minorities was different, but not significantly different from the Han Chinese. Nevertheless, they were seen as such by the Han, who characterized them with stereotypes about the supposedly bestial origins of the minorities and their bizarre cultural practices and religious beliefs. The Chinese divided the “yellow race” into two main branches, “the races of China,” including the Han, the Tibetan

⁵⁸ Zhou Jung, *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*, trans. by J. Lust (Paris: Mouton, 1968), p. 106.

⁵⁹ Han perceptions have been well treated by Dikötter’s scholarship, but see, in addition, Thomas Heberer, *China and Its National Minorities* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); and June T. Dreyer, *China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).

and Cochinese races; and “the races of Siberia,” comprised of the Mongolian, the Tungus, and the Turkic peoples.⁶⁰

I. A. Chinese Religious-Cultural and Historical Conceptions of Race

In this section, I demonstrate how attitudes about the race, skin color, or physical characteristics of the Han and others are an ancient component of Chinese civilization. There are two major factors that influence Chinese conceptions of race. The first is the traditional Chinese religious view of race. The second is the unfortunate fact, at least from the Chinese perspective, that China was conquered and occupied by non-Chinese peoples. This was traumatic and reinforced the Han concepts of race and nationalist feelings as well as generating a strong Han consciousness of biological or racial unity.

Throughout their history, the Chinese have seen themselves as unique and superior to other peoples. The Han were part of the same family, even if there were regional differences among them. But for the Chinese, there was a sliding scale of inferiority, with Manchus, and later, whites, being far “better” than other inferior peoples. These views have been reinforced by centuries of religious-cultural and historical influences and so it is no surprise that the Chinese have a long tradition of racism directed against minorities. Lamentably, this remains today.

⁶⁰ Zhou, *The Revolutionary Army*, pp. 106-107.

I. A. 1. The Impact of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism

When considering traditional Chinese attitudes toward race, we must start with a succinct evaluation of how the major traditional Chinese religions, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, consider the topic. In traditional Confucian thought, the Five Classics are the ancient books which comprise the syllabus for the disciples of Confucius [孔夫子], namely the *Shujing* [书经] (Book of History), the *Shijing* [诗经] (Book of Odes), the *Yijing* [易经] (Book of Changes), the *Liji* [礼记] (Book of Rites), and the *Chunqiu* [春秋] (Spring and Autumn Annals).

These classic texts were intended to describe and assess the world, or *tianxia* [天下], or “all under heaven.” This world was perceived to be a homogeneous entity named “great community” (*datong* [大同]). The absence of any consideration of cultural pluralism or diversity implicit in this universe has been called a “political solipsism,” the lack of recognition of any other notable or equal political system.⁶¹ The ruling elite in China, dominated by the assumption of its cultural superiority, measured foreigners according to metrics by which those who did not follow “Chinese ways” were considered barbarians.

⁶¹ Hsiao Kung-chun, *A History of Chinese Political Thought* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 24.

Later, this worldview was modified. The change originated mainly in the overwhelmingly influential *Gongyang* [公羊] school (commentaries on Confucius' *Chunqiu*), and produced a major effect. It favored an emphasis on cultural continuity, or the ability of foreigners to be Sinified, reflecting the Chinese worldview, while reducing the racial component of identity. This was the origin of the theory of “using Chinese ways to transform the barbarians” (*yongxiabianyi* [用夏变夷]). This school argued that the barbarian could be culturally absorbed—*laihua* [来华], “come and be transformed,” or *hanhua* [汉化], “become Chinese.” The *Chunqiu*, a chronological history of the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 BC), traditionally attributed to Confucius, hinged on the idea of cultural assimilation.

But this idea was not widely accepted in Chinese thought, and there remained a significant—even dominant—exclusionist view.

The most salient aspect of the exclusionist approach is a belief in the incompatibility between the fundamental natures between the Chinese and the barbarian. The origin of this belief is usually traced back to classic Chinese texts, particularly to a passage in the works of Mencius [孟子] (372-289? BC). In the passage, Mencius reproaches Chen Xiang for having abandoned Chinese ways and learning: “I have heard of men using the

doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but I have never heard of any being changed by barbarians.”⁶² The nature of the Chinese was regarded as impermeable to the evil influences of the barbarian. For the Chinese, no retrogression was possible. Only the barbarian might eventually change by adopting Chinese ways. The reverse was unthinkable for the Chinese.

It is notable that Mencius' comment was made at a time when the efflorescence of Buddhism threatened the sense of cultural superiority of the ruling class. Buddhism was seen as a threat to traditional practices and generated considerable resistance.

As the prominent enemy of Buddhism Gu Huan [顾欢] (390-453) argued in his treatise *Yixialun* [夷夏论] (*About the Chinese and the Barbarians*), Buddhism was inferior to the Chinese religion of Daoism [道教] (Taoism) because of its foreign origins: “Buddhism originated in the land of the barbarians; is that not because the customs of the barbarians were originally evil? The Tao originated in China; is that not because the habits of the Chinese were originally good?...Buddhism is not the way for China, Taoism is not the teaching of the western [i.e. Indians, not the West] barbarians. Fishes and birds are of different origins, and never have

⁶² Quoted in Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 18.

anything in common. How can we have Buddhism and Taoism intermingle to spread to the extremities of the empire.”⁶³

The comparison of Buddhism and Daoism to fishes and birds underlined a basic discontinuity between the two religions. Daoism was seen as the organic, or inherently Chinese religion. Daoism’s main thinker is Lao Tzu [老子]. Its main work is *Tao Te Ching* [道德经]. Daoism is difficult to classify, as it refers to various traditions that, when considered collectively, essentially constitute a Chinese folk religion. Certain strains emphasize ancestor worship and the immediate presence of the supernatural, others are more elite and philosophical, while others still consist of a more organized religious doctrine.

The Dao means “the way,” but that term can be applied to a wide variety of concepts, as evident in the military texts that refer to the Dao as anything from the art of ruling to manipulation of terrain. Generally, Dao refers to a spiritual ideal that can be divined and attained by paying attention to natural phenomena. It is represented by the famous yin and yang: the contrary but complementary forces that drive the motion of the universe. Divination, ritual sacrifice, and fasting are common means of “practicing” Daoism. It is very difficult to summarize such a diffuse system, but for the

⁶³ K. Ch’en, “Anti-Buddhist Propaganda during the Nan-Ch’ao,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 15 (1952), p. 172.

purposes of analyzing Daoism to better understand the military texts, one can manipulate material forces in such a way as to attain a spiritual ideal, since spirits drive the material world. Wisdom, humility and compassion are the chief virtues by which one can ascertain the Dao.

While purportedly universal, there is a strong ethnocentric idea in Daoism that makes it solely for the Chinese and not for others. This should be no surprise, as many of the world's great religions have this: a sense of "ownership" for the first peoples who adhere to it, one might consider the belief that Arabs "own" Islam, or the Greeks Orthodox Christianity. The idea of a fundamental difference between the natures of Chinese and Indians had been put forward by the Daoist He Chengtian [何承天] (A.D. 370-447): "The inborn nature of Chinese is pure and harmonious, in accordance with altruism and holding to righteousness—that is why the Duke of Chou and Confucius explain to them the doctrine of (original unity of) nature and (differentiation by) practice. Those people of foreign countries are endowed with a hard and obstinate nature, full of evil desires, hatred and violence."⁶⁴

The Daoist work *Sanpolun* [三破论] attacked Buddhism and "foreign" beliefs even more violently, appealing for the extermination of the barbarians. "The barbarians are without benevolence, unyielding, violent

⁶⁴ Quoted in Dikötter, *Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 19.

and without manners, and are no different from birds and beasts....They are also coarse and uncivilized. Desiring to exterminate their evil progeny, Lao-tzu ordered the males not to take wives, and the females not to take husbands. When the entire country submits to the teaching of Lao-tzu, they will be exterminated as a matter of course.”⁶⁵

This train of thought reappears throughout Chinese history, particularly when the elite’s position was menaced by a foreign creed or alien conquerors. The political threat posed by alien invasion or foreign relations challenged the ideals of cultural or religious universalism.

I. A. 2. The Impacts of Invasion

The major invasions of China have had a momentous impact on how the Chinese see race. For a people as xenophobic and ethnocentric as the Chinese, conquest by an ethnically or racially distinct people has been shattering for their worldview and compelled the examination of the Chinese themselves, as well as the conquering people. Two consistent themes in Chinese accounts are that the conquering peoples were either “near-Chinese” in race, and thus Chinese defeat may be explained away, or possessed superior technology that permitted their conquest of China.

⁶⁵ K. Ch’en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 137-138.

Ethnic groups that conquered and ruled China include the Jin (1115-1234), the Mongols (1280-1368), and the Manchus (1644-1911). This study does not intend to discuss the Chinese reaction to these invasions in a systematic way, but only to emphasize the importance of race and racial identity made by the Chinese themselves, in their own discussions of how they define themselves as a people.⁶⁶

Over the course of four centuries, ever larger parts of China were conquered by Inner Asian tribal peoples, culminating in 1276 with the Song surrendered to China's most successful conquer, the Mongols, who incorporated all of China into their territory. Each of the three dynasties of conquest—Liao (907-1125), Jin (1125-1234), and Yuan (1215/1276-1368)—built on the achievements of its predecessors to dominate the Han Chinese. What is unique about these dynasties is that they attacked China not just for material benefits, as had the Uighurs in the late Tang, but also occupied Chinese territory. The Khitans' Liao dynasty occupied a strip along the northern edge of China proper. The Jurchens' Jin (gold) dynasty, defeated the Liao, and continued to conquer all of northern China. The Mongols' Yuan

⁶⁶ An excellent introduction to the traditional Chinese worldview and the tributary system upon which it is based remains John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

dynasty, after defeating the Jin, were able to conquer all of China, and beyond, extending their reach into Burma and throughout Southeast Asia.

Although the Liao period is significant because it was the first time China elected to appease and accommodate a foe. In the historic Treaty of Shanyuan, January 19, 1005, the Song agreed to provide the Liao with an annual payment of 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels (approximately ounces) of silver. In absolute terms, these payments were not especially burdensome, probably equal to revenue of one or two prefectures, or less than one or two percent of the cost of waging war.⁶⁷ As a face-saving device, the Chinese did not call this tribute, which would have implied Khitan superiority, but rather “economic gifts.”⁶⁸ The Chinese today see the Treaty as a mistake, a cowardly and humiliating arrangement that reflected the military weakness and incompetence of the Song court.

For the purposes of this study, the Jurchen’s Jin empire is the most significant because it was the first time in modern Chinese history that significant Chinese land was lost through invasion. The Jurchen people originated in the mountains of eastern Manchuria. In the early twelfth century, Aguda, of the Wanyan clan, formed a confederation of Jurchen tribes,

⁶⁷ Valerie Hansen, *The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 307.

⁶⁸ Hansen, *The Open Empire*, p. 307.

proclaimed it the Jin dynasty, and invaded the north of China in 1126.⁶⁹ The Song excelled in art, philosophy and literature, eminent Sinologist John Fairbank called their rule “China’s greatest age.”⁷⁰ The Song dynasty has also been called “the Age of Confucian Rule.”⁷¹ They were responsible for three of humanity’s greatest inventions—gunpowder, the compass, and printed books. Yet, despite their considerable achievements, the Song were militarily weak. Epithets such as “perennially weak and unable to rise” (*ji ruo bu zhen*) [积弱不振] and “emphasizing civility and belittling martialism” (*zhong wen qing wu*) [重文轻武] are commonly attached to the Song dynasty.⁷² The Song, unable to resist the nomad cavalry and their skill in siege craft due to their incorporation of Chinese experts, had to retreat south of the Yangzi. The Song retained the Yangzi valley and all land to the south.

The barbarian success placed the Song in a terribly difficult position, and is a historical situation that holds important implications for analysts of Chinese strategy and DoD decision-makers today. In a successful effort at self-preservation, they adopted conciliatory policies toward the Jurchen Jin

⁶⁹ Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *Cambridge Illustrated History of China*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 136-185.

⁷⁰ John K. Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), this is the title of Chapter 4.

⁷¹ Dieter Kuhn, *The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).

⁷² Yuan-Kang Wang, *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 34.

empire. In a remarkable event, they discarded the traditional tribute system. For the first time in Chinese history, neighboring states were accepted as equals, and the Jurchen as formal superiors—the Song had become a vassal state of a non-Chinese dynasty, the Jin. Due to their weakness, officials from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries pursued a realistic and pragmatic foreign policy.

From the Chinese perspective, the unfortunate, if realistic, appraisal of the balance of power did not prevent officials from continuing to despise foreigners as “barbarians.” Indeed, given the powerful xenophobic, racist, and ethnocentric views of the Chinese throughout history, it would be unthinkable for it to be otherwise. As Sinologist Herbert Franke writes, “the principle of reciprocity in diplomatic relations with these states was nothing more than an enforced concession, which was but grudgingly granted because of the Sung’s military weakness.”⁷³ Internal official records and private correspondence made frequent xenophobia references to the Jin as

⁷³ Herbert Franke, “Sung Embassies: Some General Observations,” in Morris Rossabi, ed., *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 116-148, 121.

well as other foreigners. The terms used included “slaves,” “caitiffs,” “barbarians,” and “animals.”⁷⁴

At the same time, this equality and reciprocity proved to be a stable aspect of Song foreign relations, and could have easily been continued. Song diplomacy was flexible and allowed considerable adaptation to the frequently changing circumstances in international politics. Differences in political power could be expressed by a corresponding difference in pseudo-familial status. The lower the power and prestige of the Song, the lower its adopted family status in relation to the foreign ruling family and vice versa.⁷⁵

While not the first to conquer significant portions of Chinese territory, the Mongols were the most successful because they conquered all of it by 1279.⁷⁶ The Mongols ruled China as the Yuan dynasty. Not surprisingly, Chinese feeling toward the Mongols was laced with bitter denunciations of the origin of the Mongols. Most remarkable was a bitter denunciation by Zheng Sixiao [郑思肖] (1239-1316). His works describe the Mongols as “of a

⁷⁴ Franke, “Sung Embassies,” p. 121; and Tao Jing-shen, “Barbarians or Northerners: Northern Sung Images of the Khitans,” in Rossabi, ed., *China Among Equals*, pp. 66-86; 71-76.

⁷⁵ Franke, “Sung Embassies,” p. 122.

⁷⁶ A useful study of the Southern Song dynasty’s reaction to the Mongol invasion is Wang, *Harmony and War*, pp. 95-100.

non-human origin," (*fei renlei*) [非人类] and compared them to "dogs and goats."⁷⁷

This tone continued under the Ming dynasty, which succeeded the Yuan in 1368.⁷⁸ Fang Ziaoru [方孝儒] also made a categorization between the Chinese and barbarians: "To elevate them to a position above the Chinese people would be to lead the world to animality. If a dog or a horse were to occupy a human's seat, even small boys would be angry and take a club to them...why? Because the general order would be confused."⁷⁹

These sentiments were again expressed in the Chinese attitude toward the Manchu and the Qing dynasty, which ruled China from 1644 to 1911. In the Qing dynasty, theoretically similar arguments were made. The Manchus were barbarians, and there was a high degree of racial animosity toward the new dynasty. Important officials refused to serve the new dynasty. They refuted any claim or idea that barbarians could be morally transformed or Sinified and emphasized a sense of shame in serving a barbarian ruler. According to their thought, there was a strict separation of

⁷⁷ John D. Langlois, Jr. "Introduction," in John D. Langlois, Jr., ed., *China Under Mongol Rule* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 17.

⁷⁸ See Wang, *Harmony and War*, pp. 101-144.

⁷⁹ John Fincher, "China as a Race, Culture and Nation: Notes on Fang Hsiao-ju's Discussion of Dynastic Legitimacy," in D.C. Buxbaum and F.W. Mote, eds., *Transition and Permanence: Chinese History and Culture. A festschrift in Honour of Dr. Hsiao Kung-ch'uan* (Hong Kong: Cathay Press, 1972), p. 59.

barbarians and Chinese into distinct spheres, where each could live in accordance with his inborn character.

The strongest critic of alien rule was made by Wang Fuzhi [王夫之] (1619-1692). Wang supported traditional ideas about environmental determinism and the difference in nature of the barbarian in a theory about the isolated development of groups. His philosophical system was based on the concept of ether, and, in this, was not dissimilar to contemporary Western ontology. Ether was the creative force in the universe, which agglomerated to assume different forms and images in the world, each strictly differentiated by the concept of category (*lei*) [类]. Order in the universe was based on clear distinctions between categories, and had important political implications. If the Chinese did not separate themselves from the barbarians, the principle of ether would be violated, since they and the barbarians both belonged to different categories.

The Chinese were the “ether of Heaven” (*tianqi*) [天气], whereas the barbarians were “impure ether” (*jianqi*) [贱气]. The vital distinction between purity and impurity was implicit in the title of Wang’s major work, entitled the *Yellow Book* (*Huangshu*) [黄书], published in 1656. In this work, Wang placed the color yellow (*huangse*) [黄色], one of the five pure colors, in opposition to mixed colors (*jianse*) [间色].

China was named the “Yellow Center” (*huangzhong*) [黄种].

Distinctions between the Chinese and the barbarians could not be blurred. Everything distinguished them: “The Chinese and the barbarians are born in different places, which brings about the differences in their atmospheres, which in turn are responsible for the difference in their customs. When their customs are different, their understanding and behavior are all different.”⁸⁰

The purity of categories (*qinglei*) [清类] had to be preserved by strict boundaries (*juezhen*) [决阵] and a specific territory (*dingwei*) [定位]. The territory of the Chinese race was the “middle region” (*zhongqu*) [中区] or “divine region” (*shenqu*) [神区]. “North of the deserts, west of the Yellow River, south of Annam, east of the sea, the ether is different, people have a different essence, nature produces different things.”⁸¹ The first deputy of the emperor was to keep the boundaries between races clear: “Now even the ants have rulers who preside over the territory of their nests and, when red ants or flying white ants penetrate their gates, the ruler organizes all his own kind into troops to bite and kill the intruders, drive them far away from the anthill and prevent foreign interference.”⁸²

⁸⁰ Quoted in Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 27.

⁸¹ Quoted in Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 27.

⁸² Quoted in Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 27.

II. Modern Chinese Views on Race

Chinese identity runs deep culturally and historically, and the development of the notion of “China” developed over millennia. Yet, this identity was very well established by the early 20th Century. Chinese racial attitudes are ancient and have become worse in the modern period. This section will explore this, and consider the racial views of major Chinese thinkers and political leaders, as well as Western conceptions.

II. A. Yan Fu’s Racist Views

The Chinese philosopher Yan Fu [严复] (1854-1921, also Yen, but Yan is preferred) heavily influenced modern Chinese racial attitudes. His thought frequently recalls a century of humiliations inflicted on China by Western “barbarians,” from the Opium wars to the burning of the imperial Summer Place in Beijing. Like many intellectuals in Asia, Yan awoke to the shock of the expansion of imperial Western power. “They will enslave us and hinder the development of our spirit and body,” he wrote in 1895. “The brown and black races constantly waver between life and death, why not the 400 million Yellows?”⁸³

⁸³ Quoted in Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2012), p. 148.

As with many of his Asian peers, Yan Fu became a Social Darwinist, obsessed with the question of how China could accumulate enough wealth and power to survive. As he wrote: “Races compete with races, and form groups and states, so that these groups and states can compete with each other. The weak will be eaten by the strong, the stupid will be enslaved by the clever...Unlike other animals, humans fight with armies, rather than with teeth and claws,” and it is “the struggle for existence which leads to natural selection and the survival of the fittest—and hence, with the human realm, to the greatest realization of human capacities.”⁸⁴

Also in 1895, Yan Fu wrote, “We thought that of all in the human race none were nobler than we. And then one day from tens of thousands of miles away came island barbarians from beyond the pale, with bird-like language and beastly features, who floated in and pounded on our gates requesting entrance,” and “when they did not get what they asked for, they attacked our coasts and took captive our officials and even burned our palaces and alarmed our Emperor. When this happened, the only reason we did not

⁸⁴ Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 55.

devour their flesh and sleep on their hides was that we had not the power.”⁸⁵

He argued that the “greatest and most irreconcilable difference between Chinese and Westerner thinking is that the Chinese love the past and neglect the present, while the Westerners strive in the present to surpass the past. The Chinese believe that to resolve from order to disorder, from ascension to decline, is the natural way of heaven and of human affairs. The Westerners believe, as the ultimate principle of all learning and government, in infinite daily progress, in advance that will not sink into decline, in order that will not revert to disorder.”⁸⁶

For Yan Fu, the Westerners’ secret was a belief in progress. The Chinese believed in cycles and got nowhere, while the Westerners believed in progress and progressed. For him, the West was stronger because “China trusts to fate; the Westerners rely on human strength.”⁸⁷

Yan Fu perceived interracial conflict to be new and worse than any conflict China had confronted previously, which were intraracial: “Now on earth there are only four great races: the yellow, the white, the brown, and

⁸⁵ Quoted in James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1983), p. 50.

⁸⁶ Yan Fu, “Lun shin pien chih chi,” in Yan Fu, *Yen Fu shih wen hsuan (Selected poems and essays of Yen Fu)* (Peking: Chou Chen-fu, 1959), p. 3.

⁸⁷ Yan Fu, “Lun shin pien chih chi,” p. 5.

the black....The Manchus, Mongolians, and Han Chinese of today are all of the yellow race....Therefore China from of old has been ruled by one race only. It has never actually fallen to an alien kind.”⁸⁸ However, the future would involve struggle with the white race. Yan was not alone in his thought, as Zhou wrote around the same time: “The yellow and white races which are to be found on the globe have been endowed by nature with intelligence and fighting capacity. They are fundamentally incapable of giving way to each other. Hence, glowering and poised for the fight, they have engaged in battle.”⁸⁹

In his study of Yan Fu’s thought, Sinologist and intellectual historian James Reeve Pusey concludes that Yan Fu had a clear racial hierarchy in mind and this was a full-fledged intellectual prejudice against any race darker than the Chinese. In his list of races, Yan Fu wrote, “there are four main races on the earth: the yellow, the white, the brown and the black. The lowest is the black race...they are the so-called black slaves.”⁹⁰

Whites had waged a war against the Chinese using three weapons: “religion, to seize a country’s people; soldiers, to seize its land; and commerce, to seize its wealth;” and if the West were not stopped, they would

⁸⁸ Yan Fu, “Yuan ch’iang,” in Yan Fu, *Yen Fu shih wen hsuan (Selected poems and essays of Yen Fu)* (Peking: Chou Chen-fu, 1959), p. 20.

⁸⁹ Zhou, *The Revolutionary Army*, p. 106.

