



# Cohort Change in Political Gender Gaps in Europe and Canada: The Role of Modernization

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## Abstract

This article finds firmer evidence than has previously been presented that men are more left-wing than women in older birth cohorts, while women are more left-wing than men in younger cohorts. Analysis of the European Values Study/World Values Survey provides the first systematic test of how processes of modernization and social change have led to this phenomenon. In older cohorts, women are more right-wing primarily because of their greater religiosity and the high salience of religiosity for left-right self-placement and vote choice in older cohorts. In younger, more secular, cohorts, women's greater support for economic equality and state intervention and, to a lesser extent, for liberal values makes them more left-wing than men. Because the gender gap varies in this way between cohorts, research focusing on the aggregate-level gap between all men and all women underestimates gender differences in left-right self-placement and vote choice.

## Keywords

gender gap, voting, generations

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Political gender gaps occur where men and women differ in their political orientations and behaviors. Studying how societal differences between men and women contribute to political gender gaps furthers our understanding of political outcomes in general, and shows how gender roles and gender inequality influence political attitudes and behavior. Such gender gaps are also of interest to politicians and political parties, who often see them as an incentive to mobilize the “women’s vote” and to campaign on women’s issues. Moreover, the existence of gender gaps in preferences and attitudes has implications for representation. Unless we understand whether and how men and women differ from one another, the extent to which male-dominated political institutions fail to represent women cannot be fully known.

The political gender gap is dynamic over time. Until the 1980s and 1990s, men tended to be more supportive of the left than women—the “traditional” gender gap. More recently that situation has been reversed, with women more supportive of the left than men—the “modern” gender gap.<sup>1</sup> Inglehart and Norris<sup>2</sup> suggest that this realignment of the gender gap is linked to societal modernization, especially “increased female participation in the paid workforce, the break-up of the traditional family, and the transformation of sex roles in the home.”<sup>3</sup> A key hypothesis stemming from this argument is that the modern gender gap should exist among younger birth cohorts, since those are the cohorts that have particularly experienced modernization. However, among older cohorts, there should remain a traditional gender gap. Inglehart and Norris refer to this as a generational prediction, and elsewhere Norris has termed this the “gender-generation gap.”<sup>4</sup>

This generational prediction is underresearched. It has been examined in a cross-national context only by Inglehart and Norris, who show graphical evidence for the generational pattern, indicating that the traditional gender gap exists for cohorts born pre-1930 and the modern gender gap for those born post-1960. Furthermore, they present evidence from regression models that the modern gender gap is particularly related to support for gender equality, postmaterialism, and attitudes toward the role of government, arguing that women hold particularly left-leaning attitudes as a result of societal modernization and so are to the left of men. However, this analysis is flawed in three ways. First, the graphical evidence, which is the only test provided of the existence of a gender-generation gap, pools together all “postindustrial” countries, not all of which are available for all years in the data set used (the World Values Survey), and so the observed cohort differences could be an artifact. Second, only the coefficient for gender, and not its interaction with age or birth year, is included in the regression analysis, despite the fact that they argue the gender gap should be different for older and younger cohorts. Thus neither the existence of, nor the explanations for, a gender-generation gap are tested for in these models. Third, their approach adds multiple possible explanatory factors to the model at once, making it impossible to distinguish which features of modernization are the most important.

Inglehart and Norris’s 2003 text is well known to scholars and students, but it is important to revisit the generational argument they put forward for multiple reasons. First, most research on gender differences cross-nationally in Europe focuses on the aggregate-level gender gap between all men and all women. However, if Inglehart and

Norris's generational prediction is correct, this approach risks underestimating gender differences, since the traditional gender gap in older cohorts and the modern gender gap in younger cohorts could cancel each other out at the aggregate level. Indeed, focusing on the aggregate-level gender gap tends to find gender differences that are small in magnitude.<sup>5</sup> Second, research focusing on the aggregate-level gender gap assumes that a reasonable comparison can be made between all men and all women, which is unjustified given considerable differences between cohorts of men and women in factors relevant for political attitudes and behavior. If the modern gender gap is found primarily for younger birth cohorts, our theories of gender differences should focus on men and women in these cohorts rather than try to identify more "universal" differences between all men and all women. Third, ignoring the generational argument may miss a key part of the explanation for the emergence of the modern gender gap at the aggregate level: cohort replacement. As older cohorts with the traditional gender gap are replaced by younger cohorts with the modern gender gap, we can expect to see a growth in the size of the modern gender gap at the aggregate level. Although Inglehart and Norris have weakly demonstrated the existence of different gender gaps in different cohorts, this claim is not taken seriously in the literature, and most studies of the gender gap do not take the next logical step: to include an interaction between gender and cohort or to analyze gender gaps within different birth cohorts. The theory thus needs more rigorous attention to show its importance in helping us to understand political gender gaps.

This article sets out to answer two questions: (1) Is there a gender-generation gap in left-right self-placement and vote choice (hereafter jointly referred to as political position)? And, if so, (2) what explains the gender-generation gap? I find that there is a gender-generation gap in Western countries—specifically Europe and Canada—where men of older cohorts tend to be more left-wing than women, whereas women of younger cohorts are more left-wing than men. This suggests that it makes more sense to talk of gender *gaps*, rather than the gender *gap*, since different birth cohorts vary greatly in both the size and direction of political gender differences. Furthermore, future analysis should focus on such gender *gaps*, rather than the gender *gap*, in order to be more informative about gender differences.

Inglehart and Norris's theory of modernization contains various distinct processes, all thought to contribute to the gender-generation gap, but insufficiently disentangled in their analysis. This article tests which modernization processes are most associated with the gender-generation gap and finds that secularization is key: older cohorts of women are more religious than men, leading them to be more right-wing. In younger cohorts, religiosity declines, the gender gap in religiosity decreases in size, and the salience of religiosity for political position declines. These developments are related to the disappearance of the traditional gender gap across cohorts. At the same time, the emergence of the modern gender gap in younger cohorts is connected to women's greater support than men's for economic equality, redistribution, and state intervention, as well as, to a lesser extent, their greater liberalism concerning values associated with sexual liberation (e.g., support for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality). Women are more supportive of more left-wing economic attitudes than men in *all*

cohorts, but in older cohorts their greater religiosity appears to override that position and means that they are more right-wing in political position than men. In secular, younger, cohorts, women's political position is more in line with their economic attitudes.

The findings further highlight that common explanations for the emergence of the modern gender gap at the aggregate level relating to the changing relative socioeconomic positions of men and women—such as increasing female labor force participation, rising education rates, and declining marriage rates—are in themselves unrelated to generational change in the gender gap. This fact is important because these explanations are pervasive and often discussed, especially when cross-national variation in gender gaps are examined.<sup>6</sup> However, this article shows that such social change is less helpful in understanding the shift in the gender gap across generations, a conclusion that leaves open the question why men and women of all cohorts differ in their economic preferences. The findings thus have implications for the focus of future studies of gender gaps, as will be discussed further in the conclusion.

## Previous Literature on Gender Gaps and Theoretical Expectations

### *Modernization and Cohort Change*

The aggregate-level gender gap in political position has changed over time. The orthodox position of the 1950s and 1960s, that women were more right-wing than men,<sup>7</sup> is now termed the traditional gender gap; but by the 1990s and 2000s women had moved to the left of men. Most European countries now show either no gender gap or the modern gender gap at the aggregate level.<sup>8</sup>

Inglehart and Norris argue that the move from the traditional gender gap to the modern gender gap is due to societal modernization and the changes it brings to gender roles.<sup>9</sup> They emphasize increased female labor force participation, rising education levels, and changes to the traditional family through lower marriage rates, higher divorce rates, and declining fertility. They suggest such changes have made women more left-leaning in their values, attitudes, and vote choice. Inglehart and Norris generate three hypotheses from this argument: an *over-time* hypothesis that, since modernization increases over time, women will move further to the left over time; a *cross-national* hypothesis that in countries where modernization is more advanced the gender gap will be larger; and a *generational* hypothesis that, because the changes to individual's lives caused by modernization particularly apply to younger cohorts, they should have the modern gender gap while older cohorts retain the traditional gender gap.

