

*THE AMERICAN SOLDIER:  
ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE  
VOLUME I*

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STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY  
= IN WORLD WAR II

- Volume I. The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life*  
*Volume II. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath*  
*Volume III. Experiments on Mass Communication*  
*Volume IV. Measurement and Prediction*

The four volumes in this series were prepared and edited under the auspices of a Special Committee of the Social Science Research Council, comprising

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The data on which these volumes are based were collected by the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, War Department, during World War II. In making the data available, the War Department assumes no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations contained in these volumes, which are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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THE  
AMERICAN  
SOLDIER:  
*ADJUSTMENT DURING  
ARMY LIFE*

VOLUME I

BY  
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## FOREWORD

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**T**HESSE volumes are the end product of the four-year activity of the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, United States Army. They provide a record of the attitudes of the American soldier in World War II and of the techniques developed to study these attitudes. It is a record in many ways unique. Never before had modern methods of social science been employed on so large a scale, by such competent technicians. Its value to the social scientist may be as great as its value to the military for whom the original research was done.

The citizen army of the United States offered an exceptional opportunity for the effective use of the new scientific methods devised and taught in the years immediately preceding the war. Not only did the Army contain all the diverse elements of young American men, in numbers adequate for valid statistical results, but each of these men was indexed for various items of personal background of a kind important in drawing samples. Further, the organization of the Army was such that at the word of command groups of men could be drawn out for study with a minimum of effort, provided only that the Army authorities were willing that such studies should be made.

The Army was willing that such studies be made. What was too novel, too contrary to tradition to have gained general acceptance in our universities or in industry, was accepted by the Army at the very time of its greatest pressures for training and combat. The conservatism natural to professional men everywhere, and often particularly ascribed to the professional soldier, was broken down by the imaginative grasp of the abler leaders. Throughout the Army there were officers to whom these new methods of determining soldier attitudes seemed to promise new and sounder premises on which to base many of their decisions. The list of such officers would be long, and difficult to compile in its entirety. At the top would be the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, whose rare qualities of intelligence and character provided understanding and much needed support. In more immediate command, General Brehon Somervell's driving energy, deep sincerity, and competent critical exactions were a constant spur to more and better work. In

the field the Research Staff was supported by many diverse and able commanders whose backing made possible the extensive field studies which were the basis of all research reports.

Much of the credit for gaining the support of these and many other officers was due to the technical proficiency of the Research Staff itself. These men were not only specialists in the science of human behavior, they were also skillful in understanding and anticipating the Army's practical needs. By the end of the war the Research Branch was an accepted part of the Army organization.

It is a further tribute to the vision and integrity of the Army leadership that the basic data upon which these volumes are built, in the form of IBM punched cards and declassified reports, were made available to the Social Science Research Council in order to insure a frank and impartial analysis free from any censorship. The Army has exercised no control on the interpretations or conclusions here expressed, which are the sole responsibility of the authors in their capacity as civilian social scientists.

The work of the Research Branch was a uniquely American effort. In no other country could there have been found so many men with such a high level of scientific training in modern techniques for investigating and interpreting the behavior of human beings. The staff included specialists in psychology, sociology, and statistical analysis. They were bound together by a common ideal to present conclusions arising out of ascertained factual material. They were loyal, patriotic, and moved by the hope that their specialized efforts might make some contribution to winning the war. But there was also in them a deeper motivation. They believed that in this major application of the scientific approach to human problems might be found keys to the improvement of human relationships.

The search for factual knowledge provides a common meeting ground for all creeds and races. Such a meeting ground exists already in the physical sciences which, at least in the Western democracies, know no national boundaries. Perhaps this new approach could be extended to those human and emotional problems towards whose solution so little progress has been made during thousands of years of intuitive and hortatory approach. This may not have been the major motivation of the Research Staff. But the thought was in their minds. It lent a sort of consecration to their efforts to protect the integrity of their work. For this reason, and many others, it was a rare privilege to be associated with such a group. Each made his particular contribution. On the leaders of the group



fell not only the heaviest scientific responsibility, but a burden of work which to men less highly motivated would have seemed impossible to carry. Dr. Samuel A. Stouffer, Director of Professional Staff, Dr. Carl I. Hovland, and Dr. Leonard S. Cottrell, and all of their colleagues, gave each of us an example of self-denying devotion, extreme competence, and prodigal effort which helped to inspire the whole Division, in Washington and overseas.

A major purpose of the Research Staff was to provide a base of factual knowledge which would help the Director of the Army Information and Education Division in his administrative and policy decisions. This purpose was abundantly fulfilled. Without Research we would have too often been working in the dark. With Research we knew our course and were able to defend it before Congress and the press. Further, we made a remarkable discovery. The Army gave little weight to our personal opinions; but when these opinions were supported by factual studies, the Army took them seriously. For the first time on such a scale, the attempt to direct human behavior was, in part at least, based on scientific evidence. If this method could be developed and more widely used, it might provide further impetus for a great advance in the social relations of man. To that hope these volumes are dedicated.

FREDERICK OSBORN

*Formerly, Major General, G.S.C.*

*Director, Information and Education Division*



## RESEARCH BRANCH PROFESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL

Includes personnel who were assigned to the Research Branch in Washington, many of whom subsequently served overseas. Because records are not available, does not include overseas personnel who were never assigned to the Research Branch. Civilian personnel includes those with civil service classifications of P-1, CAF-5, and higher. Consultants includes all who had formal consultant appointments. (\*designates military personnel; \*\*designates consultants)

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## CHAPTER 1

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### HOW THESE VOLUMES CAME TO BE PRODUCED<sup>1</sup>

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THESE volumes are written for three audiences.

One is the Armed Forces. As Tolstoy long ago said in *War and Peace*: "In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown  $x$ ."

"Military science, seeing in history an immense number of examples in which the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, and in which small numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognises the existence of this unknown factor, and tries to find it sometimes in some geometrical disposition of the troops, sometimes in the superiority of weapons, and most often in the genius of the leaders. But none of those factors yield results that agree with the historical facts.

"One has but to renounce the false view that glorifies the effect of the activity of the heroes of history in warfare in order to discover this unknown quantity,  $x$ ."

" $X$  is the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire thirty times a minute."<sup>2</sup>

Since the war, the Research and Development Board which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense has established a Committee on Human Resources. This is a recognition, both by scientists and the military, of the fact not only that social and psychological problems are crucial in modern war, as in the days of Tolstoy, but also that they are now amenable to scientific study. In the peacetime Army, Navy, and Air Force there may be a good many

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter, written by Samuel A. Stouffer, represents, in general, the point of view of the technical subcommittee comprising Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Leland C. DeVinney, Carl I. Hovland, and Samuel A. Stouffer.

<sup>2</sup> Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Constance Garnett (McClure, Phillips and Co., New York, 1904), III, Part XIV, p. 268.

officers, especially among those teaching in Service schools or among those developing new training or personnel plans, who can find in the Army's experience, as recorded here and there in these volumes, an idea which they can translate into a program of experimentation for the future.

Another audience is the historians. If by some miracle a cache should be found of manuscript materials telling of the attitudes toward combat of a representative sample of, say, a hundred men in Stonewall Jackson's army, the discovery would interest Civil War historians. We have in these volumes data drawn from the expressions about their Army experiences, at home and abroad, of more than half a million American young men who were queried at one time or another during World War II. What these men had to say is a page of the history of the war and of the history of America. The data should be of special interest to the newer generation of historians, who are as much interested in institutions and the rank and file comprising them as they are interested in big personalities and big dramatic events, and some of whom are now getting training in the interpretation of statistics along with other techniques of contemporary social science investigation. From some points of view, the attitudes of soldiers, especially toward many of the traditional practices of Army life, do not make a pretty historical picture. But these young men were Americans. Their unwillingness to accept with complacency some of the ways in which the Army did things may not have been out of keeping with historic American traditions of resistance to authoritarian controls, especially when authority was coupled, as in the leadership system of the Army, with special social privileges for the wielders of power.

If either the Armed Forces, on the one hand, or the historians on the other, were to be the sole audience for these books, somewhat different procedures of organizing the primary materials would have been adopted. But there is a third audience—of social psychologists and sociologists—and this is the main audience to which these books are addressed. The study of personal and institutional adjustment to new social situations may be stimulated both by the findings in these volumes and by their shortcomings.

World War I used the tools of psychology to aid in the measurement and classification of human abilities. That demonstration of the practical value of the Alpha test and other instruments of measurement gave a new impetus to psychology after the war. Crude measuring devices were improved and superseded, early concep-



tions of the nature of intelligence were gradually replaced by models based upon new conceptual schemes tested by empirical study, and within one generation the work of hundreds of psychologists has advanced our knowledge of human abilities across successively new frontiers. When the nation was again called to arms, psychology was ready with improved techniques of measurement and classification to aid in selection of airplane pilots, navigators, and bombardiers and, in general, to supply facts about human abilities of soldiers in all branches of the service.

Just as World War I gave new impetus to the study of human *aptitudes*, so World War II has given new impetus to the study of *attitudes*. The social psychologists and sociologists who studied problems of motivation and social adjustment in World War II have an obligation, comparable to that of the generation earlier, to report on their studies and thus to speed up the process of development of the science of man. Science, unlike art or literature, is cumulative, in the sense that *a scientific achievement is most successful when it stimulates others to make the concepts and techniques it has used look crude and become obsolete as rapidly as possible*. In this spirit the present volumes have been prepared.

This chapter is in two sections. Section I sketches briefly the wartime mission of the Research Branch in the Information and Education Division of the War Department, which was responsible for the collection of the data analyzed in these volumes. Section II places these volumes in the perspective of social science research—what they owe to the past, what they seek to accomplish as an aid to the future.

## S E C T I O N I

### THE RESEARCH BRANCH AND ITS MISSION

Among the many social scientists called upon to serve in the war effort were a group in the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division of the War Department. These volumes have grown out of the cooperative effort of this group.

The Research Branch existed to do a practical engineering job, not a scientific job. Its purpose was to provide the Army command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with other facts and inferences, might be helpful in policy formation.

Even if, as is true, engineering and science often merge in ways

which make them indistinguishable, it is useful to distinguish between these two classes of operations. Science seeks to set up conceptual models which have at least a limited generality, such that one can use the model to predict what will happen in a specified concrete situation. Science is concerned with the specification, testing, and continual revision and improvement of these models. Engineering is concerned with the selection, among the conceptual models provided by science, of those which seem most applicable to the understanding or solution of a particular practical problem. Success of the engineer is likely to be greatest, it has been said, in those areas in which science has reduced the degree of empiricism the most. If no conceptual schemes exist, or if models have been verbalized but inadequately tested, the engineering operation becomes an *ad hoc* operation with large risks of failure. This is the case today with most so-called human or social engineering. In the absence of tested scientific generalizations, the social scientist has to operate "off the cuff" when he faces the task of assessing a practical problem and predicting the outcome of a particular practical policy. The fact that he uses the powerful apparatus of mathematical statistics or the fine artistic insights of the wise clinician does not protect him from risks of failure when he cannot draw with confidence upon a prior body of tested generalizations.

Many, if not most, of the engineering jobs done by the Research Branch in the war appear small, indeed, in the perspective of global war. To analyze the factors which led men in the South Pacific not to use atabrine as regularly as the Army thought they should; to investigate attitudes and practices associated with trench foot; to find which of two kinds of huts men preferred in Alaska; to compare preferences for different kinds of winter clothing among front-line troops in Belgium, Luxemburg, and Germany; to learn what radio programs men preferred or what they liked most to read in *Yank* magazine; to assess needs for different kinds of athletic equipment; to analyze the laundry situation in Panama or attitudes toward the Chinese among troops in India-Burma—inquiries to such ends were almost routine and were made in ever-increasing volume as the war progressed. In the files of the War Department are more than 300 manuscript reports prepared on a great variety of subjects. While most of the investigations dealt with subjects of local interest to a particular command in the United States or overseas, some were addressed to Army-wide problems.

In the course of a speech to the American people in 1944, Presi-

dent Roosevelt justified the Army's plans for demobilization at the end of the war on the grounds that the order of demobilization would be determined in terms of what the soldiers themselves wanted. The idea of a point system for demobilization had been conceived in the Research Branch and accepted by the War Department and the President. Representative samples of men throughout the world were queried and from their responses the variables of length of service, overseas duty, combat duty, and parenthood emerged as most significant. The final weights assigned to these variables yielded point scores which had a close correspondence with the wishes of the maximum number of soldiers, even if they did not exactly reproduce these wishes. Studies of reactions to the point system showed that the response to it was remarkably favorable, except among minorities who felt they were personally most disadvantaged by it—and the response to the idea of the point system remained predominantly favorable even after many men became angered by the alleged slowness of demobilization. The point system established the order, not the rate, of demobilization. While some men eventually confused the two ideas, the majority, though hostile to many if not most Army policies, continued to approve the point system. In view of the explosive tensions in the early demobilization period, it is possible that historians will find that the establishment of an objective system for order of demobilization whose justice was accepted by most men may have saved the country from what could have been a crisis seriously damaging to American prestige. A full description of how research served in establishing the point system appears in Volume II, Chapter 11.

In 1943, the Research Branch was asked to undertake a series of studies on the postwar plans of soldiers and, in particular, to estimate how many soldiers would go back to college if a bill should be drafted to provide federal aid to veteran education. The first studies made by the Research Branch were used by the President and Congress in estimating the cost of the proposed GI bill. It is of some interest to note that estimates made at that time on the basis of careful analyses of men's responses required only slight revision as the result of inquiries made later in the war, and provided the policy makers with a figure which postwar experience has showed to be correct within two or three percentage points. (See Volume II, Chapter 13, and Volume IV, Chapters 15 and 16.)

The Research Branch had a close working relationship with the

Neuropsychiatric Division of the Surgeon General's Office. Out of this liaison came a number of studies and, toward the end of the war, the development of a short form of psychoneurotic inventory which was employed routinely in all the induction stations of the United States. This test is described in detail in Volume IV, Chapters 13 and 14. Before American troops embarked from England for the Normandy invasion, attitudes toward combat of the men in all the rifle and heavy weapons companies of several divisions were studied and analyzed. Subsequent comparison of these data with the nonbattle casualty rates of the same companies in the first two months in Normandy showed that propensity for psychiatric and other nonbattle casualties is not a mere chance matter but is, to a perhaps surprising extent in view of the crudity of present instruments, predictable. Thus for perhaps the first time in military history it is possible to present statistical evidence relating to the factor  $x$  described in the quotation from Tolstoy's *War and Peace* at the beginning of this chapter. These data appear in Volume II, Chapter 1.

Another Army organization with which the Research Branch had an intimate relationship throughout the war was the Classification and Assignment Branch of the Adjutant General's Office. This branch was responsible for much of the staff planning and instrument construction with respect to tests of aptitudes and abilities. Throughout the war the Research Branch, in consultation with psychologists in the Adjutant General's Office, studied problems of classification and assignment from the standpoint of motivation. These studies are described in Volume I, Chapter 7. The Army, thanks to the experience of psychological testing in World War I, was equipped to use tools for taking into account aptitudes in job placement. It was less prepared to take into account attitudes and one cannot say, in spite of the urgent need to do this as shown by Research Branch surveys, that the Army ever succeeded in developing adequate procedures for systematically utilizing the motivations of men as well as their aptitudes.

A good many systematic analyses were made by the Research Branch of special problems in various large components of the Army. Some were made overseas, as in a series of studies in the Eighth Air Force, or at home, as in a comprehensive study of the problems of the Military Police. Particular attention was given, at home and abroad, to the very serious morale problems of the Infantry. For reasons analyzed subsequently in these volumes, these problems

were too large and approached too late to be solved at any fundamental level. Nevertheless, some directions of amelioration were indicated, and representatives of the Research Branch participated directly in staff planning which led to revision of pay scales, the introduction of symbols such as the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the Expert Infantryman's Badge, and the development of an aggressive program of publicity.

Anticipating social and psychological problems which would arise with the occupation of Germany and with the return of men from Europe if the Japanese war were protracted after Hitler's defeat, the Research Branch began early to collect data which might be helpful in policy formation. The collapse of the Army's nonfraternization policy in Germany was predicted in memoranda based on experiences of the first troops on German soil. The difficulties which the Army would have with men returning home while the war was still in progress were predicted from studies of the early returnees. In planning its program of redistribution stations for handling overseas returnees, the policy makers in the Army kept in close touch with Research Branch surveys, many of which were undertaken in response to requests for information on specific points.

One of the first responsibilities of the Research Branch was to serve the other branches of the Information and Education Division of which it was a part. The Information Branch was responsible for staff planning with respect to getting nonmilitary information to troops through press, film, and radio. It published *Yank*, the Army magazine; it provided staff planning for various overseas editions of *Stars and Stripes* and other publications of enlisted men; it supervised the making of films, of which perhaps the most notable were the "Why We Fight" series; it prepared radio programs, distributed recordings overseas, and organized a global radio network. The Orientation Branch did the staff planning and prepared materials for discussion programs which were held throughout the Army. The Education Branch operated a joint Army and Navy correspondence school, supervised the preparation and distribution of millions of books, planned the teaching of foreign languages, and organized schools and colleges within the service at the war's end. To train Information and Education officers who, under their own commanders, would have the direct responsibility for carrying out the work in the field, the Division operated its own service school at Washington and Lee University.

It was the duty of the Research Branch to collect facts about sol-

diers' attitudes which would be useful to planners of the information, orientation, and education programs and to set up procedures for evaluating specific ideas for improving these programs. One section within the Research Branch concentrated much of its energy on conducting controlled experiments to study the effectiveness of various techniques of communication.

The Information and Education Division, it will be seen, was an agency of communication. Most of its branches were concerned with imparting information *to* soldiers. The Research Branch was mainly concerned with analyzing and imparting information which it obtained *from* soldiers. At the beginning this was done in the form of research reports to the Director of the Division, who made them available to agencies within the Army which had requested them initially as well as to other interested Army organizations at the higher staff levels. In December 1942 a compendium of research in graphic form was published under the title *What the Soldier Thinks*, for limited staff distribution. This was followed in July 1943 by a similar publication, which led to an order from the Chief of Staff that a monthly periodical be prepared for distribution to officers throughout the Army in staff and command positions down to and including the regimental level. The first issue appeared in December 1943 under the old title, *What the Soldier Thinks*. After three issues, the order was modified to require distribution at the company level as well. This publication, prepared in the Research Branch, was continued until the end of the war. Making extensive use of graphic presentation, *What the Soldier Thinks* sought to summarize in simple and readable style some of the current research findings as to attitudes of soldiers in various parts of the world on a wide variety of problems. Emphasis was given to problems which were susceptible to treatment at the local command level. While care was taken to make sure that the data were as accurate as possible, the publication was not intended to be merely factual. Both in the selection of problems for presentation and in the manner of organizing the charts and text, the practical value to the reader was kept in mind, although explicit homiletics were infrequent. At the end of the war the security classification on *What the Soldier Thinks* was removed and files were presented by the War Department to some of the larger libraries of the country.

While *What the Soldier Thinks* was supposed to be distributed regularly both abroad and at home, the distribution channels of the Army, over which the Information and Education Division had no

control, were often clogged and, especially overseas, there was a wide gap between the theoretical and actual distribution of copies.

In addition to *What the Soldier Thinks*, the Research Branch regularly prepared research reports on selected problems, for high level staff distribution, in the *Monthly Progress Report* issued for the Army by the Control Division at Headquarters, Army Service Forces.

The most important reports, from the standpoint of impact on Army policy, did not necessarily receive publication in the above-mentioned periodicals. These usually took the form of especially written memoranda which, in the United States, passed directly from the office of the Director of the Information and Education Division to officers at a high level who had initiated the original inquiry, or which, overseas, went directly from the theater Information and Education Division to the theater command. Such memoranda, not all of which have been declassified, are in the War Department files.

This brief and inadequate sketch indicates something of the scope of the activities of the Research Branch and its overseas counterparts. It will be seen that this was no operation in an academic ivory tower. There was a practical need, and the Research Branch did its best for the Army—to provide reliable analyses of information which might be of practical use in policy formation. Emphasis was on speed as well as accuracy. Much of the work done would have been done better if time had permitted. Conclusions had to be drawn, all too often, from inadequate data. If anything, however, the Research Branch may have limited its usefulness too much, rather than too little, by the standards of accuracy it sought to meet. There were times when its findings were too slow, when they lacked specificity which an administrator would have liked. In particular, there was hesitance to make explicit recommendations, since it was recognized that an administrative decision on a given issue might involve many other variables in addition to those covered by the research. Finally, the channels of communication between the policy makers and the actual study directors in the Research Branch were often very unsatisfactory. For a junior officer or civilian technician in research to talk directly with, say, a lieutenant general who wanted some information, was at first almost heresy in the traditional Army organization. Time and again intermediaries not trained in research or unsympathetic with it mixed up the communication process. Because of such problems, the potential

effectiveness in policy making of some of the research was lost. Nevertheless, enough was accomplished to justify the Army in continuing in peacetime, on a reduced scale of course, a research operation which provided perhaps the first example in military history of the engineering utility deriving from systematic study of the attitudes of soldiers.

It is not the purpose of this chapter or of these volumes to review the history of the Research Branch. That presumably will appear as part of the official history of the war. A few facts about the organization of the Branch and its methods of operation are needed, however, by the present reader as background for appraisal of the research materials he is about to examine.

The Research Branch was officially established in October 1941 within what was known successively as the Morale Division, Special Services Division, and Information and Education Division. Earlier efforts to set up such machinery within the Army had been blocked by a directive from the Secretary of War, which said: "Our Army must be a cohesive unit, with a definite purpose shared by all. Such an army can be built only by the responsible effort of all of its members, commissioned and enlisted.

"Anonymous opinion or criticism, good or bad, is destructive in its effect on a military organization where accepted responsibility on the part of every individual is fundamental.

"It is therefore directed that because of their anonymous nature, polls will not be permitted among the personnel of the Army of the United States." <sup>3</sup>

The full story of how the War Department changed from a position of flat opposition to such research to one in which it would use such research not only for internal planning but as justification to the American people for such a vital program as its demobilization system should some day make instructive reading.

Between December 8, 1941—the day after Pearl Harbor, when the first full-scale Research Branch survey was made—and the end of the war, more than half a million soldiers were to be questioned by the Research Branch in all parts of the world. Over 200 different questionnaires, many of which contained 100 or more separate items, were to be administered.<sup>4</sup>

Many factors converged to make possible the establishment of

<sup>3</sup> War Department press release, May 24, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> The principal studies made by the Research Branch are listed in the appendix to Volume II.



the Research Branch, not the least of which was the character and personality of the new Director of the Morale Division, directly commissioned from civilian life, Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn (later Major General). He was a businessman who was also the author of two volumes on social science. From boyhood he had been a personal friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the President of the United States, and of Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War. He won the immediate confidence of the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, who was to give to research throughout the war informed and unswerving support. This support was to be needed, too. In spite of General Osborn's personal prestige, his persuasive skill which had served him so well in business, and his deep sincerity, there were times when even these assets might have availed little against occasional opposition at intermediate echelons had not General Marshall unequivocally supported the strange new program.

Also facilitating the establishment of the Research Branch was the support of G-2, the Intelligence Division. In a Special Studies Section of that Division, Edwin H. Guthrie and Allen Edwards were drawing plans, with the aid of an advisory committee of psychologists, for studies of attitudes of soldiers. The commissioning of General Osborn provided the opportunity sought by this committee to get an Army agency to undertake a task hitherto explicitly forbidden by the Secretary of War.

The preparatory work done by Guthrie and Edwards and their committee was to ease the task for new civilian advisers brought in by General Osborn. These advisers, namely, Rensis Likert of the Department of Agriculture, Quinn McNemar of Stanford, and Samuel A. Stouffer of Chicago, had the initial responsibility of planning the technical program and selecting research personnel. As first head of the Branch, General Osborn appointed a young West Point officer, Major (eventually Brigadier General) Edward L. Munson, Jr., whose knowledge of Army ways and whose vigorous and resourceful tactics in using Army machinery to accomplish ends for which the machinery was never devised, were indispensable to the establishment of this research within a military framework.

Slowly a small Research Branch evolved, with a military chief, a civilian technical director, and a mixed staff of military and civilian personnel. The first full-scale study, called a "planning survey," was made on the day after Pearl Harbor, having been preceded by pretests to work out efficient methods of administration. This

"planning survey" was limited to one Infantry division. In fact, the only survey authority which the Research Branch possessed was to study this one division, for which consent of the commanding general of the division had been required. When the report of this study was issued, the Chief of Staff authorized similar surveys on a general basis, subject to the consent of the commanding officers.

The early months of the new Branch proved to be singularly frustrating. General Osborn was heavily occupied in building up newly conceived Information and Education branches, in addition to wrestling with problems of athletics, recreation, and post exchanges, which also were his responsibility until their establishment as new and separate organizations. Major Munson was transferred from the Research Branch to head the new program of publications, motion picture production, and radio, and his successor, Lieutenant Colonel <sup>5</sup> John B. Stanley also was soon detached to aid in the organization problems involved in the Information Branch. Gradually the Research Branch was assembling able young personnel from the universities and commercial research agencies, but Army red tape was hamstringing operating plans. The situation was reflected, for example, in the following memorandum written to General Osborn on June 3, 1942, by the technical director:<sup>6</sup>

In order to clarify my own thinking about the work of the Branch and its future, I have set down these notes on paper. Possibly they may help as a basis for discussion and planning. They should be especially timely in view of the fact that our program is likely to be accelerated, with the accompanying possibility that pieces may not always be seen as part of a whole picture.

*Why research organizations too often fail in Washington*

In 1937 I made an analysis of research agencies in Washington as part of a study for the National Resources Planning Board. I concluded that research organizations attached to operating agencies succeeded only if two conditions were satisfied:

1. The administration and the research direction must be in close and continual touch with respect to administrative policies needing research for clarification or decision.
2. The research agency must try to anticipate future problems by advance planning, in order that research results can be made available very promptly *when needed*.

<sup>5</sup> Officers, who in most cases served in various grades, will be referred to in the remainder of this section by their highest grade.

<sup>6</sup> The entire memorandum is here quoted exactly as written except that the terms "Division" and "Branch" have been altered to agree with later usage which is used in these volumes.

Unless these conditions are satisfied, research tends to become an assembling of miscellaneous facts in which nobody but the research agency is interested. A vicious circle develops—I have seen it happen several times in Washington. The research men, frustrated because their stuff is not being sought or used, become more and more “academic,” satisfying their desire for expression by doing what may be good work from the scientific standpoint, but useless from the standpoint of policy determination. *This must not happen here.*

*How can we keep in close touch with administrative policy needing our research contribution?*

I think this must be done on several levels:

1. Conferences with the Chief, Assistant Chief, and other key men in the Division. By these I do not mean formal committee-type meetings nor do I mean five-minute snap consultations on some petty and often annoying detail of operation. Rather, I mean occasional relaxed, free-flowing “bull sessions,” in which broad policies are talked over and in which the mutual give and take of leisurely discussion encourages new ideas to be bandied about. This, in my experience, is much the most productive atmosphere in which research ideas vital to policy can be conceived.

2. Personal contacts with key men outside of the Division. The Research Branch ought to have at least one reliable and influential contact in every key office in the Army and War Department. We should know this man well enough and he should know us well enough so that we can talk informally and in a friendly way with our guards down. He should be so strategically placed that it is a feather in his cap if something we can do at his suggestion or with his cooperation is implemented in actual policy by his superiors. This also goes for certain civilian agencies outside of the War Department.

3. Personal contacts with enlisted men. We have tried to give all members of the professional staff a chance to visit Army camps in connection with surveys. But we have now reached the stage where, I think, further systematization is needed. The principal field man and his assistant should spend much of their time in the field between surveys, pretesting questions for future surveys and getting the “feel” of the enlisted man’s mind. Much of this prestudy should be with open-ended queries of the Likert type (“How do you like the country around here?”) which may not permit very easy tabulation but which are the ideal way to fish for new ideas and better phrasings. The chief obstacle at present to this obviously necessary use of our field men is the fact that separate permission must be obtained each time we make a move, however minor. Unfortunately, it takes almost as much time and nervous energy to arrange for one little pretest as for a major study. This is intolerable to all concerned. The obstacle could be easily overcome if a few unit commanders who have personal friends in the Branch could be induced to give a more general permission for periodic visits for pretesting, with appropriate safeguards against our abuse of the hospitality. Of course, the Special Service Unit at Ft. Meade can be utilized, also, as we have done.

4. Personal contacts with research men in other agencies and outside of the government. We must seek such contacts even more actively than in the past. I think, further, that members of our professional staff eventually should be encouraged to prepare some papers for publication on the nonconfidential aspects of the work. This would encourage discussions helpful in improving our techniques of research.

*A proposed four-point program for our future research*

1. *Planning surveys.* I believe that our Planning Surveys I and II represent a method of research well adapted to dealing with a wide variety of problems important to policy. The major improvements needed in these surveys, I think, are two: (a) Schedules should be more carefully and systematically pretested. If we can anticipate problems far enough in advance and conduct orderly and more or less continual pretesting between surveys, this improvement need result in no delays whatever. (b) Experiments in different ways of presenting the findings. It may be that we should have on our staff a professional writer who has demonstrated skill in the very specialized task of dramatizing scientific findings at the same time that he keeps faith with his data. Such men are rare. Meanwhile, with Planning Survey II we should experiment with several alternative ways of presenting the data for different types of uses and audiences.

The Planning Survey should be the keystone of our program. From the public relations standpoint (within the Army) it is important that each survey have one or more "headline topics" which give it color, body, and a general appeal. In this connection, I would like to mention a few topics which would have that appeal:

- a. Attitudes of troops said to be "vegetating" in bases like Newfoundland, Trinidad, or Alaska.
- b. Attitudes of troops who know they are about to sail abroad.
- c. Attitudes of Negroes.
- d. Attitudes in the Air Corps, as compared with the rest of the Army.
- e. Attitudes of special troops such as the Desert Army.

If our Branch were functioning ideally, I think we should be making advance preparations now for such studies as these, so that we will be ready whenever the time is ripe for making the actual surveys.

We cannot do very much at a Washington desk. Some things, of course, we can do here. We can try to get letters from Special Service officers at the bases. We can study the original schedules of other investigations (like OFF investigations of Negroes). We can talk with officers stationed here or passing through. But far more important is actually getting one or more members of our staff into the field exploring problems and testing how to ask the questions. This ought to be done well in advance of a survey and could be started now, *without necessarily committing us to going through with a final survey at any given time.* If two or three crack enlisted men are assigned to Ft. Meade to work with us, they can be of great help in this work.

2. *Experimental and long-range programs.* The only certain way to demonstrate that *A* has the effect *B* is by controlled experiment. Any other method contains a margin of error which may be considerable. Because the word experimental has connotations suggesting "guinea-pigging" it might be well not to use it, except among ourselves. We are now undertaking two experimental studies. One involves a comparison of two methods of physical training in cooperation with the Division of Welfare and Recreation. The other involves a comparison of motion pictures and lectures in education, in cooperation with the Information Division and the Bureau of Public Relations. There are precedents in the Army for experimental work—for example, General Munson proved by a controlled experiment that one type of shoe is better than another type. But there will be opposition to it, also, and we must try to select wisely our topics to make sure (a) that the results would be practically useful, if attained; (b) that they would interfere a minimum with training; and (c) that they are technically feasible. Experimental

studies should be of particular value to the work of the Division in education, motion pictures, newspaper, and radio—where *effects* of a program need to be measured.

Along with the experimental programs may be mentioned some long-range research, strictly speaking not experimental, which involves detailed and complicated analyses. An example is the study of leadership from the enlisted man's point of view in Planning Survey II. The same conditions which govern the selection of topics for experimental studies should apply to these studies. By their very nature, such studies are not dramatic and should be introduced as a by-product of something else which has more specific headline appeal. In the long run, if wisely selected, they may be even more important to the Army and to Army policy than the material making up the bulk of the Planning Survey.

A particular opportunity for long-range research exists at the Special Service School. In addition to the practical value to the Division and the School of such studies of officers, there is the additional advantage of gaining experience which might be useful if at some future time requests should come for a study of other officers in the Army.

3. *Quick returns from spot studies.* We must be prepared to make certain flash studies on a 24-hour basis—as in our survey at Ft. Meade and Ft. Belvoir. The editors of *Yank*, for example, may want to know something, the answer to which cannot wait for the slower and more cumbersome procedure of the Planning Surveys. For such studies wide geographical coverage, rather than intensity, also may be important. We should experiment in one or two camps with getting returns by "remote control." For example, a cooperative Special Service, Personnel, or Public Relations officer could take the responsibility for drawing from a couple of regiments all classification cards with serial numbers ending in 76 (or any other two digits), and the men in this 1 per cent sample could be called to fill out a simple questionnaire. An enlisted man or two could be trained by our chief field man to handle all the details under the responsible officer. The whole process would take only a few hours and the returns could be sent to us by air mail. If this works smoothly in a trial camp or two, we might extend it to a small representative sample of camps throughout the country. We should have no illusions that this procedure would get us data permitting the same type of searching analysis as the Planning Survey. It would be supplemental to the Planning Survey. It could permit us to make not only quick, spot studies, but also, perhaps, systematic comparisons between time periods not now feasible with the Planning Surveys.

4. *Indices of morale.* We must work closely with other agencies in the War Department and with the Planning Division in building up a time series of indexes of morale from official reports. Such indexes have two functions: (a) quick, graphic devices for picturing trends; (b) clues to problems needing investigation. At the present time we are in contact with the Statistical Office of General Ayres, which can be of help to us in eliciting better source data from collecting agencies.

#### *Concluding comments*

The period since we submitted the report on Planning Survey I, five months ago, has been one in which we have built up and trained a very effective staff. This staff can do in a few days what it took a month to do before January. In this period, there have been several quite successful special studies and one larger enterprise—Planning Survey II which is nearing completion. We have learned a good deal. On the debit side, I think, there are two main ways in which we have fallen short of our possibilities. First, we have not integrated our planning closely enough with broad policy of the Division and the Army. Second, we have not

worked enough on advance plans of studies—and the bother we have caused in arranging for permission for informal explorations and pretests is as great as it would have been for major studies.

If we will seek out more occasions for broad and informal discussions with key men in the Division, the Army, and elsewhere, and if we will work out a procedure for more nearly continual contacts with enlisted men in the field, I think we can rise much more effectively to the opportunities for service provided by the four-point program: (1) Planning Surveys, (2) Experimental Studies, (3) Quick Returns from Spot Studies, and (4) Indices of Morale. We want our Branch to be a model in Washington for its marriage of honest, competent research to statesmanlike policy.

When this memorandum was written, in June 1942, only two major studies had been made since the organization of the Branch the previous autumn and these were of individual Army divisions. No studies of representative cross sections had been made; the Air Forces had not been touched; no move had been made for studies overseas. Meanwhile, personnel were being recruited for a future which was none too promising in view of the obstacles in the way of making contacts either with policy makers at or near the top or with soldiers in the field. The technicians eager to use their skills were restless in the face of complacency from above as to the status quo. This complacency was due in part to a tendency for the Division to overestimate what the Branch had already achieved and in part to sheer lack of time to worry about problems of an already established Branch when more spectacular activities involving planning new motion picture production programs and founding new radio networks and magazines were occupying the full-time attention of the Division's principal officer personnel.

Gradually, the situation improved. The first cross-section study by the makeshift method of "remote control" described in the memorandum quoted above was made later in the summer and soon paved the way for making cross-section studies by research personnel sent out directly from Washington. The first large-scale study in Air Forces was also made in the late summer of 1942. As will be described later, overseas operations were slow in developing, though a Branch was established in ETO that autumn.

The competing demands of other rapidly growing branches in the Division for the very limited number of officer positions in the Division's Table of Organization was to handicap the Research Branch for many months. It was not until the addition to the Branch of Lieutenant Colonel Lyle M. Spencer that the first effective liaison with other War Department agencies, since the early days of the Branch, was established. By the summer of 1943 most of the do-

mestic problems were well on their way to solution, including the vitally important one of the privilege of informal pretests of studies without requiring each time not only the official but actually the personal intervention of General Osborn himself. There were still many frustrations, some of which were traceable to influential officers within the Division who felt that the Branch was overreaching itself whenever it sought to study problems other than those of immediate concern in developing the Division's own program—that is, problems related to leisure-time activities and information and education. For some months the military head of the Branch was overseas on an important mission not connected with Branch activities; when he was succeeded as chief by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dollard in May 1943 the domestic operations and the internal administration of the Branch were strengthened. The influence of Spencer and Dollard was crucial in establishing the next needed step in the fall of 1943—institution of a full-scale overseas research program.

As has been said, the ETO research had been established earlier. A cable from General Eisenhower in London, inspired by a conversation he had had with Elmo Roper, led to this result, Lieutenant Colonel Felix E. Moore, Jr., and Major Robert B. Wallace organizing the operation. But it was nearly a year before research teams were established in other overseas theaters, although the Branch in Washington enlarged its staff beyond immediate domestic needs in order to train officers and civilians for eventual overseas operations in anticipation of authority to go overseas. Late in 1943 and early in 1944 research teams, usually consisting of an officer, one or more civilian technicians, and an enlisted man, were sent to various theaters and overseas departments as the nucleus of a staff—other members being recruited locally. The overseas teams were responsible through channels to their theater commanders and not to Washington—a fact which increased the confidence of the theater in their work and enhanced its practical utility, while at the same time it made it difficult and sometimes impossible to get coordinated research on a given topic throughout the world. Washington could request a study using certain items; a theater could and frequently did find compliance impracticable. At the peak of operations, in the spring of 1945, the Research Branch in Washington had 10 officers, 9 enlisted men, 24 professionals with civil service grade of P-2 or above, and 50 administrative supervisors, clerks, and typists.

As will be seen, the Research Branch had a mixed military and

civilian personnel. Formally, it was, of course, part of the Army, and effort was made to observe the minutiae of military protocol. Experienced Regular Army officers within the Information and Education Division, notably Colonel Livingston Watrous, Deputy Director of the Division, helped make sure that the operations conformed to essential military patterns. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dollard remained as chief of the Branch in Washington until his promotion to Deputy Director of the Division in March 1945, when he was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. DeVinney, who had been in charge of research in the Mediterranean theater. The peacetime Research Branch was headed in February 1946 by Major Paul D. Guernsey, who had been in charge of research in India-Burma.

The research pattern developed in late 1941 was followed, with some variations, throughout the war. Suppose that a study of men's attitudes toward the medical services was requested. First, there would be conferences between representatives of the Surgeon General and of the Research Branch. Second, representatives of the Branch would do some preliminary "scouting," perhaps visiting some Army camps and talking informally about the problem both with enlisted men and with officers. The enlisted men in the Research Branch, several of whom were not only highly skilled interviewers but also social science analysts of first quality, carried the major responsibility for this operation. It was found that civilian technicians also could do this work effectively without embarrassment. Sometimes the role of officers was largely that of official escort of enlisted men or civilians, who had the main technical responsibility. On other occasions, the officers also had a primary responsibility in the exploring process, especially when the projected study involved officers' attitudes. Third, a questionnaire would be drawn up, aimed to tap the areas which informal interviewing had shown to be important. Fourth, when the subject was complicated and time permitted, the questionnaire was pretested in a dress rehearsal at one or more camps. If time was short, the questionnaire was tried out on small numbers of enlisted men near Washington. Fifth, the revised questionnaire was discussed with the "client" agency and the questions cleared by the Director of the Information and Education Division or his deputy. Sixth, the survey was put into the field.

The sample was usually preselected in Washington, if the study was domestic, or at theater headquarters, if the study was made



overseas. Using latest available classified information as to the strength of the Army and the location of particular units, a sampling specialist would select organizations, widely scattered geographically, which, when added up, should yield the correct proportion of men in the various branches of the service. Within each organization, the field team ordinarily was instructed to secure information on every *n*th man, usually by checking off names on a roster.

The Research Branch maintained only a small skeleton field staff of officers and enlisted men. Usually, a team of one officer and one enlisted man would visit a camp. While the officer was making arrangements for the survey with the local command, the enlisted man was training a few local enlisted men, usually from the classification office, to assist in the work. Men drawn from the roster were ordered to appear at a designated mess hall or other building at a given hour. When the men were assembled they were ordinarily addressed by an enlisted man, not an officer. The general idea of the study was explained and assurances of complete anonymity given. If men were having obvious difficulty in filling out the questionnaire, they were quietly invited to step outside the room and were interviewed personally by an enlisted man.<sup>7</sup> The same procedure was followed, with occasional variations, overseas. In the course of studying half a million soldiers, upwards of 10,000 "classroom" interviewing sessions were held, and there was no session at which untoward incidents occurred. Respondents cooperated with what seemed like complete sincerity. The painstaking detail with which many of the men wrote out free comments, in addition to checking answers to check-list questions, was objective evidence that these studies were taken seriously. Not that there was an absence of cynicism. Sometimes men who were hostile to the Army would write a note like this: "I don't believe the Army will do a damn thing about this situation, but I'm giving it to 'em straight just the same." In Alaska 87 per cent of the men said they thought such studies would be of help in winning the war if the Army paid attention to them, while only 4 per cent said they

<sup>7</sup> Ordinarily, only 2 or 3 men out of 100 could not read the questionnaire. In situations involving Negro troops or any other units considered likely to have an abnormal number of uneducated men, the standard practice was to draw the sample not from a roster but from the Form 20 classification cards in the personnel office. These cards contained AGCT score and educational level, and all men with very low AGCT or little schooling could be segregated in advance for personal interviewing. Methodological studies, reported in Volume IV, showed that the differences in response introduced by personal interview were not significant. It was necessary, however, to use Negro interviewers to interview Negro troops.

thought such studies were not a good idea. The reader of these volumes will see for himself that the men did not hesitate to voice their disapproval and also that they were discriminating, approving some things, disapproving others.

When questionnaires were reassembled in Washington (or overseas, at theater headquarters), they were coded and the check-list responses transferred to punch cards. The final steps were machine tabulation, analysis of tables and free comments, and preparation of the research report. Each overseas Branch was a unit complete in itself and prepared its own analyses and reports. From overseas duplicate sets of punched cards, along with sampling schemes, instruction and code sheets, and often microfilm of free comments, were shipped back to Washington. Occasionally, when quick consolidations were needed, overseas tabulations were cabled back to Washington.

The principal variations in procedure were represented by studies which depended on much more detailed qualitative exploration and informal interviewing and by studies involving controlled experiments, where extraordinary care was required, not only in matching experimental and control groups in the sampling process but also in structuring the situation psychologically when the same men were studied twice. A more detailed account of the sampling and field work appears as an appendix in Volume IV.

The staff in Washington fluctuated in size, composition, and organization and most of the senior members served overseas at one or more periods in the war. As has been previously mentioned, Chiefs of the Branch were Brigadier General E. L. Munson, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stanley, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dollard, and Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. DeVinney. Executive officers, some of whom served for considerable periods as acting chief in the absence of the Chief of the Branch, were Lieutenant Colonel Felix E. Moore, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel Lyle M. Spencer, Lieutenant Colonel W. Parker Mauldin, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Williams, Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. DeVinney, and Major Wayne F. Daugherty.

As director of the professional staff, Samuel A. Stouffer had general technical responsibility for research and for selection of professional personnel. There were two main analytical sections, one a Survey Section headed in 1943-1944 by Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., and the other an Experimental Section headed by Carl I. Hovland.

The chief analysts and study directors at various periods in the

Survey Section were John A. Clausen, Jack Elinson, Lyonel C. Florant, Clarence Glick, Robert N. Ford, Rita Hausknecht, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, Arnold M. Rose, Shirley A. Star, Edward A. Suchman, Paul Wallin, H. Ashley Weeks, and Robin M. Williams, Jr. Others who served in this section included Leta M. Adler, A. Lee Coleman, Ruth Goodenough, Ward Goodenough, Nathene T. Loveland, Erna L. Malcolm, Johanna Shattuck, Rosabelle Price, and James P. Thompson. The chief analysts in the Experimental Section were Frances Anderson, John L. Finan, Irving L. Janis, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Nathan Maccoby, Frederick D. Sheffield, and M. Brewster Smith. Others were John M. Butler, David A. Grant, Donald Horton, Eugene H. Jacobson, Alice H. Schmid, and Adeline Turetsky.

A small Statistical Section with responsibilities for sampling and for compiling statistics from other Army reports was organized by A. J. Jaffe. Among the major personnel who served, at one time or another, in this section were Robert Dubin, Paul Glick, George Hausknecht, Rita Hausknecht, and Seymour Wolfbein. Administrative sections, in which most of the clerical personnel worked, had at various times in major supervisory or secretarial positions Arlein Brown, Virginia Cobb, Esther M. Corzine, Jane B. Crow, Virginia David, Genevieve Elder, Katherine Jones Garrison, Celia L. Gibeaux, Beatrice N. Hardesty, Margaret S. Harrell, Rita Hausknecht, Marie L. Hould, Merle Judd, Myrtle P. Lacey, Myrtle L. Parker, and Martha E. Setzer. Dean Manheimer had a major responsibility in organizing and coordinating the various production operations. Other civilian personnel in relatively responsible positions are also listed at the front of this volume. In a Reports Section responsible for preparing *What the Soldier Thinks* and certain other publications were E. Wyllys Andrews, Marshall Hurt, Louis Sidran, Mrs. Charles Siepmann, and Milton Sutton. An Overseas Section, to compile a library of overseas studies and handle communications with the theaters, was organized by Dean Manheimer and later headed at various periods by Gould M. Beech, A. Lee Coleman, Felix E. Moore, Jr., and Rosabelle Price.

All these sections had a considerable turnover, as many of the personnel mentioned above also served for varying periods overseas. Perhaps the largest turnover of all was in the Field Section, which was responsible for carrying out the studies at Army posts. Service in this section was, generally, a training ground for eventual overseas duty and several of the officers in this section became chiefs

of overseas Branches. The section was organized by William McPeak, who, with Lieutenant Colonel Felix E. Moore, Jr., joined the Branch when it was organized in October 1941. These two men, together with Raymond F. McClellan, Lieutenant Colonel W. Parker Mauldin, Lieutenant Colonel F. Douglas Williams, and Eugene Zander, who joined later, were largely responsible for setting the procedures followed throughout the war in the collection of data. Nearly all of the military personnel of the Branch served at one time or another in the Field Section. To avoid the repetition of upwards of fifty names already listed under military personnel at the front of this volume we simply refer the reader to that list. Some of the most crucial contributions to the Branch, many of which involved dramatic examples of resourcefulness in dealing with the Army, were made by these officers and enlisted men, and their role in the success of the enterprise as a whole was not surpassed in importance by that of any other personnel.

For about a year in 1943-1944 a section operated within the Branch to make surveys of attitudes of civilian personnel in the War Department. A number of questionnaire surveys were made, the largest being a study at Quartermaster depots throughout the country. Because of limitations in production facilities, the section was moved to New York and the activities were finally transferred to the Civilian Personnel Division of the War Department. The section was organized by Richard L. Hull and throughout most of the period of its existence was headed by G. Frederic Kuder; major professional personnel included Dorothy P. Hull, Arthur Kolstad, Frances J. Mauldin, Trienah Meyer, Bernard G. Rosenthal, and Stanley H. Seeman. Others in the section included Harriette Buckner, Virginia Cobb, Betty J. Minor, and Catherine T. Schwartz.<sup>8</sup>

Overseas the first established Research Branch and also the largest (numbering more than 50 at peak strength) was in the European theater. This Branch was headed at various periods by Lieutenant Colonel Felix E. Moore, Jr., Major Robert B. Wallace, and Lieutenant Colonel W. Parker Mauldin. Among the chief analysts were Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., A. J. Jaffe, Irving L. Janis, Arthur Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, Nathan Maccoby, Dean Manheimer, William W. Reeder, and Robin M. Williams, Jr. The

<sup>8</sup> Because the present volumes are confined to soldiers, the findings of the Civilian Personnel section, though interesting in themselves, do not come in for discussion here.

theater was visited on occasion by other officers and civilians from Washington, including Lieutenant Colonel Dollard, Carl Hovland, S. A. Stouffer, and Kimball Young.

The Branch in the Mediterranean theater was headed successively by Lieutenant Colonel Lyle M. Spencer, Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. DeVinney, and Lieutenant Colonel F. Douglas Williams and had among its chief analysts at various periods Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Charles N. Elliott, Robert N. Ford, Paul C. Glick, Ward Goodenough, Arnold M. Rose, Frederick D. Sheffield, and M. Brewster Smith. A staff also was maintained at Cairo for a brief time under W. Parker Mauldin and L. C. DeVinney, to make studies in Egypt and Iran.

The Branch in the Central Pacific was organized by Major William Woodworth, with H. Ashley Weeks as chief analyst. When the South Pacific Branch, headed by Major Richard L. Hull, with Petterson Marzoni, Jr., as chief analyst, was discontinued upon reorganization of the Pacific Ocean areas, Hull became chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas Branch, and William McPeak joined the staff as a study director.

In India-Burma, the Branch was headed by Major Paul D. Guernsey with Ira Cisin as chief analyst.

Various other overseas establishments were maintained for limited periods of time. The Branch in the Southwest Pacific was organized by Lieutenant Colonel Felix E. Moore, Jr., with John A. Clausen as principal analyst. A temporary organization later operated briefly in Manila under Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Hand and Major M. Brewster Smith. In Panama and the Caribbean the operations were in charge of Major John L. Finan, with Dean Manheimer as chief analyst, and in Alaska with Major Gould Beech in charge and A. Lee Coleman as analyst.

In all of the overseas theaters the majority of the personnel, especially for clerical work, were drawn from men already in the theater. A number of these men, however, although never assigned to the Research Branch in Washington came to have important professional responsibilities. It is hardly possible to present a limited list of names which would do justice to all who contributed in this capacity, but special mention should be made of Robert A. Anderson, Ruben Becker, Stanley Berg, Daniel L. Camp, Joseph A. Coffey, Reuben Cohen, Herbert Goldhamer, Alfred Greenberg, Robert W. Leffler, Ansel L. Marblestone, Alexander Mitchell,

Mervin Patterson, Linwood B. Richardson, Sidney H. Rosen, John Tuohey, William L. Van Cleve, Joseph Wall, John T. Wheeler, Trezevant P. Yeatman, and David J. Yoswein.

By arrangement with the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, of which Francis Keppel was secretary, civilian consultants to the Secretary of War were appointed by the committee and assigned to the Research Branch. Some of these consultants played a crucial role and for all practical purposes were full-time staff members, often for months at a time. The two who spent the longest time with the Branch were John Dollard of Yale, whose provocative and stimulating ideas helped sharpen research formulation, and Louis Guttman of Cornell, who developed in the Research Branch new techniques of measurement. Among others whose contributions were especially important were Hadley Cantril of Princeton, Philip M. Hauser of the Bureau of the Census, Paul F. Lazarsfeld of Columbia, Rensis Likert of the Department of Agriculture, Quinn McNemar of Stanford, Robert K. Merton of Columbia, Frederick Mosteller of Princeton, Frank Stanton of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council, and Kimball Young of Queens College.

Obviously it is impossible to mention the names of the scores of officers in other agencies throughout the War Department who at critical periods made important contributions to the Research Branch. However, there were certain technicians among the officer personnel in a few agencies whose professional skills as well as administrative facilitation were of special importance. Mainly responsible for maintaining close liaison with the Neuropsychiatric Division of the Surgeon General's Office was Lieutenant Colonel John W. Appel. And when Brigadier General William C. Menninger became head of the Army's psychiatric service, the close working relationship between the two organizations became almost a model of cooperative research. Equally close were the contacts with the Classification and Assignment Branch of the Adjutant General's Office for which Dr. Walter Bingham and Lieutenant Colonel Marion W. Richardson were mainly responsible. The technical services of Major Clyde Coombs and other psychologists in that Branch were available for numerous Research Branch studies. In the Air Forces cooperative technicians were numerous, among the most helpful of whom may be mentioned Major Thomas W. Harrell and Colonel John C. Flanagan. In the Training Division of Army Service Forces, the interest of Major Arthur Weimer

in experimental studies was particularly helpful to the Experimental Section of the Branch. Major Harold F. Dorn, who was in charge of medical statistics in the Office of the Surgeon General, and many other statisticians in the Army contributed generously of their services.

Outside of the War Department in various government agencies were key men whose assistance was indispensable at various stages of the war—in the Bureau of the Budget, the War Manpower Commission, the Office of War Information, Selective Service, Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Children's Bureau, Veterans' Administration, and other agencies. Without the resourcefulness of James O. Babcock in the Civil Service Commission, for example, it is doubtful whether the red tape could have been cut in time to set up as effective an organization as was done. And without the timely assistance of Elbridge Sibley in the War Manpower Commission, along with that of Gordon W. Taft in the War Department, the organization might have been wrecked by arbitrary application of Selective Service regulations.

We have reviewed, very briefly, the mission of the Research Branch as an organization to aid in practical social engineering, and have indicated something of its procedures, its structure, and its personnel. It is easy for those who labored in the Research Branch to acquire an exaggerated sense of importance of their endeavors in the war. It cannot truthfully be said that, viewed against the whole vast perspective of world-wide warfare, the efforts of this small group of research workers were very important. But, here and there, in an unspectacular way the Branch did have its impacts on Army policy, and on a few occasions—as when it developed an objective basis for fixing the order of demobilization—it directly touched the lives of all soldiers and through them of all Americans.

Let us turn now to a consideration of the evolution of the present volumes and some observations on their possible utility to social science in the future.

## S E C T I O N I I

### INDEBTEDNESS AND IMPLICATIONS

This section will sketch the process of development of the present volumes, indicate very briefly some of the influences from our cultural heritage which have contributed to the viewpoints and tech-

niques, and suggest some of the possible implications for future research.

After the Japanese surrender, the Carnegie Corporation placed in the hands of the Social Science Research Council funds for the preparation of a report based on Research Branch data. Security classifications were removed from most of the basic material and the War Department made available to the Social Science Research Council a full set of duplicate punched cards, together with duplicate copies of sampling, coding, and editing instructions and formal reports. The detailed background materials on an individual study, which had to be carefully examined by anybody making new analyses with the cards, sometimes ran into 100 pages or more. Over 200 studies were available and such materials filled several filing cabinets.

The Committee appointed by Donald Young, director of the Social Science Research Council, to supervise the preparation of this report, arranged for preliminary analyses of survey data to be made in Washington in quarters conveniently provided by American University. Here during most of 1946 a small staff comprising Leland C. DeVinney, Beatrice Hardesty, Irving L. Janis, M. Brewster Smith, Shirley A. Star, Samuel A. Stouffer, and Edward A. Suchman, together with Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., who was present in the summer, worked over the general survey materials. At the same time at the Yale Institute of Human Relations Carl I. Hovland, Frederick D. Sheffield, and Arthur A. Lumsdaine worked on the experimental studies. Work on sections of a methodological volume was undertaken at Cornell by Louis Guttman and John A. Clausen and at Columbia by Paul F. Lazarsfeld.

This work was facilitated by the helpful cooperation of Brigadier General Charles T. Lanham, who succeeded General Osborn as head of the Information and Education Division upon General Osborn's retirement from the Army, by Major Paul D. Guernsey, Chief of the Research Branch, and Celia Gibeaux, who was secretary to chiefs of the Research Branch in both wartime and peacetime.

Before the wartime Research Branch demobilized, various analysts had been asked to organize digests of materials relative to topics on which they were particularly well informed. These digests, prepared by Jack Elinson, John L. Finan, Paul Glick, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, A. J. Jaffe, Dean Manheimer, William McPeak, Shirley A. Star, Edward A. Suchman, Paul Wallin, H. Ashley Weeks,



F. Douglas Williams, and Robin M. Williams, Jr., were to prove of great value to those who were able to join in the final job of manuscript preparation.

In the autumn of 1946 the principal survey materials and punched cards were removed to the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations, where analytical work and writing continued, as well as at the Yale Institute of Human Relations and at some other universities. Among those who helped in supervising production of final manuscript, special mention should be made of Margaret DeVinney. Tabulations for considerable portions of Volumes I, II, and IV were made under the direction of Mrs. Lucy Guthe, and the majority of charts were drawn under the direction of Mrs. Gloria Miller.

The general plan of organization of the present volumes developed at the end of the war out of group discussions within the Research Branch, in which all of the analysts present participated. Doubled printing costs, together with the desire for publication as early as possible, led to abandonment of several chapters originally contemplated. Otherwise, the broad outline of the present volumes is close to that anticipated.

Volumes I and II are essentially descriptive of soldiers' attitudes, particularly of those attitudes seeming to reflect adjustment. The first volume studies general problems of personal adjustment of soldiers to the institutionalized life of the Army; the second treats the special problems of combat and its aftermath.

Volume III analyzes the problems involved in experimental studies of communication, based on Research Branch experience. Volume IV reviews selected methodological problems of measurement and prediction and seeks to fund some of the Research Branch efforts for the benefit of future technicians.

These volumes are not digests of Research Branch reports, but in most part represent completely new analyses of data collected in the surveys and experimental studies made in the Army between 1941 and 1945. Out of the hundreds of topics which were studied in the war, only a fraction have been selected for detailed analysis. The guide for selection has been twofold: (a) the problems, or the principles which may be involved in the problems, seem to be of more than fugitive interest to social science and (b) sufficient factual data are available at least to illustrate if not to demonstrate the behavior thought to be involved.

We have here a mine of data, perhaps unparalleled in magnitude in the history of any single research enterprise in social psychology

or sociology. Some of the veins seem to contain quite high-yielding ore, in terms of potential value to social science. Others do not. It must not be forgotten that the Research Branch was set up to do a fast, practical job; it was an engineering operation; if some of its work has value for the future of social science this is a happy result quite incidental to the mission of the Branch in wartime. That the Branch was able to be of use to the Army is a tribute to such background of theory and techniques and practical experience as exists in our cultural heritage. That its contribution to the verification of scientific hypotheses of some generality is severely limited is a result, not only of the fact that the Branch had an engineering not a scientific mission, but also of the fact that theories of social psychology and sociology and techniques for verification are still in a relatively inchoate and primitive stage of development in our culture.

There are several streams of influence which are converging to develop social psychology and sociology into sciences with conceptual schemes from which, it is hoped, empirically verifiable inferences and predictions can eventually be made. At the present time, there would be little agreement on the relative importance of such streams of influence. Among those whose impact upon the writers of the present volumes has been most helpful, four may be mentioned.

One is what might be called dynamic psychology, which has drawn its data largely from clinical study of personality abnormalities and pathology. The phenomenon of rationalization, long ago demonstrated in experiments on posthypnotic suggestion, was one of the clues which shifted emphasis in inquiries about human behavior from the study of man as a rational person to man as a person with drives and wishes who was often unconscious of the "real reasons" for his behavior. Many of the ideas of Freud and his followers may eventually be rejected, but there can be no question as to the tentative utility of many of the concepts of psychoanalysis and of their revolutionary significance in the study of social psychology.

A second stream of influence is what might be called learning theory. Early Pavlovian concepts of the conditioned response have been elaborated and modified as the result of hundreds of laboratory experiments, mostly on animals, and theories of reward and punishment are constantly undergoing change in response to new ideas and new data. Almost as important to the future of social psychology as the conceptual tools involved is the experimental tradition

which students of learning theory are carrying over into social psychology. Just as medicine did not make distinctive progress until the exclusively clinical approach gave way to controlled experiments as a method of rigorous verification of hypotheses, so social psychology is likely to be limited in its development until the habit of requiring experimental verification is firmly established in research in social psychology.

A third stream of influence derives mainly from social anthropology and sociology. Studies of nonliterate societies have dramatized the plasticity of the human organism, which is such that the variations in human behavior related to learning the specific values and folkways of one's cultural and social environment are very great. The description of those variations in personality and social behavior as seen in a variety of cultures has provided a viewpoint for studying personality in our own culture. Within a relatively homogeneous group there will be individual variations, associated with physiological differences and with differences in experience, but the differences between groups in attitudes and values are often likely to be more significant than differences within groups. Sociology, in viewing the complexity of contemporary social structure, has contributed two important observations, among others, to the study of group impact on individual personality. One is related to multiple group memberships and one is related to social class and social mobility. Since the individual in our society is simultaneously a member of many different social groups, the concept of social role as developed in sociology is helpful for understanding the tensions produced by the strains for conformity to what often are conflicting group values. In addition, sociological analysis of class position and changes in class position helps in understanding the motivations and expectations of individuals once their location in the status system is specified.

These converging bodies of conceptualization are focused on the study of the individual as a member of a social system. A fourth stream of influence, via sociologists and their colleagues in other social sciences, has contributed to a better understanding of the social system apart from individuals comprising it. Particularly should be mentioned the studies of social institutions, of informal as well as formal social control, and of social change. The data to support many of the ideas in these areas have come from the historians. Without subscribing to the metaphysical implications of Durkheim, one can say with him that social facts can be a useful

object of study without necessarily referring them back to the individuals involved. Just as one can study the rules of a grammar without necessarily knowing about the individuals using it, so one can study aspects of culture and social institutions without requiring constant reference to individual psychology. The observation, emphasized in the writings of Ogburn, for example, that societal tensions arise when different parts of culture change at different rates is particularly important for the study of adjustments made by institutions to new situations. Thus, as we shall see, the Army can be viewed as an institution with customs and traditions, some of which may have been adaptive and some of which may have been maladaptive to the new demands of modern war.

The cumulative result of these and other streams of influence is implicit in the chapters which follow, and sometimes it is explicit. The chapters are not organized around any single conceptual scheme. To do that, in the present state of the knowledge of social psychology and sociology, would be as sterile as, say, it would have been to organize data in medicine a century ago around a theory of convulsive action as advanced by Dr. Benjamin Rush. We know now that not one overarching conceptual scheme but rather many limited conceptual schemes were to open the road to progress in medicine. A germ theory of disease was to be useful for one class of phenomena, a deficiency theory for another, still other theories for others. In the present state of the social sciences, it is imperative that we keep an open mind with respect to the potential utility of conceptual models which have not been subjected to the kind of rigorous verification which we can expect social scientists of the next generation to demand.

Conscious of their obligation to present Research Branch findings in a form which will maximize their utility in the future, the authors of the present volumes have adopted a compromise position with respect to introduction of explicit conceptualization. On the one hand, these reports are not conventional chapters of history. On the other hand, while theory is used both explicitly and implicitly, the data have not been selected merely because of their relevance to some general proposition now current in the psychological or sociological literature. Where the problem area is one which can be expected to concern social scientists in the future, a considerable body of factual data has often been introduced, even if the data are in no sense definitive in resolving conflict between alternative

hypotheses which might now be advanced or even if the data do not seem relevant to any current hypothesis.

The main facts in Volumes I and II pertain to attitudes of soldiers as determined by their responses. Variations in response are analyzed, as they relate on the one hand to variations in Army experience, and on the other hand to variations in personal background characteristics which these men brought with them to the Army. In Volume III changes in response are studied in the framework of controlled experiments.

Discussion of the fundamental concept of attitude is presented in some detail in Volume IV. The literature relative to attitudes is extensive.<sup>9</sup> Among the influential writings of the past are those of Pareto, Thomas, and Mead. It is instructive to inquire why such theoretical contributions are not more immediately useful in actual empirical research. Let us suppose we are interested in the relationship among three variables: (a) information about the British, (b) attitudes toward the British, and (c) zeal to fight the war. One of the most important concepts in Pareto is his model of mutually dependent systems in an equilibrium which, when disturbed by a change in one variable, undergoes changes in all other variables of the system, including reactions of the other variables on the initial one. Here is a model which might be useful in handling the attitudes described above. In his book on Pareto, Henderson illustrates the concept of mutual dependence with four rigid bodies connected by elastic bands and then with a numerical description of a physico-chemical system. He writes: "In the cases of Pareto's social system the definition of equilibrium takes a form that closely resembles the theorem of Le Chatelier in physical chemistry, which expresses a property of physico-chemical equilibrium, and which may be deduced from Gibbs.

"In any event the aim of all this is to make possible to formulate

<sup>9</sup> A review of the current attempts at attitude conceptualization and research, with a good bibliography, appeared in Muzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, "The Psychology of 'Attitudes,'" *Psychological Review*, Vol. 52 (1945), pp. 295-319, and Vol. 53 (1946), pp. 1-24. The most comprehensive single volume dealing with attitude research techniques is Hadley Cantril (editor), *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944). For a caustic and provocative attack on conventional opinion polling, see Quinn McNemar, "Opinion-Attitude Methodology," in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 43 (1946), pp. 289-374, which elicited some vigorous replies, for example, by Leo P. Crespi, in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 43 (1946), pp. 562-69, and Herbert S. Conrad, in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 43 (1946), pp. 570-89. See also review of McNemar's paper by Frederick Mosteller in *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 42 (1947), pp. 192-95.

a set of equations . . . in number equal to the number of variables, and such that all the conditions may be determined. Moreover, since it is desirable to do this for as many concrete instances as possible, every effort is made to discover the general properties of the system and to formulate these properties so that they may be used in each concrete instance.

"Here Pareto's social system fails to reach its goal, and no doubt it will be long before this goal can be reached. . . . The prospect of the introduction of quantitative methods in sociology, in such a manner as is necessary for the mathematical description of a social system, seems remote indeed. However, the logical conditions for determinancy remain, and they point toward a single path. This is the path Pareto has chosen."<sup>10</sup>

It is possible that in this quotation from Henderson we have a hint as to the reason why conceptual systems such as Pareto's have such limited use in empirical social research. The necessary condition for dealing with a collection of variables is to isolate and identify them and, in addition, it is useful if they can also be measured. Until the relevant variables can be identified, empirical tests of a conceptual scheme involving these variables hardly can be expected.

If the variables specified are attitudes, the problem is particularly difficult, because there is as yet little agreement about when one is or is not dealing with an "attitude." Some writers would identify attitudes with verbal or nonverbal behavior with respect to some object. Others would say that the verbal or nonverbal behavior is overt manifestation of a latent tendency to act toward an object. If the attitude is defined as this latent tendency it must be inferred; it cannot be directly observed. Others would make distinctions between attitudes and opinions, the former being taken as something deeply rooted in the personality, the latter being relatively superficial expressions readily subject to change. Pareto's distinction between *residues* and *derivations* has had considerable currency.

The escape from the impasse is to isolate some behavior thought to be related to one or more such concepts and to record the variations in that behavior. The name given to what is studied may or may not satisfy somebody's a priori definition; hence there will be quarrels about "validity."

The experience which to many in the Research Branch seemed

<sup>10</sup> L. J. Henderson, *Pareto's General Sociology, A Physiologist's Interpretation* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1937), pp. 85-86.

most relevant was that gained in the psychological study of the higher mental processes. A generation ago, many philosophical treatises had been written on the nature of intelligence. But these analyses were all but useless in empirical research. Then came attempts to measure intelligence by performance scores on sample tasks thought to require mental ability. This was the step which was given such a great impetus by the work of psychologists in World War I. In the decade after that war there was a boom in "intelligence testing." Thousands of tests were administered and thousands of research reports written. On the one hand, the practical use of such tests was firmly established, and on the other hand, the tests generated new and heated controversy on such subjects as the constancy of the "I.Q.," the extent to which it was environmental or hereditary, and the utility of treating mental ability as a unitary trait. Now that measurements were available, controversy did not proceed merely at a verbal theoretical level but issued directly into empirical research. Studies of identical twins, foster children, retests on the same children over long intervals brought in new evidence. The most fundamental attack on the problem of the nature of mental ability arose with the development of factor analysis. This is still a highly controversial subject, in spite of the fact that hundreds of books, monographs, and papers have appeared since Spearman's pioneer work. There are various types of mathematical models. But whatever eventual structure may be found most useful, one can say with some assurance that mental ability is not a unitary trait; rather that there are several abilities and that some of them probably vary independently of others. The research is highly cumulative. If a given ability is isolated and studied more intensively, for example, it may be found that it breaks down into two or more subtypes. The beauty of the procedure is that issues like this are settled empirically and do not have to trail off into verbal futility. Similarly, the controversy about educability takes on new and practical significance. It is quite likely that some abilities are much more amenable to the learning process than others. Having isolated these abilities for study, one can determine, with experiments in the school system, which of the abilities are most plastic and how best to develop them. The implications for education and vocational guidance are very great. It is quite likely that the conceptual models of factor analysis are only temporary scaffoldings for the theory of the interrelation of mental abilities

with each other; but the relatively simple and parsimonious formulations are a necessary preliminary to development of more complex conceptual schemes.

What is the relevance to attitude research of this experience? Just as there are an unlimited number of tasks which could be performed as reflections of mental abilities, so there are an unlimited number of acts, verbal or nonverbal, which could be reflections of attitudes. The first problem would seem to be the taxonomical one of classifying those acts into some kinds of types or groups. The armchair method of classification has not by itself been productive for empirical research, perhaps because it provides no empirical method of testing whether two or more things belong together. Factor analysis would seem to provide the best approach available now, for it is essentially an empirical method of classifying  $n$  sets of responses into  $m$  sets, where  $m < n$ .

But one must observe that the development of factor analysis of mental abilities rested on the base of two decades of experience with mental testing. To isolate mental abilities, batteries of large numbers of tests—often thirty or more separate tests—are used simultaneously. Unless many separate tests are thus used at one time, the problems of dimensionality of a complex attitude area cannot be studied in a factor matrix. No such an array of test batteries exists in social psychology. Many attitude tests have been constructed in the past, but there has been little standardization of procedure.

Rather than construct scores of new tests by the relatively crude methods of item analysis and then throw these tests into a factor matrix, it seemed economical to make a new attack on the problem of "purification" of the individual test prior to throwing it into a factor matrix. If a single test can be made to satisfy some rigid criteria of unidimensionality, then a group of such tests, in a factor matrix, can be more satisfactorily resolved into fundamental components. Since the pioneer work of Thurstone in the late twenties and early thirties, there had been little advance in the analysis of the unidimensionality of a set of qualitative items arranged to form a single test. Clearly, here was the strategic point for first attack on the problem—to develop criteria and practical techniques for a unidimensional attitude test. This the Research Branch attempted, but only as an auxiliary to its main activity.

When the Research Branch was established in the fall of 1941 those in charge of the technical plans faced a difficult choice. The



Army needed quickly and accurately facts about attitudes which would be practically useful in policy making—and not attitudes in general, but rather attitudes toward very specific things which might be manipulable. How did men feel about their job assignments: had they been fairly treated; were their civilian skills being used as well as the Army might have used them; if there were frictions within the classification and assignment process, where were they? How did men feel about promotions: were they fair; did they rest on information as to leadership abilities? How did the men feel about medical care: were there aspects of the dispensary system which they thought might be improved? What about food, clothing, recreation—how, for example, did they think the USO could improve its service? Did the post exchanges carry the kinds of items men wanted; did the Army motion picture service cater to the men's tastes? What about the training program: what frustrations did the men feel and what practical suggestions could they offer for improvement? And what about their outlook on the war: what kinds of orientation and information did they need about the goals of the war, about the enemy, about our allies?

Clearly, this was no time for directing all resources on a fundamental scientific attack on the methodology of attitude measurement. There were fires to be put out, and it was better to throw water or sand on the fires than to concentrate on studying chemistry to develop a new kind of extinguisher.

There were three alternatives available for this practical task:

(1) To employ experienced newspaper reporters and do essentially an impressionistic descriptive job, perhaps supplementing this with more systematic and detailed impressionistic case studies of special problems by observers trained in social science.

(2) To use the techniques of public opinion research and market research, involving systematic questioning of representative samples of respondents about concrete problems.

(3) To stimulate the collection by the appropriate agencies in the Army of objective statistics (on number of absences without leave, for example) from which inferences could be drawn about problems of soldiers' adjustment.

Strictly speaking, these were not alternative approaches but mutually supplementary approaches and all three were used by the Research Branch. Primary emphasis was placed, however, on the second, as best adapted to the practical situation in which the Research Branch found itself.

In the history of science, it has often been noted that the interaction between science and the applied arts is likely to be as beneficial to science as to its applications. If the development of scientific theory of attitudes had advanced slowly since World War I, the same cannot be said as to practical work in surveying public opinion and consumer wants. Largely independent of the universities, pioneers in market research and skillful practitioners like Crossley, Gallup, and Roper had built up successful commercial enterprises, with leading industrial concerns in America as their clients. The Gallup poll in the newspapers and Roper's poll in *Fortune* had made the general public and even policy makers in government aware of a new development highly significant for the operation of government in a democracy. For the first time in history, a method of auxiliary referenda was available to establish a new channel of communication between the people and their elected servants. At the same time, the variety of experience accumulated by these practitioners was to feed back into the development of science. Its first impact was in stimulating new inquiries into the theory of representative sampling which are adding to the body of knowledge comprised in mathematical statistics. Its second impact was in stimulating new inquiries into such problems as the conceptualization of the intensity with which an attitude is held. Finally, it was to provide techniques and data useful for some preliminary restructuring of theories of attitude formation, dissemination, and change. It was in recognition of the interdependence of basic and applied research in this field that a joint committee of academicians and practitioners was established by the National Research Council and Social Science Research Council in 1946.

The Research Branch drew many of its personnel from commercial research agencies with practical experience and had close and cordial relationships with leading practitioners in the nation. That background of experience in preparing studies quickly to evaluate specific problems, in drawing representative samples, in constructing questionnaires and pretesting them, and in writing succinct reports which a busy administrator would read and understand, was indispensable to the operation of the Research Branch as a service organization to the Army.