⁹⁰ Yan Fu quoted in Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 69.

swallow up China.⁹¹ For Yan Fu, when the English and other colonists called the Chinese “barbarian,” they sowed the seeds of the greatest national loss of self-confidence, Pusey argues, “the world has ever known. No people had every been more sure of themselves than the Chinese, and so no people were ever made more painfully unsure of themselves.”⁹²

II. B. Liang Qichao

Yan Fu heavily influenced many Chinese intellectuals, the most significant of which was journalist and intellectual Liang Qichao [梁启超]. For Liang, the intellectual spark for China’s rebirth grew out of the recognition that the old Chinese order was not capable of generating the organizational and industrial power needed for survival in a ruthless international system dominated by the nation-states of the West.

As Liang argued in 1902, “our country’s civilization is the oldest in the world. Three thousand years ago, Europeans were living like beasts in the field, while our civilization, its characteristics pronounced, was already equivalent to theirs of the middle ages.”⁹³ Although Liang professed faith in common humanity and racial equality, he was quite adept at using racial

⁹¹ *Shih-wu pao, (Current Affairs)*, (Taipei, 1967), Vol. II, p. 895.

⁹² Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 95.

⁹³ Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 117.

slurs against “black men, brown men, and red men,” which appeared regularly in his writings.⁹⁴ For Liang, the yellow and white races are wise; red and black are ignorant. Yellow and white are masters; red and black are slaves. Yellow and white are tight-knit groups; red and black are dispersed.⁹⁵

“India’s failure to rise,” he wrote, is due to limitations of the race. All black, red, and brown peoples are in the micro-organisms of their blood and the slope of their brains is quite inferior to white men. Only the yellows and the white are not far removed from one another. Hence anything whites can do, yellows can do also.”⁹⁶

According to Liang, the great struggle for world domination would be between the Chinese and the whites. “Someday in the twentieth century, we Chinese will be the most powerful race in the world....The whites are arrogant and not up to the hardship. The blacks and browns are lazy and unintelligent. Therefore, except for us yellows, there is no race that could undertake such a task. North America and Australia today are areas for the white race’s colonies. South America and Africa will someday be areas for the yellow race’s colonies,...of that there is no doubt.”⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 97.

⁹⁵ Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 131.

⁹⁶ Quoted in Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 117.

⁹⁷ Quoted in Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 313.

II. C. Sun Yat-sen's Racial Views

Sun Yat-sen [孙逸仙] was the second most important Chinese political leader of the 20th century. His impact on China is hard to underestimate, as is the remarkable, open period in the China he led.⁹⁸ Equally, he was a complex and Machiavellian leader. Sinologists Sidney Chang and Leonard Gordon document the complexities of Sun Yat-sen's thought and the intricacies and flexibilities of his political life as he won support both from Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as his ambition to make China a great power, and the center of a pan-Asianist movement.⁹⁹

However, at the core of Sun's thought was China and race. Sun claimed that China was a united nation inhabited by one people. He asserted that "China, since the Ch'in [Qin] and Han dynasties, has been developing a single state out of a single race," and that eventually "all names of individual people inhabiting China" would die out, thus uniting all minority nationalities

⁹⁸ An excellent study of how democratic, socially tolerant, and economically free much of China was in the 1920s is Frank Dikötter, *The Age of Openness: China before Mao* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). Some of the consequences of this are evaluated in Frank Dikötter, *Sex, Culture, and Modernity in China: Medical Science and the Construction of Sexual Identities in the Early Republican Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997).

⁹⁹ Sidney H. Chang and Leonard H.D. Gordon, *All Under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991).

with the Han in a “single cultural and political whole.”¹⁰⁰ He marveled that China was a nation “with such a prestige that small nations came to her and of their own free will demand to be annexed.” He felt that minority nationalities considered it an honor to be part of China.¹⁰¹

Following the revolution in 1911, the Nationalists (KMT, GMT) adopted policies that reflected Sun Yat-sen’s assimilationist views and independence movements were strongly opposed. As Sun wrote: “Considering the law of survival of ancient and modern races, if we want to save China and to preserve the Chinese race, we must certainly promote Nationalism....The Chinese race totals four hundred million people; of mingled races there are only a few million Mongolians, a million or so Manchus, a few million Tibetans, and over a million Mohammedan Turks. These alien races do not number altogether more than ten million, so that, for the most part, the Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single, pure race.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Sun Yat-Sen, *San Min Chi I* [三民主義] [*The Three Principles of Democracy*], trans. by F. W. Price (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1929), p. 6; and Sun, *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary: A Programme of National Reconstruction for China* (New York: AMS Press, reprint 1970), pp. 181-182.

¹⁰¹ Chang and Gordon, *All Under Heaven*, p. 41.

¹⁰² Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen), *Sanminzhuyi* [三民主義] (The Three Principles of the People) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1927), pp. 4-5.

Sun's worldview was dominated by the idea of confrontation between the yellow and white races. "Mankind is divided first into the five main races—white, black, red, yellow, brown. Dividing further, we have many sub-races, as the Asiatic races—Mongolian, Malay, Japanese, Manchurian and Chinese....The greatest force is common blood," in politics and international politics.¹⁰³

After Mongolia asserted its independence in 1911 with the fall of the Qing dynasty, Sun could not resign himself to the permanent separation of Mongolia from China, and in 1923, while negotiating for Soviet assistance, he extracted Soviet recognition of Mongolia as part of China. However, soon Soviet pressure and other power political realities forced Sun Yat-sen to modify his all-encompassing, sinocentric worldview. Under the influence of Comintern advisors, Sun accepted the principle of national self-determination as defined by Stalin.¹⁰⁴

The Sinocentric views of Sun Yat-sen are common among most of the Chinese who harken to the unification of the Qin dynasty, the first imperial dynasty of China from 221 to 207 BC, or the territorial greatness of the Qing, the last imperial dynasty of China from 1644-1911, when they

¹⁰³ Sun quoted in Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 125.

¹⁰⁴ Eric Hyer, "Sinocentrism and the National Question in China," in Susana Carvalho and François Gemenne, eds., *Nations and their Histories* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 259-260.

conceptualized “China.” Published in 1925, *Zhongguo sangdi shi* [中国丧地史] (*The History of China's Lost Territory*) continues to be cited as an example of the extensive territorial claims the Chinese make.

A chapter in the work entitled “Territory During the Halcyon Days of the Qing Dynasty,” asserts that “areas inhabited by Han, Manchu, Mongols, and Muslims were already united” during the Qing dynasty, and argues that modern China should claim territories included in the Manchu empire as Chinese. According to the author of that chapter, there are two reasons for this: “First, the territory inherited by the Republic [of China] comes directly from all that was controlled by the Qing [dynasty] during its final days, and has undergone no change at present; and secondly, all areas inhabited by the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans are in fact unified, which was completed during the Qing.”¹⁰⁵

With Chiang Kai-shek’s dominance of the KMT after Sun’s death, China’s attitude took on a hypernationalistic tone.¹⁰⁶ Although Chiang Kai-shek had fundamental ideological differences with the Chinese Communists,

¹⁰⁵ B. Xie, *Zhongguo sangdi shi* [中国丧地史] (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1925), p. 6. Quoted in Hyer, “Sinocentrism and the National Question in China,” p. 260.

¹⁰⁶ This is well captured by Frank Dikötter, “Racial Discourse in China: Continuities and Permutations,” in Frank Dikötter, ed., *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), pp. 12-33.

he was equally concerned with China's salvation and the unification of China as it was before the fall of the Manchu Qing dynasty. The "Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period," written in 1931, defined China in the broadest territorial terms: "The territory of the Republic of China consists of the various provinces and Mongolia and Tibet."¹⁰⁷ Mongolia had become independent with the fall of the Qing dynasty and Tibet was independent *de facto*, but not recognized as such by the KMT. The "Chinanness" of the minority peoples was assumed and any sense of independent identity was crushed.

For Chiang, the Japanese invasion represented the climax of a century of imperialism in China and the defeat of Japan would symbolize the end of an era of humiliation and the rebirth of a united China with the restoration of all lost territory.

These concerns were not only held by China; they were common throughout East and South Asia, as well as the Middle East. As the eminent historian of the intellectual history of Asia, Pankaj Mishra argues, Japan's leading journalist, Tokutomi Soho (1863-1957) argued in his bestselling 1886 book, *The Future of Japan*, laid out the likely costs of Japanese indifference to Westernization: "Those blue-eyed, red-bearded races will

¹⁰⁷ *China Yearbook, 1934* (Shanghai: The North-China Daily News and Herald, 1934), p. 466.

invade our country like a giant wave, drive our people to the islands in the sea.”¹⁰⁸ Yet, even by the 1890s, Japan’s growing industrial and military might was provoking images in the West of the “Yellow Peril,” and Russia’s defeat by Japan demonstrated that Tokyo’s efforts to catch up to the West had been spectacularly successful. “We are dispelling the myth of the inferiority of the non-white races,” Tokutomi Soho declared, “with our power we are forcing our acceptance as a member in the ranks of the world’s greatest powers.”¹⁰⁹

In Japan, the widespread contemporaneous belief of an inevitable race war, in which China and Japan would be regarded as sworn enemies of the West, was prominently advanced in the Japanese press in 1898 by Prince Konoe Atsumaro, who was the major proponent of Sino-Japanese cooperation for opposition to the West.¹¹⁰

Mori Ogai, one of the key Meiji intellectuals who contributed to the modernization of Japan through the introduction of Western culture and technology, made a related argument in 1903: “Like it or not we are fated to oppose the White race. Once this is realized, to study the Yellow Peril means

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire*, p. 3.

¹¹⁰ Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1993), pp. 10-11, 211.

to reconnoiter the lie of the enemy.”¹¹¹ As a rationalist and admirer of much in Western culture, Mori was pained by the idea of racial conflict, and he seems to have retained a belief in the possibility of reconciliation.

Nevertheless, the assertion in his Waseda University lecture regarding the inevitability of racial conflict seems to have heightened race consciousness in Japan. It is one of the ironies of history that the sharpening of Japanese racial sentiments following exposure to Western ideas of race war ultimately came to have their most horrific consequences for the people of China. Intensified Japanese xenophobia also had a significant impact against Western powers, as well as before and during World War II.

Mishra captures well the essence of Tsushima, “Russia’s humiliation seemed to negate the West’s racial hierarchies, making the European presumption to ‘civilize’ the supposedly ‘backward’ countries of Asia....Japan had shown that Asian countries could find their own path to modern civilization, and its special vigour.”¹¹² In South Africa, Gandhi drew a similar lesson from Russia’s defeat: “When everyone in Japan, rich or poor, came to believe in self-respect, the country became free. She could give Russia a slap

¹¹¹ Richard John Bowring, *Mori Ogai and the Modernization of Japanese Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 116.

¹¹² Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire*, pp. 3-4.

in the face...In the same way, we must, too, need to feel the spirit of self-respect.”¹¹³

In Cairo, Rashid Rida (1865-1935), whose work later served as an inspiration to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, wrote excitedly about the possibility of converting Japan to Islam, and turning the “Yellow Peril” of European imagination into a pan-Asian movement for liberation from infidels.¹¹⁴ Speaking in 1924, Sun Yat-sen recalled the somnolent last decade of the nineteenth century when the “colored races in Asia, suffering from the oppression of the Western people, thought that emancipation was possible. Men thought and believed that European civilization was a progressive one—in science, industry, manufacture, and armament—and that Asia had nothing to compare with it. Consequently, they assumed that Asia could never resist Europe, that European oppression could never be shaken off.”¹¹⁵

Rudyard Kipling, for one, thought that aiding China was not a wise idea. Dining with British businessmen who were aiding the Manchus, Kipling deplored the men who were doing their best to “force upon the great Empire

¹¹³ Quoted in Rotem Kower, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 242.

¹¹⁴ Quoted in Kower, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 240.

¹¹⁵ Sun Yat-sen quoted in Mishar, *From the Ruins of Empire*, pp. 6-7.

all the stimulants of the West—railways, tramlines, and so forth. What will happen when China really wakes up?”¹¹⁶

What was a fear for Kipling was a joy for Sun Yat-sen. Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905, Sun said, had infused Asian peoples with a “new hope of shaking off the yoke of European restriction and domination and regaining their own rightful position in Asia.”¹¹⁷ This sense existed not only in China, Japanese intellectuals saw this as well. Kakuzo Okakura wrote in 1906, “European imperialism, which does not disdain to raise the absurd cry of the ‘Yellow Peril,’ fails to realize that Asia may also awaken to the cruel sense of the White Disaster.”¹¹⁸ These sentiments are clear and forceful, yet it would not be quite correct to label these expressions a re-birth or re-awaking of nationalistic or ethnocentric feelings, as many intellectual historians do, because these emotions and beliefs were never absent, only forced into submission by the shock of Western occupation and technological prowess.

¹¹⁶ Rudyard Kipling, *From Sea to Sea: Letters of Travel* (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1907), p. 274.

¹¹⁷ Sun Yat-sen quoted in Mishar, *From the Ruins of Empire*, p. 7.

¹¹⁸ Kakuzo Okakura, *The Book of Tea* (New York: Empire Books, 1906), p. 4.

II. D. The Contemporaneous Western View of China: The "Yellow Peril"

The contemporaneous Western view of China was similarly complicated, with Westerners vacillating between the Chinese as feckless and impotent versus those who saw China at the forefront of the Yellow Peril.

The first modern, social scientific approach toward China was done by the French sociologist Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau in the 1850s.¹¹⁹

Gobineau's attitude was that politically China was immutable with an emphasis on government administration rather than war and diplomacy, in stark contrast to the West. The country's racial character was viewed as feminine, containing a primal urge for political stability but with significant tolerance for various philosophical and religious beliefs. In addition, the Chinese political system could be seen as egalitarian and even democratic in the sense that the mandarin system, which the imperial examination system made accessible to everyone, at least in theory. In the economic realm, the Chinese proclivity was for commercial success, material abundance and satisfaction for the elite. Socially and culturally, China was homogenous.

In this view of China, there was no threat to European civilization, as French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville wrote to Arthur Gobineau in

¹¹⁹ Gregory Blue, "Gobineau on China: Race Theory, the 'Yellow Peril,' and the Critique of Modernity," *Journal of World History*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 93-139.

1855: "A few million men who, a few centuries ago, lived nearly shelterless in the forests and in the marshes of Europe will, within a hundred years, have transformed the globe and dominated the other races. Seldom has Providence shown us an aspect of the future so clearly. The European races are often the greatest rogues, but at least they are rogues to whom God gave will and power and whom he seems to have destined for some time to be at the head of mankind."¹²⁰

This benign view of China began to change for two reasons. The first was the opening of China to Western imperial powers following the First Opium War.¹²¹ Greater penetration and familiarity with China provided Europeans with a more complicated view of China. To be sure, many of their beliefs were confirmed in their own minds by their encounters with China, such as a passivity and preference for material possession. At the same time, Europeans were impressed with the civilization and potential power of China. Latent though Chinese power may be, Gobineau, like Napoleon before, was concerned with what the size of the Chinese population might mean for the security of Europe.

¹²⁰ Alexis de Tocqueville, *"The European Revolution" and Correspondence with Gobineau* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 268.

¹²¹ Julia Lovell, *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of China* (Oxford: Macmillan, 2011).

The second reason was spawned from European advances in technology. The advent of the railroad was the most significant here since it required prodigious amounts of labor, in turn, driving Chinese emigration to the United States and Russia. Railroad development in Russia was seen as a great danger since it would permit the Chinese to project power against Europe—this was the origin of the “Yellow Peril”—where the Chinese hordes would destroy Europe in a modern version of the Mongol or Hunnic invasions.

Gobineau writings also show that he was fully in accord with the consensus of nineteenth-century European thought towards China, identifying it with commercialism, mediocrity, despotism, and a lack of freedom. Accordingly, his analysis of China led him to resist imperialist expansion on the basis of racist anticolonialism. In 1859, he referred to Asia as a tempting fruit that would poison whoever ate of it. Likewise, he warned of the negative effects of Russian expansion into north China as the Russian encounter would weaken St. Petersburg and ultimately aid Chinese expansion.

Gobineau’s ideas found fertile soil in France and Germany in the 1880s and 1890s, and later in Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, where concerns about the Yellow Peril were evinced at the highest levels by

Kaiser Wilhelm II, and seems to have entered common usage at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. After the war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895, France, Germany, and Russia protested. The "Far Eastern" Triple Alliance, forced Japan to return the Liaodong peninsula to China.

As Wilhelm II wrote to Tsar Nicholas II, "I shall certainly do all in my power to keep Europe quiet, and also guard the rear of Russia so that nobody shall hamper your action towards the Far East. For that is clearly the great task of the future Russia to cultivate the Asian continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow Race."¹²² Of course, it must be noted that by encouraging Russian aims in Asia, Wilhelm was compensating for the lapse of Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty between Berlin and St. Petersburg.

Wilhelm II's identification with the Yellow Peril continued for the remainder of his reign. In 1902, he wrote again to Nicholas II emphasizing the risks of a Sino-Japanese alliance: "20 to 30 Million of trained Chinese helped by half a dozen Jap Divisions and led by fine undaunted Christian hating Jap officers, is a future to be contemplated not without anxiety; and

¹²² N.F. Grant, ed., *The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920), pp. 10-11; quoted in Blue, "Gobineau on China," p. 122,

not impossible. In fact it is the coming into reality of the 'Yellow Peril', which I depicted some years ago."¹²³

In 1907, two years after the Russo-Japanese War, Wilhelm predicted that before long there would be a "final great fight...between the yellow and white races in which Japan will lead the Chinese invasion of Europe. It will also be the final great fight between the Christian and the Buddhist religions; the culture of the west and the half-culture of the east."¹²⁴

Gobineau's race theories also had a significant impact on China. Western racial ideologies were appropriated in various ways by non-Western intellectuals in the late nineteenth century, often through integration with indigenous forms of chauvinism or xenophobia. As we have seen above, when Social Darwinist thought was introduced to China by the famous scholar-translator Yan Fu in 1896, the standard Western classificatory model of five base human races (white, red, yellow, brown, and black) was reproduced and disseminated throughout the country.¹²⁵ Sun Yat-sen, also used Social Darwinist works. For Sun, the notion of the Yellow

¹²³ Grant, ed., *The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar*, pp. 90-91.

¹²⁴ Michael Balfour, *The Kaiser and His Times* (London: Cresset, 1964), pp. 260-261.

¹²⁵ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, pp. 77-80; and Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, pp. 68, 130-131.

Peril even posed the prospect that China might one day avenge the wrongs imposed on it by imperial powers.

Pusey submits that Liang Qichao recalls Wilhelm II in foreseeing that “if China really adopts Western institutions, she will become the strongest and most invincible of nations. The Mongol race will again be able to lead its armies against the West, as Attila did of old.”¹²⁶ While the language of this concern is out of date, the recognition of the consequences of China’s rise is not.

II. E. The Racism of the Chinese Communists

Given how endemic Chinese racism is, there should be no surprise that racism flourished during the Maoist years. This is despite official Marxist and Maoist ideology, which dismisses racism as an artifact of bourgeois thinking. Many of the racial divisions the Chinese made on the basis of race, were often reformulated in terms of “class.” So, while the ideas of race were officially taboo, the underlying arguments and beliefs had not changed according to Dikötter. “The messianic idea of unification (the *datong*, or “One World” ideal) was now expressed in a phraseology based on the concept of class struggle, whereas the artificial dichotomization between Chinese and Westerners in biological terms of ‘race’ was merely reformulated in social

¹²⁶ Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin*, p. 98.

terms of 'class.' Eugenic theories were increasingly applied to the individual's social origins: the best people were "born red."¹²⁷

Although there is nothing in Mao's writings that deals directly with race, it is clear that his sense of nationalism was based on a strong racial consciousness and a sense of biological continuity for the Chinese. He perceived the Chinese nation, (*minzu*) [民族] as a biologically distinct group: being Chinese was a matter of culture, but more importantly, it was a matter of race. Dikötter submits that it was likely he coalesced the notions of "class" and "race" into a vision of the struggle of the "colored people" against "white imperialism."¹²⁸ Intellectual historian Stuart Schram writes that "Mao's appeal is not merely to a union based on revolutionary principles, but to the visceral solidarity of peoples long oppressed and humiliated by the white powers of Europe and America."¹²⁹

Official propaganda advanced the idea that only Westerners could indulge in racism, with the Chinese becoming the leaders of the victimized "colored" people in the historical struggle against "white imperialism."¹³⁰ In Africa, according to Dikötter, the Chinese tried to capitalize on a common

¹²⁷ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, pp. 191-192.

¹²⁸ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 192.

¹²⁹ Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 374.

¹³⁰ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 192.

racial identity, urging that “we black stick together” against the white race, which even then, met with considerable skepticism on the African side.¹³¹ This reached its height at the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in February 1963, when the Chinese delegates vehemently insisted that the “white” Russians would never commit themselves wholly to the anti-imperialist struggle due to their whiteness. Thus, even for Maoists, race was used to advance great power interests.

Despite communist imagery of racial harmony and unity with the underdog, the Chinese adopted an aloof and racially exclusive attitude toward Africans. Friction between African students and Chinese led to violent clashes in the 1970s and 1980s. This friction remains today for Africans in China. The following section will discuss the present behavior of the Chinese in Africa.

II. F. China as a “Civilizational State”?

China has been described by Zhang Weiwei [张维为], Professor of International Relations at Fudan University, as a civilizational state, which combines the strength of both the nation-state and a civilization. That claim is also made by Martin Jacques, “China is a civilization *and* a continent. In

¹³¹ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, p. 193.

fact, China became a nation-state only relatively recently.”¹³² Reflecting on this, we can see that China has received a demotion. It was a civilization, the center of the universe, but was reduced to an “ordinary” state by European colonization, but now has the hope and aspiration of returning to its status as a civilizational state.

In an important sense, this is a key contribution as it allows us to comprehend the importance of the unity of race and civilization, or what can be termed race-civilization, in China. As a civilizational state, China is both old and young, both traditional and modern, both Chinese and international. Eight features define China as a civilizational state: first, it has a very large population; second, it has a large territory; third, it has long traditions; fourth, it has an equally well-developed culture; fifth, a unique language; sixth, unique politics; seventh, a unique society; and eighth, a unique economy.¹³³

Zhang submits that these features of the civilizational state constitute China’s greatest strengths. As he explains: “China has the richest human resources and potentially the largest consumer market; China has an

¹³² Martin Jacques: *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin, 2009), p. 196. Emphasis original.