In support of the generational hypothesis, Inglehart and Norris show that men born before 1930 are indeed more left-wing in left-right self-placement than women of those cohorts, whereas women born after 1960 are more left-wing than men born at the same time. However, this analysis has limitations. The only evidence presented for the gender-generation gap is a graph that pools postindustrial countries; the

observed generational differences could be an artifact of this pooling. No other cross-national research has tested the generational hypothesis, and there is limited evidence for it in Britain, the one country where it has been further tested.<sup>10</sup> This leads to the first hypothesis:

*Gender-generation gap hypothesis: In older cohorts, men are more likely to be left-wing than women. In younger cohorts, women are more likely to be left-wing than men.*

### **Socioeconomic Change and Economic Attitudes**

The modernization argument emphasizes that changes to women's economic position lead them to become more supportive of the left. Although Inglehart and Norris ultimately find little evidence that factors such as education, employment status, or marital status have any impact on the gender gap in their analysis, other research has consistently found that employed or single women are especially left-wing.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, differences in the gender gap between countries and between US states have been linked to female labor force participation rates and divorce and marriage rates.<sup>12</sup>

There are numerous arguments for this. First, the fact that women's entry into the workforce has exposed them to discrimination, segregation, and gender inequality makes them more supportive of parties of the left.<sup>13</sup> Second, working and single women are thought to benefit from the economic policies of left-wing parties. Working women still take on disproportionate caring responsibilities compared to working men, which are alleviated through welfare provision such as care for children or the elderly,<sup>14</sup> while single women are thought to be more economically vulnerable than married women.<sup>15</sup> Third, entering the labor force, education, and remaining single are theorized to lead women to have more "psychological autonomy" from men<sup>16</sup> and thus to develop distinct political preferences more in line with their economic status.

The latter two arguments suggest that attitudes toward government spending, welfare, and redistribution are mediators between women's economic position and their left-wing political position, because they are more economically vulnerable and have greater pressures to balance work and family life. Inglehart and Norris conclude that gender differences in attitudes toward the role of government—measured through support for nationalization and government's "providing for" people—are important for the modern gender gap. They include these measures, however, in the same model as other attitudes such as support for gender equality and postmaterialism, and so it is unclear which set of attitudes are really key. The existence of a mediating role for economic attitudes between economic position and gender differences in left-wing position has rarely been tested, but in Canada women's support for a larger role for government and lower support for capitalist values were found partly to account for the modern gender gap.<sup>17</sup>

The literature's focus on what has changed in women's lives to lead to the modern gender gap has been criticized by some as ignoring the possibility of change among men.<sup>18</sup> In the United States, the gender gap has been linked to rising Republican

identification among men because they are more conservative in their opinions toward social welfare than women.<sup>19</sup> It has also been noted that if men get “free” childcare via their wives, they may be more interested in paying lower taxes than in funding public services.<sup>20</sup> Others have argued that social changes have shifted men from being net beneficiaries of welfare programs to net contributors, and led them to be “antistatist” and support parties of the radical right at greater rates than women.<sup>21</sup> This suggests modernization has also changed men’s attitudes in such a way that there is a decline in support for the left in younger cohorts, contributing to the modern gender gap.

This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

*Economic position hypothesis: In older cohorts, women are more right-wing than men because they are less likely to be employed and less educated. In younger cohorts, women are more left-wing than men because of increases in their education rates, their participation in the labor force, and their likelihood of being single.*

*Economic attitudes hypothesis: In younger cohorts, women are more left-wing than men because they are more supportive of redistribution and the role of government than men.*

### **The Gender Gap in Religiosity and Secularization**

Religiosity is found to increase support for the right through links between Christian Democratic parties and other conservative parties to the national church,<sup>22</sup> as well as by influencing values in a conservative and right-wing direction.<sup>23</sup> As a result, women’s greater religiosity relative to men’s was consistently noted as a reason for the traditional gender gap.<sup>24</sup> However, with secularization, an important component of modernization, religiosity is declining; and gender differences in religiosity are narrowing as women’s roles move outside the home and economic life has become more important.<sup>25</sup> The decline in religiosity is especially expected for younger cohorts,<sup>26</sup> and gender differences in religiosity are smallest in younger cohorts.<sup>27</sup>

This suggests that in older cohorts, the traditional gender gap is related to women’s greater religiosity. In younger cohorts, the smaller gender difference in religiosity should contribute to the lack of a traditional gender gap but cannot account for the emergence of the modern gender gap. It is therefore unsurprising that Inglehart and Norris find little evidence that religiosity is important for the modern gender gap, examined at the aggregate level, but the arguments presented here do suggest that secularization is important for the gender-generation gap. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*Religiosity hypothesis: In older cohorts, women are more right-wing than men because they are more religious.*

### **Value Change and the Gender Gap**

Inglehart’s modernization theory argues that greater economic security experienced by younger cohorts leads them to hold “postmaterialist” values.<sup>28</sup> Inglehart and Norris

suggest that the growth of such values has been stronger among younger cohorts of women than men, and since these values are associated with support for the left, this contributes to the emergence of the modern gender gap. They conclude that such values, measured using postmaterialism and support for gender equality, are the main reason there is a modern gender gap (along with support for the role of government). However, the argument is less theoretically and empirically strong with respect to value change than with respect to economic attitudes.

Theoretically, it is unclear why women would be more postmaterialist than men if postmaterialism is linked to economic security, since women on average enjoy lower economic security than men. Women have been found to be slightly less postmaterialist than men,<sup>29</sup> and in Canada, postmaterialism was found to influence only the vote choice of men, not women.<sup>30</sup> There is more support for the argument that feminism might be related to the development of the modern gender gap in younger cohorts. Early explanations for the modern gender gap in the United States emphasized the role of feminism;<sup>31</sup> women have been found to be more feminist than men in many countries;<sup>32</sup> and feminist consciousness is related to the modern gender gaps in both the United States and Norway.<sup>33</sup> Feminism is also expected to be greatest among younger birth cohorts.<sup>34</sup>

Value change should be related to secularization. Religiosity suppresses feminist attitudes and support for abortion, leading to a rise in feminism with secularization across cohorts.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, Inglehart and Norris point out that values related to abortion, homosexuality, prostitution, and divorce have liberalized for younger cohorts in a process associated with secularization and the rise of postmaterialism, although it is not clear that this is greater for women than it is for men.<sup>36</sup>

This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

*Value change hypothesis: In younger cohorts, women are more left-wing than men because they are more supportive of the values of postmaterialism, feminism, and sexual liberation.*

### ***The Decline of Traditional Cleavages and the Rising Importance of Values***

Theories of dealignment suggest that social-structural position has declined in relevance for vote choice. Inglehart argues that postwar security, as well as contributing to the rise of new left-wing, egalitarian, and postmaterialist values for younger cohorts, also decreases the salience of older, social-structural cleavages for electoral behavior because rising affluence during one's formative years reduces conflict along such "materialist" lines.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, others have argued that new social conflicts that arise in advanced industrial societies—public versus private employment, materialist versus postmaterialist, "new" versus "old" politics—cut across traditional social cleavages based on socioeconomic position and religiosity, which undermines their relevance for political behavior.<sup>38</sup> In addition, cognitive mobilization is seen as reducing the link between social position and party choice as voters can make informed choices rather than rely on group heuristics.<sup>39</sup>



Notably for the gender-generation gap, the declining importance of social position for political position has been found to occur across cohorts. Religion and social class have been found to influence the vote choice of older cohorts to a greater extent than younger ones.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, social position<sup>41</sup> and religiosity<sup>42</sup> have been found less important for the left-right self-placement of younger cohorts than for older cohorts. As these factors decline in salience across cohorts, arguments emphasizing cognitive mobilization suggest that attitudes and values should increase in salience, since voters refer more to their own preferences rather than group position when making political decisions.

These arguments suggest that the changing relationship between social position and political position could contribute to the emergence of the modern gender gap in younger birth cohorts. The literature suggests that the traditional gender gap in older cohorts is likely to be located primarily in differences between men and women in education level, labor force participation, and religiosity. Dealignment would suggest that at the same time such factors, especially religiosity, are becoming less salient for political position in younger cohorts. Even if gender differences in labor force participation or religiosity remain in younger cohorts, their lack of relevance for political position in these cohorts means they will not lead to a traditional gender gap. Similarly, the decline in the importance of social position might lead to an increase in the importance of attitudes and values as a new basis for political position. As a result, if there are gender differences in attitudes and values, they will become more important for the gender gap in political position. For example, women were consistently found to be both more supportive of left-wing economic positions and more feminist than men even before the emergence of the modern gender gap. Dealignment theories would suggest that it is the growing importance of such attitudes for political position that contributes to the modern gender gap, rather than any change in the attitudinal gender gaps themselves.