While questionnaires filled out anonymously by representative samples of soldiers provided the backbone of the Research Branch work, the value of qualitative and impressionistic "casing of the situation" was recognized from the beginning. The field staff was

organized by a man with newspaper background, and an effort was made to recruit for the field staff both officers and enlisted men skilled in sizing up situations quickly and accurately. Whenever time permitted, the pretesting operation was much more than merely determining whether the questions proposed were understandable and unambiguous. At first, it was difficult to get permission to send teams to Army camps for the purposes of informal interviewing and visiting with officers and enlisted men. Eventually, official reluctance was overcome and the unstructured interviewing in the field was to provide a basis not merely for checking question wording but for determining what kinds of questions to ask. This type of analysis called for a great deal of insight and judgment as well as a background of personal experience in Army life. In a few instances, it was possible to detach members of the staff for relatively extended stays in the field for exploration purposes. This paid dividends. The chapters in Volume II on the infantryman in combat could not have been written in their present form, for example, except for the insights gained by a senior analyst who accompanied a division of the First Army in its battles through France, Belgium, and into Germany, keeping in constant contact with front-line troops. Members brought into the Branch from service in other units of the Army were sometimes asked to write essays based on their personal experience with some problem or set of problems. From such descriptions and analyses some of the most helpful leads for structuring problems were obtained—among the best examples were essays written by Arnold M. Rose and Paul C. Glick, both trained sociologists, after they had completed their first six weeks of basic training.

Invaluable as this unsystematic background work was, it also had its distinct limitations. It was quite possible for an observer, however astute and well trained, to be misled into erroneous generalizations by what those men said with whom he happened to talk. Particularly, this could happen when the observer had, as often he could not avoid having, certain preconceptions on a subject. In talking with men, for example, about medical care, it was easy to draw criticisms from some men. One dramatic account of mistreatment at a dispensary—"aspirin and iodine for everything"—could sensitize an observer to hear vividly other criticisms and overlook the many men who had no criticism to make. The same applies to free comments which men were invited to write at the end of their questionnaire. Occasionally, quite explosive comments would be

found on medical care, but a survey made of a representative cross section of men in the United States showed that 80 per cent said that they considered the medical attention provided by the Army "very good" or "good," while 84 per cent thought that Army doctors were "as good as" or "better than" doctors in civilian life. That this response was discriminating is shown by the fact that the majority of the same men were critical of the medical examination which they received at the induction center and varying proportions were critical about different details of the way dispensaries were operated. This is not an isolated example. In talking with a number of veteran infantrymen who had just gone through the fighting in Sicily, trained observers from the Research Branch who had been sensitized to the front-line versus rear-area tensions were much impressed by the bitterness and frequency of the comments about this subject. It came as a surprise to find, on a survey of a cross section of the division, that while this bitterness existed it was confined to a small minority—not at all comparable in frequency to some other expressions of aggression against Army experience.

There were, moreover, many problems which could not have been treated on an impressionistic basis even if the impressions were trustworthy. Take the matter of estimating how many soldiers would go back to school after the war, how many would open new businesses, how many would go to farms, how many would work for an employer, how many would go back to their home towns, and how many would settle in regions different from their home. Qualitative pretesting was particularly necessary for framing questions which would separate actual plans from wishful thinking, and few surveys made in the Research Branch were subjected to as elaborate advance analysis as this. But the final survey required an accurately representative cross section of thousands of men; otherwise, the number of sample cases of men going back to farms in the South, for example, might either have been much too few for reliable analysis or have been distorted by poor sampling.

Among social scientists, as in the public at large, there are those who feel that literary descriptions are so useful that any other form of inquiry is supernumerary. One book by Ernie Pyle or Richard Tregaskis or Bill Mauldin, one drama like *A Bell for Adano* or *Command Decision*, it will be said, gives one more of a sensitive feeling for the "realities" of World War II than any collection of statistics, however competently analyzed. This position is quite plausible if we do not examine a word like "realities" too closely. No one can

doubt that the "feel" of a hurricane is better communicated through the pages of Joseph Conrad than through the Weather Bureau's statistical records of the barometric pressure and wind velocity. But it is no reflection on the artistry of Conrad to point out that society also finds uses for a science of meteorology.

The Research Branch supplemented its questionnaires not only by informal inquiries, but also by making as much use as possible of operating statistics collected by other agencies. The current data on strength of the Army and location of units provided, as has been said, the basis for drawing samples. Figures supplied by the Adjutant General on distributions by age, education, longevity in the Army, and other characteristics not used as controls in drawing the sample provided checks on the representativeness of the sample when questionnaires were tabulated. The Adjutant General, Surgeon General, and other offices were cooperative in supplying data. In general, it was found that the statistics on such matters as court-martial, absences without leave, efficiency ratings of officers, and the like were not too helpful. On various occasions statisticians in the Research Branch were detailed to help improve the statistics. Particularly, it was hoped that some objective indexes of personal adjustment could be established for routine reporting on a unit basis. The chief difficulty with such indexes, theoretically, turned out to stem from the fact that so few men in a given unit would be involved. If only one or two per cent of the men would be arrested by MP's in a given time interval, offenses are not a very useful index of relative adjustment in such a unit unless it happens to have an extremely large number of arrests.

Near the end of the war, at the request of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, a staff from the Research Branch was assigned to study the problem of devising better statistics for routine reporting on a unit basis. A number of rather ingenious indexes were proposed and investigated—for example, the ratio of men on sick call on week ends to those on sick call the rest of the week, an extremely low ratio being thought to reflect malingering. Some of these leads were quite promising and an apparently practical procedure was developed, in cooperation with the Machine Records Division of the Adjutant General's Office, but the venture was terminated by the end of the war before all the "bugs" had been eliminated from the reporting procedure.

Where it was possible to tie questionnaire data to operational statistics it was done, and sometimes, as in a large-scale study of the

Eighth Air Force in ETO or of Infantry divisions in the Normandy campaign, the Research Branch became involved in quite elaborate analyses of operation records.<sup>11</sup>

We see, then, that the major implement of the Research Branch was a questionnaire, supplemented, on the one hand, by informal "sizing up" of the situation and, on the other hand, by official operational statistics.

For reasons already foreshadowed in the earlier discussion of attitude measurement, the questionnaires used were never wholly satisfactory instruments. In general, they were able to do the practical job for which they were designed, more quickly and more accurately than any alternative method available. But the Research Branch had few illusions that this procedure was the final answer to the problem of identifying attitudes and studying their interrelationships. Although in the main work of the Research Branch and in most of the text of the present volumes there is no precise operational definition of attitudes—whence concepts like "attitudes," "tendencies," and "opinions" are used more or less loosely and even sometimes interchangeably—the need for fundamental studies leading to unambiguous operational definition of attitudes in terms of

<sup>11</sup> In one instance, an overseas Research Branch actually set aside plans for attitude studies and concentrated on operational statistics for several months. This was in Italy, where an attitude study had pointed to the bad effects of unduly long exposure to combat without rest—a fact which the theater traced back to the inadequacy of the combat replacement program, which was based on an inter-war analysis of World War I battle casualty experience. Combat replacements to the theater were proving alarmingly insufficient, due largely to the failure of need estimation formulas to take adequate account of nonbattle casualty losses. And due to lack of information about differential losses in different combat jobs, the replacements that were received included substantial numbers of men trained for jobs in which few replacements were needed—which made even more acute the insufficiency of men trained for jobs in which losses were heavy. At the joint request of Theater G-1 and Surgeon General and Fifth Army G-1, the Research Branch unit in the theater devoted much of the winter and spring of 1944 to a detailed analysis of combat losses and replacement needs in four Fifth Army divisions from the beginning of the Italian campaign. For each division and for all four combined, average daily battle and nonbattle casualty rates for periods both in and out of combat were computed separately for Infantry, Artillery, and other branches, by rank or grade and by military occupation specification. Rates of returns to duty from Fifth Army hospitals were computed by type of battle and nonbattle casualty. Based on these figures from the experience to date in the Italian campaign, replacement needs by branch, rank, and MOS were projected. A reporting system which would make the data required for computing these rates routinely available through Army and Theater Machine Records Units was worked out and a manual prepared explaining how the experience rates could be corrected to incorporate newer experience and how replacement needs could be projected and continuously modified in the light of accumulating experience. These documents were reproduced at theater headquarters for immediate transmittal to European theater headquarters and the War Department as well as for use in the Mediterranean theater headquarters and Fifth Army.

measurement was recognized from the beginning. Side by side with practical analysis of survey data, there was a continuing concern with development of better techniques. In particular, it seemed worth while to make a new attack on the problem of scale construction with the hope of getting some simple and reliable instruments whose unidimensionality would be demonstrable. This work was begun in early 1942 under Louis Guttman, who had contributed some original thinking to the general problem, in several chapters of a Social Science Research Council monograph published the previous year.<sup>12</sup> While peripheral to the immediate function of the Branch, this developmental work was continued during the war. The fact that most questionnaire surveys were required to deal with a multiplicity of topics precluded the use of long attitude scales. Hence special attention was given to the development of scales based upon a small number of items.

This work, which perhaps represents the most important single methodological contribution of the Research Branch, is described in detail in the first ten chapters of Volume IV. Initially, there was developed a new conceptual model, called the *scalogram*, which has many interesting theoretical and practical properties for the ordering of respondents along a single continuum. Toward the end of the war the theory was generalized by the introduction of the concept of *principal components*. The second principal component, which is ordinarily a U-shaped or J-shaped function of the rank order of respondents, has been identified as a measure of intensity. In other words, people with the most extreme opinions, pro or con, also tend to hold these opinions with the greatest intensity. The intensity function can be an aid in locating a "zero point" or a "region of indifference" which appears to be quite independent of the specific wording of particular questions used in the original scale. Further study in the Research Branch of the properties of the scalogram led to a further type of generalization, carried out by Paul F. Lazarsfeld largely after the war, which is called the *latent structure* theory. In Volume IV, Chapters 9 and 10, the latent structure theory is outlined, and it is shown how scalogram theory for the ordering of respondents becomes a special case of a more general latent structure analysis.

During the war many scales were constructed by the scalogram method and, in a few instances, the intensity function was used in

<sup>12</sup> Horst, et al., *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment* (Social Science Research Council, New York, 1941). Especially pp. 251-364.

research studies which were not primarily methodological. The latent structure theory came too late for actual use in the war, though the chapters in Volume IV present several numerical examples from Research Branch data.

In Volumes I, II, and III the use of scales in the analysis is much more limited than the authors would have liked. Too often, a given scale was used in only a single study and for various reasons could not be or was not repeated in comparable studies overseas or in the United States. Consequently, if we confined our analysis to data for which scales exist we would lose out on some of the richest source material in the Research Branch archives, and, particularly, would sacrifice range of comparisons and replications.

The obvious need, in the scientific study of attitudes, for the rigorous isolation and classification of the objects of study, should not close our eyes to the utility of information yielded by individual items. Their utility, as well as their limitation, may be illustrated by an example. The Women's Army Corps was concerned about soldiers' attitudes toward women in the Army. As Cooley and other social psychologists have pointed out, one's "self-respect" is a reflection of the estimate one makes as to the respect with which one is held by others. The pride which women felt in being in uniform presumably would, therefore, be adversely affected if adverse attitudes were held by large numbers of male soldiers toward the idea of women in the Army. Did many enlisted men disapprove of women in the Army? Now, depending on how the questions are asked, we will get different percentages of unfavorable responses. For example, from a cross section of 3,400 male enlisted men in the United States in November 1943:<sup>13</sup>

In your opinion how necessary is it for the war effort to have women in the Army? (Percentage checking "not so necessary" or "not necessary at all")	39%
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "Being a Wac is bad for a girl's reputation"? (Percentage agreeing)	43
Suppose a girl friend of yours was considering joining the WAC, would you advise her to join or not to join? (Percentage checking "I would advise her not to join")	57
If you had a sister, 21 years or older, would you like to see her join the WAC or not? (Percentage checking "not like to see her join")	70
Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "A woman can do more for her country in the WAC than she can by working in a war industry"? (Percentage disagreeing)	77

<sup>13</sup> From Survey S-90. See the appendix of Volume II for a listing of the principal studies made by the Research Branch.



On the basis of these responses, it would be meaningless to settle on some single question and say "X per cent of the soldiers are unfavorable toward the Wacs." But, except as an item of curiosity, how important is precision in such a statement standing by itself? The data here are sufficient to show that very large numbers of men expressed disapproval on each item—sufficiently so to constitute a challenge to the Army to try to correct the bases of disapproval and reeducate the men as far as possible. Further questioning was done in the study to try to locate the areas of misinformation about Wacs and to see how prejudice was related to the background and Army experience of different types of men.

The main value of reasonably exact percentages is for *comparative* purposes. Even though the fact that 70 per cent of the men said that they would not like to see their sister join the WAC cannot be translated into the statement, "70 per cent of the men opposed the WAC," it is important to know that 70 per cent made this response in November 1943 as compared with only 40 per cent, on exactly the same question, in January 1943. The *direction* of the shift, especially when paralleled by shifts in the same direction on other items, further accented the unfavorableness of the situation. Reasonably exact percentages are necessary, not only for calculating such differences in time, but also for making comparisons between subgroups of respondents at the same point in time. Thus the January study, made when Wacs were relatively new in the Army, had revealed two facts, both of which were not too encouraging signs for the future, namely, that the soldiers in camps where Wacs were located tended to be slightly more disapproving of their sisters joining the WAC than were other soldiers, and that within each group of camps the better educated men were more likely to disapprove than the less educated. The percentages saying they would not like so see their sister join the WAC were as follows (size of samples in parentheses):<sup>14</sup>

*Among men in camps where Wacs were located*<sup>15</sup>—

High school graduates or college men	53%	(315)
Some high school but did not graduate	42	(215)
Grade school only	34	(262)

<sup>14</sup> From 8-35.

<sup>15</sup> Within the two higher educational groups, the difference in percentage by whether or not Wacs were in the camp is not significant at the 5 per cent level. All differences, however, are in the same direction; the sum of the three critical ratios, divided by the square root of 3, is 2.17, which is beyond the 5 per cent level of significance. (In making these calculations, percentages were carried out to two more digits than shown in the table above.) The educational differences, within each type of camp, are clearly significant.

*Among men in camps where no Wacs were located—*

High school graduates or college men	49% (1,376)
Some high school but did not graduate	40 (864)
Grade school only	28 (1,234)

The same pattern was seen on other items.

If we are extremely chary about generalizing from a single question ("X per cent of the men disapprove of the Wacs") and if we focus our main attention on *differences* rather than absolute values, we can extract from rather crude data such as the above the basis for important tentative conclusions, although with differences as well as with absolute values the idiosyncrasy of single question wording may yield deceptive results. There is no escape from the need for using "good judgment" in interpretation—one of the purposes of scales is, of course, to reduce this subjective element. The safest check, in using material like this—and of necessity most of the Research Branch data were of this type—is the *consistency of replications*.

If the pattern of differences between subgroups tends to be the same from study to study, and from one question to another question which is thought to be tapping somewhat the same attitude area, our confidence in interpreting the materials increases. Thus we will see in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, on "How Personal Adjustment Varied in the Army," that almost the entire analysis is based on *replications*. One of the most important lessons learned in the Research Branch experience was that of the risks of generalizing from a pattern of differences revealed in a single small sample. How often one sees in psychological or sociological journals a study based on one sample and that small! Even if differences are in excess of chance, there are other biases which can play havoc with the interpretation.<sup>16</sup> One of the unfortunate customs in social science is to applaud "originality" so highly that students acquire no prestige out of "just repeating what somebody else has done." Experimental psychology, which springs more directly out of the natural science tradition, puts an emphasis on replication which social psychologists and sociologists might well emulate. Much the easiest parts of these volumes to write were those based on relatively sparse data. Where several replications were available, an analytical headache was all too frequently in store. Two studies would show

<sup>16</sup> See W. Edwards Deming, "On Errors in Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 9 (1944), pp. 359-69, for a good discussion of such errors.

a certain phenomenon; why did not a third? This was the point at which the IBM machines ran overtime. Sometimes the discrepancies stimulated further statistical analysis which led to quite important new ideas later backed by other evidence. Sometimes the discrepancies could not be reconciled by the most detailed and time-consuming study. Sometimes the reluctant decision had to be made to stop with mere reporting of the discrepancies—if all that were encountered in almost any of the chapters of this volume had been followed through to the bitter end, publication would have been delayed for years. In some tables in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, for example, data are brought together from scores of studies all over the world—a single diagram at the end of Chapter 5 summarizes comparisons of 8,554 pairs of percentages. Obviously left unexplored are numerous tantalizing discrepancies, some of which may, in the perspective of future research, come to seem too important to be treated as perfunctorily as now seems necessary.

Earlier in this discussion references were made to the streams of influence, deriving from psychology, social anthropology, and sociology, which contributed to the point of view taken in the analysis in these volumes. Sometimes, it was said, a theory is explicitly invoked; more often it is implicit in the selection of problems for discussion and in their analysis. But it is one thing to use a theory as general background or orientation and illustrate it with data, and quite another thing to formulate a hypothesis of the form “If  $X$ , given specified conditions, then  $Y$ ,” and verify it. And if, as is likely, a system of mutually interacting variables is involved, assuming now that all the variables can be adequately measured, the problem is exceedingly difficult. In any case, verification based on the model of the controlled experiment is difficult to achieve with social data. In its simplest form we may consider the following model:

	<i>Before stimulus</i>	<i>After stimulus</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Experimental group	$Y_0$	$Y_1'$	$d_1$
Control group	$Y_0$	$Y_0'$	$d_0$

Here we have two groups, experimental and control, initially matched on all relevant variables, with measures  $Y_0$  and  $Y_0$  respectively on a given dependent variable. The experimental group is exposed to a stimulus which is withheld from the control group. New measures are then taken,  $Y_1'$  and  $Y_0'$ . If the two groups were

actually matched on all relevant variables, then the difference  $d_s - d_o$ , if greater than chance expectation, can be attributed to the stimulus, where  $d_s = Y_s' - Y_s$  and  $d_o = Y_o' - Y_o$ .

In Volumes I and II this model is seldom realized. In rare instances we have  $Y_s' - Y_s$ , successive observations on the same group of individuals. Whether the interpretations we offer as to the "meaning" of changes observed are correct we cannot be sure. Much more frequently we have  $Y_s - Y_o$ , differences between two groups at the same point in time. To what those differences are attributable we cannot be sure, although we can, with limited assurance, rule out some possible interpretations by holding some variables constant, that is, matching two groups with respect to these variables and observing whether  $Y_s - Y_o$  still obtains. In comparing men in the United States and men overseas we can keep such variables as longevity in the Army, rank, branch of service, education, age, and marital condition constant, but we still must be cautious in attributing  $Y_s - Y_o$  to the "effects" of overseas service, because other selectivity factors not controlled, such as physical condition before leaving the United States, may be operative. Even more uncertain is a complication of the type  $Y_s' - Y_o$ , such as is frequently found in comparing one group in a given time interval with a different group at a later time interval.

We need in social science much more frankness than is customary as to the limitations of comparisons which use only segments of the controlled experiment model. In Volumes I and II an attempt has been made to call attention to such shortcomings, but this could not be done adequately without repeating a warning on almost every other page. In the present stage of social science, and perhaps for a very long time to come, data of the type which constitute most of Volumes I and II are likely to be staples of social research. Our habits of thought are such that plausibility of an inference from a table of association or even from two illustrative cases is all too beguiling. Hence the need for candor.

But candor alone is not enough. To say frankly that one has not established adequate proof is good; to establish the proof is better. That is why the Research Branch set up an experimental section and that is why Volume III appears in this series.

The idea of doing controlled experiments in the field of social psychology is by no means new and the work of prewar pioneers has been encouraging, even if some social scientists who are in a hurry to accomplish much quickly have been tempted to scoff at such

efforts as trivial. It can hardly be said that the Army was prepared for the idea of controlled experiments, even in areas like training, job assignment, or leadership, where experimental studies might have yielded particularly useful results. The Army would test new weapons by controlled experiment, not new training methods. Nor was the Research Branch strategically located in the Army hierarchy to initiate experiments on problems which fell far outside of the scope of the Information and Education Division; but eventually some of its experimental studies were done at the request of other agencies.

In 1942, when staff planning for leisure-time activities of the Army, including athletics and recreation, was still combined with the information and education activities in the Special Services Division, an opportunity arose to do an experiment which served to convince some skeptics within the Army and within the Division itself of the practicality and power of this research approach. A committee of physical educators, headed by Charles H. McCloy of the University of Iowa, had proposed a new physical conditioning program for the Army, based on modern experience in training football players and other athletes. They believed that the traditional Army regimen of setting-up exercises and hikes was uninteresting to the men, time consuming, and generally inefficient. A Research Branch survey of samples of troops throughout the country, using tests of physical proficiency devised by the committee, confirmed the criticism, by showing that men in outfits six months to a year made little better scores on tests of strength or of stamina than did new recruits. High scores made on the same tests by paratroopers, initially selected for ruggedness and subjected to particularly rigorous physical training, tended to validate the tests. A controlled experiment was then set up. Two samples of new recruits, matched on initial proficiency tests, were selected. One sample received the committee's new program and in six weeks, when retested, made physical proficiency scores almost as high as paratroopers. The other sample received conventional Army calisthenics and hikes and when retested showed only a slight improvement over the initial scores. Moreover, although the new program was more rigorous, it was also better structured from the motivational standpoint and the men getting it liked it better than the men in the traditional program liked their training. The results were sufficiently convincing to induce the Army to scrap its traditional procedures and introduce the new program on an Army-wide basis.

While the hopes that this demonstration would induce the Army to try other experiments in handling its human resources were not fully realized, the use of controlled experiments became an important part of the developmental work of the Information and Education Division. One of the functions of this Division, as has been mentioned, was to make motion picture films to give the soldiers better orientation as to the war. The ("Why We Fight") series of films, produced under the direction of Colonel Frank Capra, was studied in detail. Two matched groups of soldiers would be surveyed as to attitudes, one would be exposed to the film and one not, and both would be resurveyed after a suitable interval. Not only the effectiveness of the films, in general, but also the differential effects on different types of soldiers and the impact of specific elements of film content were analyzed. Other types of experiments compared the effectiveness of speeches and films, both in imparting information and in changing attitudes. Other media, such as the radio, also were used to explore controversial problems about communication—for example, under what conditions is the stating and refutation of opposing arguments more effective than mere affirmation of one's own position? The experience gained in these studies, some of which were made for Army agencies other than the Information and Education Division, has been funded in Volume III, which seeks to illustrate the problems involved in measuring the effectiveness of efforts to impart information and alter opinions and motivations through the use of mass communication by film and radio.

In experimental studies, two quite different classes of problems may be seen. One may be called program testing, the other hypothesis testing, although the two are not always separable. An example of program testing is investigation to determine what effects a given film had. This may or may not involve explicit use of scientific theory in the form of hypotheses. An example of hypothesis testing is investigation to determine which of two scientific theories seems to be tenable in the light of a given set of experimental evidence. Both types of problems are reviewed in Volume III, although the work of the Experimental Section, by practical necessity, was more frequently devoted to the former than to the latter.

As compared with experiments involving manipulation of interpersonal relations in controlled situations, the problems described in Volume III, complex as they are, may turn out to be relatively

simple. As the war neared its end, the Experimental Section of the Research Branch was engaged in studies preliminary to experimental investigation of the effects on attitudes of different types of noncommissioned leadership practices. These studies stopped with the war, but it would be quite practicable to carry them on in the peacetime Army, and experimental work since the war in civilian situations, conducted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, and other institutions, has encouraged the hopes for future progress.<sup>17</sup>

If one were to attempt to sum up the experience in the Research Branch and in the preparation of these volumes, in terms of its indications for the future needs of social science, one might make the following points:

1. Social science requires theories, at least of some limited generality, which can be operationally formulated such that verification is possible, and from which predictions can be made successfully to new specific instances.
2. Such theories demand that the objects of study be isolated and accurately described, preferably by measurement.
3. Once the variables are identified, the test of the adequacy of the theory, in comparison with alternative theories, must be rigorous, preferably evidenced by controlled experiment, and preferably replicated.

Just as medical progress was slow until instruments like the clinical thermometer and compound microscope were employed, on the one hand, and controlled experiments were introduced, on the other, so we may anticipate that social science will depend for its advancement on Steps 2 and 3 as much as upon any other operations. If the examples in these volumes, both of the inadequacies of our present knowledge and of the possible remedies for these inadequacies, stimulate a few of the new generation of social scientists to do things better, the labor will not have been in vain.

Assuredly, neither the Armed Forces, nor the historians, nor the social psychologists and sociologists, who may chance to read these books, will find in them the quality of incisive formulation of theory,

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<sup>17</sup> It cannot be said that the Research Branch, in its surveys, as well as in its experiments, was as successful in studying interpersonal relationships as in studying social attitudes and personal adjustment to the Army. The reader will find in these volumes considerable data on such subjects as informal social controls, both in training and garrison life and in combat. Nevertheless, as is discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, the study of personal adjustment was found to be much easier than the study of, for example, group cooperation.

isolation of variables, and rigorous verification which should some-day become not only the ideal but the standard practice of social science. Nevertheless, all should find here many things of interest and possibly some things of professional value.

We turn presently to Chapter 2, a case study of one Infantry division at the time of Pearl Harbor, which throws light on the problems of the Army as an institution, as seen through the eyes of the men, in adapting traditional practices to the needs of modern war. Here also will be found foreshadowed some of the problems of personal adjustment treated in detail subsequently.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 bring together in one place a very large amount of statistical data on variations in personal adjustment in the Army. We compare verbal behavior reflecting adjustment with nonverbal behavior, such as success in the Army as represented by promotions or failure as represented by isolation in the guard-house or in the hospital psychoneurotic ward. The correspondence between the verbal and nonverbal behavior is high enough to indicate that the attitudes supposedly reflecting adjustment are important in the sense that they are related to other behavior which would be defined as indicative of adjustment. But this relationship is only half of the story. The other half of the story is that attitudes reflecting adjustment, though all positively correlated with nonverbal behavior, appear to represent *profiles* which vary (a) with the personal background characteristics of the individual soldier, such as education, age, and marital condition, and (b) with various factors in Army experience, for example, whether or not the soldier went overseas, what his branch of service was, how long he was in the Army, and at what stage in the war his attitudes were studied. The concept of *varying profiles* may be of considerable importance for the student of social psychology. Other conceptual tools, notably a theory of *relative deprivation*, also are introduced to help in more generally ordering otherwise disparate empirical findings.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide a long but compact background for the chapters which follow, dealing with selected problems, mainly those involved in men's reaction to the Army as a social institution. Chapter 6 treats social mobility; Chapter 7, job assignment and job satisfaction; Chapter 8, attitudes toward leadership and social control; Chapter 9, orientation of soldiers toward the war; and Chapter 10, Negro soldiers in the Army.

✧ Volume II considers the motivations and attitudes of combat



troops in Ground and Air Forces and deals with the aftermath of combat—neuropsychiatric manifestations, problems of returnees from overseas, initial problems of occupation in Germany, and attitudes of the soldier toward his Army experience and toward his civilian future as he laid down his weapons for the last time.

In Volume III the experimental study of communication is reviewed and in Volume IV methodological contributions to measurement and prediction are analyzed with copious illustrations from Research Branch experience.

These volumes deal with men at war. If our nation again should be forced to defend itself in global conflict, some of the findings may help prevent in another war mistakes which were made in this one. If we are to be vouchsafed a generation of peace, scholars can add these experiences to other experiences and use them as a help in building a social science. The latter is our hope. We know that the road of social science will be steep and dark, but men of vision and courage will try to climb it. Perhaps these volumes will add for a time to the light available until, higher up along the path, brighter torches illumine broader and more secure footways.

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## CHAPTER 2

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### *THE OLD ARMY AND THE NEW*<sup>1</sup>

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**T**HIS chapter is by way of prelude. As the curtain went up on the vast and fateful drama on December 7, 1941, the small staff of the recently organized Research Branch happened to be at an Army camp in the United States, about to make its first attitude survey. On the day after Pearl Harbor that survey was made.

The findings of that survey foreshadowed many of the problems which will be reviewed in these volumes. And in some respects, the survey was unique, except for replications made in the few months immediately following. For here one was looking at both the old Army and the new—the old Army as symbolized at the bottom by the traditional regular, the new Army as symbolized at the bottom by the new citizen-soldier drafted into uniform by Selective Service. Only at this brief period was such a view possible. Soon the hundreds of thousands and finally the millions of selectees who poured into the Army were to swamp the enlisted regulars by sheer numbers and to move upward to positions of leadership at the officer as well as the noncommissioned level.

In the five years between Hitler's conquest of France in 1940 and the overthrow of Germany and Japan in 1945, the American Army grew from a strength of 16,624 officers and 249,441 enlisted men to 772,863 officers and 7,305,854 enlisted men.

We must visualize the Army at the beginning of the war as a small organization of officers and men more or less isolated from the democratic society which rather grudgingly supported it, and possessing institutional characteristics which contrasted sharply with the civilian life around it.

Small as was the Regular Army, it was its professional traditions and its professional skills, modified in some degree as new lessons were learned in the war, which were to set the institutional forms for the great civilian fighting force. Some of these traditional in-

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, and Samuel A. Stouffer. The data used came mainly from Planning Survey I, in the analysis of which William W. McPeak and Felix E. Moore, Jr., had important responsibilities.

stitutional forms probably were adaptive and some probably were maladaptive to the needs of modern war. It is not the function of this chapter to pass judgment on such a problem. We can report, however, how such a problem was seen through the eyes of the men. And this report—particularly as of a time when the contrasts between the old Army and the new were relatively sharp and clear—can make a contribution to history. Enlisted men did not always, perhaps ever, see the big picture. But they did see what was going on immediately around them, and think and feel, and what they had to say is a paragraph in the history of the war and of our country. More than that—what they had to say is of interest to students of sociology and psychology. The frictions involved in the adaptation of old institutional forms to new situations represent one of the important areas of social science research.

If many of the pages of this and subsequent chapters describe these frictions—the conflicts and the grinding of the gears within the Army—we must never lose sight of the fact that in only a few years this Army, little more than a blueprint in the beginning, was destined to become one of the mightiest forces of arms the world has ever seen. And should there seem to be plausible justification for enlisted men's criticisms of many of the Army's institutional forms, let us remember that out of this same system, either because of these forms, in spite of them, or both, came the leadership represented in men like Marshall, Arnold, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Bradley.

The Army was a new world for most civilian soldiers. Of its many contrasts with civilian institutions, three may be cited:

1. Its authoritarian organization, demanding rigid obedience.
2. Its highly stratified social system, in which hierarchies of deference were formally and minutely established by official regulation, subject to penalties for infraction, on and off duty.
3. Its emphasis on traditional ways of doing things and its discouragement of initiative.

One must guard against the temptation to exaggerate such contrasts. Many factory workers also spend their working hours in an autocratic system, though they often individually or through their unions have recourse to object to an order and, what is more important, have the right to quit their jobs. This right may be more theoretical than actual in some situations—for instance during an industrial depression—but surely it is one of the most important

sociological distinctions between freedom and slavery, and it is of much psychological significance.

It is also true that civilian society in America is not a classless system. The subtle hierarchical distinctions marking rungs on the American social ladder have been described by sociological writers like W. L. Warner and his associates. But, at least within white civilian American society, there is no such yawning social chasm as that separating enlisted men and officers in the Army. Civilians might complain that they cannot afford the Waldorf-Astoria or abstain from going there because they would feel uncomfortable about their table manners, but they have the *right* to go there, whereas enlisted men did not have the right to venture into relatively commodious establishments reserved for officers only. And the officers' superior status was openly asserted and had to be continuously acknowledged by a host of acts symbolic of deference—such as saluting and the use of "Sir." The nearest analogy in civilian life would be that of the social relations of whites and Negroes, especially in the South—witness the often used phrase "caste system" to describe the Army. For that reason, as is suggested in Chapter 10 on the Negro soldier, it may have been even easier for Negro civilian soldiers than for white soldiers to adjust to the Army's pattern of social privilege. However, the analogy is not quite fair to the Army, and the word "caste" is perhaps not strictly applicable since it was possible for a substantial number of enlisted men to cross the social chasm and themselves become officers.<sup>2</sup>

Near the bottom of the Army social hierarchy stood the line non-coms and they, in their relations with the privates, have civilian prototypes in foremen and bosses of labor gangs; although in the Army the cult of toughness and masculinity, traditionally associated with making soldiers out of civilians, combined with almost unrestricted authority, had the effect of making the noncom seem to many privates quite different from customary immediate superiors in civilian life.

Finally, in civilian life it is easy to find institutions which, like the Army, prize conformity with tradition more highly than initiative for improvement. This is found often in religious and educational institutions, frequently among the bureaucracy in government, and it has its counterparts in industry, both in vast corporations and in

<sup>2</sup> Earlier traditions were, however, in part preserved by the fact that there was no normal promotion from enlisted to officer status. Enlisted men selected for officer candidate school were first discharged from the Army and then readmitted in their new and very different status.

smaller family enterprises. But in the Army in training, the rewarding of conformity and the suppression of initiative were all too often conspicuous practices. To many it appeared that the safest rule, from general to private, was "don't stick your neck out."

*Education as a Factor in the Transition  
from the Old Army to the New*

To the millions of civilians who came from their peaceful pursuits and democratic ways of life to become privates in the Army, the contrasts were evident and, conceivably in many instances, exaggerated. In any circumstances the task of the Army in training these men not only to be disciplined and obedient privates, but also to assume, themselves, positions of junior leadership—more than three million were to become noncoms, several hundred thousand officers—would not have been easy. But the task was complicated by a factor whose significance even yet is probably inadequately appreciated.

That factor was the high educational level of the average enlisted man in the new Army, as compared with the enlisted man in the old Regular Army.

Many of the problems traceable to the contrasts between civilian ways and Army ways were accentuated by the fact that the Army's institutional forms were adapted to a quality of man power different from that which it was assimilating at the time of Pearl Harbor and would assimilate thereafter.

Between World War I and World War II the United States went through an almost revolutionary change with respect to education. This is shown in the following estimates supplied by the United States Office of Education as of the year preceding our entrance into each war:

	<i>Number of students in high school</i>	<i>Number of students in college</i>
1916	1,700,000	400,000
1940	7,100,000	1,400,000

This phenomenal expansion in higher and secondary education was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of the American population in managerial, professional, semiprofessional, and clerical jobs—the so-called white-collar class. It is not unlikely that differences in problems of adjustment to the Army of draftees in the two wars—in so far as differences may have existed—are associated

with this change in the educational level and vocational choices and, above all, in the *levels of expectation* of the population.

In view of the fact that the Army of World War II was far more highly specialized than that of a generation before, with a host of technical and semiprofessional jobs which were not in existence earlier, the reservoir of education was an asset which reduced the training time otherwise necessary for some of those specialized military occupations using civilian skills. On the other hand, the better educated men, with high levels of personal expectation, were to be harder than others to satisfy with Army jobs making little or no use of their skills, were to be more critical of traditional Army ways of doing things which seemed maladaptive to the needs of a new kind of war, and were to experience the greatest frustration if their status drives were not satisfied.

Chart I compares the educational level of white drafted enlisted men in World War I and World War II.<sup>3</sup>

In the first war, the percentage of high school graduates and college men was 9, in the second 41. The percentage of men who had not gone farther than grade school dropped from 79 to 31.


The chart also shows the educational distribution of Regular Army men who had been in the Army at least 18 months as of December 31, 1941. It will be noted that their average educational level was actually higher than that of the cross section of drafted population in World War I. But it was substantially lower than that of the selectees in the second world conflict, 25 per cent being high school graduates or college men as contrasted with 41 per cent in the selectee population. And it was the old Regular Army enlisted man who was to be the first teacher of the new civilian soldier. What happened we shall see presently.

It should be kept in mind that educational level is much more than an index to a specified amount of book learning. It is correlated with ability on the one hand and with socio-economic status on the other. Many young people with ability do not go far in school, especially if their parents lack the means to send them, but, *on the average*, those who go farthest in school tend to be superior to those who quit school. Many young people from the most disadvantaged income groups get a good education, but, *on the average*, those who go farthest in school tend to come from higher income levels than those who do not. Consequently, though there are

<sup>3</sup> While the World War II data are from a very early point in the war, the percentage distribution of selectees by education remained essentially the same throughout the war.

many individual exceptions, educational level constitutes a useful sociological index. A group with a large proportion of college men and high school graduates will have more ability on the average, will have had more abundant economic opportunity, and will be

CHART I  
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN WORLD WARS I AND II  
(Percentage Distribution)



Data for World War I from *Memoirs of the National Academy of Science*, xv (1921), Part III, Chap. 10.

Data for World War II computed from special tabulation made for the Research Branch by Machine Records Division, AGO.

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more likely to possess intellectual values and ambitions than a group made up predominantly of men who have quit in grammar school or before finishing high school.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, on "How Personal Adjustment Varied in the Army," we shall see ample documentation of the fact that throughout the war, overseas as well as at home, the better educated, though they tended eventually to get the better assignments, were more critical of their status and jobs than were the less educated and were more critical of the Army in general.

As also will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the better educated were more favorable than others on attitudes reflecting personal commitment to the war. The better educated were more likely to feel that they should have been drafted, more likely to say that they could be more useful to their country as soldiers than as war workers, more likely as the war neared its end to say that they should stay in the Army to see things through to a finish. One of the obvious and important differences between the old Army and the new was the fact that the old Army was composed of volunteers and the new Army mainly of conscripts; had it not been for the relatively favorable personal commitment of the better educated draftees, the transition could have been even more difficult.

The better educated also, in spite of their more critical attitudes toward the Army, were likely to evidence a higher personal esprit. As Chapters 3 and 4 again will show, the better educated were more likely than others, wherever stationed, to say that they were in good spirits and in good physical condition (the latter reflecting, perhaps, not only a better attitude but actually better health, in so far as they tended to come from childhood backgrounds involving better nutrition, hygiene, and medical care).

Presumably one of the uses of education is to help individuals handle their environment realistically. Hence, the better educated were less likely than others to attempt to run away from the Army by going AWOL and were less likely to seek escape through the medical route; as Chapter 4 will show, the psychoneurotic breakdowns in training were less among the better educated than others.

The old peacetime Army was not accustomed to such a high educational level among enlisted men as it was to get in World War II. The Regular Army enlisted man was a youth of less than average education, to whom the security of pay, low as it was, and the routines of Army life appealed more than the competitive struggle of



civilian life. By self-selection he was not the kind of man who would be particularly critical of an institution characterized by authoritarian controls. He might get in trouble, of course—there were problems of drunkenness, venereal disease, and AWOL. But he would be more likely than the kind of new citizen-soldier to accept the Army's traditional forms as right. This is the kind of soldier to whom the old Army was adapted and who on the eve of World War II would, as a noncom, be the immediate boss and teacher of the new selectee.

Let us look at the Infantry division surveyed by the Research Branch at the time of Pearl Harbor. For the analysis in the present chapter only men who had been in the division at least three months have been tabulated, but the sample is a representative cross section of such men, who were about evenly divided among regulars and selectees.<sup>4</sup>

As shown in Chart II, almost all the sergeants and two thirds of the corporals were regulars. But of the privates, nearly three fifths were selectees. This was the prevailing pattern in the Army at the time and was the necessary result of the policy of putting the men with the longest Army experience in enlisted positions of highest responsibility. Almost all of the Regular Army men had been with the division over a year. But the selectees here portrayed were by


<sup>4</sup> The cross section (excluding men with less than three months in the division) comprised 868 men, of whom 462 were Regular Army men and 406 were selectees. This is called sample A. Two additional samples were drawn in the division to enlarge the base and thus increase the reliability of certain internal tabulations. One, sample B, was an additional cross section of selectees; the other, sample C, was an additional sample of selectees who had attended college. Data here reported for "all selectees" are based on samples A and B combined, as are data by rank for selectees and by education, except for the college men. When the responses of college men are shown separately, they are based on samples A, B, and C combined. The values of *n* which serve as the base for tabulations within indicated subgroups are indicated below, together with their proper weights in the total sample.

	<i>n</i>	Total weight	Privates and Pfc's only
Regulars	462	53%	300
Selectees	704	47	649
Selectees by education			
College	340	8	274
High school grad.	228	15	204
Grade and some H.S.	361	24	346
		100%	

Given subgroups are adjusted to their "proper weight," when any or all are combined in any tabulation.

## CHART II

RANK AND EDUCATION OF REGULARS AND SELECTEES IN AN INFANTRY DIVISION  
 (Enlisted Men in the Division at Least Three Months on December 8, 1941.  
 Planning Survey I)



For number of cases, see footnote 4.

no means raw recruits. All had been with the division at least three months, and while very few had belonged as long as the regulars, four fifths had been in the division at least nine months.<sup>5</sup>

The next fact of importance to note in Chart II is the comparative educational level of regulars and selectees. As we would have expected from the Army-wide figures shown in Chart I, the educational achievement of the selectees was much higher than that of the regulars. Among the selectees, 48 per cent had at least graduated from high school and a third of this 48 per cent had gone to college. Among the regulars, only 23 per cent had graduated from high school, of whom very few had gone on to college.

The result of the fact that the less educated men had seniority in terms of Army experience is shown in the bottom diagram in Chart II. The sergeants had the lowest educational level in the division. Only 27 per cent had finished high school as compared with 45 per cent among corporals and 35 per cent among privates. A third of the sergeants had not been educated beyond grammar school.

Among Regular Army men the better educated had a somewhat better chance than others of becoming noncoms and among the selectees the same was true. But the higher noncoms were regulars in such large proportion and the regulars averaged so much lower than selectees in educational level, that the total result was to place the top enlisted leadership in the hands of men who, on the average, had less education than the men they were trying to teach and lead.

Army-wide tabulations made by the Adjutant General's Office for the Research Branch showed that the situation portrayed in this division was quite general throughout the Army, with the exception of the Air Corps, which had held to higher educational standards than other branches.

Chart II portrays a situation which could hardly fail to be productive of tensions. Eventually, as has been said, the better educated tended to rise to positions of enlisted leadership. But in this early stage in the building of the new Army, the contrasts in attitudes between leaders and led give us insight into the problems of


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<sup>5</sup> It must be remembered that prior to Pearl Harbor selectees were obligated to receive one year of military training, after which they were to return to civilian life. This fact would have inhibited the desire of an Army command to fill key noncom posts in an organization with selectees, even if the desired had existed. While it may help to explain why larger numbers of the selectees with superior background had not been promoted within a division like this, it does not explain the absence of a systematic program of leadership training—in cadre schools or elsewhere—for many of these men, instead of their undergoing months upon months of traditional military training designed to fit them into a team as privates.

the Army in adapting its traditional institutional forms to the needs of modern war.

Responses of regulars are here taken as characteristic of enlisted men's attitudes in the old Army, responses of selectees as indicative of the way the Army looked to a new and different type of citizen soldier. Chart III symbolizes rather vividly the difference in point of view of these two types of men. In spite of the fact that the selectees in this sample were by no means new recruits, most of them having been in service over nine months, their basic orientation was still civilian rather than military. They looked over their shoulders

CHART III  
REGULARS AND SELECTEES COMPARED AS TO ATTITUDES TOWARD  
WEARING THE UNIFORM  
(Planning Survey I, December 8, 1941)



For number of cases, see footnote 4.

at the civilian life they had temporarily left behind them and already were making plans about what they would do after the war. Until war was declared, soldiers were permitted the option of wearing their civilian clothes when on furlough. The questionnaire in the present study was, of course, prepared a few days before Pearl Harbor and included the question, "Which do you prefer to wear on furlough, uniform or civilian clothes?" On December 8 the question was academic because the option no longer existed. But, as Chart III shows, there was a wide contrast in responses of regulars and selectees. Of the regulars, 62 per cent said they preferred to wear the uniform on furlough, as contrasted with 30 per cent among the selectees. The pattern among selectees by education is very interesting—the preference for the uniform being lowest among college selectees, 14 per cent, and highest among selectees who had not finished high school, 36 per cent.

Now let us see how certain Army ways of doing things were viewed by these different types of men.

#### *How Men Viewed Army's Authoritarian Methods*

We are not speaking here about the Army's hierarchical system of social privileges, which will be treated separately. Rather we are speaking of the system of authoritarian controls of traditional armies.

"Theirs not to make reply  
Theirs not to reason why  
Theirs but to do and die."


This survey did not contain general check-list questions pointed directly at the authoritarian system as such. Nor could any of the free comments which hundreds of soldiers wrote on the questionnaires in their own words be construed as direct attacks on the *principle* of authority. That seemed to be taken wholly for granted. Rather the criticism centered on three points with respect to the way in which that authority was exercised:

1. That many of those exercising authority were unqualified for their jobs.
2. That the soldier did not get enough chance to learn the "reason why" of orders.
3. That authority was exercised as if those in authority assumed a very low level of intelligence on the part of trainees.

Let us take these up in turn. First, *criticisms of the competence of*

*the leadership.* There were no direct questions in this early study eliciting reactions to the abilities of a man's commissioned officers.<sup>6</sup> Chart IV shows the responses of privates (including privates first class) to questions about noncoms. Whereas 48 per cent of the regular privates thought most of their noncoms were the best who could have been picked, this view was shared by only 33 per cent of

CHART IV  
OPINIONS OF PRIVATES ABOUT NONCOMS  
(Regular and Selectee Privates Who Had Been in Infantry Division at  
Least Three Months as of December 8, 1941)



For number of cases, see footnote 4.

<sup>6</sup> Such questions were thought to be unsafe to ask at a time when the whole idea of attitude studies among troops was on trial. It was not until more than a year later that direct questions about officers were permitted. Actually, there is no evidence that the asking and answering of such questions was upsetting in any way, and from them we get the source material for important sections of both Volumes I and II.

the selectee privates. Among selectee college men only 19 per cent took this view, while of selectees who had not finished high school 38 per cent gave favorable answers. This chart is just one of many illustrative of the problem faced by the Army in trying to assimilate civilian soldiers whose levels of civilian training and aspiration were so different from those of their traditional enlisted leaders from the peacetime Army.

As would be expected, the same pattern of criticism is shown in more specific questions relating to NCO leadership. The proportions, among privates, responding "Yes, all are" or "Yes, most are" to the question, "Are your instructors good teachers?" were as follows:

Regulars	51%
Selectees	34
Selectees, by education	
College	19
H.S. graduates	32
Others	39

Very similar frequencies are found among those answering "Yes, all do" or "Yes, most do" to the question, "Do your instructors understand what they are teaching?" These questions did not use the term NCO, and free comments written by the men show that many respondents were referring to officers as well as noncoms. But a count of the free answers showed that the specific criticisms written about NCO's outnumbered those about officers in a ratio of about two to one. Only the more critical are apt to write out free answers in detail; hence these comments would tend to lead a reader to exaggerate the degree of resentment existing among all men. Nevertheless, a few of the comments, typical of those who criticized, even if not typical of all men, give some of the flavor of the situation at this time when the new Army was being absorbed into the old.

Let us look first at some comments by selectees, and then get a glimpse of the viewpoint of the old regulars. Selectees' remarks:

In my whole battalion selectees have had tough going, as noncom regulars won't recommend a selectee for a rating even if the selectee is definitely entitled to it. The Army officers *don't get out enough with the men to find out who is and who is not capable*. Three noncoms in my outfit came down with venereal disease and were not busted—I believe it was because there were not any regulars who could take their places. There were some selectees, but that is a different story.

This length of service business is a luxury this Army can't afford. The best man for the job is the most efficient way and the privates can see it. It is bad when

the privates can see what the generals won't admit or do anything about. It doesn't do any good to be bossed by men inferior in every way except length of service. There is a way of limiting this as applied to noncoms. Tests for ratings might show up a lot of our present noncoms. In our company when some training tests were given the noncoms got lower than *any* of the privates. But they are still noncoms and the privates are still privates. Men don't do their best when they know that they won't be promoted for being better than the men over them.

The noncommissioned officers are not efficient enough to operate in war. There are so many who have received stripes and don't know what the score is. Anybody can be an NCO. Under the present Army, no tests are given, you are just told that you have been made corporal, sergeant, or what have you, and that is all.

Upon entering the Army we were helplessly trained by very incompetent NCO's. Now that we have eleven months of service why in heaven's name are these men still retained when they are so much inferior to most selectees? They have done much to lower the morale of the division. Ask any draftee private here—see if this is not the truth.

The Army practice of advancing men according to their length of service is one of the most detrimental practices existing. The Army is expanding too much to make such a practice sound. There is no more reason for making a fifteen-year Pfc a staff sergeant than there is for making a ditch digger a construction engineer.

This new era in the Army brought about by the Selective Service Act should be dealt with accordingly. My First Sergeant knows the NCO's are not too intelligent—he admits this. He also admits that the SS men are, by far, more intelligent than the Army's regular NCO's. But he says there is nothing can be done about this. My advice is to run an IQ test and let the men who have the most knowledge be the bosses.

There is another viewpoint from which this conflict between the old Army and the new, as symbolized by the old regulars and the new selectees, can be observed, namely the viewpoint of the old regulars. Relatively few of them commented at length, as compared with the new men, and their attitudes tended, as would be expected, to be defensive and to be critical of the citizen-soldiers:

My own pet gripe is that Selective Service men are treated much better than *we soldiers* [the significant underlining was the writer's own]. They grunt and gripe too much.

I think discipline was relaxed on Selective Service men, from what it was formerly on Regular Army men. Selectees have been allowed to wise off too much. Many of them are too smart for their own good.

The Army is nothing like it use to be say even five years ago. The men are too use to doing their on way. So it is hard to change. Sense the number men [selectees] has to be here the regulars men get put on K.P. over the week-end so the number boys can go home. I don't like that cause I was one of the boys



that got put on K.P. during Easter. I think I am as good as any man. Number men and regulars should be treated the same way. I mean what is good for the goose is good for the gander.

But some regulars shared the selectee's critical opinion of the noncoms. Not shown in Chart IV were the responses of the NCO's to the question, "Are your noncoms the best who could have been picked?" Eight per cent of the regulars answered "No, not many" though nobody answered "Almost none." The following was written by one of this 8 per cent who was also one of the 3 per cent of Regular Army sergeants who had attended college:

As a whole I like the Army. I think it is the best. I am in the best outfit and want to be one of the best soldiers. However, it seems that there are a lot of noncoms, staff sergeants and up, that figure their job is to get out of us as much work as possible and then to ride the men of lower grade. I say the noncoms can set a much better example for the new men to follow. Some I know are worse than a bunch of two day old selectees and if they can be called competent instructors, I have another guess coming. Officers in our division are a fine bunch of fellows, with the exception of a few who think they are descendants of Napoleon or some other great war lord.

Exactly how much the selectee criticism of the leadership reflected actual incompetence on the part of the leadership and how much of it represented a projection of the selectee's wish to have the job himself, or represented generalized resentment against Army treatment, cannot, of course, be determined from these data. Probably all factors were involved, but a reading of all the free comments of which the excerpts above are merely illustrative, suggests that a good deal of specific criticism would have been forthcoming even if there had been no need for displacement of aggression.

Next, let us look at criticisms of the Army's traditional methods of exercising authority *without giving men what they considered sufficient opportunity to know the "reasons why."* Actually, training manuals emphasized the need for such explanations, especially when some initiative had to be left to the individual. And there were evidently some instructors who appreciated the importance, especially among relatively well-educated troops, of transmitting along with an order as much of the context of the order as possible. Among all selectee privates, 47 per cent said that instructors "always" or "usually" gave them a chance to ask the reason why "things are done the way they are," but among college selectees the number dropped to 37 per cent. Among selectees who had not

graduated from high school the number rose to 54 per cent and was still higher, 64 per cent, among Regular Army privates. Some comments from the critical:

Maneuvering is of little value to anyone but the high officers. We are not taken into their confidence, know nothing, learn nothing, and lose interest. Even as a scout, theoretically with the lives of a platoon highly dependent on me, I am often not told the situation; just, "Move out."

The men are usually kept in the dark as to what they are accomplishing, personally or in units, and questions as to the reasons for orders are barked down immediately.

The "why" should always be explained. This is rarely done. It appears as though the thing is done because of a custom; my-grandfather-did-this, his-father, etc., attitude.

A soldier should be allowed to give his viewpoint on different occasions. It is now at a point where if an officer would ask a group whether anyone had anything to say, nobody would talk up. My first month down here I was allowed to give my opinion on one occasion. I was then told to shut up by our top kick. I try to keep suggestions to myself now and just take orders.

Communication of orders in the field and in camp suffers by the fact that the man who gives the orders does not put himself in the place of the man who carries them out, and does not give all the information necessary for the carrying out. If each man along the line got all the information and passed it on, the privates would know what to do and how to do it, but as things are now, many absurdities, much delay, many mistakes and, not the least important, much lack of interest, result from the fact that the man who has to do something doesn't know enough of the why and wherefore. And this is encouraged rather than discouraged by the Army.

Finally, as would be expected, the better educated men were particularly sensitized to react against training methods which, by their monotony and repetitiousness, *seemed to them geared to the slowest thinkers and unsuitable to many in the new kind of selectee population.* The proportions in various subgroups saying "Yes, always" or "Yes, often" to the question, "Is time being wasted by your being told over and over again how to do something?" were as follows:

Regulars	36%
Selectees	48
Selectees by education	
College	60
H.S. graduates	48
Others	44

### Some of the critical comments:

When I was in a wire section we used to have too much repetition on subjects everyone knew. It was just a waste of time. Men would have been better off playing baseball and getting exercise than sitting around half asleep.

All my training has been repetitious since I left Training Center and I haven't learned anything new since that thirteen-week period.

The repetition is caused by grouping men in companies and other instruction groups without some attempt at stratification by IQ or some other measure of learning speed. Training would be not only speedier but more effective, and less deadening on some of the men, if they were grouped so that the more quick-witted would not be held back by the more sluggish.

Privates should not be treated as children by officers who don't have the ability.

Some officers encourage the boys to go over the hill by treating them badly. They should have more respect for soldiers because we are doing our best and we shouldn't be treated like a bunch of prisoners.

I wish the officers would treat us like intelligent adults. Men inducted into the Army are those who were independent in thought and action, in other words worked for their living. Maybe the old Army had men who signed up because of the easy life and lack of responsibility involved in the shaping of the future. I wish there would be less of the monotonous repetition. Men take less interest in their work, fool around, and consequently annoy the officers, making it hard on everybody. Treat a man like a nitwit and he'll finally act like one.

### *Views of the Army's Status System*

Few aspects of Army life were more alien to the customary folkways of the average American civilian than the social system which ascribed to an elite group social privileges from which the non-elite were legally debarred and which enforced symbolic deferential behavior toward the elite off duty as well as on duty.

At the time of Pearl Harbor we encounter the beginnings of criticism directed at this system. As later chapters will show, the resentment against officers' privileges was to be a cumulative matter, tending to increase the longer a man was in the Army and tending to increase in the later years of the war, especially among soldiers in inactive theaters overseas or in rear areas of active theaters.

No direct question on the subject of officers' privileges was asked in this first survey and the data to be reviewed in subsequent chapters permit the inference that the situation at the time of Pearl Harbor was somewhat atypical. A factor contributing to a possibly lower resentment against officers at this time was the extraordinary

hostility on the part of selectees toward the Regular Army noncoms. For example, blame tended to be attached personally to the first sergeant for preventing access to one's commanding officer, rather than to the officer himself or to the Army system. In answer to the question, "Is it hard for men to get to see their Company Commander about personal problems?" a third answered "Yes." Most of these men gave reasons in response to the question, "If so, why?" Three out of four blamed the first sergeant, only a tenth blamed the officer, the rest blamed both or neither.

Also complicating the reactions was an ambivalence on the part of many soldiers—especially, the best educated. However much the Army's system jarred against their democratic civilian habits, the fact remained that they were in the Army, and, therefore, might as well make the best of it. And making the best of it involved becoming an officer one's self, or, next best, becoming a high-ranking noncom. *Hence criticism of the system existed side by side with a desire to achieve status within the system.*

As is shown in the chapter on social mobility, the opportunities to become officers could not have seemed as bright at the time of Pearl Harbor as they were to seem a year later, when Officer Candidate Schools were in full swing. Nor had the opportunities to become noncoms opened as they were to open shortly, when divisions like the one studied were to be repeatedly drawn on for cadres of noncoms to be used in training other divisions. The proportions among selectees answering "Yes, very much" or "Yes, somewhat" to the question, "Have you ever looked forward to becoming a commissioned officer?" were as follows:

College men	58%
H.S. graduates	27
Others	12

Over half of the selectee privates also said they looked forward to becoming noncoms. The percentages answering "Yes, very much" or "Yes, somewhat" to the question, "Have you looked forward to becoming an NCO?" were, among selectees:

College men	53%
H.S. graduates	66
Others	50

The "curvilinear" relationship seen here, with the high school graduates showing more frequent NCO aspirations than either college

men or the less educated, was to be found repeating itself the following year in Army-wide studies, reflecting a tendency of some college men to set their sights on officer status and to be dissatisfied with anything else.

The frustration felt in not climbing the status ladder faster was, as might be expected, much greater among the selectees—especially the better educated—than among the regulars.

In response to the question, "Is the Army giving you a good chance to show what you can do?" 52 per cent of the regular privates as compared with 30 per cent of the selectee privates responded "Very good" or "Fairly good," while among selectee privates the proportions making these responses, by education were:

College men	14%
H.S. graduates	21
Others	34

The same patterns are found in responses to other questions about job assignment.

At the time of this study the special antagonism against Regular Army noncoms combined possibly with the ambitions of many selectees to become officers themselves produced a different pattern of response to the following question, "Do you think your officers can see things from your point of view?" The better educated selectees were just about as likely as the less educated to respond "Yes, all of them can" or "Yes, most of them can":

College men	53%
H.S. graduates	56
Others	56

And the selectees, as a whole, were only slightly less favorable than regulars, 55 per cent of the selectees making the above responses as compared with 64 per cent of the regulars.

A further breakdown of the selectee data shows that at each educational level those who themselves wanted to become officers were less critical of the officers than those who professed no aspirations. It can also be noted that the better educated were more likely to have elicited personal attention from their officers than the less educated. In answer to the question, "Have you ever had a talk with your company commander?" the proportions saying "Yes" among selectees were as follows:

College men	63%
H.S. graduates	52
Others	44

When we turn to the free comments written by the men, we note a qualitative difference in the content of responses by regulars and selectees.

Almost none of the regulars who were critical seemed to be thinking of the so-called Army caste system. Most of these comments were by regular noncoms, many of whom had had longer experience in the Army and some of whom were older than the officers, and their comments mainly reflected criticism of the ability of the officer leadership as in these examples:

We need more commissioned officers that know their stuff. There are too many commissioned officers throwing orders around. Just *confuses* the noncoms.

I think reserve officers are not trained enough to go into the Army and tell an old NCO how to run his job. They should be trained first. I think we would have a better Army if the officers were only from West Point and the ranks.

I am glad the war has come and we can see how many brave men we have—I mean commissioned officers, and I don't think they have enough training to bring us into war.

By contrast, comments by the new citizen soldiers frequently and explicitly reflected resentment at the Army's system of class distinctions. Some illustrations:

I thought the caste system was restricted to India. Those officers think they are tin gods or the next thing to it.

The Army is the biggest breaker of morale. The Army idea of class distinction between officers and men is all wrong. The Army does not take advantage of its man resources. Men do not like to be treated as if they were just toys and dogs for someone to play with. We are entitled to the respect we worked for and earned in civilian life.

In my opinion it is too late to improve conditions for men in uniform today. However, I think the Army in the future after the war is over should be built on a better foundation: (1) Give the best men the leadership, not the oldest. (2) Cut out the class system between officers and enlisted men. Make it so men respect the officers because of themselves and not because they wear a couple of *bars*.

The officers of my regiment take advantage of sheer rank by subjugating the private to their every whim and desire. Why should they (the privates) have to wait on their table, clean their dishes, roll and unroll their beds, and a million

other things which every healthy man should be able to do for himself? We who were drafted for one year, and probably more, expected to devote that year in learning to soldier. Or was our conception of soldiering wrong?

An obvious need is a closer personal relation between officers and men. Do away with the idea that officers are untouchable tin gods. We're all here to do a job—let's do it together. A little bit of this attitude would go a long way with the enlisted men.

The sanctity attached to rank is such that man-to-man relationship down the chain of communication is discouraged. The efficiency of the Army should be valued more highly than the sanctity of a commission, or somebody's pride, or the feelings of some inefficient man of long service. That kind of thing may be all right in peacetime, but when everything is at stake, as it is now, it is no longer harmless. The men are smart and they can see how they suffer by the insufficiency of the officers and the system, and it is bad for morale when they are kept in the Army to train their officers to carry it on.

While such comments could be multiplied many times, one must remember that these reactions were probably neither so general nor so acute as they were to be later in the war. Several hundred thousand enlisted men eventually were to become officers themselves and to share in the special privileges which were theirs by Army tradition, but among the millions who had no access to these privileges there was to rise a swelling chorus of discontent, especially among the better educated enlisted men. The Army finally took cognizance of the problem at the end of the war by adoption of quite drastic modification of some time-honored practices, pursuant to a report by a committee headed by Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle.

*Army's Difficulties in Adapting Content of Training  
to Needs of Modern War*

We have seen some of the comparative reactions of the regulars and the selectees to the Army as an authoritarian organization—particularly to the qualifications of those exercising authority, especially at the noncom level, to the chances to learn the “reason why” of things, and to the exercise of authority—in so far as it assumed a very low intelligence on the part of trainees. Further, we have seen reactions to the Army's social system of special privileges associated with rank and have noted an ambivalence, in so far as criticism of the system was accompanied by ambition to achieve status within the system. Finally, let us look at some specific views on the content of the training program, which reflect, as seen through the eyes of the men, the slowness of an institution like the Army to modify

traditional practices even when, as it seemed to many of the men, they were maladaptive to new needs.

It cannot, of course, be assumed that the citizen-soldiers, even though the majority had received more than eight months of training, were mature and qualified judges of what was necessary or desirable in training for a mission about which they were still novices. Moreover, some of the criticism reflected a variety of emotions ranging from personal resentment to boredom. Nevertheless, a study of the free comments suggests that in criticizing, as so many did, the content of the training program as maladaptive to modern war, the soldiers were more frequently taking a detached and "objective" viewpoint than, for example, in their criticisms of their noncom leadership.

The citizen-soldiers, especially the better educated, tended to be less docile than the old-time career enlisted men in accepting the Army's traditional ways of doing things as right or best. Even the latter, however, were by no means uncritical.

Chart V shows responses to the question, "Is some of your Army drill or instruction not needed to make men good soldiers?" Sixty per cent of the regulars replied that all or most was needed, as did 43 per cent of the selectees. College selectees were the most critical, only a third defending the current program as compared with a half among the selectees who had not finished high school. The critics were not mere negativists, however, who wanted to get out of working so hard. In response to another question, "Should you be getting *more* of any kind of drill or instruction than you are getting now?" 62 per cent of the selectees joined with 64 per cent of the regulars in saying "Yes, very much more" or "Yes, some more." And the college selectees were most affirmative of all, 75 per cent making one of these responses.

In connection with these questions, the men were invited to write out comments and suggestions in some detail. These replies are quite instructive in the light which they throw on the problem of the Army in adjusting its traditions to a new situation—as it was viewed by the men.


The main criticisms concerned the emphasis on traditional peacetime garrison ways of doing things—close-order drill, "spit and polish," elaborate and sometimes allegedly "phony" inspections—to the neglect of practical and realistic instruction in fighting the kind of enemy which the German and Jap were thought to be. The date of this survey must be kept in mind, December 1941. Eventu-



ally, the Army did recognize the importance of more realistic training and in the later years of the war there was a reduction of emphasis on close-order drill and spit and polish. About the excess of the latter, especially, there were always complaints throughout the war. The period which we are examining is, however, particularly interesting as it enables one to see, as it can be inferred the men saw it, the problem of adjustment of old institutional forms at a time when the contrast between old customs and new needs was particularly vivid. Let us quote from some of the soldiers, remembering, as al-

CHART V

OPINIONS ABOUT TRAINING AMONG REGULARS AND SELECTEES IN AN INFANTRY DIVISION THREE MONTHS OR MORE AS OF DECEMBER 8, 1941



For number of cases, see footnote 4.

ways, that the most critical were the most likely to express themselves by such voluntary comments and that there were many who had no criticism to make, as could be inferred from Chart V.

First, comments relating to alleged overemphasis on outmoded forms of training:

There is too much antiquated training. Tactics have changed and with the change, training must be changed in terms of machines.

Too much time is spent on close order drill, which is pretty to see but doesn't make fighters. You won't stop a tank by doing present arms in front of it! Ninety per cent emphasis should be put on field work and, if necessary, cut short on garrison duty or else lengthen the working day.

Constant inspection of equipment prepared for this or that purpose simply to fill up time. In this connection the practice of encouraging soldiers to keep one set of equipment for inspection and another for use puts a wholly false emphasis and takes it off the necessity for having the equipment [clean].

I think we should do away with the close-order drill which only makes you respond to orders without thinking. In the wars of today I should think the soldier would have to think and use his judgment rather than do just what is shouted at him like a reflex action. Sometimes the man who shouts the orders may not be there.

Too much time spent on dress parades, regimental parades. They are all long and drawn out. All this waiting in the Army is fatiguing.

Many of the critics are quite as specific about the need of new kinds of training as about the anachronisms of the old kinds:

Practically all of the drill and instruction we have had since our basic training is not needed. Close-order drill, inspections, following officers blindly through the woods not knowing why, planting and digging up beans, K.P.—these are not very valuable in training fighting men. . . . Very important, we should have experience with and around tanks; we have never seen a method of dealing with them nor the instruments used. I saw one tank (captured) during the maneuvers. We have been told, "Oh stick a crowbar in the treads or throw a Molotov cocktail." Who carries a crowbar, where and how (sticking in treads)? What does a Molotov cocktail look like, and who carries them? If noise and fear are the chief weapons of the tank, why don't we get a chance to get used to them?

There has been too much emphasis on "spit and polish" and close-order drill. We should be given more firing on the range at moving targets, and anti-aircraft fire also. I would like to get training in fighting tanks. We don't get any of it. Also would like to see just what they actually can do. Also the other weapons. If I know what they can do, I think I stand a better chance against them than I do now. Even our officers don't seem to know what to do against many weapons. Most have never seen flame throwers or gas attacks. How can we be expected to fight successfully against something when we have only a vague idea of what it can do?

We need more rifle and bayonet work, machine gun, bridge building, and active field maneuvers. Ours should be a tough, hard hitting field Army and not a bunch of garrison soldiers who are pretty to look at.

The Army was handicapped in its training program at this period by extreme shortage of ammunition and equipment. Some of the criticism might have been lessened if the men could have seen the ordnance problem from the point of view of the top command. Over one fourth of the men wrote comments complaining of lack of training with live ammunition. This was eventually rectified as American production caught up with the Army's needs. But the men saw only the local immediate situation, and, in view of the Army's allegedly unending stress on close-order drill, inspections, and spit and polish, might still have been somewhat skeptical of the Army's adaptability to new kinds of warfare even if they could have seen the big picture.

As late as December 1943, a survey of company grade Infantry officers showed that 7 in 10 said they should have had more training in how to teach individual defense measures and self-defense tactics, 7 in 10 also said they should have had more training in how to handle personnel and morale problems, whereas only 3 out of 10 said they should have had more training in how to teach military courtesy and only 2 out of 10 in how to teach military drill.

In February 1944, a staff from the Research Branch surveyed a thousand veteran infantrymen and artillerymen as they came back to a rest area after prolonged fighting in front of Cassino. More than two thirds of these men said they had had too little training in the United States in the following subjects: Learning how to find and handle land mines and booby traps; demonstration of enemy weapons and best defense against them; what to do about trench foot; demonstration of enemy tactics and best defense against them; how to operate against different types of enemy defense. Only 2 per cent, by contrast, said they had had too little close-order drill. Veterans of Japanese fighting, studied by the Research Branch on the other side of the world in the same period, likewise emphasized need of realism in training, especially in attack on the kind of positions the Japanese liked to occupy and in countering infiltration tactics. Special advanced training eventually was given to troops after they left the States and before commitment to combat.

Desire for realism in training was not confined to ground troops. Among veteran pilots and co-pilots in the Eighth Air Force, engaged

in bombing Germany, half said they did not get enough general experience with fighter tactics, though most of them felt they had enough or more than enough training in cross-country navigation. Among veteran gunners, engineers, and radio operators in the same squadrons, 70 per cent said they had not had enough precombat training in shooting at targets in rapid motion, while only a tenth said they had not had enough training in care and maintenance of guns.

In addition to specific training for combat, the Army also gave training to vast numbers of soldiers in specialized schools—for cooks and bakers, airplane mechanics, radar specialists, and hundreds of other occupations. In general, Research Branch studies indicated that men who had attended these schools were glad they had attended, although if, as sometimes happened, shifts in demand or miscalculations of needs resulted in their transfers to jobs making no use of the skills in which the schools trained them, they tended to be very dissatisfied. With its almost unlimited funds the Army was able to take some large strides forward in developing condensed teaching innovations—notably by extensive use of especially prepared training films and other visual devices.

#### *Concluding Comments*

This chapter has used data from the first survey made by the Research Branch—in an Infantry division at the time of Pearl Harbor—as a sort of impressionistic case study of the Army in transition as seen through the eyes of the men.

The Army's institutional forms, which were the product of centuries of tradition and at the same time the product of insulation of the old Regular Army from the kinds of peacetime competitive struggle which produce in some civilian institutions more flexible adaptations, were to come face to face with the new needs of mechanized, specialized warfare. How the new citizen soldiers—civilian minded relative to regulars, well-educated, ambitious to get ahead—viewed these institutional forms and how some of them saw in this critical transition period what seemed like a lag in adjustment of the Army to new needs has been illustrated in this case study.

Later chapters will throw further light on problems as they developed throughout the war, at home, on the battle fronts, and behind the battle fronts. We shall see special problems within the Service Forces and the Air Forces. We shall find that attitudes of soldiers varied at different times and places. Amid that variation

some relatively consistent patterns were to emerge. The present chapter is illustrative rather than systematic. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 we shall look for the consistencies and variations in attitudes reflecting personal adjustment of soldiers to the Army and attempt to summarize these as a statistical background for more specific chapters which follow.

In evaluating the data which have just been presented, let us not fail to appreciate the magnitude of the Army's task in building a new Army on the basis of the old. Due to past neglect by the American people, the Army lacked tools and it lacked leaders who were trained to use them and who were willing to break the spider webs of tradition. And in its new type of citizen-soldiers it had enlisted men impatient of tradition and critical of contrasts between Army ways and civilian ways. But not all enlisted men were critical and most of them were motivated to do their duty. If they had no great crusading zeal, as Chapter 9 on orientation toward the war makes all too evident, nevertheless most of them accepted the attack on Pearl Harbor as an act for which there was only one American answer and most of them accepted without complaint the inevitability and worth-whileness of whatever sacrifice lay ahead. There was no defeatism. As one man wrote on his questionnaire on the day after Pearl Harbor: "Although most of us in Selective Service did not want to get in the Army, we realize the foresight and wisdom of such action now. With this in mind we are all ready to give our best and even our very lives so that our country may live forever in a world of peace free from the tyranny of its present rulers. All we ask is an opportunity to show our worth and we will prove we are made of the right stuff."

They did.

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C H A P T E R 3

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*HOW PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT  
VARIED IN THE ARMY—PRELIMINARY  
CONSIDERATIONS*<sup>1</sup>

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**O**UT of the millions of soldiers who wore the American uniform some adjusted to the Army more completely than others.

As a general background for the more specific chapters constituting the major parts of Volumes I and II, this chapter, along with Chapters 4 and 5, will study variations in personal adjustment as related to characteristics of the soldiers and to their Army experience.

The concept of personal adjustment is here viewed from the point of view of the Army command. One might have looked upon adjustment from other viewpoints. For example, irrespective of the needs of the Army command one might have considered adjustment as that adaptation to changing environmental demands which minimized psychological tension or anxiety; or one might have looked at adjustment from the standpoint of the consistency of concern with the democratic values of the larger society; or as conformity to the informal structure of the Army, even when that structure was at odds with military requirements. But it seemed useful, both for the engineering task of serving the Army and for the analytic task of producing these chapters, to view adjustment in terms of adaptation as viewed by the Army command.

With respect to nonverbal behavior, for example, it is assumed that, *on the average*, men who achieved a series of promotions in the Army made a better adjustment to the Army than did men who rebelled against Army life, went absent without leave, and ended up in a guardhouse or psychoneurotic ward. It may be objected that advancement in the Army was often a matter of mere seniority, or luck, or skill in cultivating the right people. If the reader, because he feels that success and adjustment, as he would define them,

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<sup>1</sup> By Samuel A. Stouffer and Leland C. DeVinney.

are imperfectly correlated, would prefer to use some other name, he is free to do so.

With respect to verbal behavior, it is assumed that, *on the average*, men who said that they were in good spirits, that they were more useful in the Army than as civilians, that they were satisfied with their Army jobs and status, and that in general they liked the Army, were better adjusted to the Army than men who were negative in several of these expressions. It may be objected that if, for example, a man's officers were in fact unfair, a man might properly be evidencing a healthy adjustment to reality in saying so. As before, if the reader feels that a definition in terms of verbal responses which are favorable from the point of view of the Army command is inimical to his concept of the word adjustment, he is free to use another word.