¹³³ Zhang Weiwei, *The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State* (Hackensack, N.J.: World Century Publishing, 2012), pp. 52-53.

unparalleled geopolitical and geoeconomic status; China has its own tradition of independent thinking, and has the richest cultural resources in the world. However, if China abandons its own model and adopts the Western model, then the greatest strengths of China as a civilizational state may turn out to be its greatest weaknesses.”¹³⁴ By this he means that “hundreds of states in one” may become “hundreds of states in conflict;” China’s “emphasis on harmonious politics may become adversarial politics; its huge population a rich source of contention; its unified vast territory split and disintegrate; and its diverse traditions the pretext for endless disputes and its cultural richness the source of cultural clashes....Under no circumstances should China lose its own identity and inherent strengths.”¹³⁵

Zhang’s remarks reveal a hidden but strong ethnocentrism and pride in China. For him, China is a unique and superior state, and so is in keeping with how the Chinese have seen themselves historically. Accordingly, Western analysts should not be surprised at the naked ethnocentrism of the Chinese, and, in this, Chinese intellectuals are no exception. This alone allows us to perceive a key difference between the West and China. It would be rare to find a Western intellectual in the academy today that would make such a boast. The recognition of China’s pride, and its people’s support of its

¹³⁴ Zhang, *The China Wave*, p. 67.

¹³⁵ Zhang, *The China Wave*, pp. 67-68.

pride, compels the acknowledgement that China is a different type of state, and its people celebrate that fact.

II. G. The Resurrection of the Racist State: Chinese Racism Continues

“This yellow river, it so happens, bred a nation identified by its yellow skin pigment. Moreover, this nation also refers to its earliest ancestor as the Yellow Emperor. Today, on the face of the earth, of every five human beings there is one that is descendant of the Yellow Emperor.”¹³⁶

If, in contemporary Germany, a leading intellectual were to identify the people of that country according to their physical features (“blond hair and blue eyes”) and represent them as a descendant of a homogenous group (“the Aryans”), he would be expelled from the public sphere.

In China, he is venerated.

For Western academics, because it is embarrassing, there is little effort to call attention to the racist views of the Chinese today. In fact, there is often the opposite sentiment. Anthropologist Charles Stafford argues that “race” is not a Chinese concept, and thus racism, for Stafford and many

¹³⁶ Su Xiaokang, “River Elegy,” in *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Winter 1991-1992), p. 9.

intellectuals like him, can only occur in the West.¹³⁷ As Jacques writes, “there is a widely held view, not least in East Asia, that racism is a ‘white problem’: it is what white people do to others. In both China and Taiwan, the official position is that racism is a phenomenon of Western culture, with Hong Kong holding a similar view. This is nonsense.”¹³⁸ Jacques continues, noting the ubiquity of racism: “All peoples are prone to such ways of thinking—or, to put it another way, all races harbour racial prejudices, engage in racist modes of thought and practice racism against other races. Racism, in fact, is a universal phenomenon from which no race is exempt, even those who have suffered grievously at its hands.”¹³⁹

There is no effort to change Chinese racial attitudes at the centers of power in China, or from below. Theories of racial purity have combined with dubious studies in anthropology to create official efforts to legitimate discrimination against minorities in China. The official promotion of China as the “homeland of the Modern Yellow Race” has far-reaching consequences not only for minority groups inside the political boundaries of the PRC.

¹³⁷ Charles Stafford, “The Discourse of Race in Modern China,” *Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 609.

¹³⁸ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, p. 245.

¹³⁹ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, p. 245.

Mongolia, for instance, has been portrayed as an “organic and integral part” of the “Chinese race,” as has Tibet.¹⁴⁰

It is well known, but never officially acknowledged, that the vast majority of Han Chinese regard only their own ethnic group, in the PRC or the diaspora, as Chinese, and hence descendants of the Yellow Emperor. Ethnic minorities who do not physically and culturally resemble the Han are not viewed as authentically Chinese or counted as fellow-descendants of the Yellow Emperor.¹⁴¹

Racial discrimination arising in a potentially unstable empire with an embattled Communist Party could have grave consequences for regional stability in Asia. Moreover, in China we see the resurrection of the ideal of a racially-based state through the myth of a Chinese people of the same race, blood, and culture. The myth of descent from the Yellow Emperor is the basis of a racial nationalism and xenophobia that submits there are primal biological and cultural bonds among the Chinese that cannot be altered.¹⁴² These bonds compel a common adherence to state patriotism and

¹⁴⁰ Frank Dikötter, “Introduction,” in Dikötter, ed., *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, pp. 1-11, 10.

¹⁴¹ Perry Link, “China’s ‘Core’ Problem: Ideology,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 122, No. 2 (March 1993), p. 195.

¹⁴² John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism,” *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 33 (January 1995), pp. 84-90.

nationalism. The Chinese are said not only to share a common ancestry but also to derive from progenitors who, in the distant past before the reign of the Yellow Emperor, separated themselves from non-East Asians, thus becoming the “core of the yellow race.”¹⁴³

Thus, we may see that in China, due to religious-cultural and historical influences, racism remains a dominant social perspective and attitude. It allows the Chinese to easily define their worldview, to know who is in the “family” and who is the outsider; from whom they should expect support and from whom they should not. As we will see in the next chapter, this is a huge advantage for the Chinese, and one Sun Yet-sen recognized and to which he appealed when he said: “The Greatest Force Is Common Blood.”

It also allows the China analyst to comprehend that racism will never be seen as a problem. Racism is a Western problem, the artifact of Western history and Western culture, and, it must be said, a Western obsession. It is also a Western weakness. The obsession with race and race guilt introduces a vulnerability into Western societies that many non-Western peoples have exploited. Most importantly, it has led to a loss of confidence in the West, in its identity, while fracturing its cohesion and leading to doubts about what

¹⁴³ Barry Sautman, “Myths of Descent, Racial Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities,” in Frank Dikötter, ed., *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), pp. 75-95, 84.

will united it, and what common bonds exist to hold together the people living in Western states.

From the Chinese perspective, racism is not a problem, at most a minor, occasional one, in their society. To the degree that discussions of race arise, it is China as a victim of Western racism. There is the strong belief, which exists today, that the Chinese have been, and continue to be, heavily discriminated against with exclusionary immigration laws.¹⁴⁴ In addition, from the Chinese perspective, present discrimination often takes the form of Affirmative Action policies that serve to exclude Chinese students from the best Universities, and implicit quotas in professions, such as in science and medicine.

Racism remains endemic in China with little expectation that it will be seen as a problem. Such strong beliefs compel us to recognize that all things “China” or “Chinese” will generate the strongest emotional reactions. We are dealing with a state that is more akin in its racial beliefs to Nazi Germany than to Western democracies. This fundamental fact is easily missed by Westerners because of an unease and lack of comfort discussing the topic and by the abandonment of intellectual considerations of race, which have,

¹⁴⁴ See Shih-Shan Henry Tsia, *The Chinese Experience in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Sucheng Chan and Madeline Y. Hsu, eds., *Chinese Americans and the Politics of Race and Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008).

on the whole, been a positive development but—at the same time—causes Western analysts to miss much about Chinese behavior.

Accordingly, the fact that China remains concerned with territory does not come as a surprise. China's state media outlet *Huanqiu* published an editorial in which its tone was one of lecturing Hillary Clinton and the U.S. about the recent territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries. Note the "impossible" tone and rather vicious bark.

Before her visit to China, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed that she was going to talk to China about the South China Sea and other territorial disputes in East Asia. Talk about what? Talk about the sovereign ownership of the Nansha and Diaoyu Islands? Impossible. Talk about the road map to resolve the territorial issues in East Asia? Also impossible.

The only thing the two sides can talk about is "grand principles," but there is not much room for that either. Hillary will probably reiterate the "peaceful settlement" principle, to which China will not object. She will also ask China to involve ASEAN in the talks on the South China Sea issue, but China will never accept (this idea). China's principle is to deal with the specific disputes with countries in a one-on-one negotiation. (China) has long denied these so-called "multilateral negotiations."

There is not much China and America can discuss. In other words, it is useless to talk. The South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands dispute have now become so prominent. The root cause behind the scenes is the United States. The United States encouraged and instigated countries that have territorial disputes with China with its 'return to Asia' to undermine the environment surrounding China's development and to harass and inhibit China's rise.

China very much hopes that the United States will not intervene in the South China Sea dispute, and very much hopes that the United States truly remains neutral in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, but no matter how hard and earnest China tries, it is impossible to move Hillary.

China and the United States have formed a huge (mutual) distrust. It is unrealistic to break it through conversation. China and the United States judge each other by their actions.

Hillary Clinton has been trying to challenge China's legitimate core interests in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, but she understands that when facing China's firm determination to safeguard its national interests, the United States needs to choose its most favorable reaction. That's enough. China should not let the US have any doubts or other misjudgments regarding its determination."¹⁴⁵

Of course, visceral Chinese nationalism may be triggered by territorial or other disputes, such as the EP-3E incident in April 2001, or the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy two years earlier. At that time, a widely circulated poem caught the nationalist tone:

When we are wearing Pierre Cardin and Nike

When we are driving Cadillacs, Lincolns, and going to

KFC and McDonald's

Do we have a clear conscience?

No!!!

Can we still find glory by using foreign products?

No!!!¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ *Huanqiu* Editorial, "Let Hillary Understand China's Determination to Defend Its Territory," *Huanqiu*, September 5, 2012, available at: <http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2012-09/3098896.html>

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in Westad, *Restless Empire*, p. 398.

Chapter Three

The Strategic Consequences of Chinese Racism

This chapter considers the strategic consequences of Chinese racism. There are nine major consequences that this study will consider. The intention is to provide an overview of these issues, while the next chapter will illuminate the implications for DoD decision-makers. As I discussed in the last chapter, the Chinese are the last major racist great power, soon to be superpower, and so their beliefs, and the strategic consequences of their beliefs, are very significant to comprehend.

In many respects, the United States is in a situation similar to the one Nathan Leites of the Rand Corporation found himself at the outset of the Cold War. At that time, the central question was how do we understand Soviet decision-making and their current and future actions. To answer these questions, Leites developed what he termed “The Operational Code of the Politburo.”¹⁴⁷

Today we confront the same situation with China. Unlike the Cold War, when the United States had few Sovietologists, the United States has a

¹⁴⁷ Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1951).

legion of Sinologists who are tasked with precisely the objectives of analyzing and predicting Chinese behavior. Yet, for all of the writings of countless Sinologists, who purportedly explore the major motivations, actions, and responses of the Chinese, United States decision-makers are still in doubt over Chinese motivations and actions, as well as how they perceive and analyze the world.

Largely, Sinologists do not want to address the fundamentally important fact about the Chinese: their racism. There are four reasons why this so. First, in academic circles, as discussed above, there is a bias against identifying racism in non-white people, and in non-Western states. There is a common belief that racism is only found among whites, or, in slightly modified form of this argument, racism is only found among those who have power, as whites have had in the modern period of international politics. Therefore, only whites may be racist.

Second, in addition to academic biases, there are strong significant interests—which may be business, cultural or found in the media—that refuse to recognize this aspect of Chinese culture, or will not acknowledge it for the fear that it will legitimize opposition to China. Calling attention to the racism of the Chinese state legitimizes those opposed to the expansion of

Chinese power with the most powerful and electric argument and emotional appeal that can be made in the United States today: resistance to racism.

Third, as M. Dujon Johnson, a black American scholar of China, argues, racism towards Africans and African Americans is simply not an important enough issue to study by Sinologists because of their assumption that racism in China is acceptable and understandable due to China's ethnocentrism. "The issue of race and racism towards Africans and African-Americans are not discussed because the...majority of China scholars are predominantly white males from the Western world or are predominately Asian males in the non-Western world. Thus racism does not affect the overwhelming majority of China scholars themselves nor does it attack or threaten the inherent privileges and perks of these China scholars because they have the preferred skin pigmentation that the Chinese people favor and idolize."¹⁴⁸

Fourth, for Sinologists, to recognize the racism among the Chinese would jeopardize their professional standing. In essence, to be a Sinologist requires traveling to China, or to Taiwan. To call out the Chinese on this point is to end their access to Beijing, and would make them unpopular in Taipei. Accordingly, as Aaron Friedberg wrote in his exceptional study of the

¹⁴⁸ M. Dujon Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas* (Bloomington, Ind.: AuthorHouse, 2011), p. xi.

future U.S. relationship with China, “the truth is that China is too important to be left to the China hands.”¹⁴⁹ Indeed, it is.

Friedberg’s insight underscores the importance of research that questions what are too often shared assumptions about China, and that is, in fact, critical of China and calls attention to the reality that China does not live up to international norms on identifying and combating racism in its society. It is especially important that research is conducted by analysts who are free to critique Chinese policies precisely because the Chinese government has no leverage over them, and so cannot punish or reward them as Beijing sees fit.

I. The Strategic Consequences of Chinese Racism: Nine Major Consequences

I. A. Racism and Eugenics Heavily Inform the Chinese Worldview

The first and the most important consequence is that racism heavily informs their worldview and self-identification. As explained in Chapter One, the legacy of evolutionary inheritance, xenophobia, racism, ethnocentrism, weighs on us today. Behaviors that aided survival now are mismatched and unfortunate. As described in Chapter Two, the weight of racist thought and action in Chinese culture and history is heavy, and the Chinese government is not combating racism or attempting to reverse it in a meaningful way.

¹⁴⁹ Aaron L Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: Norton, 2011), p. 269.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the ethnocentric beliefs positing Chinese superiority portray the rest of the world as inferior, and racist opinion and expressions are common in the public sphere.

While there are important differences among the Chinese, there is the saying “there are many Chinas” on any particular issue or aspect of life, there is a unity of culture, great patriotism and nationalism.¹⁵⁰ There is an animating drive to make China strong again, and a pride in their country. Within China, the Chinese most often identify with their province, not nation, and there is a hierarchy among the provinces. They may see someone from another province as being from another nation, just as in Europe, while all are Europeans, the Germans see the French differently, and the Italians the Czechs.

Nonetheless, strong ethnocentrism is the heart of what it means to be Chinese. These attitudes were common in the past, explicitly made even when China had its period of doubt during the “Century of Humiliation.” Policy-makers and analysts should prepare for continually greater nationalistic, ethnocentric, and racist appeals as China becomes stronger. As Lucien Pye explains: “The most pervasive underlying Chinese emotion is a profound, unquestioned, generally unshakeable identification with historical

¹⁵⁰ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, pp. 235-237.

greatness...This is all so-evident that they are hardly aware when they are being superior to others.”¹⁵¹ Pye continues: “The Chinese see such an absolute difference between themselves and others that even when living in lonely isolation in distant countries they unconsciously find it natural and appropriate to refer to those in whose homeland they are living as ‘foreigners.’”¹⁵²

There is nothing wrong with racism from the Chinese perspective. Again, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Chinese see themselves as the victims of racism, such as at elite American universities where Chinese and Chinese-Americans are discriminated against. Yet, it is quite clear that racism and racial stereotypes are endemic. As Professor John Copper reveals, in the survey of common racial attitudes from the Chinese perspective, the Japanese are racial equals.¹⁵³ The Koreans are rude, possess no culture, and are like gangsters in their actions. The Vietnamese are tougher, smarter, better than the other people of Southeast Asia, although obviously inferior to the Chinese. The Indians are not civilized, and stink, but are good engineers, which is highly praised in China since it is considered a prestigious profession.

¹⁵¹ Lucien Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 50.

¹⁵² Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, p. 56.

¹⁵³ Interview with Professor John Copper, Rhodes College, August 23, 2012.

Foreigners were traditionally described as “devils” in Chinese history, but they are distinguished by their skin color, with Caucasians referred to as “white devils” (*baigui* [白鬼]) and those of darker skin as “black devils” (*heigui* [黑鬼]), and these terms are still used today. Not all devils were regarded in the same way, however; white devils were perceived as “rulers” and black devils as “slaves.”¹⁵⁴

The Chinese general attitude toward whites is that they were superior to Asians in the past, but not so anymore. The Chinese perspective toward Europe is that Europe is irrelevant, has not produced any ideas in the last generation, and will not do so in the future. The Chinese attitude towards white Americans is more complicated. Physically, and as sexual partners, Caucasians are attractive due to their height, lighter skin, bigger eyes, pointed nose with a higher bridge. There is the belief that intermarrying with whites produces better children. Chinese women, in particular, are attracted to white men in part because for the Chinese themselves, there are deep cultural prejudices against dark skin, which is associated with lower class, and for light skin, which equates to the upper class. Capturing this bias is a popular saying “one white covers up one hundred defects” [一白遮百丑]. In addition, Western men are attractive because they are taller. Among

¹⁵⁴ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, p. 248.

Chinese women, there is the “Three Talls” folk wisdom, that is, a man should be physically tall, tall in education, and tall in income. As Johnson explains: “In the Chinas today there is a clear racial social hierarchy based on the assumptions of racial superiority. The comfort level and the acceptance of a foreigner in the Chinas are directly proportional to the skin pigmentation of that non-Chinese,” he continues, “the racial hierarchy in both Taiwan and Mainland China is very well defined in dealing with non-Chinese with whiteness being the most desired and favorable skin pigmentation. At the top of this racial and social hierarchy for the non-Chinese is the white male.”¹⁵⁵ For Chinese women, “white males are not only a status symbol but white males are also seen by them as an opportunity for upward social and racial mobility.”¹⁵⁶

However, within China, there was a time when Westerners were welcomed without doubt, but now this is changing. A May 2012 event has electrified anti-Western sentiment and gone viral. An Englishman was assaulting a Chinese woman in an attempted rape when he was stopped and beaten by bystanders.¹⁵⁷ Historically, Westerners in China always got a pass. Those days are over. Westerners are now treated in accord with the law. In

¹⁵⁵ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 37.

¹⁵⁶ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 100.

¹⁵⁷ The event is posted on YouTube and available here as of 29 August 2012: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4YNkRtVLws>

part as a reaction to the incident, Chinese authorities are stopping Westerners on the street and checking whether or not they are in China legally. The autonomy granted to Westerners in China is at an end, and the evidence for this is found among the young students protesting in a strongly nationalistic response to the Englishman's attempted assault.

The attitude towards blacks is that they are ugly, uncivilized, and have a low degree of intelligence. They need leadership and it is acceptable to exploit them. When the Chinese are accused of exploitation in Africa, a common response is that the Chinese do not interfere in domestic affairs, nor do they enslave anyone. Although, actually, China had a small number of African slaves, particularly on Chinese ships. In fact, as described below, there have been riots against Chinese managers that have resulted in deaths, most recently in Zambia.

For Johnson, with his years of living in China as a black person, Chinese racism is endemic and such an obvious aspect of life is not worth discussing: "In Chinese society one of the reasons that the issue of race and racism is rarely discussed openly in the Chinas is because racism is universally accepted and justified behind the veil of Asian cultural values," he continues, "those who hold these views consider...[Chinese] cultural perspectives of other ethnic groups to be unassailable no matter how

inaccurate or offensive they may be.”¹⁵⁸ Racism is also an issue that is not addressed among Chinese because most Chinese see themselves as superior to darker-skinned people. Therefore, within the Chinese mindset, it would be a waste of time to address an obvious fact of darker-skinner people’s inferiority.”¹⁵⁹ Some of his interviewees told of innocently brushing against a Chinese person in a crowd: “Without fail, the Chinese always responded by immediately rubbing the part of their body that had been touched by the African or African-American as if they were attempting to brush the black color off.”¹⁶⁰ He recounts how some of his African and African-American friends were assaulted without an investigation of the assault by the local police.¹⁶¹

Moreover, in his interviews with Chinese, Johnson’s research revealed that many made “a conscious attempt to stay away from darker skinned people....In sharing their views...none of the individuals interviewed considered their comments to be racist in any manner. The Chinese interviewees took their racially insensitive comments to be factual in nature.”¹⁶² After asking two Chinese human rights activists on separate

¹⁵⁸ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 31.

¹⁵⁹ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁰ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 63.

¹⁶¹ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 63.

¹⁶² Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 88.

occasions why they did not reach out to blacks in the United States, Johnson reveals his horror when both stated that they were “not at all concerned with Blacks in America because all Chinese knew that Africans and African-American people had bad social habits and vices and they would corrupt Chinese society as they had American society.”¹⁶³

Johnson submits that his experiences demonstrated to him “on a daily basis how life in Chinese society is racially segregated and in many aspects similar to a system of racial apartheid.”¹⁶⁴

Occasionally, this racism will erupt and be so blatant as to be embarrassing for the government. What was written about United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on websites when she visited Beijing in 2005 was scandalous. Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo [刘晓波] was shocked at the reaction and protested:

I have browsed China’s three biggest portals’ BBS articles [blogs] about Rice’s six-nation visit...Just take Sina as an example. I examined over 800 BBS articles...including repetitions, there were over 600 articles. Among them, there were nearly 70 articles with racial discrimination, one-tenth of the total...There were only two with a gentle tone, the rest were all extremely disgusting. Many stigmatized Rice as “really ugly”...“the ugliest in the world”...“I really can’t understand how mankind gave birth to a woman like Rice”...Some directly call Rice a “black ghost,” a “black pig,”...“a witch”...“rubbish of Humans”...Some lament: Americans’ IQ is low—how can they make a “black bitch” Secretary of State...Some, of course, did not forget to

¹⁶³ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 90.

¹⁶⁴ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, pp. 147-148.

stigmatize Rice with animal [names]: “chimpanzee,” “bird-like,” “crocodile,” “a piece of rotten meat, mouse shit, [something] dogs will find hard to eat.”¹⁶⁵

Additional remarks included: “How come the United States selects a female chimpanzee as Secretary of State?” and “She is so ugly she is losing face. Even a dog would be put off its dinner while she’s being fed.”¹⁶⁶ Others labeled her “a black bitch,” “her brain is even more black than her skin,” and one write said: “I don’t support racism, but this black ghost really makes people angry, the appearance of a little black [person] who has made good.”¹⁶⁷

Virulent racism is only a part of China’s problem, belief in eugenics completes the equation. Although eugenics has been discredited in the West, the Chinese are strong supporters of such policies, and have been throughout their history. There is an ancient Chinese saying: “Sow melons and you will reap melons, plant beans and you will harvest beans” [种瓜得瓜, 种豆得豆] that the Chinese put into practice when it comes to human life. Or, as Confucius says in *The Analects*, “superior intelligence and inferior stupidity cannot be

¹⁶⁵ Liu’s remarks were posted on www.ncn.org and quoted in Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, p. 260.

¹⁶⁶ Hamish McDonald, “China Forgets Manners as Rice Visit Touches Nerves,” *Sydney Morning Post*, March 26, 2005, available at: <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2005/03/25/1111692629223.html?from=top5&oneclick=true>.

