

# **THE HOUSTON VICTIM RECONTACT EXPERIMENT**

## **TECHNICAL REPORT**

by

Wesley G. Skogan and Mary Ann Wycoff

**Final Draft Report  
to the  
National Institute of Justice  
The Honorable James K. Stewart, Director**

**July 9, 1985**



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Police Foundation  
Hubert Williams,  
President

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PREFACE

This technical report describes the Houston Police Department's Victim Recontact Program and the evaluation of it conducted by the Police Foundation. As the report describes, the program was developed by a team of Houston police officers. They worked out of the Department's Research and Planning Division, under the direction of the Division Head and the Chief of Police. Without their creativity and cooperation there would have been no program to evaluate. The following members of the Houston Police Department were actively involved in the planning and execution of the program.

Lee Brown, Chief of Police  
John Bales, Assistant Chief  
Frank Yorek, Deputy Chief  
Hiram Contreras, Captain  
Robert Wasserman, Police Administrator

The Fear Reduction Task Force

Sergeant Steve Fowler  
Jerri Jackson                      Don Pardu                      Mara English  
Philip Brooks                      Charles Epperson              Robin Kirk  
Herb Armand                      Alan Tomlinson

Other Victim Recontact Staff

Allen Hughes                      Henry Chisholm

Staff members of the Police Foundation and research consultants were involved in the design and execution of the program evaluation, or gave advice to those who did. They included:

Sampson Annan, Director of Surveys  
Gretchen Eckman, Houston Site Observer  
Antony Pate, Newark Project Director

Research Consultants

Paul Lavrakas                      Albert J. Reiss, Jr.  
Peter Rossi                      Richard Berk  
David Bayley                      Jerome Skolnick

Bonnie Fisher worked at Northwestern University preparing and analyzing the data. Pat Mayhew made useful comments on a very early draft of the report.

The project was supported by the National Institute of Justice. The staff of the Institute provided continuous encouragement and advice. Those actively involved in this project included James K. Stewart, Director, and William Saulsbury, the original project monitor; and Gil Kerlikowske, who inherited the role of project monitor.

The entire project, including the evaluation, was conducted under the direction of Lawrence Sherman, Vice President for Research of the Police Foundation. Patrick V. Murphy, President of the Police Foundation, was active in establishing the Fear Reduction project and representing it to the policing community.

## INTRODUCTION

The program described in this report was one of several strategies tested as part of a Fear Reduction Program which was carried out in Houston, Texas, and Newark, New Jersey, in 1983 and 1984. The police departments in these two cities were invited to design and implement strategies to reduce fear of crime. The Police Foundation, with funding provided by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), provided technical assistance to the departments during the planning phase of the program and conducted rigorous evaluations of the strategies which were developed.

The overall goal of the program was to find new ways to help citizens gain a realistic picture of the crime problems facing their neighborhoods, reduce excessive fear of crime, encourage greater positive police-citizen cooperation in crime prevention, spark increased awareness among people of the steps which they could take to reduce crime, and help restore their confidence in the police and faith in the future of their communities.

In each city a number of different strategies were developed which addressed these issues. Previous research has found crime to be only one of the causes of fear and declining community morale, so those strategies addressed a broad spectrum of issues. Some focused upon reducing physical disorder, including trash and litter, abandoned buildings, graffiti, and deterioration. Others targeted social disorder, including loitering, harassment, disorderly street behavior, and violations of rules of conduct on mass transit. A number were designed to increase the two-way flow of information between citizens and the police. From the police side this included developing new mechanisms to gather information about community problems often of a seemingly "nonpolice" nature, assisting citizens in

organizing to address such problems, and testing new mechanisms to "spread the word" about community programs and the things that individual citizens could do to prevent crime.

Responsibility for planning and implementing the strategies in Houston was given to a planning Task Force, which consisted of a sergeant, four patrol officers, and a civilian member of the department. Each of the patrol officers was directly responsible for the execution of one of the strategies. During the nine-to-twelve month period that the strategies were operational, the original Task Force members assumed total responsibility for implementation. They conducted much of the operational work themselves and coordinated the activities of a few other officers who were involved in program implementation.

## PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VICTIM RECONTACT STRATEGY

The Need for a Victim Program. In March, 1983, the Houston Police Department's Fear Reduction Task Force decided that one element of its program would involve a service for victims of crime. The recontact strategy reflected growing concern in Houston and elsewhere over the fate of victims. Victims traditionally have been the "forgotten participants" in the criminal justice system. They have been valued only for their role in (a) reporting crimes when they occur, and (b) appearing in court as witnesses. Otherwise, they attracted little attention and nowhere any representation of their interests.

However, there is growing interest in crime victims. Their numbers are large--victimization surveys indicate that about one-third of all US households are "touched" by crime in some way during the course of a year (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984). New research has documented the impact of crime on individuals and households. Research on the police has highlighted the extent to which their function is one of dealing (often inadequately) with victims's problems rather than "fighting crime." Police officers who respond to calls are the primary link between victims and the state and any attempt to expand programs for crime victims inevitably will depend upon their cooperation, if not active assistance.

Research on victims has identified four somewhat overlapping categories of crime consequences: economic, physical, social, and psychological. The economic and physical consequences of crime are the easiest to evaluate. In 1981, for example, victimization surveys indicate about 3 in 10 victims of robbery and assault were injured in at least a minor way; however, only about 9 in 100 were injured seriously enough to require medical care. In

the same year, about 75 percent of robberies and 86 percent of burglaries led to financial losses, most under \$250 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1983). These costs of crime were paid most heavily by those who could least afford them, the poor and uninsured.

There is less certainty about the psychological and social impact of victimization. The list of potential psychological consequences of victimization is a long one, including depression, anxiety, loss of control, shame, embarrassment, vulnerability, helplessness, humiliation, anger, shock, awareness of mortality, tension, malaise, and fear. These can be observed in such stress-related physical disorders as nausea, insomnia, headaches, and fatigue. Some studies indicate that victimization can lead to interpersonal problems like extreme mistrust of others, social isolation, difficulty in interacting with family and friends, and an inability to function appropriately at work. (These have been summarized in a recent report of the American Psychological Association's Task Force on the Victims of Crime; see Kahn, 1984.)

Studies of the social and psychological consequences of crime vary in what they find regarding the extent and magnitude of these problems for victims. Those which focus upon selected serious crimes (rape, the survivors of homicide victims) not surprisingly find the effects of victimization to be widespread, deep and long lasting (see, for example, Burgess and Homstrom, 1974). Studies of victims whose cases have advanced through the criminal justice system also encounter many with serious problems, in part because those tend to be violent and more serious offenses. Studies of cases selected more randomly from police files reveal somewhat fewer seriously damaged victims (Maguire, 1980, 1982). Victimization surveys (which describe even more representative cases,

including those which were not reported to the police) suggest that most crimes are relatively trivial in their consequences (Mayhew, 1984).

However, the large number of victimizations uncovered by those surveys means that a small percentage of seriously impacted victims can sum to a large national total (Waller, 1982).

An idea about which there is much agreement but little precise data is that the social and psychological effects of victimization are acted out in "stages" or "phases" following the incident, and that victims have different needs during each period. Symonds (1975, 1976) proposes that these include an "impact" phase (characterized by disorganization and helplessness), a "recoil" phase (sadness, depression, breakdown of social relationships), and "reorganization (modifying behavior, adjusting to the situation). Bard and Sangrey (1979), Salasin (1981), Burgess and Holmstrom (1974), and others have proposed similar typologies, but as yet there is no useful information on the usual timing of these phases, or how they can be anticipated. Some research indicates that most of the emotional consequences of victimization dissipate within a month (Syvrud, 1967), while other studies find them present and even increasing in magnitude several years after the event (Shapland, 1984). Better information on the "life course" of victimization, and how it may vary by type of crime, is critical for planning ways to intervene in those stages to smooth the transition toward recovery.

Since the "discovery of the victim," numerous programs have been developed to provide such assistance. They offer such diverse services as crisis counseling, babysitting, emergency housing or repairs, psychological therapy, transportation, advocacy for victims in the courts, and assistance in filling out insurance and compensation forms. Most are conducted by prosecutor's offices, as an adjunct to the courts (Cronin and Bourque, 1981).

In a recent review of these programs, Waller (1982: 21) concluded "...there is almost no systematic research to support the plausible contention that they meet many of the major needs of crime victims." Studies indicate that victims do not often seek them out, in part because they are unaware of their availability (Friedman, et al., 1982). As an adjunct of the courts, they often are responsible for ensuring the availability of victims as witnesses, and can suffer severe goal conflicts as a result (Weigend, 1983; Chelimsky, 1981).

There is even less systematic information available on the effectiveness of police-centered programs for victims, although there are several in operation in the US and Canada. Waller (1982) reports that some police departments try to refer victims to social service agencies and give out information cards to victims. However, research on victim's relationships with the police indicate that the matter is much more complex. Police officers who respond to their call are the sole contact that the majority of victims have with the criminal justice system, for many crimes are never solved. While surveys indicate that most people have a favorable opinion of the police before such contacts, many come away from the experience unhappy. Victims appear to want information, recognition, advice, and reassurance, and they often do not get it from the police.

Lack of information is their biggest complaint. Victims feel frustrated by a lack of feedback about progress in their case or its probable disposition (Kelly, 1982). They know very little about police or court procedures, and are not certain what is expected of them. Several studies indicate that they have little knowledge about programs available for them or where to turn for assistance with practical problems. Victims also want recognition of their status as an injured party whose condition is



being taken seriously. They like to be listened to. This highlights the importance of the expected "rituals" of policework--questioning neighbors, searching for evidence and fingerprints, filling out forms. Victims also need advice on what to do, assistance with pressing problems, and sympathy. Shapland (1984) found that "...caring and supportive attitudes were the main subject for victim praise."

Ironically, many of the "professional" responses of the police with whom they come in contact are at odds with these needs. Police officers often appear impersonal, if polite. They can be preoccupied with technical efficiency and unwilling to venture an opinion outside of their traditional area of expertise. Often they are forbidden to recommend specific towing companies or repair contractors, as a defense against corruption. Victims, on the other hand, tend to rate police officers by the time and trouble they take to help them out. (Magure, 1982). Patrol officers can be under pressure to quickly complete incident reports and get back "in service"--surely not a victim-oriented definition of police service. There are other inconveniences imposed by the routines of police work as well. For example, victims of theft need their property back, but it is the inclination of the police to keep it locked up in the evidence room, sometimes for years.