The concept of adjustment, as here used, is an individual not a group concept. Although, as will be shown, the average responses of individuals within a given unit may reflect interpersonal behavior within that unit and may be predictive of what that unit *as a group* will do, as compared with other groups, it is important that the distinction between individual and group concepts be kept clear.

An appropriate group concept would be that of *morale*, which might be thought of as an inference from group behavior, verbal or nonverbal, as to cooperative effort toward some common goal. Just as in the case of personal adjustment, the concept of group morale requires specification of the point of view from which such cooperative effort is viewed. For example, the morale of a labor force in a factory would be considered high from the standpoint of both management and labor if labor cooperated enthusiastically to achieve a goal on which management and labor agreed. From the standpoint of labor leaders, a labor force on strike which maintained a cohesive and spirited defiance of management could be manifesting high morale. But this would not be high morale from the standpoint of management's goals. Similarly, a nonunion labor force which docilely accepted management dictation and worked at a highly efficient level would not be regarded as having high morale from the standpoint of the organized labor movement, but could have high morale from the standpoint of a particular employer. Only if neither labor organizers nor management could get effective cooperation toward a common goal or toward a goal acceptable to one of the parties would the morale be viewed as low from both standpoints.

In the Army there were no labor unions, and the goals were ordinarily set by the command. It is quite natural to view Army morale, therefore, through the eyes of the Army command. Did or did not this group cooperate wholeheartedly to achieve its objective, whether it was taking a hill under shell fire, stacking cans of beans in a quartermaster depot, or learning the rudiments of soldiery on a drill field? Often enough to win the war, the goals of the men and the goals of the Army command did coincide. But sometimes they did not, and some forms of aggressive action against the Army had a collective character such that, from the men's standpoint, they would be positive expressions of morale, while from the command's standpoint they would be negative. The mass meetings held in various places at the end of the war to protest against remaining longer overseas or in the Army (which, incidentally, might have got completely out of hand if the majority of the men had not been convinced that the point system for discharge was fair) represented from the standpoint of the leaders of such rallies high morale in terms of cooperative action, but represented near mutiny from the standpoint of a commanding general. All through the war the practice of "goldbricking," which some individuals developed into a fine art, and in which enlisted men often participated as a group, protecting each other loyally with no little skill and shrewdness, was a form of cooperative action, frequently manifesting high morale from the standpoint of the participants' goals, low morale from the standpoint of Army command. More will be said about such behavior in the discussion of informal social controls in the Army in the chapter on "Attitudes Toward Leadership and Social Control."

Even when we confine our attention to Army morale viewed as cooperative effort toward a goal set by the Army command, we find such behavior exceedingly difficult to observe and measure. Particularly crucial is the absence of suitable objective criteria. The fact that a team won does not necessarily mean that it cooperated well in winning. The fact that a quota was achieved in unloading ships at a port might simply reflect the possibility that the quota was exceedingly low to begin with. Or the reverse might be true—the failure to meet a quota might reflect not lack of zealotness in cooperative teamwork, but the unrealism of the quota. In the thousands of varied tasks which different types of units performed, it was well-nigh impossible to establish criteria of performance by which the efficiency (which includes technical skills as well as co-



operative effort) of a unit could be evaluated. Near the end of the war, the Control Division of Army Service Forces made an elaborate effort to introduce some objective standards for evaluation, but time was too short to permit adequate development. Individuals within an outfit or observing an outfit could, of course, make a subjective evaluation of how well men cooperated, but it was next to impossible to find common reference points such that subjective reports when compared, unit for unit, had any utility. Efforts by the Research Branch to compare officers' ratings and men's ratings even within a unit were largely nullified by the wide disparity among the judgments of various officers and also among the judgments of various enlisted men in the same unit. The problem of measuring the cooperative effort of a unit was never solved satisfactorily, and it must be set down as one of the subjects which should call for the best efforts of sociologists and psychologists in years ahead.

Instead of solving the problem of measurement of group morale, the Research Branch, in large part, by-passed it. Faced with the necessity of giving the Army command, quickly and reliably, information which would be useful in policy making, the Research Branch concentrated primarily not on evaluation of the cooperative zeal of groups toward Army goals, but rather on study of personal adjustment. As compared with the concept of morale, it was easier to find nonverbal behavior whose relationships with the verbal behavior could be studied.

Even though the concept of personal adjustment is an individual and not a group concept, it is nevertheless useful for group comparisons. If most of the soldiers in one outfit show evidence of adjustment, from the Army's point of view, and if most of the soldiers in another outfit show little evidence of adjustment, it is not unlikely that the former outfit would be found to have, if it could be measured, higher morale than the latter. Hence, since morale is presumed to be an important element in performance, the groups with the higher average individual adjustment scores should, *all other factors in the situation held constant*, show the better performances. For example, Chapter 1 of Volume II examines, by companies, average precombat attitude scores of men in 108 rifle companies and 43 heavy weapons companies before the Normandy invasion. These scores are then compared with objective data on the relative success of these companies in keeping unwounded men in the line during the first two months of fighting in France. Some companies lost ten times as many men in psychiatric and other nonbattle casu-

alties as other companies in the same regiment with comparable combat losses and with comparable exposure to the risk of sickness. That the companies which initially had relatively unfavorable pre-combat attitudes tended to have relatively high noncombat casualty rates in subsequent combat is clearly demonstrated.

In this chapter, and in Chapters 4 and 5, four broad areas of attitudes reflecting adjustment have been more or less arbitrarily chosen for special study. Several different individual items are available in each area, from a variety of studies made at different time points in the war and in various parts of the world. For the reader's convenience these areas have been given names:

1. *Personal esprit.* Here we are dealing with the soldier's expressed sense of well-being. An illustrative question is:

In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits, or in low spirits?

- \_\_\_\_\_ I am usually in good spirits
- \_\_\_\_\_ I am in good spirits some of the time and in low spirits some of the time
- \_\_\_\_\_ I am usually in low spirits

Other related items reflect soldiers' opinions about their physical condition and about the sort of time they were having in the Army.

2. *Personal commitment.* The verbal responses in this area are to questions dealing with the sense of obligation which the soldier felt to serve in the Army and his willingness to make sacrifices. An illustrative question is:

If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or as a worker in a war job?

- \_\_\_\_\_ As a soldier
- \_\_\_\_\_ As a war worker
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

Questions on desire for overseas service or overseas combat service and questions as to willingness for further duty, especially as the war neared its end, were related items.

3. *Satisfaction with status and job.* Example:

On the whole, do you think the Army is giving you a chance to show what you can do?

- \_\_\_\_\_ A very good chance
- \_\_\_\_\_ A fairly good chance
- \_\_\_\_\_ Not much of a chance
- \_\_\_\_\_ No chance at all
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

A considerable variety of questions reflecting general satisfaction with job assignment, interest in job, importance of job, desire to change job, reported zeal at the job, and opinions about promotions are available for study.

4. *Approval or criticism of the Army.* Example:

In general, how well do you think the Army is run?

- It is run very well
- It is run pretty well
- It is not run so well
- It is run very poorly
- Undecided

Related questions were a general evaluation of whether or not one had received a square deal in the Army, expected attitude toward the Army after discharge, criticisms of Army training and discipline, and a variety of questions eliciting responses as to practices and fitness of officer and noncom leadership.

Parenthetically, it may be noted that these four areas might take on a quite different aspect if different concepts of adjustment were used. If we viewed adjustment primarily in terms of relative freedom from anxiety, our principal attention would be on the type of items represented in (1) personal esprit. If we viewed adjustment primarily in terms of concern for preservation of the nation, our principal attention would be on (2) personal commitment. If, instead of viewing adjustment from the point of view of the Army command, we looked at it from the point of view of conformity to informal social controls of enlisted men, interpretations of some of the items in (3) and (4), satisfaction with status and job or approval or disapproval of the Army, might even be reversed in their direction. The present analysis seeks to determine what is an adjustive response in terms of an estimate of what, from the viewpoint of command, would probably be considered an adjustive response.

It would be ideal if the entire analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 could be carried out by means of scales ordering respondents in each of these four general areas, respectively. Such scales were worked out but are available only for scattered studies, especially near the close of the war. Much rich data, especially from overseas, would be lost if the analysis were to be confined to available scales. As is shown in Volume IV, one of the important virtues of scales is to show whether or not a set of items belongs together. Most of the

individual items which will be used for illustrative purposes in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 have been shown to belong to scales and this fact gives us added confidence in using them.

In this chapter, we shall show two main facts:

1. *The items in each of these four attitude areas are positively related to nonverbal behavioral indexes of adjustment in the Army.* That is, men who made the kinds of verbal responses which from the Army's point of view are favorable, tended also, on the average, to be more successful in the Army as measured by objective criteria such as rank. Conversely, men who made the kind of verbal responses which from the Army's point of view are unfavorable, tended also, on the average, to be less successful in the Army—for example, were more likely to be found among those isolated for AWOL or psycho-neurosis.


2. While each of these four areas of verbal behavior is positively related to nonverbal behavior, *the four areas do not constitute a single dimension of attitude.* Rather, they constitute a *profile of attitudes.* We shall see, for example, that better educated men tend to be high, relative to less educated men, in one portion of the profile, and low in another. Likewise, Air Corps men differ from other men in the Army in their profile, as do men overseas from men in the United States.

Let us look first at the relationships between verbal and nonverbal behavior. We shall be concerned with both static and dynamic relationships. In the present chapter we shall consider the former. In later chapters we shall show that not only was the verbal behavior *correlated* with the nonverbal behavior but also that it was *predictive* of subsequent nonverbal behavior.

The attitudes in all four areas are directly related to objective indexes of achievement or maladjustment in the Army. Chart I will illustrate this fact. It is based on the four items used as illustrations above. These data happen to represent soldiers in the United States about midway in the war. The same general pattern is found in other studies. In Chart I we see, for example, that 74 per cent of the officers said they were usually in good spirits (these were company grade officers who had once been enlisted men), as did 45 per cent of the noncoms, and 30 per cent of the privates with 6 months or more of service. The privates with less than 6 months' service were intermediate between noncoms and privates of longer service, 34 per cent saying they were usually in good spirits. As would be expected, if the questions reflected personal adjustment,

## CHART I

**RESPONSES ON ITEMS INDICATING PERSONAL ESPRIT, PERSONAL COMMITMENT, SATISFACTION WITH STATUS OR JOB, AND APPROVAL OR CRITICISM OF THE ARMY, AS RELATED TO ADVANCEMENT OR MALADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY**  
(United States, Midway in the War)



Officers from S-85, December 1943; enlisted men (except AWOL's and NP's) from S-64, July-August 1943; AWOL's from S-63F, September 1943; psychoneurotics from S-99, February 1944.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

the proportions saying that they were usually in good spirits are smallest among men in the guardhouse for having gone AWOL and among men in neuropsychiatric wards of station hospitals. The figures are 19 and 11 per cent respectively.

The same general pattern is seen in the other three areas pictured in Chart I. The reader must be warned not to compare the absolute length of bar on one item with the absolute length of bar on another item. The fact that 70 per cent of the noncoms said they had had a very good or fairly good chance to show what they could do as contrasted with 45 per cent who said they were usually in good spirits is of little or no comparative significance, since the absolute length of each bar is a function of the specific wording of the question. The crucial comparisons are those which we make for various categories of respondents to the *same* item.

Not only do responses to each of these four items—and other items which might be substituted for them—differentiate between groups objectively classified by achievement or maladjustment, but also responses to each of the items separately and to the four taken as a whole are closely related to soldiers' direct subjective evaluation of their personal adjustment. A cross section of enlisted men was asked:


- On the whole, would you say you are well adjusted or poorly adjusted to Army life?
- \_\_\_\_\_ Very well
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Fairly well
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Not so well
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Very poorly

Chart II shows that, among men favorable on all four items shown in Chart I, only 1 per cent said they were not so well or very poorly adjusted, while 58 per cent said they were very well adjusted. At the other extreme, among men favorable on none of the four items, 55 per cent said that they were not so well or very poorly adjusted, while only 7 per cent said they were very well adjusted. Chart II shows also the positive relationship between each of the four items and the subjective evaluation of adjustment, and further tabulation, not shown here, indicates that this relationship for each item holds when the other three items are held constant.

The positive association between items in each of these four areas and achievement as measured by rank, among enlisted men, is perhaps most strikingly shown in Table 1. This is a summary com-

CHART II

PERSONAL ESPRIT, PERSONAL COMMITMENT, SATISFACTION WITH STATUS, AND APPROVAL OF ARMY, AS RELATED TO SOLDIER'S APPRAISAL OF HIS OWN PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT TO ARMY LIFE



Numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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pilation from a very large number of surveys made throughout the war, in the United States and various overseas theaters. It is based on the method of matched comparisons, which is a simple and direct procedure for handling a great mass of data containing several variables. It can be illustrated by an example.

The reader is asked, at the expense of a few minutes of patience, to consider this example with some care, since some of the most important conclusions in these chapters will be based on this type of analysis.

Consider Table 2, showing the percentage who said they were usually in good spirits in a cross section of enlisted men in the United States in June 1944, classified into 3 groups by Army component (all but Air and Infantry, Air Corps, and Infantry), each of which is subdivided again into 2 groups by educational level (high school graduates and others). Each of these  $2 \times 3 = 6$  groups is again subdivided by rank (noncoms and others) and each rank group is subdivided by length of time in the Army. There are in this table  $6 \times 9 = 54$  possible subgroups of soldiers, but some are not reported because, arbitrarily, no percentage is shown if based on less than 40 cases. Now let us compare the responses of noncoms and privates, *holding other variables constant*. We shall not be concerned, especially, with the magnitude of the differences in percentages but rather with the *direction* and *consistency* of the differences. Since many individual percentages are based on small subsamples, they will have a considerable sampling error. Take the first column (all but Air and Infantry, high school graduates). Among men 3 years or more in the Army, the percentage among noncoms saying they were usually in good spirits was 37 per cent, among privates 31 per cent. We call that a (+) difference. Among noncoms 2 to 3 years in the Army, the percentage was 42 per cent and it happened to be the same among privates. We call that a (0) difference. In this particular table, 16 matched comparisons can be made. The reader can verify the fact that 13 of the comparisons show noncoms more favorable than privates, 2 are ties, and 1 is a reversal. (The reversal was among Infantry high school graduates, 1 to 2 years in the Army—noncoms, 30 per cent; privates, 32 per cent—and we call this a (-) difference.)

Now the data in Table 2 represent only one set out of many sets of data, in the United States and overseas, affording such comparisons. By pooling the results from other surveys we get the results shown in the top line of Table 1. Out of 128 such matched com-



TABLE 1  
NCO'S AND PRIVATES (INCLUDING PFC'S) COMPARED IN MATCHED GROUPS ON  
VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT

	NUMBER OF MATCHED COMPARISONS IN WHICH:			Total
	<i>Noncoms were more favorable than privates</i>	<i>Both were the same</i>	<i>Noncoms were less favorable than privates</i>	
<i>Personal Esprit</i>				
Good spirits	108	2	18	128*
Sort of time in the Army	59	1	10	70*
Attitude toward physical condition	52	1	15	68*
Total	219	4	43	266†
<i>Personal Commitment</i>				
Soldier-war worker	55	1	11	67*
Willingness for further service	22	1	12	35
Willingness to fight Japanese	12	3	14	29
Willingness for combat service overseas	24	4	26	54
Total	113	9	63	185
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>				
Chance to show what one can do	79	0	0	79*
Satisfaction with job assignment	60	0	2	62*
Importance of job	41	0	4	45*
Worth-whileness of Army duties	90	0	1	91*
Interest in job	78	0	0	78*
Would or would not change job	103	0	6	109*
Zeal at the job	39	0	1	40*
Total	490	0	14	504
<i>Approval or Criticism of the Army</i>				
How well Army is run	25	0	4	29*
Square deal in Army	76	0	1	77*
Time wasted on trivia	19	0	5	24*
Strictness of discipline	16	1	8	25
Noncoms—well picked	39	1	0	40*
Noncoms—serve under in combat	26	0	1	27*
Officers take interest in men	47	1	9	57*
Officers go through what men do	53	6	9	68*
Point system fair	19	1	17	37
Total	320	10	54	384

\* Significant at 5 per cent level.

† Tests of significance not indicated for this and subsequent totals, since component items are not independent.

parisons, noncoms were more favorable than privates in 108, 2 were ties, and 18 were negative.<sup>2</sup>

The same preponderance of comparisons in which NCO's are more favorable than privates appears on other items in all four groups shown in Table 1. There are only three deviants from this among the 23 items on which at least 20 comparisons were available for presentation in Table 1. One is on the point system—which was approved by privates about as highly as by noncoms—and the

TABLE 2  
PERCENTAGES SAYING THEY ARE USUALLY IN GOOD SPIRITS, BY BRANCH OF SERVICE, EDUCATION, LONGEVITY IN ARMY AND RANK  
(United States Cross Section, June 1944)

	ALL BUT AIR AND INFANTRY		AIR CORPS		INFANTRY	
	<i>H.S. grad.</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>H.S. grad.</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>H.S. grad.</i>	<i>Others</i>
<b>3 years or more</b>						
Noncoms	37	35	49	53	35	31
Privates	31	17	—	—	—	16
<b>2 to 3 years</b>						
Noncoms	42	39	57	50	28	46
Privates	42	26	—	46	—	32
<b>1 to 2 years</b>						
Noncoms	40	35	42	40	30	27
Privates	34	26	34	31	32	23
<b>6 months to 1 year</b>						
Noncoms	41	38	35	—	—	—
Privates	34	23	35	25	27	15
<b>Under 6 months</b>						
Privates	31	26	35	38	14	14

others are two of the four items directly in the personal commitment area: "How do you feel about being sent to an overseas theater which is fighting against the Japs?" and "If it were up to you, what kind of outfit would you rather be in?" (a combat outfit overseas, a noncombat outfit overseas, an outfit which will stay in the United States). There is some evidence that the "favorable" responses to the last two questions, in the cases of some privates, may have reflected dissatisfaction with current assignments as well as desire or

<sup>2</sup>The null hypothesis that such a result could happen by chance may be tested, almost by inspection, by the simple formula  $\chi^2 = (|a - b| - 1)^2 / (a + b)$ , where  $a$  is the number of (+) comparisons,  $b$  is the number of (-) comparisons and ties are split equally between the two. Thus  $(|109 - 19| - 1)^2 / 128 = 62$ , which is many times larger than  $\chi^2 = 3.94$ , which, with 1 degree of freedom, is required for significance at the 5 per cent level.

readiness for more sacrificial service. In the Infantry subsamples, the privates were consistently less likely than noncoms to express a preference for service in a combat outfit overseas. In the rest of the Army, the privates tended to be as likely or more likely than the noncoms to express this preference. In other words, if a noncom had a pretty good noncombat or United States assignment he had less motivation for change than a private who was less satisfied with his present assignment and hence more likely to welcome a change—even if it meant more danger or deprivation. On the other two indexes of personal commitment, which seem less contaminated by this factor of discontent with present assignment, noncoms show more favorable attitudes than privates—in 55 comparisons out of 67 on the soldier-war worker question and 22 out of 35 on willingness for further service.

There is, of course, nothing surprising about noncoms having better attitudes than privates—but the fact, for example, that in the 504 matched comparisons involving satisfaction with status and job the noncoms made more favorable responses on 490, constitutes evidence that the Research Branch questions were discriminating in the direction which would be expected if they represented attitudes reflecting personal adjustment.

The actual items used in Table 1, including the four shown in Chart I, are given below (with *X* indicating those check-list categories taken as “favorable” for the purposes of this analysis):

#### *Personal Esprit*

1. In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits?
  - I am usually in good spirits
  - I am in good spirits some of the time and in low spirits some of the time
  - I am usually in low spirits
2. In general, what sort of a time do you have in the Army?
  - I have a pretty good time
  - It's about fifty-fifty
  - I have a pretty rotten time
3. In general, what sort of physical condition would you say you are in at the present time?
  - Very good physical condition
  - Good physical condition
  - Fair physical condition
  - Poor physical condition
  - Very poor physical condition

*Personal Commitment*

4. If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or as a worker in a war job?  
 As a soldier  
 As a war worker  
 Undecided
5. Considering everything, how do you feel about further service in the Army?  
 I should be discharged now  
 I should serve a while longer, but I should not have to stay in until Japan is defeated  
 I should be discharged as soon after Japan is defeated as is possible  
 I want to remain in the Army after the war
6. How do you feel about being sent to an overseas theater which is fighting against the Japs?  
 The Army should send me now  
 The Army should not send me for a while yet  
 The Army should not send me at all
7. If it were up to you, what kind of outfit would you rather be in?  
 In a combat outfit overseas  
 In a noncombat outfit overseas  
 In an outfit that will stay in the United States

*Satisfaction with Status and Job*

8. On the whole, do you think the Army is giving you a chance to show what you can do?  
 A very good chance  
 A fairly good chance  
 Not much of a chance  
 No chance at all  
 Undecided
9. How satisfied are you about being in your present Army job instead of some other Army job?  
 Very satisfied  
 Satisfied  
 It does not make any difference to me  
 Dissatisfied  
 Very dissatisfied
10. Do you consider your own present job or duty in the Army an important one in the war effort?  
 Very important  
 Pretty important  
 Not so important  
 Not important at all  
 Undecided
11. Do you usually feel that what you are doing in the Army is worth while or not?  
 I usually feel it is not worth while  
 I usually feel it is worth while

12. How interested are you in your Army job?  
 Very much interested  
 A little but not much  
 Not interested at all
13. Would you change to some other Army job if given a chance?  
 Yes  
 No  
 Undecided
14. How about you yourself—would you honestly say that *you* usually put all you have into your Army duties, or do you usually work just hard enough to get by?  
 I usually *put all I have into it*  
 I usually work *just hard enough to get by*  
 Undecided

*Approval or Criticism of the Army*

15. In general, how well do you think the Army is run?  
 It is run very well  
 It is run pretty well  
 It is not run so well  
 It is run very poorly  
 Undecided
16. In general, do you feel you yourself have gotten a square deal from the Army?  
 Yes, in most ways I have  
 In some ways yes, in other ways, no  
 No, on the whole I haven't gotten a square deal
17. How much of your training or duty time is used in doing things that do not seem important to you?  
 A lot of it  
 Some of it  
 Only a little of it  
 None of it
18. What do you think of the military control and discipline at this post?  
 It's too strict but most of it is necessary  
 It's too strict and a lot of it is unnecessary  
 It's about right  
 It's not strict enough
19. How do you feel about the *noncoms* that have been picked from your outfit?  
 They are the best ones that could have been picked  
 They are as good as any that could have been picked  
 Somewhat better ones could have been picked  
 Much better ones could have been picked  
 Undecided
20. How many of the *noncoms* you now serve under are the kind you would want to serve under in combat?  
 All of them are  
 Most of them are

- About half of them are*  
 *Few of them are*  
 *None of them are*

21. How many of your officers take a personal interest in their men?

- All of them do*  
 *Most of them do*  
 *About half of them do*  
 *Few of them do*  
 *None of them do*

22. How many of your company officers are the kind who are willing to go through anything they ask their men to go through?

- All of them are*  
 *Most of them are*  
 *About half of them are*  
 *Few of them are*  
 *None of them are*

23. In general, what do you think of the Army Score Card Plan (the point system)?

- It is very good*  
 *It is fairly good*  
 *It is not so good*  
 *It is not good at all*  
 *I don't know enough about it to say*

We have seen that items in all four areas (personal esprit, personal commitment, satisfaction with status and job, approval or criticism of the Army) are associated with achievement in the Army as, in general, would be necessary if the items are to be useful indicators of attitudes reflecting adjustment.

However, as was pointed out in the introductory pages of this chapter, this is only half of the story. The other half of the story is the fact that, while the four attitude areas are all quite definitely related to objective indexes of achievement or maladjustment in the Army, they *do not constitute a single dimension of attitude*.

Rather, we find that, analogous to what we know about mental abilities, what we must deal with is a *profile* of attitudes, for some important subgroups of soldiers are found to be relatively high in one area and relatively low in another area. Modern studies of abilities have shown that, while some index of average "intelligence," such as an I.Q., will be positively correlated with various kinds of achievement, such as success in school, it is necessary in scientific analysis to deal with a *profile of separate abilities* rather than with a single index. Why? Because a man may be high in one ability and low in another and the different abilities may have

quite different patterns of relationships with other variables. Technically, the analysis of *profiles* of attitudes in these chapters lacks the refinement which can arrive only with the coming of age of scale construction in this field. It will not be claimed that the four areas here selected for study represent anything more than four empirical areas which differentiate various types of soldiers. Eventually, theory and measurement, working reciprocally, may be expected to isolate primary domains of attitude which will have a stable and general socio-psychological meaning. We must recognize frankly the limitations of the present analysis and plead with a new generation of social scientists to do such tasks better.

Let us illustrate what we mean by the finding that these four areas represent a profile of attitudes by studying Table 3. This table is exactly analogous in method of construction to Table 1, and in general comes from the same sources.<sup>3</sup> But now we are interested in comparing the attitudes of high school graduates (including college men) with the attitudes of those with less education. Again the method of matched comparisons is used, holding constant rank, lon-

<sup>3</sup> Actual items shown in Table 3, exclusive of those already shown in Chart I and Table 1, are as follows (with X indicating the check-list categories taken as favorable for the purposes of this analysis):

*Approval or Criticism of the Army*

1. Do you feel that the Army is trying its best to look out for the welfare of enlisted men?
  - Yes, it is trying its best
  - It is trying some, but not hard enough
  - It is hardly trying at all
2. How much does it bother you when you are ordered to do things which you don't see a good reason for doing?
  - Bother me a great deal
  - Bother me quite a bit
  - Doesn't bother me much
  - Doesn't bother me at all
3. Do you think the outfit you are in *now* pays too much attention, too little, or about the right amount of attention to inspections and "spit and polish"?
  - Too little attention
  - Too much attention
  - About the right amount
4. Do you think when you are discharged you will go back to civilian life with a *favorable* or *unfavorable* attitude toward the Army?
  - Very favorable
  - Fairly favorable
  - About 50-50
  - Fairly unfavorable
  - Very unfavorable

TABLE 3  
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND OTHERS COMPARED IN MATCHED GROUPS,  
ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT

	NUMBER OF COMPARISONS IN WHICH:			Total
	<i>H.S. grad.</i> <i>were more</i> <i>favorable</i> <i>than others</i>	<i>Both</i> <i>groups</i> <i>were the</i> <i>same</i>	<i>H.S. grad.</i> <i>were less</i> <i>favorable</i> <i>than others</i>	
<i>Personal Esprit</i>				
Good spirits	143	2	26	171*
Sort of time in the Army	55	8	22	85*
Attitude toward physical condition	82	2	3	87*
Total	280	12	51	343†
<i>Personal Commitment</i>				
Soldier-war worker	80	3	11	94*
Willingness for further service	39	0	9	48*
Willingness to fight Japanese	27	1	13	41*
Willingness for combat service overseas	59	1	14	74*
Total	205	5	47	257
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>				
Chance to show what one can do	17	1	87	105*
Satisfaction with job assignment	32	7	41	80
Importance of job	7	1	48	56*
Worth-whileness of Army duties	45	8	58	111
Interest in job	42	8	49	99
Would or would not change job	30	6	95	131*
Zeal at the job	10	0	34	44*
Total	183	31	412	626
<i>Approval or Criticism of Army</i>				
How well Army is run	12	2	27	41*
Square deal in Army	37	6	53	96
Army looks out for enlisted men	12	0	24	36*
Time wasted in trivia	14	2	35	51*
Orders without reasons	5	1	18	24*
Strictness of discipline	13	0	20	33
Spit and polish	9	0	15	24
Noncoms—well picked	10	2	38	50*
Noncoms—serve under in combat	4	1	23	28*
Officers take interest in men	5	3	70	78*
Officers go through what men do	11	4	71	86*
Point system for discharge fair	36	6	14	56*
Expected attitude to Army after discharge	3	2	19	24*
Total	171	29	427	627

\* Significant at the 5 per cent level.

† Tests of significance not indicated for this and subsequent totals, since component items are not independent.



gevity in the Army, and whether in Air Corps, Infantry, or other branches.<sup>4</sup>

Let us look closely at Table 3. On the good spirits question, 171 matched comparisons were available between the two educational levels. In 143 of these comparisons, the better educated were more favorable, that is, were more likely to say that they were usually in good spirits, 2 were ties, and 26 were reversals. The result is greatly in excess of what might be expected by chance if there were no differences by education except those attributable to sampling error. It happened that more comparisons were available for this than for any other question, but the other two items under personal esprit, namely, what sort of time one has in the Army, and attitude toward one's physical condition, show the same *direction* of difference.

Similarly, we see in Table 3 that on all the items classified under personal commitment the same direction of differences occurs as among items classified under personal esprit. Out of 257 comparisons, the better educated are more favorable in 205, there are 5 ties, and only 47 reversals.

But note the contrast with the next two areas—satisfaction with status and job, and approval or criticism of the Army.

In all 7 of the separate items involving satisfaction with status or job, the high school graduates tended to have *less* favorable attitudes than others. (It will be remembered that rank, longevity, and other variables are held constant in these comparisons.) Out of 626 comparisons, in all, the high school graduates were *less* favorable in 412, more than two thirds.

Also, look at the 13 items involving approval or disapproval of the Army. Out of 627 comparisons, the better educated were *less* favorable in 427. Of the 13 items all but 1 are in this direction. The exception is the question about the fairness of the point system, a question which would seem to reflect personal commitment as well as approval or criticism of the Army. Out of 56 matched comparisons involving the point system question, the high school graduates were more favorable than the non high school graduates in 36.

We see then, from Table 3, that although the four attitude areas have been shown to be related to achievement or maladjustment in the Army, the better educated tend to be *more* favorable than the


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<sup>4</sup> For example, in illustrative Table 2, based on a single survey in June 1944, the reader will find 21 matched comparisons possible by education. Of the 21 comparisons, 17 show the better educated to be more favorable on the good spirits question, 1 is a tie, and 3 show the better educated to be less favorable.

less educated on personal esprit and personal commitment and *less* favorable on satisfaction with status or job and approval or criticism of the Army.

This illustrates what we mean by a *profile*.

The fact that the better educated, for example, tend to be relatively high in two of the areas and relatively low in two of the areas indicates that the relationship between nonverbal behavior, verbal behavior, and a background sorting variable like education is likely to be rather complicated. Anticipating Chapter 4, we may note here that, at least after the first year or so in the war, the better educated tended to become the most successful in the Army, as measured by promotions, and were least likely to be found among deviants such as AWOL's or psychoneurotics. If, for the purpose of this illustration, we treat success in the Army as a single dimension of adjustment at the nonverbal level, we can schematize the interrelationship between the nonverbal behavior, the verbal behavior, and education in the following diagram:



This schematically represents the facts (1) that the verbal behavior in all four areas is positively related to the nonverbal behavior, (2) that education is positively related to the nonverbal behavior, and (3) that education is positively related to two areas of verbal be-

havior (solid lines) and negatively related to two areas (dotted lines).

Different patterns of relationship are found if other variables such as age or marital condition are substituted for education.

The profiles of the four attitude areas reflecting adjustment differ also when related to different variables associated with Army experience. For example, we shall see in Chapter 5 that Air Corps men tended to be, when compared with others, very favorable in attitude toward status and job, but relatively very unfavorable on approval or criticism of the Army. And we shall see that men overseas, as compared with men at home, tended to be relatively unfavorable in three of the four areas—the exception being satisfaction with status and job.

It is the purpose of the next two chapters to explore in some detail the implications of the varying profiles of attitudes reflecting adjustment.

Chapter 4 examines variations in adjustment related to personal background characteristics, such as education, age, and marital condition. Chapter 5 examines variations in adjustment related to length of time in the Army, overseas service, and other variables associated with experience in the Army.

Because of the rather formidable amount of statistical detail which was available for Chapters 4 and 5, every effort has been made to summarize the findings with the greatest brevity and clarity consistent with accuracy. The reader will have to follow the text rather closely and, it is feared, occasionally rather tediously, in order to understand how the tables and charts were derived.

In the interest of candor and with the aim of promoting the development of better techniques in the future, it should be said once again that these data, although comparatively rich by the usual standards either of historical inquiry or of public opinion research, are far short of ideal. The limitations under which the Research Branch operated, described in Chapter 1, must be kept in mind. The Branch was not expected to make a systematic socio-psychological analysis of the Army, but rather was to make *ad hoc* practical study of immediate problems as they arose or as they threatened to arise. Thus a study of attitudes and practices with respect to malarial control in the South Pacific or with respect to the fear of enemy weapons or of Japanese ruses in a combat zone, or with respect to fraternization with the Germans might or might not (more often, indeed, did not) contain items comparable on a trend basis

reflecting general adjustment. The Branch was not able to exercise direct control over the operations of overseas research teams, which reported to their own theater commands, and this fact limited the chance to make comparable studies on a world-wide basis.

Nevertheless, Chapters 4 and 5 represent as careful work as was possible within a limited time schedule in reducing to some order a very large and very scattered body of detail. The analysis has consisted primarily in piecing together portions of many studies, made at many times and places, into a coherent pattern which unfolds as we move through the chapters. In spite of the limitations, we can learn much about the variations in personal adjustment of American young men called up from their peacetime pursuits, all of whom were subjected to an authoritarian discipline alien to their democratic ways of life, most of whom experienced at one time or another severe deprivations, and many of whom were to die for their country in battle.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide a necessary general background for the chapters which follow, and after reading these chapters it is to the others one will need to go for more searching analysis of the historical context and the socio-psychological implications of selected specific problems.

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## CHAPTER 4

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# HOW PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT VARIED IN THE ARMY— BY BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLDIERS<sup>1</sup>

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IN THIS chapter are traced out some of the implications of the relationship between personal adjustment to the Army and selected characteristics of the soldier—specifically, education, age, and marital condition.

In Section I we see how profiles of attitude vary depending on these background characteristics.

In Section II we observe how objective evidence of advancement in the Army and of maladjustment is related to these characteristics.

Section III explores in special detail attitudes of personal commitment and personal esprit, with the aid of a concept of *relative deprivation*.

Section IV introduces data on certain pre-Army experiences reported by soldiers, which serve as *intervening variables* to throw further light on some of the differences in adjustment made by men who differ in education, age, and marital condition.

In Section V we present a case study of attitude profiles of different types of men, as these profiles related to *subsequent* promotions among these same respondents.

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<sup>1</sup> By Samuel A. Stouffer and Leland C. DeVinney. The design of the comparative study of psychoneurotics and normals which provides the main source of data for Section IV of this chapter was largely the responsibility of Shirley A. Star, who has contributed the more explicit analyses of psychiatric problems in Volume II, Chapter 9, and Volume IV, Chapters 13 and 14. The panel study relating attitudes to subsequent promotions, which provides the main source of data for Section V of the present chapter, was made under the supervision of William W. McPeak.

## SECTION I

VARIATIONS IN PERSONAL ESPRIT, PERSONAL COMMITMENT,  
 SATISFACTION WITH STATUS AND JOB, AND  
 APPROVAL OR CRITICISM OF THE ARMY AS ASSOCIATED WITH  
 EDUCATION, AGE, AND MARITAL CONDITION

It has been indicated in Chapter 3 that the profile of responses in these four attitude areas differed, depending on the background characteristics of the soldiers. As an illustration, it was shown in Table 3 of that chapter that the better educated tended to be *more* favorable than the less educated in personal esprit and personal commitment, *less* favorable in satisfaction with status or job and approval or criticism of the Army.

Let us now see how these profiles looked when men were sorted by age and by marital condition, as well as by education.

It happens that both age and marital condition are more complicated variables than education in such an analysis. We want, of course, to know how two sets of men differed in attitude if, for example, one set were older than the other, but with *all other relevant variables held constant*. Particularly, it is important in studying age to hold marital condition constant, and vice versa, as the older a man the greater his likelihood of being married. Also, as we shall see more in detail in Section II, the stage in the war when a man was inducted made a great deal of difference in his promotion chances. The age and marital condition, unlike the education, of inductees varied at different periods of the war—fathers, on the one hand, and youths under twenty on the other were among the last to be called. Therefore, in studying variations in attitude by age, it is necessary to hold constant not only rank, length of time in the Army, domestic or overseas service, branch of service (at least, Air Corps as compared with others), but also marital condition. The result is that, unless the number of cases in a sample is initially very large, the cases in any two subgroups for comparison by age tend to become very few after all this successive subdivision of the data.

Instead of drawing on as large a number of surveys and as wide a variety of attitude items as was available for the study of education, as shown in Chapter 3, Table 3, or for the study of the other variables which will be analyzed in Chapter 5, it was decided to limit the analysis of attitudes by age and marital condition to a relatively few surveys based on large samples and to a small number of

questions. The surveys were made at different time points in the war, in the United States and overseas. Also, resort was had to the method of standardization in order to make possible an adequate number of cases in some of the subgroups in certain of these studies. This process will be illustrated in detail later.

The general picture which we get from this analysis of these studies may now be summarized.

When any two groups of soldiers, matched on the above-mentioned variables, are compared in attitudes, we find the following profiles:

	<i>H.S. graduates minus others</i>	<i>Men 25 and over minus others</i>	<i>Married men minus unmarried men</i>
Personal esprit	+	About the same	-
Personal commitment	+	-	-
Satisfaction with status and job	-	+	About the same
Approval or criticism of the Army	-	+	About the same

This is a summary of Table 1. For example, in Table 1, 78 matched comparisons are reported between married men and unmarried men on the question, "In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits?" In 17 of these, the percentage of married men who said they were usually in good spirits was higher than the corresponding percentage of unmarried men. There were 4 ties. In the preponderant majority of comparisons, however, 57 in all, the married men were *less* likely than the unmarried men to say they were usually in good spirits. Only 10 comparisons were available on the physical condition question, but they are in the same direction, though not in themselves significant. Since the large majority of the 88 comparisons listed under *personal esprit* show that the married were less favorable than the unmarried a (-) has been indicated in the textual summary just preceding this paragraph.

The data for differences by education in Table 1 are less comprehensive than those given in Chapter 3, Table 3, being based on a smaller number of studies and on a more limited set of items. However, in Table 1, age and marital condition, as well as the variations in Army experience mentioned in Chapter 3, have also been held

constant in computing the differences by education. This makes the data in Table 1 on comparisons by education, age, and marital condition strictly comparable, since they are based on the same surveys (although the number of comparisons varies, because, arbitrarily, no percentage was computed for a given attitude unless it was based on at least 40 cases). The comparisons in Table 1 by age hold constant both education and marital condition, as well as other variables; while the comparisons by marital condition hold constant both education and age plus the other variables.

We see, then, that the profiles of attitudes differ depending on the characteristics of the soldiers. The better educated were high in two areas, relative to the less educated, and low in two areas. The men 25 and over were high, relative to younger men, on satisfaction with status or job and on approval or criticism of the Army, low on personal commitment, and about the same on personal esprit. The married men were low, relative to the unmarried, on personal esprit and personal commitment, and about the same as the unmarried on satisfaction with status or job and approval or criticism of the Army.

The findings thus summarized are quite consistent at different stages of the war and among men at home as well as among men overseas. In some respects, this consistency is rather surprising. One might have expected the married men overseas to exhibit greater negative differences from the unmarried men in personal esprit, for example, than was the case in the United States, in view of the possible deleterious emotional effect of separation from wife and family. Detailed tabulations, not shown here, fail to uncover any significant tendency for the differences in response between the married and unmarried men to be greater overseas than at home. Indeed, it is possible that opportunity to be with one's wife, if in the United States, could have had a mixed effect on some soldiers' attitudes. Pleasant as it may have been, it also could, in some cases, have had a negative effect on some attitudes reflecting adjustment to the Army. In a study made among overseas returnees in 1944, it was found that married men who found domestic life less pleasant on their return than they expected were considerably more likely to express willingness for a further term of overseas duty than were other married men.

In general, when age, education, and other variables were held constant, the attitudes of men married after entering the Army did not differ strikingly from those of other married men, although they



TABLE 1

NUMBER OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DIFFERENCES IN PERCENTAGES WITH FAVORABLE ATTITUDES, FOR A GIVEN BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTIC, HOLDING OTHER VARIABLES CONSTANT

	NUMBER OF MATCHED COMPARISONS IN WHICH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERCENTAGES FAVORABLE IN INDICATED GROUPS ARE +, -, OR 0:											
	<i>H.S. grads.—not H.S. grads.</i>				<i>Men 25 and over— men under 25</i>				<i>Married— unmarried</i>			
	+	0	-	Total	+	0	-	Total	+	0	-	Total
<i>Personal Esprit</i>												
Good spirits (1)	78	4	13	95*	47	5	33	85	17	4	57	78*
Attitude toward physical condition (3)	16	0	6	22	4	0	14	18*	3	1	6	10
Total	94	4	19	117†	51	5	47	103	20	5	63	88
<i>Personal Commitment</i>												
Soldier-war worker (4)	42	3	7	52*	12	2	31	45*	2	0	39	41*
Willingness for further service (5)	21	1	6	28*	5	1	22	28*	3	0	26	29*
Total	63	4	13	80	17	3	53	73	5	0	65	70
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>												
Chance to show what one can do (8)	9	1	44	54*	26	4	14	44	14	1	20	35
Worth-whileness of Army duties (11)	12	4	18	34	11	2	13	26	9	2	9	20
Would or would not change job (13)	4	3	32	39*	22	2	6	30*	15	0	5	20*
Zeal at the job (14)	7	1	28	36*	21	1	6	28*	12	1	10	23
Total	32	9	122	163	80	9	39	128	50	4	44	98
<i>Approval or Criticism of the Army</i>												
How well is Army run (15)	9	0	11	20	15	1	10	26	11	0	9	20
Square deal in Army (16)	8	1	19	28	19	1	8	28	12	1	16	29
Officers take interest in men (21)	1	0	30	31*	16	1	6	23	8	0	11	19
Total	18	1	60	79	50	3	24	77	31	1	36	68

Numbers in parentheses are keyed to the list of questions following Table 1 in Chapter 3, where exact wording of item is given, with check list of response categories.

\* Significant at .05 level.

† Test of significance not indicated for this and subsequent totals since component items are not always independent.

tended to be a little closer to the attitudes of the unmarried than were the attitudes of men married before entering the Army. Fathers, with other variables constant, tended to be somewhat less favorable on the personal commitment items than other married men. At the end of the war, however, fathers had somewhat more favorable attitudes toward the Army than either married men without children or single men. This was possibly due to the fact that the point system counted each child as worth 12 months of service in calculating priorities for redeployment and demobilization. As Volume II, Chapter 11 on the point system shows, fathers were most favorable to the point system and married men without children least favorable, with unmarried men intermediate.


In the sections of this chapter which follow, we shall examine first the relationship between achievement in the Army and education, age, and marital condition; then we shall explore in greater detail factors which may help us understand both the kind of attitude profiles which we have just reviewed and the levels of success in the Army, as related to these characteristics in the soldiers' backgrounds.

Before we turn to Section II, we must, however, discharge an obligation to those students who desire to know more about the technical details of the rather elaborate statistical operations lying behind Table 1. The general reader can, if he chooses, skip these pages and turn directly to Section II.

To illustrate the procedure used, let us introduce Chart I, compiled from a representative cross section of soldiers overseas in May 1945. This chart, for noncoms only, compares the responses to three of the questions summarized in Table 1, as made by married and unmarried men, respectively, holding education and age constant by the method of standardization. Among combat men, not in the Air Corps, who had been in the Army more than 3 years, 22 per cent of the married men as compared with 27 per cent of the unmarried men said that they were usually in good spirits. Seven such comparisons can be made and, in 6 out of the 7, the percentage favorable is less among the married men than the unmarried. Similarly, in 6 of the 7 comparisons as to willingness for further service the married men are less favorable. On the square deal question there is no such consistency—the married men are more favorable in 3 of the comparisons, the unmarried men in 4. Similar data from the same study are, of course, available for privates. It is from such comparisons as these, pooled from a number of surveys,

CHART I

ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT, AS RELATED TO ARMY EXPERIENCE, BY MARITAL CONDITION, HOLDING CONSTANT EDUCATION AND AGE—MAY 1945  
(Overseas Noncommissioned Officers)



Data from S-205.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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overseas and at home, at different time points in the war, that Table 1 is compiled.

In Chart I there are some very interesting differences by length of time in the Army and by other variables, but discussion of these is postponed until we come to Chapter 5.

Percentages graphed in Chart I are, as has been said, standardized percentages—that is, education and age have been held constant by standardization. The steps in the standardization procedure may be described as follows:

1. Each group by length of service—for example, combat non-coms overseas, not in Air Forces, who had been in the Army 3 years or more—was broken down into 8 subgroups of education by age by marital condition.

2. In each subgroup, the percentage saying they were in good spirits was computed. (Similarly for the other two attitude items.)

3. These percentages were then multiplied by a standard set of weights, derived from the proportion in the entire Army who were in a respective category by education, age, and marital condition. While the weights were fixed such as to represent correct marginal proportions in each of these background items, they were internally adjusted to give each educational category the same age and marital distribution, each age category the same educational and marital distribution, and each marital category the same educational and age distribution.

4. The weighted percentages in each set of 8 cells were then averaged to yield the percentages reported.

5. Chart I shows the “adjusted” size of sample on which the percentage was based. The procedure for adjusting the size of the sample is described in the footnote to the text following Chart V in Section II of this chapter. No percentages are shown if the adjusted size of a sample turned out to be less than 40 cases.

## S E C T I O N I I

### PERSONAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AS THEY RELATED TO ADVANCEMENT OR MALADJUSTMENT

We now consider the characteristics of education, age, and marital condition as they relate to objective data as to success in the Army.

Chart II, which is compiled from Research Branch surveys in the fall and winter of 1943–1944, about midpoint in the war, is illustra-

tive of the general type of relationship found throughout most of the war—at least, after the small nucleus of Regular Army men described in Chapter 2 was overwhelmed by the millions of selectees. Data which are more detailed in some respects and cover other time periods in the war will be discussed in Chapter 6, "Social Mobility in the Army." Let us examine Chart II with some care.


First, *education*. Almost all the officers—in this sample, company grade officers who were formerly enlisted men—were high school graduates, and nearly two thirds had gone to college. Of the noncoms in this cross section, 52 per cent were high school graduates; of the privates, 43 per cent. But in the maladjusted groups—AWOL's in guardhouses and psychoneurotics in station hospitals—the percentage of high school graduates was only 19 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. At the lower educational extreme, we note that there were no officers in this sample with a grade school education only (although there were a very few such officers in the Army), and that only 20 per cent of the NCO's had a grade school education only, as compared with 29 per cent of the privates in the enlisted cross section. But 48 per cent of the AWOL's and 39 per cent of the psychoneurotics had a grade school education only.

Next, *age*. We see that as a whole the older men had a better chance than the younger men to become officers or noncoms. But when the data in Chart II are examined more closely, it is seen that the greatest opportunity was in the age group 25 to 29 and that men 30 and over had no better than average chance of advancement. The youngsters under 20 were apparently in the least favorable position. Now let us look at the AWOL's and psychoneurotics. Here we see that the AWOL's, on the average, were a relatively young group, the psychoneurotics a relatively old group. Nearly two thirds of the AWOL's were under 25, nearly two thirds of the NP's were 25 and over—indeed, 40 per cent of the NP's were 30 years old and over. Whereas the better the education, the more likely a man was to achieve advancement or the less likely he was to be in one of the maladjusted groups, the relationship of age to advancement or maladjustment was much more involved. The group 25 to 29—neither too young nor too old—had the best chance of advancement, the men under 25 were more likely than others to go AWOL, the men 30 or over more likely than others to become NP's.

Finally, *marital condition*. It is instructive here to distinguish between men married before and after they entered the Army.

CHART II

ADVANCEMENT AND MALADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY AS RELATED TO EDUCATION, AGE, AND MARITAL CONDITION  
(United States Samples, Fall and Winter of 1943-1944)



Officers from S-85, December 1943; NCO's and privates from S-95, February 1944; psychoneurotics from S-99, February 1944; AWOL's from S-63F, September 1943. The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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Marital condition is, as we have seen, rather closely related to age, while the probability of marrying sometime after entering the Army would, of course, increase with length of time in the Army. Neither age nor longevity in the Army is held constant in Chart II; hence interpretations as to the meaning of the relationships between achievement and marital condition must be tentative until age and longevity are also brought in, as will be done presently. Chart II shows that the largest percentage married—especially of those married after they entered the Army—was among the officers. In the enlisted cross section, there was a larger proportion of unmarried men among privates than among noncoms, but the difference was not due to the fact that noncoms were more likely to enter the Army married. In fact, the reverse was true. Of the privates 27 per cent entered the Army married; of the noncoms, 21 per cent. But only 9 per cent of the privates, as contrasted with 20 per cent of the noncoms, were married after enlistment or induction. Both the AWOL's and the NP's tended to be married in proportions larger than the enlisted cross section.

Advancement in the Army's system was a function of seniority as much, probably, as of any other factor, as will be described in detail in Chapter 6, "Social Mobility in the Army." Hence, to avoid misinterpretations of Chart II, which might lead one to jump too hastily to the conclusion that a given personal characteristic was a determinant of advancement, we must take into account the length of time men in various categories in our sample had been in the Army.


Chart III, relating education to advancement and maladjustment, breaks the data in the preceding chart into four longevity categories—under 6 months, 6 months up to 1 year, 1 year up to 2 years, and 2 years or more. (There were in these samples too few officers—formerly enlisted men—with less than a year in the Army, and too few noncoms with less than 6 months in the Army to justify presentation of breakdowns for these groups.) Since the draft drew inductees throughout the war in relatively constant proportions by education, there would be little a priori reason to expect the better educated to be advantaged or disadvantaged over the less educated by reason of seniority alone. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that in all the longevity groups the patterns of education as related to advancement or maladjustment are substantially alike and about the same as that shown in Chart II.

Age is a more complicated story. This is seen in Chart IV. The largest proportion of men in age group 25 to 29, *irrespective of ad-*

CHART III

EDUCATION, BY LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY, AS RELATED TO ADVANCEMENT AND MALADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY

(United States Samples, Fall and Winter of 1943-1944)



Data from same sources as Chart II.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.



*vancement*, are found among men in the Army 2 years or more. This reflects the fact that the first draft calls were for men over 21 and under 30. It was not until later that the older men and the youngsters were inducted. By seniority alone the men first inducted had much the best chance for advancement. Nevertheless, an inspection of Chart IV will show that *within* a given longevity interval larger proportions of men 25 to 29 were found among officers or noncoms than among privates. The boys under 20 were particularly disadvantaged by seniority in the Army; it will be noted that the largest proportion of them appeared in the groups which had been in the Army less than 6 months or 6 months up to 1 year. But there also can be little doubt that they stood a less than average chance of promotion on age grounds alone. Among men in the Army 6 months to 1 year, only 18 per cent of the NCO's were under 20, as compared with 31 per cent of the privates. The Army evidently preferred to use its more mature men in positions of leadership or technical responsibility. The detailed data in Chart IV for AWOL's and psychoneurotics behave somewhat erratically, due to the very small samples after subdivision by longevity, but the striking contrast between the age distributions of the two types of deviants first noted in Chart II is here preserved in all five Army longevity groups.


Finally, we come to marital condition. To interpret marital condition, we must take into account age as well as longevity. Accordingly, Chart V, which shows the relationship of marital condition to advancement and maladjustment by longevity in the Army, has been standardized for age. That is, within a given longevity interval, the proportions married before entering the Army, married after entering the Army, and unmarried are not necessarily the observed proportions. Rather, they are proportions calculated on the assumption that the age distribution among officers, noncoms, privates, AWOL's, and psychoneurotics was in each instance the same as that of the entire cross section of enlisted men in the given longevity interval.<sup>2</sup> What do we see? We see that officers and,

<sup>2</sup> In Chart V the numbers in parentheses are presented to facilitate computation of chance errors by any who wish. Ordinarily, the variance of a weighted or standardized proportion is somewhat greater than the variance of an unweighted proportion. Since the variance of the latter is  $pq/n$ , while the variance of the former can be taken as  $pq/[(\sum w_i)^2/\sum(w_i^2/n_i)]$ , the factor in brackets may be used as the "equivalent  $n$ ." In this formula  $w_i$  is the weight and  $n_i$  the number of cases in the  $i$ th cell. As the variation of values of  $w_i/n_i$  approaches 0, the size of the equivalent  $n$  approaches that of the observed  $n$ . To illustrate the computation of the equivalent  $n$  consider, for example, the bar in Chart V for noncoms 6 months to 1 year in the Army, for which 165

CHART IV

AGE, BY LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY, AS RELATED TO ADVANCEMENT AND MALADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY

(United States Samples, Fall and Winter of 1943-1944)




Data from same sources as Chart II.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

CHART V

MARITAL CONDITION, BY LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY, AS RELATED TO ADVANCEMENT AND MALADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY, STANDARDIZED FOR AGE BY GIVING EACH SAMPLE, AT A GIVEN LONGEVITY, SAME AGE COMPOSITION AS ARMY ENLISTED CROSS SECTION IN THAT LONGEVITY PERIOD

(United States Samples, Fall and Winter of 1943-1944)



The first figure following each bar is the number of cases observed; the figure in parentheses is in each instance the "equivalent number," resulting from the standardization procedure. For explanation of "equivalent number," see footnote 2.

Data from same sources as Chart II.

to a lesser extent, noncoms still tend to include smaller proportions of unmarried men than privates and especially to include larger proportions of men married after entering the Army. While it may be that the longevity intervals are still too broad to eliminate all of the effects of seniority, it is likely that some relationship between marriage after entering the Army and advancement existed, apart from age and longevity.<sup>3</sup> In view of the fact that men who married before entering the Army achieved promotions in only slightly higher proportions (age and longevity controlled) than other men, it is possible that marriage was even more likely to be a *resultant* of promotion or of expected promotion than to be a factor *predisposing* promotion. Promotion brought higher pay and thus made it easier to start and support a family out of Army earnings. Of course, it may also have been true that marriage was symbolic, to some slight degree at least, of the kind of stability which the Army sought in leadership, and it may also have been true that the married man tended to have more stimulus to achieve status in the eyes of his wife and to get higher pay. But these speculations cannot be checked further against data, as far as the writers know. In any event, Chart V makes reasonably clear the fact that in so far as advancement in the Army was related to marital condition, when age and longevity are taken into account, marriage after entering the Army was even more sharply associated than marriage before entering the Army.

In Chart V both AWOL's and psychoneurotics, when age is con-

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cases were available. Weights used in standardization for age and the observed number of cases in each category (one case being omitted because age was unknown) were as follows:

Age group	Weight $w_i$	Number of cases $n_i$	$w_i^2/n_i$
30 and over	.18	30	.00108
25 to 29	.16	32	.00080
20 to 24	.38	73	.00198
Under 20	.28	29	.00270
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1.00	164	.00656

Since  $(\sum w_i)^2 = 1$ , we have as "equivalent total,"  $1/.00656 = 152$ . This procedure is used throughout Chapters 4 and 5 when percentages based on standardization are shown.

<sup>3</sup> The analysis in Chart V has been repeated on another sample, S-106, which permits finer breakdowns by longevity, especially in the longest service group. The tendency for the men who achieved promotion to be more likely than others to have married after entering the Army is essentially the same as in Chart V.

trolled by standardization, still show as in Chart II a somewhat higher percentage married than either noncoms or privates from the Army cross section in the groups who had been in the Army 2 years or more, and higher than privates in the 1 to 2 year group. Differences were negligible in the group 6 months to 1 year in the Army, and in the small sample of AWOL's under 6 months in the Army (only 99 cases) the percentage married was smaller than in the Army cross section.

We have now examined in some detail the relationships between advancement or maladjustment in the Army and education, age, and marital condition. The data show that high school graduates and college men had a *better* chance for advancement than grade school men or men who did not finish high school and also had *less* chance of being in a guardhouse for AWOL or in a ward for psychoneurosis. (These data apply, it must be emphasized, to troops in the United States and do not necessarily apply to AWOL's overseas or psychoneurotic casualties in combat. We are dealing now with the adjustment of soldiers to the Army in the training and garrison situations in the United States.) The data show also that the men 25 and over had a better chance for advancement than the men under 25, and that among these older men it was the men 25 to 29 rather than the men 30 or over who had the better chance to get ahead. However, some of the advantage enjoyed by men 25 to 29 was a mere matter of seniority, since they tended to be drafted earliest and since promotions depended heavily on seniority. When longevity was held constant, the men 25 to 29 nevertheless still were in a somewhat advantaged position, especially in contrast to the youngsters under 20. The two deviant groups, AWOL's and NP's, had contrasting age patterns. AWOL's tended to be younger than the average soldier, psychoneurotics tended to be older. Finally, we have seen that, with age and longevity controlled, married men had, on the one hand, a better chance than others for promotion and, on the other hand, if in the Army a year or more, a somewhat better chance of being found among AWOL's or psychoneurotics. However, it was marriage *after* entering the Army even more than marriage *before* entering the Army that tended to differentiate officers and noncoms from privates. Hence, one must be cautious about assuming that being married reflected, on the average, any social or psychological characteristics preferred by the Army in making promotions or that it effectively stimulated ambition. It

is possible, though it cannot be demonstrated, that many marriages after entering the Army were a resultant of promotion rather than a predisposing influence on advancement.

### S E C T I O N I I I

#### PERSONAL COMMITMENT, PERSONAL ESPRIT, AND THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

In Section I of this chapter we saw that on items reflecting personal esprit and personal commitment the following relations held:

✓ The better educated tended to be *more* favorable than the less educated.  
The married tended to be *less* favorable than the unmarried.  
The men 25 and over tended to be *less* favorable than the men under 25 in personal commitment, and the age differences on personal esprit were inconsistent.

In order to study such patterns more intensively, let us look at a cross section of soldiers in the United States in February 1944 and focus on one query, namely, how did men feel about being drafted when they entered the Army?

First, we shall see that responses to a question about the fairness of induction distinguish between the cross section of soldiers and two groups of deviants—AWOL's and psychoneurotics.

Second, we shall see that when the cross section is broken down it also reveals consistent differences in attitudes toward induction by education, age, and marital condition.

The question, with its check-list categories, is as follows:

At the time you came into the Army did you think you should have been deferred?

- I was not drafted, the question does not apply to me
- No, I did not think I should have been deferred
- Yes, because of dependents who needed my support
- Yes, because of the importance of my job
- Yes, because of my health or physical condition
- Yes, because of some other reason

In evaluating responses to this question one must remember that volunteering, in many instances, meant merely entering the Army one step ahead of draft board action. Nevertheless, Table 2 shows that, if we combine the proportions who said they volunteered and who said they should not have been deferred, we find 74 per cent among the cross section, 53 per cent among the psychoneurotics,

and 41 per cent among the AWOL's. Among the psychoneurotics 35 per cent gave health as a "reason" why they should have been deferred; the AWOLs' "reasons," on the other hand, divided mainly between "dependents who need my support" (26 per cent) and "health" (20 per cent).

TABLE 2

ATTITUDES TOWARD BEING DRAFTED AND "REASONS" GIVEN WHY ONE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DRAFTED

(United States, September 1943 and January 1944)

QUESTION: "At the time you came into the Army did you think you should have been deferred?"	PERCENTAGE GIVING INDICATED RESPONSE:		
	<i>Cross section*</i>	<i>Psycho-neurotics*</i>	<i>AWOL's†</i>
I was not drafted—this question does not apply to me.	25	17	25
No, I did not think I should have been deferred.	49	36	16
Yes, because of:			
Dependents who needed my support.	7	5	26
The importance of my job.	5	3	4
My health or physical condition.	9	35	20
Some other reason. (Includes no answer.)	5	4	9
	100	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>3,729</i>	<i>615</i>	<i>218</i>

\* Cross section and NP's from S-99, January 1944.

† AWOL's from S-74, September 1943.

While this question belongs primarily in the general area of personal commitment, responses to it also reflect personal esprit at the time of response. This is shown by the fact that among men in the cross section who were highest in personal esprit as determined by a cross tabulation of the "good spirits" item and two other related items, 90 per cent said either that they volunteered or that they should not have been deferred. However, the responses to this question are not *merely* a reflection of state of mind at the time of response. When asked of new recruits, whose report on their feelings about induction could not be colored by months or years of subsequent Army experience, the question discriminated significantly between recruits who *later* became psychoneurotics and other men. For example, in Volume II, Chapter 9, it is shown that among 73 new recruits studied soon after they entered the Army and found

later to have been diagnosed as psychoneurotics within a period of six months *after* the attitude survey, 32 per cent gave reasons why they should not have been drafted. This was in response to a question worded somewhat differently from that in Table 2. By contrast, in a sample of 730 "normal" recruits—equated with the psychoneurotics for education, age, and marital condition—who were part of the original sample to which the subsequently diagnosed psychoneurotics belonged, only 12 per cent gave reasons why they should not have been drafted. As with the psychoneurotics in Table 2, health was the predominant "reason" for deferment given by the pre-psychoneurotics.

Attitudes toward induction, among new recruits, also were positively associated with *subsequent* promotion, although this relationship, discussion of which is deferred until Section V of this chapter, is complicated by a countervailing tendency of older men to have the worst attitude toward induction but better objective chances of advancement.

Now let us see how willingness for service varied by education, age, and marital condition. The results, for the same Army cross section shown in Table 2, are given in Table 3. The range in pro-

TABLE 3  
WILLINGNESS FOR SERVICE, BY MARITAL CONDITION ON ENTERING THE ARMY,  
EDUCATION, AND AGE

	PERCENTAGE IN CROSS SECTION WHO SAID THEY VOLUNTEERED OR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEFERRED:			
	<i>Unmarried when entered Army</i>		<i>Married when entered Army</i>	
	Not H.S. graduates	H.S. graduates	Not H.S. graduates	H.S. graduates
30 and over	68 (320)	77 (157)	59 (193)	64 (128)
25 to 29	72 (323)	89 (239)	60 (124)	70 (146)
20 to 24	73 (572)	85 (719)	67 (144)	76 (105)
Under 20	79 (200)	90 (217)	—	—

Number of cases is shown in parentheses. For source of data see Table 2.

portions saying either that they volunteered or that they should not have been deferred was from 59 per cent among the married men over 30 years old who had not gone through high school to 90 per cent among the unmarried high school graduates under 20 years of age. Quite consistently, Table 3 shows, the favorable responses go up as age goes down, are higher for the unmarried than married in corresponding age and educational groups, and are higher for



high school graduates than others in each age group by marital condition. This table—which can be replicated from other studies—makes it quite unmistakable that the older married men and the less educated were more inclined to express reluctance about being in the Army than were other soldiers, and thus more nearly resembled the AWOL's and psychoneurotics in their responses.

To help explain such variations in attitude, by education, age, and marital condition, a general concept would be useful. Such a concept may be that of *relative deprivation*, which, as we shall see, is to prove quite helpful in ordering a rather disparate collection of data both in this chapter and in other chapters of these volumes. The idea is simple, almost obvious, but its utility comes in reconciling data, especially in later chapters, where its applicability is not at first too apparent. The idea would seem to have a kinship to and, in part, include such well-known sociological concepts as "social frame of reference," "patterns of expectation," or "definitions of the situation."

Becoming a soldier meant to many men a very real deprivation. But the felt sacrifice was greater for some than for others, *depending on their standards of comparison*.

Take one of the clearest examples—marital condition. The drafted married man, and especially the father, was making the same sacrifices as others plus the additional one of leaving his family behind. This was officially recognized by draft boards and eventually by the point system in the Army which gave demobilization credit for fatherhood. Reluctance of married men to leave their families would have been reinforced in many instances by extremely reluctant wives whose pressures on the husband to seek deferment were not always easy to resist. A further element must have been important psychologically to those married men who were drafted. The very fact that draft boards were more liberal with married than with single men provided numerous examples to the drafted married man of others in his shoes who got relatively better breaks than he did. Comparing himself with his unmarried associates in the Army, he could feel that induction demanded greater sacrifice from him than from them; and comparing himself with his married civilian friends he could feel that he had been called on for sacrifices which they were escaping altogether. Hence the married man, on the average, was more likely than others to come into the Army with reluctance and, possibly, a sense of injustice.

Or take age. Compared with younger men—apart now from

marital condition—the older man had at least three stronger grounds for feeling relatively greater deprivation. One had to do with his job—he was likely to be giving up more than, say, a boy just out of high school. Until the defense boom started wheels turning, many men in their late twenties and early thirties had never known steady employment at high wages. Just as they began to taste the joys of a fat pay check, the draft caught up with them. Or else they had been struggling and sacrificing over a period of years to build up a business or profession. The war stopped that. Second, the older men, in all probability, had more physical defects on the average than younger men. These defects, though not severe enough to satisfy the draft board or induction station doctors that they justified deferment, nevertheless could provide a good rationalization for the soldier trying to defend his sense of injustice about being drafted. Both of these factors, job and health, would be aggravated in that a larger proportion of older men than of younger men got deferment in the draft on these grounds—thus providing the older soldiers, like the married soldiers, with ready-made examples of men with comparable backgrounds who were experiencing less deprivation. Third, on the average, older men—particularly those over thirty—would be more likely than youngsters to have a dependent or semi-dependent father or mother—and if, in spite of this fact, the man was drafted he had further grounds for a sense of injustice.

The concept of relative deprivation may seem, at first glance, not to be applicable to the educational differentials in attitude toward being drafted, as it is to differentials by age and marital condition. Indeed, it is plausible that differentials in comprehension of the nation's military requirements and feelings of personal responsibility concerning them may have accounted for some part of the educational differentials in all attitudes reflecting personal commitment. Some evidence supporting this view is presented in Chapter 9 on "The Orientation of Soldiers Toward the War." However, the same types of factors which would seem to vary with age may also have varied with education; age, and marital condition constant. Take health. It would not be unreasonable to surmise that the better educated, *on the average*, were healthier than the less educated. Education and income are quite highly correlated, and it is likely that men from homes of relatively higher income were more likely to have had better nutrition as children, better medical and dental care, less venereal disease, and better protection against the hazards of insanitation. Consequently, such men, on the average, would

be less likely to have real physical grounds for feeling that an injustice had been done in inducting them and also would have, on the average, relatively fewer friends who were classified 4-F. Or take jobs. The less educated soldiers may have made no greater sacrifice on this score than the better educated, but when they compared themselves with their civilian friends they may have been more likely to feel that they were required to make sacrifices which others like them were excused from making. The two great classes of work which accounted for most exemptions on occupational grounds were farming and skilled labor, predominantly work done by men who have not finished high school. The great mass of professional, trade, and white-collar occupations were not deferable, although there were important exceptions in some managerial and engineering fields. The average high school graduate or college man was a clear-cut candidate for induction; marginal cases on occupational grounds probably occurred much more often in groups with less educational attainment. On the average, the non high school man who was inducted could point to more acquaintances conceivably no more entitled to deferment than himself, who nonetheless had been deferred on occupational grounds. As Research Branch data show, the soldier who was a non high school graduate was more likely than the better educated to report that he actually tried to get deferred and was turned down. Finally, the better educated (still keeping age and marital condition constant) would on the average have somewhat less anxiety about dependent fathers or mothers, since their parents would on the average be in relatively more secure income groups.

As is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, "The Orientation of Soldiers Toward the War," the informal as well as formal social pressures in the civilian community demanded military service where deferment was not clearly indicated. It is likely, too, that the positive social pressures were felt more keenly by some classes of the population than others. Thus the healthy youngster, the man without a family, and especially the man who was concerned about his future civilian status in his community or in the larger society would be most vulnerable to these social pressures. The man with future status aspirations, in particular, could not afford to jeopardize them, and this could serve to counteract, to some extent, feelings of deprivation which might otherwise have been stronger, particularly among the better educated who, by and large, would represent the majority of those with high social aspirations.

As a general idea, the concept of relative deprivation would seem quite useful and applicable, in that those groups which on a priori grounds would seem most likely to feel injustices, did, as the data in Table 3 demonstrate. But when we get down to finer details, available data are simply not adequate. Particularly, the relative roles of job, health, and dependency cannot be *separately* evaluated, as they operated differentially by education, age, and marital condition. The type of data presented in Table 4, which classifies the respondent's own reasons why he should have been deferred, is hardly more than suggestive. The proportions checking a particular "reason" are not the observed proportions, but rather are the proportions calculated after standardization—that is, by giving, for example, high school graduates and non high school graduates the same composition by age and marital condition.<sup>4</sup> About all that Table 4 shows is that the category "health" is generally the most discriminating as between demographic classes.<sup>5</sup> Because of the dubious value of "reasons" checked by individuals, unless confirmed by more extensive questioning techniques, the data in Table 4 should be treated with caution.

Especially, there is a possibility that the rationalization as to poor physical condition as an explanation of why one should have been deferred, is a projection of the physical condition the soldier felt himself to be in at the time he was surveyed. Questions as to present physical condition were sharply discriminating as between various classes of troops. For example, in the three classes shown in Table 2, the percentages responding "Yes" to the question, "Do you have any particular physical or health problem?" were:

Cross section	35%
AWOL's	56
Psychoneurotics	82

Within the cross section, the answer "No" was most likely to be given by the better educated, the younger men, and the men not

<sup>4</sup> In making tests of significance from standardized data reported in Table 4 and hereafter in this section, one should use the "equivalent totals" in Table 4, not the observed totals. For a discussion of the concept "equivalent totals," see footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> This could be attributable in part, but only in small part, to an artifact of coding. If the respondent checked "health" and some other category, a special code was used, but the category other than health was not identified. These cases, relatively few, were included in Table 4 with health. Any other combinations, also relatively few, were included under "others" in Table 4, since they could not be further identified. In consequence, the proportions checking "dependents" or "job" are slightly underreported.

TABLE 4

PROPORTIONS CHECKING INDICATED REASONS WHY THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFERRED, ARMY CROSS SECTION, FEBRUARY 1944

(By Education, Standardized for Age and Marital Condition; by Marital Condition, Standardized for Education and Age; by Age, Standardized for Education and Marital Condition)

	Not H.S. grad. %	H.S. grad. %	Among men 20 and over		20-24 %	25-29 %	30 and over %
			Unmar- ried %	Mar- ried %			
Volunteered or thought should not have been deferred	68	79	78	66	75	73	67
Should have been de- ferred because of							
Dependents	9	4	6	8	7	8	6
Job	5	5	4	7	6	3	6
Health	12	7	8	13	7	10	15
Others or no answer	6	5	4	6	5	6	6
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Observed number of cases	1,676	1,544	2,380	840	1,540	882	798
"Equivalent" number of cases	1,148	1,014	1,885	809	820	744	708

For source of data see Table 2.

For discussion of the meaning of "equivalent numbers" see footnote 2.

married when they entered the Army. Percentages responding "No" ranged from 37 per cent to 70 per cent, as will be seen below:

	UNMARRIED WHEN ENTERED ARMY		MARRIED WHEN ENTERED ARMY	
	Not H.S. graduates	H.S. graduates	Not H.S. graduates	H.S. graduates
30 years and over	46	55	37	46
25 to 29	55	64	40	48
20 to 24	60	67	50	52
Under 20	64	70	—	—

Perhaps the most that we can say, from the data available, is that (1) there can be no doubt that those classes in the Army population which, from the viewpoint of the concept of relative deprivation, should have been most likely to regard their induction as an injustice, seemed most likely to do so—namely, the less educated, the older men, and the married men—and (2) among the various factors

such as dependency, civilian jobs, and health which could be adduced as reasons for deserving deferment, health, at least, can be shown to be a favorite reason which was advanced more frequently by the less educated, the older men, and the married men, than by the others.

Since attitudes toward induction as portrayed here reflect both personal commitment and personal esprit—perhaps the former more than the latter—this discussion should provide at least the outlines of a framework of interpretation for the kind of profiles observed in these attitude areas.

However, our thinking will be further sharpened if we review, explicitly, some of the social and psychological factors in the pre-Army history of the soldiers which may take the role of “intervening variables.” That is, they may provide *links* between demographic variables such as education, age, and marital condition and personal adjustment in the Army. Such an analysis is undertaken in Section IV.

## S E C T I O N   I V

### PRE-ARMY EXPERIENCES IN CHILDHOOD AND LATER AS RELATED TO ADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY AND TO BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOLDIERS

Psychiatry has been so predominantly clinical that very little statistical evidence exists as to the presence or absence in a cross section of American people of experiences which, according to various psychiatric theories, might predispose people to confront new situations effectively or ineffectively.

The body of data now to be reviewed is, with all its inadequacies, almost unique. The American soldiers were representative of every aspect of American life—though they were selected, of course, for sex, age, and ability to meet certain minimum health standards. What a representative cross section of these soldiers has to say about its childhood experiences is therefore of interest going well beyond concerns about adjustment in the Army. Through modern methods of sampling and of question design, the machinery now exists to assemble even better inventories in the future for representative cross sections of the entire American public.

For light on adjustment in the Army, the value of the data on childhood experiences is enhanced by the fact that the Army cross section can be compared with extremes at either end of a continuum

(a) with data for men who as soldiers gave subjective evidence of unusually high personal esprit<sup>6</sup> and (b) with data for men who as soldiers were maladjusted to the extent that they were confined in guardhouses or psychiatric wards.<sup>7</sup>

Each of the items in the childhood experience inventory of the soldiers has been subjected to a twofold examination. On the one hand, the reports by the cross section have been compared with those of the so-called "best adjusted" soldiers and with those of the maladjusted soldiers. This enables us to see whether a particular reported childhood experience tends to be discriminating or not to be discriminating as a correlate of adjustment in the Army. On the other hand, the reports by the cross section are broken down by education, age, and marital condition. This helps us see whether differences in *soldiers' background characteristics* are related to differences in reported *childhood experiences*. Thus the childhood experiences may serve as an *intervening variable* to throw light on some of the differences in adjustment made by men who differ by education, age, and marital condition.