¹⁶⁷ Martin Jacques, “The Middle Kingdom Mentality: At Last China’s Culture of Racism is Being Contested by Chinese,” *The Guardian*, April 16, 2005, p. 24.

changed” [唯大智与下愚不移]. United States decision-makers need to recognize that China is a racist state, a natural consequence is that so too it is eugenicist.

The PRC passed a law in 1995 aimed at restricting births deemed to be imperfect. It suggests that in order to prevent “inferior births,” those “deemed unsuitable for reproduction” should undergo sterilization or abortion or be compelled to remain celibate.¹⁶⁸

China has a wide eugenic campaign aimed at the general public to restrict “imperfect” births. The policies and laws adopted have a strong coercive element to them, which, at its heart, seeks to prevent reproduction by “unfit” people. Twinned with the coercive approach, is a pedagogical one, where young people are educated about the need to have a sense of the reproductive responsibility of every citizen.¹⁶⁹

As Dikötter writes, “in the name of a more eugenic future, conjugal couples are enjoined strictly to monitor their reproductive behaviour and exercise self-discipline before, during, and after conception. The choice of a partner, the age of marriage, the timing of conception and even the quality of the semen are all claimed to influence the health of future offspring

¹⁶⁸ Frank Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions: Medical Knowledge, Birth Defects, and Eugenics in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 1.

¹⁶⁹ Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, p. 1.

significantly.”¹⁷⁰ To promote this, the Chinese control the medical knowledge available to prospective parents. The medical knowledge “dispensed in eugenic campaigns is not designed to enable informed individual choices in reproductive matters, but to instill a moral message of sexual restraint and reproductive duty in the name of collective health.”¹⁷¹ In China, eugenics promotes “a biologising vision of society in which the reproductive rights of individuals are subordinated to the rights of an abstract collectivity.”¹⁷²

Historically, many countries have had eugenics programs—the United States, Sweden, France, India, among many others. These policies were advanced to control people, promoting reproduction by some and restraining the freedoms of others. Eugenics provided scientific authority and a solution to social fears, lent respectability to racial prejudice and class bias, and legitimized sterilization policies. Most importantly, it allowed leaders to portray their societies as an organic body governed by biological laws. In the West, they were ended by the 1960s due to concern over their value and, critically, the violation of individual liberties.

It is straightforward for a racist state like China to maintain eugenicist policies. Appeals to “strengthening the race” and improving the state are

¹⁷⁰ Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, p. 1.

¹⁷¹ Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷² Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, p. 2.

common in the educational system. Powered by the prestige of science, eugenics allows the Chinese government to advance their policies as objective statements grounded in the laws of evolutionary science. It will be shocking for many in the West to learn that eugenicist ideas are medical policy in China. Common justifications are that the disabled will never be able to live and work independently, will provide endless misfortunes for their families, and will increase the burden on society while lowering the quality of population.

In addition, the costs of maintaining congenitally handicapped people are often invoked to justify eugenic policies.¹⁷³ As Chen Muhua, Vice President of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and president of the Women's Federation declared in 1991: "Eugenics not only affects the success of the state and the prosperity of the race, but also the well-being of the people and social stability."¹⁷⁴

Of course, this situation is made worse by China's "One Child" policy, which places a premium on having the child of the parents' dreams. Abortion, infanticide, especially female infanticide, and foreign adoption are solutions to those who do not. While the Party is changing its "One Child" policy over time, so that in 2015, a second child will be allowed, and in 2020,

¹⁷³ Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, pp. 160-162.

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Dikötter, *Imperfect Conceptions*, p. 162.

the family itself may decide its size. By 2026, China will return to population increase policies to offset its aging population, and anticipated negative economic growth due to its declining population.¹⁷⁵

Indeed, as a part of eugenicist policies, historian of China David Mungello notes the two thousand year history of the practice. Its long history, he argues, has several causes, such as a cultural preference for male children, poverty, famine, war, and other natural disasters and was more prevalent in southern than northern provinces.¹⁷⁶

It is a major human rights violation that a one-party, racist state controls the expression of dissenting opinion and limits the ability of the Chinese people to make their own reproductive choices, while actively promoting eugenicist beliefs and policies. In China, there is, frankly, a war against “imperfect births,” and those not deemed worthy of life or of reproducing. Accordingly, it falls to honest observers of China to call attention to these facts.

II. B. Chinese Racism Informs Their View of the United States

The starting point of this discussion is that the United States used to be a strong society that the Chinese respected when it was unicultural, defined by

¹⁷⁵ I am grateful to Professor Huiyun Feng for these insights.

¹⁷⁶ D.E. Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), pp. 134-136.

the centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture at the core of American national identity aligned with the political ideology of liberalism, the rule of law, and free market capitalism. As Samuel Huntington argued, it was the Anglo-Protestant culture that made America “America,” and not a Latin American state. For Huntington, there was a strong, creedal component to American national identity, which defined those who were Americans and those who were not.¹⁷⁷ This Creed originally consisted of common ancestry, language, religion, principles of government, manners and customs, and Revolutionary War experience.¹⁷⁸ Over time, the Creed has changed, common ancestry and war experience became far less important. Yet, the others remained, and, for Huntington, forged a strong national identity that permitted the United States to survive many challenges.

The American Creed allows “Americans to hold that theirs is an ‘exceptional’ country because unlike other nations its identity is defined by principle rather than ascription and, at the same time, to claim that America is a ‘universal’ nation because its principles are applicable to all human societies. The Creed makes it possible to speak of ‘Americanism’ as a political ideology or set of beliefs, comparable to socialism or communism, in a way in

¹⁷⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p 47.

¹⁷⁸ Huntington, *Who Are We?*, p. 60.

which one would never speak of Frenchism, Britishism, or Germanism.”¹⁷⁹ At the same time, it had no attachment to place in the same manner as the French or Japanese do.

The rise of multiculturalism in the United States, and the West more broadly, has destroyed, or “decentered” in the language of the multiculturalists, the American Creed, in favor of an explicitly multiracial, multicultural society that celebrates differences rather than requiring assimilation. Huntington’s American Creed has been replaced by an ideology that rejects its core principles and beliefs in favor of promoting any culture, so long as it is not Western.

From the perspective of the Chinese, it is hard what to make of this. In their view, the United States is explicitly rejecting the principles that made the country great, and united it. It is fair to say that the Chinese have not fully thought through the impact of multiculturalism on the West. According to Sinologist John Copper, the Chinese see multiculturalism as a sickness that has overtaken the United States, and a component of U.S. decline.¹⁸⁰ Their belief is that it is bad for the United States, weakening it at a time when the

¹⁷⁹ Huntington, *Who Are We?*, pp. 47-48.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Professor John Copper, Rhodes College, August 23, 2012.

United States is already weakened due to its alien political ideology and different cultural values, with too strong a focus on individualism.¹⁸¹

From the Chinese viewpoint, all of this conspires to cause the breakdown of American society and the lack of purpose in life for most Americans. Yet, at the same time, they embrace American popular culture. In essence, they think the American people are good but the American government and dominant beliefs are bad. One major implication of this is that the Chinese government may have less of a desire to confront the U.S. due to the expectation that it will collapse of its own internal discord.

II. C. Chinese Racism Informs Their View of International Politics

Third, Chinese racism informs their view of international politics in three major ways. First, as just discussed, it informs their view of what makes a strong state. States are stable, and thus good for the Chinese, to the degree that they are unicultural.

Second, Chinese ethnocentrism and racism drive their outlook to the rest of the world. Their expectation is of a tribute system, just as China practiced diplomacy in the past—famously known to the West as *kowtow* or *koutou* [叩头]—and it is quite clear who was superior and who was inferior.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Professor Eric Hyer, Brigham Young University, September 18, 2012.

Indeed, a rather telling fact is that China never sent any ambassadors; the rest of the world was expected to come to them. The same behavior may be found in modern day China. Mao never visited any country other than the Soviet Union, and he did so only briefly.¹⁸² Moreover, Mao was never cordial to foreigners, especially Africans.

Third, there is a strong, implicit, racist view of international politics that is alien and anathema to Western policy-makers and analysts. The Chinese are comfortable using race to explain events and with appealing to racist stereotypes to advance their interests. It would be unthinkable that a Western political leader such as a foreign minister, could do the same.

This becomes particularly important in the Chinese message to the Third World. The essence of which is, we do not care about your politics and we mind our own business. Of course, they do not, and the Chinese behavior in Africa is often reprehensible. But the Chinese attitude allows them to anticipate a U.S. response. The Chinese will be able to retort: "If the U.S. says the Chinese are racists, do not trust them, they will not treat you as equals." Then, Beijing may reply to Third World states: "Has the United States or the Europeans ever treated you as equals. Unlike the West, we will come to your

¹⁸² Mao was in the Soviet Union from December 1949-February 1950 to meet with Stalin. On this difficult visit, for both Mao and Stalin, see Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Knopf, 2005), pp. 350-355.

country, pay a fair price for your commodities, plus we will build your infrastructure.”

China would say of course we treat you as equals, but fundamentally, as analyzed in Chapter Two, they do not see Africans as equals. Equality is not part of Chinese thinking, to the degree it is, it is associated with Communism, Mao preached equality, which is rejected by the Chinese historically as well as today. The Chinese would contend that the international system is not based on equality but on power. The conception of equality and the need to treat a citizenry as equal, despite differences in ability, is Western and absent from Asian political thought.

II. D. Chinese Appeals to “Racial Solidarity”

Fourth, and drawing from the points just made, the Chinese will make appeals to Third World states based on “racial solidarity,” that is, the need of non-white peoples to unite against Western imperialism and racism. From the Chinese perspective, whites have exploited Asians since the Portuguese and Dutch arrived in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Again, from their point of view, non-whites have a natural affinity or bond with each other as victims of white racism. This claim is often made in the context of Sino-Afro relations, where the Chinese have used appeals based on victimhood to advance their interests.

The history of the Cold War is ripe with efforts by the Chinese to cast or define themselves as separate from the West and from the Soviet Union. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred during the height of the Sino-Soviet split, and the Chinese wasted no time lambasting the Soviets for their behavior during the crisis and their negotiated compromise that brought the Crisis to its end. Most importantly, the Chinese made entreaties to the Cubans at this time, some of which were based on racist appeals. Reflecting on China's actions during the Crisis, Nikita Khrushchev recounted in his memoirs: "The Chinese were making a lot of noise publicly, as well as buzzing in Castro's ear 'Just remember, you can't trust the imperialists to keep any promises they make!' In other words the Chinese exploited the episode to discredit us in the eyes of the Cubans."¹⁸³

Racial solidarity claims are easy for the Chinese to accomplish since they can easily make racist claims. They can frame international politics in terms of a "racial balance of power," and cast appeals to the Third World along the line of: now is the time for non-whites to dominate international politics. Such pleas immediately bring to mind the propaganda of the Japanese "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" during Tokyo's invasion of China, and later in World War II, where the slogan "Asia for the Asians,"

¹⁸³ Edward Crankshaw and Strobe Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 504.

was a popular and attractive message. As is increasingly demonstrated, these entreaties meet with only mixed success at best due to consistent and immutable Chinese racism, and a condescending attitude toward Africans in the belief that Africans need Chinese leadership.

However, the West should not underestimate how appealing this message will be to many in the Third World. There will always be a significant part of the world's population that is resentful of the West for its freedoms, equality, lifestyle, and philosophy. The popularity of Osama bin Laden tee shirts and memorabilia throughout the Third World, including non-Islamic states, is a testament to that desire. The United States should fully anticipate that as Chinese power grows, so too will its status and attractiveness as an icon and as a mechanism of soft power.

II. E. Chinese Racism Retards their Relations with the Third World

Fifth, Chinese racism makes it difficult for China to advance a positive message in the Third World, especially Africa, but also in Latin America and the Middle East. As demonstrated in this study, the Chinese have a hierarchy of looking at other groups—darker skin is lower class, race matters, and they racially stereotype Africans as backward, dirty, and prone to crime, particularly violent crime. Johnson captures this succinctly: “The Chinese are clear that Africans and African-Americans are not very desirable as a

people and they will be grudgingly tolerated in Chinese society. It is not an exaggeration to state that most Chinese would rather all Blacks return home to Africa even if they are not Africans.”¹⁸⁴

Within China, there is widespread racism. Clashes between African students and Chinese occur with regularity. Johnson has followed this issue closely and notes that from the 1960s, when Africans began studying in China, there were complaints that “racism in the Chinas was prevalent, unchecked and widespread in Chinese society. These complaints by African students ranged from impolite and racist statements by Chinese citizens to threats, intimidation and actual physical assaults.”¹⁸⁵ There were major riots by African students at Chinese universities in 1962, 1979, 1980, 1986, 1988, and 1989. Although the causes of the incidents are hard to discern, they seem to involve relationships between African students and Chinese women.¹⁸⁶

Chinese businessmen take their racist attitudes to Africa. There are many accounts now of the explicit racism of Chinese managers working in Africa. The totality of these anecdotes combine to present the Chinese with a difficult problem; they want to appeal to the Third World on a racial basis,

¹⁸⁴ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 131.

¹⁸⁵ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 27.

¹⁸⁶ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, pp. 27-36.

while at the same time their racism too often defeats what otherwise might be an attractive message. As a result of the experience of dealing with the Chinese, China's appeals fall on deaf ears.

Chinese racism will undermine their message. Worldwide, the Chinese are clannish, with numerous Chinatowns in most major cities. The Chinese network in business with other Chinese. Accordingly, the Chinese will be successful in Africa due to their business skills and their networks, which contributes to great success as well as resentment towards such success, as can be seen in the spike in violence directed against the Chinese in Africa.

The fundamental fact causing China's problems in Africa is that the Party is very good at promoting economic growth. If the economy declines, it will affect the Party's legitimacy. Therefore, unemployment is a central concern of the Party—and with good reason since there are 25 million new people for which to find jobs every year—and so the economy must support employment. To safeguard against unemployment, and in a classic case of imperialism straight out of Vladimir Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, the Chinese are dumping goods into Africa and undermining African businesses. The consequences for Africa are considerable.

China's approach often meets resistance due to its own ham-fisted and too naked grab for the resources it needs at the cost of local communities. China is increasingly seen as a "New Colonialist" by Africans, with accusations of neo-colonialism bouncing around internet message boards. Large numbers of Chinese are settling in Africa where, typically, they employ other Chinese and not Africans, purchase raw material for processing elsewhere, and sell to foreign markets, in the classic fashion of European imperialism that occurred over a century ago.

In Africa, the Chinese have been difficult trading partners. Local traders are angry about the influx and business practices of small-scale Chinese traders in Nairobi, Kenya, and have circulated anti-Chinese leaflets as well as staging a street protest. As one article in the Kenyan *Daily Nation* makes clear.¹⁸⁷ "As you read this, Chinese archaeologists are digging up Malindi, where they hope to unearth evidence of their presence in the East African coast dating way back to the Ming Dynasty, when Chinese admiral Zheng He is said to have rounded the coast of Somalia and sailed down to the Mozambique Channel. The Ming Dynasty was in power from 1368 to 1644....Well, centuries after the Ming Dynasty, when sailors blazed the trail,

¹⁸⁷ Mwaura Samora, "Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?" *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012, available at: <http://www.nation.co.ke/Features/DN2/Enter+the+dragon/-/957860/1483234/-/ejcb57/-/index.html>

Chinese corporations are here, almost ubiquitously, building roads and skyscrapers. And with them have come small-scale traders... and a source of friction.”¹⁸⁸

The news story continues: “They are a crafty lot,” said a Luthuli Avenue-based generator and public address system dealer who identified himself as Karis, of the Chinese.¹⁸⁹ The Chinese come “disguised as customers and ask for our prices, only to go back to their country and bring to the market the same products at a much lower price.”¹⁹⁰ According to Karis, the Chinese employ Kenyan salesmen only to offload them after building a client base and learning local business dynamics. Another said: “Most don’t pay rent or city council levies. They are eating into our client base.”¹⁹¹ Protesters said that “Kenya’s government should enforce taxes on Chinese imports and traders and conduct studies on why they can sell goods cheaper than local traders. A statement from China’s embassy in Nairobi noted its efforts to educate Chinese companies and citizens in Kenya to operate businesses within the law and live together in harmony with the

¹⁸⁸ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁸⁹ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁹⁰ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁹¹ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

local people.”¹⁹² It expressed concern over leaflets that “threaten both the Chinese business people in Kenya and the Kenyan people.”¹⁹³

But Nairobi is not the only African city swarming with the enterprising merchants from the Far East. Small-scale traders in Dakar, Lusaka, Luanda, Maputo and many others are contending with the entry of the dragon. To protect local vendors, the government of Malawi passed a law last month that restricts all foreign traders to the country’s four major cities (Lilongwe, Blantyre, Mzuzu and Zomba), in addition to having to deposit \$250,000 in the country’s central bank, which they must invest in the country. “The new law clearly outlines what kind of businesses foreign investors will be allowed to get involved in.”¹⁹⁴ The *Inter Press Agency* quoted Malawi’s Minister of Trade, John Bande, as saying: “We will not accept foreigners to come all the way from China and open small businesses and shops in the rural areas of this country and compete with local traders.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁹³ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁹⁴ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁹⁵ Samora, “Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?” *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

Last year, *Chinese Fuel Resurgence in Ivory Poaching*, a documentary by Kenya's *A24 Media*, claimed that 50 percent of poaching incidents in Kenya today happen within a 20-mile radius from Chinese road-building projects. The documentary also alleged that major poaching activities were reported in areas where the Chinese were grading or constructing roads, like Tsavo and Amboseli. "I think there is a link between the number of Chinese who have come into Africa recently and elephant ivory purchasing," explained Dr. Esmond Bradley-Martin, a conservationist interviewed in the documentary.¹⁹⁶ "For instance, in about 2000/2001, there was something like 75,000 Chinese working in Africa, now the figure is well over 500,000 and the Chinese are being caught all over Africa... in Kenya they have been caught with ivory coming in from Congo and Cameroon," he said.¹⁹⁷

Another point of tension for Africans is the poor quality of Chinese goods, and the suspicion that the Chinese dump these goods in Africa. This has led to a backlash for those seeking value. According to Abdou Diallo, a Senegalese businessman based in Istanbul, "we have begun to distinguish

¹⁹⁶ Samora, "Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?" *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012.

¹⁹⁷ Samora, "Who Is the Bull in a China Shop?" *Daily Nation*, September 10, 2012. On the impact of cheap Chinese goods, Ian Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 63-88. Also see Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2007).

Turkish goods from Chinese products due to their quality. Turkish goods mean European quality at a cheaper price.”¹⁹⁸

Energy resources are the major economic reason for China’s expanding presence in Africa. Although about one third of China’s oil imports come from Angola, Sudan, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Nigeria, making China the third largest trading partner of Africa, after the United States and France, many of China’s actions raise suspicions among Africans that Beijing’s approach to the continent is guided only by a concept of expedient looting of resources, in service of which any regime or politician, however loathsome, will be supported or dropped abruptly if circumstances change. This increasingly widespread conviction is making Africans into something far different from the rather eager, ideologically committed, and politically compliant partners of the 1960s. At the same time, the Chinese approach to Africa is undermining its often-reiterated positions of non-interference in foreign states, equality, respect, and so on, not only in Africa, but worldwide, where Beijing is increasingly seen as an unscrupulous player.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Quoted in Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa*, p. 111.

¹⁹⁹ Waldron, “Foreword,” in Waldron, ed., *China in Africa*, p. 6. See also Fantu Cheru and Magnus Calais, “Countering ‘New Imperialisms:’ What Role for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” in Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, eds., *The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and*

The impact of energy resources and prices may make it difficult for China to follow the same path to development, propelled by cheap energy, that lifted the states of Europe and North America. This profound fact is inescapable no matter how much oil the Chinese acquire in Latin America or Africa. Moreover, the oil that China imports contains considerable risk. Oil is transported around the world in a fleet of about 4,000 tankers, many of which serve the needs of other consumers. That procession could easily be closed by attack or blockade of the sources, such as with Saudi Arabia. To the west, in the Red Sea, is a single set of Saudi loading facilities, but the Red Sea, too, is easily blocked. China is building oil facilities in Sudan on the Red Sea, but a serious adversary could sabotage this connection with little difficulty.

In addition, the path to China is an obstacle course of maritime choke points. The entrance to the Straits of Malacca is controlled by the Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands and runs between Malaysia and Indonesia, both Muslim countries deeply suspicious of their Chinese minorities. At the Philip Channel, the easternmost part of the Strait passing Singapore, through which north bound ships must pass, the waterway is a bit more than a mile wide in places, and piracy is rampant. Given these obstacles, it may be questionable whether dependence on significant petroleum imports is viable

for China. More importantly, for the United States, it is a weapon Washington may use against China for the purposes of coercion.

Chinese business practices are a little different in Latin America.

Chinese companies are looking to increase their investments in Latin America and expand beyond the focus on mining and resources, which will help China avoid resistance to its further expansion. In Africa especially, China has been criticized for channeling much of its investment into natural-resource extraction, for importing Chinese labor on infrastructure construction projects, and for swamping local markets with cheap goods. The concern now is that a similar pattern could emerge in Latin America. China pushes for “what it wants but Latin America doesn't think the same,” said Wu Guoping, assistant director of the Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, at a September 2012 conference on Chinese investment in Latin America.²⁰⁰ Warning that trade and investment between China and Latin America was not “complementary” and

²⁰⁰ Colum Murphy, “China Steps Up Push Into Latin America,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 2012, available at: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443696604577647102203290514.html>.

entailed risks, he added, “China has to look for a new strategy for Latin America.”²⁰¹

Chinese foreign investment in Latin America surged to \$10.54 billion in 2010, the most recent figure available, from \$7.33 billion in 2009. That investment, plus increasingly active lending in the region, has given China greater sway in an area long considered a bulwark of U.S. influence. However, China is looking for new markets to manufacture and sell more sophisticated products such as cars and power-generation equipment. It could also help avoid tensions such as those with African countries—a subject of discussion during a visit by African leaders to Beijing in July 2012. During a trip to Latin America in June, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a \$5 billion cooperation fund for infrastructure investment and a \$10 billion credit line to support the construction and infrastructure industries in the region.

Nonetheless, not everyone embraces investment by Chinese companies in the area. Argentina and Brazil have prohibited land sales to the Chinese, leading the way for other Latin American states. Brazilian manufacturers are especially concerned by the prospect of a more active China in the region. The Brazilian government has become aware that China

²⁰¹ Murphy, “China Steps Up Push Into Latin America,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 2012.

is enriching raw materials exporters, while weakening its industry. The result has been a call for tariff barriers against the Chinese.²⁰² According to June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science at the University of Miami: “Chinese-made shoes are cutting into the shoe industry there and Chinese cars have the potential to bankrupt locally made ones,” she said. “Still, it’s a matter of whose ox is being gored. Many sellers of raw materials are very happy to have the Chinese market.”²⁰³

II. F. Chinese Racism Contributes to their Overconfidence

Sixth, racism, and the degree to which the Chinese permit their view of the United States to be informed by racism, has the potential to hinder China in its competition with Washington because it contributes to their overconfidence. This overconfidence is a result of ethnocentrism and a sense of superiority rooted in racism. The Chinese commonly believe that they are cleverer than others, and so may shape events in an oblique manner or through *shi* [勢], strategic manipulation of events.