Finally, it can be very hard to mandate changes in routine patrol operating procedures. It often proves difficult to get patrol officers to pass out victim information, refer victims to service agencies, or pass along names directly to victim offices.

One very important message of research on victims is that the time taken and the attitude and concern shown by officers--not the traditional standards by which "good policework" is judged--determines citizen satisfaction with the quality of police service.

The Victim Recontact Plan. In this context, the Task Force planned a program for increasing the department's responsiveness to the needs of victims in Houston. The program (which is described in detail later in this report) involved recontacting recent crime victims by telephone. For household crimes like burglary, the complainant was the target of the call. The calls would be conducted by police officers. One of their tasks was to indicate their continuing concern for the victim's plight. The officers were to find out whether victims needed any assistance. They would have on hand an inventory of community and public agencies to which victims could be referred when appropriate. The call would provide an opportunity for citizens to report threats of retaliation, further acts of crime, or even "nonpolice" problems with things like municipal services. The calls could facilitate a two-way exchange of information between victims and the police. The officers would be prepared to offer advice and information on filling out insurance claims and to answer questions about the progress of the case. They also would take reports of any new information which had turned up about the case. They had on hand a number of crime prevention brochures to mail to victims.

Finally--and most important--the Planning Task Force decided that the program would serve all individual and household victims of crime in a program area, not a selected set.

An important assumption behind the Houston program was that it would enhance victims' sense of police "presence" in their neighborhood. The "reassurance" that this presumably provides had made this an often-discussed

goal of police departments, one which is traditionally pursued by the extensive use of visible patrols. This assumption is consistent with some survey data on fear and perceptions of the frequency of police vehicular and foot patrols (Pate and Skogan, 1985; Police Foundation, 1981) although not with others (Kelling, et al, 1974). Vehicle patrols, however, are an expensive way to demonstrate police presence. Contacting victims by telephone might be a more cost-effective way to create a perception of police presence and to provide reassurance to the people who might need it the most.

An important appeal of this strategy was its simplicity and low cost, for victims could be contacted by telephone. It would be conducted from a central site using regular case reports as it's source of names and telephone numbers, so it would not call for changes in regular patrol procedures.

It was anticipated that at the outset the program would require one staff member, and would need no special facilities except a desk, telephone, and filing cabinet. Should this strategy prove effective it could easily be implemented by other police agencies.

As with other Fear Reduction projects the Task Force was planning, it was understood from the beginning that a rigorous outside evaluation would be conducted of the execution of the program and its impact upon the community. The Task Force and the project's manager cooperated fully with the evaluators. The program was organized and carried out so that a strong evaluation design--a true experiment--could be employed to examine its consequences for victims. As described below, only half of the victims whose records flowed into the project's office were contacted; a randomly chosen 50 percent were not. Then, survey interviews were conducted with

both sets of victims to compare their levels of fear and evaluation of police services. Unlike several other Fear Reduction Project strategies which were being evaluated using large surveys of program and comparison areas, this one was not designed to have neighborhood-wide effects. It was anticipated that the impact of the effort would be on the individuals who were contacted, although there might be minor spill-over effects upon their relatives and friends who heard of the program.

The area of the city originally chosen for the project (Federal-Maxey) was approximately one square mile in size, with a 1980 Census population of 3500 persons. Like other Fear Reduction Program target areas in Houston it was racially and ethnically heterogeneous. The area's crime rate for the previous year made it reasonable to expect that within six months about 200 victimizations (the original target figure for the experiment) would be reported to the police from there. Individual and household targets of most Part I offenses were to be contacted, with the exception of rape victims, who were already served by a different program.

Project Organization. The Recontact strategy was directed by a member of the Department's Fear Reduction Planning Task Force, Officer Jerri Jackson. In preparation for conducting the program she reviewed past offense reports for most types of crime, and developed an inventory of information they contained which might prove useful in identifying victim's problems. From this she developed a "Victim Information Form" which could be completed using offense reports, prior to contacting each victim. She also identified personal and other information (e.g., reports of problems with insurance

coverage) which might be obtained from victims when they were contacted, and developed separate telephone questionnaires for each major type of crime which would be used to gather that data. (See Appendices D and E for copies of the Victim Information Form and the crime-specific questionnaires.)

The first interview question asked victims "...how you've been doing since..." the incident. This allowed them to describe emotions or experiences which had resulted from the crime. The final question was, "are there any other problems that I can assist you with?" These and other questions were designed to elicit descriptions of specific problems facing victims. To be able to respond to those problems, Officer Jackson assembled a resource list which identified public and private sources of assistance for a variety of problems. At the time, Houston had no victim assistance program which could provide anything but counseling, so alternative sources of financial and other assistance had to be identified. She also collected crime prevention information which she could mail to those who indicated an interest in receiving it. Since it was apparent that some victims would be very difficult to reach by telephone, she also prepared a letter (Appendix F) explaining the Department's interest in contacting victims. This letter, which was to be mailed to those who could not be reached after several attempts, requested that the victim contact her directly.

As part of her preparation for the project, Officer Jackson observed victim contact programs in San Diego and Santa Ana, California, Police Department.<sup>1</sup>

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1. This was made possible by the technical assistance component of the Police Foundation's grant from the National Institute of Justice.

There she talked with agency personnel about problems in contacting and dealing with victims, and about the kinds of problems they most frequently mentioned. Other than this site visit, neither Officer Jackson nor the officers who later would assist her in running the program received any formal training.

Information Flow. According to the original recontact plan, victims were to be contacted within a week or ten days after each incident. At the district stationhouse, patrol officers were to photocopy incident reports which they had written in the field. These were to be forwarded to the Victim Recontact office. These forms were to be the source of victim's names, telephone numbers, and other information needed to begin the recontacting process. In actual practice the flow of these forms was erratic and created a considerable delay in the program. Despite instructions by the district captain, officers frequently failed to photocopy their incident reports, which were then sent from the stationhouse to the Records Division without coming to the attention of the Recontact Office. In addition (and this may be more unique to Houston), in many instances patrol officers did not "write" incident reports at all; rather, they entered their notes directly into the Department's computer from a terminal at the stationhouse. When they did this they were to print special copies for the Victim Recontact office, but they frequently neglected to do so. Further, in Houston reports of auto thefts are taken by a special centralized telephone unit, which then enters its reports into the computer; delays in their entry process meant that it was often two or three weeks before auto theft reports were available to the Victim Recontact team.

These problems were identified when, after the program had been in operation about three weeks, it seemed that too few reports were flowing to the Recontact Office from the field. A check of the number of forms received against incidents recorded in the central computer confirmed that there were more crimes recorded for the target area than were documented in reports received by the Office. Reminders from the captain did not lead to marked improvement in the rate at which officers made copies of their reports, so the program team turned to the computer as its source of information. They periodically printed their own copies of incident reports for the area. This produced a more complete list of victims, but it extended the time between the commission of the crime and recontact with the victim, since there often was a backlog of handwritten reports awaiting entry by the Records Division. As a result of this delay, only 15 percent of victims could be contacted within seven days of the crime; 45 percent were contacted within two weeks, and 82 percent were contacted within one month of when the crime occurred.

The report-flow problem, the fact that some victims could not be contacted during the day shift when Officer Jackson worked, and a smaller-than-anticipated number of reported crimes in the area, resulted in only 40 victims being contacted during the first four months of the program. In order for the project to be completed and evaluated, and for the personnel assigned to it to be kept usefully busy, steps had to be taken to increase the number of victims contacted each month.



Program Reorganization. Several changes were made. First, the area served by the program was expanded to include the entire 10th police district, an area with a 1980 population of almost 40,000. Based upon the 1980 Census, the district's population was 26 percent white, 24 percent black, 31 percent hispanic, and 18 percent "other." This increase in the size of the catchment area for the program significantly increased the number of victims eligible to participate, and it also made it possible to expand the size of the experimental evaluation. In the end, almost 500 victims were involved in the program, only 40 percent of whom came from the original target area. Two additional officers were assigned to make calls, one to help with the anticipated increase in office business, and the other to extend the program later into the evening when it proved easier to find people at home. The two new officers were trained by Officer Jackson and Sergeant Steven Fowler, leader of the Fear Reduction Task Force.

The Program in Action. An aggressive contact procedure was employed. The original incident reports filled out by responding patrol officers usually recorded both home and work telephone numbers, as well as the victim's addresses. When victims could not be reached in any other way, a letter was sent (see Appendix F) asking them to call the project office. By the beginning of May, 1982, (the 32nd week of the program), contacts had been made with 327 victims.

Many victims proved easy to contact. We have the most systematic data on the 235 contacts who later were involved in the program's evaluation (a subset of the 327 which excluded nonresidents, very young victims, targets



of certain residential and commercial crimes, and others described below). Of the 235 victims, the Recontact Team eventually talked with 93 percent, and only 7 percent fell into the "sent a letter only" category. It took an average of two telephone calls to reach victims who were to be found at all; including the up-to-seven calls which were to be made in an attempt to locate the others, an average of 2.4 calls were made for all cases. Fully 36 percent of all cases could be disposed of on the first telephone call, and a total of 71 percent by a second call. The remaining 29 percent took more effort.

There was considerable variation in how those calls were handled. The three officers involved in the program had different operating styles. Officer Jackson is a black female; the two officers (Chisholm and Hughes) who joined the project later are white males. Officer Jackson was a member of the Fear Reduction Task Force, and appears to have had the best understanding of the program and its objectives. More than the others she focused on communicating concern and support for the victims whom she contacted, and she was considered by observers to be the most compassionate and sympathetic of the group. A sample transcript of one of her contacts with victims is included as Appendix G. Of the two male officers, one sounded somewhat more sympathetic than the other. Thus despite the use of questionnaires to guide the interviewers, victims were exposed to a somewhat varied "treatment," as they would be in any operational program. Twenty-six percent of all contacts were made by the officer who in our judgment seemed to express the least interest in the plight of victims, 30 percent by the

one who seemed most sympathetic, and 44 percent by the officer whose style lay somewhere between the other two.