Along similar lines, Inglehart and Norris argue that the “old cleavages of class and religion have declined in importance, opening the way for the politics of gender, region, and ethnicity to become increasingly salient.”<sup>43</sup> However, it is unclear what is meant here by the politics of gender, and Inglehart and Norris’s analysis of the gender gap does not allow for the possibility that there is a changing relationship between either social cleavages, or values, and political position. Emmenegger and Manow also suggest that the declining salience of the religious cleavage means that female voters can become “socioeconomic swing voters” and switch to supporting left-wing parties in accordance with their economic preferences, but they do not test this proposition.<sup>44</sup> The impact of dealignment on the changing gender gap has thus yet to be tested.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

*Dealignment hypothesis: In older cohorts, social position and religiosity are more important for political position than in younger cohorts, increasing the traditional gender gap in older cohorts. In younger cohorts, values and/or attitudes are more important for political position than in older cohorts, increasing the modern gender gap in younger cohorts.*



## Data and Methods

### Data

My analysis combines waves 2–4 of the European Values Study (EVS)<sup>45</sup> (1989–93; 1999–2001; 2008–10) and waves 3–6 of the World Values Survey (WVS)<sup>46</sup> (1995–96; 1999–2004; 2005–08; 2010–14), producing a data set spanning from 1989 to 2014. These data are used because they provide a long timespan of the same variables for multiple countries. Furthermore, both the EVS and WVS ask questions in the same way across surveys and explicitly aim to measure cross-national and over-time change, making them helpful for this analysis. The earlier waves of the EVS and WVS do not have the necessary variables and so are excluded. The following countries have all the required variables for at least three waves and so are used here: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Tables of the distribution of respondents by country and wave, and cohort and wave, are available from the author.

### Variables

*Dependent variables.* This analysis uses two dependent variables. The first is left-right self-placement, a continuous measure in which respondents place themselves on a ten-point scale from left to right: in this analysis 10 indicates the most left-wing and 1 the most right-wing. This measure is useful in a cross-national context as it avoids problems of classifying parties, is more widely held than partisan identification, and is well recognized by European publics.<sup>47</sup> The second dependent variable is left-wing vote intention, based on who respondents said they would vote for in a general election. A vote for social democratic, green, or communist parties was coded as a left-wing vote intention.<sup>48</sup>

*Independent variables.* The gender-generation gap hypothesis is tested using *birth year*, a continuous measure of year of birth from 1925–1985.<sup>49</sup> An interaction between *birth year* and *female*, a dichotomous variable for being a woman, tests whether the gender gap changes with birth cohort.

Socioeconomic position is measured using four variables that capture how men's and women's relative economic positions have changed. *Homemaker* is a dummy for whether the respondent looks after the home or children full-time. Level of education is measured using the *age completed education* of the respondent. *Marital status* has the following categories: married (reference); cohabiting; single; divorced/separated; and widowed. *Children* is a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent has ever had children and is under the age of fifty-five. It is designed to capture whether there are children currently living with the respondent, since caring for a child is expected to be particularly relevant for their economic attitudes.<sup>50</sup> These variables are collectively referred to as "socioeconomic position" throughout the analysis below. Socioeconomic position and especially the dealignment hypothesis would perhaps be

best tested using a measure of social class, but that is not available as a consistent measure for all waves of the EVS and WVS. However, gender differences in political position are not usually linked to social class and so this lack should not be too problematic for the examination of the gender-generation gap.

There are three measures of religiosity. *Religious identification* has three categories: no religion (reference); Christian; and non-Christian. *Church attendance* is a dichotomous variable for whether a respondent attends church once a week or more. *Religious person* is a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent considers herself or himself to be a religious person. These variables capture different aspects of religiosity and are asked consistently over the EVS and WVS waves.

Economic attitudes are measured using four variables with ten-point scales, giving attitudes toward the role of government and economic issues more generally.<sup>51</sup> *Equalize incomes* goes from “we need larger income differences as incentives” to “incomes should be made more equal.” *Responsibility* goes from “people/individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves” to “the government/state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” *Competition* goes from “competition is good, it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” to “competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people.” *Benefits* goes from it is “never justifiable” to claim state benefits to it is “always justifiable” to do so.

Value change is captured through measures for postmaterialism, feminist attitudes, and attitudes toward sexual liberation. *Postmaterialism* classifies individuals as materialist (reference), mixed, or postmaterialist by their answers to four questions about their aims for the country.<sup>52</sup> *Housewife* has five categories: strongly agree that “a job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children” (reference); agree; don’t know/neither; disagree; and strongly disagree. *Homosexuality* is a dichotomous variable for disliking having homosexuals as neighbors. *Abortion* and *divorce* are continuous ten-point scales from the action being seen as “never justifiable” to “always justifiable.”

All these independent variables might be expected to be interrelated, and indeed the theories discussed above describe how socioeconomic position and religiosity might be related to attitudes and values. A correlation matrix for the independent variables is included in the Appendix. As might be expected there are reasonably strong relationships between religiosity and attitudes toward divorce, homosexuality, and abortion. However, while sometimes statistically significant, the association between the variables measuring socioeconomic position and those measuring religiosity are not particularly strong, suggesting they do indeed merit separate examination.

## Methods

The focus of this article is on cohort effects, but age and survey year are possible confounders for this. Some research finds that individuals get more conservative in their voting behavior<sup>53</sup> and more supportive of right-wing issues such as free enterprise and


government legislation against homosexuality as they age.<sup>54</sup> Period effects could also produce changes in left-right self-placement, as evidence shows that it responds to the current political environment,<sup>55</sup> and vote intention will be dependent on the current electoral context. Age and survey year/period are therefore included in the analysis in order to isolate cohort effects.

Including measures of age, period, and cohort in the same model causes problems for model identification because of the perfect collinearity of age, year of birth, and year of survey. Once we know the value of any two of age (A), period (P), or cohort (C), we automatically know the value of the third, since  $A = P - C$ . Numerous solutions have been suggested to overcome this problem, and there is a rich scholarly debate about the best way to approach research into cohort or generational effects. Here, I use repeated cross-sectional surveys that provide data on a cohort's political behavior and attitudes at multiple ages and in multiple years, and employ a variant on Yang and Land's hierarchical APC (HAPC) model.<sup>56</sup> They argue that individuals should be treated as nested within birth cohort and survey period, and so these should be specified in the model as cross-classified random effects. With only age left in the fixed part of the model there is no longer an identification problem. In the analysis here, I include birth cohort also in the fixed part of the model in order to interact it with gender, since this is central to my research questions.

There is some debate, focusing on the assumptions the model makes and the results of simulation studies, over whether HAPC models can really recover "true" cohort effects.<sup>57</sup> I thus use APC modeling strategies with different identifying assumptions to the HAPC in order to check the robustness of the results: (1) identifying the model using a categorical age variable (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65–74, 75+) and including survey wave in the fixed part of the model; and (2) identifying the model using a categorical birth cohort variable (1925–34, 1935–44, 1945–54, 1955–64, 1965–74, 1975–85) and including survey wave in the fixed part of the model. The results are robust to these alternative specifications, and since the same results are reached using three different identifying assumptions I can be more confident that they are capturing the trends present in the data.

A series of nested models are set up to test each of the hypotheses. All models include *age*, *age*<sup>2</sup>, and random effects for country-year.<sup>58</sup> Model 1 tests the gender-generation gap hypothesis using a model with *birth year*, *female*, and their interaction. In order to test the remaining hypotheses, the relevant variables are added into the model and change in the coefficients of *female* and the interaction of *birth year* \* *female* is examined.

Models 2a and 3a add the socioeconomic position variables and religiosity variables respectively to Model 1; Models 2b and 3b include interactions between socioeconomic position and *birth year* and religiosity and *birth year*, respectively. Model 4 includes the indicators of socioeconomic position and religiosity, and their interactions with *birth year*. Models 5a and 6a add the economic attitudes variables and values indicators, respectively, to Model 4; Models 5b and 6b add interactions between economic attitudes and *birth year* and values and *birth year*. Models 2a, 3a, 5a, and 6a thus



**Figure 1.** The Relationship between Gender and Cohort, and Political Position, and Its Mediators.

**Note:** \* indicates an interaction. Solid arrows indicate the relationships of interest in this paper. Dotted arrows indicate mediating relationships indicated by the theoretical discussion.

**Source:** Author's drawing.


directly test the socioeconomic position, religiosity, economic attitudes, and value change hypotheses. Models 2b, 3b, 5b, and 6b thus test the dealignment hypothesis. Finally, Model 7 includes all variables and their interactions with *birth year*.

This model specification is used because the theory discussed above expects the relationship between socioeconomic position and political position to be mediated by economic attitudes, and between religiosity and political position to be mediated by values. Socioeconomic position and religiosity are thus included as controls in the models testing the economic attitudes and value change hypotheses. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the variables underpinning this model specification in the form of a diagram, as expected from the theory. The gender-generation gap (denoted by *gender \* cohort*) is mediated by socioeconomic position, religiosity, economic attitudes, and values. Once these factors are accounted for, modernization theory suggests we should no longer see a gender-generation gap. The theory as represented in the diagram contains strong assumptions about the causal direction of the relationships, which cannot be tested here, and this will be returned to in the conclusion.