The correct understanding of *shi* in Chinese strategic thought allows us to understand Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character instruction to Chinese

²⁰² Murphy, “China Steps Up Push Into Latin America,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 2012.

²⁰³ Murphy, “China Steps Up Push Into Latin America,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 2012.

officials as an archetype: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs; hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”²⁰⁴ The strategic objective of dominance is firm and unalterable but packaged in such a manner to provoke the least resistance or effective counter-balancing coalition.

Understanding *shi* allows analysts, first, to understand why the Chinese place great weight on intelligence gathering, with one of the fundamental strategic goals of intelligence operations is being able to identify and shape events before they become sources of confrontation or contention. With this strategy, the adversary can do nothing about the situation when he is confronted with it. Not only will the battle be won before it is fought, if the Chinese have done their homework, there will not be a battle in the first place. The Chinese seek to win without confrontation. They rather seek to win by placing the opponent in such a position that he withdraws or retreats of his own accord.

Second, *shi* provides the Chinese with both a grounding for their policies and a flexibility for them. One core interest exists and it is one that does not permit flexibility in intent: to advance China’s fundamental interest of dominance. Once we move beyond China’s core interest, we understand

²⁰⁴ Deng’s 24-character instruction is quoted in Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 438.

that everything else is flexible. The Chinese will change their policies as events develop. The implication of this is that China's policies will be hard to predict, and may border on what seems to be impulsive, such as the dramatic intervention in the Korean War.

Third, *shi* allows us to understand how the Chinese will work to undermine their adversaries in the expectation that they will be able to defeat their adversaries without direct confrontation but rather to bring about their collapse from present conditions. Importantly, however, if conflict does occur, the Chinese will seek to defeat their adversaries at the beginning of the conflict with asymmetric strategies and with surprise attacks. As Henry Kissinger writes:

the strategist mastering *shi* is akin to water flowing downhill, automatically finding the right swiftest and easiest course. A successful commander waits before charging headlong into battle. He shies away from an enemy's strength; he spends his time observing and cultivating changes in the strategic landscape. He studies the enemy's preparations and his morale, husband's resources and defines them carefully, and plays on his opponent's psychological weaknesses—until at last he perceives the opportune moment to strike the enemy at the weakest point. He then deploys his resources swiftly and suddenly, rushing “downhill” along the path of least resistance, in an assertion of superiority that careful timing and preparation have rendered a *fait accompli*.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Kissinger, *On China*, p. 30.

Discerning *shi* properly allows U.S. policymakers to grasp why the Chinese will place great emphasis on a bold, strategically clever attack. For the Chinese, *shi* in this context may be thought of as a “stratagem” intended to be a masterstroke, not just solid but brilliant. It should be thought of as a strategy of strategic cleverness.²⁰⁶

In the Chinese strategic tradition, the greatest hero is Zhuge Liang of the Three Kingdoms, a leader best known for his ingenious and deceptive stratagems. Without question, Chinese science and technology have advanced, and this has emboldened the already powerful cultural conviction that China can get much more with less because it is cleverer and better than its adversaries, not only intellectually but also materially.

In its military operations, China will seek to combine local superiority with diplomatic advantage and operational surprise. China will seek to use force decisively, taking maximum advantage of its relative superiorities to create new realities. The Chinese will ruthlessly exploit the openness of democratic societies. The expectation will be that, faced with a rapid, decisive, and quickly terminated operation, the United States and its allies will be unable to do anything effectively and, as a result, will accept the new status quo.

²⁰⁶ Waldron, “The Art of *Shi*,” p. 39.

Such a conception is extremely dangerous, and many conflicts in history have been based on such profoundly misguided beliefs, as with the Japanese decision to attack Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States in December 1941. The likelihood that the Chinese are guided along a similar path by their strategic worldview is high. The Chinese have the conviction that they possess superior strategic knowledge and ability, and that China will always be able to outfox and outmaneuver its strategic foes. Likewise, they have the belief that strategic deception plays a key role in their superior strategic abilities. In their self-image, the Han are more cunning and virtuous than the rest. The United States, in contrast, is easily manipulated, although strong and violent, just like an adolescent.

But such an approach seriously underestimates the ability of the United States and other states to identify and respond. The conceit among the Chinese that they can manipulate others is supremely dangerous for the stability of Asia.

At the same time, it is a great advantage for the United States to play upon that overconfidence. To understand that an overconfident China will continue to make the mistakes it already has in the South China or East China Sea disputes. That is, making threats, issuing demands, heavy-handed shows of force, are generated by China's overconfidence. That makes it much easier

for the United States to balance China, as I will argue in Chapter Four.

II. G. Racism Is Also a Strategic Asset that Makes China a Formidable Adversary

As lamentable as it is, Chinese racism also is a strategic asset that makes a formidable adversary. Throughout history states have made appeals based on racism and ethnocentrism for purposes of unity, identity, sense of self and identification, and popular support. This is not social imperialism, generating an enemy due to overcoming social or class divisions within a state, as was the case in Wilhelmine Germany. Instead, this is the interaction between the Chinese government and its people. The government educates the people to be proud of being Han and of China. In turn, the Chinese people are proud and fiercely patriotic as well as ethnocentric, racist, and xenophobic. This aids the government and permits them to maintain high levels of popular support. Yet, the situation runs very deep; the government may change, but popular sentiments will not because they are anchored in fundamental Chinese identity, which is not questioned within the society.

There are three critical consequences that result from this. The first is the sense of unity the Chinese possess. This unity provides three major advantages for them. First, it allows the Chinese to have a sense of belonging together. As argued in Chapter One, a fundamental human need is to know where one stands in a community, to which groups one belongs and does not

belong. Chinese ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and racist views of others, answer those questions wholly and satisfactorily for the majority of the people. Despite their differences, they are one, and are told so, generation after generation, by their family, culture, history, and government.

Second, it allows the Chinese to have a strong sense of identity, which in turn permits them to weather adversity, secure and confident that the rest of the nation is with them. Knowing that one is not alone, but is backed by a over a billion others who share the same thoughts, cultural references, and attitudes is reassuring for each Han Chinese. In truth, they are a society with considerable social capital that Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam identifies as central to the prosperity of a community.²⁰⁷ It makes it far more likely that they will respond to government entreaties to support the nation as it advances or when it is challenged by domestic social or economic problems or by other states. Huntington identified the importance of this, and lamented its loss in the United States.

Third, China is not plagued by self-doubt or guilt about its past. It does not revel in its defeats; instead it recasts them in a patriotic light, as with the 1979 invasion of Vietnam, or abuses of its minorities. To the

²⁰⁷ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); and Putnam, Lewis Feldstein, and Donald J. Cohen, *Better Together: Restoring the American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

contrary, China's victories are lauded, and a self-congratulatory message and image is portrayed. China does not face a "culture war" like the one currently taking place in the United States. There is no fundamental debate about the identity of the country, the principles it embodies, who belongs and who does not, and the direction in which the country should move. This gives the Chinese government a considerable advantage as a unicultural state in competition with the multicultural United States. In sum, it will be hard to cause a loss of confidence with the Chinese.

No doubt, this situation contains disadvantages for the Chinese. The lack of doubt or willingness to question makes them a society that is neither self-reflective nor tolerant, and those are vulnerabilities that may be exploited, as we will see in the next chapter. Yet, these may be exploited only to a degree, and should the U.S. call attention to them, any countervailing message will be more effectively targeted against international audiences than the Chinese themselves.

II. H. The Chinese Are Not Open to a Civil Rights Movement

The next major consequence is that the Chinese are never going to go through a civil rights movement like the one that occurred in the United States. This is because, first, they have no freedom of the press, freedom to petition their government, and freedom to assemble, all of which are

necessary to support a civil rights movement. Second, there is no political drive or consciousness for equality in Chinese thought. As discussed above, equality is associated with Maoism, and rejected in today's China, where inequality is accepted and celebrated. In addition, there is no notion of civil rights in Chinese political thought or, practically, in jurisprudence.

These elements unite to force the conclusion that there is little likelihood that the Chinese attitudes to race and endemic racism will change. There is no force from below, no popular movement demanding minority rights, to compel them to do so. Equally, there is no motivation to force such a change from above.

This is contrast to the more dynamic and responsive societies of the West. The political systems of the West are open to profound change, and have demonstrated the ability to make significant reforms in civil and human rights over generational time. There is ample proof of the West's more adaptive and inclusive political system. The United States removed the principal obstacles to equality for blacks and other racial minorities with *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954, and the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. The Immigration Act of 1965 opened the possibility of immigration to the United States for people previously excluded because of race. The United States government has labored mightily to improve the

condition of all minorities within its borders through official policies backed by cultural and other measures, such as the influence of Hollywood and popular culture.

While China remains a racist state and has made no effort to be as inclusive as the West, it is important to recognize that the Chinese government is adaptive. As James Reilly argues forcefully, China is a robust and flexible regime that has adapted to rapid growth with remarkable speed and effectiveness.²⁰⁸ Reilly's study of public opinion's influence on Beijing's foreign policy reveals that the government adapts to public opinion as well as shapes it. In essence, the Party uses persuasion to maintain its rule. Reilly submits that the Party combines tolerance and responsiveness with persuasion and repression. This "responsive authoritarianism" accounts for why the Chinese Communist Party has thrived since the end of the Cold War. At root, the Chinese government has developed a mechanism for tolerating and responding to sporadic instances of public emotion while maintaining its overall foreign policy trajectory.

This allows us to account for the Party's intermittent tolerance of popular protests and responsiveness to popular pressures, as well as its subsequent crackdowns and policy reversals. It also accounts for the

²⁰⁸ James Reilly, *Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

considerable consistency in Beijing's relationships with foreign governments. There were major protests against Indonesia in 1998, the United States in 1999, Japan in 2010 and 2012. Following each instance, Chinese leaders moved quickly to mitigate the damage to bilateral relations, offering reassurances and working to stabilize bilateral ties. Instead of acceding to popular nationalist pressures for a more aggressive foreign policy, Chinese policy makers have developed an effect strategy for responding to sporadic outbursts of popular anger on foreign policy. By making partial policy shifts or rhetorical gestures in the directions demanded by the public, Chinese leaders enable the release of public anger and demonstrate a modicum of responsiveness to public opinion. Such shifts are generally part of a broader strategy of readjusting their overall foreign policy toward an approach that cools public anger, redirects the public's attention, and mitigates any diplomatic fallout resulting from following too closely the dictates of an emotional public.

By combining a diplomatic strategy designed to reshape the external environment with its considerable propaganda power to refocus attention, limit the flow of information, and project selective images to large segments of the public, the Party manages to end public mobilization without irreparable harm to foreign relations and without leaving behind a mass of

dissatisfied, frustrated citizens. Simply put, the rise of popular nationalism in reform-era China has not correlated with a rise in military aggression. One reason why this is the case is that, while China is authoritarian, its authoritarianism is based on Party rule, not military rule.

Party-based regimes are able to avoid falling into foreign aggression as easily is there ability to tolerate and respond to public anger in selective fashion. It is the *combination* of toleration and repression that enables Chinese leaders to avoid ruin. The repeated eruption and temporary influence of popular protests in China in response to perceived slights to national pride signal not the emergence of an uncontrollable populace, but rather the manifestation of policy-makers' strategic and nuanced response to social pressures.

In a thoughtful study, Xi Chen makes a related argument.²⁰⁹ China is an example of a rare phenomenon. It is a strong authoritarian regime that has accommodated or facilitated widespread and routinized popular collective action for a relatively long period of time. China has witnessed a dramatic change in government-citizen interaction in the Reform Era, with a great upsurge in collective protests since the early 1990s. For Chen, this is

²⁰⁹ Xi Chen, *Social Protests and Contentious Authoritarianism in China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

due to the transition to a market economy.²¹⁰ This relaxed the degree to which popular dissention would be permitted. Second, extensive economic transitions have engendered many sufferings and grievances among large sections of the population. Third, the way ordinary people connect to the Party and government changed radically in the Reform Era. With the abolition of collectivization in the countryside and the substantial decline of work units in urban areas, ordinary people have largely parted with the unit system of local control. According to Chen, “they have lost most of the benefits and security associated with the old system, but they have also been freed from,” their dependence on local agents, which pushes them toward protest as a mechanism of influence.²¹¹

United States decision-makers should recognize that China is quickly joining the rest of the world, but the terms on which China is integrating are unique, never before witnessed in history. If China is true to its history, it is very likely to remain aloof, ensconced in a hierarchical view of humanity, its sense of superiority resting on a combination of cultural hubris and racism. The implications for the rest of the world of this Sinocentric worldview are profound.

²¹⁰ Chen, *Social Protests and Contentious Authoritarianism in China*, p. 191.

²¹¹ Chen, *Social Protests and Contentious Authoritarianism in China*, p. 191.

I. I. The Treatment of Christians and Ethnic Minorities Within China

The study now addresses the treatment of Christians and ethnic minorities within China. Chinese racism has less of an impact on Christianity, particularly because the Catholic Church and Protestant dominations have been Sinified. Discrimination against ethnic minorities is considerable and will remain so.

Religious life in China has recovered from its suppression during the Maoist years. There are only five recognized religions in China: Buddhism, Islam, Daoism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. China's Christian tradition dates from the early 1500s. The Portuguese and Dutch were the first to bring Christianity, and Christian missionary zeal reached its peak in the early part of the 20th Century.

The relationship between Christianity and China is complicated with many reverses and considerable tension. As historian of China, and of the Christian presence in China, David Mungello argues, the Christians, especially the Jesuit Order, were first welcomed into China and successful in converting prominent scholar-officials. "This success came through the conscious blending of Confucianism with Christianity while criticizing Buddhism and Daoism."²¹² As Christian Orders proliferated, and more of the elite and lower

²¹² Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800*, p. 21.

classes were converted, the Court's attitude began to change, and elements of Christian proselytizing were prohibited.

As a response, the Franciscans and Church lay groups began meeting in secret, which was unfortunate given the Court's suspicion of secret societies, which have a two-thousand-year history in China. In the consideration of the Court, they are linked to peasant uprisings, for which the societies provide organization around an ideology. The uprisings are nearly always aimed at the scholar-gentry class, who were viewed by the peasants as their oppressors because they controlled the land and bureaucracy. Because of this hostility, the scholar-officials viewed secret societies with suspicion and enmity. "Like the secret societies, Christianity was often accused by the literati of subversive practices, such as prohibiting ancestor worship, meeting in small groups, using magical techniques to control followers, deceiving the people, and failing to observe customary distinctions of age and sex."²¹³

Anti-Christian sentiment gradually began to grow, especially after the Manchu conquest of 1644, and as Mungello submits, Chinese ethnocentrism,

²¹³ Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800*, p. 27.

chauvinism, and xenophobia became worse and Christianity was suppressed, although never eliminated.²¹⁴

More recently, Christianity and nationalism in modern Chinese history is equally difficult. At the peak of nationalist agitation in the mid-1920s, many radical Chinese began to believe that Christianity was a tool of Western imperialism and that it was a narrow and intolerant faith. This was part of a larger reaction to religion; modern men did not need such superstitions. At the same time others saw Christianity as part of China's rebirth: Why should the religion not serve the same purpose in China as it had in the West, where it had given meaning to unsettled lives, and steadiness through uncertain times, for almost two thousand years? For China's Christians it was not difficult to see themselves as part of their country's salvation, in both a religious and secular sense, even if their opponents objected to it.

Today, the government recognizes that religion is able to do many positive acts in a society, such as support for orphanages, and acknowledges the need for people to have a religious grounding since a moral framework may be lost in the demands of a market economy. The debate now is an echo

²¹⁴ Mugello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800*, pp. 33-36, 53-65.

of the one they had in the 1800s, how do they preserve the essence of what is Chinese in an era dominated by Western ideas.

The government is fearful of religion in the sense that uncontrolled religion may be a threat: a challenge to Beijing's authority. The government has considerable fear about cults, and the contagion of foreign ideas, especially following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.²¹⁵ So, in order to be recognized, religions in China must be autonomous as interpreted by the government. That is, autonomy is defined as having no foreign missions; no foreign subsidy; and no interference from foreign ecclesiastics.²¹⁶ Because of this, Beijing favors evangelical sects, as Guy Sorman writes: "The truth is that Protestants outnumber Catholics ten to one. But the Party finds it easier to deal with scattered evangelical groups than with an organized Catholic Church that receives its orders from outside. Between the Vatican and Yankee Protestantism, the Communist Party prefers the Americans."²¹⁷

The result is a state church *and* an underground church in China. According to Mungello, the best thing that happened to Christianity in China

²¹⁵ On the last example, see M.E. Sarotte, "China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example," *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Fall 2012), pp. 156-182.

²¹⁶ Guy Sorman, *The Empire of Lies: The Truth about China in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Encounter Books, 2008), p. 52.

²¹⁷ Sorman, p. 71.

is that Mao expelled the missionaries.²¹⁸ This forced the churches to become fully Chinese. Contrary to what was often argued, "Christianity (along with Confucianism) had not died out in Communist China, but had gone underground. When it began to re-emerge in the 1980s, it was far more Sinified than when it had been dominated by Western missionaries and mission broads prior to 1951."²¹⁹ During the intervening years, it had deepened its roots in Chinese culture. Now, to the degree that there is tension, it is Chinese Christian versus Chinese non-Christian, which is very different than foreign missionary versus Chinese.

It must be noted in this discussion of China's treatment of Christian and ethnic minorities that there is significant discrimination against villagers. One-third of Shanghai's 17 million inhabitants are migrants, yet it is virtually impossible for them to become citizens with their identity cards, which in principle gives them access to public services. In Shanghai, as in all other Chinese cities, there is a sort of local nationality by blood. The municipality decided to issue local identity cards on the basis of marriage, but the conditions are very restrictive. A non-Shanghai woman married to a Shanghai man can get nationality after fifteen years of her marriage, which

²¹⁸ D.E. Mungello, "Reinterpreting the History of Christianity in China," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2012), pp. 533-552.

²¹⁹ Mungello, "Reinterpreting the History of Christianity in China," p. 538.

means the couple's children will automatically become citizens of Shanghai, as nationality is handed down by the mother....a man from Shanghai would have to be "very poor or handicapped" to marry a "foreigner." What happens if a non-Shanghai man marries a Shanghai woman?...The law has not provided for such an eventuality...because it was unthinkable that a Shanghai woman would marry an "outsider."²²⁰

When we consider China's treatment of its indigenous ethnic minorities, we begin with the recognition that there are 56 different minorities in China. But in daily life most Chinese do not come into contact with minorities since they are on the periphery, both literally and metaphorically. Nonetheless, for the Chinese, there is a clear hierarchy among them. One exception to the usually negative perception of minorities is the Manchurians, whom the Chinese commonly see as physically attractive, and are considered to be different and nobler than other minorities.

The two most important minority groups are Uighurs and the Tibetans, and it is to the discussion of each that the study now turns. Broadly, the relationship between the Han Chinese and these minorities are very bad.²²¹ The Han resent the affirmative action policies in support of the

²²⁰ Sorman, p. 87.

²²¹ Jacques provides a nice overview of the discrimination against Uighurs and Tibetans in *When China Rules the World*, pp. 244-256.

Uighurs or Tibetans, their lack of gratitude for what China has provided, and what is seen as their rebellious nature. For the minorities, directly put, they see the Han as occupiers of their ancestral lands, abusive and contemptuous toward them, and bent on extermination of their way of life and national identities, while the rest of world tacitly accepts it.

1.1.1 China's "Wild West": The Uighurs in Xinjiang

Ethnic tensions between the Han and Uighurs in China remain high. Animosity between Han and Uighurs came to a head in July 2009 when over 200 people were confirmed killed during rioting, principally in Urumqi. The grievances of the Uighur population of Xinjiang have been exacerbated by mass immigration from other parts of China, which is part of Beijing's Sinification campaign to turn the majority Uighur population into a minority in Xinjiang by resettling Han Chinese. The Uighurs are a Muslim Turkic people, whose language and culture overlaps to a significant degree with the Turkish or Central Asian Turkic peoples.

The opinions of both the Uighurs and Han of the other group are stark and contribute to the ethnic conflict. The Uighurs commonly portray the Han as an invading force that is dispossessing and oppressing their culture, while the Han typically consider Uighurs to be lazy and are resentful that the large investment China is pouring into the region is ungratefully received. Groups

of Uighur rampaged through the city after stories circulated of migrant Uighur workers in China's southern Guangdong province facing abuse from local Han.²²² The problem was so acute that President Hu Jintao had to leave the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, in order to manage the situation.

The 2009 events served as a watershed for Beijing's strategy for the province, and a series of changes were rapidly made to party leadership. Urumqi Party Secretary Li Zhi and Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (PSB) head Liu Yaohau were held responsible for the Urumqi police's slow response to the riot, and were sacked in September 2009.

Later, in April 2010, Wang was moved to the nominally more senior position of deputy secretary of the political and legislative affairs committee in Beijing. Zhang Chunxian, formerly party secretary of Hunan province, was appointed to replace him, with the state media calling attention to his efforts to develop the province and his open approach to the media.

Zhang's theme was further developed in May 2010 when the Communist Party held a Xinjiang Work Conference that built on Hu's statement in the wake of the riots that "the fundamental way to resolve the

²²² The immediate cause of the riot according to "Wild West: Ethnic Tensions Remain High China's Xinjiang," *HIS Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 24, No. 8 (August 2012), pp. 14-17.

Xinjiang problem is to expedite development in Xinjiang.”²²³ Following the conference, a number of new policies were announced, including the pairing of 19 of China’s wealthier provinces or cities with locales in Xinjiang. In addition to sending between 0.3% and 0.6% of their annual budget as aid, the wealthier provinces were made responsible for providing technical support, including posting staff to Xinjiang. Additionally, Beijing increased its budget spent on the region and ordered the large natural resource companies that mine the hydrocarbon wealth to leave 5% of the taxes in the province. Finally, three special economic zones were established in Kashgar, Khorogos, and Alataw—the later two bordering Kazakhstan—in an effort to replicate the success of previous Special Economic Zones, such as in Shenzhen.