The principal form of advice that the team gave to victims concerned crime prevention. Of the 218 victims who were contacted, 189 were sent crime prevention brochures. However, when questioned, two-thirds of those contacted indicated that they did not need any other form of assistance. Only 9 cases actually involved referral to another agency; 2 each to counseling and legal assistance agencies, and 5 to "other" places which were not specifically recorded. Several other victims (26) even declined the offer of a crime prevention brochure. This has implications for the findings of the evaluation, as we shall see below.

Differences in the personal qualities of the Victim Recontact staff may be seen in one large difference between them in the interviewing process. The most sympathetic member of the team elicited twice as many reports of problems as did the other two (54 percent, as opposed to 26 percent). This suggests that the level of staff training and commitment to the program may play an important role in determining its success in identifying victims in need of aid. The importance of training and supervision was also highlighted in a randomized experiment evaluating the impact of home security surveys. Rosenbaum (1983) found the program increased levels of fear among participants. He attributed this to the style of implementing officers, who were prone to make remarks like "there sure is a lot of burglary in this neighborhood," and "maybe you should move."

The Victim Recontact program did feature substantial information exchange. Over one-quarter of those contacted provided the police with

further information about their case. Most relayed new information on stolen property (serial numbers, etc.), or descriptions of additional stolen property. A number provided the police with names and addresses of witnesses of the crime who had not been identified by patrol officers who responded to the initial complaint. Finally, a few victims provided descriptions of new suspects. All of this information was recorded on supplemental report forms and forwarded to appropriate divisions in the department.

Who Were the Victims? Table 1 describes the background of victims who were interviewed as part of the evaluation. It compares them to adults interviewed at a random sample of addresses in all five of the Fear Reduction Program's matched program and comparison areas in Houston.

Table 1 illustrates how these victims differed from, and resembled, the general population of similar areas of Houston. For example, the victim group is made up of more males and fewer high school graduates. These differences turn out to be attributable to the personal crime victims in the group. On the other hand, victims had a somewhat higher income level than the general population, and they were more likely to be long term residents and working full time. Much of this is linked to the characteristics of property crime victims in the sample. There was a close match between the two groups in terms of marital status and race.

Some Lessons Learned about Operations. This test of the Victim Recontact strategy for responding to citizen's concern about crime has some

lessons about how to organize such an effort. The Houston experience suggests:

- allocate personnel across shifts to match the times when victims can be found at home. Recontact efforts were most successful during the late afternoon and early evening (4:00-8:00 p.m), the Evening Watch of most police agencies.
- make a careful estimate of the workload which is anticipated for the Recontact team. This will involve crime analysis, matching the size of the program's target area and the projected number of recorded crimes there to the number of available personnel.
- assign the project an adequate, secure space for reviewing and storing incident reports and interview records, and a private and quiet location for conducting victim interviews. Such space can be hard to come by in a busy district stationhouse.
- make careful provision for the flow of information about victims to the Recontact office, and the reverse flow of new information from the Recontact team to the Records Division, Detectives, Community Relations, and other divisions of the department. It may be difficult to get this flow to function in a timely manner.
- training and commitment is essential for a successful program. Personnel assigned to make calls should be trained in how to conduct such interviews and in the resources at their disposal to deal with problems they uncover.
- train patrol officers about the program, and give them material to give to victims who seem to need assistance. The Recontact team was surprisingly successful in leaving messages or sending letters and having victims call them in return. Give victims early information about a place to call.

What it would cost another agency to conduct a Victim Recontact Program is difficult to estimate. Because of the evaluation, the Houston team completed a great deal of paperwork which would not be necessary for a routine program. A Police Service Officer was assigned to assist Officer Jackson because of this paperwork. However, even without an evaluation it would be important for the contacting officer to study incident reports before making calls, and to keep track of the call-backs which a successful project would require. Added to the average of about 2.5 calls per case,

Table 1

Characteristics of Victims and Residents of Matched Houston Program Areas:  
Survey Findings

Characteristics	Victims	Five Areas
Percent Male	60	49
Percent Black	26	27
Percent White	48	51
Percent Hispanic	24	20
Percent High School Graduate	51	68
Percent Income Over \$15,000	68	62
Percent Lived In Under 3 Years	40	50
Percent Work Full Time	72	62
Percent Married	57	56
(Number of Cases)	(351)	(2240)

and budgeting for an occasional foray to uncover additional "lost" incident reports, it appears that each completed contact might consume 60 minutes of staff time.

#### EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

In order to evaluate the effects of Houston's Victim Recontact Program, crime victims were selected on a random basis to be called by the program office or assigned to a noncontacted control group. Randomization into treatment and control categories helped equate these groups of victims on such theoretically important factors as sex, race, and type of victimization. This randomization process helped clarify the impact of the program upon victim's fear of crime, their assessment of police performance, and other potential consequences of the program.

It is important in field experiments that operational personnel not make decisions--even "random" ones--on the basis of their reading of a case. Rather, a system must be developed to control the assignment of cases as they "trickle in" which makes a true random allocation and enables the integrity of the assignment to be monitored by outsiders (Goldman, 1977).

Two procedures were employed to make these random assignments. During the first three months of the Recontact Program, assignment was based upon a digit embedded in each incident's case identification number which was effectively random; even numbered cases were to be contacted, while odd numbered cases were not. This procedure, which determined the assignment of the first 69 cases to enter the office, proved clumsy and seemingly ineffective (an inexplicably large proportion of the early cases fell into the nontreatment control group). So a change was made in the case assignment process. The remaining 416 incidents which came into the office were assigned on the basis of the date on which they occurred; those which

took place on even numbered days were to be contacted, while those which occurred on odd-numbered days were not. This proved to be an easy-to-follow allocation rule, and one which was simple for the evaluation team to monitor. There were only two misassigned cases, which are excluded from this analysis. There is no reason to expect day number to be confounded with the nature of crime incidents, the attributes of victims, or the impact of the program. There typically are more incidents reported to police departments on Fridays and Saturdays than on other days of the week, and over the 32 weeks of the evaluation weekend days were balanced between odd and even dates. (Midnight marked a shift in the treatment status).

The Recontact team contacted 327 victims of virtually all of the incidents which took place in their expanded target area in Houston. However, for purposes of the evaluation only a subset of victims were considered targets for later interviewing. The following incidents and victims were included and excluded from the formal evaluation:

- Only victims 13 years of age and older were included.
- Only residents of Houston at the time of the incident were included.
- Victims of fraud (e.g. unpaid taxi drivers) and "pigeon-drop" victims (there were 2) were excluded.
- Only victims of noncommercial incidents were included. Businesses and organizations (e.g., churches) were excluded, although individuals who personally were the targets of commercial robberies (clerks and store owners) were included.
- Victims of rape and the survivors of homicide victims were excluded, for they fell into the jurisdiction of other programs.
- Participants in another Fear Reduction Project experiment being conducted in the area (the police-community newsletter study) were excluded by checking victim's addresses against a master list of the

small random sample of addresses involved in that experiment. As the Victim Recontact Program's cases came from a much larger area, there were only a few overlaps.

#### THE SAMPLE

Including only the types of cases and victims described above (and excluding the two misassigned cases), this procedure yielded an evaluation sample of 485 persons, 250 in the uncontacted control group and 235 in the treatment category.<sup>2</sup> There were a few multiple victims, persons from the target area who reported two separate incidents on various mixtures of odd and even-numbered days. They were included in the treatment category if any of those incidents fell on an even day and they were eligible for a follow up contact; otherwise, they were in the control group. Property thefts predominated in this area; only 18 percent of the 485 victims were involved in assault or robbery incidents. Of the assaults, less than 30 percent were classed by the Houston police as felonies involving serious injury or a firearm. Virtually all of the robberies were armed robbery cases. The largest category of offenses (202 cases, or 42 percent of the total) encompassed vehicle-related property crimes. These involved thefts of vehicles (136 cases), thefts of packages or goods out of them (62), and thefts of parts or accessories from them (3). Other simple thefts accounted for only 44 cases, less than 10 percent of the total. There were 149 residential burglaries (31 percent of the total), perhaps the most serious type of incident in the property crime group.

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<sup>2</sup> Both methods of group assignment described above were used. The small number of victims assigned using the incident-digit procedure did not differ from those assigned using the incident-date procedure.



The randomization procedure appears to have equated the treatment and nontreatment groups of victims on a variety of important factors. These comparison variables were gleaned from police incident reports filled out at the time of the incident, and thus were independent of any later effects of the program. Table 2 details the statistical significance of these treatment-control group comparisons. Some (race, sex, age) reflect the social backgrounds of victims, but because it comes from offense reports much of the information in Table 2 relates to various features of the crimes in which they were involved. These include injury, victim-offender relationships, weapon use, and whether or not the police report indicated the victim was suffering any form of shock (crying, screaming, etc.) As Table 2 indicates, the only significant difference between the two groups concerned the presence of a weapon (but not necessarily its use) during the crime. Weapons were more likely to have been involved in control cases than in treatment cases, although they were not present very frequently in either. By this measure only, control cases were somewhat more serious than treatment cases. Otherwise, there were no significant differences between the two groups.

#### EVALUATION SURVEY INTERVIEWS

Data for evaluating Houston's Victim Recontact program were obtained in personal interviews with these victims. Because they were randomly divided into treatment and control conditions, differences in responses between the two groups of victims can be attributed to the effect of the program.

Table 2

Relationship Between Treatment Status and Selected Victim and Incident Characteristics

Comparisons of Control and Treatment Groups

	Control	Treatment		Control	Treatment
Crime Type			Injury		
Theft	8	11	None	88	88
Vehicle	42	42	Minor	8	6
Burglary	29	32	Hospital	5	6
Assault	13	11		101%	100%
Robbery	8	5		(p = .76)	
	100%	101%	Relationship		
	(p = .36)		Stranger	83	88
Race			Not Stranger	17	12
White	47	50		100%	100%
Black	23	23		(p = .17)	
Hispanic	27	24	Weapon present		
Other	3	3	No weapon	88	94
	100%	100%	Weapon	12	6
	(p = .77)			100%	100%
				(p = .05)	
Sex			Age Category:		
Male	58	57	13-25	26	28
Female	42	43	26-32	28	28
	100%	100%	33-49	30	26
	(p = .83)		50-87	17	18
				100%	100%
				(p = .94)	
Shock Mentioned					
No	98	97			
Yes	2	3			
	100%	100%			
	(p = .50)				

Chi-square tests of significance. There were 250 persons in the control group and 235 persons in the treatment group

During the course of the project, copies of all incident forms, notes on victim contacts, and project paperwork were forwarded on a regular basis to the evaluators. These were screened for completeness and compliance with the randomization procedure. Each sample case was assigned a unique identification number. At the beginning of the interviewing period, basic information necessary for locating victims was forwarded to the Police Foundation's survey interviewing team in Houston. Neither the interviewers nor the on-site survey field director were told the treatment or control status of victims in the sample, or any other details about the respondents. That information could be linked to sample names only through the identification number. Interviewers knew that the sample consisted of persons who had been victimized and that the police department was the source of their names and addresses. If respondents asked the interviewers how they were selected for questioning or how their names and other data were obtained, they were to be told that interviews were being conducted "with persons who had contacted the Houston police." If a respondent asked, it was to be noted in a checkbox on the questionnaire; 43 percent were given this information.