First, let us look at Chart VI, which portrays some of these differences in pre-Army experience, as they relate to adjustment in the Army.

If a factor in the background were of considerable importance, one would expect it to show up in tabulations like this. It must be remembered that men filled out questionnaires anonymously, and, as is evident from responses to many of the questions, seemed to feel

<sup>6</sup> Based on men who gave favorable responses to *all three* of the following questions:

"In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits?"

"In general, what sort of time do you have in the Army?"

"Are you ever worried or upset?"

These men, 410 in all, who for brevity are labeled as "best adjusted" in the charts and tables following, strictly speaking can be called best adjusted only from the standpoint of "personal esprit." They also tended to be high, on the average, in the other three areas of the adjustment profile.

<sup>7</sup> It must be emphasized that in this chapter, AWOL's and psychoneurotics are not studied as a problem in themselves but their responses are introduced to represent one end of a continuum of Army adjustment. In particular, it should be noted that the responses of men who have been isolated in guardhouses or neuropsychiatric sections of hospitals were not necessarily the same as responses of men who were *later* to experience detention but had not yet given the Army cause for action. The problems of *predicting* psychiatric breakdown, together with some attitude data on *pre-psychoneurotics*, are discussed in Volume II, in the chapter on "Psychoneurotic Symptoms in the Army" and in Volume IV in the chapter on "The Screening of Psychoneurotics." It also should be kept in mind that the data in the present chapter refer to deviants in the United States, not to men overseas who sought to escape combat by the disciplinary or medical route. Reference to the behavior of the latter will be found in the combat chapters in Volume II.

little inhibition about self-deprecatory admissions. Let us look at Chart VI with some care.

The top set of bars refers to broken homes. Differences are small—much smaller than elsewhere on Chart VI—although they do show that psychoneurotics and AWOL's were somewhat (just significantly) less likely to say they had parents who lived together until the respondent was sixteen years old.

Next, we see a report on child health. Half of the cross section said they were "very healthy" children; among the "best adjusted" it was over two thirds. But among psychoneurotics only 21 per cent said they were "very healthy" children, while 32 per cent said they were "rather sickly." The AWOL's tended to be in between the cross section and psychoneurotics in their response. It may legitimately be objected, of course, that this question represents to some extent a projection of attitudes toward present physical condition. How much this is the case cannot be determined. The same objection would not be as applicable to other questions in Chart VI.

On the subject of sociability, the cross section and the "best adjusted" differ sharply from both the psychoneurotics and the AWOL's. Much larger proportions of these Army deviants than of others said that before they came into the Army they usually went around alone.

In respect to truancy from school, the psychoneurotics tended to behave more nearly like the cross section or the "best adjusted" than like the AWOL's, the majority of whom in pre-Army life, as well as in the Army, apparently tended to run away from authority.

As it contrasts with the pattern on truancy, the response to the question of fighting in childhood is very interesting. Here the AWOL's behave more nearly like the normals and the "best adjusted" and it is the psychoneurotics who deviate sharply. Over half of the NP's said that they "didn't like fighting at all," a much larger proportion than in other groups.


Somewhat the same pattern is seen in the last question in Chart VI—dates with girls before coming into the Army. The psychoneurotics were much the most likely to say they had dates with girls less often than the average, while the AWOL's, as in the question on fighting, were more nearly like the cross section and the "best adjusted." In fact, if we look at extreme categories, the AWOL's were most likely of all to say they "really liked fighting as a kid" and went with girls "more often than the average."

We have, then, quite sharply contrasting patterns as respecting



CHART VI

REPORTED CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES AS RELATED TO ADJUSTMENT IN THE ARMY



For sources of data see Table 2.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

types of Army deviants. The psychoneurotics and the AWOL's tended, according to their own testimony, to be less sociable than the cross section or the "best adjusted" in the sense of going around alone. The AWOL was more likely to be truant from school, the psychoneurotic more likely to shrink from fighting or to avoid dates with girls.

Let us now examine childhood background situations in somewhat more detail, especially observing differences, if any, among subgroups of the Army cross section.

Take the home. We have seen in Chart VI that there was a slight relationship, barely significant, between broken parental homes and maladjustment in the Army. Further analysis of the responses by the cross section to this question by education, age, and marital condition shows that there were no notable differences, except by education. Standardizing for age and marital condition, we find that of the high school graduates 16 per cent came from homes broken by death or separation before the respondent was sixteen years old; among the non high school graduates, 25 per cent.

When we look at another question relating to the family, we find a more striking and possibly more important relationship. In response to the question, "So far as you know, has anyone in your family had a nervous breakdown? (Do NOT include yourself if you think you had a nervous breakdown)" we can compare responses of the cross section with those of the "best adjusted" and of the psychoneurotics as follows:<sup>3</sup>

	<i>"Best adjusted"</i>	<i>Cross section</i>	<i>Psychoneurotics</i>
Yes	12%	22%	46%
Don't know	13	18	29
No	75	60	25
	100%	100%	100%

However dubious this report would be in a clinical analysis of an individual case, unless more probing were done to determine how adequately the respondent defined a nervous breakdown, the fact remains that the question is statistically highly discriminating. The proportion saying "No" varied from 75 per cent among the "best adjusted" to 25 per cent among the psychoneurotics. In the cross section, age differences were not significant. The high school grad-

<sup>3</sup> In the case of this and subsequent questions where data are not shown for AWOL's, the question was not asked of the AWOL sample.

uates, when age and marital condition are held constant by standardization, were more likely than the less educated to say there had not been a nervous breakdown in their families (69 per cent as compared with 51 per cent), as were also the unmarried, with age and education held constant (63 per cent as compared with 52 per cent among the married). The latter difference, however, may merely reflect an ambiguity in definition of "family"; if the married men included their wives and even their in-laws one would expect more reports of nervous breakdown.

Another interesting line of questioning refers to the justice and severity of punishment in childhood. Take the question, "When your parents or the people who brought you up punished you, did you usually deserve it or not?" Of the Army cross section, 64 per cent said that they "always deserved" the punishment they got, as compared on the one hand with 74 per cent among the "best adjusted" and 50 per cent among the psychoneurotics. While this question on justice of punishment was a rather discriminating one, the question on severity of punishment was not. When asked, "When you actually had done something wrong and were punished for it, did you usually get an easier or harder punishment than other kids you knew?" 72 per cent of the cross section answered "about the same as others" as compared with 71 per cent among the "best adjusted" and 68 per cent among psychoneurotics. The psychoneurotics were a little more likely than others to respond "harder" (17 per cent as against 13 per cent in the cross section and 12 per cent among the "best adjusted") and a little less likely to respond "easier" (12 per cent as against 14 per cent in the cross section and 16 per cent among the "best adjusted"), but these slight differences are not significant. Within the cross section itself there were no significant differences by education, age, or marital condition on either of the punishment questions.

A theory currently of considerable interest in psychiatry seeks to trace some types of neurotic behavior to overprotection by the mother. If men were conscious of having an unusually close attachment psychologically to their mothers, it should be evident in responses to the question, "Were you your mother's favorite child?" Either such a psychological condition is too subtle for conscious awareness or else it is not, as compared with other factors already reported in this section or to be discussed subsequently, of general significance.

Let us look at the responses:

	<i>"Best adjusted"</i>	<i>Cross section</i>	<i>Psycho-neurotics</i>
I was an only child in my family	8%	8%	8%
An older brother or sister was the favorite	5	8	8
A younger brother or sister was the favorite	9	9	11
I think I was the favorite	20	17	15
There were no favorites	56	54	51
No answer	2	4	7
	100%	100%	100%

If anything, the "best adjusted" were more likely than the psychoneurotics to say that they were their mother's favorite child, but the differences are too small to be significant. These data certainly do not support dramatic popular accounts of the prevalence of psychiatric breakdown in the Army as traceable to maternal overindulgence. If anything, they are slightly in the direction of supporting a deprivation rather than an overindulgence hypothesis. The actual situation might be that extremes of overindulgence and extremes of deprivation are both likely to be productive of psychoneurosis; a hypothesis susceptible to statistical test but requiring more detailed data than are available for the present study.

There are no important differences when the data for the cross section are broken down by education, age, and marital condition and examined on each variable after standardization to hold constant the other two:

	<i>Among men 20 and over</i>						
	<i>Not H.S. grad.</i>	<i>H.S. grad.</i>	<i>Un-married before entering Army</i>	<i>Mar-ried before entering Army</i>	<i>20 to 24</i>	<i>25 to 29</i>	<i>30 and over</i>
I was an only child in my family	6%	11%	8%	8%	8%	9%	7%
A brother or sister was the favorite	18	15	18	16	17	18	17
I think I was the favorite	14	19	18	15	19	17	14
There were no favorites	58	53	53	58	54	53	60
No answer	4	2	3	3	2	3	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>"Equivalent number" of cases after standardization</i>	1,148	1,014	1,885	809	820	744	708

In passing, it may be noted that a slightly larger proportion of the high school graduates tended to be only children, as would be expected because of the well-known relationship of the birth rate and income. Families with larger income are more likely than others to see that their children have a good education, and also are likely to have fewer children. In addition, the better educated were somewhat more likely to say they were favorite children, as were the unmarried and the younger—although all the differences are too small to merit much speculation.

As far as the home is concerned, we have seen that the most discriminating item, as between psychoneurotics at the one extreme and "best adjusted" at the other, was that dealing with nervous breakdown in the family. The question on broken homes was only slightly discriminating—less so than the question on justice of punishment. The items on severity of punishment and on whether or not the soldier thought he was his mother's favorite child yielded very small differences. The better educated apparently were somewhat more likely than others to come from a stable family background—their parents being a little less likely to have died or become divorced or separated and less likely (at least as reported by the soldiers themselves) to have had a nervous breakdown. There were no large educational, age, or marital differences on justice or severity of punishment or on whether or not the respondent was the mother's favorite child.

Let us look now at child health, physical and mental. We have already seen in Chart VI that psychoneurotics and, though not so decisively, AWOL's as well were less likely than the cross section to say that they were in very good health when children. While these responses were discounted to some extent as possibly representing projections, nevertheless the differences were much too great to be ignored. The range in percentage saying that they were "very healthy" as a child was from 69 per cent among the "best adjusted" down to 21 per cent among psychoneurotics. When we break the cross section down by education, age, and marital condition, and standardize in analyzing each variable, we see differences which are statistically significant, though not large enough to be especially noteworthy, in all three categories, in the proportion saying they enjoyed "very good" health as a child:

Among high school graduates	52%
Among others	46

Among men 20 and over who were:	
Married before entering Army	45
Unmarried before entering Army	52
Among men 30 and over	47
Among men 25 to 29	45
Among men 20 to 24	52

One of the evidences in childhood of personality problems which might not be conducive to a successful adjustment in the Army would be excessive childhood fears. Retrospective reports on a subject like this cannot be accepted uncritically. There could be a considerable element of projection backwards from the present psychological situation. Nevertheless, Table 5 is of considerable interest. It compares the proportions in the Army cross section and among Army psychoneurotics who said that as children they were "not at all" afraid of a given object or event. (Other check-

TABLE 5  
REPORTED CHILDHOOD FEARS AS RELATED TO NEUROPSYCHIATRIC BREAKDOWN  
AMONG TROOPS IN THE UNITED STATES (JANUARY 1944)

QUESTION: "Below is a list of things commonly feared by children. Some of them are important in medical histories, but nothing is known about how often the average person has been afraid of these things. Check one answer after each thing listed to show how much you yourself were afraid of it when you were a kid."

	PERCENTAGES CHECKING "NOT AT ALL" *		
	Cross section	Psycho- neurotics	Difference
Being on high places	43	23	20
Being shut up in a room or closet	55	35	20
Thunderstorms	54	34	20
Falling	40	21	19
Sharp knives	46	27	19
Being with girls	60	41	19
Strangers	59	41	18
Walking by a graveyard at night	44	28	16
Large animals	45	30	15
The Devil	58	43	15
Family quarrels	42	28	14
Being laughed at by other boys	39	26	13
Being left alone	42	30	12
Getting bawled out	25	14	11
Being called on to recite in class	30	19	11
Thoughts of death	45	34	11
Getting a bad report card from school	31	21	10
Being punished	25	16	9
Snakes	21	15	6
<i>Number of cases</i>	<b>5,729</b>	<b>613</b>	

For source of data, see Table 2.

\* Other check-list categories were "Very much" and "A little."

list categories were "very much" and "a little.") For example, in the cross section 43 per cent said they were "not at all" afraid of being on high places; among psychoneurotics only 23 per cent made this response. This difference of 20 per cent is duplicated in respect to fear of being shut up and fear of thunderstorms. The smallest differences are in respect to fear of being punished or fear of snakes. Table 5 presents the complete list of items included in this question. All differences are statistically significant.<sup>9</sup>

Of considerable interest is the report of the soldier's pre-Army association with institutions like the school and the church. We have already seen in Chart VI that the psychoneurotics were not too different from either the cross section or the "best adjusted" in their own reports on truancy. It was the AWOL's who deviated sharply from the general pattern in admitting a relatively high frequency of truancy. In the cross section there was no appreciable difference in incidence of reported truancy by age or marital condition, but there was a small though statistically significant difference by education (age and marital condition held constant by standardization). Among high school graduates 27 per cent said that they played hooky "very often" or "several times"; among those who had not finished high school 34 per cent gave these responses.

As might be expected, partly because a larger proportion finished high school, the men in the cross section were less likely than AWOL's or psychoneurotics to say that they made low grades in school. In answer to the question, "What kind of grades did you usually get when in school?" the responses were as follows:

	<i>"Best adjusted"</i>	<i>Cross section</i>	<i>AWOL's</i>	<i>Psycho-neurotics</i>
"Very high" or "high" grades	43%	32%	32%	21%
"Medium" grades	55	63	46	61
"Low" or "very low" grades	2	4	21	17
No answer	—	1	1	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Obviously, there was a tendency for men to overrate their grades, since it is unlikely, in a cross section of American young men such

<sup>9</sup> These tabulations were made from a special set of punched cards, which were subsequently lost. Hence without going back to the original schedules and repunching cards, it was not possible to make further tabulations. Differences by education, age, and marital condition are therefore not available.

as was in the Army, that the true ratio of high grades to low grades would be 32 to 4. But it is the *comparative* picture, from one group to another, in which we are interested. Within the cross section differences by age and marital condition were negligible, but, as would be expected, the better educated (other variables held constant) were considerably more likely than men who quit in grammar school or before high school graduation to say they made "very high" or "high" grades—42 per cent as against 21 per cent.

A single question on church attendance in civilian life could not be too dependable. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that differences between the "best adjusted," the cross section, and the psychoneurotics were very small in response to the question, "Before you came into the Army how often did you go to church?"

	<i>"Best adjusted"</i>	<i>Cross section</i>	<i>Psycho- neurotics</i>
Once or twice a week	39%	39%	34%
Two or three times a month	18	18	16
About once a month	12	11	10
Several times a year	14	16	21
Almost never	17	16	18
No answer	—	—	1
	100%	100%	100%

Within the cross section differences by education and marital condition were inconsistent and negligible, but differences by age were quite marked. The percentages, by age, saying that before they came into the Army they went to church at least as often as two or three times a month were:

30 and over	45%
25 to 29	51
20 to 24	58
Under 20	71

These figures are unstandardized, but standardization for education and for marriage in the groups 20 and over makes no appreciable change in these groups. Either there was a definite tendency for men in their late twenties and early thirties to attend church less regularly than younger men, or there were differences in recall due to the memory interval. That the tendency, if it existed, could have little relationship to Army adjustment is, however, indicated



by the earlier observation that such maladjusted men as psychoneurotics claimed, on the average, to attend church almost as frequently in civilian life as did the "best adjusted."

Let us turn, finally, to the soldiers' reports of their pre-Army associations with others. We have already seen in Chart VI that both AWOL's and psychoneurotics were more likely than others to say they usually went around alone. We saw also that the psychoneurotics were considerably more likely than others to dislike fighting in their youth and to avoid dates with girls. In these two respects, it will be recalled the AWOL's and cross section were much alike.

Let us examine further the responses to the question, "Before you came into the Army did you usually go around with a bunch of others or by yourself?" Since this question distinguished quite sharply between those maladjusted in the Army and others, it will be of interest to break down the cross section by education, age, and marital condition. For each factor, when the others are held constant by standardization, we find significant and rather substantial differences in the proportions saying they "usually went around with a bunch of others" (other check-list categories were "by myself" and "with one or two others"):

Among high school graduates	44%
Among non high school graduates	30
Among men 20 and over who were:	
Married before entering Army	29
Unmarried before entering Army	43
Among men 30 and over	31
Among men 25 to 29	36
Among men 20 to 24	39

In the age group under 20, which is not comparable with the above, because it contains practically no married men, 48 per cent said they usually went around with a bunch. We see, therefore, that the tendency to go around with a group of others in civilian life not only was a favorable sign for Army adjustment, but also was more frequent among those groups in the Army cross section which were most likely to feel that they were inducted into the Army justly and who, as Section I of this chapter showed, were more likely after they were in the Army to report that they were in good spirits.

What about fighting as a youngster? We know from Chart VI

that the psychoneurotics, especially, said they disliked it. There were differences, significant but small, by education, age, and marital condition within the cross section, in response to the question, "How did you feel about fighting as a kid?" Standardized percentages were as follows:

	Among men 20 and over						
	Not H.S. grad.	H.S. grad.	Unmar- ried before entering Army	Mar- ried before entering Army	20 to 24	25 to 29	30 and over
Really liked fighting	14%	9%	13%	9%	14%	10%	9%
Didn't particularly like or dislike it	50	57	55	51	55	55	50
Didn't like fighting at all	35	34	32	39	31	34	40
No answer	1	—	—	1	—	1	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

It will be seen that the better educated, the married, and the older men were somewhat less likely than others to say that they really liked fighting as a kid. However, there were no differences in the cross section by education and marital condition, and only a barely significant difference by age in response to another question, "Were you a good fighter as a kid?" This question, like the preceding, showed AWOL's responding like the average soldier, and only the psychoneurotics showing a substantial deviation:

	"Best adjusted"	Cross section	AWOL's	Psycho- neurotics
Yes	48%	39%	43%	22%
Undecided	31	33	31	36
No	20	27	26	40
No answer	1	1	—	2
	100%	100%	100%	100%

A more sophisticated kind of contest than fighting is sports, in general. The men were asked what kind of sports they took part in as a boy. In the cross section, 38 per cent said they played football "a lot" as a boy as compared with only 18 per cent of the psychoneurotics. Corresponding figures for baseball were 54 and 31 per cent, respectively; for basketball, 32 and 18 per cent. All the sports in the check list can be summarized in the following table:

	<i>"Best adjusted"</i>	<i>Cross section</i>	<i>Psycho-neurotics</i>
At least one "bodily contact" sport and at least one "non bodily contact" sport checked "a lot"	62%	53%	30%
A "bodily contact" sport checked "a lot," but no "non bodily contact" sport so checked	17	19	14
A "non bodily contact" sport checked "a lot," but no "bodily contact" sport so checked	15	17	22
Neither type of sport checked "a lot"	5	10	31
No answer	1	1	3
	100%	100%	100%

"Bodily contact" sports on the check list included football, basketball, and baseball; "non bodily contact" sports included fishing or hunting, golf and tennis. Whereas, in the case of fighting we saw that the high school graduates were, if anything, less likely than others to say they really liked fighting as a youth, the reverse is clearly true with respect to participation in sports. This is perhaps a result of organized athletics in high school. The men married before entering the Army, age and education constant, were less likely than others to claim participation in sports, and the same is true of the older men, marital condition and education constant. The latter difference, though significant, is small and may merely reflect differences in recall because of the longer time perspective involved. The standardized proportions saying that they participated "a lot" in at least one bodily contact sport and in at least one non bodily contact sport are as follows:

Among high school graduates	60%
Among non high school graduates	47
Among men 20 and over who were:	
Married before entering Army	48
Unmarried before entering Army	59
Among men 30 and over	48
Among men 25 to 29	50
Among men 20 to 24	56

In Chart VI, it will be recalled, the psychoneurotics, in contrast to the "best adjusted" and the cross section, and also in contrast to the AWOL's, were much more likely to say that in their youth they

dated girls "not as often as most other fellows I knew." Although the question about frequency of dates could have looked somewhat ambiguous to a man married before he came into the Army, there was in the cross section no difference in response by either marital condition or age. The only difference was by education, 31 per cent of the high school graduates as compared with 24 per cent of the non high school graduates saying that in their civilian days they did not have dates "as often as most fellows I knew." (These figures are standardized for age and marital condition.)

To summarize the discussion introduced with Chart VI, we have observed a number of things in childhood or adolescent pre-Army experience which distinguish between the cross section and the "best adjusted," on the one hand, and either AWOL's or psychoneurotics or both, on the other hand. With respect to the home, the most telling item, though weakened somewhat by possible influences of projection, was whether or not the soldier reported that somebody in his family had had a nervous breakdown. Broken homes were slightly more frequent in the history of the maladjusted, as was the reported injustice of punishment. No important differences appeared with respect to severity or indulgence in punishment or to overprotection by the mother. Very large differences were observed in reports of health in childhood and considerable differences with respect to childhood fears, though both types of response must be discounted to some extent because of possible projection. AWOL's stood out conspicuously in the frequency with which they reported truancy in school. Neither group of Army maladjusted reported making as good grades in school as the Army cross section or the "best adjusted." Differences as to reported church attendance were negligible. In general, on items involving sociability, the psychoneurotics were distinctly less likely than others to report much comradeship either with boys or girls, and were less likely to say they liked fighting or sports. The AWOL's made about the same responses as the cross section on fighting or dates, but were, like the psychoneurotics, more likely than others to say they usually went around alone. Broadly, we can say that the evidence seems to show that a stable home background, a healthy childhood, good work habits in school, and association with other boys and girls, including participation in sports, were assets for the young civilian who put on the uniform and tried to adjust to Army life.

Considering only those data in pre-Army histories which distinguished, at least to some significant extent, between those who

adjusted to Army life and those who did not, let us summarize further the relationships observed by education, age, and marital condition. Not many of the observed differences, even when significant, are large, but some patterns do emerge.

In general, we have seen that the better educated apparently came from somewhat stabler family backgrounds than the less educated. Somewhat fewer came from broken homes, considerably fewer reported nervous breakdowns in their families, and somewhat more of them said that they were very healthy as children. As would be expected, the better educated were much more likely than others to say that they made high grades in school and somewhat less likely than others to report truancy. Also the better educated were more likely to report that they went around with a group of fellows and that they had frequent dates with girls. They were somewhat less likely than others to like fighting as a youth—the only instance among the above examples in which the better educated were below average on a trait associated with adjustment in the Army. But they were just as likely as others to say they were good fighters and were considerably more likely to say they participated “a lot” in sports.

While we see that, in general, the better educated seemed to have been somewhat advantaged with respect to childhood and adolescent experience, there is no such clear consistency with respect to those who were married before entering the Army as compared with other men or with respect to the older men as compared with the younger men. Holding education and age constant, the men who were married before entering the Army do not seem to have had much different childhood experiences from the unmarried. It is true that the married were somewhat more likely to report a nervous breakdown in their family, but this could reflect ambiguity in possibly applying the question to in-laws as well as immediate family. The married were somewhat less likely than the unmarried to say that they were “very healthy” as children—a rather surprising finding which could conceivably be in part a projection from their feelings as of the time of response. (The married, it will be recalled from data earlier in this section, were more likely than others to say that they had some health problem; there can be little doubt, from findings on other forms of the question and other Research Branch studies that, on the average, the married soldier, education and age constant, was less likely than others to admit that he was in good physical condition.) The married man also was less likely than others to say that

he usually went around with a bunch of other fellows or that he participated a lot in sports. Where statistically significant differences in reports between the married and the unmarried occurred—and they were not many—they were in the direction of the civilian experiences of the married men tending to have been somewhat more on the unfavorable side. By unfavorable we mean that a given type of pre-Army experience was more likely to be reported by maladjusted soldiers, like AWOL's and psychoneurotics, than by other men.

A priori, there is no particular reason to expect the background histories to differ much by age, after we have held marital condition and education constant, as we have done throughout. Age differences on most of the items, if they occurred and if they were not attributable to projection or to differences in time perspective in viewing events of youth, would imply sharp changes over time in social practices within the United States. In view of the shortness of the time span between even the extreme age groups, it would not be likely that such social changes as occurred would be perceptible by the rather crude forms of mass inquiry used in this section. In fact, as we have seen, significant age differences were few and, where they occurred, small. In view of the possibility that projection or differences in time perspective could easily account for such differences as those observed in reports on childhood health or even in participation in sports—the younger men being in the more favorable categories—it is perhaps best to be conservative and not attempt further discussion of these data as relating to age.

Thus we get some evidence from intervening factors, like pre-Army family background, school habits, sociability, and participation in sports, which suggests links between our demographic categories and adjustment. In some instances factors which a priori might have been thought to play quite important roles do not show up as important in this analysis. It is regrettable that some of these problems did not receive more intensive study than the Research Branch was able to give and that other methods of analysis, particularly involving a large number of searching clinical interviews, could not have been employed systematically to supplement the present findings; although, of course, informal interviews were made in the process of building the original questionnaires.

To conclude this chapter we turn now to Section V which represents a case study of the relationship between background characteristics and attitude profiles, on the one hand, and *subsequent* promotions of the respondents.

## SECTION V

ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT TO THE ARMY  
AS RELATED TO SUBSEQUENT PROMOTION  
OF THE RESPONDENTS—A CASE STUDY

To illustrate directly the way in which attitudes from the four areas of adjustment became associated with advancement in the Army, we need data which will relate such attitudes to *subsequent* advancement. This will be done in the present section, based on three samples of men whose attitudes were surveyed when they were relatively new recruits, whose questionnaires, though filled out anonymously, afterwards were identified, and whose careers were followed for a few months after the survey.<sup>10</sup>

Sample A comprises 378 privates whose attitudes were surveyed in September 1943. Their attained rank as of January 1, 1944, was ascertained and a fifth were found to have become privates first class (Pfc's), which is the first rung up the promotion ladder. Four fifths were still privates on January 1.

Sample B comprises 376 privates whose attitudes were surveyed in November 1943 and some of whom by March 1944 had become noncoms (mostly, corporals).

Sample C comprised 102 men who when surveyed in November 1943 had already attained the grade of private first class. The majority of them had become noncoms by March 1944. The great difference in promotion rates between Samples B and C illustrates the great importance that seniority in rank, once established, exercised in subsequent promotion.

All these men were relatively new recruits, having entered the Army during the summer of 1943. In these samples, due to the operations of Selective Service at the time these men entered the Army, 90 per cent of the men 25 years of age or over were married, while 82 per cent of the men under 25 years of age were unmarried. Hence it is not practical here to analyze marital condition separately from age. When tabulations are presented by age, it must be remembered that age here reflects marital condition also.

Let us now look at Chart VII. The top sets of bars show the relationship of education by age to promotion. The sets of bars below show the relationship to promotion of attitude items—good spirits,


<sup>10</sup> The three samples of attitude data were obtained in an Infantry division in the fall of 1943.

soldier-war worker, job satisfaction, and how well is the Army run—holding both age and education constant.

Let us look first at Sample A. The chance of moving from private in September to Pfc in January was associated with both education and age. Of the high school graduates 25 and over, 46 per cent were promoted to Pfc by January; of those under 25, only 27 per cent.

CHART VII

PROPORTIONS PROMOTED, AS RELATED TO EDUCATION AND AGE, AND TO ATTITUDES HOLDING EDUCATION AND AGE CONSTANT



Data from S-60 and S-70, September and November 1943.

Numbers at the end of each bar indicate the observed number of cases on which percentages are based, except in the case of the standardized percentages by categories of attitude items, where, as explained in footnote 2, "adjusted totals" are presented. These equivalent totals are somewhat smaller than the observed totals.



Of the non high school graduates 25 and over, 16 per cent were Pfc's by January; of those under 25, only 11 per cent. The same type of pattern is seen in Sample B. The high school graduates and the older men had the best chance of moving from private in November 1943 to noncommissioned officer by March 1944. The number of cases in Sample C is much too small for satisfactory reporting, but here, again, we see that among the older men, as among the younger men, the high school graduates had a better chance than others to move from Pfc in November to NCO in March, while among both high school graduates and others, the men 25 and over had a better chance of promotion than the younger men.

We see then, just as we saw in Chart I of Section II in this chapter, that promotion depended, at least in part, on factors associated with education and age. Education, of course, is associated with AGCT scores and Mechanical Aptitude scores, as well as with other factors such as attitudes. Age played an important role. As has been mentioned, this division contained two rather distinctly different products of the draft—older married men who had been passed by in the first rounds of Selective Service and youngsters who had only recently become eligible for the draft. It apparently was thought better to have older men leading younger men than the reverse.

The chances of promotion, then, were related to factors associated with education and age. But *attitudes* are among the factors associated with education and age. How were the chances of promotion related to these *attitudes*?

Let us illustrate with an example. Take the area of personal commitment, using the question, "If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or as a worker in a war job?" Consider only Sample A. The proportions in the four education-age groups who said in September that they could do more for their country as soldiers than as war workers, were as follows:

H.S. graduates 25 and over	28%	(70)
H.S. graduates under 25	52	(86)
Others 25 and over	17	(94)
Others under 25	38	(128)

Here we see the same type of relationship between personal commitment and education and age which we have encountered on an Army-wide basis earlier in this chapter. The *better educated*, who

as a class had the better chance for subsequent promotion, and the *younger men*, who as a class had a worse chance than older men for subsequent promotion, were more likely to express acceptance of the soldier role.

Now let us break the sample down further and form the following table:

	PERCENTAGES PROMOTED AMONG THOSE WHO:	
	<i>Accepted the soldier role</i>	<i>Did not accept the soldier role</i>
H.S. graduates 25 and over	55 (80)	42 (50)
H.S. graduates under 25	29 (45)	24 (41)
Others 25 and over	25 (16)	14 (78)
Others under 25	14 (49)	8 (79)
Weighted average <sup>11</sup>	28 (110)	20 (88)

The number of cases in some of the subgroups becomes very thin, but we see in this table two facts. One, that within each educational and age class the men with the better attitude in September had a somewhat better chance for subsequent promotion. In other words, *independent of age and education*, attitude contributed in some degree to subsequent promotion. Two, that *independent of attitude*, the high school graduates and the older men had the better chance for promotion.

The same direction of tendency appears in Samples B and C, although the number of cases in the latter is much too small for reliable analysis.

Also, we see in other attitude areas how attitudes are involved in the relationship between education and age and chances of promotion. In the case of personal esprit, the better educated were more favorable in their prepromotion attitudes, while there was no consistent age difference. In the case of satisfaction with status and job and with criticism or approval of the Army the better educated tended to be *less* favorable than the less educated, while again age differences were inconsistent.<sup>12</sup> But in all three cases, when the data are broken down as in the personal commitment example cited above, the men *within* a given subgroup by age and education who

<sup>11</sup> The weights used were 70, 86, 94, and 128 respectively.

<sup>12</sup> The inconsistency of the age differences may reflect the confounding of age and marital condition. While the Army-wide data cited in Section I of this chapter showed the older men in the Army, generally, to be more favorable in these two attitude areas than younger men, the Army-wide data at the same time showed no consistent differences among married men, holding age constant.

had the better attitudes also had the better chances of subsequent promotion.

In other words, good attitudes seemed to *pay*.<sup>13</sup> This conclusion is summarized by the bars in the lower part of Chart VII, where the percentages promoted as related to attitudes are graphed. These are standardized percentages, that is, weighted averages like the 28 per cent and 20 per cent shown in our illustrative example for the soldier-war worker question. The reader will find these two percentages graphed in Chart VII for Sample A opposite the category "Accept soldier role" and "Others."

The data for some additional items are presented in Table 6. These data reinforce the evidence from Chart VII of the consistency with which, in Samples A, B, and C, the men who expressed the more favorable attitudes tended also to have the better chances for subsequent promotion—education and age held constant.<sup>14</sup>

We have just looked closely at certain facts which might, at first glance, have seemed paradoxical. The fact that the better educated, even though generally more critical of the Army than other men, tended to get ahead faster than other men takes on a different meaning when we see that among the better educated taken alone, those with the better attitudes toward the Army got ahead faster, and similarly among the less educated taken alone. Likewise the fact that the older married men, though tending to be deficient as

<sup>13</sup> It must be made clear that the attitude questionnaires were filled out anonymously and were not seen by anybody in authority in the division. Therefore, the surveys themselves could have exerted no direct influence on promotions. It is true that the research team from Washington identified the questionnaires by matching background information like date of birth, date of enlistment, and state of residence with corresponding information on the Form 20 personnel cards. This was necessary in order to trace the future promotions of the men. But this information was retained by the Research Branch and by agreement not made available to the division command.

<sup>14</sup> Because of this consistency, the differences in promotion rates as between men sorted by initial attitudes are significant at the 5 per cent level. This is true for the four attitude items shown in Chart VII and it is also true for the supplementary items shown in Table 6, with one exception—the item on worry about battle injury, where the difference is significant for Sample B, but because of a reversal in Sample A the final test falls short of indicating significance at the 5 per cent level.

The test of significance used on these items was as follows: first, for a given item and a particular sample the value of  $\chi = (p_1 - p_2) / \sigma_{p_1 - p_2}$  was calculated, using  $p_0 \left( \frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2} \right)$  as a convenient estimate of the variance, where  $p_0$  was the percentage promoted in the entire sample. Since there were three independent samples and since it was desired to take account of the sign of  $(p_1 - p_2)$ , the three values of  $\chi$  were summed and divided by  $\sqrt{3}$ , the standard error of their sum. The values of  $n$  shown in Chart VII and Table 6 for comparisons on the attitude items and used in computing tests of significance are "equivalent numbers" computed by the method described in Section II of this chapter in footnote 2.

compared with younger unmarried men in wholehearted personal commitment, tended to get ahead faster, is seen in somewhat different light when we observe that among older married men taken alone those with higher personal commitment were preferred for subsequent promotion, and similarly for younger unmarried men taken alone.

TABLE 6

PROPORTIONS PROMOTED, AS RELATED TO ATTITUDES, HOLDING EDUCATION AND AGE CONSTANT BY STANDARDIZATION

	SAMPLE A <i>Among privates in Sept. 1943, percentage be- coming Pfc's by Jan. 1944</i>	SAMPLE B <i>Among privates in Nov. 1943, percentage be- coming NCO's by Mar. 1944</i>	SAMPLE C <i>Among Pfc's in Nov. 1943, percentage be- coming NCO's by Mar. 1944</i>
Think fair to be drafted	24 (242)	27 (186)	81 (76)
Others	19 (122)	20 (116)	63 (30)
In good physical condition	24 (114)	40 (80)	80 (50)
Others	18 (231)	20 (210)	77 (42)
Seldom worry about combat injury	21 (256)	29 (201)	80 (78)
Others	24 (140)	16 (110)	75 (24)
Expect to do O.K. in battle	25 (270)	32 (139)	81 (74)
Others	15 (103)	15 (127)	70 (26)
Think Army's control not too strict	29 (216)	28 (143)	81 (54)
Others	12 (159)	22 (163)	74 (43)
Think AWOL serious	28 (237)	28 (132)	79 (79)
Others	14 (128)	20 (126)	79 (17)
Think officers interested in EM	26 (193)	29 (173)	80 (55)
Others	16 (122)	19 (135)	73 (44)

Data from same sources as Chart VII.

Numbers in parentheses are "equivalent totals" as used in Chart VII and as described in footnote 2.

In the case both of education and of age or marital condition, other factors than attitudes surely played important parts in selection for advancement, as we have seen.

It will be profitable, in concluding this section, to say a few more words on the role of education with respect to a soldier's satisfaction with his status or job in the Army and with respect to his approval or criticism of the Army. We shall have a good deal to say about this in Chapter 6 on social mobility, in Chapter 7 on job assignment and job satisfaction, and in Chapter 8 on leadership and social con-

trol. But there are two points which might be made here, in anticipation of subsequent analyses:

1. The better educated man was probably better equipped than the less educated to *appraise a given situation realistically*. While it is true that he generally was highly critical of the Army, it can be shown that his criticisms were particularly strong with respect to those areas in which the Army may have been most vulnerable to criticism. Excessive attention to spit and polish, waste of time, and antiquated methods of training, abuse of privileges of rank—with respect to such matters the better educated man was apparently much more sensitive than others, at least as long as he was an enlisted man and not an officer himself. But when it came to matters like the necessity for discipline or the need for conformity to Army mores to the extent of keeping out of trouble, the better educated was even more likely than others to accept the official point of view in both his verbal and nonverbal behavior. An illustration of his tendency to view the facts of a situation more realistically than the less educated is given in the next chapter, which shows how in one theater, India-Burma, the better educated were more likely than others to consider the theater and hence their Army mission important at a time when the theater was, in fact, important. Near the end of the war, the importance of the theater declined and with it declined the better educated men's appraisal of its importance. But the less educated still thought the theater important, now even more so than did the better educated.

Volume III, which reviews experimental studies of the effects of media of mass communication, presents some telling instances of the greater realism on the part of the better educated men.

2. The concept of *relative deprivation* is particularly helpful in evaluating the role of education in satisfaction with status or job, as well as in some aspects of approval or criticism of the Army. This will be spelled out in later chapters where the aspirations of the better educated men to get ahead in the Army, however much they may have felt moved to criticize and resent many things the Army did, are examined with some care. With higher levels of aspiration than the less educated, the better educated man had more to lose in his own eyes and the eyes of his friends by failure to achieve some sort of status in the Army. Hence, frustration was greater for him than for others if a goal he sought was not attained—and this happened often, indeed, as a consequence of the kind of criteria which the Army traditionally employed in selecting enlisted

men for promotion. It is true that his relative deprivation was especially severe in the very early days of the war—as portrayed in Chapter 2 of this volume—but, in spite of the fact that the Army increasingly recognized the advantages of putting educated men who were also good soldiers into leadership positions, much frustration continued. It would be quite wrong to attribute to mere envy the fact that better educated soldiers criticized the officers and non-commissioned leadership more frequently than the less educated. There were too many justifications for criticism to permit such a conclusion, as we shall see in the chapter on leadership. But the tendency to criticize was certainly not lessened by such soldiers' resentments over their lack of status as enlisted men, as compared with the status which they may have had or might expect as civilians with relatively superior social and economic advantages due to their family backgrounds and their schooling.

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This chapter, which analyzes some of the relationships between personal adjustment, as seen by verbal and nonverbal behavior, and the background characteristics of education, age, and marital condition, sets the stage for further analysis of selected problems in many other chapters of these volumes. We turn next to a review of the profiles of adjustment as related to variables involving Army experience, with special attention to differences in attitude as associated with overseas service, type of branch (as Air Corps or Infantry), and length of time in the Army and stage of the war.

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## CHAPTER 5

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# HOW PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT VARIED IN THE ARMY—BY TYPE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE ARMY<sup>1</sup>

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THIS chapter, continuing the analysis of general profiles of personal adjustment, will sketch three important types of variation in attitudes, as related to (1) whether or not the respondent was overseas or at home, (2) whether he was in the Air Corps, Infantry, or other branches of the Army, and (3) whether he had been in the Army a short time or a long time and in what stages of the war he was studied.

The method of matched comparisons, used in Chapters 3 and 4, will provide the main framework, and additional descriptive material will be introduced to give the reader a more intimate view of some of the attitudes than can be provided by bare statistical tables.

### SECTION I

#### OVERSEAS SERVICE AND ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT TO THE ARMY

We can make the following broad generalizations about attitudes of men overseas as compared with those at home:

1. *Personal esprit.* Men overseas tended to be more unfavorable than men at home in responses to questions involving personal esprit, except for questions on physical condition (the latter reflecting, in part, the selective process by which the more healthy were sent overseas).

2. *Personal commitment.* Men overseas tended to be more likely than others to make unfavorable responses to questions in this area,

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<sup>1</sup> By Samuel A. Stouffer and Leland C. DeVinney. Analysis of the data in Section III relating to the growth of resentment against the Army was largely the responsibility of Irving L. Janis.

although the tendency for overseas men to say, more frequently than others, that they had already done their share in the war in many cases reflected the objective facts as well as personal motivations.

3. *Satisfaction with status and job.* Broadly speaking, this is the one attitude area in which it can *not* be said that the overseas men, in general, had more unfavorable attitudes than others. On some types of job questions there were no differences or only slight differences between attitudes of men overseas and those of men at home. On other types of questions—those involving the *importance* or *worth-whileness* of their Army duties—the men overseas tended to be *more favorable* than those at home.

4. *Approval or criticism of the Army.* There can be little doubt that men overseas tended, as a whole, to be more critical of the Army than men at home, though we shall see that some exceptions will have to be made.

The broad patterns of the attitude profile sketched above can be seen in Table 1, based on about a thousand matched comparisons between men overseas and men at home made at various time periods of the war. Table 1 was compiled in the same manner as Table 1 in Chapter 3. A sample of men overseas was matched with a sample of men at home with roughly the same length of service in the Army, the same rank, and the same educational level. Air Corps men overseas were always matched with Air Corps men at home, infantrymen overseas with infantrymen at home, and others overseas with others at home, at about the same time point in the war.<sup>3</sup>

As Table 1 shows, there was a good deal of consistency in the patterns of difference. (The physical condition exception and variations within the area of satisfaction with status and job have already been noted.) In general, however, the *size* of the differences, even

<sup>3</sup> The test of significance used in Table 1 is necessarily different from that used in tables presented earlier since for many surveys samples from more than one overseas theater are compared with the same United States sample. C. F. Mosteller has provided the following formula: If there are  $K$  sets of differences, all the  $n_i$  differences in the  $i$ th set being computed from a single sample value, and if  $m_i$  of the  $n_i$  differences are positive (or if  $m_i$  are negative) then the critical ratio becomes

$$\left[ \sum \left( m_i - \frac{n_i}{2} \right) \right] / \sqrt{\frac{n_i^2 + 2n_i}{12}}$$

where summations are from 1 to  $K$ . When ties occur, they are split evenly between positive and negative differences. Significant differences at the 5 per cent level in Table 1 are indicated by an asterisk. In this test the standard error is larger than for the binomial, except for the special case of  $n_i = 1$ , where, as it should, it coincides with the binomial.



when they were consistent in direction, was not strikingly large, except on items like willingness for further service. This can be illustrated by summarizing the responses to three questions in a world-wide survey made in May 1945 at the time the Army reached its peak strength, just after the defeat of the Germans and before the

TABLE 1

MEN OVERSEAS AND MEN IN UNITED STATES NOT YET OVERSEAS COMPARED IN MATCHED GROUPS ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT

	NUMBER OF COMPARISONS IN WHICH:			Total
	<i>Men overseas were more favorable than men in U.S. not yet overseas</i>	<i>Both were the same</i>	<i>Men overseas were less favorable than men in U.S. not yet overseas</i>	
<i>Personal Esprit</i>				
Good spirits	23	2	113	138*
Sort of time in the Army	6	0	23	29*
Physical condition	27	0	10	37*
Total	56	2	146	204†
<i>Personal Commitment</i>				
Soldier-war worker	9	3	30	42*
Willingness for further service	14	0	39	53*
Willingness to fight Japanese	4	0	32	36*
Willingness for combat service overseas	3	1	36	40*
Total	30	4	137	171
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>				
Chance to show what one can do	38	3	37	78
Importance of job	20	1	6	27*
Worth-whileness of Army duties	57	8	24	89*
Interest in job	23	1	46	70*
Would or would not change job	49	6	39	94
Zeal at the job	33	1	20	54
Total	220	20	172	412
<i>Approval or Criticism of Army</i>				
Square deal in Army	24	2	46	72*
Noncoms—well picked	16	3	36	55*
Officers take interest in men	3	0	53	56*
Officers go through what men do	11	2	65	78*
Point system for discharge fair	28	5	27	60
Total	82	12	227	321

\* Indicates the difference was significant at the 5 per cent level.

For description of test of significance used, see footnote 2.

† Tests of significance are not indicated for this and subsequent totals, since component items are not independent.

capitulation of Japan. The data are shown in Chart I for noncoms and in Chart II for privates.

The stage in the war at which this study was made must be kept clearly in mind. Although the war in Europe was over, the war with Japan still loomed as a long and bloody struggle. Two thirds of the soldiers throughout the world answered the question: "What is your best guess as to how long it will probably take us to beat Japan?" by guessing one year or more.

The men were pretty well agreed that there was a long hard struggle ahead (60 per cent thought we would suffer great losses in men and materials and only 4 per cent thought the war was practically won), but there was also a tendency to want to let the other fellow finish the job. In response to a question as to willingness for further service we see the following for the world-wide cross section:

How do you feel about what you have done in the war?	
I feel I've done my share and should be discharged	46%
I feel I've already done my share, but I'm ready to do more	36
I don't feel I've done my share yet	16
No answer	2
	<hr/>
	100%

The pattern of response to an alternative form of the question with different check-list categories was similar.


In Charts I and II, in order to eliminate differences which might be attributable to education, age, or marital condition, the data have been standardized throughout to hold these factors constant, by the method described in Chapter 4, Section I.<sup>3</sup>

Comparisons of the attitudes of men overseas with those of men at home are complicated by the fact that at this stage of the war the men at home constituted two broad groups—returnees from overseas and men who had not yet gone overseas. Both had a more than average sprinkling of misfits and maladjusted men. As is shown in Volume II, Chapter 10, "Problems of Rotation and Reconversion," there was a tendency to ship maladjusted men home on rotation. The men not yet overseas included two quite different classes—men relatively long in the Army who had been classified as

<sup>3</sup>The number of cases shown after a given bar represents adjusted totals, deflating the actual size of the sample to allow for the effects of standardization on the sampling error. See footnote 2 in Chapter 4. No percentage is shown if based on an adjusted sample of less than 40 cases.

CHART I

ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT, AS RELATED TO ARMY EXPERIENCE. HOLDING CONSTANT PERSONAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS—MAY 1945  
(Noncommissioned Officers)




Data from S-205 and S-213.  
The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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limited service men because of physical or psychiatric defects, and newly inducted recruits, many of whom were just out of school.

CHART II

ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT, AS RELATED TO ARMY EXPERIENCE, HOLDING CONSTANT PERSONAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS—MAY 1945  
(Privates and Privates First Class)



Data from S-205 and S-213.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

Let us look at Chart I and focus on those noncoms with 3 years or more of service. Take men not in the Air Corps. We have:

	PERCENTAGES GIVING FAVORABLE RESPONSES		
	<i>Willingness</i>		
	<i>Good spirits</i>	<i>for further service</i>	<i>Square deal</i>
Overseas combat men	25	22	36
Overseas noncombat men	29	33	36
Returnees with combat experience	27	18	29
Returnees without combat experience	26	30	30
Men not yet overseas	46	66	34

We see that on the "good spirits" question and on "willingness for further service" the overseas combat men and the overseas returnees with combat experience were about alike and less favorable than the men not yet overseas. Likewise, the overseas noncombat men and the returnees without combat experience tended to be about alike and also less favorable than the men not yet overseas. Differences on the "square deal" question were slight.

If we follow out similar comparisons in Charts I and II carefully, we will see that the most consistent patterns are on the question as to willingness for further duty. In all 6 available comparisons the overseas combat men were less willing for further duty than were the men not yet overseas, and in 5 of the 7 available comparisons the overseas noncombat men were less willing than men not yet overseas. On the other hand, in all but 1 of 10 possible matched comparisons, the men still overseas were more likely to be willing for further duty than were the returnees. Combat men, in general, whether overseas or returnees, were definitely less likely to express willingness for further duty than noncombat overseas men or non-combat returnees.

The range on the question as to willingness for further duty is very large, as might be expected, running from 18 per cent among combat noncom returnees with 3 years or more of service, to 88 per cent among privates not yet overseas with less than 1 year of service.

On the good spirits and square deal questions, the range of variation was much narrower and no very consistent results appear, taking the two tables as a whole. In general, on both items the men overseas were more favorable than the returnees, but they split about 50-50 with the men not yet overseas.

The reader must be warned that at the time period of this survey, the combat troops overseas, at least in Europe, were in a relatively good psychological situation as compared with earlier in the war. Quite different was the situation at earlier periods among troops

who had fought long and fatiguing and slow-moving operations or had made assaults on beaches, with more to go. Among combat veterans—infantrymen, field artillerymen, engineers, and others—in Infantry divisions which had been fighting the Japanese, which were surveyed between campaigns during the winter and early spring of 1943–1944, less than 18 per cent said that they were usually in good spirits. This figure included both noncoms and privates. The samples comprised veterans of such widely dispersed campaigns as Burma, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, the Gilberts and Marshalls, and Attu. Among veterans of North African and Italian fighting interviewed in Europe in the same period, the figures averaged almost as low. Further analysis makes it evident that these figures for percentage saying that they were usually in good spirits were not only lower than among combat men near the war's end but also lower than among the comparable noncombat men in 1943–1944.

In May 1945, as compared with combat men in Europe, those in the Pacific were in a somewhat less favorable position psychologically. For a minority in the Pacific as well as in Europe, who would be redeployed or discharged with the defeat of Germany, the war was essentially over, but for others in the Pacific there was no such prospect of a breathing spell, including a trip to the United States, as faced most of the combat men in Europe. Consequently, it is not surprising to find combat veterans in Europe in May 1945 in somewhat better spirits on the average than in the Pacific. The percentages saying they were usually in good spirits, after standardization for longevity and rank as well as background characteristics were:

Europe	32% (655)
Pacific	26% (283)

The difference is present when NCO's and privates are tabulated separately and also appears, in about the same magnitude, on the further duty and square deal questions.

It would have been ideal if a panel of the same combat men could have been interviewed prior to any combat, in intervals between campaigns, and at the war's close. This was not possible. The nearest approach to this was a restudy in early May 1945 of a small sample of combat veterans whose attitudes had been first observed in the fall of 1943 as part of the panel study described in Section III of this chapter. Because of transfers and other factors, those who

could be interviewed in Europe nearly two years after their first interview represented a certain amount of selection. They had fought through a quite severe campaign in the southern part of the western front, and when interviewed were experiencing, like so many other combat troops in Europe, the great relief of victory and respite from immediate danger. The comparison between their responses on the good spirits question when privates back in training camp and their responses nearly two years later is perhaps more of academic interest in exhibiting the amount of stability in response over such a long period of time than of historical interest in typifying attitude trends in general:

		IN TRAINING CAMP IN UNITED STATES, IN 1943		
		<i>Other responses</i>	<i>Usually in good spirits</i>	<i>Total</i>
IN	Usually in good spirits	17%	27%	44%
EUROPE,	Other responses	47	9	56
1945	Total	64	36	100

The total number of cases is 110. There was a net improvement of 8 per cent, but the difference falls short of significance by the test that is shown in Table VI in Section III of this chapter. Although over four fifths of the sample were noncoms, the proportion saying they were in good spirits in the 1945 study was somewhat above the corresponding proportion among combat noncoms in Europe generally. More interesting is the evidence of stability of responses over a period of nearly two years, as indicated by the fact that the point correlation for the above table is .48.

The problems of adjustment of combat troops, both ground troops and flying personnel, involved so many special factors that the larger part of an entire volume—Volume II—is devoted to their analysis.

In the present chapter, we shall devote the remainder of this section to some additional observations on problems of the noncombat soldier overseas. While about two thirds of the soldiers were overseas, only a minority of those overseas actually saw combat. Hence, in dealing with the noncombat soldiers overseas we are dealing with a class of men which was numerically very important. In thinking of the overseas experiences of soldiers, it is easy and natural to fall into the error of thinking of soldiers overseas mainly as combat men. The Army's ultimate task, of course, was to kill the enemy and destroy his means to wage war. It is possible, however, that the old beat-up GI Joes of Mauldin's cartoons or Ernie Pyle's dispatches

or the airmen who flew in the stratosphere through flak and fighter opposition to wipe out another German or Japanese city may, in the public eye, too much symbolize the American soldiers overseas.

A corrective for this is Chart III. In July 1945, just a few weeks before the surrender of Japan, the Research Branch questioned 5,000 company grade officers and 17,000 enlisted men throughout the world on various topics of concern to the Army in its demobilization planning. Among other items an incidental question was asked about combat experience:

- Have you been in actual combat in this war?  
 No  
 Yes, I have been under enemy fire,  
but not in actual combat  
 Yes, I have been in actual combat


"Combat" turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to define, so much so that the Army was obliged to use the admittedly inadequate criterion of award of campaign stars as a substitute for counting days in combat in determining demobilization credit under the point system. Since rear-area troops as well as forward-area troops in an active theater normally received campaign stars, the number of men receiving combat credit under the point system was much inflated as compared with the number in actual combat. The data in Chart III are important for historians, because they represent the Army's only source of tabulated information on the proportion of the Army engaging in combat.<sup>4</sup> The Research Branch experimented with various ways of phrasing the question and check list and finally settled on the introduction of the middle category, "Yes, I have been under enemy fire, but not in actual combat," as a means of identifying those soldiers in the rear who may have been in an enemy air raid or under some artillery bombardment. Responses, of course, are subject to errors in judgment and, possibly, to occasional tendencies to exaggerate. But, all in all, these are about the best data which historians are likely to get. The sampling, as always, was done with care, as attested by the fact that when the subsamples were appropriately weighted, the men's detailed questionnaires provided a frequency distribution of demobilization point

<sup>4</sup> The only other source from which a tabulation might be made would be the service records of the individual soldiers. Such a tabulation would be formidable, indeed, even on a sampling basis.



CHART III

COMBAT EXPERIENCE OF COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AS OF WAR'S END



Officers (company grade only) from S-219; enlisted men from S-218 and S-220 (July 1945).

The relative numbers of cases in the various samples on which percentages in this chart are based are not proportionate to the Army population. Sampling ratios varied depending on the need for additional cases for detailed analysis in certain areas or among officers as compared with enlisted men. The bars for total Army and total overseas represent adjusted figures, after giving each sub-area its proper weight, based on Army strength figures supplied by the Adjutant General.

scores which did not differ by more than 2 or 3 per cent in any broad class interval from the official War Department figures.

Let us look now at Chart III. As of the closing days of the war, we see that only 27 per cent of the officers and enlisted men, alike, said that they had been in actual combat in the war. Over half had not even been under enemy fire, according to their own reports. At this time almost exactly two thirds of the Army was overseas, according to the Adjutant General's records.


Among those overseas, as Chart III shows, about 2 out of 5 reported that they had been in actual combat, about 1 out of 5 reported that they had been under enemy fire but not in actual combat, while about 2 out of 5 officers and men overseas had not, according to their own reports, even been under enemy fire. The proportion who said they had been in combat or under enemy fire was somewhat larger in Europe than in the Pacific. The proportion was, of course, much less in less active areas, not shown separately on the chart. In India-Burma, for example, only 4 per cent of the enlisted men said they had been in actual combat.

A picture of the difference between attitudes of noncombat men overseas and those of men at home which is perhaps more typical than that shown in Charts I and II can be constructed from surveys made during the months preceding or following the opening of the year 1944. Pearl Harbor was more than two years behind, the surrender of Germany and Japan a year and a half ahead. North Africa and Sicily were cleared of Germans, but Normandy was not yet invaded. Japan had been driven out of the Solomons, the Gilberts, and the Aleutians, but the great strides toward the Philippines, Marianas, and the Japanese homeland had not yet begun. Especially important is the fact that the soldiers in the United States were still very numerous and constituted a much more representative group, for purposes of comparison with overseas men, than later in the war when the bottom of the barrel had been scraped.

In Chart IV are graphed, separately, for privates and noncoms, comparative percentages favorable on the same four items representing areas of personal adjustment as were first introduced in Chart I of Chapter 3. Four additional items, three in the general area of satisfaction with status and job and one in the area of approval or criticism of the Army, are also included in Chart IV. Here we can now compare the percentages of men making favorable responses at home with percentages of men making favorable re-

CHART IV

UNITED STATES AND OVERSEAS SERVICE, AS RELATED TO ATTITUDES OF MEN WITH OVER ONE YEAR IN ARMY—EXCLUSIVE OF MEN IN AIR CORPS AND INFANTRY (Late 1943 and Early 1944)



Overseas percentages are the unweighted averages of the percentages in the number of separate theaters or departments indicated by the digit after a particular bar. For number of cases on which percentages are based see Chart V, which also is keyed to the sources of data.

sponses overseas. This illustration is limited to men in the Army at least 1 year and to men not in Air Corps or Infantry.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Most of the men in the Air Corps, of course, were not combat men. But as we shall see in Section II, Air Corps attitudes differed somewhat from others, and the Air Corps is here excluded because its differential weight in different theaters would complicate the interpretation.

Consider, for example, the good spirits question. In the United States 41 per cent of the noncoms said they were usually in good spirits; in seven overseas theaters or departments the average percentage was 32. Among privates in the United States 31 per cent said they were usually in good spirits; overseas the average percentage was 24. Among noncoms, though not among privates, the United States men were more likely than men overseas to say that they would be more useful as soldiers than as war workers. Differences between men at home and abroad were slight on the question as to whether the Army was giving them a chance to show what they could do. On the question, "How well is the Army run?" the men at home, privates and noncoms alike, were more favorable than the men overseas.

Let us repeat a warning already given more than once. When comparing domestic and overseas responses on these and other items, one must be careful to focus attention on *differences* in percentages among different categories of men with favorable attitudes on a given item, not on absolute percentages. The fact that the percentages saying the Army was run pretty well or very well are large does not mean, necessarily, that so many men were actually favorable to the Army—such percentages are artifacts of question wording and of the check-list categories arbitrarily selected as "favorable." Similarly, the fact that only a minority of men said they were usually in good spirits is by no means independent of the format of the question. But when we focus on *differences* in percentages responding favorably to the *same* questions, among men in different categories, the differences can be meaningful in a sense in which the absolute values can not.

The first impression which we get from Chart IV is perhaps the fact that the differences are small. Just as we saw in Table 1 at the beginning of this chapter, the overseas men tended to be somewhat less likely than men in the United States to make favorable responses in the areas of personal esprit, personal commitment, and approval or criticism of the Army, while differences were negligible on the items reflecting satisfaction with status or job.

In Chart IV the reported percentages are unweighted averages of the percentages in those overseas theaters or departments for which data were available for late 1943 or early 1944. The original percentages, by separate areas, on which these overseas averages were based, are shown in Chart V.<sup>6</sup> In Chart V, for example, we see that

<sup>6</sup> The data shown in Chart V are keyed to the following surveys on which they are based (see footnote continued on next page):

the percentage of privates who said they were usually in good spirits was higher in the United States (31 per cent) than in 6 of the 7 overseas areas for which data are available, the exception being India-Burma. Likewise, the corresponding percentage among noncoms (41 per cent) was higher in the United States than in 6 of the 7 overseas areas, the exception being ETO.

It would be particularly intriguing to speculate upon the reasons for variation among the different theaters or departments wherever, as happens in several instances, differences between two overseas theaters are greater than can be attributed to chance. Why were men in Alaska and Panama, for example, less likely to say they were usually in good spirits than men in ETO or the Southwest Pacific? One might suggest that Alaska and Panama had already been bypassed by the war (the Aleutian campaign was over at the time of this study) while men in noncombat jobs in ETO or in the Pacific could be supported by a greater sense of the significance and immediacy of their contribution to the war. But that will not also suffice to explain the relatively high spirits in India-Burma at this period or the relatively low spirits in the South Pacific where the campaign was still actively in progress, nor will it account for some of the individual theater variations in response to the question as to the worth-whileness of one's Army duties. It would be dangerous, therefore, to push speculations very far without an intimate knowledge of local conditions *at the particular time of the study*. There is no doubt that the variable of importance of the task as perceived by the men is one which would need to be taken into account, along with such variables as health, isolation, and boredom, and they will be discussed later in this section.


The data in Chart V should be used, not for the purpose of pinning down differences between particular theaters, but rather for the pur-

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United States (a)	S-95 (2/44) S-106E (6/44)
United States (b)	S-106E (6/44)
United States (c)	S-95 (2/44)
United States (d)	S-64 (7/43) S-87 (12/43)
Central Pacific (a)	S-125 (3/44) S-106H (6/44)
Central Pacific (b)	S-125 (3/44)
Central Pacific (c)	S-106H (6/44)
South Pacific	S-124 (1/44)
Southwest Pacific	S-93 (11/43)
European Theater (a)	S-92 (11/43) S-116 (1/44)
European Theater (b)	S-92 (11/43)
Alaska (a)	S-133 A and B (5/44)
Alaska (b)	S-133 A (5/44)
India-Burma	S-131 (3/44)
Panama (a)	S-115 A and B (2/44)
Panama (b)	S-115 A (2/44)

CHART V


UNITED STATES AND OVERSEAS SERVICE, AS RELATED TO ATTITUDES, BY SEPARATE THEATERS OR DEPARTMENTS. MEN WITH OVER ONE YEAR IN ARMY—EXCLUSIVE OF MEN IN AIR CORPS AND INFANTRY (Late 1943 and 1944)



Letters in parentheses (a, b, c, or d) are keyed to footnote 6 and identify the particular study on which data are based.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

CHART V (Continued)



Letters in parentheses (a, b, c, or d) are keyed to footnote 6 and identify the particular study on which data are based.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

pose of examining the *consistency* with which soldiers in the United States as compared with men on noncombat duty overseas responded more favorably or less favorably to given items reflecting personal adjustment. If, as in the case of the good spirits question in Chart V, and of the questions reflecting approval or disapproval of the Army (how well the Army is run, and officers take interest in men), the men at home were rather *consistently* more favorable than men overseas, our confidence in the significance of such a United States-overseas difference is increased.

It may be well to reverse the emphasis for a moment and ask why the differences between attitudes of men at home and their noncombat counterparts overseas are not greater and even more invariable than observed. In view of the fact, to be discussed later in this section, that the overwhelming desire of the men overseas was to get home, it would not have been surprising to find much sharper sets of differences than were seen in Charts IV and V.

Three factors may help to explain why larger differences did not occur. One is an attribute of the selection process which kept some men at home and sent others overseas; the other two are psychological.

First, it must be remembered that men ordinarily were not sent overseas if they failed to meet certain physical standards. Hence there was a selection physically—men who, in the doctor's opinion, qualified only for limited service tended to be left behind. In the last year of the war, the troops in the United States tended more and more to be either new recruits, overseas returnees, or veteran soldiers who did not leave the United States because of physical defects. Fortunately for our interpretation of Charts IV and V, the effects of the selection process on an overseas-United States comparison could not have been as great in the time period there represented—late 1943 and early 1944—as later.

Second, the concept of differential deprivation and reward introduced in Chapter 4 may help us understand some of the psychological processes relevant to this problem. In general, it is of course true that the overseas soldier, relative to soldiers still at home, suffered a greater break with home ties and with many of the amenities of life in the United States to which he was accustomed. But it was also true that, relative to the combat soldier, the overseas soldier not in combat and not likely to get into combat suffered far less deprivation than the actual fighting man. If he was in rear areas of an active theater he could be, and was, thankful that he was es-



caping the risks of death and the gruelling life of the front lines. (It is hardly surprising, for example, that no more than 10 per cent of the men in a sample of quartermaster and transportation battalions in rear areas in Italy, studied in 1944, said that they wanted to transfer to combat units.) This is not to imply that men overseas did not compare their lot with that of men at home. Of course they did. But in the rear areas of active theaters, or in inactive areas like Alaska after the reconquest of Attu or like Panama or India, there was still the pretty safe assurance that noncombat men would come out of the war unscathed. Although there was bad climate, and boredom and, especially, as we shall see, bitterness at the differential privileges of officers as compared with enlisted men, the enlisted man in such rear areas could still feel, relative to the combat men, that he had got a fairly good break in the Army.

Third, there were periods and places overseas in which a sense of the significance of one's Army job would, on a priori grounds, be expected to be greater than in the United States. When the great push was on in Europe or in the Pacific, the soldier needed little "orientation" to be aware of the importance of what he was doing—even if he was only a humble stevedore or truck driver or road repairer. On the other hand, when a theater had stagnated, or even in an active theater in the intervals between dramatic larger events, the need for orientation among troops overseas was believed by officers in the Information and Education Division to be as great or greater than among troops in the United States. Much more elaborate data, by separate theaters, than are presented in Chart V would be necessary to provide adequate evidence on this point. While the differences between theaters there presented cannot prove or disprove hypotheses, the fact that, *on the average*, as Chart V shows, United States-overseas differences on attitudes toward Army jobs were negligible or reversed—as compared with United States-overseas differences in personal esprit or attitudes toward the Army—is a fact not to be overlooked. There can be little doubt that belief in the significance of one's immediate mission served, for many men, to counteract, at least to some extent, those feelings of deprivation and of injustice which were aggravated by overseas experience.

In Charts IV and V, education, age, and marital condition have not been held constant, by standardization, because of the complications involved in thus handling data from so many separate theaters. However, the data for each theater and the United States

have been broken down by cross tabulation of these background characteristics and the resulting matched comparisons analyzed. They need not be repeated here, since the findings are essentially in the same direction as was reported in Table 1 of this chapter, for matched comparisons of men at home with men overseas.

Studies of Air Corps noncombat troops overseas show essentially the same patterns of differences from attitudes of Air Corps men at home as we have observed in Table 1 generally and in the illustration just presented, which was limited to men in neither Air Corps nor Infantry.

By looking somewhat more concretely at certain of the problems of the overseas man not on combat duty, we can perhaps get a little closer understanding of how variations in overseas experiences could color or fail to color the general attitudes of men. Let us take four types of concrete problems, involving health, recreation, work, and desire to get home.

To begin with, take *health*, attitudes toward which we have already encountered in Table 1 of this chapter. Comparative data on attitudes toward physical condition as between men overseas and matched groups at home are rather sparse, but we have seen in Table 1 that the overseas men were more likely than men at home to say they were in good physical condition. As already has been pointed out, the healthier men tended to be selected for overseas duty.

Nevertheless, health was an especially anxious problem for the Army command in some overseas areas. In many places men were exposed to extreme rigors of heat and cold and in some places ran the risk of disease, for example malaria.

A special comparison of some interest is invited by the contrast in climate as between Panama and Alaska. The questions asked in the two departments are not identically worded but are sufficiently alike in content to throw light on a possible factor in Army adjustment which thus far in this chapter has not been introduced, namely, geographical background of the soldier. Specifically, one might expect men from the Southern states to adapt somewhat better than men from the North to the heat of the tropics, and the reverse in Alaska. After standardizing for education and length of time in the theater, we find that there was no significant difference in attitudes of Northern or Southern men to their physical condition—in either Alaska or Panama. (Responses on this subject, as on all

other attitude items in this chapter, are reported for white soldiers only.)

In Alaska the responses to the question, "On the whole, would you say that your health since you have been at this post has been better, about the same, or worse than it was back in the States?" were as follows, after standardization:

	<i>Men from the South</i>	<i>Men from the North</i>
Better	2%	3%
About the same	45	42
Undecided	6	4
Worse	47	51
Total	100%	100%
<i>Number of cases</i>	373	952

In Panama, responses to the question, "Are you in better physical condition now than when you first came into this area?" were, after standardization:

	<i>Men from the South</i>	<i>Men from the North</i>
Better	4%	6%
About the same	52	48
Worse	44	46
Total	100%	100%
<i>Number of cases</i>	368	1,123

It may be reported here that, in general, neither in the United States nor overseas did noteworthy differences in attitudes between Northerners and Southerners appear, except on questions relating to Negro-white relationships, which are described in a later chapter in this volume. Sometimes an apparent North-South difference would appear, only to be erased when education was held constant, the Northerners, as would be expected, having on the average a higher educational level.

The overseas Research Branches, operating in large part independently from the Washington office, gave a good deal of attention to attitudes toward special local health problems with which the Medical Department of the theater was concerned. In particular, information was sought to aid the theater command in the control of diseases such as malaria or venereal disease in which attitudes of the soldiers toward preventive practices were important.

An illustration of the kind of data obtained on men's attitudes, information, and practices with respect to malaria control is a study made in February 1944 of troops in Guadalcanal and New Georgia, all of whom were on atabrine and supposed to be taking it regularly. One man in 4 said that he did not take his atabrine regularly, while 2 out of 5 of the men said that there was not a close checkup in their outfits to see whether atabrine was taken. At first it seemed paradoxical to find that the proportion who said they always took their atabrine was actually higher (83 per cent of 406 men) in outfits without a close checkup than in outfits with a close checkup (70 per cent of 593 men). However, further analysis showed that the outfits with a less close checkup were located in spots where the need was most obvious to the men, whereas the outfits where the command was trying hardest to enforce taking atabrine, and with less success, were located in spots held longest by our troops and in which sanitation measures for mosquito control had been most effectively carried through. It was troops in the latter localities who were most likely to be careless. Hence it was important to ascertain men's attitudes toward atabrine in order to develop a more effective educational campaign to reinforce commands.

Various misconceptions came to light. For example, a fourth of the men thought that atabrine was likely to have bad effects on one's health and another fourth were not sure about this. (One rumor, quite frequent, was that repeated use of atabrine would induce impotence.) The Army had to walk a narrow path between convincing the men, on the one hand, that malaria was a serious disease, and, on the other hand, that a man who got malaria was still useful in the theater. Most men were sure that malaria was a bad thing to get (only 6 per cent said it was "not very serious" and 4 out of 5 thought it was worse than a broken leg), but half of the men also believed that a man with malaria was no longer fit for service in the tropics. A tenth of the men believed the false rumor that most men with malaria were being sent back to the States—a particularly dangerous idea in view of the strong motivation of the men to go home (for example, two thirds of the men checked their belief that "a man who has been overseas for 18 months has done his full share in the war and deserves to go home," while less than 1 in 5 disagreed outright with the statement).

Special studies of venereal disease problems were made at the request of theater commands in India-Burma, Italy, and the Philippines. Like the malaria studies, the questioning was directed at

practices of the men and their attitudes toward these practices. The anonymous questionnaire procedure standardly used in Research Branch studies proved very well adapted to getting information even on topics which normally would be associated with a good deal of defensiveness or ego involvement. In Italy, for example, it was possible from the men's own questionnaire reports to compute the venereal disease rate in the theater, and this computed rate tallied almost exactly with the Surgeon General's official figures. The kind of information obtained in Italy will serve as an illustration of the type of facts elicited in the venereal disease studies.<sup>7</sup>

While statistical analysis of the men's own responses in Italy showed that approximately 4 cases of venereal disease arose from every 1,000 sexual contacts, there was considerable variation, both in the frequency of intercourse and the probability of getting venereal disease. More likely than others to be continent were the better educated, the older men, and the married men. Men who said they were temperate in the use of liquor were more likely to be continent; or, if they had intercourse, less likely to admit not using prescribed precautions against venereal disease. The venereal disease rate per 1,000 exposures was, of course, much higher among men who said they sometimes used a rubber, pro-station, or pro-kit but had no set procedure than among men who said they always used a rubber and pro-kit or always used a rubber and went to a pro-station. Of all men who reported sexual contacts, only 43 per cent claimed they always both used a rubber and either used a pro-kit or went to a pro-station. Answers to other questions showed that this neglect was not due to unavailability, or to lack of knowledge of availability. As the free answers written by the men indicated, the main objection to the condom was its interference with full enjoyment of intercourse. The main reasons alleged for not going to a pro-station were belief that a condom was sufficient protection, embarrassment at lining up in public for prophylaxis, objections to the sanitary conditions at some pro-stations, ideas as to harmful physiological effects of prophylaxis on the sex organ, and fear of alleged consequences when their outfits were informed officially that they had visited a pro-station. The major reason given for not using pro-kits was that a visit to a pro-station made them unnecessary, but there were also frequent expressions of disapproval, because of the unpleasantness of using them or doubts about their

<sup>7</sup> This study was made in the summer of 1945 and is based on the entire theater, including former combat as well as noncombat troops.

efficacy, especially if the contents had had time enough to deteriorate.

A seven-question information test on venereal disease was given to the men in Italy, and 20 per cent of the men had the right answers to all questions, while 50 per cent were correct on at least six. Men who exposed themselves most frequently and those who already had had venereal disease made just as high scores on the test as other men, which indicates that the problem of control was even more one of attitudes than of information.

Particularly interesting were differences in motivation to avoid venereal disease. In response to the question, "What is the main reason why you yourself want to keep from getting a venereal disease?" the group which had the most intercourse was most likely to check the response, "A venereal disease can ruin your health permanently," while the group which had the least intercourse was most likely to check, "If I caught one I might give it later to someone I love."

The problem of venereal disease was a health problem, and it also was a special case of another class of problems of special concern to the Army overseas—namely, those relating to recreational and leisure-time needs of the soldiers. In view of the isolation and boredom of life in many overseas areas, provision of adequate recreation was a matter of primary concern. Staff planning was done by the Special Services Division and Information and Education Division in Washington, and supplies and some of the trained personnel were sent out by these divisions to the theaters, but it was the responsibility of the local command to use these supplies and personnel effectively. No small part of the work of the overseas Research Branches consisted in ascertaining desires of the men, locating situations in which supplies or their use or both were inadequate, and giving the theater command documentation to support further calls on Washington for assistance.