This modernization comes at a cost, and maybe designed to further destroy Uighur culture under the guise of development. Kashgar’s transformation into a Special Economic Zone entailed the demolition of the historic old city. This was done under the auspices of making it earthquake-proof and to improve access to public services. Uighurs interpreted it as further destruction of their cultural heritage and part of Beijing’s effort to erode gradually the historical memory and cultural identity of the Uighur people.

²²³ Quoted in “Wild West,” *IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review*, p. 15.

There has been a noticeable increase in violence in the province, particularly in the south, where Uighurs remain a majority of the population. In June 2012, the government closed down a madrassah, which it accused of being illegal. Almost a year before, in July 2011, a group of Uighurs stormed a police station in Hotan, a city south of Kashgar, having earlier attacked a nearby tax office. According to officials in Beijing, during the assault, the men raised a flag proclaiming: "Allah is the only God. In the name of Allah." This is consistent with local reports that blamed the attack as a response to the crackdown on the use of the hijab and niqab by Uighur women.

A week later, in early August, local media reported that trouble flared in Kashgar when one, or possibly two, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) misfired in public spaces around the city before men armed with knives hijacked a vehicle and drove it into a crowd, killing eight and injuring 27. A similar incident occurred a day later, and was directed at a largely-Han crowd. December 2011 marked another incident in Guma county in the Hotan prefecture; and two months later, on 28 February 2012, another stabbing incident took place, where it seems that 13 Uighur men attacked passersby. Finally, in June 2012, the government raided a religious school in Hotan, which injured several children. Later that month, six Uighur men attempted to hijack a flight leaving from Hotan to call attention to anti-

Uighur discrimination before they were overpowered by the crew and passengers.²²⁴

What is notable about these incidents in Kashgar is that there is evidence some of the militants had trained in Pakistan. Local authorities claimed that a militant detained during the second attack had claimed the leader of his unit had trained in Pakistan. Given the succession of the attacks, it is probable that one group was responsible for both attacks. That suggests both organization and direction, and so aroused China's suspicion that the attacks had a connection to Pakistani trained groups. This was reinforced the following month when the Pakistan-based Uighur jihadist group the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), referred to by the Chinese as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, released a video claiming responsibility for the attacks. According to the video, the TIP had trained Tiliwaldi, one of the two men killed on the outskirts of Kashgar following the second day of attacks, before dispatching him to Xinjiang to carry out the mission. According to *IHS Janes*, the video seemed to show Tiliwaldi wrestling with others in a camp purportedly in Waziristan, part of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.²²⁵

²²⁴ "Fast and Loose," *The Economist*, August 18, 2012, p. 39.

²²⁵ "Wild West," *IHS Jane's Intelligence Review*, p. 16.

While none of the other incidents were claimed by the TIP or any other external group, the Pakistani press reported in the wake of the Kashgar incidents that Hu had called President Asif Zardari of Pakistan to express his concern about extremist activity in Pakistan's lawless territories. This resulted in a rapid press release condemning the attacks by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, while the director general of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Ahmed Shuja Pasha, was sent on a visit to China. Zardari followed suit in September, notably visiting Urumqi in honor of the first Eurasian Expo.

Despite Islamabad's eagerness to please, there are signs that China is increasingly frustrated with Pakistan, blaming it, at least in part, for the repeated incidents in Xinjiang. In the wake of the Yecheng stabbings in February 2012, Chairman Nur Bekri, the most senior Uighur in the Xinjiang government, spoke of the many links between extremists in the province and a "neighboring country," assumed to be Pakistan.

Subsequently, in April, the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing released a wanted notice for six individuals described as having links to "a South Asian" country and being members of "East Turkestan groups," which is the Chinese media's generic name for Uighur separatist groups. Accordingly, China's security forces are clearly focused on the links between

Xinjiang and militants in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the countries of Central Asia. A delegation of senior People's Liberation Army officers were sent to Pakistan in late 2011/early 2012 to attend talks. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how much these incidents can really be blamed on "outside forces," as China's government claims. While there was a clear claim of responsibility from the TIP for the Kashgar attacks, which included the deployment of up to two VBIEDs—something that might have required outside training or assistance—there is no indication that foreign groups or domestic groups outside of China were involved in the attacks.

Instead, most incidents appear to be the result of local grievances that have escalated out of control. Although the repeated tactic of mass stabbings may be more than a coincidence, it is also reasonable to expect that it would be the favored method of attack in a society where access to firearms and explosives is closely controlled.

The fundamental problem remains that over the three years since the 2009 riots, the Uighur situation is not better. The prosperity that was meant to be generated by the 2010 Xinjiang work conference plan has not yet trickled down, with many of the large projects in limbo as the government has difficulty convincing investors that the province is a good investment opportunity.

While the infrastructure in the province has been rapidly and effectively upgraded, making travel around the province easier, and it is clear that the “paired” provinces have spent considerable money in Xinjiang, it is not transparent that it is having the desired effect of reducing discontent there. Social dissatisfaction remains high on all sides. The Uighur complaints are consistent: they see Han overwhelming the province and a lack of opportunities for Uighurs. Uighurs identify government efforts to interfere with religious practices during the Muslim Ramadan holiday. Exiled Uighur activists see it as the continuation of the government’s attempts to replace religion as a centerpiece of Uighur life. According to Alim Seytoff of the Uighur American Association “the whole idea,” behind Beijing’s efforts, “is to secularize the Uighur people.”²²⁶ And one might add, marginalize them in their own province. But the concerns are reciprocal, if not existential for the Han. Common Han remarks are fear of going into Uighur areas due to fears of crime and attack.

The development challenges facing Xinjiang are exacerbating the longstanding ethnic divisions that plague the province. The repeated incidents of low-level violence directed by the Uighurs at the Han may have outside links and be inspired by jihadist beliefs, but, equally, in most cases

²²⁶ Quoted in “Fast and Loose,” *The Economist*, August 18, 2012, p. 39.

they are more likely caused by local explosions of rage, rather than the start of an effective revolutionary movement directed at the government. However, in October 2012, there were reports that Chinese Muslim separatists are fighting in Syria alongside al Qaeda and associated movements, all of which can only be alarming for Beijing.²²⁷

The implications of Uighur oppression for the Pakistani-Chinese relationship is clear from Beijing's perspective. The Chinese have an immediate concern with jihadist militants and their efforts to radicalize the Uighur population, but Beijing is also worried about regional instability, including Afghanistan.

The June 2012 decision to allow Afghanistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an observer state, and the Chinese signing of a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, all show a growing Chinese focus on Afghanistan and its security problems. At the same time, Afghanistan serves as an avenue for Beijing to advance its influence in the region as the United States presence is reduced, and to stay a step ahead of the Russians, who are sure to attempt to reassert their influence with Kabul as NATO's diminishes.

²²⁷ Christopher Bodeen, "Beijing Report Says Chinese Muslims Are in Syria," *Associated Press*, October 29, 2012, available at: <http://ratsass.krvw.com/mailman/private/access/attachments/20121029/53013206/attachment.html>.

While Xinjiang remains China's most pressing internal security issue, Beijing's desire to stabilize its western frontier is prompting a deeper engagement in Central and South Asia. However, more is involved in this situation than Beijing's concern about stability on its borders and security in Xinjiang. First, it must be acknowledged that China has a more offensive goal of balancing or supplanting the presence of the United States and India in these areas, while simultaneously preventing the resurgence of Moscow's influence. When we consider the issue strategically, central and South Asia is the western reciprocal of the territorial disputes and power contest occurring in the South and East China Seas. Second, Beijing's concern for energy compels a major presence in this region.

1.1.2. Continued Unrest in Tibet

As with Xinjiang, Tibet is an Autonomous Region within China with a degree of separatism, although the separatist problem is not as great as in Xinjiang. Since 2009, there have been at least 60 reported incidents of self-immolation in the Tibet Autonomous Region, as well as in Tibetan prefectures in neighboring provinces. The most recent of which, at the time of writing, were two young Tibetans both of whom immolated themselves to death in

October 2012, the first outside a police station in Amchok, and the second in Sangchu, both locations in the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Kanlho.²²⁸

According to the exiled Tibetan movement in Dharamshala, India, the deaths are protests against Beijing's increasingly tight control over China's estimated 5.5 million Tibetans, 2.6 million of which are living in the TAR. Since unrest swept through the TAR in March 2008, Chinese security forces have cracked down. Beijing is particularly worried over what will happen when the 77-year-old Dalai Lama dies. There is concern that radical Tibetan nationalists, both within the exiled movement in India as well as in China, might seize control of what it describes as the "splittist" movement and may advocate non-peaceful or even insurgent tactics against the central authorities.

With the Dalai Lama's death, anti-Chinese sentiments, among even ordinary Tibetans, may also rise due to the controversy over how to select a reincarnation for the 14th Dalai Lama. Respected high priests (lamas) in Tibet, as well as the Dalai Lama's aides in India, have insisted that choosing the successor is purely a Tibetan matter. However, that is unacceptable to

²²⁸ Nirmala Carvalho, "The Massacre Tibetan Continues, Two Other Young Men Set Themselves on Fire," *AsiaNews*, October 27, 2012, available at: <http://ratsass.krvw.com/mailman/private/access/attachments/20121029/0a62bd11/attachment.html>. For a general overview see Willy Lam, "TAR Wars: China Cracks Down on Tibetan Unrest," *IHS Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 24, No. 9 (September 2012), pp. 54-55.

Beijing, and it has stated that its approval is a prerequisite for the confirmation of the 15th Dalai Lama.

To keep order, Beijing is expected to increase the police presence in the region. But many, less coercive measures are taken as well. Since 2011, extra emphasis has been given to “patriotic education” for children as young as five years old. The Chinese are experts at using their educational system to indoctrinate the population, even among minority peoples and dissidents. This educational program will focus on ensuring Chinese nationalism and combating any separatist political leanings. This was made clear during a July 2012 inspection tour by the current CCP party secretary of Tibet, Chen Quanguo, in the Linzhi Prefecture outside Lhasa. Chen, a former governor of Hebei Province who once had a reputation for being a relative moderate, urged educational officials and teachers to “ensure that pupils will from infancy feel gratitude to the party, listen to the party’s words and follow the party’s instructions” in order to “build a firm line of ideological defense to counter secessionism and to safeguard stability.”²²⁹

Second, in the coming decade, Beijing will redouble its economic outlays in the TAR, just as they are doing in Xinjiang. About \$51 billion has been earmarked for 226 projects, largely infrastructure development. Again,

²²⁹ Chen quoted in Lam, “TAR Wars,” p. 54.

as with Xinjiang, Chinese authorities are “partnering” prosperous cities along the eastern coast, such as Shanghai, as well as key state-owned enterprises, with localities in the TAR. In theory, what Hu has called the “leap-forward in Tibetan development” is geared towards boosting living standards and providing employment opportunities for Tibetans. However, scholars in Western Tibet have pointed out that most of the money will go to Chinese entrepreneurs, managers, firms, and workers rather than Tibetans, as most of the indigenous Tibetans are farmers.

Apart from facilitating the movement of goods and military materiel into Tibet, upgrading the infrastructure will serve the third prong of Beijing’s Tibet strategy: the large scale migration of Han Chinese into Tibet. Traditionally, the high-altitude climate of Tibet has served as a deterrent to the influx of a large number of Han. Yet, Beijing is counting on that improved transport, coupled with enhanced economic opportunities, will be the incentive the Han need to come to Tibet. Official Chinese figures from 2010 showed that 90% of Tibet’s population of 2.9 million is Tibetan. However, the exiled government and international human rights organizations claim that the number of Han is higher.

The path Beijing has selected is likely to fuel further outbreaks of unrest. While Beijing had always maintained a large police and military

presence in Tibet, it had always gone through the motions of listening to the grievances of the Tibetans. However talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama ended in January 2010 after more than 30 years, and are not likely to resume.

There is concern that if the Dalai Lama dies without any major concessions from the Chinese side in the attempt to resolve the difficulties, then it is probable that a few will turn to more radical methods of achieving greater independence for Tibet.

A final consideration that reaffirms China's tough stance on Tibet is the geopolitical significance of the Himalayan highlands. If tensions with India were to increase, as they are likely to given the economic growth of both states, Beijing's control of Tibet enables China to place pressure on India through water resources. Tibet is the origin of several major waterways in Asia, including India's Brahmaputra. Militarizing Tibet, despite New Delhi's protests, could also allow China to substantiate its claim over the northern portion of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing calls "Southern Tibet."

Given the importance of Tibet to China's internal concerns, any liberalization would affect Xinjiang negatively from Beijing's perspective, and

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China's desire to influence and coerce India if necessary, there is little hope for greater autonomy in Tibet.

When we reflect on China's treatment of minorities we can understand why the tension will remain. First, the sources of this tension, Han racism and discrimination against the Uighurs and Tibetans will not change. Second, there is no possibility of a civil rights movement in support of these groups to change their conditions, so the outlets will remain political violence for some and, for a greater number, resistance to and alienation from Beijing. Fundamentally, of course, minority resistance is likely to be overcome by Beijing's Sinification policy with the result that these peoples will disappear as a discrete nation in the years to come.

Chapter Four
Implications for United States Defense Decision-Makers:
Strategic Asymmetries for the United States

This chapter evaluates measures that the United States may advance to take strategic advantage of Chinese racism. To further this goal, the chapter will consider each mechanism in turn, beginning with the positive image the United States may adopt in the competition for ideas in international politics. The chapter argues that Chinese racism is a major asymmetry for the United States. I discuss five major implications for United States decision-makers. Each of these implications provides a foundation for messages designed to undermine or weaken China's position in the world.

In the present confrontation with China, there are many lessons we may learn from the bipolar Cold War. There will be intensive and varied diplomatic, economic and military confrontations. The Third World will be a venue for many of these confrontations. We should expect that there will also be an equally important struggle in the realm of ideas for the support and loyalty of allies throughout the world.

As the Cold War contained a stark and fierce global struggle over ideology and ideas—was capitalism or communism the superior economic

system, representative democracy or totalitarianism, was human freedom to be valued over the belief in the inevitability of socialism—so too does the present period concern equally important and weighty issues. The present global struggle over ideas receives scant attention in the West. Indeed, sensitivity to the existence of the struggle and concern over its outcome gathers little traction even in the specialized, national security press and think tanks. However, as with many asymmetries, the lack of attention does not equal absence of significance.

A large part of the competition between the United States and China occurs in the realm of “soft power.” The term was conceived in 1990 by the eminent professor of Government and former-Pentagon official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who argued that the United States had large reserves of power and influence that were discrete from its “hard power,” or traditional economic, diplomatic, and military means of advancing its interests. In contrast, soft power is about “getting others to want what you want,” or “the ability to shape the preferences of others....getting what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a

country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced."²³⁰

More generally, the components of soft power are also language and the willingness or desire of other peoples to learn the dominant language whether that is English or Mandarin, overseas investments, development assistance, cultural influence, film, television, other aspects of popular culture, education, travel, tourism, and disaster relief.

One of China's most important soft power assets is their informal policy of "no strings" attached to aid. The recipient governments of PRC trade and investment money are often authoritarian and so are attracted to the fact that Chinese aid comes without human rights conditions, good governance requirements, or environmental quality regulations that typically come with Western aid. China markets itself as more efficient and less intrusive for its recipients, and perceives this as a key competitive advantage over the West when wooing governments.

By all accounts, it works. According to Senegal's President Abdoulay Wade, "I have found that a contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign with the World Bank takes three months when we dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in good governance and the

²³⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5, x.

rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our ability to act—and when poverty persists while international functionaries drag their feet—African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter solutions.”²³¹

While the West may be able to reduce red tape to some degree, there is no desire or willingness at this stage to match Beijing’s flexibility and unrestricted investments while holding the recipients of its aid to no international standards. Accordingly, the West should expect its influence will wane to the degree that influence is determined by aid.

A second soft power advantage Beijing has is the fact that much of its foreign investment is carried out by its strong state-owned sector. These state corporations lack transparency, have considerable wealth supported by government, and operate without constraints like annual public reporting. Unlike U.S. or most Western corporations, who lack government patronage and must answer to their shareholders, Chinese state-owned companies have the luxury of being able to take a longer-term, strategic view that advances Chinese national priorities without having the concern for immediate profits that Western firms have.

In the competition with China, its rapid rise is a growing source of international influence, investment, and political and economic power. For

²³¹ Senegal President Abdoulaye Wade, “Time for the West to Practise What It Preaches,” *Financial Times*, January 24, 2008, p. 6.

many observers, China is seen as trying to project soft power by portraying its own system as an alternative model of economic development.²³² In addition, through Confucian Institutes, and other sources, China is advancing its language and civilization as an alternative to the United States and the West.²³³

When we consider its history, it is clear that the ideological struggle with China has been a long one. The Cold War served as the venue for fierce ideational conflict between Beijing and Washington. With the warming of relations in the 1970s and 1980s, this conflict cooled, only to commence again after the Cold War's end. China analyst Steven Mosher has well studied the ups and downs of the United States' periods of strong support and hatred for China.²³⁴

²³² Congressional Research Service, *China's Foreign Policy and "Soft Power" in South America, Asia, and Africa* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008).

²³³ Consider the efforts to replace English as the language of science. In the summer of 2012, *Qishi Journal* ["求是"杂志], a bi-weekly publication of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, whose mission is to spread CCP theories and policies, has called for the creation of an academic language system with Chinese characteristics and style to replace English. The objective is to increase China's soft power by enhancing the affinity, appeal, and influence, as well as to draw scholars throughout the world away from English. See ZH, AF, AT, *Qishi Journal*, June 2012, available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/wz/cmjl/201206/t20120611_163264.htm.

²³⁴ Steven W. Mosher, *China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

The first round of the struggle took place two decades ago in the context of the Asian Values school of thought advanced by Lee Kuan Yew in contrast to Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis—the triumph of Western ideas of capitalism and liberal democratic government. This debate has not gone away, but has segued into the struggle over rival economic systems, the "Washington Consensus" versus the "Beijing Consensus."

Does the "Washington Consensus," belief in freedom, free markets, and the law triumph over the "Beijing Consensus" model of state capitalism for modernization, which advances authoritarian government, done by the Communist Party in the case of China, state led economic development, protected markets, and acceptable corruption and crony capitalism. The Beijing Consensus has gained traction with countries that now seek to follow China's path to economic development.²³⁵

The advantages China receives by engaging in this ideological-cum-economic-cum-strategic struggle are significant. First, China undermines American power and Western economic institutions. Second, in an ideological struggle, China's success is seen as a rising economic and military power, in contrast to America's decline. Third, it assists with alliance relationships by giving developing countries and emerging markets the

²³⁵ Stefan Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

freedom to deny Western conditions of financial engagement. For example, China also provides states in economic crisis, such as Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Venezuela, and Uzbekistan with an alternative to following the dictates of Western institutions like the International Monetary Fund. Also, they no longer must choose between emulating the Western model or rejecting capitalism.

Equally importantly, Beijing recognizes what Washington did in the 1940s: When it comes to alliances, birds of a feather, flock together. The hegemon creates the alliance structure by enticing or imposing similar economic systems or economic interests and similar ideologies to generate and sustain alliances. The similarity may come from a negative component, unification caused by opposition to Washington, or from a positive component, accepting and welcoming Beijing's organizing principles in political beliefs, governmental structure, or economic operation, which is better for the longevity of the alliance. The new elite of the country accept the values, principles, and norms of Washington's order, and do so generation after generation.

Indeed, one of the great open secrets of Washington's success in creating an international order that reflected its interests was that it required the political, economic, legal, and cultural elite of West Germany,

Italy, and Japan to conform to its major values.²³⁶ To be sure, the process contained difficulties and was resisted in some quarters, think of the anti-Americanism of High Tories like Harold Macmillan and Anthony Eden, but opposition was to no avail. Ministers, or even leaders, could be replaced if they strayed too far from Washington's objectives. Even France under De Gaulle, a thorn in Washington's side if there ever were one, maintained dovetailed strategic interests in Europe once it was clear to him that West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer would not join him in a "Third Way," an alliance to balance the Soviet Union and the United States.

Today, China's model seems to be more attractive. Stephan Halper, a Senior Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of Cambridge and Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, argues that China's model is more appealing to the developing world and middle-sized powers, like Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, and Vietnam, than America's market-democratic model captured in the Washington Consensus. China's model gives rise to a strategic challenge for the United States, accelerates the "power shift" from the U.S. to China, and raises the possibility that the world will be increasingly

²³⁶ See Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany 1941-1945* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002); and Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

unsympathetic to the democratic principles and values of the West and to U.S. leadership.

Indeed, China is pushing hard in this direction. United States decision-makers must recognize the alternative message China is developing. Like the Soviets, they seek to cloak their rise using attractive rhetoric, and with appeals to reason and a desire for peace. The appeal is to a “peaceful growth,” a “moral standing,” and Confucianism, rather than the “march of History” of the Soviet Union, but the ideational threat is even greater than the significant threat posed by the Soviet Union. An excellent example is Yan Xuetong’s [阎学通] telling book on the relationship between ancient Chinese political thought and how it informs the rise of China today.²³⁷ His essential argument is that a stable international order stems from the leadership of a humane authority, which has strong “moral standing” and whose rule is accepted, rather than hegemonic with an emphasis on hard power.

It is an important argument because of what it reveals. First, the Chinese see their rise to dominance as the manifestation of rule by “humane authority.” Second, they perceive the U.S. as unable to achieve such a lofty goal when it was the dominant state, but it is an obligation of the Chinese to

²³⁷ Yan Xuetong, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* trans. by Edmund Ryden (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011).

provide a “better model for society” and international order than that provided by the United States. Third, the Chinese we return to their traditional policy of “Sinification,” or requiring weaker states to recognize Chinese leadership and adapt to what Beijing wishes under the mantle of “wise” or “humane” direction.

A major strategic objective for the United States is to defeat Chinese soft power. Thankfully, the United States has much on its side. These combine to yield powerful asymmetries for the United States. First, while it is beyond the boundaries of this study, it must be noted that an important exception to this acceptance of the Beijing Consensus is India. India’s great strengths are that it is democracy and that it embraces, in its own way, private enterprise. Like the United States, New Delhi has a commitment to entrepreneurship as the source of innovation and growth. This provides the United States with a continued stake in India’s economic growth and prosperity for obvious commercial reasons and global economic expansion, but also for strategic reasons and as an alternative to the Beijing Consensus.²³⁸

²³⁸ An exceptional analysis is Pranab Bardhan, *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

In addition, the United States must recognize that it still retains a dominant image in the world. It has an open society, economy, universal ideology that respects individual liberty and freedom, a history of humanitarian aid, an absence of territorial disputes, and no desire to dominate. Moreover, it also has a significant advantage in the fact that it is not a racist state. China is.