Interviewing began in March of 1984. The Police Department's Victim Recontact team continued to process treatment and control incidents throughout most of the interviewing period, and the last survey interviews (with the final treatment and control cases to pass through the Recontact Office) were concluded in mid-July. About 25 interviewers were employed in this effort. They were trained in advance of the interview period, and were supervised by an on-site survey manager. The interviewers were an

experienced team, and also were conducting interviews evaluating other Police Foundation experiments. They always attempted to make their first contact with a respondent with a personal visit, proceeded by an advance letter introducing the survey. Every effort was made to locate sample victims, even if they had moved some distance. A large number of follow-up contacts were required in every case, and cases were abandoned as "noncompletions" only after individual review and authorization by the survey manager. Independent verification contacts were made for one-third of the completed interviews.

In the end, interviews were completed with 72 percent of the sample, including 74 percent of treatment cases and 70 percent of control cases. The somewhat higher completion rate for the treatment group is to be expected, for as the Recontact Team made their telephone calls they sometimes needed to find new addresses and phone numbers for victims in this group. The evaluation interviewers attempted to do the same thing later for both groups, but it was some months later and such information could be more difficult to find. One completed evaluation interview was dropped because it could not be verified. There are therefore a total of 351 survey interviews available for analysis, 176 in the control group and 175 in the treatment group. Table 3 describes the distribution of completed and noncompleted interviews for treatment and control groups, and for other key variables.

As illustrated in Table 3, there were relatively few outright refusals by victims to cooperate in the study (only 4 percent). More often, interviewers were unable to find anyone at an address after many visits (9

Table 3  
Disposition of Sample Cases in Follow-Up  
Evaluation Survey

Attribute	Completed Interview	Survey Victim Refused	Disposition Made Maximum Calls	Other	(N)	Sigf.*
Control Group	70	5	8	16	(250)	.35
Treatment Group	74	3	10	12	(235)	
Theft Cases	72	5	9	14	(247)	.04
Burglary Cases	79	4	5	12	(149)	
Personal Crimes	64	1	16	19	(89)	
White	71	5	9	15	(245)	.46
Black	77	4	6	12	(112)	
Hispanic	68	3	14	15	(107)	
Other races	86	0	0	14	(21)	
Male	74	3	11	12	(278)	.09
Female	70	5	7	18	(207)	
Age 13-25	70	5	8	16	(121)	.51
Age 26-32	71	5	12	12	(125)	
Age 33-49	70	5	6	18	(125)	
Age 50-87	80	1	9	10	(79)	
Total	72	4	9	14	(485)	

\*Chi-square tests of significance

percent). More uncompleted interviews were attributed to "need language other than English or Spanish" (interviews were conducted in both), and "respondent moved-unable to locate," both coded as "other" in Table 3.

Table 3 also examines the disposition of sample cases by type of incident and the characteristics of victims. The only significant difference was for type of crime; there were fewer than average completions with victims of personal crimes, and somewhat more with victims of burglary. Again this is not unexpected, for the residence of victims is much more firmly established in the latter case, while many of these targets of personal crime were victimized away from home. Otherwise, there was a tendency for older victims and males to be easier to locate, but the differences were not statistically different from chance.

This "success" rate of 72 percent is roughly comparable with other studies which attempt to locate and interview crime victims. For example, between 1970 and 1972 the U.S. Census Bureau conducted similar interviews with samples of crime victims selected from police files in Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and San Diego. The Bureau's completion rates in these surveys were 67 percent, 69 percent, and 64 percent, respectively. The completion rate was higher than some comparable nongovernmental efforts. In 1980, New York City's Victim Services Agency also carried out an interview study of samples of recent victims selected from police files. They paid victims for participating. In that study, interviews were completed with 15 percent of the sample (Friedman, et al., 1982).

In the end, the critical issues are, "is the interview sample statistically different from the original sample?" and if so, "will differences between them lead us to make false conclusions about the effect of the program?" The first question is addressed in Table 4, which compares

the original sample and the interviewed sample on some key factors which could be identified on police incident reports. Table 4 suggests that the high completion rate and relatively even disposition of noncompletions across key variables in this survey led the interviewed group to resemble closely the total sample. None of the sample-completion comparisons made in Table 4 are close to significantly different, and no differences are greater than 3 percentage points.

#### MEASURING THE PROGRAM'S CONSEQUENCES

The impact of Houston's Victim Recontact program upon victims was assessed using their own responses to the survey. As discussed above, four general consequences of being recontacted were anticipated:

1. Victims' fear of crime would be reduced;
2. victims' commitment to their neighborhood as a place to live would increase;
3. victims' satisfaction with the quality of police service would be enhanced;
4. victims would take more positive measures to protect their home from re-victimization.

The evaluation survey was designed to measure each of these potential consequences of the program. Questions directed at fear, residential commitment, satisfaction with policing, and crime prevention activities were either written (a few) or drawn from previous studies of these topics (most). The questionnaire was structured to lead respondents through a discussion of their neighborhood, perceptions about, and fear of, crime in the area, victimization experiences, assessments of the program and of the

Table 4  
Comparison of Original Sample and Interview Sample

Characteristic	Original Sample Percent	(N)	Interview Sample Percent	(N)	X <sup>2</sup> Sigf. of Difference
Control	52	(250)	50	(176)	.74
Treatment	48	(235)	50	(175)	
Theft	9	(44)	8	(29)	.80
Vehicle	42	(203)	42	(147)	
Burglary	31	(149)	34	(118)	
Assault	12	(58)	10	(34)	
Robbery	6	(31)	7	(23)	
White	48	(235)	47	(164)	.95
Black	23	(112)	24	(86)	
Hispanic	25	(122)	25	(88)	
Other race	3	(16)	4	(13)	
Male	57	(287)	59	(207)	.68
Female	43	(207)	41	(144)	
Age 13-25	27	(121)	26	(85)	.93
Age 26-32	28	(125)	27	(89)	
Age 33-49	28	(125)	27	(88)	
Age 50-87	18	(79)	19	(63)	
Not injured	88	(429)	91	(318)	.76
Injured	12	(56)	9	(33)	
Stranger	85	(413)	87	(305)	.54
Not Stranger	15	(72)	13	(46)	
No Weapon	90	(440)	92	(322)	.70
Weapon present	9	(45)	8	(29)	

Chi-square tests of significance



police in general, and to gather details about them and their household. (A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix C of this report.)

Three measures of fear of crime were developed, each of which was based upon responses to several individual survey questions. All described in some length in Appendix B. The first measure of fear was dubbed fear of personal victimization, for it combined responses to four questions about how fearful respondents felt out alone in their area at night, if there were places nearby they were afraid to walk, and how worried they were about being robbed and attacked in the area. The second fear measure focused upon local personal crime problems which were not necessarily personalized. Responses to three questions asking "how much of a problem" assault, robbery, and rape were in the area were combined to form this indicator of fear. Finally, responses to five other questions covering worry about and the extent of area problems with various forms of burglary and theft were combined to form an index of concern about property crime.

One general measure of satisfaction with police services is employed in this analysis. It combined responses to questions which cover:

- How good a job police do preventing crime.
- How good a job police do helping victims.
- How politely police deal with people.
- How helpful police are when dealing with people.
- How fairly police treat people.

The evaluation survey also asked about six specific measures that people can take to protect their household and property. These ranged from installing better locks on doors and windows and marking valuable property to asking neighbors to watch one's home if it is going to stand empty for some length of time. Four other questions examined the tendency of respondents to take measures to protect themselves from personal crime.

These included avoiding certain people and places, going out with an escort, and avoiding going out at all after dark. This is a behavioral measure of fear.

Finally, respondents to three survey questions were combined to form an index of satisfaction with area. They inquired if the area had gotten better or worse, if it was likely to get better or worse in the future, and how satisfied respondents were with the area as "a place to live."

Appendix B describes in detail the content of these measures and the way in which they were created, and presents estimates of their reliability. Because they combined responses to several questions, the resulting scales took on a wide range of values. These were distributed relatively normally, and seem usefully to approximate the assumption of simply OLS regression.

Past research indicates that answers to questions like these are firmly rooted in people's race, sex, age, and other demographic attributes, so deeply so that some have questioned whether they are in fact even responsive to transient experiences or program interventions (Bielby and Berk, 1980). Responses to these measures do appear to be sensitive to the immediate victimization experiences of individuals. Similar data (using virtually the same questionnaire) were collected from samples of the general population in four program and control areas in Houston. The respondents were interviewed twice, which allowed an analysis of the impact of victimization which occurred between the two interviews, by comparing it to changes in levels of fear, concern, perceptions of crime, area satisfaction, and crime-related behaviors. All of these fear, perceptual, and behavioral measures shifted in response to recent experience with crime. This finding persisted when other factors, including even experience with crime prior to the first interview, were controlled for (Skogan, forthcoming). Of course, this does not demonstrate that these measures are responsive to planned interventions --that can only be determined by conducting experiments like this one.

### OTHER FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE OUTCOMES

Although randomization was the basic tool for isolating the impact of the Victim Recontact Program upon victims in Houston, it was important to examine the influence of other factors as well. There are two reasons for this. First, fear of crime, perceptions of the police, crime prevention activity, and satisfaction with one's neighborhood are strongly related to a number of features of people's lives and to other experiences which they may have had. It is therefore useful to control for those factors, to highlight any additional effect of the program upon measures of those outcomes. Then we need not simply depend upon the similarity of large samples to "cancel out" differences in those things between treatment and control groups. Second, it may be that this and other programs affect some kinds of people or victims of some kinds of crimes, but not others. This can be very complicated to determine, for there were many types of people and crimes involved in this project, but taking some of those elements of the situation into account might further clarify the effects of the program.