## Results

### Descriptive Statistics


Figures 2–5 show how the characteristics of men and women change between older and younger cohorts. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of female homemakers



**Figure 2.** Lowess Curves of Proportion of Women Who Are Housewives, Average Age of Leaving Education, Percentage Christian, and Percentage Who Attend Church Once a Week or More, for Cohorts Born 1925–85.  
**Note:** N = 47,435.  
**Source:** Combined EYS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).




**Figure 3.** Lowess Curves of Average Positions for Competition, Benefits, Equalize Incomes and Responsibility for Cohorts Born 1925–85.  
**Note:** N=47,435. Higher values indicate more economically left-wing positions.  
**Source:** Combined EYS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).



**Figure 4.** Lowess Curves for the Average Position for Abortion, Divorce, Homosexuality, Housewife, and Postmaterialism for Cohorts Born 1925–85.

**Note:** N=47,435. Higher values on the abortion, divorce, and housewife scales indicate more liberal values. **Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).





**Figure 5.** Lowess Curves for the Average Left-Right Self-Placement and Vote Intention for Cohorts Born 1925–85. **Note:** N=42,023 (self-placement; left); 41,164 (vote intention; right). Higher values on the y-axis indicate more left-wing positions. **Source:** Combined EYS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).

gradually declines across cohorts and education levels increase across cohorts. The gender difference in education level also narrows for younger cohorts. Furthermore, younger cohorts are less religious than older cohorts and the gender gap in religiosity narrows for younger cohorts, especially for church attendance. These patterns are exactly what the modernization theory expects to be important for the gender-generation gap, although it is interesting that even in younger cohorts women are somewhat more religious than men.


Figure 3 shows cohort trends in economic attitudes for men and women. Younger cohorts are more economically left-wing than older cohorts, especially for the *benefits* indicator. However, women tend to be more left-wing than men on these indicators in all cohorts, and there is little evidence that they become more so in younger cohorts. This finding is inconsistent with the predictions of the modernization theory, which suggests that the gender gap in economic attitudes should widen for younger cohorts as women become more economically left-wing. It is interesting that women even in older cohorts are more supportive of economic equality and redistribution than their male peers, and yet we expect them to be more likely to place themselves on the right or express a right-wing vote intention.

Figure 4 shows cohort trends in values for men and women. Younger cohorts are more tolerant in their attitudes. However, again contrary to the modernization perspective, the gender gap remains fairly stable for all cohorts, and in fact women are only noticeably more liberal than men for the *homosexuality* and *housewife* indicators. *Postmaterialism* behaves completely differently from what is expected: younger cohorts are actually less postmaterialist than those born in the middle of the century, and men are more postmaterialist than women.

Finally, Figure 5 shows cohort trends in left-right self-placement and vote intention for men and women across all countries, in the form of loless curves. This shows that for older cohorts, born before about 1950–55, there is the traditional gender gap where men are more left-wing than women. This reverses for younger cohorts, and seems especially to be caused by a greater movement of women to the left relative to men. It is interesting that younger cohorts are more left-wing in their self-placement but not in their vote intention—although these graphs do not control for age or period effects and vote intention is affected by party fortunes in the various countries.<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, both measures show a very similar, widening gender gap for all younger cohorts born after 1955, in accordance with Inglehart and Norris's modernization thesis.

### *The Gender-Generation Gap in Cross-National Comparison*

Figure 6 shows gender gaps in left-right self-placement and left-party vote intention for all respondents, cohorts born before 1955, and cohorts born after 1955, by country. All countries except Ireland and West Germany show a gender-generation gap in left-right self-placement, and all countries except Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands,



**Figure 6.** The Gender-Generation Gap in Left-Right Self-Placement (Left) and Vote Intention (Right) Cross-Nationally. **Note:** The gender gap in self-placement is calculated as the mean left-right self-placement among women minus the mean left-right self-placement among men; the gender gap in party choice is calculated as the proportion of women who support left-wing parties minus the proportion of men who support left-wing parties. Negative numbers indicate a traditional gender gap, and positive numbers a modern gender gap. N=42,023 (self-placement; left); 41,164 (vote intention; right).

**Source:** From the merged EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).

**Table 1a.** Models 1–4 for Left-Right Self-Placement.

	Model 1	Model 2a: + Economic position	Model 2b: + Economic position * Birth year	Model 3a: + Religiosity	Model 3b: + Religiosity * Birth year	Model 4
Birth year	-0.066* (0.030)	-0.113* (0.030)	-0.184* (0.040)	-0.161* (0.029)	-0.261* (0.032)	-0.377* (0.041)
Female	-0.184* (0.043)	-0.172* (0.045)	-0.153* (0.047)	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.010 (0.042)	0.004 (0.047)
Female * Birth year	0.090* (0.013)	0.097* (0.013)	0.090* (0.014)	0.080* (0.013)	0.067* (0.013)	0.069* (0.014)
Age and age <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socioeconomic position		Y	Y			Y
Socioeconomic position * Birth year			Y			Y
Religiosity				Y	Y	Y
Religiosity * Birth year					Y	Y
Log-likelihood	-99019.736	-87915.059	-87905.81	-87238.302	-87191.749	-87131.346

**Note:** Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. Random effects for country-year are included in all models. N=42,023.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\*p < .05.

and France show a gender-generation gap in vote intention: among the older cohort there is either a traditional gender gap or a smaller modern gender gap than the younger cohort, for whom there is almost invariably a modern gender gap.

The descriptive evidence thus far shows that there appears to be a gender-generation gap in most of the countries examined, and the changes between cohorts in socioeconomic position and religiosity show a narrowing of the gap between men and women for younger cohorts. However, that there is little change in differences between men and women on economic attitudes and values between cohorts suggests that a growing divergence between men and women on these issues is not related to the gender-generation gap as Inglehart and Norris suggest.

### Testing the Hypotheses

Tables 1a–2b show the results of Models 1–7 for gender and birth year for left-right self-placement and vote intention; full results with all variables can be found in the Appendix. The two key terms are *female* and the interaction between *female* and *birth year*. The coefficient for *female* gives the gender gap at the oldest cohort, born 1925. A negative coefficient for *female* indicates the presence of the traditional gender gap for this cohort where women are less left-wing than men. The interaction between *female* and *birth year* gives the change in the effect of gender as birth year increases. A positive interaction therefore indicates a trend toward the modern gender gap across cohorts. Model 1 thus shows that there is a gender-generation gap for both dependent variables. The oldest cohort shows the traditional gender gap (negative coefficient)

**Table 1b.** Models 5a–7 for Left-Right Self-Placement.

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Birth year	-0.569* (0.040)	-0.685* (0.045)	-0.344* (0.041)	-0.345* (0.047)	-0.645* (0.050)
Female	-0.065 (0.044)	-0.055 (0.045)	-0.040 (0.046)	-0.033 (0.047)	-0.097* (0.045)
Female * Birth year	0.059* (0.013)	0.055* (0.013)	0.070* (0.014)	0.068* (0.014)	0.056* (0.013)
Age and age <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socioeconomic position	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socioeconomic position * Birth year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Religiosity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Religiosity * Birth year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Economic attitudes	Y	Y			Y
Economic attitudes * Birth year		Y			Y
Values			Y	Y	Y
Values*Birth year				Y	Y
Log-likelihood	-85136.251	-85117.657	-86595.307	-86586.626	-84596.465

**Note:** Random effects for country-year are included in all models. Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. N=42,023.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\*p < .05.

**Table 2a.** Models 1–4 for Left-Wing Vote Intention.

	Model 1	Model 2a: + Economic position	Model 2b: + Economic position* Birth year	Model 3a: + Religiosity	Model 3b: + Religiosity * Birth year	Model 4
Birth year	0.145* (0.033)	0.104* (0.033)	-0.020 (0.045)	0.056 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.203* (0.048)
Female	-0.106* (0.048)	-0.089 (0.050)	-0.079 (0.053)	0.051 (0.049)	0.105* (0.050)	0.109* (0.054)
Female * Birth year	0.057* (0.014)	0.061* (0.015)	0.057* (0.016)	0.041* (0.015)	0.023 (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)
Age and age <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socioeconomic position		Y	Y			Y
Socioeconomic position * Birth year			Y			Y
Religiosity				Y	Y	Y
Religiosity * Birth year					Y	Y
Log-likelihood	-25823.322	-25753.476	-25737.586	-25229.368	-25194.135	-25148.11

**Note:** Random effects for country-year are included in all models. Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients are log odds. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. N=41,164.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\*p < .05.