No adequate data are available permitting a direct comparison of attitudes, of overseas men not in combat, toward the Army's recreational provisions, with corresponding attitudes of men in the United States. The theater research teams were properly concerned with specific local problems, which varied from place to place and from time to time.

Perhaps the most important fact which emerges from the overseas data on recreation is not so much general complaints about inadequacy, as the complacency with which men accepted privations

when they realized that there was little that could be done about them; and the anger with which they responded when some Army personnel at the same stations—especially officers—seemed to be getting more than their share of scarce goods or privileges.

Some overseas men not on combat duty were extremely isolated from the normal amenities of life—few more so, perhaps, than men in Panama and the Caribbean, thousands of whom were scattered throughout jungles of Central America and on tiny islands like Galapagos, in very small detachments sometimes only the size of a platoon, waiting, often in steaming heat and almost always in boredom, for an attack on the Canal which never came. It may be of interest to compare the things done by such men in their off-duty time with things done by men in the same region who were living in large Army posts and often could find urban recreation in places like the city of Panama. Table 2 compares answers of two groups of sol-

TABLE 2

HOW ENLISTED MEN IN PANAMA CANAL DEPARTMENT SAID THEY SPENT THEIR OFF-DUTY TIME, BY RELATIVE ISOLATION OF POST

	PERCENTAGE SAYING THAT THEY ENGAGED IN GIVEN ACTIVITY IN OFF-DUTY TIME YESTERDAY:		
	<i>Least isolated</i>	<i>Most isolated</i>	<i>Difference</i>
<i>Activities engaged in more in least isolated posts</i>			
Went to town or village	26	13	+13
Saw a movie	58	47	+11
Took part in outdoor sports (except swimming or fishing)	22	15	+7
Caught up on sleep	40	33	+7
<i>Activities in which there was no significant difference</i>			
Spent some time with a girl	11	8	+3
Played pool or ping-pong	24	23	+1
Took part in group singing	4	3	+1
Wrote a letter or letters	53	55	-2
Drank beer or liquor	32	35	-3
Read or looked through a magazine or newspaper	62	66	-4
<i>Activities engaged in more in most isolated posts</i>			
Read a book	30	37	-7
Played cards, shot dice, or similar games	17	24	-7
Went swimming or fishing	4	14	-10
Listened to radio	50	61	-11
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>836</i>	<i>408</i>	

S-115A, February, 1944.

diers (degree of isolation classified not by the men themselves, but by the Research Branch on the basis of personal knowledge of the region) to the question: "Think of how you spent your off-duty time yesterday. Then look over the list of items below and check either 'Yes' or 'No' for each item, to show whether you actually did a thing or not."

From Table 2 it is evident that there were differences in the activity patterns and differences in the directions which might be expected, although hardly of the magnitude, in some instances, which one might expect from knowledge of the relative isolation. The least isolated men were more likely than others to go to a town or village or to see a movie or to take part in outdoor sports other than fishing or swimming; the most isolated were more likely to listen to a radio, to go fishing or swimming, to play cards or shoot dice, or to read a book.

Differences by educational level in leisure-time activities were more or less what one would expect. The high school graduates, at both types of posts, were more likely than the non high school graduates to say that they read a book, read or looked through a magazine or newspaper, or took part in outdoor sports, including fishing and swimming. Almost the only activity which the less educated checked more frequently was playing cards or shooting dice. Among the *unmarried* men, those 25 or over, in both types of outfits, were more likely to report reading or listening to the radio; those under 25 were more likely to report writing letters, drinking beer or liquor, or playing pool or ping-pong. Otherwise, there were no age differences in response worth noting. The number of married men under 25 was too small for tabulation, but among the men 25 and over the recreational pattern was about the same for the married as for the unmarried. These married men were more likely to say they wrote a letter or letters, and less likely to say that they drank beer or liquor or spent some time with a girl.

From the responses to various questions, it can be inferred that the men in isolated outposts did not enjoy their assignment. Nevertheless, as an illustration of the fact that such men, in realization of the problems of the Army as a whole, were very little more inclined to blame the Army for lack of recreational facilities than were men closer to the normal amenities of soldiers, responses to the following question may be cited:

Considering everything, do you think the Army does all it can to provide interesting things for you to do in your off-duty time?



	<i>Least isolated</i>	<i>Most isolated</i>
Yes, it does all it can	24%	22%
Does quite a bit, but could do more	52	53
Doesn't do nearly enough, could do a lot more	23	25
No answer	1	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100%	100%
<i>Number of cases</i>	835	403

Differences by educational level, age, or marital condition were negligible, as usually the case with questions dealing with recreation.

The concept of differential deprivation would lead us to look further for a reason why the actually more deprived group of soldiers seemed little more critical than the less deprived group. A clue is seen in the response to another question, as follows:

Considering their responsibilities, how do you feel about the privileges and breaks that officers where you are stationed get?

	<i>Least isolated</i>	<i>Most isolated</i>
Far too many privileges and breaks	46%	40%
A few too many privileges and breaks	22	21
About the right number of privileges and breaks	28	36
Too few privileges and breaks	2	3
No answer	2	—
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100%	100%
<i>Number of cases</i>	835	403

Here we see that the men in the most isolated posts were somewhat *less* likely to say that their officers got too many privileges and breaks than did the men in the posts closer to normal amenities (40 per cent as compared with 46 per cent, a rather small yet statistically significant difference). The differential was consistent among the better educated and less educated, when tabulated separately. The better educated were the more critical in both types of outfits, but especially at the least isolated posts. In other words, at the outposts where officers had to share the same privations as the men, relatively more than in the larger camps, there was somewhat less tendency to be critical of officers' privileges than in the larger camps.

As we shall see in the chapter on leadership, the less the differential between officers and men in the enjoyment of scarce privileges—the extreme case being that of actual combat—the less likely was the enlisted man to be critical of the officers and the easier it was for him to accept the inevitability of deprivation.

The chapter on leadership will document in considerable detail the attitudes toward officers expressed by noncombat men overseas as well as by combat men, and comparisons of these with attitudes toward officers expressed by soldiers in the United States. Suffice it to say here that the overseas noncombat theaters and the rear areas of combat theaters tended to provide the most fertile soil for the development of antagonism. Amenities, especially those connected with off-duty time and recreational facilities, were limited—yet not so limited that officers could not enjoy some amenities in conspicuous contrast to the men. It is possible that no small part of the explanation of the greater criticism of Army management overseas, shown earlier in this section, is related to the antagonism to officers reflected in the patterns of response we saw in Table 1 and Charts IV and V.

We have reviewed some problems of *health* and *recreation* and now will turn to a brief consideration of *work*. This subject will receive more extended treatment in Chapter 7, "Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction." The findings earlier in this chapter showed that attitudes associated with Army job tended to be no worse among noncombat men overseas than among matched groups of men at home. In fact, there was a tendency, not conclusively significant, for overseas men to be more favorable than men at home on such items as attitude toward worth-whileness of Army job or as reported zeal on the job.

As was suggested earlier in this section, it would be particularly interesting if we could pin down by statistical tabulations the role played by a sense of the theater's mission in the total war effort, in so far as that role influenced attitudes toward one's immediate Army job in particular and personal esprit in general. It is a principle of personnel management in civilian industry that men need to be oriented as to the wider significance of their immediate personal tasks. The Army tried to supply such orientation. This was one of the functions of the Information and Education staff in a given area. As we shall see in Chapter 9, "The Orientation of Soldiers Toward the War," the men appreciated orientation meetings even if, as often was the case, they were dull and poorly conducted. They also appreciated orientation through Army newspapers and magazines, radio, and newsmags. Documentation for these statements will appear in the chapter on orientation. But there were times overseas when orientation had pretty tough going. Particularly was this true when a theater, in reality, had lost most or all of its significance in the war.

In a global war, this happened many times. Panama dwindled in importance as the threat to the Canal became more and more remote. Alaska had its great moments when the Japanese invaded the Aleutians and there was danger of further enemy progress; then it dwindled to the dull routines of garrison life. The islands of the South Pacific were scenes of decisive battle, then became merely garrisons in the backwash of war as the forces under MacArthur and Nimitz swept northward to Tokyo. North Africa saw our first conquest of German-held territory, and lapsed into comparative inactivity as our Italian campaign moved northward and its base section shifted to Italy. To the men in the theater who were sweating on the construction of the Ledo Road or ferrying supplies over the Himalayas, India-Burma at one period seemed destined to be the back door through which the conquerors of Japan would march; hardly had the great road been hacked and bulldozed through the jungle when it became clear that the India-Burma route would not be needed. And so it went. To troops left behind the main centers of the war, there was the consolation that as long as they stayed there they were not being shot at, but there also was the frustration of feeling that what they were doing had little meaning. The Army's harassing insistence on the perfection of minutiae, on keeping busy even if there was little really important to be busy at, could serve only to accentuate frustration. Orientation probably could do little in this kind of situation—especially when the better educated, and presumably the better informed, were the most cynical.

An illustration of the phenomenon we have been describing is presented in Chart VI. It shows, at three different points in time, responses to two questions in the India-Burma theater:

How important do you consider this theater in the total war effort?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Very important
- \_\_\_\_\_ Pretty important
- \_\_\_\_\_ Not so important
- \_\_\_\_\_ Not important at all
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

Do you consider your own present job or duty in the Army an important one in the war effort?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Very important
- \_\_\_\_\_ Pretty important
- \_\_\_\_\_ Not so important
- \_\_\_\_\_ Not important at all
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

We see, separately for noncoms and privates by education, how the proportions responding "very important" or "pretty important" to both questions dropped sharply between March 1944—when the land route to China and the air route over the Hump seemed of obvious significance—and the summer of 1945, as the war neared its close.

Also interesting to note are the educational differences. In the spring of 1944 the better educated, both among noncoms and privates, were more likely than the less educated to say that the theater was very or pretty important. As the importance of the theater declined in fact, the responses of the better educated reflect the more realistic appraisal of the situation. By July 1945, fewer of the better educated noncoms than of the less educated would say the theater was very or pretty important (no educational difference among privates).


In July 1945 we have also the attitudes of a cross section of company grade officers toward the importance of the theater (not available in the earlier studies). We see that their appraisal was, as might be expected, most realistic of all. With the officers and the better educated noncoms most likely of all to recognize the diminished importance of the theater, orientation efforts to stimulate enthusiasm by emphasizing the continuing significance of the theater probably could have had little success.

Paralleling the decline in belief in the importance of the theater was a decline in belief in the importance of the individual's own particular job. As the end neared, the officers, though more than others aware of the drop in theater importance, were more likely than enlisted men to consider their own jobs important; just as were noncoms as compared with privates. But as Chart VI shows, belief in the importance of the job went down, step by step, among noncoms and privates alike, as the theater in fact diminished in importance.

Finally, a few words may be said here about the all-pervasive eagerness of the men overseas *to get the job over and return home*. Midway in the war a rotation policy was adopted, which is discussed in some detail in Volume II, Chapter 10, on "Problems of Rotation and Reconversion." It is hardly necessary to document the intense desire of the soldiers to return to the United States, even at relatively early periods of the war. But this section would be seriously inadequate in communicating a flavor of the attitudes among soldiers overseas if it did not at least suggest the strength of feelings on this subject.

CHART VI

ATTITUDES TOWARD IMPORTANCE OF THEATER AND IMPORTANCE OF ARMY JOB AT THREE POINTS IN TIME, BY RANK AND EDUCATION (India-Burma Only)



Officers from S-219; enlisted men for March 1944 from S-131, for May 1945 from S-205, for July 1945 from S-220.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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Earlier in this chapter, dealing with world-wide attitudes near the war's end, we saw what large proportions of men felt that they had already "done my share." But even in late 1943 and early 1944—the time period with which most of the data in this section are concerned—the desire to get home was very great. An illustration of this feeling, which could be replicated with other questions from other theaters, is given in Chart VII, based on a cross section of men in the South Pacific early in 1944. Three fourths of the men felt, for example, that "there is no reason why the Army could not send all men home after two years overseas if it really wanted to," and two thirds felt that "a man who has been overseas for eighteen months has done his full share in the war and deserves to go home." Such feelings were not confined to combat veterans or to men in the theater a very long time, but were shared by large proportions of all important classes of troops in the theater, as further breakdowns of the data in Chart VII would show.


The only exception in direction of response to the six statements in Chart VII is with respect to the statement, "The Army should send men home at the end of two years or so even if this did slow up the war and delay victory a little bit." This statement brought forth a bare majority in disagreement. Taken in context with the other items and with additional information available, this response emphasizes the fact that many men were quite skeptical about whether they were needed overseas, though unwilling to say they wanted to go home if really convinced they were needed.

Misconceptions about the need to keep men overseas a long time were fed by letters from home, especially those telling about other soldiers who had come back from overseas or about soldiers who had not gone overseas allegedly having a "soft" time in the States. Furthermore, the main reason given by the Army for the small extent of rotation was lack of transportation, which many men doubted when they saw ships sail home empty. The men tended to forget that each man sent home on these "empty" ships had to be replaced by a new man on incoming ships already overcrowded. These ideas were freely and often vitriolically expressed in free comments which men overseas were invited to write at the end of their questionnaires—comments about being kept too long overseas outnumbering all others except, in some instances, criticisms of officers' privileges. Some examples from the South Pacific, which could be replicated from other areas:

CHART VII

ATTITUDES TOWARD GOING HOME AMONG SOLDIERS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, IN EARLY 1944

(Each Bar Based on 2,507 Responses)



Data from S-124, February-March 1944

I think a rotation plan should be put in practice and kept. As yet I believe it is propaganda for the public and only a few will be sent home.

It is hell living here in the Pacific. God damn it, get me out of these jungles. Have you forgotten us poor souls that have been overseas?

I think I've had my share being overseas over two years. That's plenty for any man. I would like to get to the good old U.S.A. and get a good meal instead of having powdered eggs and spam. Let them USO boys get some of this chow once in a while, then they will know what it is to sleep in the mud with mosquitoes buzzing around them like a P-38. Then they will know what life is in this damn Pacific.

I've been over here so long until I am getting doubts of what we are fighting for. It seems that everybody back home doesn't know there is a war on. Why in hell don't they send some of their guys over here for a change and let us come home for a while?

We should have a chance to breathe a little fresh air for a while. But I guess you better keep them USO boys back there or there won't be any USO.

As far as I am concerned, I've lost all hope of ever getting back home. My own parents are tearing down my morale, because the radio and newspapers tell them that men who have 2 years overseas are coming home. Why build up false hopes?

It is hard as hell to be here and read in every paper that comes from home where Pvt. Joe Dokes is home again on furlough after tough duty as a guard in Radio City.

In every newspaper you get from home you see where there is soldiers going on a thirty-day furlough and lot of them is from overseas, too.

Every paper we receive from home tells about the USO boys on furlough. Give us a chance.

We receive letters from soldiers who have not yet left the States and who are on their second furlough. Also our parents ask us why we do not ask for furlough or to be reassigned in the States. Rumors at home keep them asking when we are going to return.

They can get transportation to ship men all over these islands and there is no transportation to get home for a furlough. They way it looks now they just set a bunch of men on these diseased islands and forget about them.

They say there is no transportation in the States, but what we would like to know is what the ships carry back that bring the men over.

Now that we have a Navy equal to the combined Navies of the world and are turning out shipping tonnage at a fantastic rate, I can see no excuse for cutting the percentage of men to be returned to the U.S. to 2%. I've had it comparatively easy, still I'm sure that something has gone out of me that I'll never regain.

With all these ships the U.S. is always bragging about being launched there should be adequate transportation to get us home.



Of course, such free comments as these were voiced by those who either felt the strongest about the subject or were the most articulate. But data such as those in Chart VII and comments like these, coming a year and a half before the end of the war, made it no surprise when, as the war neared its end, the overseas sentiment to come home was so vigorous. In June 1945, for example, with Germany defeated and the Japanese war still very much in progress, only 13 per cent of the men in the Mediterranean theater wanted to be transferred to the Pacific. Nearly three fourths wanted to come back to the United States to stay, while 14 per cent expressed a preference to stay for a time in Italy (some of these men fearing that if they went to the United States they would be sent on to the Pacific).<sup>8</sup>

In view of this strong desire to come home, the fact that the general adjustment of noncombat men overseas, as analyzed earlier in this section, compared no more unfavorably with that of men in the United States is all the more notable.

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Summarizing this section of Chapter 5, we have shown that overseas men tended to be somewhat less favorable than their counterparts among soldiers at home in attitude areas reflecting personal esprit, personal commitment, and criticism or approval of the Army.

In satisfaction with status or job, however, they tended to be about as favorable as the men at home—even more so when it came to recognition of the importance of one's Army assignment. In addition to the picture of the attitude profiles in general, we examined in some detail responses from a world-wide cross section near the war's end and from samples of noncombat troops near the midpoint of the war. Finally, illustrations were given of attitudes related to selected specific problems of men overseas, such as health, recreation, work, and desire to return home.

## S E C T I O N I I

### HOW AIR CORPS MEN AND INFANTRYMEN DIFFERED FROM OTHERS IN ATTITUDE PROFILES

Since Volume II contains long and detailed discussions of the Air Corps and the Infantry, especially oriented to combat problems, and since Volume I, Chapter 7 is concerned in part with a study of

<sup>8</sup> From S-205.

attitudes of men in the several branches of the service, including attitudes toward their own branch, we shall attempt no more in this section than to sketch the broad outlines of the attitude profiles.

We shall limit the present analysis to a comparison of attitudes of Air Corps men and infantrymen with men not in the Air Corps or Infantry.

In Table 3 we have the profile of comparisons of Air Corps men with men in branches other than the Air Corps or Infantry. In general, we see that the differences in attitude are quite decisive. In personal esprit, personal commitment, and satisfaction with status and job, the Air Corps men had consistently *more* favorable attitudes. On the other hand, they were *less* favorable in the area of approval or criticism of the Army.

It must be remembered that this table holds education as well as rank, length of service, overseas service, and other Army experience variables constant.

The Air Corps men, as will be shown more in detail in the next chapter, were more likely than others to be noncoms and were more likely to be better educated. The combination of these two variables would have made the picture in Table 3 even more one-sided with respect to personal esprit and personal commitment, if they had not been held constant.

Holding rank constant has the tendency of reducing the sharpness of the differential on satisfaction with status or job, while holding education constant has an opposite effect. The superior status of the Air Corps in the eyes of soldiers was so striking, however, as viewed by the men, that practically all tabulations, whatever variables are used as controls or omitted, show that Air Corps men, compared with others, tended to feel that they were especially fortunate in their assignments. Not that the Air Corps men did not have plenty of complaints to make. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the problem of promotions was a particularly troublesome one in the Air Corps, for precisely the reason that relatively more promotions were possible than in other branches. We shall see in Chapter 6 how the concept of relative deprivation helps us to understand an apparent paradox—why men in the Air Corps, who were on the average most favored by promotions, were also the most critical of promotion policy.

In connection with approval or criticism of the Army, the Air Corps men, because of their superior rank, might have been expected to be less critical of the Army than others; however, because of their

TABLE 3

AIR CORPS MEN AND MEN NOT IN AIR CORPS OR INFANTRY COMPARED IN MATCHED GROUPS ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT

	NUMBER OF COMPARISONS IN WHICH:			Total
	<i>Air Corps men more favorable than men in branches other than Air Corps or Infantry</i>	<i>Both were the same</i>	<i>Air Corps men less favorable than men in branches other than Air Corps or Infantry</i>	
<i>Personal Esprit</i>				
Good spirits	62	4	45	111
Sort of time in the Army	41	7	11	59*
Attitude toward physical condition	57	1	5	63*
<b>Total</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>233†</b>
<i>Personal Commitment</i>				
Soldier-war worker	53	4	12	69*
Willingness for further service	25	0	6	31*
Willingness to fight Japanese	23	0	6	29*
Willingness for combat service overseas	42	2	10	54*
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>183</b>
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>				
Chance to show what one can do	58	2	20	80*
Satisfaction with job	52		11	63*
Importance of job	35	1	7	43*
Worth-whileness of Army duties	65	0	10	75*
Interest in job	52	0	12	64*
Would or would not change job	85	3	6	94*
Zeal at the job	17	0	11	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>447</b>
<i>Approval or Criticism of the Army</i>				
How well Army is run	7	0	18	25*
Square deal in Army	26	0	28	54
Time wasted on trivia	7	1	15	23
Strictness of discipline	13	0	20	33
Noncoms—well picked	16	0	20	36
Officers take interest in men	10	1	36	47*
Officers go through what men do	19	0	34	53*
Point system fair	10	1	18	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>300</b>

\* Significant at the 5 per cent level.

† Test of significance not indicated for this and subsequent totals since component items are not independent.

higher educational level, they might have been expected to be more critical. But in Table 3, both rank and educational level have been held constant in making the comparisons. It might be thought that Air Corps men were reacting against the symbol of the Army in their responses, thinking of themselves as being set apart from the rest of the Army. That might be true to some extent and might account for less favorable responses by the Air Corps men to such questions as, "How well is the Army run?" but it is not sufficient to account for the less favorable attitudes of Air Corps men toward their own Air Corps officers as compared with attitudes of other men in the Army toward their own non-Air Corps officers.

Parallel to Table 3 is Table 4, which summarizes matched comparisons of attitudes of men in branches other than Air Corps and Infantry with attitudes of men in the Infantry. The outstanding difference between these two classes of soldiers is with respect to attitudes toward status and job. Just as the Air Corps men were more favorable in this area than men other than Air and Infantry, so were the latter, in turn, more favorable than infantrymen. In 145 out of 182 matched comparisons this was the case, as Table 4 shows. Looking at the individual items under satisfaction with status and job, one sees two interesting exceptions, however. On the question, "Is what you are doing worth while?" the score was relatively close: Infantry more favorable in 15 comparisons, others in 23. Only 6 comparisons were available of combat infantrymen versus combat noninfantrymen (not shown separately on Table 4) and in all 6 subsamples the combat infantrymen were more likely than others to say that their job was worth while. On the question about zeal on the job, the infantrymen tended, but not significantly more often, to be more likely than others to say they "put everything into it."

In the other areas represented in Table 4, the differences between infantrymen and others are not so decisive as in the area of status and job satisfaction, and there are some variations in results among individual questions within a given area. Take personal esprit: there can be little doubt that infantrymen were less likely than others to say they were in good spirits or were having a relatively good time in the Army. On the other hand infantrymen, who as compared with others were a rather select group from the standpoint of physical stamina, were equally as likely as the others to say they were in good physical condition. The lack of unidimensionality also in the items listed under personal commitment is evi-

dent in the comparisons between Infantry and others. On the soldier-war worker and the combat overseas items, the infantrymen, significantly often on the former item, had the better attitudes. This reflects, in part, the responses of limited service men in the Service Forces, who were least likely of all, on the average, to feel that they should have been drafted and many of whom, of course,

TABLE 4

MEN IN BRANCHES OTHER THAN AIR OR INFANTRY AND INFANTRYMEN COMPARED IN MATCHED GROUPS ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT

	NUMBER OF COMPARISONS IN WHICH:			Total
	<i>Men in other than Air Corps or Infantry were more favorable than infantrymen</i>	<i>Both were the same</i>	<i>Men in other than Air Corps or Infantry were less favorable than infantrymen</i>	
<i>Personal Esprit</i>				
Good spirits	32	1	9	42*
Sort of time in the Army	25	2	11	38*
Attitude toward physical condition	16	0	16	32
Total	73	3	36	112†
<i>Personal Commitment</i>				
Soldier-war worker	8	2	31	41*
Willingness for further service	18	0	6	24*
Willingness for combat service overseas	8	1	12	21
Total	34	3	49	86
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>				
Chance to show what one can do	28	0	1	29*
Importance of job	18	0	5	23*
Worth-whileness of Army duties	23	0	15	38*
Interest in job	31	0	2	33*
Would or would not change job	37	0	1	38*
Zeal at the job	8	0	13	21
Total	145	0	37	182
<i>Approval or Criticism of the Army</i>				
Square deal in Army	15	1	6	22
Time wasted in trivia	13	0	8	21
Officers take interest in men	10	0	35	45*
Officers go through what men do	10	0	22	32*
Total	48	1	71	120

\* Significant at the 5 per cent level.

† Test of significance not indicated for this and subsequent totals since component items are not independent.

did not want overseas service or even qualify for it. On the other hand, as we saw in Section I of this chapter, the combat men were least likely of any to say, toward the end of the war, that they owed the Army further service and this attitude is manifested in responses of infantrymen as compared with others in Table 4. There are not enough different types of questions in the area of attitudes toward the Army to permit confident interpretation. On the square deal question the infantrymen tended to make less favorable responses than others, and the infantrymen tended to be at least as critical as the others and perhaps more so on the subject of wasted time in the Army. But on attitudes toward officers, infantrymen were *more* favorable than other soldiers. How this finding is related to the sharing of danger and deprivation by officers and enlisted men is described in the chapter on leadership and social control.

We can, broadly, summarize the findings in Tables 3 and 4 by saying that in personal esprit and satisfaction with status and job the Air Corps men tended to have the most favorable attitudes, men other than Air Corps and Infantry intermediate, and infantrymen the least favorable attitudes. In personal commitment, both Air Corps men and infantrymen tended to have better attitudes than the others, though the infantrymen were most likely of any, as the war neared its end, to say that they had done their share in the war—a result which was not unrealistic, as the relatively high casualty figures of the Infantry show. In general approval or disapproval of the Army, the men in branches other than Air and Infantry tended to have more favorable attitudes than either Air Corps or Infantry, although in attitudes toward officers the order was Infantry most favorable, others than Air and Infantry intermediate, and Air Corps least favorable.

The Infantry, in more than one respect, was the problem child of the Army from the standpoint of morale. The Army's efforts to cope with the problem are noted in Chapter 7, which also analyzes in detail a number of variables associated specifically with dislike of the Infantry. The chapters on infantrymen in combat in Volume II provide a very substantial body of information as to the reactions of these men when faced with privation and danger.

Because of the differences in profiles illustrated by Tables 3 and 4, one is obliged to take explicitly into account the branch of service in which a soldier served before attempting interpretations of many of his responses to items reflecting adjustment to the Army.

## SECTION III

HOW ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT VARIED BY  
LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY AND BY STAGE  
OF THE WAR

We come, finally, to a problem which is especially difficult to handle, namely, the trends of attitudes through time.


First, without introducing controls, let us simply compare samples at different points of time in successive cross-section studies made in the United States. For illustrative items on which there were exact replications of question wording on cross sections over a considerable time span, the data are shown in Chart VIII. This chart indicates that among the changing population of troops in the United States there was no decisive evidence of an upward or downward trend between early 1943 and the end of the war in personal esprit, as reflected in the good spirits question or in satisfaction with status and job (except for the item on chance to show what one can do). This is in contrast with evidence of a drop between 1944 and 1945 in personal commitment, as represented by the soldier-war worker question, and in approval or criticism of the Army, as represented by several questions.

Substantially the same picture may well have prevailed overseas, although populations shifted so drastically and points of observation were so haphazard that no statement may be made with confidence. Chart IX, based on India-Burma, where the Army population was relatively more stable than in other theaters over a period of two years and where more than an average number of replications of identically worded questions are available, will serve as an illustration. There was no evidence of net decrease of favorable responses to the question, "How satisfied are you with your Army job"; while the decrease on the good spirits question (represented mainly in a drop between June and July 1945) was relatively small as compared with the decrease in the soldier-war worker question and the question involving attitudes toward officers.

Such trend data as represented in Charts VIII and IX, though accurate enough in portraying what representative samples of men at different time periods said, should be interpreted with considerable caution. The problem is intrinsically much more complicated than would be the case in interpreting attitude ups and downs in,

CHART VIII

PROPORTIONS FAVORABLE ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT  
(In Successive United States Cross Sections, 1943-1945)




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CHART IX

PROPORTIONS FAVORABLE ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT  
(In Successive India-Burma Cross Sections, 1944-1945)



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say, the American civilian population. The reason is that the Army population at various stages of the war was changing rapidly, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. As we saw in Chapter 4, the background characteristics of men—age and marital condition, for example—varied at different time periods depending on what groups Selective Service was able to send to the armed forces. As the war progressed, all kinds of selection processes operated—screening out men for Officer Candidate Schools, discharging many of the disabled as well as the psychological misfits, picking out certain types for overseas service and combat service, and leaving others behind. The Army population in the United States at the war's end, as has been indicated in some detail, was a very different population from that observed two years earlier, and it would be unsafe to conclude that differences in attitudes among samples studied at several different time points would necessarily correspond with differences in attitudes among the *same individuals* studied again and again.

Panel studies, though highly desirable, were impractical to carry out on any large scale in the circumstances under which the Research Branch was compelled to operate. An illustration from such a study will be presented later in this chapter, showing that new recruits experienced a quite general deterioration in attitudes reflecting adjustment—especially in attitudes involving expressions of approval of the Army. This study shows also that those who got promoted deteriorated less in attitudes, as would be expected, than those who did not get promoted.

Another approach to the problem of evaluating the variable of time was to observe differences in attitudes *within* a given study, as those differences were associated with length of time in the Army. Men in the Army a long time were not necessarily the same type of men to begin with as men in the Army a short time, in any given survey, and, therefore, one is still faced with serious problems of interpretation. Are the differences due to longevity or merely due to differences in type of personnel? To some extent, differences other than longevity can be ruled out by taking a sample of men in the same branch of service, with the same education, the same rank, doing more or less the same kind of work in the same theater, and then, after they have been subdivided according to length of time in the Army, comparing their responses to attitude questions. One must say, "to some extent," for other uncontrolled variables could conceivably accentuate effects apparently attributable to

Army longevity; or effects actually related to longevity could be masked either by such uncontrolled variables, or if some of the control variables explicitly introduced were not finely enough graduated. In Chapter III, Chart I, without controlling these variables, we saw that as a class the privates in the United States with 6 months or more of service showed quite consistently less favorable attitudes than privates with less than 6 months' service; the attitudes of the latter, indeed, were about as good as, if not better than, those of noncoms with longer service. In the world-wide survey cited in Section I of the present chapter, longevity was introduced in detail as one of the variables. A backward glance at Charts I and II in that section will show there was a consistent tendency for men with longer service in the Army (many other variables held constant) to be less willing for further service than men with less time in the Army, and there was also some tendency, less consistent, for men with longer service to be lower in personal esprit and approval of the Army. Bringing together matched comparisons from many studies made throughout the war, we can get the kind of overall picture presented in Table 5.

This table summarizes analyses of the same basic data as were represented in Tables 1 and 3 in Chapter 3 and in Tables 1, 3, and 4 in the present chapter. Referring to Table 2, Chapter 3, based on a June 1944 study in the United States, the reader can see the process involved. In that table take noncoms 3 years or more in the Army and compare them with noncoms 2 to 3 years in the Army, matched on education and whether Air, Infantry, or other. On the good spirits question there are 6 such matched comparisons in 2 of which the men 3 years or more in the Army are more favorable than men in the Army 2 to 3 years and in 4 of which men in the Army 3 years or more are less favorable. The data for all comparisons of adjacent longevity groups in that illustrative table may be summarized as follows, as the reader himself can verify if he chooses, by counting differences:

<i>Noncoms</i>	+	0	-
Men in the Army 3 years or more minus men in the Army 2 to 3 years	2	0	4
Men in the Army 2 to 3 years minus men in the Army 1 to 2 years	5	0	1
Men in the Army 1 to 2 years minus men in the Army 6 months to 1 year	1	0	2
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	8	0	7

TABLE 5

MEN IN ARMY A GIVEN LENGTH OF TIME AND MEN IN LONGEVITY INTERVAL JUST PRECEDING COMPARED IN MATCHED GROUPS ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT (SHOWN SEPARATELY FOR PRIVATES AND NONCOMS)

	PRIVATES				NONCOMS			
	Number of comparisons in which: Men in Army a given length of time were more favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding same	Both were the interval preceding same	Number of comparisons in which: Men in Army a given length of time were less favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding same	Total	Number of comparisons in which: Men in Army a given length of time were more favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding same	Both were the interval preceding same	Number of comparisons in which: Men in Army a given length of time were less favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding same	Total
<i>Personal Esprit</i>								
Good spirits	40	4	47	91	56	4	57	117
Sort of time in Army	16	1	42	59*	36	2	22	60*
Attitude to physical condition	21	4	33	58	22	4	31	57
Total	77	9	122	208	114	10	110	234†
<i>Personal Commitment</i>								
Soldier-war worker	23	3	25	51	47	3	14	64*
Willingness for further service	2	1	18	21*	2	2	28	32*
Willingness to fight Japanese	—	—	—	—	9	1	18	28
Willingness for combat service overseas	28	2	11	41*	34	3	12	49*
Total	53	6	54	113	92	9	72	173
<i>Satisfaction with Status and Job</i>								
Chance to show what one can do	9	3	53	65*	36	3	32	71
Satisfaction with job	18	4	23	45	24	3	19	46
Importance of job	16	0	27	43*	20	3	13	36
Worth-whileness of Army duties	13	3	37	53*	27	0	20	47
Interest in job	12	1	61	74*	51	3	21	75*
Would or would not change job	30	5	48	83*	50	3	35	88
Zeal at the job	4	3	18	25*	20	0	15	35
Total	102	19	267	388	228	15	155	398

TABLE 5 (Continued)

	PRIVATES			NONCOMS			Total
	Number of comparisons in which: Men in Army a given length of time were more favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding	Men in Army a given length of time were less favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding	Both the same	Number of comparisons in which: Men in Army a given length of time were more favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding	Men in Army a given length of time were less favorable than men in the longevity interval preceding	Both the same	
<i>Approval or Criticism of Army</i>							
How well is Army run	6	16	0	14	10	5	29
Square deal in Army	16	30	5	32	36	1	69
Time wasted on trivia	9	12	1	9	9	2	20
Strictness of discipline	—	—	—	18	6	1	25*
Noncoms—well picked	5	22	0	21	14	1	36
Noncoms—serve under in combat	—	—	—	9	11	2	22
Officers take interest in men	10	34	0	22	32	1	55
Officers go through what men do	7	37	2	21	40	1	62*
Point system for discharge fair	12	9	0	19	15	2	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>354</b>

\* Indicates the difference is significant at the 5 per cent level. For test of significance used see footnote 9.  
 † Test of significance is not indicated for this and subsequent totals since component items are not independent.

*Privates*

Men in the Army 3 years or more minus men in the Army 2 to 3 years	0	0	3
Men in the Army 2 to 3 years minus men in the Army 1 to 2 years	3	1	0
Men in the Army 1 to 2 years minus men in the Army 6 months to 1 year	4	1	1
Men in the Army 6 months to 1 year minus men in the Army less than 6 months	3	1	2
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	10	3	6

From all available cross-section samples, totals like 8-0-7 are combined to form the entry for the good spirits question in Table 5. There evidently was no consistent tendency for noncoms of a given longevity to be more likely to say that they were in good spirits than for noncoms in the preceding longevity interval. As Table 5 shows, among noncoms the longer-service men were more favorable in 56 matched comparisons, tied in 4, and less favorable in 57. Privates showed almost the same pattern, the corresponding figures in Table 5 being 40, 4, and 47 respectively.

If we look at the broad outlines of the findings in Table 5, we see that, when individual items are pooled in the four general attitude areas we have been observing, there are no very striking differences by longevity among noncoms—except possibly a tendency for the noncoms longer in the Army to be somewhat better satisfied with status and job, a finding which would reflect the fact that the proportion of top three graders among all noncoms increased as longevity increased. Among privates, however, men a longer time in the Army tended to have less favorable attitudes than those in the Army a shorter time. This was especially manifested in Table 5 in areas of satisfaction with status and job and of approval or criticism of the Army. On status and job, the longer-service privates were less favorable than others in 267 out of 388 matched comparisons, and on attitudes toward the Army they were less favorable in 160 out of 233. The pattern is consistent for all the individual items within these two areas, except for attitudes on the point system, where there was no appreciable difference in attitudes by longevity. In personal esprit, the longer-service privates also had attitudes inferior to those of shorter service in the majority of comparisons, but the differences were not sharp, except in the item about “sort of time in the Army.” The results on individual items

in the "personal commitment" area for privates in Table 5 are conflicting and hence the total for this area is not particularly meaningful. On the soldier-war worker question there was no appreciable difference by longevity, on the further service question the longer-service men were least willing to stay in the Army, and on preference for overseas combat service the longer-service privates were more likely than others to have favorable attitudes. The last result reflects particularly the quite understandable opinion of men of relatively short service that they had not yet had enough training to want to go overseas, particularly in a combat outfit.<sup>9</sup>

Table 5 combines all comparisons of adjacent longevity groups. If we examine separately a particular set of comparisons—for example, taking only men 2 to 3 years in the Army as compared with those in the Army 1 to 2 years—no very striking exceptions to the general pattern are found. The only noteworthy special case is that of the shortest longevity group among privates. When we compare men 6 months to 1 year in the Army with men under 6 months, we find that the new privates tended quite consistently to have more favorable attitudes than the privates of 6 months to 1 year of service, and that the differences tended to be much more consistent than those found in any other sets of matched comparisons of men in adjacent longevity intervals. On 18 of the 20 separate items shown for privates in Table 5, the proportion of comparisons where privates of 6 months to 1 year were less favorable than privates under 6 months was greater than the corresponding pro-

<sup>9</sup> If, as in this instance, a chain of differences is considered, the conventional sign test is not applicable. The following modification has been derived by C. F. Mosteller: Given  $K$  sequences of numbers, the  $i$ th sequence containing  $n_i$  numbers and hence  $n_i - 1$  differences, among which differences  $m_i$  are positive. The critical ratio can then be shown to be

$$(U - T)/\sigma_T, \text{ where}$$

$$U = \frac{\sum n_i - K}{2},$$

$$T = \sum m_i,$$

$$\sigma_T = \sqrt{\frac{\sum n_i + K}{12}},$$

summations being from 1 to  $K$ .

When each  $n_i = 2$ ,  $\sigma_T^2$  is identical, as it should be, with the variance of the binomial. As  $n_i$  becomes  $> 2$ ,  $\sigma_T^2$  becomes *smaller* than the variance of the binomial. When each  $n_i = 5$ , for example,  $\sigma_T^2$  is exactly one half of the variance of the binomial.

portions among all comparisons involving other longevity intervals.<sup>10</sup> The overall picture may be summarized in the following table:

Questions reflecting:	Privates 6 months to 1 year minus privates under 6 months in the Army				Privates in all other longevity intervals minus those in the preceding longevity interval			
	+	0	-	Total	+	0	-	Total
Personal esprit	12	2	33	47	65	7	89	161
Personal commitment	15	2	13	30	38	4	41	83
Satisfaction with status and job	22	4	84	110	80	15	183	278
Approval or criticism of Army	6	1	38	45	59	7	122	188

One must be careful about generalizing too far from these data, but, taken in conjunction with the panel study of new recruits to be described later in this section, they tend to indicate quite a sharp deterioration in attitudes during the first year of Army life among men who did not rise in that year to noncommissioned rank. The majority of men 6 months to 1 year in the Army were privates (including Pfc's). Among the minority who were promoted to noncom status in their first year, the picture is the reverse. We have already seen in Table 1 in Chapter 3 that noncoms quite consistently had more favorable attitudes than privates in the same longevity intervals. We find also that noncoms 6 months to 1 year in the Army tended to have better attitudes than privates under 6 months:

Questions reflecting:	Noncoms 6 months to 1 year in Army minus privates under 6 months			
	+	0	-	Total
Personal esprit	27	2	7	36
Personal commitment	17	0	8	25
Satisfaction with status and job	73	1	6	80
Approval or criticism of Army	20	2	14	36

The only notable exceptions on individual questions were in attitudes toward officers. Although those NCO's who won their pro-

<sup>10</sup> The two exceptions were the questions on preference for service in a combat outfit overseas (this question has already been discussed in terms of the tendency for men not to express such a preference until their training is completed) and the question on transferring to another Army job (where the impatience of some recruits to get their basic training over and get a unit assignment is reflected in some of the negative answers).



motions early were in relatively good spirits and were, relatively, very well satisfied with their status and jobs, they were no less critical of officers than were the privates newer in the Army. Of 14 matched comparisons available on the officer questions, the NCO's of 6 months to 1 year were more favorable than the privates under 6 months in 5, tied in 1, and less favorable in 8.

In studying time as a variable, one has still another approach to the data. One can compare matched groups at different stages in the war. For example, one can compare attitudes of NCO's 1 to 2 years in the Army in 1943 with those of NCO's of the same longevity in 1944, and in 1945, holding constant education, service in Air, Infantry, or other branches, and whether in the United States or in a particular theater overseas. The simplest procedure for making such comparisons was first to form an unweighted average for a particular year of all the percentages of men in such a subclass who made favorable responses to a particular question. Then that average was compared with the corresponding average for a group with the same characteristics in the preceding year. Some questions were not asked in all years and only a few replications were available on some of the others. The general tendency, however, with practically no exceptions on individual items, was for men in 1945 to have less favorable attitudes than comparable men in 1944 and for men in 1944 to have less favorable attitudes than comparable men in 1943:

<i>Questions reflecting:</i>	<i>Men in 1945 minus comparable men in 1944 (matched in rank, longevity, etc.); and men in 1944 minus comparable men in 1943</i>			
	+	0	-	Total
Personal esprit	51	9	104	164
Personal commitment	15	1	45	61
Satisfaction with job and status	73	0	125	198
Approval or criticism of Army	20	0	47	67

These figures are consistent with the type of data plotted in Charts VIII and IX for cross sections without the introduction of controls, in so far as the areas of personal commitment and approval or criticism of the Army are concerned. One reason why the above data for personal esprit and satisfaction with job and status show sharper indications of deterioration with stage of the war than did Charts VIII and IX is that in the table above rank is held constant. As

will be shown in detail in the next chapter on social mobility, the proportion of the enlisted men who were noncoms increased rapidly and steadily as the war progressed and as the Army succeeded in getting its tables of organization revised. From Chapter 3, Table 1, we saw that noncoms had quite consistently better attitudes than privates. Hence, as the war progressed it was possible for attitudes of privates and noncoms, taken separately, to deteriorate, but for the attitudes of all combined not to register this decline fully because the proportion of men in the noncom group was increasing.

We shall now introduce two case studies to give us a more intimate view of the role of *time* as a variable. First, we shall examine a sample of new recruits on whom it was possible to get successive observations as to attitudes, with a lapse of some months between observations. Second, we shall look at a set of end-of-the-war attitudes reflecting the decreased favor with which the Army was viewed as was portrayed in Charts VIII and IX.

Let us now look at a sample of 420 privates and privates first class, who entered the Army in the summer of 1943 and were surveyed in November 1943 and again in March 1944. These men had gone directly from reception centers to an Infantry division and had by-passed replacement center training.<sup>11</sup>

Chart X compares the responses of these recruits in November and again in March on items of the type previously cited in this chapter, as representing the four areas of personal esprit, personal commitment, satisfaction with status or job, and approval or criticism of the Army. We see that the differences are negligible, except on the question, "How well is the Army run?" on which there was a significant drop from 71 per cent answering "very well" or "fairly well" to 54 per cent.

In Table 6 are shown the fourfold tables with the proportions in a given item who were favorable in both November and March, the proportions unfavorable in both November and March, and the proportion shifting in each direction.

Besides the four items shown in Chart X, data also have been tabulated on some additional items, and the corresponding fourfold tables are shown in Table 6. As Table 6 indicates, there was a significant decline in favorable responses to a question asking, "What kind of physical condition are you in?" but particularly interesting is the fact that, just as in the case of the item on "how well is the

<sup>11</sup> This sample constituted part of the same group of soldiers whose attitudes, by education and age, were related to *subsequent* promotion in Chapter 4, Section V.

Army run," there were significant declines on *all three supplementary items dealing with attitude toward the Army*, namely:


"Do you feel that the Army is trying to control you and other soldiers more strictly and in more ways than it needs to?"

"In general, how serious an offense do you think it is for a soldier to go AWOL?"

"How many of your officers are the kind that always look out for the welfare of enlisted men?"

CHART X

PROPORTIONS IN A PANEL OF 420 INFANTRY RECRUITS WITH FAVORABLE ATTITUDES WHEN FIRST SURVEYED EARLY IN TRAINING AND WHEN RESURVEYED FOUR MONTHS LATER



Data from S-60, November 1943 and March 1944.

The decline from 56 per cent with favorable responses on the officer question to 42 per cent is particularly noteworthy.

Table 6 indicates opposite each item a point correlation coefficient. There is reason to believe that these correlation coefficients, which range from .31 to .63, would have been considerably higher but for the fact that different respondents had quite different experiences in the four months elapsing between the original study and the re-take. A few were promoted to NCO's, many to privates first class, and some got no advancement whatever.

Further breakdown of the data in Chart X and Table 6, not shown here, indicates that on most items some deterioration in atti-

tude was evident among those who either did not receive a promotion or merely went up to private first class. Among those who went from private to NCO, there was an *improvement* rather than decline, on almost all items except those directly in the area of approval or criticism of the Army. Among even these men, favored by the local command, there was as much of a drop as among other men—a decline of 14 percentage points in the proportion saying the Army was run well and a decline of 17 percentage points in

TABLE 6  
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES AMONG A PANEL OF 420 INFANTRY RECRUITS  
DURING A FOUR-MONTH PERIOD

	PERCENTAGES WHO WERE				Total	Point correlation coefficient
	Favorable in Nov. 1943 and		Unfavorable in Nov. 1943 and			
	Favor- able in March 1944	Unfavor- able in March 1944	Favor- able in March 1944	Unfavor- able in March 1944		
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)		
Good spirits	18	12	9	61	100	.49
Soldier-war worker	18	10	10	62	100	.50
Job satisfaction	21	12	10	57	100	.50
How Army is run*	47	24	7	22	100	.33
Fair to be drafted	57	8	9	26	100	.63
Physical condition*	21	14	8	57	100	.50
Worry about injury	55	12	11	22	100	.48
How do in battle	50	13	11	26	100	.49
Army's control*	29	19	13	39	100	.36
Seriousness of AWOL*	47	17	11	25	100	.42
Officer interest in EM*	31	25	11	33	100	.31

\* Shift from November to March is significant at 5 per cent level. By multiplying any percentage in column b by N/100 we get back to the original frequency, which we call B. The corresponding original frequency in column c we call C. The null hypothesis is tested by the formula  $\chi^2 = (|B - C| - 1)^2 / (B + C)$ , with one degree of freedom. For example, for "How Army is run" we have  $B = 101$ ,  $C = 29$ , and  $\chi^2 = (72 - 1)^2 / 130 = 39$ .

the proportion saying that all or most of their officers took a personal interest in their enlisted men.

There can be little doubt, from this study and from other evidence available, that there was a marked increase in critical attitudes and resentment toward the Army during the first few months of Army experience. Why this deterioration?

The vast majority of men did not come into the Army voluntarily. While most selectees did not resist the demands of the Selective Service System which were reinforced by almost all the formal and

informal social controls in civilian society, these men were not likely to regard entering the Army as a matter of their own free choice. Army environment was, therefore, probably perceived as something imposed upon the men. Once they were in the Army, however, this environment could have been accepted with enthusiasm by some with strongest drives to help win the war or to get ahead personally in the Army, and was likely to be resented by those who most strongly objected to being drafted. For the majority, the acceptance of the soldier role probably tended to be passive in character, at least with respect to initial attitudes. This has direct implications for understanding adjustment to Army life among recruits. On the one hand, there would be little overt resistance to the demands made by the authorities. There would be a high degree of external conformity, facilitating acquisition of the elementary overt habits which the Army intended to build up in recruits. But, on the other hand, the passive attitude toward military service implied a relative absence of identification with broad social goals which would serve to deflect attention away from the day-to-day frustrations in the new environment. Recruits were therefore likely to be sharply aware of the deprivational features of Army life.

Upon entering the Army, the average recruit found himself in a highly disadvantageous position. As a trainee, at the bottom of the Army status hierarchy, he was subjected to continual demands from his superiors, regulating the most minute details of his daily life. Not only was the new recruit confronted by the stresses of adjustment to a new way of life, but he also was subjected to highly impersonal treatment and severe discipline from those in charge of his activities. More than any other time in the soldier's Army career, the initial period was characterized by exposure to explicit coercive threats, frequent overt punishment, and almost complete disregard of one's personal feelings.

While there was considerable variation in subjective reactions of recruits to the new social environment, there were probably very few men who escaped the feeling of being oppressed and intimidated. A flavor of the Army world, as perceived by the new recruit, is found in these brief excerpts from a diary kept by a soldier who later became a member of the Research Branch:

The boys are mainly bewildered and, like myself, trying to look tough. We are all tense and unsure of ourselves. (1st day)

I am learning very fast to keep my all too glib and funny mouth shut. (3rd day)

So many things happen here that we cannot explain, or that we cannot prepare for, that our outward attitude is wary, and tough, and often comical. We are scared easily. A blast on a whistle sends us running; the word "ten-Shun!" stops us from breathing; the sight of the Sergeant makes us tremble. The boys who were scared of dying, and those who weren't, see now that it will be a long time before they have an opportunity to do any dying; they are now scared of sergeants, commissioned officers, KP, and humiliation before their fellow men. (5th day)

This morning, as every morning, we climbed out of beds and rushed outside at 5:45, where our profane and abusive sergeant said, among other things, "You think you're soldiers? You are shit!!" . . . "Get good haircut by tomorrow 4:30. Last man I give haircut was in 1926, and he not need one since." . . . "I want good turn-out for church today, udderwise you all go, Yiddish and all of you, hear something you no know before!!" It is enough to see boys pulled out of ranks, and pushed against a barrack wall, and told to run, cough, laugh, or just stand at attention for an hour, to make us well-behaved in ranks. (6th day)

Some of the boys are chafing terribly under the discipline—others are showing up wonderfully. After six hours of marching, a few guys are in a homicidal fury, while others dissipate their frustration in little spite songs, like "Corporal Jackson needs a hump, parlez vous. . . ." (10th day)

Before the parade, we were told to put on our leggings, which are hot, foolish-looking canvas leg covers; after we spent half an hour dragging them on, the order came through to remove them. This arbitrariness makes some guys mad, but after a few weeks in the army most of us aren't surprised at anything. . . . The appalling waste of time down here had me buffaloes, but I'm beginning to catch on now. I carry with me a nail file, shoe rag, metal polishing rag, and writing paper. We can't always do such things in ranks, but when the opportunity arises, I don't pass it up. This may sound funny, but it sure as hell isn't, for half of our time is spent waiting. . . . It is difficult to keep morale at its best peak when so much time's wasted. (11th day)

These quotations illustrate a developmental pattern which doubtless was fairly widespread among recruits during their early Army experience. The initial bewilderment and anxiety ("we are scared easily") gradually declined and, as the recruit became more sophisticated about the nature of Army life, he began to develop resentful and critical attitudes.

Not only have we seen evidence of the decline in favorable attitudes toward the Army in the early months of a recruit's Army experience, but we have also seen signs, in Charts VIII and IX, of a deterioration associated with the late stages of the war.

It is pointed out in some detail in Volume II, Chapter 12, on "The Aftermath of Hostilities" that as the threats to the security of a group are removed, the unity of the group and the controls over its members tend to weaken, and subordination of individual concerns

is replaced by the predominance of these concerns. We shall see, however, as we proceed through these volumes that there were plenty of individualistic concerns throughout the war. It may be that the approaching end of the war did little more than stimulate a more permissive atmosphere for their expression.

In the world-wide cross section taken in May 1945 after the defeat of the Germans but while the battle of Japan still loomed as a long and costly venture, men were asked whether or not they had had a square deal in the Army. Tabulations of the answers to this question secured in this study were shown in Charts I and II in Section I of the present chapter. Throughout the world, when this question was asked, the check list was followed by the words "Any comments?" and several ruled lines were added to permit the writer to say anything he wished.

Because the comments written in response to this invitation throw a good deal of light on the nature of the resentments accumulated throughout soldiers' Army experiences, it will be instructive to examine them in some detail. Following this, we shall make some attempt at estimating the extent of aggression against the Army at the war's end.

About a third of the GI's took advantage of the invitation to write comments. As is usual, in such situations, the overwhelming majority of the remarks (over 9 out of 10, in fact) were critical of the Army. From a properly weighted cross section, these comments were copied on cards, coded, and classified. Considering the negative comments only, it was found that they fell into the following groups:<sup>12</sup>

Generalized resentment	17%
More specific complaints:	
Assignment	28
Promotions	14
Passes, furloughs, rotation	11
Discharge	11
Miscellaneous	19
	<hr/>
	100%

Any such classification is very arbitrary, and the fact that two thirds of the soldiers wrote nothing at all makes a strict interpretation of the findings risky. However, it is rather important to note that a

<sup>12</sup>The data in this section, as elsewhere in this chapter unless otherwise specified, are for white troops only. Negro responses to this question were quite different, with emphasis on racial discrimination in the Army. See Chapter 10, "Negro Soldiers."

large proportion of the specific complaints involved assignment and the closely related problems of promotions.

To quote from a few of the comments in each category will give the reader a more intimate feeling for the spirit of these complaints than can be portrayed by statistical tables. It would be still better if space permitted longer excerpts. But the reader must be warned that any such collection of free answers, however idiomatic, runs serious risks of giving erroneous impressions. After presenting the excerpts, we shall seek to answer statistically, as best we can from available data, the question "How general was the spirit of aggression against the Army at the war's end?"

*Generalized criticism of the Army.* In the category of generalized resentment against the Army are included those comments which did not specify concrete examples of alleged personal mistreatment, but rather indulged in general expressions of criticism and aggression. In these comments (17 per cent of all critical write-ins) the conduct of officers was explicitly mentioned in nearly half of the cases and clearly implied in many of the others. Examples:

I consider the Army tradition bigoted and medieval, utterly out of keeping with our democratic ideals. (IB)

I just don't know the right people. I do believe it is who you know that counts, not what you know. (Oahu)

Politics is placed ahead of intelligence in the Air Corps. (IB)

The man who puts his nose up somebody's ass gets it all and I refuse to do that. (ETO)

There is too much ass kissing and too many people feel with a little rank that they are better than the soldiers who do the fighting and dying. (Italy)

They treat you like a dumb idiot not able to have an opinion of his own and not able to think for himself. (Okinawa)

We are fighting for democratic and free-speaking peoples. The Army has too much class distinction. (ETO)

One person does the work and another gets the credit. (ETO)

I don't like, never have, and never will like the Army. I hate regimentation. I hate to be dominated by people whom I wouldn't even consider giving a job to in civilian life. (US)

I have been promised too much and been given no or little reason to have faith in these promises. (Guam)



All pertinent comments have been made too often to bear further repetition. Professional soldiers have a peculiar method of thinking about which nothing, apparently, can be done. I just don't think even one who thinks we fight for a just cause can be blind to the fact that the Army is a form of fascism of itself. (US)

A promise isn't worth a darn in this Army. (IB)

I hate to be treated as a slave; to be called to do things as one calls a dog. Cheap labor. (Italy)

The Army is a big racket. (ETO)

The American Army is the most blundering successful Army in the World. (Italy)

General comments specifically alluding to officers may be illustrated by the following:

The Army officers I know and have been under have always treated the EM like slaves and no good. (ETO)

A person's immediate CO can either be a good feller or can be otherwise. In my squadron 90% of us believe him to be otherwise. The other 10% obtain their objectives by brown-nosing. (Italy)

My own officers are more interested in women and other things than the job we have to do. (IB)

The officers have got the idea that an EM is just a man to clean his dirt up and take what's left over. That is, most of them, not all. (Italy)

Officers deserve respect and privileges, but they don't deserve the jeeps, gasoline, whiskey, and women that naturally go along. (Oahu)

Too much time is spent building officers' clubs, etc., when very important work has to be done. We aren't in the Army to build officers' Paradises. Most of the officers aren't worthy of the uniforms they wear. (Saipan)

The attitude that an officer can do no wrong was out-dated in the 13th century. (IB)

Criticisms, such as these, of officers will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 8, "Attitudes Toward Leadership and Social Control."

*Assignment.* The comments on assignment constituted the largest single block of specific complaints about personal treatment. It must be remembered that the men had just been asked whether or not they had received a square deal in the Army. In some other context, it is possible that the subject of assignments would not

have loomed so large, especially at this late stage in the war. The comments fall into two general groups, those emphasizing primarily the job and those emphasizing primarily the branch of service. Examples of the first type are as follows:

I studied for 1½ years for the type of work I want (radio) and was licensed in that work. I never was given a chance to do this kind of work in the Army. Why? (Saipan)

The Army spent 4 months plus a lot of money trying to make a truck mechanic out of me. I haven't touched an engine since leaving school. (ETO)

I was a bookkeeper so the Army sent me to airplane mechanic's school. At the same time they were sending mechanics and machinists to clerical school. (US)

Before I came into the Army I was a truck driver—trucks and trailers—that's what my MOS is. I haven't drove a truck. I have been doing nothing but damn labor work. (Guam)

A civil engineer graduate with 12 years experience classified as a weather observer—Nuts. (Oahu)

Illustrations follow of criticisms of assignment to force or branch of service (a majority of the comments in this category, incidentally, came from men who felt they were wronged by being placed in the Infantry):

Had practical knowledge as B 26 mechanic—instead of sending me in Air Corps where I could put my knowledge to use I got stuck as a litter bearer. (ETO)

Had 2½ years experience with airplanes and a high I.Q. and landed in the infantry. (Italy)

3 years of college in electrical engineering—no specialized training in Army. So I wind up a rifleman in the infantry. (Italy)

I was a railroad man and could have helped the Army more if I had been placed in a railway battalion instead of the MP's. (IB)

I have seen combat in Inf. after I was classified Limited Service. My eyes are 20/80 and my heart isn't so good. (ETO)

I volunteered. Was taking Infantry basic when told to go to Air Corps. Why don't they let the men who want the Infantry remain there? (US)

I worked hard and became an Aviation Cadet. I really wanted to fly and do my share. Then Cadets were closed and I was shuffled around aimlessly until I landed in an ordnance outfit, and, gentlemen, now I don't give and am not worth a damn. (ETO)

The problems involved in assignment are analyzed in some detail in Chapter 7, "Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction."

*Promotions.* The phrasing of some of the comments classified under general resentment of the Army suggests that disappointment in promotion may have been at the roots of some of the bitterness there revealed. In 14 per cent of all critical comments, however, injustice about promotions is specifically mentioned. It will be remembered that tabulations of the square deal question showed that noncoms were much more likely to say that they had a square deal than privates. But that is not to say that noncoms were satisfied, in general, with their promotions. Many of the comments cited below are from noncoms, and, as we shall see in Chapter 6, "Social Mobility in the Army," inequalities of promotion rate within non-com grades were productive of much criticism of promotion policy:

My ability and experience have meant nothing as far as ratings were concerned. In most units I have been in, ratings were on a friendship basis not on ability or leadership. (Guam)

I do the work of a Surgical Technician, and get no technician's ratings for it, while some people who don't even know what an aspirin is used for get ratings as technicians. (ETO)

I have spent 32 months overseas, have done my best to do right, haven't got a bad point on my record, had over 400 days of combat, and still a PFC. How does that sound? Well, I know I am not too smart but I have seen them dumber. (ETO)

Too much favoritism and a very poor system of making noncoms. It is not what you know, it is who you know. (IB)

Of course there are many men who have given their lives and were only privates. So I shouldn't be bitching about such a matter as ratings. It burns my ass, though, to see some fellows brownnose themselves into four and five stripes when you know yourself a better man. (ETO)

Right now and for the past year I have done the work of a Master Sergeant. For my type of work the Navy and the British give automatic commissions. I know more about my field than anyone in the Squadron and I still have two stripes—disgusted. (IB)

Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the written-in complaints about promotions were greatest relatively from the Air Forces, which had the most ratings, and least from Ground Force trained troops, which on the whole had the fewest ratings. This seemingly paradoxical finding will be encountered again in another

context in the chapter on social mobility, and a plausible theory advanced and tested to account for it.

*Passes, furloughs, rotation.* Complaints in this area totaled 11 per cent of all criticisms. The frequent failure of the Army command to keep what, in the eyes of the soldiers, were promises with respect to furloughs or rotation home from overseas was to engender a considerable skepticism about the Army's good faith in carrying out demobilization. Examples of comments on passes, furloughs, rotation:

Before coming overseas in 1942 I as well as many others was promised furloughs home which we never got in our time. (ETO)

43 months is a long time to be away from home; even a furlough would help a lot. The Army seems to think we have no feelings. (Oahu)

In forty months I have one 3-day pass and I can't go back to Hawaii for a rest leave. Enlisted personnel seldom get a break. (Guam)

I started fighting at Guam, slept on ground, and food was no good. Then Leyte. After that rested seven days and than a lot more fighting, then Ito Shima and now we are fighting on Okinawa for a hell of a long time. What the hell is fair in that. (Okinawa)

There are many men in the Army, I believe, who have never been home since they entered. I am one of them. (IB)

Never had a chance to see any of my folks after entering the service. Never had a furlough. (Italy)

*Discharge.* About the same number (11 per cent) who said they had not had a square deal with respect to passes, furloughs, and rotation made specific complaints about not receiving a square deal with respect to discharge or demobilization. About three fourths of these men mentioned the point system specifically. The factors counting toward discharge—length of time in the Army, length of time overseas, number of campaign stars and decorations, and number of children—were based closely on soldiers' own preferences as previously determined by the Research Branch. No system could let everybody out first, and from a minority there were complaints when the system was announced. Most vocal of all perhaps were the front-line infantrymen, who felt that campaign stars were not a fair index to combat credit because many rear echelon units got them too. (The Army decided that the records were both too complicated and too incomplete to justify calculating combat credit by days in the line.)

I ought to get out. I have been wounded 3 times and my nerves are wrecked and I don't think I am any more good to the Army. (ETO)

Drafting a man who is employed on a war job into the Army and having him sit on his fanny doing nothing while his family wants him is not a good sound policy. I should be discharged. (US)

I honestly ought to be demobilized. I've been through combat—no good to the Army any more. I'm kaput. (ETO)

I haven't done enough over here to warrant being taken away from my family. (IB)

I feel that the front line doughboys got a very raw deal in the point system. Very few men in actual combat with the Infantry live long enough to get out on points unless they have a family. (ETO)

I and many more like me volunteered for overseas duty but never got there yet. Then the Army comes out with the point system. We don't control who goes over and who stays. (US)

I am in a service squadron servicing a bomb group. In our squadron we are allowed to wear 3 campaign stars while the bomb group personnel have eleven stars. I don't think it's fair. (Italy)

*Miscellaneous specific complaints.* In this group are included all other specific comments (19 per cent). The largest categories involved criticisms of training (3 per cent) and criticisms of medical services (2 per cent). Other comments ran the gamut of Army experience—pay, allotments, insurance, food, etc.—no category including as much as 1 per cent. Also included here were scattered comments about the injustice of Selective Service, which were not properly complaints against the Army. The flavor of comments with respect to training is suggested by the following:

I only got 15 weeks of training before I was in combat and there are lots of men in the states that have been there for 2 and 3 years and still trainees. (ETO)

I have been through the same training for about seven times and it gets monotonous. I've tried to get assigned but to no avail. (Italy)

I've trained in outfits and then when the training is finished the outfit is broken up and I land in an outfit that has just started training. Which is all a waste of time. (US)

Comments about medical care—a subject on which, incidentally, studies throughout the war indicated a relatively high degree of approval in the Army as compared, let us say, with attitudes toward job assignment—may be illustrated as follows:

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When you go to the medics for an ailment that you know you have and doctored for in civilian life they laugh and send you right back to duty. (ETO)

I have several physical defects that hinder me lots. But I can't seem to get the medic to do anything about them. (US)

A man who has an ailment which doesn't totally disable him has very little chance of getting medical attention. (US)

Complaints like those against Selective Service hardly belong in this list of criticism of the Army. But to complete the record a few illustrations may be offered:

I should not have been drafted at 35 with 3 children when there were plenty of single men 20 to 25 not working that still have not been drafted. (IB)

Why should a civilian be kept out of the Army because he works in a defense plant? Anybody can do that after a little practice. Put a uniform on those God-damned civilians. (ETO)

There are other fellows healthier than I am that are in 4F now. (US)

*Favorable comments toward the Army.* It will be remembered that two thirds of the men wrote no comments at all. Also, it will be remembered that of the comments actually written a few were favorable. It cannot by any means be assumed that those who wrote no comments had no criticism to make, nor can it be assumed, either, that the few who took the trouble to speak favorably of the Army were the only ones who were favorable. We will attack the problem presently of estimating the relative proportions of men who at the war's end were aggressive toward or favorable toward the Army. First, to keep the record in balance, we should look at some illustrations of favorable comments toward the Army:

I can honestly say I have no complaints. There is a war to be fought and for what we know is right. We all bitch, including me, but no more than I'd do in regular life. I think it's very fair. (Okinawa)

The U.S. Army is a great place a man should be proud to serve in it. (ETO)

You usually get back from the Army what you put in. (Italy)

When you're in the service you realize that you'll not be pampered and do not expect it. The saying "You're in the Army" and "That's the Army way" help to cover a multitude of sins. All in all, I have no real bitch. (Italy)

My name was drawn first for a furlough back in the states. Have been fairly lucky all along. (Guam)

I've gotten a very square deal. No combat service, rapid promotions. I've been very lucky. (IB)

Have been lucky to be stationed in the U.S. without pulling any strings. (US)

After all they did give my wife fine care when my son was born. (Oahu)

No gripe whatever. All the rough deals I've had have been little things, nothing of any real or lasting importance. (ETO)

I think the Army is doing a swell job trying to be fair with all the fellows. (Italy)

You can't please everyone. Some GI's want too much out of the Army, and then give so little themselves. (ETO)

Step out of line and you will be corrected. Stay in line and life in the Army isn't bad at all. (ETO)

At times I feel as tho I have been pushed around and then I think of the men who are fighting hand-to-hand with the enemy. It's then I know that I have no complaints to make. (Italy)

I've been unusually lucky. Am doing about the most interesting and desirable work within my capacities. Psychiatric social work. (Oahu)

I am doing the same work that I did in civilian life. The Army has sent me to school and I have learned more about my work. I have been very lucky in the service, in many ways. (US)

Let us now turn to the problem of estimating the extent of resentment against the Army among enlisted men at the war's end.

### *Problems of Estimating the Extent of Resentment Against the Army*

One could fill a book with entertaining reading based solely on the penciled comments written on questionnaires from all over the world. Many volumes have already been published of anecdotal accounts of the GI's reactions to his environment—of which some, like Ernie Pyle's and Bill Mauldin's, bid fair to be classics. These are also important contributions to history. Without minimizing the importance of this kind of material, it is necessary to point out that there also should go into the record an estimate of the extent and type of variation of attitudes such as those reflecting approval of or resentment against the Army. That is the primary function of a volume such as the present one.

We have already reviewed a substantial body of evidence showing what types of men tended to be most likely to express approval of the Army—in terms of variation in Army experience and in terms

of variation in background characteristics such as education, age, and marital condition. We now address ourselves to the more difficult problem of attempting to answer the question: "What proportion of the enlisted men, at the war's end, can be said to have been resentful toward the Army?"

The problem is difficult because thoroughly tested measuring devices are not yet available. A single item or an ordinal scale based on many items may be satisfactory for comparing one group of men with another group of men or one point in time with another point in time—provided we focus attention, as we have done throughout this chapter, on *differences* in percentages rather than on *absolute* percentages. No one question, as has been reiterated throughout this chapter, is in itself ordinarily a dependable basis for estimating absolute percentages. Neither is a scale, unless there is some way to determine a "zero point" or a "zero region." Near the end of the war, the concept of an intensity function to be used in conjunction with an attitude scale was developed in the Research Branch, for the purpose of locating a zero point or region of indifference. This technique is described in detail in Volume IV and the student should turn there for critical analysis of the logic behind it and the evidence as to its value and limitations. Alternative methods already have been suggested, and at some future date students may want to rework some of the material in this section with a view to applying still more refined techniques.

We shall now consider a survey made in June 1945 comprising a representative cross section in the United States of returnees from overseas and men not yet overseas. A substantial proportion of these men were eventually discharged within six months of the time of the survey. Since we are dealing with men nearing the end of military service, the opinions which these soldiers expressed at this period, while not necessarily typical of earlier time periods, are relevant for an understanding of the attitudes carried with them when they returned to civilian life.

Using the scalogram technique described in Volume IV, it was found that the following questions formed a content scale of attitudes toward the Army (the full list of answer categories with the "positive" answers indicated is shown in Volume IV):

In general, how well do you think the Army is run?

Do you think when you are discharged you will go back to civilian life with a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the Army?



All things considered, do you think the Army is run about as efficiently as possible, or do you think it could be run better?

In general, do you think the Army has tried its best to see that men get as square a deal as possible?

In general, do you feel you yourself have gotten a square deal from the Army?

Do you feel that the Army is trying its best to look out for the welfare of enlisted men?

In general, how interested do you think the Army is in your welfare?

Each question when presented to the enlisted man was followed by the question:

How strongly do you feel about this?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Not at all strongly
- \_\_\_\_\_ Not so strongly
- \_\_\_\_\_ Fairly strongly
- \_\_\_\_\_ Very strongly

From the intensity questions alone, a quasi-scale of intensity was derived. Each man's content score was then cross tabulated with his intensity score, with the results shown in Table 7. (A low content score meant relatively unfavorable attitudes toward the Army, a high content score meant relatively favorable attitudes.) For each content score a median intensity score was computed. As one can see in Table 7, these medians form a more or less U-shaped distribution. Men at either extreme on the X-axis, the content distribution, tended to be highest in intensity. The lowest intensity score was found in the group with a content score of 10. The cumulative frequency distribution of content scores in Table 7 shows that the majority of men had content scores below 10. In Chart XI the percentage distribution by intensity is plotted against the percentage distribution by content. We see that the minimum point is such that approximately 70 per cent are below it and 30 per cent are above it. If this minimum were a reliable figure, not subject to considerable sampling error, we could interpret Chart XI as showing that the ratio of men with unfavorable attitudes toward the Army to those with favorable attitudes was about 70 to 30 in this survey. More study is needed, however, before such reliance can be placed on a single cutting point. One of various alternative approaches would be to draw a horizontal line arbitrarily through the points at which 50 per cent are relatively more intense and 50


TABLE 7  
ENLISTED MEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ARMY (JUNE 1945)—CONTENT BY INTENSITY SCORES\*

	(Neg.)	CONTENT SCORE																Cum.			
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	Total	%	
(High) 10	49	26	30	46	58	68	81	73	64	50	37	40	32	28	30	22	22	66	797	22	100
9	8	11	15	20	25	31	35	57	40	29	19	19	23	20	20	17	16	405	11	78	
8	3	8	11	15	16	29	44	41	33	38	26	20	22	19	15	17	7	363	10	67	
7	1	7	10	11	22	17	28	35	35	34	25	20	11	12	14	11	4	307	9	57	
6	—	1	7	9	7	19	31	45	26	23	26	16	15	14	10	8	5	268	7	48	
5	—	1	6	7	13	20	27	46	37	27	26	23	12	11	5	5	2	268	7	41	
4	1	—	10	9	8	16	37	29	23	18	27	19	8	7	1	1	214	6	34		
3	—	—	1	3	10	9	24	26	25	28	29	26	14	12	10	4	—	221	6	28	
2	—	—	—	1	3	10	21	40	28	20	33	20	15	15	7	1	—	214	6	22	
1	—	—	—	—	2	1	5	21	24	30	38	29	25	13	12	7	2	2	211	6	16
(Low) 0	—	—	—	—	7	7	24	65	52	47	43	31	25	25	6	7	3	347	10	10	
Total	59	54	78	129	170	223	372	487	409	357	311	267	199	176	131	97	96	3,615	100		
%	2	2	2	4	5	6	10	13	11	10	8	7	5	5	4	3	3	100			
Cumulative %	2	4	6	10	15	21	31	44	55	65	73	80	85	90	94	97	100				
Cumulative % to midpoint of content scale interval	1	3	5	8	12.5	18	26	37.5	49.5	60	69	76.5	82.5	87.5	92	95.5	98.5				
Median intensity score (in percentiles)	87	78	71	69	67	64	54	43	43	41	36	37	43	45	58	64	82				

Data from S-215 A and B.  
\* For the questionnaire items included in the content scale of general attitudes toward the Army, see accompanying text.

per cent relatively less intense. If we do that on Chart XI, we see that the median intensity for relatively *unfavorable* content scores involving about 30 per cent is above the line while the median intensity for relatively *favorable* content scores involving about 10

CHART XI  
GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ARMY—JUNE 1945  
(Curve of Median Intensity Scores)



Data from S-215 A and B

per cent of the men is also above the line. Either procedure, locating a single zero point, or marking off a region of relative indifference, leads to essentially the same broad conclusion—namely, that more men in this survey had unfavorable general attitudes toward the Army than had favorable attitudes.

It was possible to repeat this study on a cross section of men in the United States (preponderantly returnees) in October 1945. Mass demobilization was at its peak and attitudes would be expected to be less typical of earlier periods than those in the June survey. Again we find by the intensity analysis that the majority of the men were unfavorable to the Army. In this study, in fact, nearly 90 per cent lay to the unfavorable side of the "zero point." To what extent the more frequent manifestation of hostility is due to differences in the composition of the samples and to what extent it is due to actual shifts in attitude it is difficult to say. The important fact, however, is that both studies agree in showing that there were more enlisted men at the war's end who were unfavorable to the Army than who were favorable.