I. Five Major Implications for United States Decision-Makers

I. A. Chinese Racism Provides Empirical Evidence of How the Chinese Will Treat Others Now and If/When China Is Dominant

One of the key insights into Chinese future behavior is its behavior in the past. Analysts do have insight into how China will behave in the future based on its behavior in the past when it was the hegemon of Asia, the known world as far as China was concerned.²³⁹ As the study has shown, China sees itself as the center of the universe, all others are inferior, with varying degrees of inferiority. That is not an attractive model for winning allies and influence.

The Chinese have a huge burden imposed on them by their ethnocentrism and racism as well as their past. Their ethnocentrism and

²³⁹ Excellent studies are Nicola Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Nicola Di Cosmo, *Military Culture in Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); and Stewart Gordon, *When Asia Was the World* (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2008).

racism will surface inevitably in their dealings with the rest of the world. As they become more powerful, they will be less restrained about evincing these behaviors and alienating people the world over. No doubt Chinese money and power can buy allies of a kind, and for a period of time, but they are likely to be more fragile than the alliance relationships forged by the United States through its seventy years of engagement.

This study concurs with Jacques' recognition that: "For perhaps the next half-century, it seems unlikely that China will be particularly aggressive. History will continue to weigh heavily on how it handles its growing power, counseling caution and restraint. On the other hand, as China becomes more self-confident, a millennia-old sense of superiority will be increasingly evident in Chinese attitudes."²⁴⁰ But, rather than being imperialistic in the Western sense, "though this will, over time, become a growing feature as it acquires the interests and instincts of a superpower—China will be characterized by a strongly hierarchical view of the world, embodying the belief that it represents a higher form of civilization than any other."²⁴¹

This recognition dovetails with historian Wang Gungwu's [王赓武] argument that the tributary system was based on hierarchical principles, the

²⁴⁰ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, p. 392.

²⁴¹ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, pp. 392-393.

most important of which “is the principle of superiority.”²⁴² This combination of hierarchy and superiority will reveal itself in China’s relations with the rest of the world. One suspects that it will do so first in China’s attitude toward Africa and Southeast Asia. Both are barometers of Chinese behavior, and what we are witnessing is that China is acting very boldly, in accord with the principles of power politics and economic exploitation, and directly opposed to any “Confucian” or benign foreign policy.

Wang Gungwu suggests that even when China was forced to abandon the tributary system and adapt to the humiliations and disciplines of the Westphalian system, in which all states are sovereign and enjoy formal equality, China never accepted it. “This doubt partly explains the current fear that, when given the chance, the Chinese may wish to go back to their long-hallowed tradition of treating foreign countries as all alike but equal and inferior to China.”²⁴³

The size of its population and the longevity of its civilization mean that China will always have a different attitude toward its place in the world

²⁴² Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay,” in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 61.

²⁴³ Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia,” in *The Chinese World Order*, p. 61.

from the European states and the United States. China has always believed itself to be universal, or what Jacques calls the “Middle Kingdom mentality.”²⁴⁴ In a very real sense, China does not desire to run the world because it already believes itself to be the center of the world, which is its natural role and position. This attitude will strengthen as it becomes a superpower. As a consequence, China will probably be less aggressive than the imperialist powers of the West, but that does not mean that it will be less assertive or less determined to impose its will. Indeed, United States decision-makers should expect that it will do so. Yet, it will do so guided by the inherent belief in its own superiority and the “proper” hierarchy of relations, in which China is the center.

What the great author William Faulkner wrote of life in the American South is true for China today: “The past isn’t history. It isn’t even past.” China’s past informs their view of international politics. It will be back to the future, once China is powerful enough. It will be a return to the tribute model of international politics and international leadership, the *koutou*. However, the *koutou* is not an attractive model. In Chinese history, political entities had to accept it. Today, there are other sources and centers of power, including maintaining an alliance with the United States.

²⁴⁴ Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, pp. 233-271.

This condition yields a significant asymmetry for the United States. It provides empirical evidence of how the Chinese see non-Han others. Historically, they have perceived darker peoples as inferiors. This remains true today. They are the world's only racist superpower.

Accordingly, United States decision-makers may tailor messages to the global community to aid its alliances among those allies that might be weakening in support, to augment its soft power, and to weaken the attractiveness of the "Beijing Consensus" and China as a model for the world.

I suggest the following themes that United States Defense decision-makers might draw upon as asymmetrical messages to weaken China's support in the world. The first of these themes should be to advance a "reality check" to the global community: "how do Chinese words match Chinese deeds when it comes to treating people fairly and equally."

The second theme is to introduce fault. "Why do the Chinese refuse to change their racist views of the rest of the world?" Or more succinctly, "why don't the Chinese like black people; or Indians; or South East Asians; or Latin Americans?" Attention needs to be called to its eugenics policies as well. "Why do the Chinese support eugenics generations after it was discredited in the West?" Likewise, explicit ties to the policies of Nazi Germany may be

made since both Berlin and Beijing embraced eugenics, and Beijing continues to do so long after it has been discredited.

A third theme is to suggest that there is something profoundly wrong with China's worldview: "Why are the Chinese unable to change their racist views?" Or that there is something deeply iniquitous with China itself, there is something immoral with the Chinese people, or with their elite: "Why is China a racist state?" "Racism has been confronted and defeated worldwide, why is it celebrated in China?"

These themes allow the United States and other states to challenge China's projected image of an oppressed victim of racism with actual empirical reality: China is a racist superpower. It does not equal the horrors of Nazi Germany, but it is far closer to Nazism than it is to a free and tolerant society. More glibly, but not too distant from the reality, the tone should be: "China is not Nazi Germany, but you can see it from there."

I. B. Allows the United States to Undermine China in the Third World: Chinese Appeals for Non-European "Racial Solidarity" Will Be Made, But the United States Can Counter

As they did in the Cold War, and as discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese will advance an appeal for alliances with and support to the Third World based on racial solidarity. This message will indeed find favor with many in

the Third World. For Beijing, this is a key asymmetry to be used against the United States.

The United States must be prepared for it and poised to counter. In order to do so effectively, there must be recognition about what has changed since the United States last confronted a peer competitor. First, this is a racially different peer opponent. Accordingly, race will be a subtext of every interaction. The United States has never faced a racially different opponent, and so race adds a new layer into superpower competition that will have advantages for the United States, as discussed below, as well as disadvantages.

Second, what it means to be developed or modern has changed. For the Third World there will not be a single modernity, there will be many. Until around 1970 modernity was, with the exception of Japan, exclusively Western. Over the last half-century, we have witnessed the emergence of many modernities, drawing on some Western concepts, but ultimately responsible themselves for their ability to mobilize, build upon, and transform their societies. There is the hybridization of what may be learned from the West, regional neighbors, but also through their own history and culture. Thus, modernization in Africa will be different, a hybrid, not Chinese and not Western.

Third, in this competition, the expectation should be that the West will have many lessons to learn. In the face of the growing success of East Asian states, the West will be forced to learn from these states and incorporate their insights and characteristics, such as with respect to fiscal discipline, the importance of rigorous education, and living within one's means. The bottom line is that modernity need no longer include Enlightenment principles and a Western-style rule of law, an independent judiciary and representative government. While that is true, the West provides a far better model of achievement for respect for human rights and individual identity.

China's relationship with African states and aid to that continent has expanded greatly. From the formative period in the 1950s until the late 1970s, China offered African countries aid motivated by political objectives. Much of the aid at that time consisted of infrastructure projects, such as railroads, most notably the famed Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway of the early 1970s, major buildings, as well as economic developmental projects. Until the late 1970s, when China began its internal modernization process, its engagement in Africa was primarily defined by, first, a shared interest in spreading socialist revolutions, and, second, participating in Cold War rivalries with the United States and Soviet Union. Since its modernization, China has increasingly pursued bilateral ties defined by wealth creation and

other positive economic outcomes rather than ideological considerations. In Africa, China continued to support a variety of aid projects, but it increasingly began to use cost-benefit analyses in making decisions about these projects.

China's growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a relatively recent phenomenon in international politics. Beginning in April 2001, with President Jiang Zemin's 13-day tour of Latin America, a succession of senior Chinese officials have visited Latin American countries to court regional governments, while Latin American leaders also have been frequent visitors in Beijing. China's primary interests in the region are, first, to gain access to raw materials and energy resources through increased trade and investment. All three of China's oil firms, Sinopec (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation), CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), and CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation), have moved into Latin America with alacrity.²⁴⁵ China's second objective is to offset or replace U.S. power in the region over the longer-term, as well as to use its presence in the region to collect intelligence against the United States.

Since the 1990s, China's rapid growth has heavily informed its interests in Africa. Importantly, China has touted its doctrine of political noninterference and respect for state sovereignty that aids it in its dealings

²⁴⁵ On China's grab for resources, oil, in particular, see Pádraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2011), pp. 65-111.

with African states. The first of China's interests in Africa have been to secure the continent's resources, especially energy resources.²⁴⁶ To advance that end, Chinese diplomacy labors to ensure that future Chinese aid and investment remains welcomed in Africa. Due to its political history and economic success, the PRC sees itself as a leader of developing countries. Its second objective is to offset or replace U.S. and European power in the region over the longer-term, as well as to use its presence in the region for basis to advance its interests.

To advance these ends, Beijing is acting with dispatch. As of October 2012, China has launched 31 Confucius Institutes and five Confucius Classrooms in 26 African countries.²⁴⁷ From 2010-2012, China has provided 5,710 government scholarships to African countries. It plans to implement the "African Talent Project," which will recruit and support future African leaders. Over the next three years, China will train 30,000 professionals in different fields and provide 18,000 government scholarships, as well as job

²⁴⁶ This issue is well explored in John Ghazvinian, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil* (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2007); and Ian Taylor, *China's New Role in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2009).

²⁴⁷ *BBC Chinese*, "China's Influence in Africa Continues," September 26, 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2012/09/120926_china_africa.shtml.

training and support.²⁴⁸ These efforts are fully in keeping with China's advance into Africa through economic and cultural means in order to increase its influence on the continent. Through 2011, China has been Africa's largest trading partner for the third consecutive year, with the trade volume between the two countries reaching a record \$166.3 billion.²⁴⁹

As Arthur Waldron writes, there is a strategic purpose behind Chinese investments in Africa and, one could assume from his logic, elsewhere in the Third World as well. Waldron argues China: "is seeking a China-centric community, mostly of small and medium-sized states, that could serve as a counterweight to the emerged or emerging powers of the West, Japan, India, and so forth. The Chinese Communist government is most interested not in the welfare of the Chinese people, but in their own regime survival. The gradual disappearance of communism worries them deeply."²⁵⁰

Waldron continues with his assessment of China's interests in Africa: "China's new interest in Africa would be part of an increasingly visible pattern of seeking to create her own set of economic and political friends. Chinese states have historically been uncomfortable with any but

²⁴⁸ *BBC Chinese*, "China's Influence in Africa Continues," September 26, 2012.

²⁴⁹ *BBC Chinese*, "China's Influence in Africa Continues," September 26, 2012.

²⁵⁰ Arthur Waldron, "Foreword," in Waldron, ed., *China in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2008), p. 7.

hierarchical foreign relations that they dominate.”²⁵¹ When we review China’s situation in the world, “today’s China is not particularly happy with her truly advanced Asian neighbors, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, nor is she naturally congenial with India or Southeast Asia, which are less developed, or for that matter with Europe or the United States.”²⁵² However, “in every case, purely economic considerations would suggest ever-closer cooperation, but as a single-party dictatorship in a world where Pakistan and South Africa and Russia hold elections, China worries about political contagion—not to mention the numerous territorial disputes that poison, for example, relations with India. Taking such considerations into mind, two areas of the world look attractive. One is Latin America, the other is Africa.”²⁵³

Of these, Africa is far more strategically important for China, “in the case of Africa, Beijing has the possibility of winning almost fifty allies many rich in resources, while facing little danger of liberal contagion, and not least being at least seemingly in command of the relationship by virtue of superior education, resources, and technology. All of these states vote in the United

²⁵¹ Waldron, “Foreword,” in Waldron, ed., *China in Africa*, p. 7. Also see Robert I. Rotberg, “China’s Quest for Resources, Opportunities, and Influence in Africa,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 1-20.

²⁵² Waldron, “Foreword,” in Waldron, ed., *China in Africa*, p. 7.

²⁵³ Waldron, “Foreword,” in Waldron, ed., *China in Africa*, p. 7.

Nations. Many are deeply embedded and influential in international organizations. Furthermore, from Nigeria to Sudan to Tanzania, they offer what many seem to be strategic political and military positions, on the Atlantic, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean.”²⁵⁴

Of course, China’s approach often meets resistance due to its own ham-fisted and too naked grab for the resources it needs at the cost of local communities. China is increasingly seen as a “New Colonialist.” Large numbers of Chinese are settling in Africa where, typically, they employ other Chinese and not Africans, purchase raw material for processing elsewhere, and sell to foreign markets in the classic fashion of European imperialists over a century ago.

The essence of the Chinese message to Third World states is a straightforward rhetorical query: Has the United States or the Europeans ever treated you as equals. In contrast, the Chinese say they come to your country, pay a fair price for your commodities, and build your infrastructure, with no strings attached. According to experts on China’s penetration of Africa, Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan, a “positive image of China exists despite the prevalence among the Chinese of racist attitudes, which have been experienced both by Africans in China and Africans working alongside

²⁵⁴ Waldron, “Foreword,” in Waldron, ed., *China in Africa*, p. 7.

Chinese residences in Africa” mostly due to the legacy of colonialism and Third World solidarity.²⁵⁵

The United States needs to counter the expansion of Chinese influence by tying in to the messages stated above, but adding the important point that there is no culture of anti-racism in China, and so there is little hope for change. Messages may be advanced along the following line: “The West confronted racism and developed a strong culture of anti-racism, China has not, nor is it likely to do so.”

Second, the United States should argue that Chinese business practices are destructive. As discussed in Chapter Three, there often is considerable resentment toward the Chinese due to their ruthless business practices, which undercut and destroy African businesses. China is dumping products, or rather very forcefully and carefully marketing products, which ironically fits Lenin’s thesis very well concerning the need of capitalists to exploit the Third World to meet the needs of overproduction.

The combination of the two messages, “China is racist with no culture of anti-racism, and their businesses practices are destructive for the locals,” would be most effective in making appeals to the Third World.

²⁵⁵ Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” *African Studies Review*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (December 2007), pp. 75-114, 94.

Third, it is an obvious point, but it must be made: the Chinese are hypocrites when it comes to race and racial equality. For all of their rhetoric on Africa and their “African brothers,” one almost blushes at the positive spin by the Chinese and their supporters in the press.²⁵⁶ The cold facts of Chinese racism triumph paeans to “Third World solidarity.”

Fourth, the message of the United States should be: We are better than the Chinese for the development of Africa. We will assist you with economic aid to offset what you receive from China. Culturally, socially, and politically, we are better, we are equal, recognize racial equality, and civil rights.

I. C. Permits a Positive, Inclusive Image of the United States to Be Advanced In Contrast to China

China’s racism permits a positive image of the United States to be advanced in direct contrast to China’s. The simple fact is, when compared with China, it is easy to convey the message to the rest of the world that the United States is open and inclusive, whereas China is not. This is because to do so is completely in accord with the principles of the United States and its history.

²⁵⁶ See Kaiyu Shao [邵开宇], “Go East: African Immigrants in China,” *Consultancy Africa Intelligence*, 2 March 2012, available at: http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=963:go-east-african-immigrants-in-china&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264.

The United States seeks the best from around the world, and permits them to come to the country so that they may prosper, fulfill themselves as individuals, innovate, and, in turn, aid the economic growth and innovation in the United States.

Table One captures the important societal differences, both positive and negative, between the United States and China. Naturally, the Chinese are sure to counter with messages about racism in the United States, significant crime and unrest in the country, profound uncertainty about America's direction and future, negative images of Americans, including laziness, individualism, and lack of honor, and filial piety, numerous cases of economic hardship and business failures, and individual hard cases of immigrants, minorities, youths, or other Americans.

This is not a "glass half empty, glass half full problem," that is, both societies have positive and negative elements in them, and thus should be treated as equals. Such relativism is as misplaced today as it was during the Cold War. On the contrary, the society of the United States is profoundly better than China's, and, as such, Beijing's efforts to portray a negative image of the United States can be countered easily.

Table One
Major Societal Differences between the United States and China

U.S. Is an Open, Free Society	China Is a Closed, Authoritarian Society
Welcomes Immigration	Hostile to Immigration
Promotes Diversity	Promotes Unculturalism
Is Transparent, and Able to Outreach to the Rest of the World	Does Not Outreach to the Rest of the World
Is Declining in Relative Power	Is Rising in Relative Power
Will Have Less Relative Wealth in the Future	Will Have Greater Relative Wealth in the Future
Relatively Divided	Relatively Homogenous
Anti-racist	Racist
Heterogeneous	Homogenous

This may be done first, by identifying a modern day Horatio Alger, “rags-to-riches,” story—the poor immigrant rises to the security and comfort of the middle class, or to wealth, through hard work, determination, and honesty. The United States needs to emphasize success, which is readily done, for example, Steve Jobs was the son of a Syrian immigrant, and that remains as true in the present as it did in the past. This makes the United States more attractive for information technology and other skilled immigrants from around the world. The projected image of the United States in this regard matches the empirical reality.

Second, the society of the United States is inclusive, not exclusive. The rapid growth of immigrants to the United States, and the fact that more immigrants want to come to the United States is proof that the United States is a favorable destination for the world's population. This is in direct opposition to China, which receives only a small number of immigrants every year, and by far most of those are from the Chinese diaspora. In 1980, 20,000 foreigners stayed in China for more than six months. By the end of 2011, 600,000 did, principally living in Shanghai, and coming mostly from Taiwan and the diaspora, but a modest number from Vietnam (to Guangxi and Guangdong) and from North Korea (to Manchuria). That there are 600,000 in country of 1.34 billion, and that has a net migration loss of almost a half-a-million people according to the United States Census Bureau compares unfavorably to the United States, where there maybe anywhere from 33-38 million out of a population of 314 million.²⁵⁷ These data demonstrate the reluctance of the Chinese to support immigration.

The Chinese are more than aware of the need to attract a variety of talents, investors, skilled workers, and what the Chinese call “seagulls,” foreign businessmen who work with multinationals around the world. Yet,

²⁵⁷ United States Census Bureau, “Demographic Overview—Custom Region—China,” data for 2012, available at <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php>

the ability of a foreigner to receive the equivalent of permanent resident status or citizenship is a difficult challenge, even if the government wants the resident and almost unknown of if the government does not.

In this vein, the election and re-election of Barack Obama as the first black U.S. President and son of a foreigner sends a powerful symbolic message to the rest of the world. It is something that would be impossible in China.

Moreover, the United States opens its society, educational system, universities, military, and economy to immigrants as countless examples demonstrate. Additionally, it has in place Affirmative Action policies as a matter of state policy that benefits immigrants from racial minorities and or those who are women. In sum, the United States is one of the most transparent societies in the world for immigrants.

This message is low-hanging fruit for the United States, but needs to be advanced as appropriate in international fora and in diplomacy, Track Two diplomacy, and soft power media. Defense decision-makers should be cognizant that the ideational struggle between the United States and China is occurring right now. China has the upper hand in this because their advance is coordinated, and the United States' response seems to be ad hoc, uncoordinated, and thus dependent on local media or officials whose

attention is occasional and whose interests might not dovetail with those of the United States. Accordingly, countervailing messages along the themes suggested need to be advanced to push back against the Chinese, and provoke thought among the governing and intellectual elite of Third World countries about the true costs of supporting China.

I. D. Allows Political and Ideological Alliances of the U.S. to Be Strengthened

These messages will allow the political and ideological alliances of the United States to be strengthened. The political alliances particularly with Third World states are an obvious benefit. Equally important are the ideological alliances that the United States may augment. Intellectual circles in Europe, Canada, and the United States value multiracial and multicultural societies.

Journalists and media opinion-makers frequently share a multiracial and multicultural vision of their societies as well. Yet, thus far, they have not treated the problem of Chinese racism with the attention it deserves, in part for the reasons discussed in Chapter Three concerning academic and intellectual biases with respect to China and Western intellectual conceptions of racism.

To redress this imbalance, scholars may call attention to the problem of racism through studies and publication in specialized and popular journals

like *Foreign Affairs* and *The Atlantic* and in opinion pieces in major newspapers in the United States and Europe.

It will help with international organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that have a strong interest in advancing human rights worldwide. Thus far, these organizations have not focused their attention on the issue of Chinese racism and its affect on immigrants and the behavior of Chinese corporations abroad, especially in Africa.²⁵⁸

It allows the United States to advance a positive U.S. image and position in the international arena, which will serve as an alternative and sharply contrasting image with China both now and in the future when the United States may be weaker than China. The connection to the global media is critical. Unfortunately, the constellation of power in global media will change with China's rise. The Chinese are creating their own media and news services. The major media forces today, *New York Times*, BBC, *Washington Post*, *Le Monde*, Fox and Sky News, CNN, and the other major American networks, will not always be dominant, and so their ability to

²⁵⁸ Indeed, a review of their reports reveals nothing on the racist behavior of the Chinese. To their credit, they do address many other human rights abuses by the Chinese, such as freedom of expression.

shape global opinion will be weakened. In contrast, China's media, and the ability of China to advance its message will increase.

As Chinese power grows, the traditional alliance structures will come under strain, and even long standing European allies will be tempted to bandwagon with China. This will be so for three reasons. First, Beijing holds material power advantages, such as European debt, which gives them some influence over policy. It is important not to overstate this influence; Europe is not yet captive, but likewise, some Chinese influence is undeniable. An important insight for United States defense decision-makers is that, indeed, material power heavily informs fundamental interests of states, such as, with whom it will ally. Yet, it is not solely determinative. People and states want to share interests and have a role in decision-making, to be treated as equals in the sense of having a role in institutional mechanisms and discussions. In general, the United States does this well; the Chinese do not.

Second, there is an ideological component. The attractiveness of the Beijing Consensus and socialism remains salient for a significant segment of the European population. For these Europeans, Beijing shows that socialism can work, and the train of reasoning for European socialists would be along these lines: "the revolutions of 1989 were an aberration due to the fact that the Soviets provided a false model of socialism. Socialism is redeemed

through China's example, successful modernization, rise to dominance, and ultimate victory over capitalism."

Third, the legacy of anti-Americanism still exists in Europe today. However, the culture of anti-racism is very strong throughout European societies. Touting the salience of racism and the importance of combating racism will make it more difficult for European governments to distance themselves from the United States in favor of an alliance with an ideologically incompatible and morally repugnant China.