**Table 2b.** Models 5a–7 for Left-Wing Vote Intention.

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Birth year	-0.336* (0.049)	-0.343* (0.055)	-0.192* (0.048)	-0.195* (0.055)	-0.327* (0.063)
Female	0.060 (0.055)	0.058 (0.056)	0.067 (0.055)	0.057 (0.056)	0.001 (0.057)
Female * Birth year	0.019 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)	0.029 (0.017)	0.023 (0.017)
Age and age <sup>2</sup>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socioeconomic position	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socioeconomic position * Birth year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Religiosity	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Religiosity * Birth year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Economic attitudes	Y	Y			Y
Economic attitudes * Birth year		Y			Y
Values			Y	Y	Y
Values * Birth year				Y	Y
Log-likelihood	-24428.503	-24427.718	-24869.798	-24864.986	-24152.872

**Note:** Random effects for country-year are included in all models. Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. N=42,023.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\* $p < .05$ .

and the interaction between *female* and *birth year* is positive and statistically significant. This provides strong support for the gender-generation gap hypothesis.

Model 2a adds socioeconomic position. The coefficient for *female* in the model for vote intention, but not for left-right self-placement, becomes statistically insignificant, indicating women's more right-wing political position in older birth cohorts is somewhat related to their different socioeconomic position relative to men. However, the interaction coefficient does not decrease in size or statistical significance. This shows that the trends shown in Figure 2, where younger cohorts of women are more likely to be employed and educated to the same level as their male peers compared to older cohorts, have little relation to the *change* in the gender gap across cohorts. Model 2b includes interactions between each of the measures of socioeconomic position and *birth year*, and the *female \* birth year* coefficient shows no change in this model from Model 1. For younger cohorts, *children* and *age left education* are more associated with being left-wing on both dependent variables, but this does not appear to be related to the gender-generation gap.

Model 3a tests the religiosity hypothesis by adding the religiosity indicators to Model 1. This provides strong support for the religiosity hypothesis. The gender gap for the oldest cohort given by the coefficient for *female* becomes much smaller and statistically insignificant compared to Model 1, indicating that the greater religiosity of women in older cohorts is strongly associated with the traditional gender gap in

these cohorts. The size of the coefficient for *female \* birth year* reduces in size, showing that some of the change in the gender gap across cohorts is related to changing levels of religiosity across cohorts, shown in Figure 2. If women were as religious as men in older cohorts, there would have been little or no gender difference in political position in older cohorts, and thus the change in the gender gap across cohorts would have been less pronounced.

Model 3b adds interactions between religiosity and *birth year* to Model 3a. This provides evidence for the dealignment hypothesis. Religiosity is less associated with political position for younger cohorts than for older cohorts,<sup>60</sup> and the coefficient for *female \* birth year* decreases in size. This indicates that even though in younger cohorts women remain more religious than men, religiosity is no longer salient for political position and so the gender gap in religiosity is no longer salient for the gender gap in political position. In Model 3b for vote intention, there is now a statistically significant *positive* gender gap for the oldest cohort, shown by the *female* coefficient, and a statistically insignificant interaction coefficient. This indicates that if religiosity and the salience of religiosity were constant across cohorts, women in older cohorts would in fact be more left-wing than men in their vote choice. The positive coefficient for *female* and the absence of a statistically significant change in the gender gap across cohorts (the interaction term) indicates that there is a positive gender gap in vote intention for all cohorts once religiosity especially is controlled for. Model 4 includes both measures of socioeconomic position and religiosity. For both dependent variables the *female* and *female \* birth year* coefficients are very similar to the model which just includes religiosity.

Model 5a adds measures of economic attitudes to Model 4 to test the economic attitudes hypothesis. There is support for this hypothesis. The *female \* birth year* coefficient reduces in size compared to Model 4, suggesting that gender differences in economic attitudes are partially associated with the emergence of the modern gender gap in younger birth cohorts. Furthermore, the *female* coefficient becomes statistically insignificant in the vote intention model once economic attitudes are included. This indicates that, controlling for religiosity, an association between voting for left-wing parties and being economically left-wing is found for women of all cohorts. Model 5b includes an interaction between the economic attitudes measures and birth cohort. For left-right self-placement only, the association between left-wing economic attitudes and left-wing self-placement is larger in younger cohorts than in older cohorts.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, the *female \* birth year* interaction reduces in size. This suggests that the gender gap in support for economically left-wing policies that is present for all cohorts becomes more salient for the gender gap in left-right self-placement in younger cohorts, because such attitudes in general become more salient for political position. However, the same does not hold for vote intention.

Model 6a tests the value change hypothesis by adding the value measures to Model 4. There is some evidence for this hypothesis in the vote choice model, since, as with economic attitudes, the coefficient for *female* becomes statistically insignificant once values are included. This indicates that, controlling for their greater religiosity, women are more likely to vote for left-wing parties than men and this is partially related to their greater liberalism. Contrary to the expectations of the dealignment hypothesis, values have not become more salient for political position in younger cohorts, with the



exception of attitudes toward abortion, which have become *less* associated with political position in younger cohorts. Including the interactions between values and cohort makes little difference to the coefficients of interest.


Model 7 includes all explanatory variables and their interactions with birth cohort. This shows that, overall, these processes are very important for the gender-generation gap. For left-right self-placement, the coefficients for *female* and *female \* birth year* remain statistically significant but much reduced compared to Model 1. For vote intention, both coefficients are statistically insignificant in Model 7. Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder,<sup>62</sup> Figure 7 plots the marginal effects of gender at five-year birth year intervals calculated from Models 1 and 7 to aid the interpretation of the interaction terms.<sup>63</sup> In these figures, the effect of gender in a given cohort is statistically insignificant when the confidence intervals overlap with the zero line. The plots for Model 1 for both dependent variables show the gender-generation gap. In older cohorts, the marginal effect of gender is negative, indicating men are more left-wing than women. After cohorts born in the 1950s, the marginal effect of gender is positive, indicating the gender gap has reversed and women are more left-wing than men. In Model 7, including all explanatory variables and their interactions with birth cohort, the slope is much less steep, indicating that the processes described above play a significant role in explaining the gender-generation gap. The plots show that for younger cohorts, there is still a statistically significant modern gender gap even in Model 7. Although secularization and gender differences in economic attitudes can go a long way to explain the gender-generation gap, there is still an unexplained gender gap in younger cohorts.

## Robustness Checks

In addition to the robustness checks related to the HAPC models, a series of robustness checks were run to ensure that results are not dependent on the countries included. (1) Model 1, with only *birth year*, *female*, and *age*, was run including additional countries originally excluded because they lacked necessary variables (Denmark, Malta, Portugal, Switzerland, Great Britain, and Northern Ireland), and the results were similar to those presented here. (2) Models 1–7 were run dropping out each country in turn. The results remain the same although in the models for vote intention the traditional gender gap in older cohorts becomes statistically insignificant when Austria, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, or Italy are omitted, but the coefficients remain a similar size to the models with all countries and in a negative direction. (3) Model 1 was run for all countries individually. Although for some countries the gender-generation gap is statistically insignificant, because of lower statistical power, the trends are the same. The exceptions are West Germany and Ireland for left-right self-placement and France, Ireland, and the Netherlands for vote intention. These results are broadly consistent with Figure 5. The results of all robustness checks are available on request.

## Conclusions

This article confirms that there is a gender-generation gap in Europe and Canada. In older cohorts, men are more to the left than women, but the reverse is true for younger




**Figure 7.** Marginal Effect of Gender on Left-Right Self-Placement (Left Panels) and Vote Intention (Right Panels).  
**Source:** Models 1 and 7 using the combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVS (1995–2012).

cohorts. Inglehart and Norris's finding of nearly fifteen years ago is present when a longer span of data and more rigorous analysis are used, and thus comparative research on political gender gaps should take the existence of the gender-generation gap seriously. The presence of the gender-generation gap suggests that studies that focus on the aggregate-level gender gap, comparing all men and all women, underestimate the magnitude of political gender differences since the largest gender gaps are to be found within particular birth cohorts. This traditional approach to studying the gender gap misses key explanations for the gradual emergence of the modern gender gap over time, especially since it focuses on reducing the size of the gender coefficient in a model by adding sets of explanatory variables. Such an approach is problematic because the aggregate-level gender gap is produced by averaging over different gender gaps, from different birth cohorts, with different causes. It thus makes more sense to talk of, and to analyze, gender gaps in political position and behavior, rather than a single gender gap. The point applies to analysis not only of the traditional left-right gender gap but also the gender gap in support for parties of the radical right. The gender gap in radical right voting is also inconsistent and often small.<sup>64</sup> Examining generational change in this gap might therefore prove fruitful, especially by assessing the question of whether it is young women who are particularly against voting for the radical right. Finally, if scholars of vote choice and political preferences wish to control for gender they should perhaps include an interaction between gender and birth cohort in order properly to specify this control variable.