Here is a brief list of the major "other" factors which were examined in some detail:

- Type and seriousness of crime.
- Incident location and victim-offender relationships.
- Other recent victimization experiences, and knowledge of local crime.
- Other recent contacts with the police, especially encounters initiated by the police.
- Victims' personal and household characteristics, including race, sex, age, income, home ownership, education, and length of residence.
- Linguistic and cultural differences which might inhibit the clear exchange of information between the police and citizens.

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS

Because victims were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, the simplest test of the impact of the program is to compare the average scores of the two groups on the outcome measures of interest. Because there is variation around the mean for each group (people in them have both higher and lower scores), a test of significance is required to tell us if differences in the groups means really are significant (different from chance). Mean scores, standard deviations, and tests of significance are presented for all seven outcome measures in Table 5.

Table 5 indicates that there was only one significant difference between victims who were recontacted and those who were not. Those who were contacted were significantly more likely to perceive area problems with personal crime. (This difference is very robust, as we shall see in analyses to follow.) There were no significant (or even close to significant) differences between the two groups on the other two measures of fear, no differences in reports of household or personal precautions against victimization, and no differences in perceptions of the quality of police service.<sup>3</sup>

Appendix A of this report presents supporting statistical tables which provide more detailed analyses of these data. They report mean differences

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<sup>3</sup> The statistical "power" of a test of significance can be low--and thus misleading--if there is a great deal of error in measurement, if sample sizes are small, or if there is a great deal of within-group variance in the measures. Those factors can outweigh even large true differences between treatment and control-group means. However, none of these factors seem to be overriding here, and differences between the groups are tiny in any event. (See: Medlar, et al., 1981; Crane, 1976).

Table 5  
 Mean Outcome Scores for Treatment and Control Groups

Outcome Scale	Mean Scores (Standard deviations)		Significance of Difference*
	Control	Treatment	
Fear of area personal victimization	1.64 (.616)	1.67 (.604)	.58
Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	1.57 (.570)	1.69 (.601)	.05
Concern about area property crime	2.11 (.614)	2.18 (.602)	.30
Satisfaction With Area	2.23 (.626)	2.17 (.619)	.36
Evaluation Of Police Service	3.18 (.706)	3.22 (.756)	.61
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	.397 (.334)	.399 (.341)	.95
Household Crime Prevention Measures	.703 (.458)	.680 (.468)	.64

\*One-tailed t-tests of the significance of mean differences

between treatment and control groups on responses to each of the component questions which make up these summary scale scores. They further support the conclusions illustrated in Table 5. Responses to all of the component questions which make up the area personal crime problems measure were higher for the recontacted group, although only one was significantly so. An examination of all twelve questions which make up the three fear measures (two personal, one property) indicates that nine of them point to higher levels of fear among the treatment group (but few significantly so), while only three of them (none significantly) point to lower levels of fear among those who were recontacted. These survey data therefore strongly suggest that Houston's Victim Recontact Program had none of the positive benefits for victims which were initially hypothesized, and the only significant effect of the program ran counter to its expectations.

#### MULTIVARIATE TESTS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS

As indicated above, it is often useful to extend the analysis of the effects of an experimental program to take into account what is known about the problem upon which it focuses. In a true experiment with a sufficiently large sample, mean differences between groups (or the lack thereof) may be persuasive evidence of program effects. However, there are other important causes of the outcome measures of interest here. Women are more fearful of crime and do more to avoid personal victimization than do men. The elderly report high levels of fear on some measures, are much less likely than others to expose themselves to risk, and generally have very positive views of the police. Blacks generally report being more fearful and less

supportive of the police than do whites, and the type of crime in which victims are involved makes a great deal of difference in their emotional responses. There has been a great deal of research on the correlates of fear, perceptions of neighborhood, satisfaction with the police, and crime-related behaviors among city dwellers (c.f. Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). This research indicates "other causes" of these outcomes have substantial effects on most of the measures employed in this evaluation.

These correlates of naturally occurring (as opposed to experimentally manipulated) variation in the outcome measures of an experiment are sometimes call "disturbances" in those outcomes (Judd and Kenny, 1981). That is, they are an uncontrolled source of variation in the measures which "join in" with the (presumed) influence of the experimental intervention to determine their level. [In addition, there are some (perhaps random) disturbances in the measures which are attributable to measurement error; this is discussed briefly in Appendix B.] Statistically, one can improve the "efficiency" of an estimate of the impact of an experimental intervention by controlling for those disturbances in outcome measures. Because those other known sources of variation are thus accounted for, remaining variation in outcomes which might be related to the intervention can be more accurately estimated. This works because age, sex, type of victimization, and other factors which generally influence fear and behavior are randomly distributed with regard to the treatment, in a true experiment.

Those controls are introduced here using multiple regression. Table 6 lists a relatively long list of measures which were controlled for in this



way. It includes 27 indicators of 22 different constructs; some, like race and type of crime require multiple indicators to capture all of their important categories. These measures were included in a regression analysis, along with one for treatment or control status, to account for their distinct relationship to fear, reports of behavior, community attachment, and perceptions of the police.

The critical piece of information in each column of Table 6 is at the top.<sup>4</sup> The first row reports the statistical significance of the treatment measure when other factors are taken into account. Those tests simply reinforce the conclusion drawn from the analysis of mean differences: the recontact program appears to have had an effect only upon perceptions of area problems with personal crime, and it is a positive effect which is contrary to the program's goal. If anything, this analysis finds the effect is more significant than indicated at first. Otherwise, controlling for other factors which in the past have been correlated with these outcome measures does not reveal any significant program effects.<sup>5</sup>

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4. Otherwise, do not pay attention to the coefficients attached to any particular independent variable. They are a "laundry list" of factors which have been shown to be variously related to the different dependent variables, and not all are of interest in any particular case. They are intercorrelated, often highly so when they are dummy codes for different categories of the same construct, some are redundant, and none is a useful test of a substantive "fear of crime" hypothesis.

5. Regressing treatment status on these 27 indicators revealed that in multivariate combination the "victim-offender relationship" measure was significantly correlated with treatment condition. All of these analyses were therefore rerun without that indicator, for it was presumably capturing some treatment effect and thus leading us to underestimate the impact of the program. However, removing it had no effect except to increase somewhat the significance of the program's effect upon perceptions of area personal crime problems.



Regression Analysis of Outcome Measures  
Using Treatment Status and Covariates

Explanatory Factors	Fear of Area Personal Victimization		Perceived Area Personal Crime Problems	
	Beta	(sigf.)	Beta	(sigf.)
Treatment Status	.06	(.24)	.14	(.003)
Crime Type				
Burglary victim	-.02	(.83)	.02	(.76)
Personal victim	-.16	(.08)	-.04	(.64)
Seriousness				
Weapon present	.06	(.50)	.19	(.03)
Gun present	-.04	(.60)	-.15	(.07)
Injury level	.12	(.07)	.08	(.24)
Shock reported	.01	(.77)	.14	(.003)
Loss over \$100	-.10	(.07)	-.02	(.66)
Incident Features				
At or near home	.11	(.13)	-.10	(.18)
Know offenders	-.15	(.005)	-.10	(.07)
Other Victimization				
Total number	.26	(.001)	.27	(.001)
Number violent	-.02	(.68)	-.04	(.55)
Number predatory	.10	(.08)	-.01	(.90)
Know assault victim	.16	(.006)	.12	(.03)
Know robbery victim	.06	(.32)	.15	(.01)
Know burglary victim	-.00	(.96)	.01	(.79)
Personal Attributes				
Sex - female	.29	(.001)	.16	(.01)
Age	.15	(.01)	.08	(.19)
Education	-.06	(.25)	.09	(.09)
Length of residence	-.01	(.92)	.10	(.15)
Marital - single	-.05	(.34)	-.01	(.83)
Black	.01	(.83)	-.10	(.06)
Hispanic	.01	(.83)	.02	(.66)
Asian or other	.06	(.24)	.04	(.42)
Rent home	.01	(.92)	.13	(.02)
Know families in the area (count) (log)	-.02	(.68)	.07	(.18)
Proactive contact with police	.03	(.53)	.06	(.23)
Elapsed time between crime and survey (log)	-.06	(.25)	-.03	(.55)
2 R = adj (N)	.27 (350)		.25 (350)	

Table 6 - continued

Regression Analysis of Outcome Measures  
Using Treatment Status and Covariates

Explanatory Factors	Concern About Area Property Crime Problems		Satisfaction With Area	
	Beta	(sig.)	Beta	(sig.)
Treatment Status	.04	(.39)	-.05	(.33)
Crime Type				
Burglary victim	-.05	(.51)	-.03	(.72)
Personal victim	-.04	(.68)	.08	(.43)
Seriousness				
Weapon present	-.02	(.79)	-.10	(.30)
Gun present	.00	(.96)	.11	(.19)
Injury level	.01	(.92)	-.07	(.29)
Shock reported	.13	(.01)	-.09	(.07)
Loss over \$100	.07	(.23)	.06	(.31)
Incident Features				
At or near home	.10	(.20)	-.12	(.12)
Know offenders	-.04	(.46)	.09	(.09)
Other Victimization				
Total number	.39	(.001)	-.28	(.001)
Number violent	-.06	(.35)	.15	(.01)
Number predatory	.01	(.82)	.02	(.71)
Know assault victim	.01	(.80)	-.20	(.001)
Know robbery victim	.11	(.05)	-.03	(.59)
Know burglary victim	.16	(.002)	-.06	(.26)
Personal Attributes				
Sex - female	-.07	(.17)	.05	(.36)
Age	-.12	(.04)	-.03	(.67)
Education	-.03	(.55)	.03	(.58)
Length of residence	.10	(.14)	-.12	(.07)
Marital - single	-.10	(.06)	.05	(.37)
Black	-.08	(.14)	-.08	(.14)
Hispanic	.02	(.76)	.09	(.12)
Asian or other	.06	(.25)	.03	(.53)
Rent home	.04	(.50)	-.06	(.34)
Know families in the area (count) (log)	.06	(.28)	.06	(.29)
Proactive contact with police	.05	(.30)	.09	(.07)
Elapsed time between crime and survey (log)	-.09	(.08)	.11	(.04)
2 R = adj (N)	.24 (350)		.19 (350)	