A cruder though more direct approach to the problem of estimating whether or not at the close of the war a majority were unfavorable rather than favorable toward the Army would be to take a series of questions, answers to which could be *tentatively* classified in terms of manifest content as favorable or unfavorable and see how *consistent* were the majorities on one side or the other. Perhaps the best material for that purpose is found in one of the last studies made by the Research Branch in November 1945 among men in the United States who had been in the Army at least 2 years or had at least 40 points toward discharge and who were subdivided into three samples: combat returnees, noncombat returnees, and men who had not been overseas.

To each of the three samples the questionnaires were distributed such that every other person received a Form A of the questionnaire while the remaining half received Form B. Thus the samples receiving each form were matched very closely.<sup>18</sup> Form A contained a group of statements which could be presumed to bear a fairly close relationship to attitudes toward the Army. The respondent was asked to check simply whether he agreed or disagreed with the statement. Some of the statements were worded so that a person unfavorable to the Army should have agreed with them, some so that he should have disagreed with them. In Form B a more or less parallel form of each statement appeared, but so worded as to reverse the direction of response. For example, in Form A, a statement read, "Promotion in the Army is based on *what* you know,

<sup>18</sup> Except possibly among combat returnees, of whom 164 received Form A and 196 Form B. Among noncombat returnees 166 received Form A, 150 received Form B. Among men with service only in the United States, 361 received Form A, 367 Form B.

not *who* you know." In Form B, the statement read, "Promotion in the Army is based on *who* you know, not *what* you know."<sup>14</sup>

In all, responses to 20 such pairs of items are available. In 7 instances the results were inconsistent to the extent that on at least one of the three samples by type of Army experience the proportion agreeing with the unfavorably slanted statement differed from the proportion disagreeing with the favorably slanted statement by more than 15 per cent. Responses to the remaining 13 pairs of statements are summarized in Table 8.

The important fact to note in Table 8 is that, *independently* of the way these questions were slanted, the majority of men, nearing the end of their Army careers, checked the responses unfavorable to the Army *on all 13 pairs of questions*. If the majority of men were really favorably disposed toward the Army, such a result would have been exceedingly unlikely. One should not attempt to arrive at a precise figure by, let us say, averaging the proportions in Table 8, since it is fairly obvious from manifest content that while the items must be correlated with attitudes toward the Army they reflect other variables as well.<sup>15</sup> But one can feel pretty confident in view of the consistency, item by item, with which the majority gave unfavorable responses, that the majority were, in fact, unfavorable in general. Eventually, it is to be hoped, the theory of attitude measurement will be sufficiently developed and tested so that it will not be necessary to go into such detail as in this section to get an answer to a relatively simple question and also such that a precise instead of a very rough answer may be forthcoming.

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<sup>14</sup> The instructions were as follows: "Read each statement carefully. You will find that you agree with some and disagree with others. If, on the whole, you agree with the statement, check the word **AGREE**. If, on the whole, you disagree with a statement, check the word **DISAGREE**. There are no right or wrong answers. The only answer to give is your own honest opinion. Remember to check *one* answer for each statement."

<sup>15</sup> The same general result is obtained on 6 items in either Form A or Form B for which no replication was available. On the 7 pairs of items which showed greater than 15 per cent discrepancy in any of the three subsamples, 32 out of the  $6 \times 7 = 42$  negative responses were also greater than 50 per cent and some ran as high as 90 per cent. In every instance, a pair included at least 1 item which elicited unfavorable responses from a majority in all three samples by type of Army experience.

TABLE 8

AGGRESSIVE AND CRITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ARMY AMONG MEN WHO WERE WITHIN A FEW MONTHS OF BEING DISCHARGED (UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 1945; MEN WITH 2 YEARS OR MORE OF SERVICE OR 40 OR MORE POINTS TOWARD DISCHARGE)

	PERCENTAGE EXPRESSING UNFAVORABLE		
	<i>Among men with service only in the U.S.</i>	<i>Among returnees with overseas noncombat service</i>	<i>Among returnees with overseas combat service</i>
"The Army has <i>not</i> done its best to look out for the welfare of the enlisted men." (B*) % agreeing	67	68	75
"The Army has done its best to look out for the welfare of the enlisted men." (A*) % disagreeing	60	53	70
"The Army has <i>not</i> tried its best to keep enlisted men informed about what was going to happen to them." (A) % agreeing	69	71	78
"The Army has tried its best to keep enlisted men informed about what was going to happen to them." (B) % disagreeing	68	66	74
"When the Army <i>says</i> it will do something that the men want, most of the time it ends up by <i>not</i> really doing it." (A) % agreeing	74	74	85
"When the Army <i>says</i> it will do something that the men want, most of the time it ends up by really doing it." (B) % disagreeing	71	64	70
"You can't trust the Army to keep a promise." (A) % agreeing	79	75	77
"You can trust the Army to keep a promise." (B) % disagreeing	84	84	89
"The Army places too much importance on military courtesy." (A) % agreeing	74	70	78
"The Army does not place too much importance on military courtesy." (B) % disagreeing	86	75	84
"The Army places too much importance on spit and polish." (B) % agreeing	73	71	80
"The Army does <i>not</i> place too much importance on spit and polish." (A) % disagreeing	72	71	75
"Promotions in the Army are too slow." (A) % agreeing	78	75	74
"Promotions in the Army are not too slow." (B) % disagreeing	80	65	62

TABLE 8 (Continued)

	PERCENTAGE EXPRESSING UNFAVORABLE OPINIONS:		
	<i>Among men with service only in the U.S.</i>	<i>Among returnees with overseas noncombat service</i>	<i>Among returnees with overseas combat service</i>
"The Army does not try its best to praise and reward the soldier who does an exceptional job." (A) % agreeing	70	70	78
"The Army tries its best to praise and award † the soldier who does an exceptional job." (B) % disagreeing	63	59	66
"Promotion in the Army is based on <i>who</i> you know, not <i>what</i> you know." (B) % agreeing	81	75	80
"Promotion in the Army is based on <i>what</i> you know, not <i>who</i> you know." (A) % disagreeing	78	71	73
"Most officers put their own welfare above the welfare of enlisted men." (B) % agreeing	72	74	77
"Most officers put the welfare of enlisted men above their own welfare." (A) % disagreeing	80	72	81
"On the whole, I think the Army has hurt me more than it has helped me." (A) % agreeing	52	66	62
"On the whole, I think the Army has helped me more than it has hurt me." (B) % disagreeing	53	53	66
"My experiences in the Army have made me more bitter and cynical." (B) % agreeing	55	55	60
"My experiences in the Army have made me less bitter and cynical." (A) % disagreeing	69	63	70
"I get angry more quickly now than I did before I came into the Army." (A) % agreeing	53	52	63
"I get angry less quickly now than I did before I came into the Army." (B) % disagreeing	57	51	56

Data from S-234 A and B.

\* Indicates to which of two parallel samples the question was submitted. See text for more details and size of samples.

† A misprint on the questionnaire. Should have read "reward."

We come now to the end of this chapter on the variation in attitudes reflecting adjustment to the Army by type of Army experience.

In Section I we studied profiles of attitudes as they differentiated men overseas from those at home.

In Section II our concern was with differences in attitude among men in the Air Corps, the Infantry, and the other branches of the Army.

In Section III, just concluded, we inquired how attitudes varied with time, giving special attention to the shifts early in the soldiers' career and to the resentment against the Army which seemed to increase as the war neared its end.

This concludes our general analysis of profiles of attitudes reflecting adjustment to the Army and of their broad implications. Now we are ready to turn to the succeeding chapters, each of which focuses on a more specific set of problems than the chapters just

TABLE 9  
SUMMARY OF ATTITUDE PROFILES SHOWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MATCHED  
GROUPS OF SOLDIERS IN FAVORABLENESS ON VARIOUS ATTITUDES  
REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT TO THE ARMY

	DIRECTION OF DIFFERENCE IN NUMBER OF COMPARISONS IN WHICH THE DIFFERENCE IN PERCENTAGE FAVORABLE WAS POSITIVE:			
	<i>Personal esprit</i>	<i>Personal commit- ment</i>	<i>Satis- faction with status and job</i>	<i>Approval or criticism of the Army</i>
Noncoms <i>minus</i> privates	+	+	+	+
H.S. grads <i>minus</i> not H.S. grads	+	+	-	-
Men 25 and over <i>minus</i> men under 25	No diff.	-	+	+
Married <i>minus</i> unmarried	-	-	No diff.	No diff.
Men overseas <i>minus</i> men in United States	-	-	No diff. (or +)	-
Air Corps <i>minus</i> others than Air and In- fantry	+	+	+	-
Others than Air and Infantry <i>minus</i> In- fantry	+	No diff.	+	-
Noncoms in a given longevity interval <i>minus</i> noncoms in preceding longevity interval	No diff.	No diff.	No diff.	No diff.
Privates in a given longevity interval <i>minus</i> privates in preceding longevity interval	-	-	-	-
Men in a given group in one year <i>minus</i> men in a given group in preceding year	-	-	-	-



concluded. It may help the reader if we sum up the attitude profiles, described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, in a single schematic diagram. This is presented as Table 9.

It will be of interest to note that this table rests on the analysis of comparisons of 8,554 pairs of percentages, each percentage in turn being based on the responses of anywhere from forty to several hundred soldiers.

The next chapters will study a variety of selected problems. Chapter 6, for example, deals with the Army status system and problems of social mobility. Chapter 7 considers job assignment and job satisfaction. Chapter 8 analyzes attitudes toward leadership and social control. Chapter 9 deals with the ideology of the soldier. Many of the problems in these chapters have been touched on, in passing, in the broad outlines of personal adjustment in the Army just presented. But the further discussion attempts to analyze more searchingly, in so far as the Research Branch data permit, certain variations in attitude as they relate to the specific historical Army context in which they occurred.

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## CHAPTER 6

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### *SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE ARMY*<sup>1</sup>

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**I**N CHAPTER 2, when studying the attitudes of soldiers at the outbreak of the war, we observed an ambivalence in attitudes toward the Army's status system.

On the one hand, there was the beginning of criticism of the system, particularly of the castelike gulf between officers and enlisted men which was maintained by formal regulations off duty as well as on duty.

On the other hand, there was desire to get ahead within the system—to climb the ladder of rank.

As the war progressed, the criticism of the status system increased, and this will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 8, "Attitudes Toward Leadership and Social Control." At the same time there was continuing desire for personal advancement within the system, and frustration, on the part of many soldiers, when advancement was blocked. As we have already seen in Section III of Chapter 5, in the world-wide study of free answer responses to the question, "In general, have you gotten a square deal in the Army?" one of the largest blocks of comments made by soldiers whose attitudes were negative concerned injustice with respect to promotion.

Just as there were simultaneous and contrasting strains to criticize the status system in the Army and to rise within it, so also there were contrasting attitudes in the Army toward promotion. On the one hand there was cynicism about promotions as symbolic of real achievement, and on the other hand there was recognition that civilians on the outside—one's family or friends, in particular—might view the situation otherwise. This is clearly reflected in the sharp differences in the percentages of soldiers agreeing, near the end of the war, to the following statements about promotion and status:

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Edward A. Suchman, on the basis of a variety of survey projects too numerous for specific credit, as well as tabulations made by the Machine Records Division of the Adjutant General's Office. The section on differential attitudes toward promotion, by education and branch of service, for men at a given rank and longevity, was the work of Samuel A. Stouffer and Leland C. DeVinney.

	<i>Percentage of soldiers agreeing to the statement</i>
Most <i>soldiers</i> think that if you are only a private or Pfc, it's because you weren't good enough to get a rating.	25
Most <i>civilians</i> think that if you are only a private or Pfc, it's because you weren't good enough to get a rating.	81

The present chapter is organized in three sections: I. Promotion Opportunities; II. Desire for Promotion; III. Factors Determining Which Men Got Promoted.

We proceed first to a brief description of promotion opportunities for officers and enlisted men, showing how these opportunities shifted in the course of the war and indicating, with more detail than was presented in the preceding chapters, how these promotion opportunities varied with longevity, branch of service, education, and age.

## S E C T I O N I

### PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES

The pyramidal status structure of the Army is portrayed in Chart I, which shows the Army at its point of greatest man power—just after VE Day. In fact, there were two pyramids, separate ones for officers and enlisted men, with the few warrant and flight officers occupying a somewhat anomalous status in between the two pyramids.

In view of the fact that most of the officers and men in Chart I—except for those near the top of the officers pyramid, and for a small number in other ranks or grades—were civilians in 1940, it is obvious that there was a vast upward mobility of soldiers during the war. Here were opportunities for millions of men to climb a status ladder and for many of them to occupy positions of authority over other people which they hardly would have dreamed of attaining in civilian life.

The magnitude of the Army's task in providing leadership and of the opportunities for promotion which this afforded is obvious from the fact that the Army grew from a strength of only a quarter of a million in 1940 to a peak strength of over eight million in 1945, among whom were more than three quarters of a million officers. This growth is shown in Table 1.

*Source of Commissioned Officers*

Between July 1, 1940, and June 30, 1945, inclusive, 857,767 men were commissioned as officers. (This is a larger number, of course, than the total officer strength at any given time, since there were also separations.) As Chart II, based on Table 2 shows, out of every 100 officer accessions, about 38 were former enlisted men who completed Officer Candidate School or received direct commissions; 29 were flyers who completed aviation cadet training; 13 were civilians receiving direct commissions (including doctors and other specialists); 13 were reserve officers, ROTC, and CMTC men; while the remaining 7 were former National Guard officers, former warrant or flight officers, or Regular Army accessions such as new West Point graduates.


There we see that commissions to enlisted men, including aviation cadets, accounted for *two thirds* of all the officer accessions between July 1, 1940, and June 30, 1945, while all other commissions accounted for *one third*. While, technically, the flyers commissioned upon completion of aviation cadet courses served as enlisted men during training, a psychologically important distinction must be made between them and other enlisted men who, after service in the ranks, were sent to Officer Candidate School. Many of the aviation cadets went directly from civilian life into cadet training and there enjoyed a special status comparable neither to that of officers nor to that of ordinary enlisted men.

*How Chance to Become an Officer Varied During the War*

Opportunities for enlisted men to become officers varied greatly at different stages of the war. This is shown strikingly in Chart III. Until 1942, most of the commissions went to ROTC men, reserve officers, and specialists commissioned directly from civilian life. Then the tremendous Officer Candidate School training program got fully under way, with 89,922 enlisted men getting commissions from OCS in the last half of 1942 and 90,868 in the first half of 1943. At this point the OCS program was cut back sharply, as will be seen in Chart III. In the remaining two years of the war up to June 30, 1945, fewer OCS commissions were issued than in the first six months of 1943.

Throughout the war a very small number of direct commissions were given to enlisted men, often because of certain specialized or professional skills, and the number stepped up rather sharply as

**CHART I**  
**OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN, BY GRADE, MAY 31, 1945**  
 (In Thousands)




Data from the Adjutant General

TABLE 1  
 HOW THE ARMY GREW  
 (Official Report, the Adjutant General)

	<i>Total strength of Army</i>	<i>Number of male officers</i>
June 1940	267,767	16,624
Dec. 1940	620,774	45,755
June 1941	1,460,998	93,172
Dec. 1941	1,686,403	116,058
June 1942	3,074,184	190,662
Dec. 1942	5,397,674	366,859
June 1943	6,993,102	521,435
Dec. 1943	7,482,434	621,035
June 1944	7,992,868	692,351
Dec. 1944	8,052,693	737,192
May 1945	8,291,336*	772,863*
June 1945	8,266,373	772,583

\* Peak strength.

CHART II  
 MALE OFFICER ACCESSIONS BY SOURCE  
 (July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1945)



the war neared its end. In the first six months of 1945 there were 16,447 direct commissions mostly for battlefield performance.

While the commissions to ROTC men or civilian specialists dropped sharply by the last half of 1942 and continued to decline through the rest of the war, the commissions to aviation cadets mounted steadily, reaching a peak of 64,108 in the first six months of 1944. Then the aviation cadet program was cut back, as battle losses proved less than expected, and, as Chart II shows, the number of commissions thereafter diminished to the end of the war.


TABLE 2  
MALE OFFICER ACCESSIONS BY SOURCE  
(July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1945)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Officer Candidate Schools	280,949	32.7
Direct Commissions to Enlisted Men	44,399	5.2
Total	325,348	37.9
Aviation Cadet Training	246,810	28.8
Direct Commissions to Civilians	112,355	13.1
Reserve Officers Training Corps	87,112	10.2
Officers Reserve Corps	16,622	1.9
Officers Military Training Corps	5,773	.7
Total	109,507	12.8
National Guard	22,543	2.6
Former Warrant or Flight Officers	19,561	2.3
Former World War	17,486	2.0
Regular Army	4,157	.5
Total	63,747	7.4
Grand total	857,767	100.0

As would be inferred from Chart III, the chance of an enlisted man's becoming an officer, relatively slight at first, reached its peak rather early in the war and then diminished rapidly. Table 3 shows this fact directly. Whether we include or exclude commissions from aviation cadet training, the peak comes in the last six months of 1942. The third column of Table 3 shows the number of male officers commissioned from the ranks in a given six-month interval, per 1,000 male enlisted men at the beginning of the interval. This column *overstates* the chance of an ordinary enlisted man's becoming an officer in a given interval since many aviation cadets, as has been pointed out, had only technically been in enlisted status while in

training. The sixth column of Table 3 shows the number commissioned from the ranks (excluding commissions from aviation cadet training), per 1,000 male enlisted men other than aviation cadets at the beginning of the interval. This column *understates* the chance of an enlisted man's becoming an officer in a given interval, in so

CHART III  
 MALE OFFICER ACCESSIONS BY SOURCE  
 (By Six-Month Periods, July 1940 to June 1945)





far as the aviation cadets who were drawn into cadet training directly from the ranks are excluded.

TABLE 3

MALE OFFICERS COMMISSIONED FROM THE RANKS BY SIX-MONTH INTERVALS,  
AS RELATED TO MALE ENLISTED STRENGTH AT BEGINNING OF INTERVAL


	<i>Number of enlisted men at beginning of the six-month interval in thousands (1)</i>	<i>Male officers commis- sioned from the ranks including Aviation Cadets in thousands (2)</i>	<i>Ratio of (2) to (1) X 1,000 (3)</i>	<i>Number of enlisted men at beginning of the six-month interval excluding Aviation Cadets in thousands (4)</i>	<i>Male officers commis- sioned from the ranks excluding commissions from Aviation Cadet Training in thousands (5)</i>	<i>Ratio of (5) to (4) X 1,000 (6)</i>
July-Dec. 1940	249.4	2.3	9	247.5	1.3	5
Jan.-June 1941	572.8	4.1	7	568.1	2.0	4
July-Dec. 1941	1361.5	9.5	7	1352.9	3.6	3
Jan.-June 1942	1562.3	36.3	23	1544.7	25.3	16
July-Dec. 1942	2867.8	117.8	41	2819.5	94.7	34
Jan.-June 1943	4989.1	138.6	28	4902.9	94.0	19
July-Dec. 1943	6358.2	83.0	13	6258.7	34.7	6
Jan.-June 1944	6738.9	75.3	11	6624.5	11.2	2
July-Dec. 1944	7144.6	54.8	8	7062.0	24.2	3
Jan.-June 1945	7127.9	50.4	7	7088.9	34.2	5

### *Opportunities to Become a Noncom*

While the gates of opportunity to become an officer (except through cadet training) began to close rather early in the war, the picture is different with respect to the opportunity to become a noncom. The proportion of all enlisted men who had become noncoms steadily increased throughout the war. As of Pearl Harbor, 20 per cent of the enlisted men were noncoms. By VE Day, nearly 50 per cent were noncoms. The progressive upgrading within the enlisted ranks is shown in Chart IV. The absolute figures are graphed in Chart V. As of June 30, 1945, three and a half million enlisted men were wearing the stripes of a noncommissioned officer. A million and a half were corporals or technicians fifth grade, a million were sergeants or technicians fourth grade, and nearly a million were top three graders—first or master sergeants, technical sergeants, or staff sergeants. The consequence of the increase in proportion of noncommissioned ratings throughout the war was that

later arrivals in the Army—two and a half million men were added to the Army in the two years after July 1, 1943—were not denied a chance to climb the mobility ladder within enlisted ranks, even if their chance of becoming a commissioned officer was negligible. However, promotion to noncom grades was so highly dependent on length of service in the Army that the later arrivals were at a distinct

CHART IV  
ENLISTED MEN BY GRADE, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION  
(December 1941 to June 1945)




disadvantage as compared with men who had served longer in the Army.

How great was the disadvantage of the latecomers is illustrated by Chart VI, which shows enlisted grades as related to longevity based on a 2 per cent world-wide sample of the Army as of December 31, 1944. The Air Force is shown separately, as its promotion opportunities were considerably greater than in the rest of the Army. The chart shows that six months before VE Day three fourths of the men in the Air Force who entered the Army after July 1, 1943,

were still privates and Pfc's, as well as four fifths of the corresponding men in the rest of the Army. If an Air Force man had been in the Army 18 to 30 months, his chances of being a noncom were 6

CHART V  
 ENLISTED MEN BY GRADE  
 (December 1941 to June 1945)




out of 10; if he had been in 31 months or over, 8 out of 10. The corresponding figures for the rest of the Army were 5 out of 10 and 6 out of 10. The great importance of longevity as a factor in promotion is obvious.

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CHART VI

ENLISTED GRADE AS RELATED TO LONGEVITY  
(Based on 2 Per Cent Sample of Army as of December 31, 1944)



### *How Longevity Affected Promotion Chances of Different Age Groups*

As already has been pointed out in Chapter 4, Section II, the Selective Service calls operated in such a way as to bring into the Army men with somewhat different characteristics at different stages in the war. The earliest cohort was of nonfathers 21 to 29 years of age. Because men in this group were in the Army longest, they had the best chance, all else equal, to get to Officer Candidate School, or at least to become noncommissioned officers. Men entering the Army after July 1, 1943, had almost no chance to become

commissioned officers and, as we have seen from Chart VI, much less chance than others to become noncommissioned officers. These men tended to be much younger on the average than other Selective Service cohorts, since the draft age had been lowered to take in 18-year-olds. Also included, however, were older men, fathers, and others who had been exempted in the earlier years of the war. As of December 31, 1945, a representative sample of 107,000 cases collected by the AGO on a world-wide basis showed that among the men who had been in the Army 18 months or less those aged 21 and under constituted 43 per cent, as compared to 25 per cent among those who had been in the Army 19 to 30 months, and only 2 per cent of those who had been in 31 months or over.


How men of different age groups fared in the chance to become noncommissioned officers is portrayed in Chart VII, which shows strikingly how the men aged 21 and under were penalized by their late arrival in the Army. The diagrams in the lower part of Chart VII show age as related to grade, in the AAF and the rest of the Army respectively. The similarity in the patterns of the diagrams in the lower and the upper sections of the chart is striking, as would be expected from the close relationship between longevity and grade which was shown in the preceding chart. For example, among men 21 and under, 46 per cent had been in the Army 18 months or less as of December 31, 1944, and 57 per cent of those in the AAF and 77 per cent of those in the rest of the Army were still privates or Pfc's. Of the men 26 to 29, only 16 per cent had been in the Army 18 months or less, and only 29 per cent in the AAF and 47 per cent in the rest of the Army were still privates or Pfc's.

There is a trace of curvilinearity by age in both the longevity and the grade charts. The men aged 30 or over had, on the average, been in the Army a little less time than the men between 26 and 29 and, correspondingly, their chances to become noncoms were slightly less both in the AAF and in the rest of the Army.

While the youngest men, in particular, were penalized because of their late arrival in the Army, there is evidence that they were penalized to some extent also because of their age—either because they tended to lack the maturity to lead men older than themselves as line noncoms, or because they lacked the technical civilian experience to qualify for technicians' ratings. As is shown in Table 4, *within* a given longevity group the men of 21 and under were somewhat less likely to have become noncoms, in either the AAF or the rest of the Army, than the older men.

CHART VII

AGE AS RELATED TO LONGEVITY AND RANK  
 (WORLD-WIDE CROSS SECTION OF 107,000 MEN AS OF  
 DECEMBER 31, 1944. DATA COLLECTED BY AGO)  
 (Percentage Distributions)



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Other factors, such as education and AGCT score, which went into the determination of who became noncoms, will be discussed later in this chapter.

Summing up the evidence reviewed to this point, we may say that there were great opportunities within the Army to climb the mobility ladder. The chances to become an officer were limited to about 325,000 enlisted men who went through Officer Candidate Schools or were directly commissioned from the ranks, plus about 250,000 men who successfully completed aviation cadet training. But

TABLE 4  
 PERCENTAGE OF ENLISTED MEN WHO WERE NONCOMS, BY AGE,  
 FOR DIFFERENT LONGEVITY PERIODS  
 (World-wide Cross Section of 107,000 Men as of December 31, 1944,  
 Data Collected by AGO)

Length of time in Army	AGE			
	21 or less	22 to 25	26 to 29	30 or over
<i>AAF</i>				
31 months or over	61	80	84	81
19 to 30 months	52	61	65	65
18 months or under	24	30	27	30
<i>All Others</i>				
31 months or over	36	59	65	63
19 to 30 months	35	46	54	54
18 months or under	10	15	23	28

these chances began to dry up about midway in the war, and the later cohorts of enlisted men to join the Army had almost no chance for a commission. By VE Day, nearly three and a half million enlisted men—half of the enlisted strength—had acquired noncommissioned officers' chevrons. The steady increase throughout the war in the *proportion* of noncoms to the total enlisted strength prevented a freeze-out of promotions to men joining the Army in the later period of the war. Nevertheless, promotion to noncommissioned status was so much a function of length of time in the Army that men entering late had definitely less chance of being noncoms, as of a given point in time, than did others. This served particularly to penalize the very young men who were late in being drafted, although there is evidence that youth also was penalized in promotion chances because of other factors. There was a slight tendency for the oldest age groups also to be slightly penalized in promotion chances because of shorter longevity.

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## SECTION II

## DESIRE FOR PROMOTION

Although it is a popular stereotype to view American civilian culture as a classless society, a host of sociological investigations have shown how important the class lines are in our social system. Perhaps the greatest distinction between American and most older European cultures is not the absence of class lines in America as compared with Europe but rather the greater extent of vertical mobility from one class to the next above. This vertical mobility has been made possible throughout American history by the progressive increase in standard of living, through the opening of new lands, and through increase in productivity per man hour by unparalleled use of machine power. It has been facilitated also by the differential birth rate, which encourages mobility from the fertile lower socio-economic strata to fill vacuums left by low fertility in the top classes. To climb the socio-economic ladder is the American dream, and those who do not succeed still are psychologically identified with the process through projecting on their children their own unfulfilled ambitions.<sup>2</sup>

We noted in Chapter 2 the spectacular growth in American education between World Wars I and II and observed the initial impact on the Army institution of the flood of American young men, of whom nearly half were high school graduates or college men. These better educated men included most of those in the higher class positions and also, almost surely, they included most of the men who had the highest concern with upward mobility in civilian life.

Initially, men entered the Army as equals (except for those who came in as officers or officer candidates like many aviation cadets). But it would be reasonable to expect that men who were in higher class positions in civilian life, or who aspired to such positions, would be most concerned to achieve status in the Army and would be most disappointed if they failed.

This expectation tends to be confirmed by studies of the soldiers' own answers on surveys made by the Research Branch. It is illustrated in Table 5, based on a survey of white enlisted men in March 1943 when, as we have seen, promotion chances were relatively high.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1940). The most extensive recent sociological studies of social class in America are those of W. L. Warner and Associates, *Yankee City Series* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941).



This table shows that the proportion wanting to be officers was highest among college men and diminished steadily as one went down the educational ladder. The desire to become a noncom was high in all educational groups, but tended to be lowest at the top and bottom. Some college men, especially in the Air Corps, wanted to be officers but not noncoms, and many grade school men did not want to be either officers or noncoms.

### *Educational Level of Officers*

Ambition to become an officer, as we saw in Table 3, could be fulfilled only by a very small fraction of the enlisted population, in spite of the fact that two thirds of the officers came up from the ranks (including graduates from aviation cadet training). There were no formal educational requirements for most officer positions, but a minimum score of 110 on the Army General Classification Test was required for admission to Officer Candidate School. Because of the high correlation between test scores and education, this requirement automatically eliminated the majority of the men who had not gone through high school.

Table 6, based on a sample tabulation by AGO, shows the comparative educational background of officers and enlisted men who were in the Army, on December 31, 1944. This table shows that two thirds of the officers were men who had attended college—including those who did not graduate from college. The majority of the remainder were high school graduates.

The table also shows that of all college men in the Army, 40 per cent were officers. Of high school graduates only 8 per cent were officers, and the proportion of other groups who were officers is negligible. This table must not, of course, be interpreted as representing the chances of, say, a college man in the ranks becoming an officer. As we have seen earlier, a considerable fraction of the officers did not come from the enlisted ranks. In addition, there is evidence that the educational level of officers commissioned from the ranks averaged lower than that of officers who entered the Army through nonenlisted channels, such as ROTC, Reserve officers, and civilian specialists. Sample tabulations from Research Branch surveys of officers show that of the men commissioned from the ranks (except from aviation cadet training) approximately two thirds were former college men—about the average of the entire officer population. But of the officers who entered the Army without serving in the ranks, about 9 out of 10 were college men. At the other extreme

TABLE 5

DESIRE FOR STATUS IN THE ARMY, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ENLISTED MEN  
(White Cross Section in the United States, March 1943,  
from Research Branch Survey S-32)

	PERCENTAGE SAYING THEY WANTED TO BECOME OFFICERS:			PERCENTAGE SAYING THEY WANTED TO BECOME NONCOMS
	<i>All soldiers</i>	<i>Noncoms</i>	<i>Privates</i>	<i>Privates</i>
<i>Air Corps</i>				
College	68 (246)	51 (107)	83 (139)	66
High school graduates	53 (469)	48 (228)	57 (241)	89
Some high school	45 (325)	44 (107)	45 (218)	93
Grade school	33 (311)	32 (94)	33 (217)	76
<i>All Others</i>				
College	68 (412)	61 (139)	74 (273)	73
High school graduates	51 (848)	47 (281)	54 (667)	77
Some high school	38 (911)	46 (234)	36 (677)	65
Grade school	24 (1,203)	23 (200)	23 (1,003)	52

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

were the Air Corps flyers, somewhat over half of whom had attended college, although most of them had at least graduated from high school.

We see, then, that mobility into the officer class was largely dependent on factors associated with civilian educational achievement. The college men tended to get the preference, but even among college men the majority remained in the ranks. For college men as for all others entering the Army after the midpoint of the war, the

TABLE 6

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN  
(AGO Sample Tabulation, December 31, 1944)

	<i>Enlisted men</i> %	<i>Officers</i> %	<i>Percentage officers among total in Army</i>
College	11	67	40
High school graduates	30	25	8
Some high school	29	7	3
Grade school	30	1	*
	100	100	

\* Less than 1 per cent.

opportunities for commissions were largely closed, as would be evident from Table 3.

### *Educational Level of Noncoms*

For the majority of college men, and for the overwhelming proportion of other men, the only prospect of social mobility in the Army was to climb the ladder of noncommissioned grades. These grades were coveted, as Table 5 has shown. Not only did they represent better pay, freedom from many menial and irksome tasks, and frequently other special privileges as respecting quarters or passes, but they also were a badge of success. To a college graduate many of whose classmates had become Army or Navy officers, achieving a noncommissioned rating was by no means a gratification of ambition—we have seen in Table 5 that some college men said they wanted to be officers but did not want to be noncoms. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that the higher the man's civilian educational level the higher were his chances of becoming a noncom. In the first months of building the wartime Army, the noncommissioned posts, as has been pointed out previously, tended to be filled largely by Regular Army men with lower average education than selectees. But looking only among the Selective Service enlisted men in the Army as of December 1941, we find that 10 per cent of the college men and of the high school graduates had become noncoms, as compared with only 4 per cent of the men who had not graduated from high school. Throughout the war the better educated tended to get promoted faster, and in a world-wide cross section of the Army, taken by the Research Branch in June 1945, shortly after VE Day, we see that the better educated were more likely than others to have achieved the higher enlisted status positions. This is shown in Chart VIII.


Differences are relatively slight among college graduates, men who had attended college but not graduated, and high school graduates, owing in part to the selection factors which drained off men from the highest educational classes to become officers. But lower educational groups fall off sharply in the proportion of men becoming noncoms.

While the general pattern of status achievement, as shown in Chart VIII, bears a direct relationship to desires for status as shown in Table 5—in that classes most desirous of promotion tended most to get promoted—we must not lose sight of the fact that a very substantial proportion, even of the groups most desirous of status, did

not achieve it. For example, as Chart VIII shows, at the end of the war with Germany 38 per cent of the college graduates, 37 per cent of the men who had attended college but had not graduated, and 40 per cent of the high school graduates were still privates or Pfc's. Most of those not achieving even the lowest noncommissioned grades entered the Army relatively late. We have seen ear-

CHART VIII

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTED GRADES BY EDUCATIONAL CLASS  
(World-wide Cross Section, June 1945, from Research Branch Survey S-205)



Numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

lier the dominant role which longevity in the Army played, in according status to enlisted men, in Chart IV for example. How longevity operated to increase or dampen the chances of promotion within each educational group is shown in Table 7. For example, as the top row of Table 7 shows, 84 per cent of the college men who had been in the Army 3 years or more were noncoms, as compared with only 7 per cent among those who had been in the Army less

than a year. At the other educational extreme, the corresponding figures for grade school men were 57 per cent and 2 per cent.

Table 7 also brings out the fact that the same general pattern holds for Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces,<sup>3</sup> separately.

TABLE 7

PROPORTION OF MEN IN A GIVEN EDUCATIONAL CLASS WHO WERE  
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS, BY FORCE AND LONGEVITY  
(World-wide Cross Section, June 1945, from Research Branch Survey S-205)

	PERCENTAGE WHO WERE NCO'S AMONG MEN IN THE ARMY:				
	<i>Under 1 year</i>	<i>1 to 2 years</i>	<i>2 to 3 years</i>	<i>3 years or more</i>	<i>Among all men</i>
<i>All Forces</i>					
College	7 (96)	39 (198)	67 (530)	84 (364)	63 (1,188)
H.S. grad.	2 (263)	38 (285)	66 (799)	83 (687)	60 (2,034)
Some H.S. Grade	5 (220)	28 (257)	50 (721)	68 (553)	46 (1,731)
	2 (175)	30 (171)	36 (518)	57 (507)	38 (1,571)
<i>Air</i>					
College	— (23)	— (37)	82 (211)	91 (158)	77 (429)
H.S. grad.	2 (56)	51 (77)	74 (326)	90 (263)	72 (722)
Some H.S. Grade	— (16)	48 (44)	64 (190)	78 (152)	65 (402)
	— (9)	— (11)	53 (127)	71 (96)	57 (243)
<i>Service</i>					
College	— (17)	45 (78)	64 (183)	86 (102)	64 (380)
H.S. grad.	— (29)	47 (93)	67 (202)	80 (205)	65 (529)
Some H.S. Grade	— (27)	33 (86)	48 (220)	68 (166)	50 (498)
	— (27)	40 (60)	32 (130)	56 (170)	42 (387)
<i>Ground</i>					
College	7 (56)	35 (83)	48 (136)	73 (104)	46 (379)
H.S. grad.	2 (178)	23 (115)	58 (271)	79 (219)	46 (783)
Some H.S. Grade	4 (177)	18 (127)	43 (311)	64 (216)	38 (831)
	2 (139)	18 (100)	31 (261)	48 (241)	29 (741)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

Air Forces had, as has been observed earlier in this chapter (Chart IV), a higher proportion of noncommissioned ratings than the rest of the Army. Relative to Ground and Service Forces, the Air Forces also absorbed a somewhat higher proportion of the better educated men. This is shown in Table 8. The fact that better

<sup>3</sup> In the world-wide survey on which Table 7 was based, it was not possible to equate the troops by forces in the various theaters exactly. Troops were classified on a jurisdictional, not branch of service, basis. All troops under jurisdiction of Air Forces were called Air Forces, all under the jurisdiction of Armies were called Ground Forces, and all in Base Commands in Communications Zones or non-air troops in inactive areas were called Service Forces. In all other Research Branch tabulations reported in this chapter, classification is made on a branch of service, not a jurisdictional basis.

educated men tended more than others to be assigned to the component of the Army which had the highest proportion of noncoms tended to work in the direction of satisfaction of the status drives of those most wanting status. But even in Air Forces, as Table 7

TABLE 8  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY FORCE, OF ENLISTED MEN AT A  
GIVEN EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  
(World-wide Cross Section, June 1945, from Research Branch Survey S-205)

	<i>Air Forces</i>	<i>Service Forces</i>	<i>Ground Forces</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
College	36	32	32	100	(1,188)
High school graduates	36	26	38	100	(2,094)
Some high school	23	28	49	100	(1,781)
Grade school	18	28	54	100	(1,571)

shows, a very substantial proportion of the better educated men did not advance beyond private or Pfc, especially among those entering the Army late.

*Who Were the Most Critical of the Army's Promotion Opportunities?*

Data from research surveys to be presented will show, as would be expected, that those soldiers who had advanced slowly relative to other soldiers of equal longevity in the Army were the most critical of the Army's promotion opportunities. *But relative rate of advancement can be based on different standards by different classes of the Army population.* For example, a grade school man who became a corporal after a year of service would have had a more rapid rate of promotion compared with most of his friends at the same educational level than would a college man who rose to the same grade in a year. Hence we would expect, at a given rank and a given longevity, that the better educated would be more likely than others to complain of the slowness of promotion. The facts, as we shall see, tend to bear this out. The better educated, in spite of their superior chances of promotion, were the most critical.

A similar phenomenon appeared to operate between different branches of the service. This, along with the differentials by rank and education, is illustrated in Chart IX. Here the responses of Military Police to the question, "Do you think a soldier with ability has a good chance for promotion in the Army?" are compared with responses of Air Corps men, in early 1944. Longevity is held

roughly constant by taking only men who had been in the Army 1 to 2 years. It will be noted that more of the less educated, among both privates and noncoms in both branches, had favorable opinions than did the better educated. For example, among privates and Pfc's in the Military Police, 33 per cent of the less educated said that a soldier with ability had a very good chance for promotion, as compared with 21 per cent of the better educated privates and Pfc's. Finally, it will be seen, among both privates and noncoms in each educational group, that the Air Corps men tended to take a dimmer view of promotion opportunities for men of ability in the Army than did the Military Police.


Without reference to the theory that such opinions by soldiers represent a relationship between their expectations and their achievements relative to others *in the same boat with them*, such a finding would be paradoxical, indeed. For chances of promotion in the Military Police were about the worst in any branch of the Army—among this sample of men in the Army 1 to 2 years, only 24 per cent of MP's were noncoms as compared with 47 per cent of the Air Corps men. The MP's felt, too, that as a *branch* the Military Police had been discriminated against in getting ratings, two thirds of them saying in answer to another question that MP's do not have as good a chance for promotion as men in other branches.

But consider a high school graduate or college man in the Military Police with Army longevity of 1 to 2 years. The chances of his being a noncom were 34 out of 100, based on the proportions of noncoms in this sample at this time. If he earned the rating, he was one of the top third among his fellows of equal educational status. If he failed to earn the rating, he was in the same boat with two thirds of his fellows with equal schooling. Contrast him with the Air Corps man of the same education and longevity. The chances of the latter's being a noncom were 56 in 100, based on the proportions in this sample at this time. If he had earned a rating, so had the majority of his fellows in the branch, and his achievement was relatively less conspicuous than in the MP's. If he had failed to earn a rating, while the majority had succeeded, he had more reason to feel a sense of personal frustration, which could be expressed as criticism of the promotion system, than if he were one of two thirds in the same boat, as among the MP's.

The process would work in the same way among the less educated. In both the Military Police Branch and the Air Corps, the promotion chances of the less educated were inferior to the chances of

### CHART IX

#### OPINIONS ABOUT PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY—COMPARISONS BY EDUCATION AND RANK BETWEEN MILITARY POLICE AND AIR CORPS (White Enlisted Men in the Army 1 to 2 Years, Continental United States)



Military Police data from special survey of a representative cross section of MP's, S-107, March 1944. Air Corps data are a segment from a representative cross section of all white EM in United States, S-95, January 1944.



others. In the MP sample, only 17 per cent of the less educated were noncoms; in the Air Corps sample, the corresponding figure was 47 per cent. An MP who did not complete high school would feel unusually rewarded compared with others in his outfit in becoming a noncom; one who remained a private had so much company that he hardly could view discrimination against him as a reflection on his personal competence. In the Air Corps, those with ratings had almost as much company as those who remained privates—with less room for personal satisfaction over comparative achievement and more room for dissatisfaction over comparative failure to climb the status ladder.

While the psychological mechanisms seem to operate as described above in producing the pattern of opinions about promotion possibilities, we must not lose sight of the fact that on the average those with ratings had more favorable opinions about promotion than those without. Nor must we jump to the conclusion that men who were critical of promotion policy were necessarily dissatisfied with their Army jobs. True, cross tabulation, within a particular subgroup, of opinions about promotion and expressions of job satisfaction will almost invariably show that men who were most critical about promotions were also least satisfied with their jobs. But that is *within* a given subgroup. As between subgroups, the relationship may vanish or reverse itself. In the case of the comparison of the Military Police and the Air Corps it reverses itself. Although the Air Corps men were more critical of promotion, they also were more likely than the MP's to be satisfied with their Army job. For example, 36 per cent of the Air Corps men in this sample said they would *not* change to some other Army job if given a chance, whereas only 21 per cent of the MP's gave this response. Promotion opportunity was only one of many factors in job satisfaction, as Chapter 7 shows in detail. Other elements, such as the chance to learn something useful in civilian life, entered in, as did informal status factors such as the general prestige of the branch to which assigned. In general, Air Corps was a high prestige branch, Military Police a low prestige branch. One of the elements which contributed to making the difference in prestige was, no doubt, the difference in T/O<sup>4</sup> opportunities for social mobility.

The illustration presented in Chart IX was based on a special cross-section survey of Military Police in March 1944 and the Air

<sup>4</sup>Table of Organization. This specified the number of grades authorized for the organization.

Corps segment of a cross-section survey of the Army at the nearest available date—namely, January 1944. These data were especially selected to exhibit the structure of opinion on two sharply contrasting groups with respect to promotion opportunities in the Army. It is desirable to see whether the same general pattern holds up on a broader basis, where there is less contrast between groups.

The findings of a study based on a representative cross section of white enlisted men in continental United States in June 1943 are shown in Chart X. Here is charted, in a given vertical bar, the percentage distribution of response to the same question about promotion opportunity as was portrayed in the previous chart. Instead of MP's and Air Corps, we now compare Ground Force branches, Service Force branches, and Air Corps. The same educational groups are shown as in Chart IX. Five ranks are shown, from private to top three grades, and three longevity periods—under 6 months, 6 months to 1 year, and 1 year or over.

The number of cases on which an individual bar is based is in many instances very small. No comparison is shown if the numbers in the sample for a particular rank, longevity, and education group fell below 30 for any one of the three Army Forces. Nevertheless, no particular inference should be drawn from a single pair of comparisons. It is rather on the *pattern as a whole*—on its regularities and irregularities—that we must focus attention.


In general, differences in opinion about promotion opportunities are rather small, tending in any individual case to be somewhat less striking than in the extreme illustration presented earlier, but a definite pattern is present, as can be seen by a general inspection of Chart X and confirmed by more detailed examination. Four findings emerge:

1. *For a given rank, the shorter the longevity the more favorable tends to be the opinion about promotion.* Compare, for example, less educated AGF privates in the Army less than 6 months with those in the Army 6 months to 1 year. The proportion of men who say that promotional opportunities are very good drops from 50 per cent to 42 per cent respectively. A total of 18 such comparisons can be made in Chart X and all 18 are in the same direction.

2. *For a given longevity, the higher the rank the more favorable tends to be the opinion about promotion.* For example, consider less educated AGF men in the Army a year or more. The number who say that opportunities are "very good" is 64 per cent among the top three grades, and it drops to 52 per cent among buck sergeants, and

CHART X

OPINIONS ABOUT PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES BY FORCE, ACCORDING TO RANK, LONGEVITY, AND EDUCATION  
(United States White Cross Section, July 1943, S-63 and S-64)



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to 45 per cent among corporals. Thirty comparisons are possible between any two grades, in Chart X. Of these, 25 show the tendency indicated, 1 shows no difference, and 4 show the reverse tendency. (It must be remembered that many of the percentages are based on a small number of cases and are thus subject to a large sampling error. Moreover, the tie and reversals are all found in the Pfc-private comparisons.)

3. *For a given rank and longevity, the less the education the more favorable tends to be the opinion about promotion.* This, as are the two conclusions above reported, is in accordance with the expectation based on the analysis previously presented. Take AGF top three grades with over a year in the Army. Among the less educated, 64 per cent rated promotion opportunity "very good"; among the better educated, 56 per cent. There are 24 such comparisons possible in Chart X. Of these, 22 are in the direction indicated, 1 shows no difference, and 1 is a tie.<sup>5</sup>

4. *For a given rank, longevity, and educational level, the less the promotion opportunity afforded by a branch or combination of branches, the more favorable the opinion tends to be toward promotion opportunity.* This, again, is in accord with our previous discussion. On the average, promotion opportunity was very much better in the Air Corps than in either Service Force or Ground Force branches. It was somewhat better in Service Forces than in Ground Forces. Consider privates first class with less than high school education and less than 6 months in the Army. In Ground Forces, 51 per cent rated promotion opportunities "very good," in Service Forces 50 per cent, in Air Forces 43 per cent. Between Ground Forces and Air Forces, 16 such comparisons can be made in Chart X, and of these 14 are in the direction indicated and 2 are reversals. Of the 16 comparisons between Air Forces and Service Forces, 13 are

<sup>5</sup> In view of the possibility that some of the apparent difference between the less educated and better educated conceivably could be attributable to an artifact—namely, a slightly greater tendency of the less educated than the better educated to check the first and extreme category in a list of responses—it is worth noting that when comparisons are made in Chart X after combining the responses of "very good chance" and "fairly good chance," the conclusion is essentially unaltered. The less educated still were more favorable than the better educated in 18 out of 24 comparisons, with 6 reversals. Because of the extremely skewed nature of the overall distribution of responses, 80 per cent of the entire sample checking either "very good" or "fairly good," comparisons on the basis of the "very good" category alone are preferable, as long as the educational response bias is not more serious. An educational response bias would not likely apply, of course, to other comparisons, for example between rank groups, as education is at least broadly controlled in these comparisons.

in the direction indicated with 1 tie and 2 reversals. Of the 16 comparisons between Ground Forces and Service Forces, the Ground Force men are more favorable in 11, the Service Force men more favorable in 4, and in 1 comparison both are the same. These patterns of difference are statistically significant,<sup>6</sup> but the picture tends to become less decisive if looked at from some other viewpoints. For example, we know that promotion opportunities were best in Air Forces, intermediate in Service Forces, and least in Ground Forces. But in only 10 of the 16 comparisons do the proportions "very favorable" come out in exactly the reverse order. And the results, though still in the same direction, tend also to be statistically indecisive if comparisons between any two forces are made by combining the "very favorable" and "fairly favorable" categories. To be conservative, we should limit our conclusion by saying that a force with relatively less promotion chances tended to have a larger proportion of men speaking very favorably of promotion opportunities than another force with greater promotion chances.

As in our earlier discussion of the Military Police and the Air Corps, a caution must be sounded against assuming from these findings that a liberalization of promotion policy—which might reduce rather than raise the relative self-gratification of the successful men and increase rather than reduce the sense of defeat of the unsuccessful—would increase job satisfaction. What actually would happen we do not know, because this could be determined only from controlled experiments, which were never made. But it is relevant to point out that job satisfaction was highest in the Air Forces, intermediate in Service Forces, and lowest in Ground Forces—reversing exactly the direction seen in attitudes toward promotion. This is discussed at length in the chapter on job satisfaction, Chapter 7. For example, using the question, "How satisfied are you with your Army job instead of some other Army job?" for the same men as shown in Chart X, AAF tends to have, in almost all subgroups, a larger proportion of men who say they are very satisfied with their job. Air Forces exceed Ground Forces in all 16 comparisons and exceed Service Forces in 14 out of 16 com-

---

<sup>6</sup> Assuming, as a null hypothesis, that a positive difference was equally as likely as a negative difference and calling ties failures, the likelihood of getting 12 or more successes by chance, in 16 comparisons, would be less than .04. The likelihood of getting 13 or more successes would be .01 (using the point binomial distribution).

parisons, with 1 tie and 1 reversal. Service Forces exceed Ground Forces in 13 out of 16 with 1 tie and 2 reversals.<sup>7</sup>

The strong role of status in job satisfaction is reflected in the fact that in 30 comparisons which may be made between job satisfaction of men at a given rank level with men at the next higher rank level (holding education, force, and longevity constant) 27 show the greater proportion of satisfied men among men with the higher rank.<sup>8</sup>

It has been possible to repeat the analysis shown in Chart X in other samples and at other periods in the war. No unusual or significant divergencies from the pattern there revealed of attitudes toward promotion have been observed. From one survey made in the Pacific, it was possible to compare the results from two questions, somewhat different in manifest content, which were asked on the same questionnaire. One was, "Do you think a soldier with ability has a good chance for promotion in the Army?"—the same question with the same check list of responses as was used in Chart X. The other was, "Do you think a soldier with ability has a good chance for promotion in your outfit?" As might perhaps be anticipated, for a given longevity differences by rank were sharper with the latter question than the former, as were differences by longevity for a given rank. But with respect to education and branch, the pattern of differences was the same with either question. Consistently, using either question and holding rank and longevity constant, the less educated tended to look more favorably on promotion opportunities than the better educated. Likewise, the men in Air Forces tended to look less favorably on promotion opportunities than men in Service Forces and, in turn, the latter tended to be less favorable than men in Ground Forces.

### S E C T I O N I I I

#### FACTORS DETERMINING WHICH MEN GOT PROMOTED

Whether any men in a unit got promoted depended on whether vacancies occurred in the T/O of their unit, either through transfer or separation of noncoms or through an increase in the T/O allow-

<sup>7</sup> Based on the proportions answering "very satisfied" to the question on job satisfaction. If the "satisfied" are added to the "very satisfied," Air Forces exceed Ground Forces in 15 out of 16 comparisons, Air Forces exceed Service Forces in 14 out of 16, and Service Forces exceed Ground Forces in 14 out of 16. There were no ties.

<sup>8</sup> Again based on those answering "very satisfied." If the "satisfied" are added, the men of higher rank are more likely to express satisfaction in 28 out of 30 comparisons.

ance. On the other hand, *which* men got promoted when vacancies occurred depended solely on the judgment of the commanding officer of the unit, often advised by his lieutenants and senior noncoms. Ordinarily, the decision was not and could not be based on objective tests for noncom performance, because such tests did not exist, although in the case of appointment of technicians—as distinguished from line noncoms—objective criteria of ability to perform a specialty often were used, such as a record of civilian experience or graduation from an Army technical school. The Form 20 card, containing a record of a man's civilian and Army experience, was available to the commanding officer, who could also see on the card the man's AGCT score or his score on mechanical aptitude and other tests. So many factors other than the ability to make high scores on such tests are presumably involved in successful leadership of line noncoms or efficient performance of technicians that the extent to which they influenced the actual selection process may have been relatively minor. Nevertheless, such tests played a role, even though subordinate to that of acquisition of Army know-how as measured by sheer longevity in the Army. This is shown in Table 9. Among the Air Forces men making the highest test scores, the chance of having become a sergeant at the time of this survey (December 1944) varied from 10 per cent among those in the Army 18 months or less to 75 per cent among those in the Army 31 months or over. In the rest of the Army the corresponding range was from 9 to 57 per cent. Such differences in chances tended to be greater than differences between high or low test score groups.

One factor which hardly would have failed to enter to some extent into the judgment of an officer in selecting a man for promotion was his conformity to the officially approved military mores. Those officers who themselves were conformists were the most likely to have been promoted, as we shall see later in this chapter, and the same was true of enlisted men. Table 10 provides an illustration. The differences are rather small, but they are consistently in the expected direction. Consider the kind of men who *disagreed* with the statement, "Too many officers take unfair advantage of their rank and privileges." Among those in the Army 1 to 2 years, 46 per cent had become noncoms, as compared with 30 per cent among those with the same longevity who agreed with the statement. Such sample results as are represented in Table 10 could be repeated with other questions from the same and other surveys, and the results, as far as have been studied, would be in the same direction.

It will be recalled, for example, that in Chapters 3 and 4 it was shown that soldiers who had received promotions tended more frequently than others to have attitudes favorable from the Army's point of view on a wide range of items.

As was pointed out there, however, the inference cannot be made with confidence that higher ranking men, who had better attitudes than others *after* promotion, *necessarily* had better attitudes *before* promotion. The panel study described in Section V of Chapter 4 revealed, as might be expected, that attitudes of men who received

TABLE 9  
PROPORTION OF ENLISTED MEN WHO WERE SERGEANTS (ALL GRADES),  
BY LONGEVITY AND AGCT SCORE  
(Tabulated from Data in a Sample of 107,000 Men, Collected by the  
Adjutant General, December 31, 1944)

Length of service	AGCT CLASS	
	I and II %	III, IV, and V %
<i>31 months or more</i>		
Air Forces	75	49
Others	57	31
<i>19 to 30 months</i>		
Air Forces	44	25
Others	32	16
<i>18 months or less</i>		
Air Forces	10	8
Others	9	4

promotion tended to improve while those of men who failed to receive promotion tended to deteriorate. Hence differences in attitudes between the two groups were greater after the one group had been promoted than they were before promotion.

But *direct* evidence also showed in Section V of Chapter 4 that, in this panel of Infantry recruits, those who expressed favorable attitudes on anonymous Research Branch questionnaires received subsequent promotions in significantly higher proportions than others.<sup>9</sup> This was shown with age and education, factors related to both attitudes and promotion, held constant by standardization.

These findings were based on attitudes considered favorable from the Army's point of view on a variety of items, many of which did not relate specifically to conformity with the Army's mores. Two

<sup>9</sup> See Chart VII and Table 6 in Section V of Chapter 4.



TABLE 10

PROPORTIONS WHO HAD BEEN PROMOTED TO A GIVEN GRADE AMONG MEN WITH CONFORMIST ATTITUDES COMPARED WITH PROPORTIONS WHO HAD BEEN PROMOTED AMONG OTHER MEN, WITH LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY HELD BROADLY CONSTANT (S-198E, February 1945, United States Cross Section)

	<i>Percentage who were noncoms (any grade) among those in the Army 1 to 2 years who expressed indicated attitude</i>	<i>Percentage who were sergeants in the Army 2 to 3 years who expressed indicated attitude</i>	<i>Percentage who were top 5 graders among those in the Army 3 to 5 years who expressed indicated attitude</i>
<i>Question:</i>			
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements made by enlisted men:			
"Too many officers take unfair advantage of their rank and privileges."			
Among those who "disagree"	46 (144)	42 (221)	42 (91)
Among those who "agree"	30 (324)	34 (467)	28 (359)
"It would be a lot better if officers and enlisted men were more friendly with one another."			
Among those who "disagree"	44 (126)	49 (198)	38 (168)
Among those who "agree"	31 (343)	33 (499)	26 (293)
<i>Question:</i>			
"Which of the following would you most prefer in regard to your relationship with the Army after the war?"			
Among those saying "Reserve Corps"	46 (149)	40 (184)	46 (206)
Among those undecided	31 (108)	34 (209)	33 (167)
Among those saying "No connection at all with the Army"	22 (389)	26 (529)	28 (392)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

of the items from Table 6 in Chapter 4 which seem most clearly to indicate such conformity are presented in Table 11.<sup>10</sup> It will be noted that of the privates who in September 1943 said they did not think the Army's control was too strict, 29 per cent had become Pfc's by January 1944, while only 12 per cent of the other privates

<sup>10</sup> For details about the sample used, see Section V of Chapter 4; for the wording of the questions and the check-list categories, see footnote to text accompanying Chart XI.

had become Pfc's. Similarly, among those privates who in November 1943 expressed satisfaction with the strictness of Army control, 28 per cent had become noncoms by March 1944, while among other privates the figure was 22 per cent. Among Pfc's in November, the corresponding proportions becoming NCO's by March are 81 per cent among those not critical of Army control and 74 per cent among others. Table 11 shows similar differences in proportions later promoted among privates who thought AWOL a very serious offense as compared with other privates. No differences appear on this item among Pfc's, only 17 of whom were found in the non-conformist group. While the numbers of cases in all the subgroups

TABLE 11

PROMOTION OF RECRUITS AS RELATED TO PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED CONFORMIST ATTITUDES, WITH EDUCATION AND AGE HELD CONSTANT BY STANDARDIZATION

	<i>Percentage becoming Pfc's by January 1944, among privates expressing indi- cated attitude in September 1943</i>	<i>Percentage becoming NCO's by March 1944, among privates expressing indi- cated attitude in November 1943</i>	<i>Percentage becoming NCO's by March 1944, among Pfc's expressing indi- cated attitude in November 1943</i>
Think Army's control not too strict	29 (216)	28 (143)	81 (64)
Others	12 (159)	22 (168)	74 (48)
Think AWOL a very serious offense	28 (257)	28 (182)	79 (79)
Others	14 (128)	20 (126)	79 (17)

Numbers in parentheses are "equivalent" numbers of cases, after standardization, on which the percentages are based. As indicated in Chapter 4, these are slightly smaller than the observed numbers of cases.

From Table 6 in Chapter 4, Section V.

shown in Table 11 are small, the differences in proportions later promoted as between those expressing conformist attitudes and other men are significant at the 5 per cent level when the three critical ratios are pooled for each question.<sup>11</sup>

The two items shown in Table 11 form, along with other items, a quasi-scale of attitudes of conformity.<sup>12</sup> When the three samples

<sup>11</sup> For test of significance used, see footnote to text accompanying Table 6 in Section V of Chapter 4.

<sup>12</sup> Items comprising the scale are as follows, in scale order (footnote cont., p. 263):

in Table 11 are broken down by scale scores rather than by responses to individual items we get the pattern shown in Chart XI. Consistently, in all three groups we see that the men whose attitudes were most conformist were the ones most likely to be promoted subsequently. When the data in Chart XI are broken down into two educational classes, the same consistency appears in all three samples for high school graduates and college men and in two of the three samples for other men, in spite of the small numbers of cases.

On other correlated items, such as attitudes toward officers, the same picture is seen as appears in Chart VII in Chapter 4, and in Table 11.

The data reviewed in this section are not all that could be desired

- 
1. How much of your training or duty time is used in doing things that do not seem important to you?
    - A lot of it
    - Some of it
    - Only a little of it
    - None of it
  
  2. In general, how well do you think the Army is run?
    - It is run very well
    - It is run fairly well
    - It is not run so well
    - It is run very poorly
  
  3. In general, how serious an offense do you think it is for a soldier to go "AWOL" (Absent without leave)?
    - Very serious
    - Pretty serious
    - Not so serious
    - Not serious at all
    - Undecided
    - It depends on the conditions
  
  4. Do you feel that the Army is trying to control you and other soldiers more strictly and in more ways than it needs to?
    - Yes
    - No
    - Undecided
  
  5. Do you usually feel that what you are doing in the Army is worth while or not?
    - I usually feel it is *not* worth while
    - I usually feel it *is* worth while
    - Undecided
  
  6. How important is it to you personally to make good as a soldier?
    - It is very important
    - It is pretty important
    - It is not so important
    - It is not important at all

Each of the category lists was dichotomized with the X representing the "conformity" response which would produce the maximum internal consistency. The reproducibility of the scale was only fair, namely, .82.

by way of replication, but they support the expectation that within the Army, as in perhaps any institution and especially any authoritarian institution, the price of advancement was at least a minimum conformity with the system, in mind as well as in action.

From the viewpoint of Army leadership, then, one would expect the criteria for promotion to be ability, seniority, and conformity. But, as we have seen, objective indices of ability were too often lacking, especially where skill in handling men was an important element in the job to be filled. The commanding officer had to make a subjective judgment and at least two factors made this judgment hard to arrive at: (1) work of enlisted men in a unit tended to be so routinized and standardized that there was little opportunity for one enlisted man to prove himself, by performance, better at leadership than others, and (2) the segregation of officers and enlisted men and the chain-of-command system by which orders went down from officers to noncoms to privates reduced officers' opportunities to observe and judge the performance of individual men.

#### *"Bucking" for Promotion*

The result was that in making subjective judgments, the commanding officer necessarily laid himself wide open to charges of favoritism and particularly of succumbing to the wiles of those enlisted men most skilled at "bucking." The shibboleth in the Army, "Promotion is based on *who* you know, not *what* you know," was subscribed to by 60 per cent of the officers and 80 per cent of the enlisted men in a survey made after the war was over.<sup>13</sup>

An official War Department pamphlet given to new recruits attempted to give "bucking" a blessing: "'Bucking' implies all the things a soldier can honestly do to gain attention and promotion. The Army encourages individuals to put extra effort into drill, extra 'spit and polish' into personal appearance. At times this may make things uncomfortable for others who prefer to take things easier, but it stimulates a spirit of competition and improvement which makes ours a better Army."<sup>14</sup>


But to the enlisted men, "bucking" and the frequently used term "brown-nosing" were terms of opprobrium. They were used to describe the type of act which is too obviously aimed at making an impression on one's superiors. Currying favor of officers partook

<sup>13</sup> November 1945 (S-234). Cross section of 2,068 enlisted men and 644 company grade officers from the same outfits in the United States. The same result was obtained using opposite forms of the statement.

<sup>14</sup> War Department pamphlet 21-13, "Army Life," p. 55.

CHART XI

PROMOTION OF RECRUITS AS RELATED TO PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED ATTITUDES FORMING A SCALE OF CONFORMITY TO ARMY



For source, see Chart VII in Chapter 4.

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of class disloyalty and also represented a conflict with soldierly values of toughness and self-reliance. Eighty-seven per cent of the enlisted men in the post-hostilities study last cited agreed with the statement that "Most soldiers lose respect for a man who is always bucking for promotion" and 75 per cent of the officers in the study concurred.

How the process of bucking worked and how the informal social controls of the enlisted group mobilized against it is rather vividly described in a piece written by an enlisted man for the Research Branch in 1944, which contains excerpts from a diary which he kept:

In basic training, two persons were prominently typed as brown-nosers (and the fact that one of them had a light brown mustache hardly helped his case at all). Their behavior corresponded generally to that known as apple-polishing in college life. They were prominent at asking questions and answering questions, not for information but for attention, and not always intelligent questions. They found their ten-minute breaks much more interesting in the company of sergeants, lieutenants, and captains or majors. These ten-minute breaks were devoted to highly active efforts to impress the superior, either with knowledge and brilliance, their good-fellowship, or their interesting life histories.

This behavior was resented by the group. The progression in the face of continued sucking was simply from individual scorn and dislike to casual comments by neighbors, to group demonstrations chorused at the suck-ups, to indignation and bitter words by a few, and in some cases mild ostracism. The following quotations from notes made at the time indicate the various stages of the development of the group's attitude toward these individuals:

1/12/44. K coming in for his share of suck-up comments. Have heard some say that he's always getting the breaks because he sucks so much. Also a few say he's an awful chow-hound.

1/24/44. S is extremely officious. I tilted with him over where I should work—said I didn't give a damn where I worked, did he? He kept trying to tell me that I was *supposed* to work over there—"But you're *supposed* to. The lieutenant said you were supposed to."

2/2/44. Very much more than usual griping and nasty comments versus S and K for sucking so much. Almost everybody comments today, and no one went to their defence.

2/3/44. Everybody making sucking, kissing noises at K and S now, but they ignore it.

First period today, goldbricking with M, C, and R, we were supposed to be moving equipment to the class room, talk was of suck-ups. This has become a chronic hot-topic. C remarked that if any one would get any place G would. I poopohed this, but C was quite serious. S said that T was the stupidest person he had ever known. All speculated on how K and S could make such "despicable asses of themselves in public." Sgt. B, with considerable vehemence said, "some people just are so ingrained, they have to be pushing and getting ahead *all* the time."

2/9/44. Yesterday, K went up to Lt. C during class to ask him questions. Everyone chorused and made loud kissing, sucking noises at him as he walked down the aisle, which made Lt. C laugh, but K seemed not to have heard.

This making of sucking noises is quite the custom now, and is directed at K, and S especially; and then at W, and T. Just now, as soon as the break was called, K went up to Lt. C, offered him a cigarette and talked. Whole room broke into squeaking, sucking noises. Lt. C smiled; K ignored it.

2/10/44. W, S, and K sucked all afternoon; hung around lieutenants and asked bright questions. Group chorused sucking noises as usual.

3/23/44. Was told by two people today that K, although qualified for overseas service, had got some Lieut. to hold him here as expert small arms mechanic. K knows as little as any of us about small arms, and we all know very little. Fellows who told me this were quite resentful. (Within one month after the end of the basic training cycle, K, in his new job as small arms mechanic, made staff sergeant. S. assigned to the medics, still a pfc. Medic t/o is pretty tight.)

It is common belief that these efforts, if done by persons with any skill at all, appear to be successful despite group efforts to impede them. No physical punishment was ever meted out, except indirectly. Ostracism was visible, but mild. These two people were disliked, and few were friendly toward them, though they were friendly toward each other. This unfriendliness did not go to extreme ostracism, but occasions arose where people avoided their company. Once they were both told to get out of a poker game because they were disliked and because the accusation that they had been cheating met no opposition.

#### *Opinions on Methods of Promotion in One's Own Outfit*

Brown-nosing, currying favor, bootlicking, and politics were roundly condemned by the enlisted men and widely practiced. But the finding that 80 per cent, as we have seen, agreed that the saying "*Who you know not what you know*" correctly described the promotion situation requires some further examination, since it is pretty easy to get people to agree with widely quoted and cynical shibboleths. Let us attempt to pin soldiers' opinions on promotion methods down to a more specific situation, particularly the situation in their own outfit.

In two cross-section studies of troops in the United States, one made in January 1943 and one made two and a half years later, between VE Day and VJ Day, soldiers were asked, "How do you think the men in your outfit were selected for promotion?" A check list included "ability," "bootlicking, or playing politics," "luck," "been in the Army a long time," and "other" with a blank for specifying. Instructions were to make only one check, picking the one which seemed most important in one's outfit, but a small proportion of men checked more than one. The "other" write-ins were usually rephrasings of some item in the check list, but tended to refer to factors other than ability.

Table 12 shows the comparative answers at the two widely separated time periods. In both surveys, the newer soldiers tended to

be rather respectful of the method of selecting noncoms in their outfit, 50 per cent of the privates in the Army under 6 months checking "ability." In both studies the percentage of privates checking "ability" dropped abruptly after the first six months. In 1943 noncoms in the Army 1 to 3 years tended to have about the same rather favorable viewpoint of the methods of noncom selection as did new privates, 53 per cent checking "ability" and only 16 per

TABLE 12  
COMPARISON OF OPINIONS ABOUT NONCOM SELECTION IN JANUARY 1943, AND  
TWO AND A HALF YEARS LATER  
(Cross Sections of White Enlisted Men in the United States, S-35 and S-213)

QUESTION: "How do you think the men in your outfit were selected for promotion? (Check the one that is most important)."	PRIVATES AND PFC'S IN ARMY LESS THAN 6 MONTHS		PRIVATES AND PFC'S IN ARMY 6 MONTHS TO 1 YEAR		PRIVATES AND PFC'S IN ARMY 1 TO 3 YEARS		NONCOMS IN ARMY 1 TO 3 YEARS	
	Jan. 1943	June 1945	Jan. 1943	June 1945	Jan. 1943	June 1945	Jan. 1943	June 1945
	<i>Percentage checking</i>							
Ability	50	50	34	25	28	17	53	24
Bootlicking or playing politics	15	14	27	17	35	34	16	24
Luck	9	10	15	16	12	12	8	12
Been in the Army a long time	13	7	8	8	10	7	6	5
Other (what?)	1	7	1	14	1	15	1	22
Combinations of the above or no answer	12	12	15	20	14	15	16	13
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	2,164	388	726	77	318	422	562	452

cent checking "bootlicking or politics." Toward the end of the war, in July 1945, the proportions of noncoms in the Army 1 to 3 years who checked "ability" and "bootlicking," respectively, were equal—24 per cent.<sup>15</sup> The results for the later period are not strictly comparable with those for 1943 because of the large number in 1945 who took advantage of the opportunity to write in the "other" category. Unfortunately, these write-ins were not coded, but, judging from other experience, they were surely not more likely to

<sup>15</sup> A further breakdown of the 1943 data shows that returnees were slightly more uncomplimentary than men who had been in the Army an equivalent time but had not left the States. There was no significant pattern of differences between those in the Army 1 to 2 years and 2 to 3 years, respectively.



be complimentary to the existing system than to be uncomplimentary. Even if half of them could have been transferred to the "ability" category, this would have left the proportion of noncoms checking "ability" in 1945 substantially lower than in 1943 and the proportion checking "bootlicking or politics" higher.

The picture can be summarized by saying that initially half of the soldiers tended to look on the selection methods as picking men for their ability, but that increased time in the Army tended to make soldiers as a whole more cynical—especially, of course, those who did not themselves get promoted.

An interesting special case near the beginning of the war was that of the National Guard. In May 1942 an intensive survey was made of various problems in one National Guard Infantry division and two Regular Army divisions, one Infantry and one Armored.<sup>16</sup> In the National Guard division 52 per cent of the privates who were former National Guardsmen said that promotions were made through "bootlicking or politics" as compared with only 26 per cent who said promotions were made through "ability." The percentages were almost exactly reversed among Regular Army privates in the two Regular Army divisions, 27 per cent checking "bootlicking or politics" and 46 per cent checking "ability." The selectee privates in all three divisions were less critical, being relatively new in the Army, but those in the National Guard division checked "bootlicking" more frequently than those in the other divisions, and selectee privates from the home state of the division were almost as critical as the National Guard privates. Since this study was not repeated in other National Guard divisions, one should be cautious about generalizing too far, although it is consistent with informal impressions of critics of the National Guard, and favoritism and politics may have been among the reasons leading the Army to make extensive transfers of personnel from these divisions.

The best educated enlisted men tended to be the most cynical about promotion methods. This is illustrated by Table 13, which is based on a representative cross section of the enlisted men in 12 fighter groups in the Air Forces in England in December 1943. Longevity is roughly controlled by taking only men in the Army 1 to 2 years. As the table shows, among college sergeants (half of whom, incidentally, were top three graders), 43 per cent said that "having an 'in' with the right people" was the biggest help in getting a promotion in their outfit, as compared with 33 per cent among

<sup>16</sup> Planning Survey II.

men who had not gone through high school. Among college corporals and privates, 64 per cent gave this answer, as compared with 42 per cent in the lowest educational group.

While no single reliable figure can summarize the extent to which soldiers were cynical of promotion methods, the evidence from surveys all over the world and at different time periods makes it clear that the role which personal favoritism played in promotion was

TABLE 13

OPINIONS ON WAYS TO GET A PROMOTION IN FIGHTER GROUPS,  
BY RANK AND EDUCATION

(Cross Section of Enlisted Men in 12 Fighter Groups in England,  
December 1943. Based only on Men in Army 1 to 2 Years. S-113)

QUESTION: "Which of the following do you think would be the biggest help in getting a promotion in your outfit?"	Grade and some high school	High school graduates	College
<b>SERGEANTS (all grades)</b>			
<i>Percentage checking</i>			
Ability on the job	37	33	26
Time in the Army	1	4	5
Having an "in" with the right people	33	38	43
Education	2	—	1
Being a conscientious and hard worker	20	18	16
No answer	7	7	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>203</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>135</i>
<b>CORPORALS AND PRIVATES</b>			
<i>Percentage checking</i>			
Ability on the job	27	24	14
Time in the Army	7	4	5
Having an "in" with the right people	42	53	64
Education	1	1	—
Being a conscientious and hard worker	18	9	8
No answer	5	9	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>378</i>	<i>210</i>	<i>142</i>

much too great, in the eyes of the men. Dissidence must be expected in any social institution from those who are thwarted in their ambitions to climb the mobility ladder. But dissidence is maximized when the criteria for selection are vague and subjective—and there lay the root of the problem from the Army's standpoint. Until objective methods can be devised to measure the ability re-

quired in a given leadership or technical position and to pick out those men most likely to succeed, the problem will be with the Army always.

### *Factors in Officer Promotion*

In the case of enlisted men we have seen that seniority, or longevity, played a very large role in determining how high a given enlisted man would stand on the status ladder. The same was generally true of officers.

No one could ordinarily advance in rank without having served a certain minimum time in the rank below. The time served before entering the next higher rank went up as rank went up. For example, in the last six months of 1944, figures compiled by the Adjutant General show that officers promoted to first lieutenant in this period had served a median of 14 months as second lieutenant. Those promoted to lieutenant colonel had served a median of 23 months as major.