In contrast to the theory of modernization put forward by Inglehart and Norris, my analysis finds that secularization, specifically, has had the most consequence for the gender-generation gap. Although secularization might be linked to developments such as increasing female labor force participation, increased female education rates, and declining marriage rates, those factors exert much less influence on the gender-generation gap than does religiosity. Taking the descriptive and regression analysis together, in older cohorts, women are much more religious than men, overall levels of religiosity are higher, and religiosity is important for political position. In younger cohorts, religiosity declines, the gender gap in religiosity declines, and religiosity declines in salience. Once religiosity and its political salience are accounted for, the difference between older men and women becomes insignificant and the change in the size of the gender gap across cohorts is much reduced. The importance of the declining salience of religiosity suggests a link between processes of dealignment and the growth of the modern gender gap, which should be the subject of further research.

At the same time, women of *all* cohorts are more supportive of equality, redistribution, and state intervention than men. However, for older cohorts, this support does not translate into women's being more likely than men to identify as left-wing or vote for a left-wing party, probably because of the power of religiosity for older cohorts. With the decline both of religiosity and its salience in younger cohorts, women's greater support for economically left-wing issues appears to draw them toward a left-wing political position and left-wing parties. It is interesting that economic attitudes have a clear association with the gender-generation gap that is independent of socioeconomic position. This suggests that traditional variables such as labor force participation,



**Figure 8.** Relationship between Gender and Left-Wing Self-Placement/Vote Choice, and Its Mediators.

**Note:** Thicker arrows denote a stronger causal relationship; minus signs indicate a negative relationship; plus signs indicate a positive relationship.

**Source:** Author's drawing.

education, and marital status are relatively unimportant in helping to understanding the changing gender gap across cohorts. Instead of the process of modernization described by Inglehart and Norris and depicted in Figure 1, the gender-generation gap may be related to the process depicted in Figure 8. Older women are more religious and for them religiosity is more salient for political position, leading them to be more right-wing *despite* their economic preferences. Younger women are less religious and religiosity is less important for them, leading them to be more left-wing *in line* with their economic preferences.

This finding is consistent with Emmenegger and Manow's argument that declining religiosity has encouraged political parties to compete along more economic lines, and in particular parties of the left to foreground their economically left-wing policies in an attempt to attract female voters who have become less attached to Christian Democratic parties because of declining religiosity.<sup>65</sup> This trend would raise the salience of economic attitudes for political position, although my analysis suggests it only does so for younger cohorts. In my analysis, economic attitudes matter for the gender-generation gap, while labor force participation, education levels, and marital status do not. It appears that, to the extent that differences between men and women in their economic attitudes are related to their relative socioeconomic positions, these standard variables do not accurately measure differences between men and women in socioeconomic position. Such differences between men and women are likely located in more complex interactions between individual and partner economic status, occupation, and child caring responsibilities. More theoretical work is needed to understand the social and economic reasons behind men's and women's divergent economic preferences.

At the same time, however, this interpretation makes strong assumptions about the causal direction between attitudes and political position that cannot be verified here. It is possible that younger cohorts of women are drawn to parties of the left for reasons other than their position on economic issues, and this brings their political affiliation in line with their economic attitudes, rather than being caused by them. Indeed, women's political position might lead them to develop left-wing economic attitudes, a

reverse causality from that depicted in Figures 1 and 8. For example, parties of the left tend to have greater female representation and thus might be more attractive to younger cohorts of women, and affinity with such parties leads women to adopt the economic position of these parties. Further research is needed to assess the nature of this relationship between economic attitudes and political position and its role in the formation of gender gaps. The utilization of more detailed country-specific, panel data sets would be beneficial here. Furthermore, the role of political parties in shaping political gender gaps should be further examined.

This article has argued that, consistent with Inglehart and Norris, there is a gender-generation gap in left-right self-placement and vote choice. Thus research into differences between men and women in political orientations and behavior should start focusing on gender gaps, rather than the aggregate-level gender gap, in order to avoid underestimating gender differences. The gender-generation gap is found to be associated mostly with secularization, with differences between men and women in their attitudes toward economic equality and redistribution also playing a role. The findings offer guidance for the focus of future research on gender gaps. To understand more fully the growth of the modern gender gap in Europe and elsewhere, scholars should give theoretical and empirical attention to specifically younger cohorts of men and women, as well as gender differences in economic preferences.

## Appendix

**Table A1a.** Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables.

	Age completed education	Marital status	Home-maker	Children	Religious identification	Church attendance	Religious person	Competition
Age completed education								
Marital status	0.0133*							
Home-maker	-0.1512*	-0.1149*						
Children	-0.1014*	0.0059	0.0544*					
Religious identification	-0.0768*	-0.0705*	0.0617*	0.0534*				
Church attendance	-0.0929*	-0.0377*	0.1365*	0.1173*	0.2577*			
Religious person	-0.0869*	-0.0515*	0.1067*	0.1138*	0.4071*	0.3216*		
Competition	-0.0372*	0.0406*	0.0281*	0.0013	-0.0666*	0.0003	-0.0168*	
Benefits	-0.0461*	0.0567*	-0.0124*	-0.1015*	-0.0449*	-0.0716*	-0.0763*	0.0924*
Responsibility	-0.0572*	0.0294*	0.0495*	-0.0138*	0.0007	0.0105*	0.0055	0.2122*
Equalize incomes	-0.0580*	0.0565*	0.0227*	0.0394*	-0.0089	-0.0223*	-0.028*	0.1125*
Divorce	0.1915*	0.0965*	-0.0946*	-0.1163*	-0.2018*	-0.3140*	-0.2819*	0.0016
Postmaterialism	0.1642*	-0.0015	-0.0668*	-0.0754*	-0.0983*	-0.0569*	-0.0755*	0.0061
Homosexuality	-0.1469*	-0.0260*	0.0385*	0.0733*	0.0877*	0.1301*	0.1109*	-0.0276*
Abortion	0.2012*	0.0477*	-0.1095*	-0.1025*	-0.2536*	-0.3424*	-0.3374*	0.0043
Housewife	0.0862*	0.0258*	-0.0813*	-0.0975*	-0.0910*	-0.1049*	-0.1268*	0.0002

**Note:** All correlations given as Pearson’s correlation coefficient.

**Source:** Author’s data.

\*p < .05.

**Table A1b.** Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (Continued).

	Benefits	Responsibility	Equalize incomes	Divorce	Postmaterialism	Homosexuality	Abortion
Responsibility	0.0496*						
Equalize incomes	0.0438*	0.1687*					
Divorce	0.0256*	0.0212*	0.0122*				
Postmaterialism	-0.0121*	-0.0025	-0.0096	0.1315*			
Homosexuality	0.0205*	-0.0129*	-0.0024	-0.2320*	-0.0909*		
Abortion	0.0539*	-0.0087	0.0032	0.6572*	0.1370*	-0.2138*	
Housewife	0.0253*	0.0044	-0.0344	0.1689*	0.0676*	-0.0707*	0.1572*

**Note:** All correlations given as Pearson's correlation coefficient.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\* $p < .05$ .

**Table A2.** Full Results from Models 1–4 for Left-Right Self-Placement.

	Model 1	Model 2a: + Economic position	Model 2b: + Economic position* Birth year	Model 3a: + Religiosity	Model 3b: + Religiosity* Birth year	Model 4
Birth year	-0.066* (0.030)	-0.113* (0.030)	-0.184* (0.040)	-0.161* (0.029)	-0.261* (0.032)	-0.377* (0.041)
Female	-0.184* (0.043)	-0.172* (0.045)	-0.153* (0.047)	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.010 (0.042)	0.004 (0.047)
Female * Birth year	0.090* (0.013)	0.097* (0.013)	0.090* (0.014)	0.080* (0.013)	0.067* (0.013)	0.069* (0.014)
Age	0.010* (0.005)	0.020* (0.005)	0.013* (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Marital status (married)						
Cohabiting		0.214* (0.040)	0.343* (0.122)			0.096 (0.121)
Single		0.270* (0.029)	0.245* (0.084)			0.225* (0.082)
Divorced/ separated		0.333* (0.035)	0.328* (0.089)			0.103 (0.087)
Widowed		0.120* (0.049)	0.165* (0.080)			0.152 (0.078)
Age left education		0.002 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.003)			-0.011* (0.003)
Homemaker		-0.176* (0.035)	-0.310* (0.072)			-0.223* (0.071)
Children		0.022 (0.035)	-0.128 (0.066)			-0.029 (0.065)
Cohabiting * Birth year			-0.033 (0.031)			0.005 (0.030)
Single * Birth year			0.005 (0.021)			-0.004 (0.021)
Divorced/separated * Birth year			0.000 (0.029)			0.039 (0.029)

(continued)

**Table A2. (continued)**

	Model 1	Model 2a: + Economic position	Model 2b: + Economic position* Birth year	Model 3a: + Religiosity	Model 3b: + Religiosity* Birth year	Model 4
Widowed*Birth year			-0.033 (0.047)			-0.031 (0.046)
Age left education*Birth year			0.003* (0.001)			0.004* (0.001)
Homemaker*Birth year			0.052* (0.024)			0.040 (0.024)
Children * Birth year			0.084* (0.029)			0.041 (0.029)
Religion (no religion)						
Christian				-0.493* (0.026)	-0.854* (0.060)	-0.838* (0.060)
Non-Christian religion				-0.090 (0.061)	-0.551* (0.146)	-0.558* (0.146)
Church attendance				-0.437* (0.029)	-0.552* (0.054)	-0.541* (0.055)
Religious person				-0.371* (0.023)	-0.441* (0.052)	-0.448* (0.053)
Christian * Birth year					0.113* (0.017)	0.113* (0.017)
Non-Christian religion * Birth year					0.132* (0.040)	0.140* (0.040)
Church attendance * Birth year					0.056* (0.018)	0.057* (0.019)
Religious person * Birth year					0.022 (0.015)	0.026 (0.015)
Log-likelihood	-99019.736	-87915.059	-87905.81	-87238.302	-87191.749	-87131.346

**Note:** Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. Random effects for country-year are included in all models. Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. N=42,023.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\*p < .05.