Table 6 - continued

Regression Analysis of Outcome Measures  
Using Treatment Status and Covariates

Explanatory Factors	Evaluation of Police Service		Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	
	Beta	(sigf.)	Beta	(sigf.)
Treatment Status	.03	(.53)	.05	(.33)
Crime Type				
Burglary victim	.06	(.48)	.24	(.003)
Personal victim	.10	(.31)	.09	(.35)
Seriousness				
Weapon present	-.11	(.27)	-.09	(.32)
Gun present	.06	(.49)	.02	(.79)
Injury level	.06	(.38)	-.01	(.84)
Shock reported	-.09	(.11)	.05	(.30)
Loss over \$100	.04	(.54)	-.04	(.50)
Incident Features				
At or near home	-.06	(.47)	-.11	(.17)
Know offenders	.03	(.62)	-.05	(.38)
Other Victimization				
Total number	-.25	(.001)	.22	(.001)
Number violent	.06	(.34)	.00	(.98)
Number predatory	-.02	(.74)	.13	(.04)
Know assault victim	-.05	(.41)	.00	(.95)
Know robbery victim	-.02	(.75)	.02	(.75)
Know burglary victim	-.08	(.17)	-.02	(.70)
Personal Attributes				
Sex - female	.06	(.30)	.30	(.001)
Age	.17	(.01)	.07	(.24)
Education	.02	(.79)	-.05	(.37)
Length of residence	.03	(.67)	.00	(.98)
Marital - single	.00	(.97)	-.08	(.12)
Black	-.11	(.05)	.07	(.17)
Hispanic	-.02	(.68)	.06	(.25)
Asian or other	-.04	(.52)	.04	(.56)
Rent home	.02	(.75)	.04	(.52)
Know families in the area (count) (log)	.10	(.09)	-.06	(.23)
Proactive contact with police	-.04	(.43)	-.01	(.86)
Elapsed time between crime and survey (log)	.08	(.14)	-.05	(.33)
2 R = adj (N)	.09 (350)		.21 (350)	

Table 6 - continued

Regression Analysis of Outcome Measures  
Using Treatment Status and Covariates

Explanatory Factors	Count of Household Crime Prevention Measures	
	Beta	(sigf.)
Treatment Status	-.03	(.62)
Crime Type		
Burglary victim	.11	(.18)
Personal victim	.14	(.15)
Seriousness		
Weapon present	-.30	(.002)
Gun present	.15	(.09)
Injury level	-.18	(.02)
Shock reported	-.02	(.70)
Loss over \$100	-.06	(.28)
Incident Features		
At or near home	.08	(.29)
Know offenders	.07	(.22)
Other Victimization		
Total number	.06	(.32)
Number violent	.12	(.07)
Number predatory	-.08	(.22)
Know assault victim	-.02	(.73)
Know robbery victim	.18	(.01)
Know burglary victim	.00	(.98)
Personal Attributes		
Sex - female	.00	(.94)
Age	-.17	(.01)
Education	.09	(.13)
Length of residence	.14	(.04)
Marital - single	-.09	(.12)
Black	-.01	(.92)
Hispanic	.01	(.80)
Asian or other	-.03	(.60)
Rent home	-.10	(.10)
Know families in the area (count) (log)	.08	(.14)
Proactive contact with police	-.00	(.92)
Elapsed time between crime and survey (log)	-.03	(.60)
2 R = adj (N)	.13    (350)	

## PROGRAM EFFECTS ON SUBGROUPS OF VICTIMS

There is a final form of analysis which often proves useful in the evaluation of programs: it asks the question, "does the program appear to have a (larger) effect upon particular kinds of clients?" Often a program or policy may prove more relevant to or useful for some groups of people, and less for others. This may be linked somehow to who they are or the nature of their problems. Statistically, such effects are known as "treatment-covariate interactions."

Often hypotheses about these subgroup interaction effects are sufficiently numerous, unanticipated, or so ill-formulated that they are not built into the evaluation design, but instead are explored after the fact using the data. That was the case here. There were no special strata used in assigning cases to treatment or control condition in order to ensure a balance of cases for particular client subgroups, and the number of victims who fall into some hypothetically important categories is sometimes very small. However, the nature of the program as it evolved and the problem it addresses suggests several plausible hypotheses about "who might be affected" among the larger pool of victims recontacted by the police in Houston. These victims were a far-from-homogeneous group, because of the wide net spread by the program, and there is considerable variation among them along several dimensions which might mediate the impact of the program. These include:

- Communication Problems. A number of victims involved in the program had a linguistic and cultural heritage other than English and North American, including both Hispanics and Asians (mostly Vietnamese). The Victim Recontact Program was conducted in English, and the effect of the police calling some of these victims or attempting to find them through intermediaries may not have been as "reassuring" as intended. The same may have been true for black victims, who as a group have historically had troubled relations with the police. Hypothesis: recontact had negative effects upon Hispanic, Asian, and black victims.
- Seriousness. One important feature of the Victim Recontact Program was that it involved victims of all manner of crimes. Most victim services programs (which this was not) confine themselves to serving victims of personal crime or even more narrowly-defined and serious categories of offenses (See Waller, 1982). As noted above, one striking feature of the client interviews conducted by the Recontact Team was the large number of victims who indicated that they did not need any assistance and had "no problems." Perhaps the impact of a program like this is confined to those who do. Hypothesis: recontact had positive effects upon the victims of serious crimes.
- Vulnerability. Previous research on fear of crime suggests that certain kinds of people feel themselves to be particularly vulnerable to crime, either because of their limited capacity to defend themselves or their fear of the physical consequences of victimization (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). Two vulnerable groups represented in this sample are the elderly and women. Hypothesis: recontact had positive effects upon vulnerable victims.
- Supporters. One finding of research on fear is that people who are not surrounded by networks of "supporters" are more afraid of crime (cf. Friedman, et al., 1982). They have no one to share their concerns with, and if they are victimized they may not have anyone to take care of them. They may feel more at risk as well because they may more often be alone. People who are isolated may rely more upon the police for reassurance and support. Two related indicators of such support are whether victims are married or single, and whether they live with other adults or alone. Hypothesis: recontact had positive effects upon more isolated victims.

- Extent of Victimization. While everyone in our evaluation sample had been victimized at least once, they varied considerably in the extent of their experience with crime. In the evaluation survey they described an average of 3.1 victimizations in the past 10 to 12 months. Twenty-six respondents recalled seven or more victimizations during that period. In addition, many were "indirectly" victimized--that is, they knew other people who lived in their area of Houston who were victims of robbery, assault, and burglary. Both personal and indirect victimization are correlates of fear of crime and preventive behaviors (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). The Recontact Program may have reached in this group a subset of victims in need of reassurance. Hypothesis: recontact had positive effects upon more frequently and indirectly victimized victims.
- Time. Finally, one feature of the evaluation is that there was a varying gap in the length of time between when respondents were victimized and when they were interviewed. People forget things, including telephone calls from the Recontact Team, and it seems likely that the apparent impact of the Recontact Program would be greater among those who were victimized and then recontacted closer in time to the interview. This is in part because even the impact of the victimization should fade with the passage of time. In this experiment the average gap between incident and evaluation interview was 81 days, and the median was 65 days--more than 9 weeks. The maximum was 284 days, but 75 percent of victims were interviewed within 15 weeks of the incident. Hypothesis: recontact appears to have had positive effects among those interviewed more quickly after the event. [Note the disclaimer--recontact may have affected others at the moment, but due to the passage of time before the evaluation interview that effect subsided.] One shortcoming of these evaluation data is that very few victims were contacted soon after the incident, so we cannot really test the extra effectiveness of such recontacts.

Table 7 tests all of these hypotheses. In each test it presents the results of a multiple regression analysis which examines the impact of three measures: the hypothesized mediating factor (the "covariate"), victims' treatment or control status, and a combination of the two ("a treatment-covariate interaction term"). The latter was scored so it was always zero for control cases (not contacted) and for treatment cases not in the hypothesized category. If there is a statistically significant relationship between the interaction term and an outcome measure when its components



Table 7

Effects of Treatment, Communication Problems, and  
Communication-Treatment Interaction

Indicators of Communication Problems

Outcome	Spanish-Other Race			Victim Black		
	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	race	-.13	(.07)	Black	.06	(.40)
	treatment	-.06	(.33)	treatment	.09	(.16)
	interaction	.23	(.004)*	interaction	-.15	(.07)
Perceived Personal Crime Problems in Area	race	-.05	(.50)	Black	-.11	(.16)
	treatment	.04	(.48)	treatment	.12	(.06)
	interaction	.16	(.04)*	interaction	-.03	(.74)
Concern About Area Property Crime Problems	race	-.11	(.13)	Black	.04	(.61)
	treatment	-.02	(.77)	treatment	.04	(.51)
	interaction	.19	(.02)*	interaction	.03	(.67)
Satisfaction With Area	race	.19	(.01)	Black	-.10	(.18)
	treatment	.00	(.99)	treatment	-.07	(.26)
	interaction	-.12	(.14)	interaction	.06	(.50)
Evaluation Of The Police	race	-.04	(.58)	Black	-.05	(.48)
	treatment	.00	(.94)	treatment	.07	(.26)
	interaction	.06	(.47)	interaction	-.10	(.19)
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	race	-.11	(.14)	Black	.05	(.51)
	treatment	-.09	(.14)	treatment	.02	(.71)
	interaction	.24	(.002)*	interaction	-.05	(.53)
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	race	-.07	(.31)	Black	.03	(.71)
	treatment	-.05	(.40)	treatment	.02	(.70)
	interaction	.11	(.18)	interaction	-.09	(.27)

\* Interaction significant  $p < .05$



Table 7 - continued

Effects of Treatment, Incident Seriousness, and  
Seriousness-Treatment Interaction