Again, as in the case of enlisted men, the rapidity of promotion varied with branch of service and type of duty. For example, during 1944 the average monthly number of promotions per 1,000 officers in the Air Corps was 40, as compared with 36 in the Quartermaster Corps, 31 in the Corps of Engineers, 28 in the Field Artillery, 25 in the Infantry, and 20 in the Coast Artillery. The promotion rate was higher overseas than in the United States, 41 per 1,000 officers overseas as compared with 29 per 1,000 in the United States.<sup>17</sup>

If in a given situation officers of equal seniority were considered for promotion to fill a T/O vacancy in an organization, the officers' records, containing the judgments made of them by their superiors in the past, played a role along with contemporary impressions in determining which officer would get the promotion. One index which was particularly important was their efficiency ratings, given them every six months by their commanding officers and reviewed at the next higher echelon. To be eligible for promotion, an officer had to have efficiency ratings of superior, excellent, or very satisfactory. Since the overwhelming majority of officers were rated as superior or excellent, even the rating of very satisfactory was likely to be a bar to promotion. This is illustrated by Table 14, based on a Research Branch survey of a representative cross section of officers in Continental United States in February 1945.

<sup>17</sup> Data from the Adjutant General.

Table 14 is confined to ASF and AAF officers who were former OCS men or aviation cadets, since the sample of other classes of officers was not large enough to permit similar breakdowns. Consider those officers in ASF who had been in the Army 1 to 2 years since receiving their commissions as second lieutenants. Of those with relatively high efficiency ratings, 73 per cent had become first lieutenants, as compared with 57 per cent among those with medium efficiency, and only 34 per cent among those with relatively low efficiency ratings. A similar relationship is shown in other columns of Table 14.<sup>18</sup>

TABLE 14  
OFFICERS' PROMOTIONS AS RELATED TO EFFICIENCY RATINGS  
(Limited to Graduates of OCS and Aviation Cadet Training,  
Research Branch Survey S-198-O, February 1945, in  
Continental United States)

	<i>Percentage who were 1st Lieutenants among all who were commissioned 2nd Lieutenants from 1 to 2 years earlier and reported indicated ratings</i>	<i>Percentage who were Captains among all who were commissioned 2nd Lieutenants from 2 to 3 years earlier and reported indicated ratings</i>
<b>SERVICE FORCES</b>		
<i>Efficiency ratings:</i>		
Relatively high	73 (82)	46 (105)
Medium	57 (85)	22 (85)
Relatively low	34 (35)	13 (48)
<b>AIE FORCES</b>		
<i>Efficiency ratings:</i>		
Relatively high	75 (24)	64 (44)
Medium	59 (120)	40 (113)
Relatively low	21 (19)	0 (23)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

As in the case of enlisted men, there is some evidence suggesting that officers who conformed most wholeheartedly with the accepted military mores were more likely to get promotions than other offi-

<sup>18</sup> *Relatively high* means that of the last efficiency ratings received up to and including four, all were "superior." *Medium* means that of the last four efficiency ratings, all were at least "excellent," though not all "superior." *Relatively low* means that there was at least one rating of "very satisfactory." Officers who received ratings of "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" are not included in Table 14. While these ratings were furnished by the officers themselves by memory, as part of an anonymous Research Branch questionnaire on attitudes, a careful pretest comparison of efficiency ratings as reported under such conditions with efficiency ratings as shown in the official records showed the officers' own reports to be reliable.

cers. Unfortunately, the evidence depends solely on a comparison of attitudes of officers of higher rank with the attitudes of officers of lower rank but of corresponding longevity in the Army. In the case of enlisted men, it will be recalled it was possible to check the validity of the interpretation from such a relationship by following up a group of men and getting their subsequent promotion records. That check showed that men who at a given time held conformist opinions were more likely to be found in the group which later was promoted than were other men. In the absence of such a check, in the case of officers, we must rely on plausibility rather than proof for interpretation of data such as those illustrated by Table 15.

Consider Service Force officers in the Army 1 to 2 years, as shown in Table 15. Among those who *disagreed* with the opinion "Too much 'chicken' to put up with," 59 per cent had been promoted to first lieutenant. Among those who *agreed*, 43 per cent had been promoted. Some of the differences shown are small and based on too few cases to be significant, but the general pattern of differences is, except for two ties, invariably in the direction of the higher proportion of officers who had achieved higher rank being found in the group who expressed conformist attitudes. Also, as doubtless would be expected, the group of officers who had become sufficiently identified with the Army way of life to want to make a career in the Army contained the higher proportion who had been promoted. We must repeat the caution that such a table is not proof of causal direction of the relation of attitudes and promotion and thus is suggestive rather than conclusive.

Among officers, as among enlisted men, the absence of criteria for performance opened the way for favoritism and "bucking." The Research Branch has no evidence of its own directly on this subject, but the opinions of officers about promotion, analyzed in the pages following, without doubt reflect criticism of a promotion system which, although based primarily on seniority, leaves open the door to favoritism. Thirst for promotion at the expense of doing a good job and "bucking" was a frequent charge against officers made by enlisted men in their free comments. At the close of hostilities, three fourths of a United States cross section of enlisted men agreed that "most officers are more interested in getting promoted than in doing a good job" and over a third of the company grade officers interviewed also agreed.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> S-198. Cross section of 1,034 enlisted men and 322 company grade officers. An alternative form of the statement gave substantially the same results.

TABLE 15

OFFICERS' PROMOTIONS AS RELATED TO CERTAIN ATTITUDES OR PREFERENCES  
(Limited to Graduates of OCS and Aviation Cadet Training.  
Research Branch Survey S-198-O February 1945)

	SERVICE FORCES		AIR FORCES	
	<i>Percentage who were 1st Lieutenants among those who had been officers 1 to 2 years and expressed indicated attitudes</i>	<i>Percentage who were Captains among those who had been officers 2 to 3 years and expressed indicated attitudes</i>	<i>Percentage who were 1st Lieutenants among those who had been officers 1 to 2 years and expressed indicated attitudes</i>	<i>Percentage who were Captains among those who had been officers 2 to 3 years and expressed indicated attitudes</i>
<b>Question:</b>				
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements made by enlisted men:				
"Too much 'chicken' to put up with."				
Among those who "disagree"	59 (97)	32 (134)	59 (109)	44 (125)
Among those who "agree"	43 (129)	27 (151)	56 (139)	35 (85)
"Too many officers take unfair advantage of their rank and privilege."				
Among those who "disagree"	59 (140)	29 (186)	61 (156)	56 (113)
Among those who "agree"	37 (86)	29 (99)	54 (92)	23 (97)
"It would be a lot better if officers and enlisted men were more friendly with one another."				
Among those who "disagree"	55 (140)	29 (190)	59 (190)	48 (153)
Among those who "agree"	43 (86)	29 (95)	55 (55)	19 (57)
<b>Question:</b>				
Which of the following would you most prefer in regard to your relationship with the Army after the war?				
Career in Regular Army	59 (44)	35 (86)	58 (93)	53 (87)
Reserve commission	50 (138)	28 (141)	57 (132)	37 (104)
No Army connection at all	36 (29)	14 (28)	—	—

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

In its farewell editorial, *Yank* magazine recognized the prevalence of "bucking" among officers as well as enlisted men, and the limitations of seniority as an automatic method of promotion: "Let's have all promotions—both noncommissioned and commissioned, on a basis of competitive examination without overdue attention to seniority. Between two equally qualified candidates, personal preference of the officer in charge will necessarily be the deciding factor. But let's have a few less sergeants made sergeants simply because they're good guys and let's put an end to the ridiculous sight of capable young junior officers prancing around their CO like so many newly rich women around a reigning dowager, trying by this favor and that attention to buck their way a grade higher. As to seniority, there is no evidence that hardening of the arteries, even in colonels, is an infallible index of brain power."<sup>20</sup>

#### *Attitudes of Officers Towards Promotion*

Although the Research Branch did not make a systematic effort to study attitudes of officers toward promotions, scattered studies in which questions about promotion were usually incidental add up to the conclusion that complaints about promotion were frequent among officers, though probably not as frequent as among enlisted men.

Chart XII compares opinions with respect to fairness of promotions of a cross section of company grade officers and a cross section of enlisted men in Continental United States as the war was drawing to a close. The survey was made in July 1945 between VE Day and VJ Day.

Four comparisons of officers and enlisted men are shown in Chart XII. In all cases a somewhat larger proportion of officers than of enlisted men said that promotions in their outfit usually or always went to those who deserved them most. (The question asked of officers referred to officers' promotions; that asked of the men referred to enlisted men's promotions.)

In general, Air Force officers tended to be less favorable toward the fairness of promotions in their outfit than officers in Ground Forces or Service Forces. This tended to be true both of flying and nonflying officers. In previous discussion, the greater tendency of Air Forces enlisted men than those in other branches to be critical of promotion opportunities has been treated in some detail and the Air Forces officers' opinions about fairness of promotions, as far as

<sup>20</sup> *Yank*, December 21, 1945, p. 19.

can be ascertained, tended to behave in the same way. The opinions about promotion held by officers returned from overseas were not markedly less favorable than those of officers who had not gone overseas.

Further details are shown in Table 16. With respect to opinions about the fairness of promotions, there is no consistent pattern of difference by rank. In 6 out of 7 comparisons possible in this table, a higher proportion of captains than of first lieutenants had favorable attitudes, while in 3 out of 4 comparisons relatively more second lieutenants were favorable than first lieutenants. But most of the differences are small and no special point should be made of them. Differences in length of time in grade might account for some of the differences in attitude, but time in grade was not ascertained in this study. It will be noted that the somewhat less favorable attitudes of Air Corps officers tended to be due especially to the very considerable extent of criticism among Air Corps first and second lieutenants.

#### *Staff Officers Versus Line Officers*

Especially interesting in Table 16 is the comparison of opinions of staff officers and line officers in Ground and Service Forces. While they do not differ consistently in their responses to the direct question on fairness of promotion, they do show a consistent pattern of differences with respect to another question, namely, "Do you feel that your superior officers know your abilities and what you are able to do?" Staff officers were more likely to say that their superiors had a good idea of their abilities. In five comparisons available in Table 16, all are consistent in this respect even if some of the differences are small and not significant in themselves. Also, it will be noted, Air Forces nonflying officers consistently were more likely to answer this question favorably than flying officers at the same grade.

If another aspect of the promotion situation is looked at—the relative opportunities for promotion available to staff officers as compared with line officers—there is no question but the line officers thought themselves at a disadvantage. This is illustrated in Chart XIII, which compares the opinions of company grade staff and line Infantry officers, all veterans of combat, in five divisions overseas—two in Europe and three in the Pacific. Half of the line officers in the European sample and a little more than half in the Pacific sample thought the staff officers had the better chances of promotion, while few thought the line officers' chances were better. Staff offi-



CHART XII

COMPARISON OF OPINIONS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN ABOUT FAIRNESS OF PROMOTIONS IN THEIR OUTFIT

(United States Cross Section, July 1945, S-219 and S-220)

QUESTION "When promotions are made in your outfit, how often do they go to the officers (men) who deserved them most?"\*

AIR FORCES

PERCENTAGE ANSWERING

Rarely or never    Sometimes    About half the time\*\*    Usually Always

Back from overseas

OFFICERS



ENLISTED MEN



Did not go overseas

OFFICERS



ENLISTED MEN



OTHERS

Back from overseas

OFFICERS



ENLISTED MEN



Did not go overseas

OFFICERS



ENLISTED MEN



\*In the above question the word "officer" appeared in questionnaires for officers, the word "men" in questionnaires for enlisted men.

\*\* includes those who did not answer.

cers tended to call the chances equal, but even among staff officers more thought staff officers had an advantage over line officers than thought the opposite.

Among the line officers who thought staff officers had an advan-

TABLE 16

OPINIONS AS TO FAIRNESS OF OFFICERS' PROMOTIONS AND AS TO HOW WELL SUPERIORS KNOW ONE'S ABILITIES  
(Cross Section of Company Grade Officers in the United States, July 1945, S-219)

	AIR FORCES		GROUND AND SERVICE FORCES	
	<i>Flying</i>	<i>Nonflying</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Staff</i>
"When promotions are made in your outfit, how often do they go to the officer who deserves them most?"				
<i>Percentage answering "always" or "usually" among officers:</i>				
BACK FROM OVERSEAS				
Captains	41 (78)	30 (104)	43 (40)	37 (54)
1st Lieutenants	26 (186)	22 (111)	38 (99)	38 (60)
DID NOT GO OVERSEAS				
Captains	— (27)	41 (241)	49 (76)	43 (218)
1st Lieutenants	29 (122)	27 (257)	41 (201)	35 (207)
2nd Lieutenants	28 (295)	30 (105)	43 (345)	47 (67)
"Do you feel that your superior officers know your abilities and what you are able to do?"				
<i>Percentage answering "they have a good idea" among officers:</i>				
BACK FROM OVERSEAS				
Captains	26	38	35	40
1st Lieutenants	32	33	27	43
DID NOT GO OVERSEAS				
Captains	—	53	48	51
1st Lieutenants	26	45	40	47
2nd Lieutenants	23	30	31	52

Number in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.


tage, 18 per cent thought the present promotion practice was "OK," 50 per cent thought it "somewhat unfair," and 32 per cent thought it "very unfair." Similar belief in and discontent with the relative promotion chances of line and staff officers were manifest in a study in the United States of officers with divisions in training.

*Rank, Education, and Time in Grade*

From the studies of enlisted men reported previously in this chapter, it would be expected that attitudes of officers about promotion, like those of enlisted men, would reflect some relationship with level of expectation and with level of achievement relative to that of one's acquaintances. Thus we would expect a captain who had been in

CHART XIII

OPINIONS OF COMPANY GRADE INFANTRY OFFICERS OVERSEAS ABOUT  
 RELATIVE PROMOTION CHANCES OF STAFF AND LINE OFFICERS  
 (Survey of Combat Veterans in 2 Divisions in Europe and  
 3 Divisions in the Pacific, March-April 1944, S-101)



grade a long time compared with other captains to be less happy about the promotion situation than a lieutenant in grade a relatively short time. Likewise, we should perhaps expect a college graduate to be more sensitive than officers of less education to delays in promotion, although since almost all of the officers who had not graduated from college were at least high school graduates and many had

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attended college, educational differences among officers cannot reflect the same range of differences in civilian levels of aspiration as in the case of enlisted men.

Chart XIV shows, for staff officers in five ASF installations in the United States, how attitudes varied by rank, length of time in grade, and education. There is no consistent pattern of differences by rank in answer to the question, "Do you think your present assignment gives you a fair chance of promotion?" Length of time in grade, however, for all ranks and at both educational levels, makes a large and significant difference in attitudes. Educational differences are also consistent, in spite of the very small number of cases in some of the subgroups. No one of the differences by education would be significant in itself, but the consistency of the pattern is evident.

#### *Officers' Opinions of Promotion Chances for Enlisted Men*

There is evidence that officers, while apt to be dissatisfied with promotion policies which affected them, tended to have a much more favorable opinion of promotion policies which affected their enlisted men. Chart XV illustrates this point. Of the combat flying officers in medium and light bombardment squadrons studied in England in 1944 shortly before D Day, 44 per cent expressed satisfaction with promotion policy for officers, whereas 61 per cent of the same officers expressed satisfaction with the promotion policy for enlisted men. Among enlisted men, on the other hand, only 32 per cent in these squadrons expressed satisfaction with promotion policy as it affected them. The contrast is sharper in the heavy bombardment squadrons, where an even smaller proportion of officers than of enlisted men viewed promotion policy favorably as it affected themselves, but 70 per cent of the officers were very well satisfied or satisfied with the policy for enlisted men.


A similar picture is seen among officers in Infantry divisions in training in the United States in May 1944. Officers tended to think promotion policy much better for their men than for themselves. Eighty-one per cent of the officers thought that when promotions were made in their outfits they usually or always went to the enlisted men who deserved them most. But the enlisted men disagreed. Only 36 per cent of the enlisted men in the same outfits thought the promotions usually or always went to the enlisted men who deserved them most. And the officers' opinions of promotion policy for officers was far less favorable than their opinion of promotion policy

for enlisted men (54 per cent favorable as contrasted with the 81 per cent figure previously cited).

It is evident from data such as these that officers and enlisted men did not see eye to eye in evaluating the promotion situation as it applied to enlisted men. On the other hand, the evidence accumu-

CHART XIV

OPINIONS ABOUT PROMOTION CHANCES AMONG A SAMPLE OF ASF STAFF OFFICERS, BY EDUCATION, RANK, AND TIME IN GRADE  
(Survey of Technical and Administrative Officers in 5 ASF Installations in United States, January 1944)




The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

CHART XV

COMPARISON OF OPINIONS OF OFFICER AND ENLISTED COMBAT FLYERS AS TO PROMOTION POLICY

(Cross Section of Flying Personnel in Heavy, Medium, and Light Bombardment Squadrons, European Theater, May-June 1944)



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lated shows that when officers were appraising *their own* promotion situation they were very nearly as likely to be critical as were enlisted men in viewing *their own* chances to climb the enlisted men's ladder.

The importance to the Army of revising the promotion system for both officers and enlisted men was stressed in the report of the Doolittle Committee to the Secretary of War, May 1946. The report recommended: "that a complete review be made of the system of promotion, and that a promotion system on a merit basis be established, making it possible to permit especially competent individuals to be advanced ahead of any seniority average; that some system of demotion be established whereby, after a trial period, if an individual does not meet the requirements and demonstrates that he is incapable of assuming certain responsibilities and performing certain duties, he will be demoted." The report recognizes: "that a great deal more supervision on the part of commanders is going to be required under a merit system in order that promotion and/or demotion may be accomplished intelligently; also it is realized that it will be necessary to assure freedom from individual prejudices, favoritism, and political pressure."

In recommending that selection of men for positions of responsibility, up the scale, be based on "the most advanced practices in personnel selection found in industry, business, government, and developed in the Army," the report advocates a bold step which will involve much trial and error. The core of the problem technically is that of devising objective criteria and techniques for predicting successfully what combination of qualifications possessed by given men are likely to be best for given assignments of responsibility. This will take many years and could use some of the best skills of psychologists and other social scientists. How far the Army will go in modifying its traditional practices to utilize new psychological selection techniques, along with its use of new weapons, only the future will tell.

*JOB ASSIGNMENT  
AND JOB SATISFACTION*<sup>1</sup>

**T**HIS chapter studies the problem of man-power utilization in the Army as it is related to the attitudes of the soldiers.

In Chapter 5 it was observed that men who said they had not had a square deal in the Army indicated as their major complaint their assignment to branch or to job more often than any other complaint. Chapters 3 and 4 showed that satisfaction with job was associated with formal status (the noncoms, in practically all tabulations, had better attitudes than the privates) and with informal status (the men in the prestigious Air Corps, for example, were more likely to be satisfied with their jobs than men in other branches). Job satisfaction was shown also to be related to level of expectation—for example, the better educated, at a given rank, for a given longevity in the Army, tended to be less satisfied with their assignments than the less educated. In Chapter 6 this important status component of job satisfaction was analyzed in further detail in the study of social mobility in the Army.

The present chapter brings together a large and varied body of data throwing further light on the Army's problem of utilizing its man power effectively. The chapter is organized in two main sections.

Section I views the problem of job satisfaction as a relationship between the Army's needs and the men's desires. It is in three parts: (1) a general statement of the importance of taking into account attitudes as well as aptitudes in man-power utilization; (2)

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Samuel A. Stouffer, who drew upon numerous studies made at various periods of the war. Edward A. Suchman is responsible for the analysis of attitudes toward branch of service. A. J. Jaffe, more than any other member of the Branch, was responsible for the original studies of job assignment and job satisfaction, and his thinking, especially on the importance of choice in assignment, has influenced the chapter greatly. Personnel in the Classification and Assignment Branch, AGO, notably Walter Bingham, Lieutenant Colonel Marion W. Richardson, and Major Clyde Coombs, made important contributions to the research here cited. The author of the chapter was aided by a thoughtful preliminary resume prepared by Jack Elinson.



a brief sketch of the institutional difficulties involved in adapting personnel policies to the needs of modern war; (3) an analysis of branch preferences as they throw light on the general problem of what kind of Army jobs men wanted.

Section II analyzes, in some detail, four desires of the men as they were related to job satisfaction: (1) desire for status in the Army, (2) desire to maximize experience which would be useful in civilian life after the war, (3) desire to minimize the chances of death and injury, and (4) desire to minimize deprivations from civilian comforts.

## SECTION I

### JOB SATISFACTION AS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMY'S NEEDS AND MEN'S DESIRES

#### PART 1. Importance of Taking into Account Attitudes as Well as Aptitudes

From World War I a relatively new idea respecting the use of military man power emerged—namely, the importance of taking into account skills and aptitudes in job assignment. It was not, however, until the Second World War that elaborate machinery was used Army-wide for matching men's skills to jobs requiring those skills.

From World War II, an additional consideration has become strikingly apparent—namely, the importance of taking into account *attitudes* as well as *aptitudes* in assigning and using military man power. This idea is by no means new to civilian industry or even to the Army, but its systematic implementation in the Army would require changes far exceeding anything tried in World War II.<sup>2</sup>

The problem of man-power utilization was not necessarily the same when viewed from the Army's standpoint as when viewed from the men's standpoint. The problem, from the Army's point of view, was to assign and use men in such a manner as to get the

<sup>2</sup> Since demobilization, the Army in its recruiting program has stressed opportunity to choose one's own assignment and, in practice, has made serious effort to assign recruits in accordance with their desires. This may be easier in peacetime than it would be in wartime, and there is a recognized need for improved instruments which will better identify a soldier's general interests, in view of the likelihood that assignment in keeping with his general interests may be better both for him and for the Army than assignment to a specific job he indicates he wants. Moreover, in taking account of interests, the Army never can afford to neglect aptitudes. Attitudes and aptitudes are, perhaps, like two blades of a pair of scissors.

maximum from their aptitudes and training. The problem, from the viewpoint of the individual soldier, was to have a job which gave him a "good break." For the soldier this "good break" was a relative matter—some kind of relation between what he got and what he thought he ought to get. Hence, we have already seen that men with relatively low levels of expectation or aspiration were more easily satisfied than men with higher aims.

The Army's needs and men's desires most nearly coincided, of course, for those soldiers who were able to choose their Army jobs. The problem of matching Army needs and men's desires could not be an easy one. As later sections of this chapter will show, the desires of most men probably could be grouped into four categories: (1) To acquire status in the Army. (2) To maximize experience which would be useful in civilian life after the war. (3) To minimize the chances of death and injury. (4) To minimize deprivations from civilian comforts.

With respect to each of these categories there was wide individual variation among soldiers. There were a minority—like paratroopers and many Air Corps flyers—who volunteered for jobs of maximum danger. There were a good many who seemed to care little about status or about learning something which would be useful in postwar civilian life. Such variants will be duly noted in the detailed analysis of data later in the chapter; but the weight of the evidence is consistent with the selection of the four categories listed above as representing what most soldiers seemed to want out of their Army job.

The Army needed three classes of men: (1) Men with physical stamina and aptitude for combat. (2) Men with skills and aptitudes for an enormous variety of semiskilled, skilled, technical, and clerical noncombat jobs. (3) Men for unskilled labor.

Jobs in the first and third categories had to be filled—with certain notable exceptions such as Air Corps flyers—by men who much preferred assignments in the second category of jobs. The inevitable result was a large amount of job dissatisfaction among such men, especially if they had skills which they thought the Army could have used in a noncombat capacity.

If a man's assignment came within the second category—semi-skilled, skilled, technical, and clerical noncombat—there was some likelihood of the average soldier's getting the kind of assignment he wanted. But the Army had quotas to fill, and even if the elaborate classification and assignment system established by the Army had

functioned perfectly, as it did not, there would have been a large surplus of certain types of skills and aptitudes for which there was limited demand within the Army. Moreover, changes in the military situation at different stages in the war required drastic reconversion of men from one military job to another, with attendant dissatisfaction.

From the Army's standpoint, the individual's satisfaction with his job was a secondary by-product of the assignment process. While it would be agreed that a soldier satisfied with his job is a better soldier, it must also be agreed that an infantryman who doesn't like being an infantryman is better than no infantryman at all. The Army succeeded in glamorizing the paratroopers, all of whom volunteered for jumping even though most of them had been drafted into the Army. But it did not succeed in giving to the Infantry the kind of status which the Marine Corps has achieved. Nor did the Army's ordinary labor battalions probably get the public recognition which the Navy achieved for its Seabees. Having failed, on the one hand, to glamorize assignments which men ordinarily would avoid, and not having set up machinery for explicitly assessing men's interests and desires as well as skills, the Army was forced to fill a great many of its positions with men who wanted jobs different from those to which they were assigned.

From branch to branch there was wide variation in the opportunity within the branch to choose one's specific assignment.

As would be expected, and as Chart I shows, liking for a branch of service and opportunity within that branch of service to pick one's job assignment went hand in hand. In the study portrayed in this chart, over half of the men in the Air Corps sample in 1944 had chosen the job they were in, only 12 per cent of the infantrymen had chosen the job they were in. Most of the Air Corps men and few of the infantrymen preferred their own branch to others. Men in other branches were in-between on both variables. Of course, as we shall discuss later, chance to choose one's job was only one of many variables entering into branch preference.<sup>3</sup>


Chart II shows, for Air Forces, Service Forces, and Ground Forces separately, as well as for selected volunteer groups, the high proportion, among men who chose their assignments, responding "very satisfied" or "satisfied" to the question, "How satisfied are you

<sup>3</sup> The high correlation in Chart I is due to the extreme positions of Air Corps and Infantry. When these are removed, however, a significant correlation still remains between the two variables, among the other branches.

about being in your present job instead of some other Army job?" The contrast with the lower percentages satisfied among those who did not choose their assignments is very sharp.

One obvious caution should be observed in the interpretation of

CHART I  
 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANCE TO CHOOSE ARMY ASSIGNMENT AND  
 BRANCH PREFERENCE  
 (Troops in the United States)



Data from S-44, April 1943

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these tables. When a man says, "I had a chance to choose my Army job and got the job I chose," he may not always be making a strictly factual statement. Presumably, if he likes his present job he would be a little more likely to remember favorably the situation in which he received his assignment and, conversely, if he dislikes it, he might choose to forget that he asked for it. Particularly, there might be memory errors in marginal situations where, to be sure, there was a choice, but an extremely limited one—say, among three of four equally undesirable alternatives. Theoretically, the point could be pinned down by research only if a study were made at the time of choice and two groups of men, those who got what they chose and those who did not (or got no chance to choose), were re-studied after a suitable interval. Such a study was not made. The nearest approximation is to match each individual among a group of men who said they had had a chance to choose their assignment with an individual in the same job, in the same branch, at the same rank, and with the same educational background, who said he had not had a chance to choose his present assignment. This was possible, for example, for a sample of men in the Signal Corps and Engineers in the United States in July 1943. The results are shown in Table 1. Even if due allowance is made for possible fallacies of the type referred to above, differences in attitude of this magnitude leave little room for doubt that the man in a job which he had some chance to choose was much more likely to be a satisfied soldier than one who did not get a chance to choose an assignment or did not get the assignment which he chose. Other studies yield similar results.


Before we turn to more specific consideration of the kinds of assignments the soldiers wanted, it will be instructive to sketch briefly the problem within the Army of making its classification system work—a system which had its troubles in matching men's skills to Army needs, quite apart from what would have been an added problem if the matching of men's interests and desires to Army needs also had been more explicitly attempted.

## PART 2. The Army's Adaptation of Personnel Policy to the Needs of the New Technology of War

Between World War I and World War II, warfare went through an "industrial revolution." Mechanized war, with planes and tanks, trucks and jeeps, radio and radar, represented a profound change in technology. In the strains involved in the adaptation of man-power policies to these changed technological needs, the

## CHART II

### JOB SATISFACTION AS RELATED TO CHANCE TO CHOOSE JOB ASSIGNMENT (Troops in the United States)



Data for Air Corps Bombing Crews, Paratroopers, and Rangers from S-63G, August 1943. Other data from cross section derived from S-44, April 1943.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

Army provides the sociologist with a valuable case study in institutional adjustment. It is a subject much too complex for more than cursory treatment here and doubtless will be the subject of study by military historians and social scientists for many years to come.

In view of the fact that the Regular Army prior to World War II had few officers with modern training in personnel procedures comparable to the experts in personnel selection and management in

TABLE 1

CHANCE TO CHOOSE ARMY JOB AS RELATED TO JOB SATISFACTION

(Each man who said he got a chance to choose an Army job and got the job he chose is matched by a man in the same occupation with the same rank and educational level who said he did not get a chance to choose or did not get the Army job he asked for. Signal Corps and Engineers, July 1943)

	PERCENTAGE WHO SAID THEY WERE "VERY SATISFIED" OR "SATISFIED" WITH THEIR ARMY JOB, AMONG THOSE WHO:		
	Asked for Army job and got it	Did not get job asked for or did not get chance to ask	Number of matched pairs of men
Clerks and typists	85	45	161
Automotive mechanics	85	45	72
Cooks and bakers	85	53	57
Radio operators	83	41	76
Truck drivers	78	39	123
Telephone linemen and maintenance men	70	43	112

Data from S-68.

industry, and in view of the fact that problems of assignment of enlisted men in the old Army provided few problems in the use of specialties—and these problems codified by decades of tradition—it is quite remarkable how ready the Army was by 1940 to set up a modern and elaborate system for the classification and assignment of personnel. The planning was aided greatly by the experience of World War I, during which a group of psychologists, in the face of constant opposition from traditionalists, managed to get a system introduced, if not too widely accepted in the field, for classifying and assigning men by skill, not just as "bodies."<sup>4</sup> The procedure

<sup>4</sup> This experience was written down frankly in two volumes, *Personnel Procedures in the World War*, published by the Adjutant General in 1923. The authors of the Mobilization Regulations setting policies and procedures for World War II made frequent use of these volumes. The official history of classification and assignment in World War II has not yet been completed. The impressionistic summary in this section of

put into effect upon mobilization in 1940 called for the preparation of an individual card for each soldier (Form 20), to be initiated at the time of enlistment. This card carried detailed information on the occupational history of the individual, his education, his military experience if any, his civilian leadership experience if any, and his hobbies. Space was provided for recording a score on an Army General Classification Test, called the AGCT, which was mandatory for all enlisted men, and on such aptitude tests as were appropriate for him. The card, which followed the man throughout his military career along with his service record, provided for a listing of his military occupation specification as determined by a classification officer, and for a historical record of his assignments and promotions throughout his time in the Army. At the same time, the bookkeeping system of the Army was mechanized by elaborate IBM installations, which were decentralized and some of which were in mobile units to accompany troops to the field. Schools were set up for the training of classification officers and enlisted men and of statisticians and IBM operators. Thousands of men, including many psychologists, were commissioned and assigned as classification officers, and they, in turn, being in a strategic position for so doing, selected as assistants in the classification offices enlisted men with high AGCT scores and special skills. Especially in the Air Forces, some of the leading personnel experts in large industries were commissioned for posts at the higher echelons.

Normally, the recruit was given his initial interview and AGCT at the reception station, where he was kept only a few days and where he generally received his assignment to a branch of the service. Thence he went to a replacement training center for basic training in the branch to which he had been assigned. Here he was screened further and sent to a specialists' school or directly to a line outfit. The process varied at different times; during a period when pressures were extreme to build up the Infantry, for example, the replacement training center was by-passed and recruits sent directly from reception stations to Infantry divisions in training. To keep a check on field operations, inspection teams moved regularly from post to post; and from time to time special inspections were undertaken. Two such inspections, which involved elaborate check-ups on the assignment of hundreds of thousands of men, were under-

certain of the personnel problems is written largely out of the personal experience of members of the Research Branch who were in close contact with the Adjutant General's Office. When an official history is written, it may turn out that some of the impressions here recorded make the wrong emphasis or otherwise err.



taken following sample studies made by the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division. The Research Branch, throughout the war, worked in close and cordial cooperation with the agencies in charge of staff planning of classification and assignment procedures and some of the studies of attitudes of troops toward their Army jobs appeared as joint publications.

*How the Efficiency of Personnel Work Was Impeded*

Forces impeding the successful operation of the personnel system were present at both lower and higher echelons. It would oversimplify the picture to attribute them solely to resistance to new ideas on the part of officers who had grown up in the old Army tradition of considering enlisted men as "bodies," though this attitude was encountered.

At the lower echelons, a personnel policy calling for maximum use of special skills in Army jobs needing those skills encountered particular resistance when it required a commanding officer to give up good men because they were more needed elsewhere. From the colonel reluctant to lose his chauffeur who happened to be a skilled machinist, to an entire branch reluctant to give up surplus telephone linemen needed in another branch—even if those linemen were doing odd jobs like digging ditches—there was an understandable resistance to yielding men who were regarded as good men to have in an outfit. The pressures on the classification officer to "play ball" for his superior in such situations must have been heavy and, sometimes, irresistible. Likewise, there was pressure on the classification officer to get rid of so-called "undesirables" in an outfit, when a chance arose to transfer men in response to a request from a higher echelon. There was apparently no system for rewarding a commanding officer who sincerely complied with the larger Army demands for transfer of skilled men, rather than indirectly punishing him if his outfit made a subsequently poorer showing because of his compliance. The problem is difficult, because some of the cards are stacked the wrong way.

From the higher echelons, the personnel program probably met even greater handicaps to efficient operation than from the lower commands in the field. Three examples may be cited, one at the beginning of the war, one near the middle, and one near the end.

An initial decision to permit each branch of the service to provide its own basic training, even if the first month or so of that training in many of the branches was ordinary infantry training, required

the classification system to determine the entire direction of the military career of most recruits during the few days—sometimes only hours—which they spent at the reception center. Here the assignment to branch of service was made. The difficulty was not so much lack of time to do a thorough classification job, serious as this difficulty may have been, as it was the necessity of filling immediate quotas for various classes of men. A reception station might get a call on one day for 100 men with experience or aptitudes for radio operators to be sent to Air Forces and a few days later a call for 100 men with experience or aptitudes for automobile mechanics. The first quota might have to be filled by including 20 skilled automobile mechanics who had some aptitude to become radio operators, even if the men themselves preferred to be automobile mechanics. The second quota might have to be filled by including several radio hobbyists who happened to have aptitudes as motor mechanics, even if the men themselves preferred to be radio operators. Topside put the emphasis on speed in filling the quotas and the classification officers had no recourse. *If a plan could have been established for filling quotas from a uniform basic training center, in which all of the men received their first month of basic training, greater flexibility would have been provided and it probably would have been possible to take into account more effectively the men's own interests, within the limits of the Army's needs.* Partly as a result of Research Branch studies, efforts were made, especially in Air Forces, to make the quota system more flexible, but the basic difficulty could not be corrected without modifying the replacement training center program, which was not done until after the war.

A second difficulty faced by the personnel system in operation was due to *shifts* in high-level planning. Perhaps the most drastic example came in the winter of 1943–1944, when it was discovered that the needs for Army Ground Forces and particularly for Infantry had been grossly underestimated. The Army Specialized Training Program, which was sending to college carefully selected young men of highest AGCT for special training, was suddenly abandoned and those men largely sent to the Infantry as riflemen; thousands of air cadets who had volunteered and had been screened for training as pilots were thrown into the Infantry; and Army Service Forces were stripped of a large proportion of their technically trained personnel who at the same time were physically fit for combat duty. The extent to which such a drastic upheaval of personnel was due to lack of good statistical analysis at the highest

staff level and to lack of reasonable foresight in anticipating the Army's needs, and the extent to which it was a fortune of war resulting from unforeseeable shifts in the military situation, is a complicated problem for military historians. The effects, however, in turning upside down the placement work of classification officers, can easily be imagined.

A final example of the role of high-level planning in the difficulties of the personnel program had to do with the placement and utilization of men returned from overseas on rotation or permanent limited assignment prior to VE Day. This problem is discussed in detail in the chapter on problems of rotation and reconversion in Volume II. Suffice it to say here that a dilemma arose which apparently never was completely solved. On the one hand, it was decided to retain returnees in the same grade they held overseas; on the other hand, there were not enough T/O vacancies in units in the United States to absorb large numbers of returnees in the grades they had attained overseas. For example, thousands of veteran infantrymen were sent home as qualified for limited service only. A few of them could be used as Infantry instructors, but the majority had to be transferred to some other branch of service. One of the ASF branches which needed men in large numbers was the Military Police, and the ribbons which these ex-combat men wore might have helped much in raising the prestige of this much calumniated branch of the service. But the number of men whom the Military Police could absorb was sharply restricted by the high rank which the returnees held and the lack of paper vacancies for men in such grades. Due to conditions like this, study after study made by the Research Branch in the year prior to VE Day showed evidence of waste of man power and of unfavorable attitudes among the returnees, who wanted either to be assigned to something worth-while or discharged. Officers in the field in charge of assignment, even when trying their utmost, were often helpless in the face of such dilemmas which could be solved only at high-policy levels.

One can say that the Army officially recognized the advantages of maximizing the use of aptitudes and civilian skills in Army jobs calling for these skills. In setting up its elaborate classification system—tests, record forms, and staff of experts drawn from civilian life and from Army schools for the training of more personnel experts—the Army had an institutional mechanism adaptable to the man-power needs of the new kind of war technology. The effectiveness of the system was handicapped and sometimes negated

by resistances at the lower echelons, but more especially by high-level policy. That many of the lessons of World War I were applied and an incomparably better job done in World War II, there can be little doubt. That the adaptation of the personnel program to demands of the new technology of war was far from perfect is also true, and is reflected in soldiers' testimony previously cited and in the data to be presented in this chapter.

### PART 3.    Branch Preference as an Indicator               of the Kind of Assignments Soldiers Wanted


The factors which made for the average soldier's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his Army assignment cannot be inferred from any single set of data. It is instructive to begin with a broad comparison of attitudes of privates and noncoms in the three great components of the Army—Ground Forces, Service Forces, and Air Forces. Chart III compares men in these three components in the summer of 1943—about midway in the war. The sample is a representative cross section of soldiers in continental United States. The measure of job satisfaction is a scale based on five items. AAF is highest, AGF lowest, and ASF intermediate. Among AGF, Infantry is particularly low. This pattern is found in all studies, at any period of the war. Noncoms are higher than privates. This, as we saw in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, is almost universally the case.

What do these findings suggest as to what the average soldier wanted and found in his Army assignment?

Within Ground Forces, the largest branch was the Infantry. The Infantry offered a maximum chance of death or injury, and was not only a certain ticket for overseas duty but also was recognized as having hard, dirty, and disagreeable work; its opportunities for promotion were less than in some, if not in most, other branches; and it provided little chance to learn skills specifically useful in civilian life. Eventually, before the end of hostilities, the combat infantryman got his share of the respect for valor which was accorded the flying men throughout the war. But the Infantry was the branch which men wanted most to avoid. The Armored Force had most of the disadvantages of the Infantry, but had the advantage of a little more glamor and in the eyes of the men was somewhat less dangerous and also less arduous. The Field Artillery was correctly regarded as much less dangerous than the Infantry, though it satisfied few positive motivations.

The heterogeneous branches trained by Army Service Forces gen-

CHART III  
 VARIATION IN JOB SATISFACTION IN THE ARMY  
 (Troops in the United States)



Data from S-64, July 1943.  
 The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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erally had jobs which minimized death or injury. There were exceptions, as among the combat engineers or the combat medical men, but most of the jobs were not at the front lines. Many of the jobs called for hard, monotonous drudgery involving little skill; hence the Army Service Forces were the dumping ground for men thought to be unfit even for the Infantry—many of the less educated Negroes, for example. But Army Service Forces also had hundreds of thousands of noncombat jobs calling for high technical and clerical skills and often carrying good ratings, and these jobs were coveted. They minimized chances of death or injury, they minimized deprivations from civilian comforts, provided good chances for promotion and acquisition of status within the Army, and in many instances provided chances to get experience which would be useful after the war. Even to the unambitious manual laborer who had quit school early in civilian life, a labor job in ASF, unpleasant as it often was, was at least safer than an equally dirty job in the Infantry.

The Air Forces included many men trained in Service Force branches, but the Air Corps itself occupies a special position in the soldiers' hierarchy of preferences. It "had everything" from the standpoint of wants. The glamorous dangers of the combat flyers lent a reflected glory to the vast majority of Air Corps men who were nonflying personnel. In the Air Corps training program it was less necessary than in the Quartermaster Corps to sell the idea that its men really had tough combat jobs. No civilian would paraphrase the refrain from World War I,

"Take down your Service flag, Mother,  
Your son's in the SOS,"

by substituting "Air Corps" for "SOS." True, distinctions between flying and nonflying personnel were sharp within the Air Corps itself. Yet the dependence of the men with wings on the men without wings for maintenance of the planes and the chain of supply was so immediate and personal that men at a base were made to feel themselves part of a great fighting team—and with a minimum exposure to personal risk. The Air Corps had all of the other advantages of Service Force jobs, as contrasted with the Infantry, and had some of them to even a greater degree. The men usually slept in beds, not in fox holes, and had warm food. Early in the war they were highly selected for education and, especially in the earlier periods, were offered the best of all chances for promotion

and a maximum chance to learn something which might be useful after the war.

Because of the fact that the Air Corps was the most respected branch of the service as well as the branch men would most like to be in, there was a rather close overall relationship between respect for branch and liking to be in it. However, when attitudes toward

TABLE 2  
RESPECT FOR A GIVEN BRANCH AND LIKING FOR A GIVEN BRANCH COMPARED  
(First Preferences of a Cross Section of Enlisted Men in the United States in April 1943)

	PERCENTAGE SAYING THAT THEY:	
	<i>Respected a given branch most</i>	<i>Would like most to be in a given branch</i>
Air Corps	56	45
Infantry	9	4
Engineers	4	4
Field Artillery	3	4
Armored Force	2	3
	—	—
	18	15
Medical Corps	3	5
Signal Corps	2	4
Coast Artillery	2	4
Ordnance	2	7
Quartermaster Corps	2	6
Transportation Corps	1	4
Military Police	1	4
Chemical Warfare Service	—	1
	—	—
	13	35
Undecided or no answer	13	5
	—	—
	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	1,000	1,000

Data from S-44, April 1943.

branches other than Air Corps are considered, an ambivalence is apparent. Although 18 per cent of the men studied in 1943 respected most a combat arm like Infantry, Field Artillery, and Armored Force (together with the Combat Engineers), as compared with only 13 per cent who respected most some other arm or service (Air Corps excepted), the picture was reversed when it came to wanting to be in a given branch. Only 15 per cent said they

wanted to be in Infantry, Field Artillery, Armored Force, or Engineers, as compared with 35 per cent who wanted to be in some other branch. These data are shown in Table 2, representing preferences expressed by a cross section of the Army in the United States in April 1943.

The same tendency appears when attitudes of men within a particular branch toward their own branch are considered. This is seen in Table 3. On the average, in the Engineers, Field Artillery,

TABLE 3  
HOW MEN IN A GIVEN BRANCH VARIED IN THEIR RESPECT FOR AND  
THEIR LIKING FOR THEIR OWN BRANCH  
(Troops in United States, April 1943)

	PERCENTAGE IN A GIVEN BRANCH SAYING THAT THEY:			Number of cases
	<i>Respected their own branch most</i>	<i>Liked most to be in their own branch</i>	<i>Difference</i>	
Air Corps	73	76	-3	399
Engineers	25	32	-7	387
Field Artillery	22	27	-5	335
Armored Force	19	26	-7	356
Infantry	17	11	+6	314
Average	21	24	-3	
Signal Corps	27	46	-19	468
Medical Corps	18	35	-17	351
Ordnance	16	42	-26	345
Quartermaster Corps	14	38	-24	403
Coast Artillery	13	26	-13	457
Military Police	12	36	-24	408
Chemical Warfare Service	7	30	-23	220
Average	15	36	-21	

Data from same source as Chart I.

Armored Force, and Infantry, 21 per cent said they *thought most highly* of their own branch, as compared with 15 per cent in other branches (exclusive of Air Corps). By contrast, the proportion *liking* their own branch best averaged 24 per cent in the Engineers, Field Artillery, Armored Force, and Infantry—well below the average of 36 per cent in other arms and services.

There is probably no single factor which will explain this ambivalence.

Variables related to respect for a branch surely included beliefs



about the importance of the branch in winning the war and about the degree of danger encountered in the branch. The proportions who rated a given branch most highly on these variables were:

	<i>Which will be most needed in winning the war?</i>	<i>Which has the most dangerous jobs?</i>
Air Corps	59%	23%
Infantry, Engineers, Armored Force, Field Artillery	20	57
All others	9	8
Undecided or no answer	12	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,000</i>

There can be little doubt that dangerous jobs, though respected, were also an inducement to stay out of a branch which had them. (The Air Corps was an exception, as heretofore noted, because one could serve in a relatively safe ground job and still recognize his branch as a dangerous combat arm.) Other variables associated with like or dislike of a branch included opportunities for training for a civilian job after the war and relative comfort, as represented by presence or absence of dirty and disagreeable jobs or excessively hard work. The proportions who would rate a given branch most highly on these variables were:

	<i>Which would give you best training for a civilian job after the war?</i>	<i>Which has the most dirty and disagreeable jobs?</i>	<i>Which works its soldiers the hardest?</i>
Air Corps	33%	2%	3%
Infantry, Engineers, Armored Force, Field Artillery	16	56	79
All others	36	25	6
Undecided or no answer	15	17	12
	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>1,000</i>

The same essential picture with respect to branch preference as shown in the proportions wanting to be in a given branch, seen in Table 2, appears throughout the war. Preference for Air Corps dropped, but only slightly as the war went on. As late as May 1945, when returnees from overseas were queried, 38 per cent preferred to be in the Air Corps, 12 per cent in the Infantry, Armored Force, Field Artillery, or Engineers, and 38 per cent in all other branches,

while 12 per cent were undecided or did not answer. Overseas, in both the Pacific and in Europe, as compared with earlier studies in the United States, there was a drop in the preference to be in the Air Corps on the part of men in both Ground Force and Service Force trained branches, and this was compensated by an increase in preference for noncombat Service Force branches. But the Air Corps remained to the end of the war by far the most popular arm of the service.

TABLE 4  
REASONS FOR BRANCH PREFERENCE

	PERCENTAGE CHECKING INDICATED REASON AMONG THOSE WHO:		
	<i>Prefer an AGF branch</i>	<i>Prefer an ASF branch</i>	<i>Prefer Air Corps</i>
<i>Importance to war effort</i>			
<i>"It is an important branch in winning     the war"</i>	31	15	25
<i>Danger and toughness</i>			
<i>"It would give me a chance to get into     combat"</i>	18	3	6
<i>"The men in it are the best and tough-     est soldiers"</i>	5	1	1
<i>Skill utilization or training</i>			
<i>"I would get a chance to do the kind     of work I can do best"</i>	17	48	23
<i>"It would give me training for a better     job after the war"</i>	3	16	29
<i>All other reasons*</i>	11	6	6
<i>No answer</i>	15	11	10
	100	100	100
<i>Total per cent</i>	100	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	427	1,192	1,547

Data from 8-95, February 1944.

\* None mentioned by more than 5 per cent.

Further light is thrown on the reasons for branch preference by a study made in the United States in February 1944. Men were asked to check the branch they preferred to be in and to mark the most important single reason for their preference from a check list. Table 4 compares percentage distributions of responses from men preferring a Ground Force branch, a Service Force branch, or the Air Corps, respectively. The contrasting patterns of responses as between those preferring Ground Forces and Service Forces are quite apparent—especially responses relating to danger and tough-

ness on the one hand and to skill utilization or training on the other. This contrast becomes even more striking in Table 5, where the handful who preferred Infantry are compared with others.

One has to be cautious in interpreting absolute proportions on a check list such as this, but there can be little doubt as to the implications of the comparative proportions.

The data as to branch preference serve as background for a more detailed exploration into desires of soldiers as they were related to job satisfaction. That is now undertaken in Section II which follows.

TABLE 5

REASONS FOR BRANCH PREFERENCE AMONG INFANTRYMEN AND NONINFANTRYMEN ACCORDING TO PRESENT AND DESIRED AFFILIATION

	PERCENTAGE CHECKING INDICATED REASON AMONG THOSE WHO:			
	<i>Prefer Infantry</i>	<i>Non-Infantrymen</i>	<i>Prefer some other branch</i>	<i>Non-Infantrymen</i>
<i>Importance to war effort</i>				
<i>"It is an important branch in winning the war"</i>	45	16	10	21
<i>Danger and toughness</i>				
<i>"It would give me a chance to get into combat"</i>	18	34	3	5
<i>"The men in it are the best and toughest soldiers"</i>	15	10	1	1
<i>Skill utilization or training</i>				
<i>"I would get a chance to do the kind of work I can do best"</i>	5	10	37	32
<i>"It would give me training for a better job after the war"</i>	—	1	23	20
<i>All other reasons</i>	10	20	20	14
<i>No answer</i>	7	9	6	7
<b>Total per cent</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	56	68	417	3,053

S-95.

## SECTION II

### DESIRES OF THE MEN AS RELATED TO JOB SATISFACTION

In this section four desires of the men are analyzed in some detail as they relate to job satisfaction. They are desire for status, desire

to avoid danger of death or injury, desire to utilize civilian skills and to learn something that would be useful in civilian life after the war, and desire to avoid deprivation from civilian comforts. All except the last seem to bear a close relationship to job satisfaction. With respect to the last, we have seen that a branch like the Infantry which involved great danger also involved maximum deprivations. Men rated it highest of all branches for having the most dirty and disagreeable jobs and for working soldiers the hardest. However, we are to find, if we hold constant the danger variable, that job satisfaction seemed to have rather slight relationship to the deprivations of the environment in which the job was performed. In Chapter 5, it will be remembered, there was some evidence that the sense of importance of one's work tended to be higher overseas than in the United States and this, together with the fact that discomforts were relative rather than absolute, may have prevented a marked lowering of job satisfaction in the presence of an unpleasant environment.

We turn first to a brief consideration of status as related to job satisfaction.

#### PART 1. Status

Formal status was denoted by rank, but there were other less formal means by which status could be enjoyed. Although the Army maintained the fiction that all branches had equal status, this was, of course, not the case, as we have seen by the men's own testimony. And there were special elite units like Paratroopers or Rangers. Moreover, within a branch and transcending rank, there were various kinds of informal status. The outstanding example is the combat veteran as compared with the man who might be of equal rank but who had not yet been exposed to enemy fire. Since the combat veteran is the subject of several chapters in Volume II, he will not be discussed further in the present context. Also there were jobs in which men of several grades could be assigned, and in such situations high rank was not necessarily associated with high job satisfaction. Finally, there were varied jobs at the same rank and branch which differed in their prestige value.

Chapters 3 and 4 have already documented so thoroughly the relationship between formal status (rank) and job satisfaction among enlisted men that there is no need for repetition. Some illustrations to show that, as would be expected, officers generally had higher job satisfaction than enlisted men may be reviewed briefly.

The earliest study permitting a direct comparison of officers with enlisted men is a survey made in four branches of the service in the United States in November 1943.<sup>5</sup> The data are presented in Table 6. In all cases officers had general job attitudes equally as favorable or more favorable than noncoms, and noncoms had general job attitudes equally as favorable or more favorable than privates. Branch differences, with Infantry lowest and Air Corps highest, tended to be very large and consistent for all grades. On some of the specific subjects, however, it may have been that differences were not as great as in the general appraisal of the assignment. Only one example is available from the November 1943 study—a question on whether officers recognize the respondent's abilities. For officers the question was, "Do you feel that your superior officers recognize your abilities and what you are able to do?" For enlisted men the word "superior" was eliminated. The categories on the check list were: "Yes, I'm sure they do," "Yes, I think so, but am not sure," "No, I am sure they do not." The proportions checking the first two categories were not significantly different as between officers and noncoms but in both groups were higher than among privates.

Probably the best available sample on which to base a comparison of attitudes of enlisted men and officers who themselves were once enlisted men comes from a cross-section survey made in the United States in February 1945.<sup>6</sup> By this time, the deployment overseas was, of course, extensive and there were some returnees, but by taking only officers and men who had been in the Army at least a year and who had never been overseas in the war and by tabulating separately by force, some of the otherwise disturbing factors can be controlled. Only one relevant question is available, namely, "How interested are you in the work you are doing on your present Army assignment?" (The check-list categories were "Very much interested," "A little but not much," "Not interested at all.") The data appear in Table 7. The percentage who checked "Very much interested" ranges from 23 per cent among AGF privates to 96 per cent among Air Corps flying second lieutenants. Some of the subsamples are very small and reliance should be made on the general pattern of consistency rather than on a single figure. It will be noted that the proportion of favorable responses among sergeants and top three graders is about as high as among officers.

<sup>5</sup> S-86 and S-87.

<sup>6</sup> S-198.

Air Corps first lieutenants in this sample show slightly less favorable attitudes than Air Corps second lieutenants, but not too much should be made of this point in the absence of corroborating data.

Only scattered data are available from overseas comparing job

TABLE 6  
COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN IN  
FOUR SELECTED BRANCHES  
(United States, November 1943)

	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Field Artillery</i>	<i>Signal Corps</i>	<i>Air Corps</i>
<b>"If you had a chance, which of these branches would you rather be in?"</b>				
Percentage naming their own branch on a check list of all branches				
Officers	44	52	63	93
Noncoms	11	30	46	85
Privates	9	30	33	75
<b>"Do you feel that everything has been done to place you in the Army job where you fit best?"</b>				
Percentage saying "Yes"				
Officers	37	42	46	65
Noncoms	20	30	45	50
Privates	11	25	26	36
<b>"Do you feel that your officers recognize your abilities and what you are able to do?"</b>				
Percentage saying "Yes, I'm sure they do" or "Yes, I think they do, but I'm not sure"				
Officers	66	64	72	70
Noncoms	71	64	66	68
Privates	48	53	45	50
<i>Number of cases</i>				
<i>Officers</i>	<i>362</i>	<i>118</i>	<i>199</i>	<i>268</i>
<i>Noncoms</i>	<i>225</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>442</i>
<i>Privates</i>	<i>402</i>	<i>103</i>	<i>252</i>	<i>165</i>

satisfaction of officers and enlisted men. The same general pattern of higher job satisfaction among officers is present.

As soldiers returned from overseas, a number of studies were made of the job satisfaction of enlisted men, and in some instances samples of officers were included for comparison. These studies

are discussed in the chapter on returnees in Volume II and will not be reviewed here, save to point out that they reveal no marked aberrations from the pattern of positive correlation between rank and job satisfaction. Returnees in general were much less satisfied with their Army assignments than men who had not gone overseas, and a returnee of a given grade tended to have worse attitudes than a man of somewhat lower grade who had not been overseas. But

TABLE 7

INTEREST IN ARMY JOB AMONG OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN  
(Officers and Men Who Have Been in Army at Least 1 Year and Have Not Been Overseas; Officers Who Were Formerly Enlisted Men, Date of Survey, February 1945)

	"How interested are you in the work you are doing in your present Army assignment?"				
	PERCENTAGE SAYING "VERY MUCH INTERESTED"				
	AGF	ASF	AAF	AAF nonflyers	AAF flyers
1st Lieutenants	80	79		76	83
2nd Lieutenants	74	77		78	96
Top 3 Graders	*	82	82		
Sergeants	73	73	75		
Corporals	53	59	69		
Privates 1st Class	21	37	59		
Privates	23	25	42		
	SIZE OF SAMPLE				
1st Lieutenants	113	326		254	80
2nd Lieutenants	198	266		276	624
Top 3 Graders	*	50	107		
Sergeants	55	77	103		
Corporals	61	91	349		
Privates 1st Class	67	182	87		
Privates	107	179	86		

\* Less than 40 cases in the sample.

when returnees and men not yet overseas are studied separately, the general pattern described above is maintained.

An interesting illustration of an exceptional situation where rank was negatively associated with job satisfaction was observed in a survey of a B-29 bomber wing made just before it took off for the Pacific in May 1945.<sup>7</sup> About a fourth of the flight engineers in the wing were lieutenants or flight officers and about three fourths were enlisted men. When asked, "Would you change to some other Army job if given a chance?" 96 per cent of the officers and flight

<sup>7</sup> S-207.

officers said "Yes," as compared with only 20 per cent of the master sergeants and technical sergeants, and only 6 per cent of the staff sergeants, sergeants, and corporals. Further inquiry revealed that most of these officers and flight officers were rated pilots who were assigned to the job of flight engineer because of a surplus of pilots and shortage of engineers. The enlisted men, particularly those of the lower grades, instead of being "burned up" about not having commissions for this task were reasonably well satisfied. The lower the grade, the more confidently the enlisted men viewed their chances of promotion, at least within enlisted grades, as a separate question on promotion chances shows.

Further evidence that among men of different rank performing the same task higher rank did not necessarily lead to job satisfaction is seen among other officers in the plane crews excluding commanders. Among co-pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and radar observers, all of whom were officers, those of higher rank were somewhat less likely to be satisfied with their assignment than those of lower rank on the same jobs. Of the captains and first lieutenants, 52 per cent said they would change to another Army job if given a chance; of the second lieutenants and flight officers, the corresponding figure was 31 per cent (114 and 428 cases, respectively). This pattern of differences is consistent for each of the positions on the ship taken individually.

Among enlisted men who were aerial gunners or radio operators there were no significant differences in attitude by rank, 30 per cent of the sergeants and 31 per cent of the corporals and privates first class saying that they would change to some other Army job if they had a chance. This is in contrast to the usual difference expected by rank, sergeants ordinarily exhibiting considerably higher job satisfaction than corporals. As would be expected, the men of lower rank in the B-29 study viewed their chances of promotion more favorably than men of higher rank. We must always keep our eye on expectations as well as achievement in evaluating an attitude relating to status.

The generally higher level of job satisfaction in Air Corps than in other branches, documented in Chapter 5, was without much doubt in part a function of the prestige of being in the Air Corps. In Chapter 6 we saw that men in the Air Corps, where promotions were more rapid than in other branches, were more likely than others at the same rank and longevity to be critical about promotions. But this did not necessarily carry over to general dissatis-



faction with one's assignment, and Air Corps men, taken as a whole, were less likely than men in any other branch in the Army to want to transfer to other Army assignments.

With respect to branch of service, the Army's greatest problem, without much question, was related to the Infantry. As Chapter 5 showed, Infantry was almost always low on indices of job satisfaction. Here was present the danger variable, to be studied in the next part of this section, but here also was the status variable. Why did not the Army succeed in making the Infantry glamorous, like the Air Corps? The answer that the Air Corps was symbolic of modern warfare and that the Infantry was symbolic of an outmoded past neither squared with the facts nor would serve to explain why the Marine Corps never seemed to lack in prestige. One important clue is the matter of selectivity. The Air Corps and Marine Corps publicized the exacting standards necessary for admission. In the early days of the war, there can be little doubt that the Infantry was the dumping ground for men who could pass physical standards but who need not satisfy any other test. This is seen indirectly in the educational level of the Infantry, which was among the lowest of any branch of service in the Army. The men, too, realized this, as shown by a survey of infantrymen in training in the spring of 1944 when 74 per cent said that they thought "the Infantry gets more than its share of men who aren't good for anything else."

By the time the Army recognized this status problem, most of the damage had already been done. Nevertheless, directly in response to studies made in the Research Branch, the Chief of Staff initiated a systematic program to raise the prestige of the Infantry. There were several parts to the program, including an Act of Congress to increase the T/O ratings and pay (which dispatches from Ernie Pyle did much to promote), a large-scale publicity campaign, and the introduction of the Expert Infantryman's Badge and the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

A case study in the effect of such a symbol as the Expert Infantryman's Badge in improving attitudes toward Infantry service is provided by an experimental study made in three divisions by the Research Branch in March 1944. The badge, it will be remembered, was an award for passing certain rigorous tests.

All three divisions were surveyed before the program was introduced. In two of the divisions men were resurveyed after the tests had been run and the awards announced. The third division was


maintained as a control; no tests or awards were made between the "before" or "after" surveys. The results are shown in Chart IV. It will be seen that among those who won badges there was an increase from 48 per cent to 61 per cent in the proportion who said they thought more highly of the Infantry than of any other branch, and among those not taking the test in the experimental division or those who failed the test, there was an increase in respect for the Infantry as large as or larger than that in the control division. The same picture is seen in regard to liking to be in the Infantry. The improvement was small, but it represented an increase from the extremely low level of 14 per cent to 21 per cent, among those earning badges, with no gain in the control group.

A single symbol cannot of course be expected to overcome all status deficiencies which are more deeply rooted. The most effective procedure would doubtless have been to introduce a higher level of selectivity at the beginning of the war. Eventually, many misfits had to be screened out of the Infantry and many replacements hastily added, including thousands of intelligent, able-bodied ASF men who, with better early planning, might have been initially sent to the Infantry, with prestige advantages to it.

The lowest rung on the status ladder was probably held by the Military Police. "The policeman's lot is not a happy one" applied to the policemen of the Army as well as to civilian representatives of law and order. Not only was there, in the Military Police, an absence of informal status-building characteristics of "importance-danger" such as could make men respect the Infantry even though they did not themselves want to be in the Infantry, but also the police function could be an obnoxious one. (In spite of abuses of power by MP's, however, 72 per cent of a cross section of soldiers in the United States in 1945 said that "most MP's treat soldiers fairly.") Job satisfaction was low among the Military Police as compared with men in most other branches and this went hand in hand with low pride in outfit. A special study of the Military Police, made by the Research Branch in 1944 for the Provost Marshal General, showed that this branch had about as low an educational level as any branch in the Army and that it contained numerous castoffs from other branches. The study suggested that, since there were several classes of duties within the Military Police, systematic effort be made to use different types of men in the different duties. The jobs of guarding prisoners, for example, surely called for a different type of personality from the jobs of policing trains,

stations, and city streets. It seemed especially desirable that returned combat veterans with many ribbons, whose utilization was a problem to the Army, might very well be retrained for these jobs which involved much contact with the Army and the public, thus raising the status of the MP assignment. An effort was made to do this, but it was not wholly successful, due to the fact that re-

CHART IV  
 EFFECT ON ATTITUDES TOWARD INFANTRY OF INTRODUCTION OF  
 EXPERT INFANTRYMAN'S BADGE  
 (Three Infantry Divisions in the United States, March 1944)



The numbers at the bottom of each pair of bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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turnees kept their attained rank and the Army did not see fit to provide for enough increase in rank within the Military Police to absorb as many qualified returnees as became available and as were needed.

In such an elaborate organization as an army, it is an intricate task to manipulate the status rewards so as to maximize the relationship between an army's needs and men's desires. Merely increasing rank, in general, would not necessarily be effective—we saw in Chapter 6 that men who had a given rank were more critical of promotion policy if relatively many of their associates were promoted than if relatively few were promoted. This problem in the future Army, just as in civilian industry, is one calling for much intensive and extensive study by social psychologists in the years ahead.

## PART 2. Utilization and Acquisition of Civilian Skills

While the Army existed to kill the enemy, and consequently a considerable part of these volumes is concerned with combat troops, we must not lose sight of the fact that the majority of the soldiers were not combat men but technicians and laborers in a vast organization to supply and support the fighting soldier. Sometimes these noncombat men, as at Bataan or Anzio or in some phases of the Battle of the Bulge, shared perils equally with the combat soldiers. Generally, they did not.

No official data are available classifying the jobs of soldiers into combat and noncombat or subclassifying the noncombat jobs into broad skill types. However, it is probably a fairly good rough approximation to think that *out of every four men in the Army one had a combat job and of the remaining three, one had a clerical job, one had a skilled job, and one had a semiskilled or unskilled job.*

In three surveys in the United States in 1943 and 1944 an effort was made to code the respondents into Army jobs according to these four types. The results were not too satisfactory, because of the ambiguity of many of the classifications and the difficulty of training coding clerks to interpret the respondent's description of his Army job in a form which would permit assignment to the appropriate category. The three studies agree very well in the proportion of men in combat jobs (after excluding from the total those men who were in basic training and men who provided no data or whose answers could not be classified):

	<i>Percentage of Army jobs classified as combat jobs</i>
March 1943 sample	24
April 1943 sample	26
February 1944 sample	25

The studies agree less satisfactorily on the classification of noncombat jobs into "clerical," "skilled," and "semiskilled" or "unskilled." In the March 1943 study the figures were 24 per cent, 28 per cent, and 24 per cent, respectively. In April 1943 they were 23 per cent, 35 per cent, and 15 per cent, respectively. In February 1944 they were 35 per cent, 22 per cent, and 18 per cent. None of the samples included Negro troops. Inclusion of Negroes and also of illiterate whites (who comprised the bulk of nonrespondents) would raise the proportion in unskilled and semiskilled jobs by a few per cent. Discrepancies from study to study are due to differences in coding as well as to differences in sampling, and no trend value must be ascribed to them.


Each sample comprised Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces in approximately correct proportions. At these periods the relative proportion of men in combat and noncombat jobs deployed abroad, while it may have differed from the proportion in the United States, could not have differed enough to have yielded a world-wide distribution materially different from that in the United States at this period.

If we examine each of the four broad job types as to the characteristics of the men comprising them, we obtain substantially the same picture from each of the three Research Branch surveys, even though the total numbers in each category were subject to discrepancies. The combat men were on the average younger and less well educated than the noncombat men. In the noncombat jobs, the clerical positions tended to go to the better educated, the unskilled and semiskilled jobs to the less educated—indicating, in a very broad way, the results of the elaborate classification and assignment program adopted by the Army. Chart V shows the data from the February 1944 survey by way of illustration.

With three fourths of the Army jobs noncombat jobs, and with many of these jobs having civilian counterparts, two facts are evident: (1) that the Army had a great reservoir of civilian skills on which to draw, and (2) that the Army was in a position to give many soldiers training which would be useful in civilian life after the war.

To many recruits entering the Army both the hope of using their civilian skills and the chance to acquire new or improved skills were no doubt factors of major concern. A sample of 1,187 recruits

CHART V  
AGE AND EDUCATION BY TYPE OF ARMY JOB  
(White Enlisted Men in United States, February 1944)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

studied at six reception stations in February 1945 was asked to indicate what branch they preferred to be in and to check the reason for their choice. Such check lists are likely to be unreliable, but it may be mentioned that out of a list of twelve response categories

more men checked "Because I would get a chance to do the work I can do best" or "Because it would give me training for a better job after the war" than any other category. As the soldier advanced through basic training to his specific job assignment, he continued to be concerned with the chance to use his civilian skills or to acquire new skills. All studies show, as would be expected, that men who said that their Army job did not use their civilian skills or did not teach them anything which would be useful in civilian life also tended to say that they were dissatisfied with their job. As the war neared its close and the eyes of the soldier focused on getting out of the Army as soon as possible, the potentialities of the immediate Army job for skill utilization or training and the desire to transfer to a better job may have become less important to him, although it is difficult to establish this from the available data.

At least in the middle periods of the war, the information collected by the Research Branch can throw considerable light on the soldier's desire to use his skills or learn something which would help him after the war.

Not all soldiers were alike in attitude toward use or acquisition of civilian skills. Some soldiers wanted a combat job, even if it taught them little; on the other hand, some who wanted most of all to avoid combat may have rationalized by expressing their desire to give the Army the benefit of their civilian experience in some noncombat job. Some may have seen a job using their civilian skills as the quickest road to promotion and status; some, whose skills did not fit too well into the Army pattern, preferred a job totally different from their civilian job as the road to promotion and status. Finally, we must keep in mind the fact that many soldiers had worked, if at all in civilian life, only at emergency war jobs and did not necessarily contemplate doing the same type of work after the war.

Who were the men who would want most to use their civilian skills on an Army job, and who were the men who would be even more concerned with having an Army job which taught them something useful? The former presumably would be those who had acquired civilian skills which they expected to use after the war or who had been training as civilians for a career which the Army interrupted. The latter would tend to be those who were not planning to return to the same type of work they had done before the war.

In a cross section of troops in ETO, surveyed in January 1944,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>S-116.

about a third of the men—807 in all—said they had a chance to ask for their Army job and had got the job they asked for. Of these men, 459, or three fifths, said that after the war they planned to go back to the same sort of thing they were doing before they came into the Army. It is interesting to compare two groups—those who planned to go back to their old type of work and those who had different plans (or were uncertain)—with respect to their appraisal of their Army job. As Table 8 shows, the men who wanted to go

TABLE 8  
FUTURE WORK PLANS AND SKILL UTILIZATION OR ACQUISITION  
(Men in ETO Who Say They Got the Army Job They Asked For.  
Survey in January 1944)

	<i>Percentage who say they are using their civilian skills</i>	<i>Percentage who say they have been taught something they may use in their civilian work after the war</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
Among men who planned to return to old civilian type of work after the war	70	44	459
Among all others	64	59	348

back to their old civilian type of work were more likely than the others to be in an Army job which they felt used their civilian skills and less likely than the others to feel that they had been taught something useful.<sup>9</sup> Further breakdown of these data shows that among men who planned to return to their old type of work, only 7 per cent said that they were not using their civilian skills but

<sup>9</sup> The questions involved in the cross tabulation in Table 8 are as follows:

Do you think you would want to go back to the same sort of thing you were doing before you came into the Army (that is, job, school, etc.)?

- Would like to do the same sort of thing
- Would like to do something else
- Not sure

Have you learned any skills or trades in the Army which you think you will use in the civilian work you expect to do?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

Do you use your civilian training and experience you had before you came into the Army in your present Army job or assignment?

- Yes, most of the time
- Yes, once in a while
- No, never



had learned something useful. Among the other men the figure was 19 per cent.

The figures in Table 8, of course, do no more than indicate a tendency for a man's plans for future work in civilian life to be associated with what he wants to get out of his Army job. The men represented here were presumably in Army assignments of their own choice, and hence their belief that their job used their skills or that the Army had taught them something useful is an indirect indication of the kind of expectation they had in choosing the job.<sup>10</sup>

Let us ask, further, what kind of men comprised those who planned to go back to their old type of work after the war.<sup>11</sup> We should expect them to tend to be men who were already established in their careers when drafted and who therefore had the largest investment in their civilian skills. This would suggest that the older men and, particularly, the older married men, would be more likely than younger men to plan to return to their old type of work. Also, one might expect the better educated to be more stable in their career lines.

Table 9 shows that the tendency is in the direction of expectation, except for education. The college man is as likely as any to say that he hopes to resume his old type of work after the war, but this is not true of the high school graduate who has not attended college. He would appear somewhat more likely than men at other educational levels to be planning a different type of work after the war than he had before the war or to be uncertain about his plans. This finding is not an accident of sampling, since it appears within most age groups and it appears similarly in the portion of the ETO survey (not shown here) which covers men who had not obtained the Army job which they asked for.

The general relationship in Table 9 of age with expectation of returning to old civilian type of work after the war appears separately among both the married and single and within the different education groups. Similarly, the married man was somewhat more likely

<sup>10</sup> Several factors probably tend to make the relationships shown in Table 8 even less striking than would be the case if they could be controlled. Some of the men may have chosen their Army job, it is true, but had an extremely narrow range of choice—between two or three equally unsatisfactory alternatives. Some of the men may have chosen the job with the expectation that it would use their civilian skills, or teach them something useful, only to be disappointed. Some may have been in such general low spirits that they said their job did not use their civilian skills when in fact it did—a point which will be discussed subsequently in this section.

<sup>11</sup> Only 6 per cent in this sample said they were going to school just before coming into the Army.

than the single man, independent of age or education, to expect to return to his old civilian vocation.

Table 10 compares, by age, marital condition, and educational groups, the percentages who said they were using their civilian experience and the percentages who said they had learned something which would be useful in civilian life after the war. As might be expected from Tables 8 and 9, the relationships of these two variables with age, marital condition, and education tend to be *opposite in direction*. (These data, like those in the preceding tables, are

TABLE 9  
FUTURE WORK PLANS, BY AGE, MARITAL CONDITION, AND EDUCATION  
(Men in ETO Who Say They Got the Army Job They Asked For.  
Survey in January 1944)

	<i>Percentage who planned to return to former civilian type of work after the war</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
<i>Age</i>		
30 and over	67	200
25 to 29	56	229
Under 25	53	364
<i>Marital condition</i>		
Married	66	265
Single	52	542
<i>Education</i>		
College	62	97
High school graduate	51	241
Some high school	60	268
Grade school	61	203

based only on those men who said they asked for and got their Army job.) The older the man, the more likely he was to be in a job which he said used his civilian skills; the less likely he was to say he had learned something useful. The married man was a little more likely to say he was using his skills; less likely to say he had learned something useful to his civilian career. The high school graduate who had not attended college was the least likely to say he was in a job using his skills; the most likely to say he was learning something useful to his civilian career.

Before accepting such indirect data as indicating the relative motivations of various classes of soldiers with respect to the use or acquisition of civilian skills, however, we should look for confirmation from some other source.

TABLE 10

REPORT OF SKILL UTILIZATION OR ACQUISITION, BY AGE, MARITAL CONDITION,  
AND EDUCATION

(Men in ETO Who Say They Got the Army Job They Asked For.  
Survey in January 1944)

	<i>Percentage who said they were using their civilian experience</i>	<i>Percentage who said they had learned something they might use in their civilian work after the war</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
<i>Age</i>			
30 and over	71	44	200
25 to 29	64	48	229
Under 25	61	54	364
<i>Marital condition</i>			
Married	70	44	265
Single	65	51	542
<i>Education</i>			
College	65	44	97
High school graduate	60	54	241
Some high school	73	49	268
Grade school	68	51	203

In February 1944 a cross section of white soldiers in the United States was asked to indicate what branch they would like most to be in. This was followed by the following question:

Which of the following statements tell *why* you would like to be in the branch you checked in Question 14?

Put check marks in front of statements that give the most important reason why you would choose that branch.