The "China is a racist state" message of the United States will help win allies in global, popular culture, which is heavily influenced by ideals rooted in Western, left wing political thought, including strong currents of anti-racism. Popular cultural figures from film, music, television, and sports, will be far better able to call attention to China's racism for younger audiences worldwide than will official or semi-official Washington.

In sum, this is the "taking lemons and making lemonade" model. If it is the case that the United States is in decline, or will be in the near future, it must use every effort to assist itself. It is to the advantage of the United States to have the world consider the costs of Chinese dominance in order to grasp what will be lost. This is an exercise that most of the world has not

done, and so there is no appreciation of what will be lost; or how hypocritical, domineering, and imperialistic China will be.

I. E. At the Same Time, Chinese Racism Is a Cohesive Force for the Chinese

As with most matters in international politics, racism does serve to benefit the Chinese in four major ways. First, the Han Chinese possess a strong in-group identity with a polarized and tightly defined out-group. They know who belongs and who does not. This allows the Chinese government to expect sacrifice and as well as support from a considerable majority of the Chinese people.

Second, based in this identity, the government has the ability to focus with great willpower on the demands of the state. All governments make patriotic appeals, but the Chinese government is able to do so effectively because any entreaty is based on patriotism as well as nationalism. Both Chinese patriotism and nationalism may be made fiercely with explicitly ethnocentric and racist messages, appeals to ancestors and the long history and civilizational identity of the Chinese. When we reflect on the tools the Chinese government has to extract support and resources from the population, only one conclusion is possible, they are formidable.

Third, they have strong societal unity and purpose, which supports Chinese power. The Chinese do not have a culture that is self-critical or one

that ponders its fundamental faults. When Johnson considered his experiences in China and the Chinese inability to confront racism, he observed that Chinese culture “shies away from self and cultural criticism,” and so he is not optimistic that a direct and frank consideration of racism should ever be expected of China.²⁵⁹

While that can be a great strength for China, it also gives the United States an advantage. The lack of any desire by the Chinese to self-reflect on the profound faults of their society means that there is no motivation to solve these faults. Accordingly, a powerful message may be that China will not change because it has no desire to do so. In essence, with China, “what you see is what you get.” The country is a civilization, and that yields them great strength.

At the same time, there cannot be fundamental change. China is not an open society, transparent and porous for new ideas, that would challenge its core beliefs. For those states and peoples whom the Chinese see as inferior, dissatisfaction with core Chinese beliefs is certain to increase as Chinese power expands. Thus, the United States may tap into that “market of dissatisfaction” by calling attention to China’s lack of flexibility, contempt for, and dismissal of the rest of the world.

²⁵⁹ Johnson, *Race and Racism in the Chinas*, p. 128.

Fourth, China's racism and ethnocentrism serves China's teleological worldview. History, in the Hegelian sense, is moving in China's direction, the future belongs to it, China's political beliefs, civilizational culture, and economic might triumphed over the West. This is Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" argument, just with China rather than the United States in the van of History. In essence, international politics is returning to "normal" with China at its center. This perception serves Chinese pride and provides them with a confidence reminiscent of that found in the West after the revolutions of 1989 and the death of the Soviet Union. That is a powerful elixir for a people, and one that is likely to fill the Chinese with even greater hubris and arrogance that offends and generates resentment throughout the world.

To advance its interests, the United States may make appeals to those actors in international politics that do not desire China to be at the center of the world either, first, because their interests directly conflict with China's, like India, Japan, Russia, and Vietnam; second, because they resent being excluded from consideration, treated equally, or with respect; or third, because they reject China's values and worldview.

Although it may be cold comfort for the United States at present, power in international politics is constantly being redistributed. China is rising today, but it may plateau or fall of its own devices, and this may occur

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in short order, perhaps more quickly and dramatically than could be expected, or over a longer period of time. Additionally, its power may be equalized or surpassed by the rise of other states like India. Thus, China's rise is profound and one pregnant with many dangers and risks for the United States, but it also contains the certainty of decline. China may rule the world one day, but its day, too, will end. The United States and its friends need to say so.

Conclusions

This is a difficult time for the United States. Its primacy in international politics is challenged as it never has been before by mounting fiscal difficulties, which hinders its ability to meet its challenges, its numerous strategic challenges and military commitments around the world, and a rising peer competitor. This combination of strategic difficulties makes essential that the United States use every means available to maintain its position in international politics, including non-traditional means. Calling attention to Chinese racism is one such non-traditional strategy but, nonetheless, a powerful tool that provides the United States strategic leverage that will aid Washington in its effort to maintain its primacy.

[This study explored the causes of Chinese racism, the strategic consequences of Chinese racism, and how the United States](#) may use this situation to advance its interests in international politics.

Chapter One considered the origins of xenophobia, [racism](#), and ethnocentrism. These traits are caused by human evolution, and, as this study has stressed, are not unique to the Chinese. However, they are made worse by Chinese history and culture.

Chapter Two presented the conception of race in Chinese [history and culture](#). It found that Chinese religious-cultural and historical conceptions of race reinforce Chinese racism. [In Chinese history and contemporary culture, the Chinese are seen to be unique and superior to the rest of the world. Other peoples and groups are seen to be inferior, with a sliding scale of inferiority. The major Chinese distinction is between](#) degrees of barbarians, the “black devils,” [the savage inferiors beyond hope of interaction and the “white devils” or tame barbarians with whom the Chinese can interact.](#) [These beliefs are widespread in Chinese society, and have been for its history.](#)

Lamentably, modern Chinese views on race are no better than they were in the past. Racism remains a key component of how the Chinese see the world, their central place in it, and the world’s other, inferior inhabitants. The Chapter recognizes that China has been and remains a racist state, where racists and eugenicist beliefs inform the Chinese worldview.

Chapter Three evaluated the nine strategic consequences of Chinese racism. The first of these was that virulent racism and eugenics heavily inform Chinese perceptions of the world. United States decision-makers must recognize that China is a racist state, closer to Nazi Germany than values of the West. Most often, [the Chinese do not even recognize their](#)

racism as a problem. They believe that racism is a Western phenomenon and that Westerners are obsessed with race. This obsession is seen by the Chinese to be a strategic vulnerability of the West, whereas China is not affected by racism.

Second, Chinese racism informs their view of the United States. From the Chinese perspective, the United States used to be a strong society that the Chinese respected when it was unicultural, defined by the centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture at the core of American national identity aligned with the political ideology of liberalism, the rule of law, and free market capitalism. The Chinese see multiculturalism as a sickness that has overtaken the United States, and a component of U.S. decline.

Third, their racism informs their view of international politics in three ways. First, states are stable, and thus good for the Chinese, to the degree that they are unicultural. Second, Chinese ethnocentrism and racism drive their outlook to the rest of the world. Their expectation is of a tribute system where barbarians know that the Chinese are superior. Third, there is a strong, implicit, racist view of international politics that is alien and anathema to Western policy-makers and analysts. The Chinese are comfortable using race to explain events and appealing to racist stereotypes

to advance their interests. [Most insidious is the Chinese belief that Africans in particular need Chinese leadership.](#)

Fourth, as they did during the Cold War, the Chinese will make appeals to Third World states based on “racial solidarity,” that is, the need of non-white peoples to unite against Western imperialism and racism. Racial solidarity claims are easy for Chinese to accomplish since the Chinese can make racist claims. They can frame international politics in terms of a “racial balance of power,” and cast appeals to the Third World along the line of: now is the time for non-whites to dominate international politics.

Fifth, Chinese racism retards their relations with the Third World. Chinese racism makes it difficult for China to advance a positive message in the Third World, especially Africa, but also in Latin America and the Middle East. The Chinese have a hierarchy of looking at other groups, darker skin is lower class, and race matters, the racial stereotypes of the Africans is that they are backward and dirty, and prone to crime, particularly violent crime. These beliefs surface regularly in China’s relations with the Third World and these beliefs, coupled with clannish and ruthless Chinese business practices, generate enormous resentment in the Third World.

Sixth, the racism, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism of the Chinese, and the degree to which the Chinese permit their view of the United States to be

informed by racism, has the potential to hinder China in its competition with the United States because it contributes to their overconfidence. This overconfidence is a result of ethnocentrism and a sense of superiority rooted in racism. The Chinese commonly believe that they are cleverer than others, and so may shape events in an oblique manner or through *shi*, that is, the strategic manipulation of events. This conceit among the Chinese that they can manipulate others is supremely dangerous for stability in Asia. At the same time, it is a great advantage for the United States to play upon that overconfidence. To understand that an overconfident China will continue to make the mistakes it already has in the South China or East China Sea disputes. That is, making threats, issuing demands, heavy-handed shows of force, are generated by China's overconfidence.

Seventh, as regrettable as it is, Chinese racism helps to make the Chinese a formidable adversary. There are three critical consequences that result from this. The first is the sense of unity the Chinese possess. Second, it allows the Chinese to have a strong sense of identity, which in turn permits them to weather adversity, remain focused, and confident that the rest of the nation is with them. Third, China is not plagued by self-doubt or guilt about its past.

Eight, the Chinese are never going to go through a civil rights movement like the United States. This is because, first, they have no freedom of the press, freedom to petition their government, freedom to assemble, all of which are necessary to support a civil rights movement. Second, there is no political drive or consciousness for equality in Chinese thought. Equality is associated with Maoism, and rejected in today's China, where inequality is widely accepted and celebrated. In addition, there is no notion of civil rights in Chinese political thought or, practically, in jurisprudence.

Ninth, China's treatment of Christians and ethnic minorities is poor. The government recognizes that religion is able to do many positive acts in a society, and they do see the need for people to have a religious grounding since a moral framework may be lost in the demands of a market economy. The debate now is an echo of the one they had in the 1800s, how do they preserve the essence of what is Chinese in an era dominated by Western ideas. Yet, the government is fearful of religion in the sense that uncontrolled religion may be a threat: a challenge to Beijing's authority. Not surprisingly, the treatment of ethnic minorities is equally bad.

Chapter Four considered the five major implications for United States decision-makers and asymmetries that may result from Chinese racism. These are summarized in Table Two.

Table Two
Summary of Asymmetries and Messages the U.S. Should Advance

Asymmetries/Strategies	Themes/Messages
1. <i>China is a racist state. Chinese racism provides evidence of how it will engage other international actors (i.e., China is the center of the universe, other societies are inferior).</i>	A. Reality Check on Chinese foreign policy. B. Fault with China's unwillingness to confront racism. C. Flaw in Chinese worldview. D. China is a racist superpower. It practices discredited eugenics policies. It does not equal the horrors of Nazi Germany, but it is far closer to Nazism than it is to the free and tolerant societies found in the West.
2. <i>Undermining China in the Third World.</i>	A. China has no culture of anti-racism B. Chinese business practices are destructive C. The hypocrisy of China's "Third World Solidarity" diplomacy. D. The U.S. has/will uphold principles of racial equality and civil rights.
3. <i>Promote a positive image of the U.S. to contrast Chinese racist diplomacy.</i>	A. The U.S. has a history of welcoming immigrants that can prosper by contributing to the growth of American society. B. The U.S. is a free and open society. C. American society does not tolerate racism and seeks to minimize it, while maximizing equality (i.e., affirmative action).
4. <i>Foster political and ideological alliances with states that oppose China's racist worldview, especially in the Third World.</i>	A. Bring in sympathetic popular culture figures to assist in drawing attention to Chinese racism and destructive policies in the developing world. B. Highlight the reality of imperialistic Chinese dominance in international politics.
5. <i>Benefits of Chinese racism (i.e., strong in-group identity, success of patriotic appeals, absent culture of self-reflection, ethnocentric policymaking).</i>	A. China has no desire to adjust/change racist worldview. B. China is a closed society. C. As China rises, its racist diplomacy will become more pronounced. D. The threat of China's values and worldview to the national interests of allies and smaller powers.

First, Chinese racism provides empirical evidence of how the Chinese will treat other international actors if the Chinese become dominant. One of the key insights into Chinese future behavior is its behavior in the past.

Analysts do have insight into how China will behave in the future based on its

behavior when it was the hegemon of Asia, the known world as far as China was concerned. China sees itself as the center of the universe, all others are inferior, although there are varying degrees of inferiority. That is not an attractive model of winning allies and influence.

United States defense decision-makers might draw upon the following themes as asymmetrical messages to weaken China's support in the world. The first of these themes should be to advance a "reality check" to the global community: "how do Chinese words match Chinese deeds when it comes to treating people fairly and equally."

The second theme is to introduce fault. "Why do the Chinese refuse to change their racist views of the rest of the world?" Or more succinctly, "Why don't the Chinese like black people; or Indians; or South East Asians; or Latin Americans?" Attention needs to be called to its eugenics policies as well. "Why do the Chinese support eugenics generations after it was discredited in the West?" Likewise, explicit ties to the policies of Nazi Germany may be made since both Berlin and Beijing embraced eugenics, and Beijing still does.

A third theme is to suggest that there is something profoundly wrong with China's worldview: "Why are the Chinese unable to change their racist views?" Or that there is something deeply iniquitous with China itself, there is something immoral with the Chinese people, or with their elite: "Why is

China a racist state?" "Racism has been confronted and defeated worldwide, why is it celebrated in China?"

These themes allow the United States and other states to challenge China's projected image of an oppressed victim of racism with actual empirical reality: China is a racist superpower. It does not equal the horrors of Nazi Germany, but it is far closer to Nazism than it is to the free and tolerant societies found in the West.

The second major implication is that it provided the United States with a major asymmetry in the Third World. Chinese racism allows the United States to undermine China in the Third World.

The essence of the Chinese message to Third World states is a straightforward rhetorical query: Has the United States or the Europeans ever treated you as equals. In contrast, the Chinese say they come to your country, pay a fair price for your commodities, and build your infrastructure with no strings attached.

The United States needs to counter the expansion of Chinese influence by tying in to the messages stated above, but adding the important point that there is no culture of anti-racism in China, and so there is little hope for change. Messages may be advanced along the following line: "The West

confronted racism and developed a strong culture of anti-racism, China has not, nor is it likely to do so.”

Second, the United States should argue that Chinese business practices are destructive. There often is considerable resentment toward the Chinese due to their ruthless business practices, which undercut and destroy African businesses. The combination of the two messages, “China is racist with no culture of anti-racism and their businesses practices are destructive for the locals,” would be most effective in making appeals to the Third World.

Third, it is an obvious point, but it must be made: the Chinese are hypocrites when it comes to race and racial equality. For all of their rhetoric on Africa and their “African brothers,” the cold facts of Chinese racism triumph paeans to “Third World solidarity.”

Fourth, the message of the United States should be: We are better than the Chinese for Africa. We will assist you with economic aid to offset what you receive from China. Culturally, socially, and politically, we are better, we are equal, recognize racial equality, and civil rights.

The third major implication is that it permits a positive image of the United States to be advanced in contrast to China. The direct fact is, when compared with China, it is easy to convey the message to the rest of the world that the United States is open and inclusive, whereas China is not. This

is because to do so is completely in accord with the principles of the United States and its history.

The messages should be, first, the United States seeks the best from around the world, and will permit them to come to the country so that they may prosper, fulfill themselves as individuals, innovate, and, in turn, aid the economic growth and innovation of the United States. Second, the United States opens its society, educational system, universities, military, and economy to immigrants as countless examples demonstrate. Third, it has in place Affirmative Action policies as a matter of state policy that benefits immigrants from racial minorities and/or those who are women. In sum, the United States is one of the most transparent societies in the world for immigrants.

The fourth significant implication for the United States is that calling attention to Chinese racism allows the political and ideological alliances of the United States to be strengthened. The political alliances particularly with Third World states are an obvious benefit. Equally important are the ideological alliances that the United States may augment. Intellectual circles in Europe, Canada, and the United States value multiracial and multicultural societies.

Journalists and media opinion-makers frequently share a multiracial and multicultural vision of their societies as well. Yet, thus far, they have not treated the problem of Chinese racism with the attention it deserves. The “China is a racist state” message of the United States will help win allies in global, popular culture, which is heavily influenced by ideals rooted in Western, left wing political thought, including strong currents of anti-racism. Popular cultural figures from film, music, television, and sports, will be far better able to call attention to China’s racism for younger audiences worldwide than will official or semi-official Washington.

It is to the advantage of the United States to have the world consider the costs of Chinese dominance in order to grasp what will be lost. This is an exercise that most of the world has not done, and so there is no appreciation of what will be lost; or how hypocritical, domineering, and imperialistic China will be.

Fifth, and finally, United States defense decision-makers must recognize that racism is a cohesive force for the Chinese. Racism does benefit the Chinese in four major ways. First, the Han Chinese possess a strong in-group identity with a polarized and tightly defined out group. This allows the Chinese government to expect sacrifice and as well as support from the considerable majority of the Chinese people.

Second, based in this identity, the government has the ability to focus with great willpower on the demands of the state. All governments make patriotic appeals, but the Chinese government is able to do so effectively because any entreaty is based on patriotism as well as nationalism. When we reflect on the tools the Chinese government has to extract support and resources from the population, only one conclusion is possible, they are formidable.

Third, they have strong societal unity and purpose, which supports Chinese power. The Chinese do not have a culture that is self-critical or one that ponders its fundamental faults.

Fourth, China's racism and ethnocentrism serves China's teleological worldview. History, in the Hegelian sense, is moving in China's direction, the future belongs to it, China's political beliefs, civilizational culture, and economic might triumphed over the West.

While racism can be a great strength for China, it also gives the United States an advantage. The lack of any desire by the Chinese to self-reflect on the profound faults of their society means that there is no motivation to solve these faults. Accordingly, a powerful message may be that China will not change because it has no desire to do so. In essence, with China, "what you

see is what you get.” The country is a civilization, and that yields them great strength.

At the same time, there cannot be fundamental change. China is not an open society, transparent and porous for new ideas, that would challenge its core beliefs. For those states and peoples whom the Chinese see as inferior, dissatisfaction with core Chinese beliefs is certain to increase as Chinese power expands. Thus, the United States may tap into that “market of dissatisfaction” by calling attention to China’s lack of flexibility, contempt for, and dismissal of the rest of the world.

Lastly, the United States may make appeals to those actors in international politics who do not desire China to be at the center of the world either, first, because their interests directly conflict with China’s, like India, Japan, Russia, and Vietnam; second, because they resent being excluded from consideration, treated equally, or with respect; or third, because they reject China’s values and worldview.

These insights provide a significant opening for the United States to advance its interests at China’s expense. Washington may explain why its open policies and specific policies to combat racism make it a more attractive ally.

[The United States can take advantage of Chinese racism in its foreign and defense policies](#), as well as in as in the global public sphere. Again, most of the world's opinion makers in the media and popular culture are sensitive to the dangers of racism, and so are more favorably inclined to Washington's policies than Beijing's.

Chinese racism also provides the world with important insights into how the world will look when China is dominant. These insights should add further support for Washington. In sum, [Chinese racism offers the United States specific asymmetries it can exploit](#), for example, [to hinder China's appeal in the Third World](#).

[The conclusion is that endemic Chinese racism offers the United States a major asymmetry it may exploit with major countries, regions like Africa, as well as with important opinion makers in international politics. The United States is on the right side in the struggle against racism and China is not. The United States government, allies, and individual actors like academics should call attention to this to aid Washington's position in international politics.](#)

The United States must be confident enough and have the willpower to advance these messages against China. While it is beyond the scope of this study, the West does indeed have significant influence in China and should

use its power to advance its interests. It is to be expected that the Chinese will always protest, and do so rather vociferously, any statement of fact concerning racism or criticism as interference in Chinese internal affairs.

More significantly, it deserves to be stated plainly that the fate of the country depends to a large extent on decisions made in the West. Sorman stresses this vulnerability when he notes: "Should foreign investment and imports begin to peter out, the Chinese economy would come to a grinding halt. Sixty percent of Chinese exports are carried out by foreign companies, and the Communist Party's survival depends on its ability to maintain a favored relationship with Western decision makers. It is precisely for this reason that the Propaganda Department assiduously woos Western public opinion and tries to buy it off."²⁶⁰

As Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng [魏京生] argues, the fear of losing the vast Chinese market is making people cowards. However, this myopia will not last long, "Sooner or later, the Americans will realize that the Communist Party has been lying to them about everything be it intellectual property, human rights, Taiwan, or its support to North Korea."²⁶¹ The critical question implied by Sorman should be stated in clear terms: "Is a conflict between the United States and China inevitable?" For Wei, "a

²⁶⁰ Sorman, *The Empire of Lies*, p. xxvi.

²⁶¹ Quoted in Sorman, *The Empire of Lies*, p. 6.

showdown is inevitable with the Communist Party but not with the Chinese people. He reminds us that so far, twenty-six dynasties have ruled over China. Now the time for democracy has come."²⁶²

Indeed, in its confrontation with China, the United States needs to take stock of all of its advantages and resources. To advance its interests, the United States may make appeals to those actors in international politics who do not desire China to be at the center of the world either. A large part of this confrontation will be in the realm of ideas, diplomacy, popular culture, and public opinion of United States' allies, the Third World, and in China itself.

The great advantage of the United States is that it is a better society than China, and is a better manager of the interests of allies and the global community than is China. The United States has done far more for the world through its creation of the global economic order, its many humanitarian actions, and the stability that results from its military alliances and power. It is an open, transparent society that welcomes foreigners and permits them to enjoy full civil rights and the prodigious benefits of living in the United States.

But facts will not speak for themselves. Indeed, as this study has demonstrated, there is a great reluctance by many actors to point out the racism of the Chinese. If it is going to be done, it must be done through a

²⁶² Sorman, *The Empire of Lies*, pp. 6-7.

concerted effort. This study is the first contribution to that goal. At the same time, the United States needs to proclaim its considerable strengths to the rest of world. It needs to tap into the resentment that China generates inexorably through its rapid growth and the inevitable strategic hubris and mistakes that accompany such a spectacular rise.

Additional research should be conducted, first, to explore how the messages may be tailored, expanded, or modified to reach all global audiences; second, to illuminate other societal or further weaknesses China possesses that may serve as asymmetries for the United States in its global competition with China; and third, to understand what other strengths the United States possess, whether these are societal or other, non-traditional tools that may be used in the confrontation.

Finally, and most importantly, it must be stated directed: China is a racist state, and is very proud of this fact. This must be recognized to compel all international actors—states, nongovernment organizations, human rights groups, academics, media, popular culture celebrities, and individuals—to think through the consequences of the rise of China for what they value. The commercial lure of China is strong, and the Sino-American competition has many components to be sure. But one, thus far, neglected aspect needs to be highlighted. The Sino-American confrontation has a moral component too. It

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needs to be thought of as a clash between right and wrong, racism and anti-racism, a racist state and an anti-racist one. Just as in the Cold War, the United States is on the right side.

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