Indicators of Incident Seriousness

Outcome	Seriousness Score			Victim of Personal Crime		
	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)
Fear of Personal Victimization in Area	serious	.06	(.35)	victim	.06	(.41)
	treatment	.03	(.54)	treatment	.04	(.45)
	interaction	.02	(.79)	interaction	-.03	(.68)
Perceived Personal Crime Problems In Area	serious	.15	(.02)	victim	.17	(.01)
	treatment	.12	(.04)	treatment	.14	(.02)
	interaction	.05	(.44)	interaction	-.04	(.56)
Concern About Area Property Crime Problems	serious	.01	(.82)	victim	.00	(.96)
	treatment	.06	(.32)	treatment	.08	(.19)
	interaction	.00	(.97)	interaction	-.09	(.22)
Satisfaction With Area	serious	.05	(.47)	victim	.07	(.33)
	treatment	-.02	(.77)	treatment	-.03	(.56)
	interaction	-.12	(.07)	interaction	-.03	(.70)
Evaluation of The Police	serious	-.02	(.72)	victim	.00	(.96)
	treatment	.02	(.73)	treatment	.02	(.76)
	interaction	.02	(.76)	interaction	.04	(.56)
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	serious	.09	(.15)	victim	.08	(.24)
	treatment	.03	(.63)	treatment	.01	(.86)
	interaction	-.05	(.46)	interaction	.01	(.83)
Household Crime Prevention Effects	serious	-.14	(.03)	victim	-.12	(.08)
	treatment	-.03	(.56)	treatment	-.04	(.45)
	interaction	.01	(.89)	interaction	.07	(.30)

Table 7 - continued

Effects of Treatment, Victim Vulnerability, and  
Vulnerability-Treatment Interaction

Indicators of Vulnerability

Outcome	Victim Female			Victim Over 50		
	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)
Fear Of Personal Victimization In Area	female	.33	(.001)	older	.15	(.04)
	treatment	-.01	(.96)	treatment	.07	(.23)
	interaction	.05	(.75)	interaction	-.10	(.19)
Perceived Personal Crime Problems In Area	female	.19	(.01)	older	.09	(.20)
	treatment	.05	(.77)	treatment	.13	(.03)
	interaction	.07	(.67)	interaction	-.07	(.36)
Concern About Area Property Crime Problems	female	-.01	(.92)	older	-.09	(.21)
	treatment	.05	(.75)	treatment	.06	(.32)
	interaction	.00	(.98)	interaction	-.03	(.66)
Satisfaction With Area	female	-.07	(.35)	older	-.12	(.09)
	treatment	.05	(.76)	treatment	-.10	(.11)
	interaction	-.11	(.51)	interaction	.12	(.12)
Evaluations Of The Police	female	.07	(.37)	older	.18	(.01)
	treatment	.20	(.21)	treatment	.01	(.84)
	interaction	-.20	(.25)	interaction	.09	(.24)
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	female	.33	(.001)	older	.08	(.25)
	treatment	-.08	(.60)	treatment	.02	(.69)
	interaction	.10	(.53)	interaction	-.05	(.53)
Household Crime Prevention Effects	female	.11	(.14)	older	-.03	(.68)
	treatment	.16	(.31)	treatment	.02	(.76)
	interaction	-.19	(.26)	interaction	-.10	(.20)

Table 7 - continued  
 Effects of Treatment, Victim Support, and  
 Support-Treatment Interaction  
 Indicators of Victim Support

Outcome	Unmarried			Live Alone		
	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)
Fear Of Personal Victimization In Area	unmarried	.07	(.33)	alone	.08	(.30)
	treatment	.05	(.44)	treatment	.05	(.41)
	interaction	-.04	(.63)	interaction	-.05	(.50)
Perceived Personal Crime Problems In Area	unmarried	-.00	(.95)	alone	-.04	(.58)
	treatment	.05	(.47)	treatment	.08	(.21)
	interaction	.12	(.14)	interaction	.09	(.26)
Concern About Area Property Crime Problems	unmarried	.03	(.72)	alone	-.00	(.99)
	treatment	.08	(.22)	treatment	.07	(.22)
	interaction	-.06	(.49)	interaction	-.06	(.45)
Satisfaction With Area	unmarried	-.05	(.51)	alone	-.09	(.24)
	treatment	-.06	(.37)	treatment	-.09	(.12)
	interaction	.02	(.82)	interaction	.12	(.11)
Evaluation Of The Police	unmarried	-.12	(.10)	alone	-.04	(.58)
	treatment	-.04	(.56)	treatment	.02	(.72)
	interaction	.13	(.12)	interaction	.01	(.88)
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime	unmarried	.10	(.19)	alone	.08	(.30)
	treatment	.06	(.36)	treatment	.02	(.71)
	interaction	-.12	(.17)	interaction	-.05	(.52)
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	unmarried	.04	(.60)	alone	.04	(.62)
	treatment	.04	(.53)	treatment	.01	(.90)
	interaction	-.11	(.20)	interaction	-.05	(.52)

Table 7 - continued

Effects of Treatment, Victimization Experience, and  
Victimization-Treatment Interaction

Indicators of Victimization

Outcome	Know Crime Victims in Area			Victimization Past Year		
	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)
Fear Of Personal Victimization In Area	know victims	.26	(.001)	victimizations	.34	(.001)
	treatment	.04	(.51)	treatment	.02	(.79)
	interaction	-.03	(.75)	interaction	.04	(.71)
Perceived Personal Crime Problems In Area	know victims	.36	(.001)	victimizations	.41	(.001)
	treatment	.14	(.03)	treatment	.23	(.02)
	interaction	-.06	(.44)	interaction	-.13	(.21)
Concern About Area Property Crime Problems	know victims	.30	(.001)	victimizations	.49	(.001)
	treatment	.05	(.40)	treatment	.19	(.04)
	interaction	.00	(.98)	interaction	-.13	(.18)
Satisfaction With Area	know victims	-.25	(.001)	victimizations	-.33	(.001)
	treatment	-.07	(.28)	treatment	-.09	(.35)
	interaction	.05	(.58)	interaction	.02	(.81)
Evaluation Of The Police	know victims	-.13	(.09)	victimizations	-.31	(.001)
	treatment	.05	(.41)	treatment	-.04	(.64)
	interaction	-.04	(.62)	interaction	.07	(.52)
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Per- sonal Crime	know victims	.21	(.005)	victimizations	.36	(.001)
	treatment	.04	(.51)	treatment	.13	(.19)
	interaction	-.08	(.33)	interaction	.13	(.21)
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	know victims	.25	(.001)	victimization	.24	(.001)
	treatment	.06	(.38)	treatment	.15	(.13)
	interaction	-.14	(.10)	interaction	-.20	(.07)

Table 7 - continued

Effects of Treatment, Elapsed Time Since Incident, and  
Elapsed Time-Treatment Interaction

Elapsed Time (log) Between Incident and Survey Interview

Outcome	Variable	Beta	(sigf.)
Fear Of Personal Victimization In Area	time	-.07	(.33)
	treatment	.65	(.11)
	interaction	-.63	(.13)
Perceived Personal Crime Problems In Area	time	.00	(.99)
	treatment	1.14	(.006)
	interaction	-1.05	(.01)*
Concern About Area Property Crime Problems	time	-.11	(.12)
	treatment	.39	(.35)
	interaction	-.34	(.42)
Satisfaction With Area	time	.11	(.13)
	treatment	-.54	(.19)
	interaction	.50	(.23)
Evaluation Of The Police	time	-.02	(.82)
	treatment	-.65	(.11)
	interaction	.69	(.10)
Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Per- sonal Crime	time	-.10	(.15)
	treatment	.02	(.95)
	interaction	-.02	(.96)
Household Crime Prevention Efforts	time	-.10	(.14)
	treatment	-.26	(.54)
	interaction	.25	(.55)

Note: Elapsed time in days logged to correct skewed distribution

\*Interaction significant  $p < .05$

(the "main effects") also are taken into account, it suggests that the recontact had a unique effect upon the hypothesized subgroup--for better or worse, depending upon the sign of the coefficient (see Reichardt, 1979).

Virtually the only significant subgroup effects apparent in Table 7 are to be found in the first column. There is a significant relationship between falling in the hispanic/other background category and being recontacted, and fear of crime. This is true for all three measures of fear presented in Table 7, and in each case the apparent impact of program contact was to increase levels of fear. Recontacted persons in this category also were significantly more likely to report taking defensive actions to protect themselves from personal crime, which can be seen as a behavioral measure of fear.

The effect of this treatment-covariate interaction was extremely robust. When entered with treatment status and the other 27 indicators used as covariates in the large regression analyses presented in the previous section, this background treatment interaction was still significantly related to fear of personal victimization ( $p < .01$ ) and concern about area property crime ( $p < .03$ ). It was also still related to taking more defensive actions ( $p < .01$ ).

Table 8 explores this somewhat unexpected finding in more detail. It presents mean outcome scores for racial groups in the victim sample (as indicated in survey), separately for those in the treatment and control categories, and notes for significance of those differences. These means

Table 8

Outcome Scores by Race and Facility With English

	Fear of Area		Perceived Area		Concern About Area		Satisfaction With Area		
	Personal Victimization Control Treatment (Sigf)	Personal Crime Problems Control Treatment (Sigf)	Personal Crime Problems Control Treatment (Sigf)	Property Crime Problems Control Treatment (Sigf)	Property Crime Problems Control Treatment (Sigf)	Control Treatment (Sigf)	Treatment (Sigf)	Control Treatment (Sigf)	Treatment (Sigf)
Race									
Black	1.70	1.54	1.45	1.55	2.15	2.26	2.12	2.13	(.50)
White	1.69	1.67	1.66	1.69	2.17	2.07	2.15	2.14	(.50)
Hispanic	1.51	1.86	1.53	1.84	2.01	2.34	2.40	2.18	(.10)
English									
Good	1.68	1.68	1.60	1.67	2.19	2.19	2.15	2.16	(.50)
Fair or Poor*	1.44	1.58	1.39	1.94	1.72	2.05	2.64	2.28	(.05)
	Evaluations of Police		Defensive Behaviors To Avoid Personal Crime		Household Crime Prevention Measures		Number of Cases		
	Control Treatment (Sigf)	Treatment (Sigf)	Control Treatment (Sigf)	Treatment (Sigf)	Control Treatment (Sigf)	Treatment (Sigf)	Control Treatment (Sigf)	Treatment (Sigf)	
Race									
Black	3.11	2.98	.43	.39	1.65	1.38	43	45	
White	3.28	3.29	.42	.35	1.67	1.55	79	85	
Hispanic	3.16	3.23	.34	.54	1.48	1.79	44	38	
English									
Good	3.17	3.20	.42	.39	1.67	1.58	147	163	
Fair or Poor*	3.24	3.48	.27	.48	1.21	1.42	29	12	

\*Based on interviewer rating. "Poor" includes interviews conducted in spanish.