**Table A3. Full Results of Models 5a–7 For Left-Right Self-Placement.**

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Birth year	-0.569* (0.040)	-0.685* (0.045)	-0.344* (0.041)	-0.345* (0.047)	-0.645* (0.050)
Female	-0.065 (0.044)	-0.055 (0.045)	-0.040 (0.046)	-0.033 (0.047)	-0.097* (0.045)
Female * Birth year	0.059* (0.013)	0.055* (0.013)	0.070* (0.014)	0.068* (0.014)	0.056* (0.013)
Age	-0.015* (0.005)	-0.015* (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.017* (0.005)

(continued)



Table A3. (continued)

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Marital status (married)					
Cohabiting	0.099 (0.115)	0.115 (0.115)	-0.006 (0.119)	-0.003 (0.120)	0.013 (0.114)
Single	0.112 (0.079)	0.134 (0.079)	0.214* (0.081)	0.216* (0.081)	0.126 (0.078)
Divorced/separated	0.034 (0.083)	0.045 (0.083)	0.052 (0.086)	0.072 (0.087)	0.010 (0.083)
Widowed	0.103 (0.075)	0.113 (0.075)	0.161* (0.077)	0.164* (0.077)	0.126 (0.074)
Age left education	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.020* (0.003)	-0.020* (0.003)	-0.016* (0.003)
Homemaker	-0.261* (0.067)	-0.248* (0.067)	-0.174* (0.070)	-0.175* (0.070)	-0.197* (0.067)
Children	-0.034 (0.062)	-0.050 (0.063)	0.045 (0.065)	0.045 (0.065)	0.021 (0.062)
Cohabiting * Birth year	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.029)	0.019 (0.030)	0.019 (0.030)	0.006 (0.029)
Single * Birth year	0.001 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.020)
Divorced/separated * Birth year	0.038 (0.027)	0.034 (0.027)	0.041 (0.028)	0.034 (0.028)	0.031 (0.027)
Widowed * Birth year	-0.035 (0.044)	-0.038 (0.044)	-0.024 (0.045)	-0.025 (0.045)	-0.032 (0.043)
Age left education * Birth year	0.004* (0.001)	0.005* (0.001)	0.004* (0.001)	0.004* (0.001)	0.005* (0.001)
Homemaker * Birth year	0.041 (0.023)	0.037 (0.023)	0.044 (0.023)	0.044 (0.023)	0.042 (0.022)
Children * Birth year	0.033 (0.028)	0.041 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.029)	0.002 (0.028)
Religion (no religion)					
Christian	-0.787* (0.057)	-0.794* (0.057)	-0.704* (0.059)	-0.701* (0.060)	-0.664* (0.057)
Non-Christian religion	-0.478* (0.139)	-0.468* (0.139)	-0.477* (0.144)	-0.467* (0.144)	-0.379* (0.138)
Church attendance	-0.527* (0.052)	-0.535* (0.052)	-0.440* (0.055)	-0.435* (0.056)	-0.423* (0.053)
Religious person	-0.430* (0.050)	-0.437* (0.050)	-0.347* (0.052)	-0.342* (0.053)	-0.328* (0.051)
Christian * Birth year	0.110* (0.016)	0.113* (0.016)	0.096* (0.017)	0.095* (0.017)	0.094* (0.016)
Non-Christian religion * Birth year	0.118* (0.038)	0.114* (0.038)	0.151* (0.039)	0.147* (0.039)	0.121* (0.038)
Church attendance * Birth year	0.050* (0.018)	0.054* (0.018)	0.064* (0.018)	0.062* (0.019)	0.058* (0.018)
Religious person * Birth year	0.030* (0.015)	0.032* (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)	0.021 (0.016)	0.026 (0.015)

(continued)

Table A3. (continued)

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Competition	0.090* (0.004)	0.082* (0.009)			0.074* (0.009)
Benefits	0.008 (0.005)	-0.017 (0.012)			-0.014 (0.012)
Responsibility	0.093* (0.004)	0.064* (0.008)			0.065* (0.008)
Equalize incomes	0.163* (0.004)	0.148* (0.008)			0.150* (0.008)
Competition * Birth year		0.003 (0.003)			0.004 (0.003)
Benefits * Birth year		0.008* (0.003)			0.008* (0.003)
Responsibility * Birth year		0.010* (0.002)			0.009* (0.002)
Equalize incomes * Birth year		0.005* (0.002)			0.004 (0.002)
Divorce			0.024* (0.005)	0.001 (0.010)	0.007 (0.010)
Postmaterialism (materialist)					
Mixed			0.119* (0.026)	0.093 (0.053)	0.131* (0.051)
Postmaterialist			0.659* (0.032)	0.597* (0.069)	0.571* (0.066)
Homosexuality			-0.231* (0.027)	-0.263* (0.052)	-0.275* (0.050)
Abortion			0.034* (0.004)	0.056* (0.010)	0.054* (0.009)
Housewife (strongly agree)					
Agree			-0.002 (0.027)	0.066 (0.055)	0.078 (0.053)
Don't know			0.140* (0.044)	0.225* (0.092)	0.206* (0.088)
Disagree			0.092* (0.029)	0.201* (0.062)	0.217* (0.059)
Strongly disagree			0.163* (0.038)	0.089 (0.091)	0.106 (0.087)
Divorce * Birth year				0.008* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Mixed * Birth year				0.009 (0.016)	0.003 (0.016)
Postmaterialist * Birth year				0.021 (0.021)	0.006 (0.020)
Homosexuality * Birth year				0.013 (0.018)	0.016 (0.017)
Abortion * Birth year				-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)
Agree * Birth year				-0.025 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.017)

(continued)

**Table A3. (continued)**

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Don't know * Birth year				-0.031 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.027)
Disagree * Birth year				-0.038* (0.019)	-0.027 (0.018)
Strongly disagree * Birth year				0.018 (0.027)	0.029 (0.025)
Log-likelihood	-85136.251	-85117.657	-86595.307	-86586.626	-84596.465

**Note:** Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. Random effects for country-year are included in all models. N=42,023.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\*p < .05.

**Table A4. Full Results of Models 1–4 for Vote Intention.**

	Model 1	Model 2a: + Economic position	Model 2b: + Economic position * Birth year	Model 3a: + Religiosity	Model 3b: + Religiosity * Birth year	Model 4
Birth year	0.145* (0.033)	0.104* (0.033)	-0.020 (0.045)	0.056 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.203* (0.048)
Female	-0.106* (0.048)	-0.089 (0.050)	-0.079 (0.053)	0.051 (0.049)	0.105* (0.050)	0.109* (0.054)
Female * Birth year	0.057* (0.014)	0.061* (0.015)	0.057* (0.016)	0.041* (0.015)	0.023 (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)
Age	0.034* (0.005)	0.042* (0.006)	0.034* (0.006)	0.025* (0.005)	0.024* (0.005)	0.027* (0.006)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Marital status (married)						
Cohabiting		0.320* (0.044)	0.530* (0.134)			0.278* (0.137)
Single		0.211* (0.032)	0.154 (0.092)			0.141 (0.095)
Divorced/separated		0.283* (0.039)	0.395* (0.096)			0.184 (0.098)
Widowed		0.072 (0.054)	0.166 (0.090)			0.160 (0.092)
Age left education		0.001 (0.002)	-0.013* (0.004)			-0.019* (0.004)
Homemaker		-0.143* (0.038)	-0.279* (0.080)			-0.166* (0.082)
Children		0.027 (0.039)	-0.154* (0.073)			-0.070 (0.075)
Cohabiting * Birth year			-0.057 (0.034)			-0.016 (0.035)

(continued)