One-tailed small sample t-tests of significance

are not controlled for the other factors taken into account in the regression analyses, but they tell generally the same story.

Hispanics in the group which was recontacted by the Houston police were more fearful of personal victimization, perceived more problems with personal and property crime in their area of the city, and were more likely to report taking fear-related defensive actions when on the street. Hispanics were also less likely to be satisfied with the area as a place to live if they had been called, but the difference was not significant. None of these differences could be seen for whites or blacks in the same groups. There were not enough Asians in the victim sample to report a statistical analysis (there were 4 in the treatment category and 3 in the control group), but those few in the treatment group were even more likely to be fearful, worry about personal and property crime, and take defensive actions, and their satisfaction with the area as a place to live also went down.

There is little in the data indicating why the Recontact Program should have had this effect on hispanics and asians. It is not that they were soured on the police by the recontact experience; in fact, Table 8 indicates that in both groups evaluations of police service were higher (but not significantly) in the treatment category. Hispanics and Asians in both groups gave ratings of the police which were higher than those for blacks, but there were no comparable untoward effects registered by black victims who were contacted in the program. It may be significant that all of the Asian victims in this sample were recent immigrants to the U.S., and because of this they may have found the Recontact telephone call bewildering.



However, the same was not true for Hispanic victims, many of whom were long-term residents of Houston.

One possible clue may be found in interviewer ratings of each respondent's facility with English, a judgment which was made at the conclusion of the interviews. Virtually all of the victims whose English was rated as "fair" or "poor" rather than "good" were in these two groups; thirty-two percent of hispanics and 5 of the 7 asians were given this lower rating. Table 8 also examines outcome scores for the rating categories. It indicates that victims in the treatment group who were rated only fair or poor in their facility with English were more likely than others to perceive area personal crime problems, to be dissatisfied with the area as a place to live, and take defensive precautions. Differences on other outcome dimensions were not significant, but also point to unexpected program consequences.

Using this facility-with-English measure in either the treatment-covariate regressions in Table 7 or regression analyses of outcome measures like those presented earlier in Table 6 does not account for all of the "Hispanic/other" effect, however. That effect may in part be linguistic, but other factors were at work in this program which are not captured by that measure. More research and field testing needs to be done before a police department institutes a program like this in areas with large Hispanic or (recent immigrant) Asian populations.

Nonexperimental Variations in Treatment. It is tempting to use data generated for the Victim Recontact evaluation to examine the impact of variations in how the treatment was delivered. This is decidedly

nonexperimental. Differences in which officers talked to which victims was related to the shifts which they worked and when victims were home; the friendliness of the exchange and how reassuring it seemed was probably as much a function of how it was received by the victim as how it was conducted by the officer; some victims refused to receive the crime prevention materials which were offered; the gap in time between the incident and the recontact call was linked in part to how many attempts it took to find victims at home. In short, there was a great deal of "self selection" by victims into "variations in treatment" which makes it impossible to untangle the impact of differences in how matters were conducted at the Recontact office. (C.F. Cook and Poole, 1982, and a damaging rejoinder by Mark, 1983).

Interestingly, the data also do not suggest any. Despite the injunctions above we examined the correlates of four variations in treatment: which officer conducted the interview, if victims indicated they needed assistance of some kind, if they were referred to another program or agency, and if victims offered information to the police. Using the multivariate regression variables listed in Table 6 to control for some of the differences in fear and other outcomes attributable to differences among victims, there were no significant residual relationships between these treatment variation measures and any of the outcomes.

#### VICTIMS' ASSESSMENTS OF THE PROGRAM

The evaluation survey conducted in Houston also enables us to report upon the Victim Recontact Program from another perspective--that of victims themselves. In the survey questionnaire, respondents were quizzed about

their victimization experiences "since July of 1983," the date marking the beginning of the program. Nineteen victimization questions were covered, and then all were asked,

After any incident in which you were a victim, did the police call you later to see if there was additional assistance you might need?

Not unexpectedly, some of those in the treatment group--29 percent--failed to recall they were contacted. Those who "remembered" were significantly more likely to be younger and more fearful, and women and whites were almost significantly more likely to recall the recontact as well. Fully 85 percent of those in the "letter only" group which could not be reached by telephone said they were not contacted. Victims who did recall such a contact were asked a series of questions about how it went. A brief summary of those assessments is presented in Table 9.

As Table 9 indicates, the vast majority of those recalling a program contact found it somewhat or very helpful. Almost everyone (92 percent) thought the officer they talked to was "very polite." They were a little less certain that the officer was "very concerned" about their plight (23 percent said it was "somewhat"), but few came away with a bad impression on that score. Paralleling the administrative records, a majority of those questioned (62 percent) did not recall being referred to any agency or organization which could assist them. Of the relatively small number who recalled they were directed to some form of assistance, a large majority (79 percent) reported that they did not follow through upon that recommendation. Most of the respondents (80 percent) remembered receiving crime prevention

Table 9

Victims' Assessments of the Recontact Program

<p>The officer who called was:</p> <p>not at all helpful            2</p> <p>not very helpful             1</p> <p>somewhat helpful            18</p> <p>very helpful                 79</p> <p><u>100%</u></p> <p>(124)</p>	<p>Did the officer tell you about any agencies or organizations which might be able to assist you?</p>
	<p>No            62</p> <p>Yes          38</p> <p><u>100%</u></p> <p>(122)</p>
<p>The officer who called was:</p> <p>very impolite                0</p> <p>somewhat impolite         0</p> <p>somewhat polite            8</p> <p>very polite                 92</p> <p><u>100%</u></p> <p>(124)</p>	<p>After the call from the officer, did you receive any crime prevention information in the mail?</p>
	<p>No            20</p> <p>Yes          80</p> <p><u>100%</u></p> <p>(123)</p>
<p>The officer who called was:</p> <p>not at all concerned        1</p> <p>not very concerned         3</p> <p>somewhat concerned        23</p> <p>very concerned             73</p> <p><u>100%</u></p> <p>(124)</p>	<p>Do you think the police department should continue to call crime victims to offer them support?</p>
	<p>No            3</p> <p>Yes          97</p> <p><u>100%</u></p> <p>(122)</p>

Note: Based on treatment group respondents who recalled being recontacted (71% of treatment group).

information in the mail, one of the "treatments" administered almost universally by the program.

Finally, virtually everyone who was interviewed (97 percent) thought the Houston Police should continue to contact crime victims to offer them support.

#### FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

By most of the measures examined here the Victim Recontact Program in Houston failed to achieve its fundamental goals. It had no discernible impact upon victims' perceptions of police service, even when the measure included questions about "how well the police treat victims," "how helpful" and "how polite" they are, and "how good a job they do" preventing crime. It did not appear to stimulate positive efforts by victims to protect their homes from further victimization. It was unrelated to what victims thought about their neighborhood. Finally, on many measures of fear there was a tendency for those who were contacted to be slightly more fearful, and victims in the treatment group were significantly more likely to think personal crimes were a "big problem" in their area of Houston. There is some evidence that victims in the most culturally distinct categories--Hispanics and Asians--became somewhat more fearful when they were recontacted.

In considering why this is the case it is useful to review differences between the Victim Recontact Program and victim assistance programs (VAPs). This contrast highlights many of the limitations of the Recontact Program on Houston. One difference is that VAPs usually are much more intensive; victims meet personally with advisors, and often repeatedly. VAPs typically spend much more than the 60 minutes of staff time on a case which we

estimate is required for a routine police recontact effort. Victim assistance programs often have resources; they can house battered women, provide emergency service, and often deal directly with social welfare agencies concerning particular victims. The Victim Recontact program had nothing to offer but solice and a referral list. VAPs usually deal with self-selected clients, people who know and call them--or are specifically referred to them--because they are in need of what the program has to offer. Self-selection by clients into treatment usually makes a program look very successfully targeted. Some victim programs get referrals through patrol officers who are trained to direct severe cases or special classes of victims--such as the elderly--to specialized services. Selection and referral processes, plus the specialization of many VAPs in specific types of crime, also results in a concentration of serious and personal crime victims in their programs. The Recontact Program reached out to many people who thought they did not have any problems. It had no special expertise in dealing with particular victim problems, and dealt with such a varied set of clients that it could not concentrate upon particular forms of victim support. Finally, VAPs try to work rapidly. Truly pressing problems are those which people must confront promptly--a smashed-in front door, a stolen car, or need for medical care, for example. Many of Houston's recontact calls came so long after the event that victims probably were already forced to deal with them as best they could. The immediate trauma of victimization also should have dissipated before the median recontact, two and one-half weeks later. The high incidence of "no problem" cases may well reflect the fact that the offered assistance came too late to be of much help.

The absence of these features from the program in Houston was deliberate. When the Victim Recontact Program was planned, a conscious decision was made not to emulate VAPs. Rather, the program was designed to be simple and relatively inexpensive, to operate without making any demands upon the remainder of the department, and to serve a broad spectrum of victims. This evaluation suggests that such a program is not likely to have much impact upon victims.

This is not to say we are certain that more intensive and expensive victim assistance programs which focus upon specific categories of victims in need do have more positive benefits. Although no randomized experimentation in the field of Victim Services has been published, inventories of the features which apparently lead to successful programs for victims (reviewed in Mayhew, 1984; Waller, 1982) contain many elements which were not present in the Houston Victim Recontact Program. Many of these features are present in programs in other cities however. For example, the Edmonton, Alberta, police department has conducted a victim services program since 1979. It offers crisis intervention, counseling, emergency services, the provision of follow-up case information, and even aid in making funeral arrangements, as well as assistance in filling out insurance claims and referral to other agencies. Like other programs in Canada and Great Britain, it relies heavily upon civilian volunteers to make to face-to-face contacts upon which the program is built. (For a description of this and other Canadian programs, see Canadian Federal-Provincial Task Force, 1983.) Although much more complex and difficult to organize, such programs may provide a model for more effective police services for victims.



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