**Table A4. (continued)**

	Model 1	Model 2a: + Economic position	Model 2b: + Economic position * Birth year	Model 3a: + Religiosity	Model 3b: + Religiosity * Birth year	Model 4
Single * Birth year			0.011 (0.024)			0.006 (0.024)
Divorced/separated * Birth year			-0.041 (0.032)			-0.003 (0.032)
Widowed * Birth year			-0.068 (0.053)			-0.067 (0.054)
Age left education * Birth year			0.006* (0.001)			0.007* (0.001)
Homemaker * Birth year			0.053* (0.027)			0.034 (0.027)
Children * Birth year			0.101* (0.033)			0.063 (0.034)
Religion (no religion)						
Christian				-0.327* (0.029)	-0.531* (0.066)	-0.518* (0.066)
Non-Christian religion				-0.110 (0.071)	-0.767* (0.179)	-0.765* (0.179)
Church attendance				-0.685* (0.036)	-0.823* (0.070)	-0.819* (0.070)
Religious person				-0.341* (0.026)	-0.523* (0.058)	-0.537* (0.059)
Christian * Birth year					0.064* (0.019)	0.065* (0.019)
Non-Christian religion * Birth year					0.189* (0.049)	0.195* (0.049)
Church attendance * Birth year					0.065* (0.024)	0.068* (0.024)
Religious person * Birth year					0.059* (0.017)	0.065* (0.017)
Log-likelihood	-25823.322	-25753.476	-25737.586	-25229.368	-25194.135	-25148.111

**Note:** Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients are log odds. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. Random effects for country-year are included in all models. N=41,164.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\*p < .05.

**Table A5. Full Results of Models 5a–7 for Vote Intention.**

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Birth year	-0.336* (0.049)	-0.343* (0.055)	-0.192* (0.048)	-0.195* (0.055)	-0.327* (0.063)
Female	0.060 (0.055)	0.058 (0.056)	0.067 (0.055)	0.057 (0.056)	0.001 (0.057)

(continued)

Table A5. (continued)

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Female* Birth year	0.019 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)	0.029 (0.017)	0.023 (0.017)
Age	0.016* (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)	0.024* (0.006)	0.024* (0.006)	0.013* (0.007)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Marital status (married)					
Cohabiting	0.273 (0.140)	0.274 (0.140)	0.190 (0.138)	0.184 (0.138)	0.170 (0.142)
Single	0.041 (0.097)	0.046 (0.097)	0.133 (0.096)	0.133 (0.096)	0.035 (0.098)
Divorced/separated	0.136 (0.101)	0.139 (0.101)	0.134 (0.099)	0.132 (0.099)	0.082 (0.102)
Widowed	0.135 (0.094)	0.138 (0.094)	0.168 (0.093)	0.173 (0.093)	0.153 (0.095)
Age left education	-0.014* (0.004)	-0.015* (0.004)	-0.027* (0.004)	-0.029* (0.004)	-0.025* (0.004)
Homemaker	-0.183* (0.084)	-0.184* (0.084)	-0.125 (0.083)	-0.123 (0.083)	-0.137 (0.084)
Children	-0.076 (0.077)	-0.075 (0.077)	-0.010 (0.076)	-0.002 (0.077)	-0.006 (0.078)
Cohabiting * Birth year	-0.018 (0.036)	-0.019 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.036)
Single * Birth year	0.014 (0.025)	0.013 (0.025)	0.001 (0.025)	0.001 (0.025)	0.009 (0.025)
Divorced/separated * Birth year	-0.003 (0.033)	-0.004 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.033)
Widowed * Birth year	-0.072 (0.055)	-0.073 (0.055)	0.062 (0.054)	-0.065 (0.054)	-0.073 (0.055)
Age left education * Birth year	0.008* (0.001)	0.008* (0.001)	0.007* (0.001)	0.008* (0.001)	0.009* (0.001)
Homemaker * Birth year	0.030 (0.028)	0.031 (0.028)	0.035 (0.028)	0.034 (0.028)	0.031 (0.028)
Children * Birth year	0.058 (0.034)	0.058 (0.034)	0.031 (0.034)	0.026 (0.034)	0.021 (0.035)
Religion (no religion)					
Christian	-0.515* (0.068)	-0.515* (0.068)	-0.413* (0.067)	-0.401* (0.067)	-0.396* (0.069)
Non-Christian religion	-0.745* (0.182)	-0.745* (0.182)	-0.691* (0.181)	-0.673* (0.181)	-0.646* (0.184)
Church attendance	-0.837* (0.071)	-0.842* (0.071)	-0.724* (0.071)	-0.704* (0.072)	-0.719* (0.073)
Religious person	-0.538* (0.060)	-0.540* (0.060)	-0.451* (0.059)	-0.436* (0.060)	-0.431* (0.062)
Christian * Birth year	0.070* (0.020)	0.070* (0.020)	0.052* (0.019)	0.048* (0.019)	0.053* (0.020)
Non-Christian religion * Birth year	0.185* (0.049)	0.185* (0.049)	0.203* (0.049)	0.196* (0.049)	0.187* (0.050)

(continued)

**Table A5. (continued)**

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Church attendance * Birth year	0.068* (0.024)	0.070* (0.024)	0.077* (0.024)	0.070* (0.024)	0.072* (0.025)
Religious person * Birth year	0.068* (0.018)	0.069* (0.018)	0.063* (0.017)	0.059* (0.018)	0.061* (0.018)
Competition	0.074* (0.005)	0.076* (0.011)	0.063* (0.017)	0.059* (0.018)	0.071* (0.011)
Benefits	0.027* (0.006)	0.011 (0.014)			0.015 (0.014)
Responsibility	0.066* (0.005)	0.066* (0.010)			0.069* (0.010)
Equalize incomes	0.109* (0.004)	0.110* (0.009)			0.114* (0.010)
Competition * Birth year		-0.001 (0.003)			0.001 (0.003)
Benefits * Birth year		0.005 (0.004)			0.004 (0.004)
Responsibility * Birth year		-0.000 (0.003)			-0.001 (0.003)
Equalize incomes * Birth year		-0.000 (0.003)			-0.001 (0.003)
Divorce			0.028* (0.005)	0.019 (0.012)	0.023 (0.012)
Postmaterialism (materialist)					
Mixed			0.067* (0.031)	0.053 (0.064)	0.092 (0.065)
Postmaterialist			0.438* (0.037)	0.526* (0.081)	0.537* (0.083)
Homosexuality			-0.189* (0.032)	-0.254* (0.064)	-0.281* (0.065)
Abortion			0.042* (0.005)	0.060* (0.012)	0.062* (0.012)
Housewife (strongly agree)					
Agree			-0.075* (0.031)	-0.098 (0.066)	-0.091 (0.067)
Don't know			-0.102* (0.051)	-0.224* (0.109)	-0.224* (0.111)
Disagree			-0.021 (0.033)	-0.045 (0.073)	-0.028 (0.075)
Strongly disagree			0.063 (0.044)	0.047 (0.106)	0.062 (0.108)
Divorce * Birth year				0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Mixed * Birth year				0.004 (0.020)	0.000 (0.020)
Postmaterialist * Birth year				-0.029 (0.025)	-0.040 (0.025)
Homosexuality * Birth year				0.026 (0.021)	0.029 (0.022)

(continued)

**Table A5. (continued)**

	Model 5a: + Economic attitudes	Model 5b: + Economic attitudes * Birth year	Model 6a: + Values	Model 6b: + Values * Birth year	Model 7
Abortion * Birth year				-0.006 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)
Agree * Birth year				0.008 (0.021)	0.013 (0.021)
Don't know * Birth year				0.041 (0.033)	0.050 (0.034)
Disagree * Birth year				0.008 (0.023)	0.015 (0.023)
Strongly disagree * Birth year				0.006 (0.031)	0.016 (0.032)
Log-likelihood	-24428.503	-24427.718	-24869.798	-24864.986	-24152.872

**Note:** Birth year is adjusted so that the coefficient for female can be interpreted as the gender gap at the oldest birth year, 1925. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive numbers indicate more support for the left. Random effects for country-year are included in all models. N=42,023.

**Source:** Combined EVS (1989–2010) and WVVS (1995–2012).

\* $p < .05$ .

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## Notes

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50. The EVS/WVS does not provide a consistent measure of age of children or children in the household.
51. Other variables relating to economic attitudes are available in some waves of the EVS/WVS; these five are the ones available for all waves required here.
52. Respondents were asked which of these was most important, and which was the next most important: (1) maintaining order in the nation, (2) giving people more say in important government decisions, (3) fighting rising prices, or (4) protecting freedom of speech. They were classified as materialist if they selected both 1 and 3, postmaterialist for both 2 and 4, and mixed if they selected either 1 and 2 or 3 and 4.
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