You may check as many of these reasons as you want to:

I would like to be in that branch—

- Because it would give me a chance to get into combat
- Because it gets the best training
- Because I think the work in it would not be too tough
- Because it is given a lot of credit by the general public
- Because it would give me a better chance to stay in the USA
- Because it gets the best of everything
- Because it is an important branch in winning the war
- Because I would get a chance to do the kind of work I can do best
- Because the men in it are the best and toughest soldiers
- Because it would give me training for a better job after the war
- Because it has a low casualty rate
- Some other reason (write the reason here):

If you have checked more than one of the reasons in the list, which one is the *most important* of all the reasons you checked? Write it here:

All but 5 per cent of the respondents checked one or more items and the one checked as most important was coded for tabulation. Leading the list was "Because I would get a chance to do the kind of work I can do best" (checked as most important by nearly a third of the men). Next were "Because it is the most important branch in winning the war" and "Because it would give me training for a better job after the war" (each checked as most important by a fifth of the men). No other category was chosen by more than 6 per cent of the men. Many technical problems in the interpretation of such data arise and will not be discussed here, except to say that risks are reduced if we frankly admit that the absolute proportions derived from such a question can have little validity. Nevertheless, *differences* between two or more groups of respondents may be quite meaningful, if whatever errors the form of the question introduces are more or less the same for each of the groups.


Let us now focus our attention on two of the items in the check list: "Because it would give me training for a better job after the war." "Because I would get a chance to do the kind of work I can do best." What kind of men would check the first as most important? What kind of men would check the second? If our interpretation of the data cited from the European theater is correct, we should expect men who are least sure they are going back to their old civilian work after the war to tend to prefer the first item and men who are most sure to tend to prefer the second item. There would be overlapping, of course. For example, some men who are going back to their old job may want to supplement their training; some who are not going back may still want to do in the Army the type of thing they did before coming to the Army. In the February 1944 survey in the United States which we are here examining, no data are available on postwar job plans, but we can, as with the European data, compare responses of men by age, marital condition, and education. The results are shown in Chart VI.

The picture shown in Chart VI, based on reasons given by a cross section of troops in the United States for their branch preference, is reasonably similar in *direction* to the results obtained in the European theater by a cross tabulation of those respondents who said they had received an Army assignment they asked for and were evaluating their experience. The younger men again manifest relatively more interest than older men in learning something in the Army which they can use after the war. The relationship by education, as in the European data, tends to be curvilinear. The

CHART VI

HOW AGE, MARITAL, AND EDUCATIONAL CLASSES DIFFER IN REASONS GIVEN FOR BRANCH PREFERENCE

(Cross Section of White Enlisted Men in the United States, February 1944)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

men with the most schooling and the men with the least schooling are relatively less interested in getting an assignment which will teach them something useful after the war. This holds among both younger and older age groups. The difference between married and single men is slight.

A further breakdown of the college group into college graduates and those who had not completed college shows that the college graduates were the least likely of any group to indicate training for a better job after the war as their main reason for branch preference. Since most of the clerical and skilled jobs in the Army were at a non-professional or at best a semiprofessional level, this is hardly surprising. A certified public accountant, for example, would not necessarily expect to learn much in the kind of routine accounting job which would be available, in the main, to an enlisted man in a headquarters or Army finance office. Or, an attorney would not find duties as an enlisted clerk in the Office of the Judge Advocate necessarily helpful to his civilian career.

The findings in Chart VI which call for particular caution in interpretation are those relative to the grade school men. A long check list such as was used to derive this chart is a rather formidable problem for a respondent who has difficulty in reading. If the findings for grade school men had not been consistent with the findings from the European study earlier reviewed, the tendency would be to disregard them. Even though they are consistent with other findings, they should not be given quite the same order of credence as can be given the responses of other men. It probably is best to reserve judgment about their motivations. A plausible case could be made for the position that the Army had relatively more to offer the grade school men by way of job training which would be useful in civilian life than almost any other educational group. On the other hand, as Chart V at the beginning of this section shows, the grade school man tended to get either a combat job or an unskilled or semiskilled service job. The Army needed hundreds of thousands of ordinary laborers, and the classification system operated to put grade school men in such categories as long as there was an adequate supply of better educated men for the more skilled jobs. This fact, in so far as it was known to the grade school men, would keep their level of expectation low, and the fact that in civilian life they quit school at the eighth grade or earlier is probably an index of lower average level of expectation or ambition before they entered the Army.

A classification and assignment system which puts emphasis on use in the Army of past civilian skills—as should be done, up to a certain point, from the standpoint of efficiency—must be careful also to take account of the fact that many men with aptitudes for several different kinds of jobs would actually prefer a job quite different from what they had in civilian life. One reason can be that such men were less than enthusiastic about their civilian jobs. This can be illustrated from a study of a cross section of nonflying person-

TABLE 11  
 PERCENTAGE WHO PREFERRED NOT TO USE SKILLS FROM THEIR LAST CIVILIAN JOB, BY WHETHER OR NOT THEY SAID THEIR LAST CIVILIAN JOB WAS "VERY INTERESTING," BY RANK, AGE, AND EDUCATION

	PERCENTAGE PREFERRING NOT TO USE LAST CIVILIAN JOB SKILLS:	
	<i>Among those who said last civilian job was "very interesting"</i>	<i>Among all others</i>
<b>NONCOMS</b>		
<i>25 and over</i>		
H.S. grads and college	42 (125)	65 (101)
Others	60 (83)	71 (67)
<i>Under 25</i>		
H.S. grads and college	54 (170)	76 (160)
Others	63 (70)	75 (61)
<b>PRIVATES AND PFC'S</b>		
<i>25 and over</i>		
H.S. grads and college	44 (133)	68 (88)
Others	55 (142)	75 (81)
<i>Under 25</i>		
H.S. grads and college	56 (210)	71 (185)
Others	68 (147)	85 (128)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.  
 Source: Planning Survey III, cross section of nonflying personnel in Air Force tactical squadrons, United States, August 1942.

nel in the Air Corps in tactical squadrons in the United States in the summer of 1942.

Men were asked a long series of detailed questions about their civilian jobs and their Army jobs. In Table 11 they are classified into two groups, those who said that their last civilian jobs were very interesting, and all others (excluding from the analysis those who had not worked before entering the Army). By further cross tabulation of several items, the men were again sorted into groups with respect to attitude toward Army job. One group comprised those who said they were not using skills from their last civilian job

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and did *not* want to transfer to a job using those skills, plus those who were using skills from their last civilian job but wanted to transfer to a job not using them. These men, referred to in Table 11 as those who preferred not to use skills from their last civilian job, are expressed as a percentage of all men.

Table 11 shows, as would be expected, that the percentage preferring not to use skills from their last civilian job was consistently lower among those whose last civilian job was reported as very interesting than among others. Also, it is of interest to observe, the younger men and the less educated were more likely *not* to want to use their last civilian skills than other men—which is consistent with findings reported earlier in this section.

In general, it can be shown that a man using his civilian skills in the Army was, on the average, more likely than others to say that he was satisfied with his job. But the foregoing discussion makes it clear that the correlation would be far from perfect. The only crucial test of the importance to job satisfaction of use of skills or chance to learn something new would be manipulative: change a sample of disgruntled men to jobs actually using their civilian skills better or giving them a better chance to learn something and then remeasure their attitudes toward the job after a suitable time interval. This was not done in the Army, although such a controlled experiment designed by the Research Branch was once tentatively approved by higher authorities, only to be subsequently called off because of the pressures on man power.

Perhaps the nearest approximation to such a test is a case study made in July 1943 of enlisted men in selected Signal Corps and Engineer units in the United States.<sup>12</sup> The men were administered a questionnaire asking for a detailed description of their last civilian job and of the two jobs, if any, held previous to the last one. Also obtained on the questionnaire was a detailed description of the present Army assignment, together with a record of specialist's schools attended. The usual background questions as to age, education, and the like were asked, as well as a series of attitude questions dealing with the Army job assignment and personal adjustment to the Army. While at a camp, the research team also had transcriptions made of data from the Form 20 cards, for all men in the sample, on civilian experience and Army assignment. Since anonymity was preserved in the administration of the question-

<sup>12</sup> S-68.



naires, the Form 20 transcripts were matched in Washington with the men's own questionnaires through the background information (for example, age, education, marital condition, state of residence). In general, the Army job as recorded on the Form 20 agreed with the job as recorded in the matched questionnaire, though there were some differences—the man sometimes reporting that he was not now working at the job to which he nominally was assigned.

The next step was to use both sets of information to code his last three civilian occupations according to the standard five-digit United States Employment Service code and to code his Army job according to its Military Occupation Specification number. This task was supervised by experienced occupational coders in the Bureau of the Census, and two of the chief occupational research officers for the Office of the Adjutant General gave many days of time to advising on the coding and analysis.

The main purpose of the study was to see how many men had scarce and much needed civilian skills for certain categories of Army jobs but were not using these skills in the Army. The study found that about half of the men in these needed categories were not assigned to jobs using their skills. The secondary purpose of the study was to ascertain the men's attitudes toward their jobs, as related to the utilization of their civilian skills. It is with this aspect of the study that we are here concerned.

After the civilian experience and Army job for a given man were coded, a judgment was made, based on information supplied by the Army occupational experts, as to whether or not the Army job actually used the man's civilian skills. This judgment was an objective one, based on a comparison of USES and MOS code numbers, and was not based on the respondent's own adding up of the case. It was desired to avoid coloring the result by directly using the soldier's answers to such a question as the following:

Do you use the civilian training and experience  
you had before you came into the Army?

- Yes, most of the time
- Yes, once in a while
- No, never

Conceivably, the soldier who was angry at the Army might say "No, never" even if he were using his experience; or one might say "Yes, most of the time" simply because he felt good about being promoted.

Table 12 shows the percentage of cases, among the 1,813 men in

the sample with six months or more time in the Army, who were classified as using in their Army job experience from one or more of their last three civilian jobs or from some civilian hobby, such as radio operation. These are called the *matched* group. The other men constitute the *unmatched* group. Table 12 shows also for each subgroup, matched and unmatched separately, the proportion of men who made relatively high scores on a six-question scale of job satisfaction. This table deserves careful study. It shows that, while in practically every instance the men in the matched group made higher job satisfaction scores than the men in the corresponding unmatched group, the differences in job satisfaction associated with matching tend to be less than the differences associated with rank.

But even more important is the fact that the proportion of men matched is highest at the higher educational levels and lowest at the lower educational levels—while job satisfaction tends to go in *exactly the opposite direction*. The most satisfied are the least educated.

Let us turn next to the soldier's own testimony as to his use of civilian skills. This is portrayed in Chart VII. It is evident that there is quite a substantial degree of correlation between the "objective" determination of utilization of civilian skills and the sol-


TABLE 12  
MATCHING OF ARMY JOB WITH CIVILIAN SKILLS AS RELATED TO JOB SATISFACTION  
(Enlisted Men in Army 6 Months or More, in Selected Signal Corps and  
Engineer Units, July 1943)

NUMBER OF CASES	PERCENTAGE WHOSE CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE AND ARMY JOB WERE "MATCHED"	PERCENTAGE MAKING RELATIVELY HIGH SCORES (5 OR 6 POINTS) ON A SCALE OF JOB SATISFACTION		
		<i>Matched men</i>	<i>Unmatched men</i>	
<i>Noncoms</i>				
College	232	45	31	27
High school graduate	453	43	47	42
Some high school	253	28	54	46
Grade school	170	25	70	46
<i>Privates and Pfc's</i>				
College	63	35	15	10
High school graduate	171	35	40	16
Some high school	221	27	28	32
Grade school	245	31	50	33

### CHART VII

#### SKILL UTILIZATION AS DETERMINED FROM JOB DESCRIPTION AND FROM THE SOLDIERS' OWN EVALUATION

(Enlisted Men in Army 6 Months or More, in Selected Signal Corps and Engineer Units, July 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are

dier's own evaluation. If anything, the men were a little more likely to say their skills were being used "most of the time" contrary to the "objective" information than to say their skills were "never" being used, when they were classified as belonging to a matched group. Noncoms at all educational levels were more likely than privates, if in matched groups, to say that their skills were being used, and, if in either group, were less likely to say that their skills were never used. This may reflect a tendency for a noncom to consider leadership in its own right a use of civilian skill; it may reflect an actual greater use of a civilian specialty; or it may simply reflect a greater sense of well-being.

In studying Chart VII one will observe that the proportions of men in matched groups who said their skill was used most of the time increase as education decreases—among noncoms from 49 per cent of college men to 62 per cent of grade school men; among privates from 46 per cent among high school graduates to 55 per cent among grade school men.<sup>13</sup> The differences are small but consistent. Either the better educated men have somewhat higher standards of what constitutes use of their civilian skills—a reasonable hypothesis—or their answer is more a reflection of dissatisfaction due to other causes.

One of the many elements, other than the use of civilian skills, which could account for job satisfaction or dissatisfaction would be the chance which the job offered to learn something which would be useful after the war. Answers to the question, "Are you learning anything in your present Army job which you think you will be able to use in a civilian job after the war?" show no consistent relationship with the "objective" matching of job and skills, but are very highly correlated with the scale of job satisfaction. We cannot, of course, infer causal significance from this relationship. But we do know from the previous discussion in this section that an opportunity to learn something that would be useful in civilian life was a desire of many men, especially those who looked forward to trying something different after the war. We have seen some evidence that the hope may have been particularly extensive in the middle educational groups. The college men in the present case study were the most likely of all to complain that they were not learning anything useful, but there is little evidence that the college men expected such an opportunity, at least as enlisted men. The

<sup>13</sup> The corresponding figure for college privates is not graphed in Chart VII, as it is based on too few cases. It is 44 per cent.

prediction we can hazard from this case study is that use of civilian skills was a sufficiently positive factor in job satisfaction so that some improvement in job satisfaction could be expected by improved classification—but a large improvement would not be anticipated.

In general, the discussion in this section has emphasized the fact that to considerable numbers of men in the Army the chance to learn something useful in civilian life was as strongly or more strongly desired than the chance to use one's past civilian experience. Each of these possibilities was without doubt an important desire of a very large number of soldiers, their relative importance varying with the age and education of the men.

### PART 3. Danger

The statement that the majority of American soldiers hoped for a job assignment which minimized the chances of death and injury is difficult to prove or disprove conclusively, although it tends to be supported by the weight of the evidence.

There undoubtedly were some men who sought thrills—for example, the same type of men who in civilian life drive cars or motorcycles at breakneck speed. The Army made a special effort to attract this kind of man on a volunteer basis into such outfits as the Paratroops, and glamorized the occupation by distinctive symbols (badges, boots, etc.) and by publicity (movies, press releases, etc.). In most cases the man who deliberately chose such an outfit probably did not seek it for the thrill alone but for the associated status symbols as well. This is illustrated by the reaction of paratroopers in training who were "browned off" because ordinary infantryman's boots were substituted for the high-laced jump boots, which according to 75 per cent of the sample of 500 men interviewed were the most distinguishing mark of the paratrooper.<sup>14</sup> Ninety-five per cent of the men said the jump boots meant a great deal to them as symbols, and three quarters of the men who did not have them claimed that they would pay \$16 a pair or higher out of their own pocket for the boots if they could be purchased. In the Air Corps, the hundreds of thousands of officers and enlisted men who volunteered for flying duty certainly were not seeking "safe" assignments; but it is also true that they were rewarded with status symbols (such as wings, rank, and extra flying pay) far beyond the average soldier

<sup>14</sup> S-217, March 1945.

in the Army. Also, their combat assignments generally carried a normal terminal point, such as a specified number of missions or combat hours, as contrasted with the foot soldier who had some reason to think he would be kept under enemy fire until he became a casualty or the war ended.

Inferential evidence of the average soldier's desire to minimize his chance of death or injury is seen in his responses to explicit questions about desire for combat service overseas, his attitudes toward service in the Infantry, and his unwillingness to volunteer for Infantry duty.

In four surveys of representative cross sections of enlisted men in the United States, from March 1943 to January 1944, the question was asked: "If it were up to you, what kind of outfit would you rather be in?" In none of the surveys did more than 50 per cent of the men check "In a combat outfit overseas." The four surveys are summarized in Table 13.

Even though about half of the soldiers expressed a preference for service in "a combat outfit overseas," this did not imply an eagerness to serve in the Infantry, which, while constituting about 10 per cent of the strength of the Army, accounted for 70 per cent of all the battle casualties in World War II. In fact, only 2.5 per cent of the noninfantrymen in a representative cross section of 16,000 troops studied in the United States in the summer of 1943 said that they would rather be in the Infantry than any other branch of the Army. Small as this percentage was, when projected on the total strength of the Army in the United States at that time, it would amount to several divisions, and the study on which it was based was utilized by the Army, along with other data, in reaching a policy decision to campaign for volunteer transfers to the Infantry from other branches. The exact number transferring as a result of this campaign is not available. Not many volunteered, but it was said to be equivalent to two or three Infantry divisions. It is interesting to note that the 2.5 per cent in branches other than the Infantry who said they preferred the Infantry had distinctly better attitudes than the average soldier toward service in the Army as contrasted with doing civilian war work,<sup>15</sup> and, of course, much more readiness for combat service overseas.

<sup>15</sup> For example, of the men in ASF branches who preferred the Infantry, 57 per cent thought they could do more for their country as a soldier than as a worker in a civilian war job, as compared with only 32 per cent among those who preferred Air Forces, and 35 per cent among those who preferred an ASF branch other than their own.

In evaluating the relative unwillingness to transfer to the Infantry, one must keep in mind, of course, that a complex of factors was involved, of which danger was only one. The men knew that the Infantry was not only dangerous but also physically demanding, with a maximum of discomfort and hardship, and that it offered little in the way of training in skills that would be useful in civilian life after the war. Such factors should not be ignored, even if they cannot be separated from the danger element. As an illustration of the avoidance of admission of desire to avoid danger, it may be

TABLE 13  
ATTITUDES OF WHITE ENLISTED MEN IN THE UNITED STATES TOWARD OVERSEAS COMBAT SERVICE

QUESTION: "If it were up to you, what kind of outfit would you rather be in?"				
Percentages responding:	March 1943	April 1943	June 1943	January 1944
"In a combat outfit overseas"	41	50	47	49
"In a noncombat outfit overseas"	15	12	14	21
"In an outfit that will stay in the U.S."	42	36	37	28
No answer	2	2	2	2
	100	100	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	4,800	1,000	4,246	3,729

Survey identification: S-32, S-44, S-64, S-95.

noted that among a sample of new recruits studied at reception stations in the spring of 1945, two thirds listed an AGF branch (usually Infantry) as the branch they would try hardest to avoid if they had a free choice, and among these only 8 per cent checked as the reasons "It sees too much combat" or "Its casualty rate is too high." Instead, 25 per cent checked "I don't think I am physically qualified for it"; 27 per cent checked "It would not give me a chance to do the kind of work I can do best"; 24 per cent checked "It would not give me training for a better job after the war"; while the remainder checked a variety of miscellaneous reasons.

An analysis of the attitudes of infantrymen in training who, it has been observed, tended to register a relatively high degree of dissatisfaction with their Army assignment, shows explicitly that anxiety about danger was associated with their dislike of their assignment.

In April 1944 a sample of 10,429 infantrymen in the United States with 3 months up to 3 years of service was asked, "Do you ever worry about whether you will be injured in combat before the war is over?" Thirty-two per cent answered that they "never worry about it," 39 per cent that they "hardly ever worry about it," 20 per cent that they "worry about it fairly often," and only 9 per cent that they "worry a great deal about it." The marginal frequencies of answers to a question such as this cannot be taken as absolute measures of the degree of anxiety among infantrymen in training. Although the training program emphasized the universality of fear, it is quite possible that many soldiers who were to some degree fearful checked an answer like "never worry about it" and that some who admitted worrying "a great deal" or "fairly often" actually had less fear than some who denied anxiety. As subsequent chapters on men in combat will show, men who have gone successfully through combat are much more likely to feel free to express fears than men who have not yet seen combat.

Nevertheless, as Chart VIII shows, there is a marked relationship, among the infantrymen in the United States, between admission of anxiety and preference for the Infantry or for overseas combat service.<sup>16</sup> The kind of infantrymen who said they worried "often" or "sometimes" about injury in combat were much less likely than those who said they "seldom" or "never" worry to say that they preferred Infantry to other branches; or, if they preferred some other branch, they were less likely to say that they preferred service in a unit which would see combat overseas. Among those who said they often worried, 79 per cent preferred neither Infantry nor overseas combat service; among those who said they never worried, the corresponding figure is only 37 per cent.

One stereotype of the kind of man who would like the Infantry, or at least would like overseas combat service, would perhaps be a man with low education from farm or village, the kind of man "who can shoot a squirrel's eye out at ninety feet." Tabulating separately the infantrymen who did not finish high school and came from rural areas,<sup>17</sup> we find that such men were, indeed, somewhat

<sup>16</sup> A column in Chart VIII represents a cross tabulation of two questions. Those who checked "Infantry" in a check list of 14 branches following the question, "If you had a choice, which one of these branches of the Army would you like to be in?" were classified as "preferring Infantry." Those who checked "In a combat outfit overseas" in response to the question, "If it were up to you, what kind of an outfit would you like to be in?" were classified as preferring overseas combat service.


<sup>17</sup> The census definition of "rural" is used here, that is, farms and communities of less than 2,500 population.



more likely than the rest of the infantrymen to say that they never worry about combat injury (40 per cent as compared with 30 per cent). However, there is also among these rural men a larger proportion who said that they worry often (12 per cent as compared with 8 per cent). These findings may, of course, merely reflect a

CHART VIII

PREFERENCE FOR INFANTRY OR FOR OVERSEAS COMBAT SERVICE AS RELATED TO WORRY ABOUT BATTLE INJURY  
(Infantrymen in the United States, 3 Months to 3 Years of Service, April 1944)



The numbers at the bottom of the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.


general tendency of less educated men to be more willing than better educated men to check extreme categories in response to a question. But when, within each of the "worry" categories, the two groups of men are compared, as in Chart IX, as to preference for Infantry or for overseas service, the less educated rural soldier was consistently and significantly somewhat *more* likely than other soldiers to say that he did *not* prefer Infantry or overseas combat service. One explanation of this perhaps surprising finding might be

the fact that a larger proportion of less educated rural soldiers were married and that the difference in attitudes could be due to the possibility that married men were less likely to prefer Infantry or over-

CHART IX

WORRY ABOUT BATTLE INJURY AS RELATED TO PREFERENCE FOR INFANTRY OR OVERSEAS SERVICE—ATTITUDES OF RURAL NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES COMPARED WITH ALL OTHERS

(Infantrymen in the United States, 3 Months to 3 Years of Service, April 1944)



Data from S-121.

The numbers at the bottom of the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

seas combat service than single men. Actually, 41 per cent of the rural soldiers who did not finish high school were married, as compared with 34 per cent in the rest of the sample; and it is true, as is shown in detail in Table 14, that the married men, rural or urban,

TABLE 14

PREFERENCE FOR INFANTRY OR OVERSEAS COMBAT SERVICE AS RELATED TO WORRY ABOUT BATTLE INJURY, BY MARITAL STATUS, RURAL OR URBAN RESIDENCE, AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  
(Infantrymen in United States, 3 months to 3 years of service, April 1944)

	SINGLE				MARRIED			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	H.S. grad.	H.S. and coll.	H.S. grad.	H.S. and coll.	H.S. grad.	H.S. and coll.	H.S. grad.	H.S. and coll.
<b>"NEVER" WORRY</b>								
<i>Percentage who</i>								
Prefer Infantry and overseas service	12	14	12	12	6	8	8	11
Prefer Infantry, but not overseas combat service	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	6
Do not prefer Infantry, but prefer overseas combat service	54	58	49	62	37	39	33	48
Do not prefer Infantry or overseas combat service	32	26	37	24	55	51	55	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>511</i>	<i>845</i>	<i>524</i>	<i>369</i>	<i>418</i>	<i>347</i>	<i>267</i>	<i>100</i>
<b>"SELDOM" WORRY</b>								
<i>Percentage who</i>								
Prefer Infantry and overseas service	11	7	6	9	6	6	2	5
Prefer Infantry, but not overseas combat service	2	2	4	2	3	4	7	2
Do not prefer Infantry, but prefer overseas combat service	50	50	38	52	27	35	21	28
Do not prefer Infantry or overseas combat service	37	41	52	37	64	55	70	65
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>452</i>	<i>1,452</i>	<i>401</i>	<i>442</i>	<i>396</i>	<i>469</i>	<i>278</i>	<i>134</i>
<b>"SOMETIMES" OR "OFTEN" WORRY</b>								
<i>Percentage who</i>								
Prefer Infantry and overseas service	6	3	2	5	2	2	1	1
Prefer Infantry, but not overseas combat service	3	1	5	2	2	2	5	7
Do not prefer Infantry, but prefer overseas combat service	29	33	21	32	12	16	5	18
Do not prefer Infantry or overseas combat service	62	63	72	61	84	80	89	76
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>357</i>	<i>893</i>	<i>307</i>	<i>198</i>	<i>436</i>	<i>409</i>	<i>311</i>	<i>113</i>

Data from S-121.

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high school graduates or others, were less likely than the single men to prefer Infantry or overseas combat service. In fact, marital condition differentiates these attitudes more sharply than either education or rural or urban origin. But, as Table 14 also shows, separately for the married and the unmarried, the men who were least enthusiastic about Infantry or overseas service were still the less educated rural men.

The attitude of troops engaged in actual combat toward danger will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters and need not be treated here, except to say that combat was not anticipated with enthusiasm, to put it very mildly. That noncombat troops overseas, like troops in training in the United States, were not generally eager to court danger is illustrated by a study made in Italy in August 1944. The data are shown in Table 15.

TABLE 15

ATTITUDES TOWARD COMBAT SERVICE AMONG WHITE NONCOMBAT TROOPS IN  
SELECTED QUARTERMASTER AND TRANSPORTATION CORPS UNITS IN ITALY  
(1,640 Enlisted Men, August 1944)

"Would you rather stay in the kind of work your outfit is now doing or would you rather get into front-line fighting in a combat outfit?" *	<i>Per cent</i>
"I would rather stay in the kind of work my outfit is now doing"	89
"I would rather get into front-line fighting in a combat outfit"	10
Undecided or no answer	1
	100

\* Approximately half of the units were given this alternative form of the question: "Would you rather get into front-line fighting in a combat outfit or would you rather stay in the kind of work your outfit is now doing?" The two forms of the question gave the same results.

In a survey of 3,023 SOS enlisted men in England in August 1943, 42 per cent expressed a desire to be transferred to some other Army job, but only 5 per cent wanted to transfer to Field Forces (Infantry, Armored Force, or Field Artillery). Troops in Alaska were asked in April 1944 to check which of four statements "best tells the way you feel about getting into the fighting." About one fourth checked statements indicating that they would like to get into the fighting soon or eventually, about one half said they hoped they would not have to, and the remainder gave miscellaneous responses. Almost exactly the same pattern of responses to substantially the same question was found among enlisted men studied in the Central

Pacific in March 1944. Five surveys of representative cross sections of the India-Burma theater between March 1944 and July 1945 showed very little shift throughout this time span in the proportion who checked "In a combat outfit overseas" in answer to the question, "If it were up to you, what kind of an outfit would you like to be in?" The proportions were as follows: March 1944, 22 per cent; October 1944, 22 per cent; March 1945, 17 per cent; June 1945, 16 per cent; and July 1945, 20 per cent. It will be noted that these proportions are considerably lower than the corresponding figure—47 per cent—cited in Table 13 for troops in the United States.

Thus, the weight of the evidence indicates that the majority of soldiers overseas were not eager for combat assignments—possibly even less eager than those in training in the United States—and it can hardly be doubted that danger, along with other factors, contributed to this attitude.

#### PART 4. Discomforts Other than Danger

As has been shown previously, the men in the various branches of the service had rather definite opinions as to which branches had the most dirty and disagreeable jobs and the hardest work to do. As he became more experienced as a soldier, the enlisted man could look about him and compare his Army assignment with other Army assignments in terms of sheer personal discomfort. It was to be expected that attitudes toward the job would be affected not only by factors specific to the job itself but also by the general milieu in which the tasks were performed. To take perhaps the most severe case, one would expect that there would be marked differences in job satisfaction among troops overseas, depending on the rigor of the climate, the primitiveness of living and working conditions, and the length of time overseas.

It is one of the important findings of these volumes, discussed in Chapter 5, that, while differences in personal adjustment, including job satisfaction, associated with length of exposure to difficult climate and rigorous living conditions were found to exist, they were usually *slight* in comparison with differences associated with exposure or nonexposure to combat danger or with differences associated with rank. However, if a combat infantryman tended to dislike his job, as he did, more than did an SOS soldier in the same theater, one of the elements in his dislike may have been the relative ruggedness of his living conditions apart from danger. Likewise, if a pri-

vate overseas tended to dislike his job, as he did, more than did a noncom, one of the elements in his dislike may have been his deprivation of the relative comforts and privileges available to the noncom, apart from the noncom's advantage over him in status, authority, and pay.

There seems to be no way of isolating the comfort factor and evaluating it directly in such cases. But if the rigors of Army living in a particular locality were strong determinants of job satisfaction, there should have appeared much larger differences in attitude between men of the same rank doing the same type of work in different localities than have come out in the survey data.

A typical picture is presented by Chart X, in which troops stationed in New Guinea are compared with troops on the Australian mainland and in the United States. The question on which the diagrams are based is, "Would you change to some other Army job if you had a chance?" Differences in length of time in the Army are controlled by matching the men in New Guinea with the same proportion of men in each longevity group among those stationed in Australia or the United States.<sup>18</sup>


It should be noted, first, that the proportion of Air Corps noncoms who said that they would not change to some other Army job if they had a chance is larger in all three areas than the corresponding proportions of non-Infantry noncoms in Service and Ground Force

<sup>18</sup> The matching was actually done by standardization. For example, for Air Corps noncoms in Australia with over 1 year and less than 2 years in the Army the percentage distribution of responses to the question on Army jobs was computed and these percentages were then applied to the total number of Air Corps noncoms in New Guinea with the same Army longevity. Similar computations were made for Air Corps noncoms in Australia with 6 months up to 1 year in the Army and for 2 years or more in the Army and applied to New Guinea in like manner. By addition of the three longevity groups, the calculated number making each response to the question was obtained and this number, in turn, was converted into a percentage. It is this percentage distribution which is shown in the bar for Australian Air Corps noncoms. The same procedure was followed in standardizing responses of men in the United States on the New Zealand distribution by longevity. The standardization was carried out separately for Air Corps noncoms, noncoms in Service and Ground Forces except Infantry, privates in Service and Ground Forces except Infantry, noncoms in Infantry, and privates in Infantry. The New Guinea and Australian data are based on S-93 (November 1943). The United States data are based on S-95 (January 1944) excluding limited service men.

In Chart X numbers of cases shown for Australia and the United States are "equivalent numbers" after standardization, obtained by the formula  $N' = (\sum w_i)^2 / \sum (w_i^2 / n_i)$ , where  $w_i$  and  $n_i$  are the weights and observed numbers, respectively, in the  $i$ th subcategory, for example, among men in the Army 6 months to 1 year. This formula is described and used frequently in Chapter 4. The United States sample is small, but is the nearest in time to the Pacific sample of any United States study. Replications at somewhat different time periods show no important differences in the United States figures.

CHART X

JOB SATISFACTION AMONG MATCHED GROUPS OF SOLDIERS IN NEW GUINEA, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED STATES, BY BRANCH AND GRADE



Source: New Guinea and Australia, S-93; United States, S-95.

Numbers after bars for New Guinea indicate actual size of sample. Numbers for Australia and the United States are "equivalent numbers" obtained after standardization. For details see footnote 18.

assignments, and very much larger than the corresponding proportions of Infantry noncoms. For New Guinea, for example, the percentages run 42, 28, and 7 respectively. Air Corps privates are omitted, as there were not enough cases in the overseas samples for reliable comparison. In each of the three areas, non-Infantry privates in Service and Ground Forces have less favorable attitudes than the corresponding noncoms, but much more favorable attitudes than the corresponding Infantry privates.

One of the most striking facts in the chart is the almost universal desire of infantrymen, whether stationed in New Guinea, Australia, or the United States, to change to some other Army assignment. The units surveyed in New Guinea were mostly veterans of the long and bloody Buna campaign; those surveyed in Australia were troops not yet committed to combat who were for the time being located at relatively comfortable stations. Yet there was no significant difference in the attitudes of the Infantry privates, as between troops in New Guinea and in Australia or as between these and infantrymen in training in the United States. Among Infantry noncoms there was a difference, those in the United States showing better attitudes than those overseas, especially the New Guinea veterans.

For evidence on the role which rugged climate and living conditions—apart from combat dangers—can play in job satisfaction, the comparative subdivided bars for New Guinea, Australia, and the United States are instructive. Since only a small fraction of the Air Corps sample comprised plane crewmen, the Air Corps men even in New Guinea were relatively free from danger of combat injury, except for the threat of an occasional Japanese bombing raid. But general environmental conditions in which these men lived in New Guinea were much more punishing than in Australia or in the United States. Nevertheless, the difference in attitudes between Air Corps noncoms in New Guinea and Australia was relatively small as contrasted with other differences portrayed on Chart X. Similarly, the differences in attitude of non-Infantry noncoms in Ground and Service units in New Guinea, as compared with Australia and the United States, were small, though possibly statistically significant. Among non-Infantry privates in Ground and Service units, attitudes in New Guinea actually were slightly better than attitudes of comparable troops in the United States, though not as favorable as among comparable troops in Australia.

The conclusion which one must reach from the data in Chart X



is that, compared with differences in attitude as between Infantry, Air Corps, and other troops, or between privates and noncoms, the fact of assignment to the uncomfortable environment of New Guinea apparently has relatively small association with satisfaction about Army job.

This finding is so important that further analysis is desirable in order to determine whether New Guinea may have constituted a special case or whether it conforms to a pattern found in other regions where the soldier was placed in an unusually uncomfortable environment.

The results of such an analysis are summarized in Table 16. This table represents a consolidation of several surveys made at about the same period in the war—winter of 1943–1944. As representative of areas in which the climate is temperate and the amenities of civilization are available, England and Hawaii (Island of Oahu) are used. As representative of areas in which the climate is difficult and in which there is isolation from many of the amenities of civilization, New Guinea, the Solomons, the Aleutians, and Panama (including outlying isolated Caribbean posts) are used. This table shows the percentage distribution of responses to the question, "Would you change to some other Army job if you had a chance?" Men who had been overseas less than 1 year and men who had been overseas 1 to 2 years are shown separately. Ground and Service Forces exclusive of Infantry are shown separately for noncoms and privates and Air Corps is shown for noncoms only.

The unweighted averages of the percentages for New Guinea, the Solomons, Panama, and the Aleutians have been computed within each category and are graphed on Chart XI for easy comparison with corresponding unweighted averages of the percentages for England and Hawaii. To Chart XI have been added, for purposes of rough comparison, bars representing attitudes of troops in comparable categories in the United States with more than 6 months of Army service.<sup>19</sup>

Chart XI, it will be observed, leads to essentially the same conclusion as did Chart X. The big differences in attitudes tend to be between Air Corps noncoms and other noncoms, and between the

<sup>19</sup> The United States figures are not standardized, and the effect is in the direction of making the overseas figures look slightly more unfavorable as compared with those in the States than would have been the case if allowance had been made for the fact that the average longevity of troops at home was slightly less than among troops overseas. This discrepancy is partly, though not completely, corrected by using data only from troops in the United States with 6 months or more of service in the Army.

TABLE 16

JOB SATISFACTION AMONG TROOPS IN SELECTED OVERSEAS AREAS CLASSIFIED AS  
RELATIVELY COMFORTABLE OR RELATIVELY UNCOMFORTABLE, BY  
LENGTH OF TIME OVERSEAS\*


	UNDER 1 YEAR OVERSEAS				1 TO 2 YEARS OVERSEAS			
	Percentage who:				Percentage who:			
	Would change Army job	Were unde- cided	Would not change Army job	Num- ber of cases	Would change Army job	Were unde- cided	Would not change Army job	Num- ber of cases
<i>Air Corps noncoms</i>								
England	44	14	42	436	47	12	41	215
Hawaii	37	9	54	105	38	15	47	112
Average	41	12	48		43	14	44	
New Guinea	39	10	51	185	46	13	41	310
Solomons	40	16	44	118	31	19	50	117
Panama	28	20	52	152	31	21	48	346
Aleutians	33	16	51	81	42	12	46	69
Average	35	16	50		38	16	46	
<i>Service and Ground Force noncoms (except Infantry)</i>								
England	52	14	34	255	50	16	34	113
Hawaii	50	18	32	622	52	19	29	452
Average	51	16	33		51	18	32	
New Guinea	51	20	29	252	56	16	28	163
Solomons	44	24	32	154	51	20	29	260
Panama	44	24	32	152	48	21	31	646
Aleutians	50	22	28	155	53	20	27	433
Average	47	23	30		52	19	29	
<i>Service and Ground Force privates (except Infantry)</i>								
England	57	12	31	309	65	17	18	65
Hawaii	59	17	24	1,036	60	19	21	489
Average	58	15	28		63	18	20	
New Guinea	54	18	28	263	60	18	22	97
Solomons	53	20	27	208	69	14	17	242
Panama	59	21	20	250	60	21	19	585
Aleutians	62	20	18	272	62	18	20	415
Average	57	20	23		63	18	20	

Data from England, S-92, January 1944; Hawaii, S-145, March 1944; New Guinea, S-93, November 1943; Solomons, S-124, February 1944; Panama, S-115, 1944; Aleutians, S-133, April-May 1944. In Chart XI, the data from the United States are from S-95, January 1944.

\* The areas classified as relatively comfortable are England and Hawaii; those classified as relatively uncomfortable are New Guinea, Solomons, Panama, Aleutians.

CHART XI

JOB SATISFACTION AS RELATED TO WHETHER RESPONDENTS WERE STATIONED IN COMFORTABLE OR UNCOMFORTABLE AREAS



Data from Table 16

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
other noncoms and corresponding privates. In general, the differences in attitudes between men in the relatively comfortable environments and those in the relatively uncomfortable environments tend to be small. Not only do the attitudes in the two types of environment closely resemble each other, but they also closely resemble the attitudes of troops at home in the United States. In both types of overseas areas there is a suggestion of a slight deterioration of attitudes with length of time overseas; and this is quite consistent in the individual areas shown in Table 16. In all, 18 comparisons, by length of time overseas, can be made from Table 16. Inspection of the table will show that the percentage of men who said they would not change their Army job was a little less in the group 1 to 2 years overseas than in the group overseas less than 1 year in 15 out of the 18 comparisons.

Although the differences in attitudes in the two time periods were not great, it is possible that larger differences might have appeared if a longer period overseas could be considered. In the studies cited above, there were only three regions for which the available number of cases of men who had been overseas 2 years or more was adequate for this comparison. These were Hawaii, the Aleutians, and Panama. The data are presented in Chart XII for non-Infantry Service and Ground Force troops. They give no sign of great deterioration of job satisfaction after 2 years in any of these areas. The privates with longest time overseas have significantly less favorable attitudes than other privates; the noncoms with longest time overseas are slightly more likely both to say they would change to another Army job if they could and to say they would not change—the undecided category diminishing. But none of these differences are large as compared with other categories of difference shown on Chart X. It will also be noted that there is no evidence that job attitudes of the men overseas 2 years or more are any better in Hawaii than in the less comfortable environment of the Aleutians or Panama.

It must be remembered that data such as those presented in Charts XI and XII are not equivalent to data which would trace the attitudes of *the same men* in a given region over a fixed time span. No information of the latter type is available. Conceivably, the observed longevity differences—or, perhaps more accurately, the lack of large differences—might reflect changes in the *type* of men who constituted successive cohorts shipped to a given area. Further detailed tabulations in several of these areas indicate that there

CHART XII

JOB SATISFACTION AS RELATED TO LENGTH OF TIME OVERSEAS  
(Service and Ground Force Troops Except Infantry)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are


were variations in the composition of the troops constituting successive cohorts. A larger proportion of old Regular Army men were found among the men with a long time in the theater. Their job attitudes tended to be slightly better than those of selectees with the same longevity, but when the regulars are removed from the sample and selectees alone are considered, the change in the picture is negligible. In the more recent cohorts, a larger percentage of the enlisted men were married. No noteworthy differences between the job attitudes of married and single men appear in the areas studied and the picture is consequently not altered by using only single men in the sample.

Note also should be taken of the fact that, by breaking the data presented into two groups, privates and noncoms, the reported differences in attitudes between men who have been in a theater a long time and men who have recently arrived tend to *understate* the relative job satisfaction of the area's veterans as a whole as compared with the newcomers as a whole. Actually, a much larger percentage of the men with longer longevity in any overseas areas were noncoms, and if rank had not been controlled, the older group taken as a whole ordinarily would have manifested better job satisfaction than the more recent arrivals. If a cohort of men could have been studied upon entrance to an area and restudied at various intervals over the three-year period, it would certainly have been found that, on the average, they advanced in rank and it might very well be that perquisites and satisfactions attaching to promotion more than offset the cumulative discomforts attaching to long residence in a rugged environment.

Since some question may be raised about the inclusion of Panama as an area not only with uncomfortable climate but also with isolation from many of the amenities of civilization, it may be of interest to compare the attitudes toward their Army job of men in the Caribbean, classified by the degree of isolation of their posts according to the length of time they have spent at their present stations. This is done in Chart XIII. The "more isolated" stations were often jungle outposts or extremely small installations in remote parts of the Caribbean area. The "less isolated" stations were old established large Army posts in the Canal Zone and some other installations resembling a true post. Again, there is no evidence of worse job attitudes among troops in the more uncomfortable environment and no evidence that length of time at such stations is associated with deterioration of these attitudes.

CHART XIII

ATTITUDES TOWARD JOB AMONG SOLDIERS IN PANAMA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BY ISOLATION OF STATION AND LENGTH OF TIME AT STATION (Men Who Have Been in Theater 1 to 2½ Years)




The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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A particularly interesting set of data is available from the South Pacific. Portrayed in Chart XIV, it shows that men on duty in the Solomons who had had malaria showed only slightly worse attitudes toward their Army jobs than did men who had escaped malaria. As in the other charts, the differences in job attitudes between pri-

CHART XIV

ATTITUDES TOWARD JOB AMONG SOLDIERS IN THE SOLOMONS BY WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAD HAD MALARIA  
(Noncombat Troops in Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Espiritu Santo Who Have Been Overseas 1 to 2 Years, January 1944)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

vates and noncoms tend to outweigh any differences attributable directly to exposure to worse environmental conditions.

Various hypotheses about the relative adaptability, as far as job satisfaction goes, of soldiers with different demographic characteristics who have been transplanted to uncomfortable environments have been considered and investigated where the data permit. In no instance have marked differences in adaptability by age, educa-

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tion, or other background characteristics been revealed. One example will be given by way of illustration. It might be thought that soldiers from the South would show greater job satisfaction than Northern soldiers in the tropics, and that the reverse would be true in a very chilly region.<sup>20</sup> As Chart XV shows, the hypothesis is unsupported by the data.<sup>21</sup> A larger proportion of noncoms from the North than from the South had favorable attitudes in *both* the Aleutians and the Solomons, although the differences are too small to be statistically significant. Differences between the attitudes of privates from the North and South are even smaller.

In spite of the evidence converging to the conclusion that men stationed in an uncomfortable environment, broadly considered, showed about as high job satisfaction as those stationed in better places, it still could be true that smaller units *within* a region showed variations in job satisfaction associated with *local* differences in the conditions of Army living and working. Particularly, invoking the theory of relativity of satisfaction, one should expect discontent with Army assignment among troops deprived of amenities which they see, with their own eyes, other soldiers possessing.

In November 1944 representatives of the Research Branch asked the officers at headquarters of one of the large Service Commands in the United States to pick two of the best and two of the worst large posts in the Service Command from the standpoint of general living conditions. There was fairly good consensus about the worst, though not so much agreement about the best posts. The four camps selected were then visited by a research team, and enlisted men in the station complement at each installation were given questionnaires.


Chart XVI shows that the majority of enlisted men, noncoms and privates alike, in camps A and B which had been selected at Service Command headquarters as the better posts tended to prefer their present station to whatever camp had been their last previous regular assignment in the United States. By contrast, only a third of the enlisted men in camp C and less than a fifth in camp D—designated at headquarters as the worse camps—showed a corresponding preference.

<sup>20</sup> "South" includes the states in the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central grand divisions, as defined by the census. "North" as here used includes the rest of the country except the Pacific and Mountain States. Data in Chart XV are from S-124 and S-133.

<sup>21</sup> It will be recalled that in Section I of Chapter 5 a similar hypothesis about attitudes toward health was shown to be unsupported by the data.

CHART XV

JOB SATISFACTION OF SOLDIERS FROM NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN STATES IN ALEUTIANS AND SOLOMONS




The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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CHART XVI

CAMP PREFERENCE AND JOB SATISFACTION



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

The opinions of members of the research team agreed that camps A and B were distinctly better places to be stationed, in terms of physical environment, than camps C and D. The former are large posts, not too inaccessible to sizable cities, and well provided with all standard facilities. The latter also are fairly large posts, but are more isolated. Although none of the camps are more than 200 miles apart, the swampy terrain at camps C and D makes these locations less desirable, while camp D had a particularly bad reputation in the Army for its poor housing and sanitation. It was originally designed as an amphibious and jungle training center. After conversion to a more standard-type training center, less than a quarter of its hutments, at the time of this survey, had floors.

Here should be a good test situation as to the relationship of job satisfaction and comfortable milieu. Since different types of soldiers were in training at the four posts, the only strictly comparable men would be those comprising the Headquarters, Supply, Medical, and Military Police Departments of the station complement. These men were asked "How satisfied are you with your present Army job?" Chart XVI shows, for each camp, and for noncoms and privates separately, the percentages who replied "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied." Noncoms, as usual, are better satisfied than privates. It will be observed that the highest proportion of favorable replies was found, among both privates and noncoms, at one of the two better posts, camp B, and the lowest proportion was found at one of the two worst posts, camp C. Yet camp A men do not differ in job satisfaction from men in the worst camp of the four from the standpoint of physical environment, camp D. In fact, among privates, attitudes in camps A, B, and D are almost the same, only camp C being out of line.<sup>22</sup>

It is interesting to ask why the job satisfaction could have been as high as reported at camp D, in view of the unpleasant milieu. Many possible explanations might present themselves for inquiry. One set would relate to differences in the composition of the troops. However, there were no inter-camp differences in age, marital con-

<sup>22</sup> In order to make the comparison as fair as possible, separate percentages were computed for each detachment at a post and an unweighted average of these percentages is used as the figure presented in Chart XVI. This has the effect of controlling variations in the strength or sample size of different types of detachments. The four standard station-complement detachments were present at all posts except camp D, where headquarters and supply were combined as one large detachment. This detachment is given a weight of 2 in all calculations. Military Police detachments engaged in guarding prisoners of war were present at only two of the posts, and are excluded from the present study.

dition, education, army longevity, or overseas service which, when analyzed, change the general picture in Chart XVI in any important way. A second set of factors would relate to differences in mess or in pass policies or in relative irksomeness of post regulations or in relative consideration in treatment by one's "housekeeping" officers and noncoms. A third set of factors would relate to differences in working conditions, particularly the quality of work supervision given by officers and higher noncoms on the job.

The second and third sets of conditions are difficult to evaluate from an analysis of men's own responses in the absence of an outside criterion.

Let us begin with the unit mess. In any outfit there will be chronic complainers who will complain about almost everything, including the mess. Hence, a cross tabulation which shows, as it usually will, that men dissatisfied with the mess tend to be more dissatisfied with, say, their job assignment than other men, proves little or nothing. Improving the mess would not necessarily improve attitudes toward the job, nor would reassignment of mis-assigned men necessarily improve attitudes toward the mess. A somewhat better approach is to cross-tabulate outfits rather than individuals. If the overwhelming majority of men in one unit say their mess is bad and the overwhelming majority of men in another unit say their mess is good, there is reason to suspect that there is an objective difference in the quality of the two messes. Belief in the objective difference would be strengthened if the noncoms, among whom are fewer chronic complainers than among privates, agreed with the privates in their respective outfits.

While extreme differences between two units in opinion about the mess would lead one to expect objective differences in the mess, the same cannot be said for smaller differences in opinion between two units. Men in one unit might be somewhat more "browned off" than men in another unit about something quite unrelated to the mess—the way the CO handles pass policy or work details, for example—and the general sourness engendered would reflect itself in attitudes toward the mess as well as other elements of daily routine.

In the four-camp study, the men were asked "Compared with other Army messes how does your mess rate?" They could check "better than most," "about average," or "poorer than most." The range, by detachments, in percentage saying "poorer than most" was from 14 per cent in one detachment in camp B to 85 per cent in each of two detachments in camp C. None of the detachments

in camp A or B had a majority of complainers, while all the detachments in camp C had a majority of complainers. The picture was mixed in camp D, 79 per cent of the men in the combined headquarters and supply detachment saying that their mess was "poorer than most," as compared with 34 per cent and 45 per cent in the other two units at this post.<sup>23</sup> Averaging the individual detachment percentages for the four posts, we find 42 per cent in camp A, 36 per cent in camp B, 75 per cent in camp C, and 59 per cent in camp D with unfavorable attitudes toward their mess. Thus the attitudes toward the mess averaged better in the two camps with better physical environment and worse in the two camps with a worse setting. Superior mess would not seem to explain why men in camp D were relatively so well satisfied with their jobs.

About the same picture is found if one takes a question like "How do you feel about the Army rules and regulations at this post?" The answer categories were "all are necessary," "some are not necessary," and "a lot are not necessary." The average percentage at each post who checked "a lot are not necessary" was: camp A, 28 per cent; camp B, 18 per cent; camp C, 37 per cent; and camp D, 30 per cent—again not reflecting any unusual circumstances prevailing at camp D to counteract its discomforts.

Let us consider further the Army jobs at the four posts. The station complement at all places had the same prescribed tasks. The volume of work load may have varied, but no data are available on this. Another factor which could have varied was the quality of officer supervision on the job. In fact, the officer in charge of the research team, in writing up his experience before results of the study were tabulated, noted: "All in all, I would say that the men at camp D had better morale than they had any reason to have, purely because of excellent leadership."

As Chapter 8 on "Attitudes Toward Leadership and Social Control" will show, it is particularly difficult to evaluate the effects of good or bad leadership from responses of the men alone. Men who have good morale are likely to say they have good leadership and vice versa. *Only if the leaders are changed and before-and-after measurements are made of the changes in attitudes can the effects of leadership be satisfactorily measured.*

The men in the four camps were asked "How successful are the

<sup>23</sup> The figures are standardized by calculating percentages for noncoms and privates separately and averaging. The correlation between opinions of privates and noncoms about the mess for the 15 detachments was  $+ .83$ .

officers in charge of your work in getting wholehearted cooperation from the men?" Answer categories were "very successful," "fairly successful," "not very successful," and "unsuccessful." If the two favorable categories are combined, the smallest percentage of favorable answers in any detachment was 64, the highest 94. On the average, attitudes toward officers in charge of work were relatively favorable at camp D (82 per cent)—second only to those at camp B (84 per cent)—and somewhat better than those at camp A (75 per cent) and camp C (70 per cent). This is consistent with the observation that good leadership at camp D may have been compensating for some of the handicaps of the post's unfavorable location and physical setup.

To stop with such a finding is disappointing. What we would like to do is to estimate what the job satisfaction would have been in the various detachments, taking into account the quality of their leadership alone. Then we could measure the extent to which variations from this estimated value, camp by camp, were associated with other factors. The appropriate statistical machinery of analysis of variance and covariance is ready at hand, but its use would be unwarranted. Since the majority of men in all detachments in this study had a favorable opinion of the officer in charge of their work, there is no ground for inferring that minority negative opinions always pointed to the presence of poor officers. An alternative interpretation might be that outfits with a larger minority of critics of officers than others tended to have, had a larger minority of men who were generally critical of Army life. By contrast, in opinions about their Army mess there was near unanimity in some outfits to the effect that the mess was poor and near unanimity in other outfits to the effect that the mess was good, and therefore there would be somewhat more justification for using such subjective reports as a substitute for an outside judgment. In either case, however, the greatest caution is necessary in drawing conclusions when such a subjective variable is studied in its association with another subjective variable like job satisfaction.<sup>24</sup>

In summary, the evidence from the four-camp study has shown that job satisfaction was about as high at one of the two inferior posts as at the better posts. The fact that it was relatively high at the poorer camp, in spite of general living conditions, apparently cannot be attributed to better food or better local camp regulations,

<sup>24</sup> The observed correlation between attitudes toward officers in charge of jobs, by detachments, and job satisfaction was  $+0.38$  for privates;  $+0.75$  for noncoms.

but possibly may be due in part to better leadership on the job. While not ruling out the possibility that large compensating factors like better leadership may be necessary to make up for effects of a bad milieu, the evidence is consistent with other evidence previously cited—by comparison of different types of overseas environments—in suggesting that the factor of comfort is a relatively less important component of job satisfaction than other factors, such as freedom from danger or the attainment of rank.

A final illustration of the probable low order of relationship appearing to exist between comforts and job satisfaction is provided from a survey made in England in December 1943. Enlisted men in the ground crews of twelve Air Force fighter groups were studied, the sample averaging about 250 men per group. The men were asked the following questions about food, housing and sanitation, and recreation:

“Are your mess facilities and food about as good as they could be under the present circumstances?”

“Are your housing and sanitary facilities about as good as they could be under the present circumstances?”

“Are your recreation and entertainment needs about as well taken care of as they could be under the present circumstances?”

Alternative responses in each case were: “about as good as could be,” “could be a bit better,” and “could be a lot better.”

There were quite marked variations among groups in the proportions of men within the groups checking the third category, “could be a lot better,” as is shown in Table 17. On food, the range was from 9 to 62 per cent. On housing and sanitary facilities, the range was from 2 to 55 per cent. On recreation the range was somewhat less, from 9 to 46 per cent.

Whether the group in which only 9 per cent said the mess facilities and food could be a lot better actually had better mess facilities than the group in which 62 per cent made this claim cannot be determined from the survey data—similarly, with respect to the other variables. It may be noted, however, that all the groups had an unusually large proportion of men (as compared with the Army average) in the top three noncom grades. Now the opinion of top three graders is worthy of special attention, if only for the reason that they are less likely to be “browned off” about the Army than others and their complaints, if they make them, are more likely to have a specific referent. As Chart XVII shows, the opinions about food, housing, and recreation held by top three graders in the



twelve groups were very similar to those held by the rest of the men. For example, if half of the top three graders in a group thought the housing could be a lot better under the present circumstances, so did an approximately similar percentage of the rest of the group. Or if only 10 per cent of the top three graders complained, the proportion of others complaining was about the same. If anything, the top three graders were a little more prone to complain about the amenities than the other enlisted men.

TABLE 17

ATTITUDES TOWARD FOOD, HOUSING, RECREATION, AND ARMY JOB OF GROUND CREWS IN TWELVE FIGHTER GROUPS IN ENGLAND, DECEMBER 1943

GROUP	PERCENTAGE COMPLAINING ABOUT			PERCENTAGE "SATISFIED" OR "VERY SATISFIED"							
				WITH ARMY JOB				NUMBER OF CASES			
	Food	Housing	Recreation	Pvts. Cpls.	Top 3 Sgts.	All graders	All men	Pvts. Cpls.	Top 3 Sgts.	All graders	All men
1	17	21	11	64	79	89	77	101	78	95	274
2	46	24	29	44	56	81	59	91	71	74	236
3	28	45	36	47	65	80	61	103	68	69	240
4	62	34	13	61	73	88	74	93	60	81	234
5	13	45	32	41	66	90	66	130	71	90	291
6	44	23	24	43	70	82	64	81	46	81	208
7	62	28	46	54	69	87	69	87	42	68	197
8	19	2	9	66	70	86	76	100	77	83	260
9	9	31	9	59	57	81	65	117	82	80	279
10	33	20	22	55	66	81	67	97	62	91	260
11	53	55	35	48	72	76	68	114	69	102	285
12	24	37	12	57	75	77	68	95	71	62	228
											2,982


\* Data from S-113.

While the close agreement between opinions of top three graders and others, together with the considerable range in opinions between groups, gives one some reason to think that different groups really were experiencing different conditions with respect to food, housing, and recreation, the possibility cannot be excluded that some of the negative opinions reflected a general dissatisfaction with Army life and therefore would contribute to a misleading association with job satisfaction or any other subjective variable. Put it this way: even if there were no reason to think an improvement in mess or recreation would improve job satisfaction, a table would be expected to show some degree of association between these variables.

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## CHART XVII

**COMPARISON OF EXTENT OF COMPLAINTS BY TOP THREE GRADERS AND ALL OTHER ENLISTED MEN WITHIN THE SAME FIGHTER GROUP AS TO FOOD, HOUSING, AND RECREATION**  
 (Ground Crews of Twelve Fighter Groups in England, December 1943)



Data from same source as Table 17

Actually, as is shown in Chart XVIII, there is no evidence of such an association except possibly among enlisted men in the lowest grades. Chart XVIII is based on regroupings of the percentages in Table 17. For example, the four units with most favorable attitudes toward the mess were groups labeled 9, 5, 1, and 8. The proportions of top three graders who said they were "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with their Army job<sup>25</sup> in these groups were 81, 90, 89, and 86, respectively, as can be seen in Table 17. The average of these percentages, 87, is graphed as the top left-hand bar in Chart XVIII. Other percentages in Chart XVIII were determined in a comparable manner.

Ratings were so high among enlisted men in these samples that not enough cases of privates were available for reliable unit figures. Hence privates are combined with corporals (or T/5's), while sergeants (or T/4's) and the top three graders are shown separately. The close association of job satisfaction with rank is, as in most of the other exhibits presented in this chapter, one of the most conspicuous features of Chart XVIII. This association is in quite vivid contrast with the relatively low association between job satisfaction and attitudes toward food, housing, and recreation.


Like other studies summarized in this section, this analysis of ground crewmen in fighter groups in England shows that job satisfaction or dissatisfaction is likely to exist quite independent of the amenities available to the men in a given organization. That the amenities do make a difference has not been disproved, nor has it been convincingly established. The fact, shown in Chart XVIII, that among corporals and privates those in units which speak best of food, housing, and recreation, have somewhat higher job satisfaction than men of the same rank in other groups is not to be disregarded. But in view of the expectation that some association would appear even if no causal relation existed, one is obliged to treat such findings conservatively.<sup>26</sup> In any event, the conclusion

<sup>25</sup> Based on the question, "How satisfied are you about being in your present Army job instead of some other Army job?" Categories are "very satisfied," "satisfied," "it does not make any difference to me," "somewhat dissatisfied," and "very much dissatisfied."

<sup>26</sup> Other studies show similar results. About the same magnitude of relationship as was shown among privates and corporals between job satisfaction and attitudes toward housing and recreation is seen in a study of 16 field artillery battalions of the First Army in England in April 1944. This study used exactly the same questions as to the amenities as were used in the Fighter Command study and the question as to job was "Do you think everything possible has been done to fit you into the job you are best fitted for in your outfit?" Privates in outfits most favorable to their housing had significantly better job attitudes than those in outfits least favorable (63 per cent as

CHART XVIII

JOB SATISFACTION AMONG GROUND CREWS OF FIGHTER GROUPS IN ENGLAND, BY RANK, AS RELATED TO REPORTS AS TO FOOD, HOUSING, AND RECREATION—DECEMBER 1943



Data from Table 17

seems to stand that among the components of job satisfaction the factor of comfort, however important, was less decisive than some other factors.

### *Concluding Comments*

This chapter on "Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction" has viewed the problem of job satisfaction as a relationship between the Army's needs and men's desires. The importance of taking into account attitudes as well as aptitudes in making assignments has been emphasized, with special attention to the comparatively favorable attitudes on the part of soldiers who had a chance to choose their jobs. What the average soldiers wanted in their Army jobs is first analyzed inferentially from a study of branch preferences. There was a minority who volunteered for dangerous combat assignments which also had been glamorized in the public eye. But the majority of soldiers probably were not motivated to court danger, even though those confronted with danger without recourse gave an account of themselves which will be forever creditable in American history and hundreds of thousands lost their lives. Four desires of the men, as related to job satisfaction, have been examined in some detail, namely (1) desire for status in the Army—informal as well as formal; (2) desire to maximize experience which would be useful in civilian life after the war; (3) desire to minimize the chances of death and injury; and (4) desire to minimize deprivations from civilian comforts. All of these had some relation to job choice when choice was possible and to satisfaction on the job, although among the four the evidence is that the last named—comforts—played a relatively minor role in actual satisfaction or dissatisfaction while on the job.

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compared with 48 per cent). Corresponding figures for noncoms, 77 per cent and 70 per cent. Those in outfits most favorable to their recreation also had significantly better job attitudes than those in outfits least favorable (63 per cent as compared with 45 per cent). Noncoms, 80 per cent and 71 per cent. No relationship was found between attitudes toward food and job satisfaction in this study.

ATTITUDES TOWARD LEADERSHIP  
AND SOCIAL CONTROL<sup>1</sup>

**I**N AN authoritarian institution like the Army, with responsibility passing from the top down through a chain of command and with the formal rules requiring obedience at each echelon, the qualifications of leadership are variables of the utmost importance in the success or failure of the organization. It is farthest from the purpose of this chapter, however, to pass judgment on the qualifications of the leaders of the American Army in World War II, whether in the higher or in the lower positions of responsibility. Instead, its purpose is to report the attitudes of enlisted men toward their leaders and toward the problem of social control in the Army, with the view of illustrating some of the tensions which developed and of aiding in the analysis of the situations which gave rise to these tensions.

The chapter is necessarily a descriptive account, rather than a report of manipulative experiments to test hypotheses. For fairly obvious reasons, it was difficult, especially early in the war, to get some elements in the Army leadership to permit questioning of soldiers on attitudes toward officers, and such questioning brought the Research Branch under a certain amount of criticism, in spite of the evidence that answering questions about officers did not lead to "incidents" or to any apparent or measurable increase in general hostility to the Army.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Edward A. Suchman, Samuel A. Stouffer, and Leland C. DeVinney. While attitudes toward leadership were the subject of many inquiries for which various analysts were responsible, the main work on leadership practices was done during the war by Suchman. The concluding pages of the chapter, on group punishment and group rewards, were written by Irving L. Janis.

<sup>2</sup> Such questioning might, indeed, be thought to have had a beneficial cathartic effect. If it had any effect, however, it was very slight. In one controlled experiment, for example, a random half of a sample was given a list of questions deliberately intended to call forth a maximum of aggressions against officers if existent, and these questions were followed by a set of standard questions on personal adjustment and general attitudes toward the Army. The other random half of the sample received the same questionnaire except that for the questions on officers some entirely "innocuous"

Even more reluctant were the authorities to permit experimental studies to test hypotheses about leadership. The social-psychological and sociological literature on this subject is filled with precepts and stereotypes which embody a great deal of common-sense experience, but any substantial advance in the way of proving that if you vary *X* you will also vary *Y* depends on experimentation under controlled conditions. Not until the war neared the end was authority obtained to begin experimental studies of the effects of leadership (at the noncom level) on troop attitudes. For a few weeks a study preliminary to experimentation was carried out at an Army post in New England, but the end of the war and curtailment of research activities brought this effort to an abrupt end.

There are few practical problems facing social science more urgent than that of studying leadership experimentally and developing some tested hypotheses to replace the copybook maxims that now fill most manuals on leadership, whether written for the Army, for industry, or for organizations like the YMCA. Considerable peacetime progress can be expected.

Meanwhile, the present chapter is not without its values in analyzing, with relevant statistics, some of the attitudes toward leadership and social control existing in the Army and the varying conditions under which these attitudes were held.

The chapter is divided into three sections:

I. *Officers*—attitudes toward officers and their leadership practices; barriers to understanding between officers and enlisted men.

II. *Noncoms*—attitudes of and toward the noncommissioned officer, as the intermediary between officers and men.

III. *Social Control*—attitudes reflecting problems of adherence to informal codes as well as to formal codes of behavior.

## S E C T I O N I

### OFFICERS

The analysis in this section falls into three parts: (1) Attitudes toward officers. (2) Attitudes as related to specific leadership prac-

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questions were substituted. If the effect of the officer questions had been deleterious, the first sample should have shown at least some negative differences from the second sample on the last questions in the questionnaire. Or, if the effect of the officer questions had been cathartic and beneficial, the first sample should have shown some positive differences from the second sample. Actually, there were no significant differences; nor were there on other studies in which a time interval of several days elapsed between presenting questions about officers and a subsequent questionnaire.

tices. (3) Barriers to understanding between officers and enlisted men.

#### PART 1. Attitudes Toward Officers

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, detailed tabulations were summarized on a number of attitudes reflecting personal adjustment, including attitudes toward the Army in general and attitudes toward officers in particular. From these summaries the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. In any given survey, relatively new recruits tended to have more favorable attitudes toward officers than did men with longer service.

2. At later stages of the war, men tended to have less favorable attitudes toward officers than did men in the same rank and longevity groups in earlier surveys.

3. At a given time period, the smallest proportion of favorable attitudes tended to be found in the relatively inactive overseas theaters; the highest proportion of favorable attitudes tended to be found among combat troops; the proportion favorable among troops in the United States who had not gone overseas tended to be intermediate between these two groups.

4. The better educated enlisted men, rank and longevity held constant, tended to be less favorable in attitudes toward officers than less educated men.

This pattern of attitudes bears interesting resemblances to and differences from other general patterns described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

1. The tendency for the new recruit's attitude to be more favorable to officers is consistent with a tendency for the new recruit's attitudes to be more favorable to the Army generally. The deterioration of attitudes in early months of service is analyzed in some detail in Chapter 5.

2. The tendency for attitudes toward officers to deteriorate in the later stages of the war is consistent with the decline in sense of personal commitment as the war neared its conclusion and with an increase in general resentment against the Army. The extent to which deterioration in attitudes toward officers was a causal factor in the increased resentment toward the Army cannot be measured. There is a basis for inference, however, that deterioration in attitudes toward officers was not a mere reflection of increasing dissatisfaction with Army life, since the deterioration in attitudes toward



officers was perhaps sharper than that in any other set of attitudes. In some instances—attitude toward Army job assignment, for example—there was little or no evidence of deterioration.

3. The relatively inactive overseas theaters, where the attitudes toward officers tended to be particularly unfavorable, did not have the worst attitudes on all other variables. For example, satisfaction with Army assignment tended to be higher among men in these theaters than among combat troops, yet the latter had much the more favorable attitudes toward officers.

4. As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, the better educated men were not always the worst "grippers." The better educated tended to have a higher sense of personal commitment to the war than their less educated fellow soldiers and tended more frequently to say they were in good spirits and good health. On the other hand, the better educated were, as we have seen, less likely to be convinced of the importance of their particular assignment, were more likely to be sensitive to status deprivations, and were more likely to be critical of the Army's way of doing things. The fact that the better educated were the most critical of officer leadership could be in part a reflection of their own greater sense of status deprivation and in part a reflection of the higher standards by which they judged the Army's performance. But the detailed evidence to be reviewed later makes it quite clear that specific practices of officers—especially overseas in exploiting their rank to benefit by special privileges—were so widely observed and criticized that one cannot dismiss the attitudes of the better educated as mere expressions of "sour grapes."

Perhaps the most significant findings, from the standpoint of a conceptualization of the leadership problem, are those which show that overseas attitudes toward officers were most favorable in the front lines and least favorable in the rear areas. These findings, mentioned in summary in Chapter 5, may be illustrated by Chart I in the present chapter. Here it is shown that responses to items reflecting attitudes toward officers were most favorable among men in Infantry rifle and heavy weapons companies (81 per cent of whom said they had been in actual combat), intermediate among men in other field force units (48 per cent of whom said they had been in combat), and least favorable among men in the communications zone (only 17 per cent of whom said they had been in combat).


The proportions among front-line infantrymen responding favor-

ably on these two questions were higher than was ever found in a survey in the United States using these two items, except among recruits with less than three months' service in the Army.

Strictly comparable data are not available on a sufficient sample of Air Forces combat flying personnel overseas to permit reporting comparisons, though there is little reason to doubt that the same phenomena would be present. In a study made in 1945 at a B-29 training base just before a B-29 group embarked for combat in the Pacific, the percentages of enlisted men who responded to the question, "How many of your present officers are the kind that always

CHART I

ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICERS AMONG TROOPS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER,  
BY CLOSENESS TO THE FIGHTING



Data from S-223, April 1945.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

try to look out for the welfare of enlisted men?" by saying "all" or "most" were as follows:

Flying personnel in B-29 group	33%	(1,153)
Ground personnel	24	(1,134)
In bomber group	30%	(477)
In service group	28	(362)
In base unit	13	(295)


Evidence of the type summarized in Chapter 5 which illustrates the relatively low esteem in which officers were held in inactive theaters overseas, as well as in the rear areas of active theaters, is shown in Chart II. These data are for enlisted men in the Army 1 to 2 years and 2 to 3 years respectively, who were in branches of the service other than Air and Infantry and had not been in combat. Data are shown separately for noncoms and privates and for two educational groups. The troops in the United States are compared with those in six overseas theaters or departments. The question is: "How many of your officers take a personal interest in their men?" The percentage saying "all" or "most" is higher among troops in the United States than among those overseas in 34 out of the 38 matched comparisons available in this chart. For noncombat Air Corps men, 14 comparisons are available from the same surveys and in all 14 cases the soldiers at home made higher percentages of favorable responses than soldiers overseas. The same kind of picture is obtained from responses to other questions reflecting attitudes toward officers. As the summaries in Chapter 5 made clear, there can be little doubt that attitudes toward officers were lower in such overseas areas than at home or among troops at the front. It will be noted that the studies reported in Chart II were made at a midpoint in the war—long before the swelling chorus of criticism, arising at the end of the war, reached the public's ears and motivated the Army to appoint a board of investigation headed by Lieutenant General Doolittle to review the problem of officer-enlisted man relationships.

Even if the behavior of officers had been a model of self-denial and concern for the welfare of the enlisted men, it is reasonable to expect that the leadership would have been a target for aggression. Army life, for most civilian soldiers, was a succession of deprivations and frustrations, and it is not surprising that the blame should have been personalized and focused on those in authority. The fact that combat soldiers had more favorable attitudes than others toward their officers could be attributed in part to the opportunity to discharge their aggression directly against the enemy. But this would be much too simple a view of the matter. Among combat troops,

whether air or ground, officers and enlisted men shared the common experiences of deprivation, danger, and death. Social differentiations and special privileges were at a minimum. In rear areas and inactive theaters and, to a lesser extent, in the United States, the

CHART II

ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND VARIOUS OVERSEAS THEATERS AMONG ENLISTED MEN IN BRANCHES OTHER THAN AIR CORPS AND INFANTRY—WINTER AND SPRING OF 1943-1944



Source: United States, S-95 (February 1944); Alaska, S-133 (April 1944); Central Pacific, S-125 (February 1944), ETO, S-92 (November 1943); Panama, S-115 (January 1944); South Pacific, S-124 (March 1944).  
The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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privileges enjoyed by the officer class were so much out of line with democratic tradition and so unjustified in the eyes of the men that a smoldering resentment, which was to burst into flame with the end of the war, probably was inevitable.

Why was the criticism of officers even more acute in inactive theaters and in rear areas of active theaters than in the United States? The most plausible hypothesis seems to turn on the concept of *scarcity*. If the supply of attractive women, liquor, or entertainment is severely limited, as was the case in many overseas areas, the problem of equitable distribution is much more acute than if there is plenty to go around. The charge which enlisted men repeated in theater after theater was that the officers used their rank to monopolize these desired objects. This was not expressed merely in indictments of particular officers, although some were more conspicuous in giving offense than others. It was an indictment of a *system*—a system by which a privileged minority acquired, through their authoritarian position, a preponderant share of the scarce objects which were craved by others.

The principal source of information on this subject is the free comments written by men all over the world on the margins and at the ends of their Research Branch questionnaires. By way of illustration, let us look at a single area, the Persian Gulf Command, in which a survey was made in October and November 1943 of 1,793 enlisted men constituting a representative cross section of the command.

In this survey, about three fifths of the men took the trouble voluntarily to add written comments in their own words at the end of the questionnaire. As is always the case with such comments, almost all represented specific complaints, rather than complimentary remarks about the Army.

When the free comments were classified, it was found that well over half the comments concerned officers and officer-enlisted man relations and almost all were unfavorable. Of the criticisms of officers, only one out of six charged incompetence. The overwhelming majority of the criticisms dealt with special privileges of officers, their concern for their own prerogatives and welfare, and their indifference to the deprivations of enlisted men. Many of the criticisms not classified under the heading of criticisms of officers probably belonged in the same category. For example, complaints about a town being placed off limits for enlisted men were classified as criticisms of officers only if officers were specifically blamed for it

or if invidious comparisons were made about officers' access to such a town as compared with enlisted men's.

The following quotations from free comments from the Persian Gulf Command are representative of the range of criticisms on the score of special privilege and indifference to enlisted men's needs:

The officers in this command are the most selfish egotistical people I've ever come across. They never think of the men but they get very angry when things do not go right for themselves. A good illustration is the incident where the officers' club was built before the hospital. Another example of the officers' selfishness occurs practically daily in the PX. They are allowed to enter the PX at all hours for the ridiculous reason that it is beneath them to wait their turn to get served. After all, we do belong to the greatest democracy the world has ever known but you would not know it after being stationed in the Persian Gulf Service Command.

When we first came to this camp our barracks was just below the officers' club and we heard that it was built while work was stopped on our hospital. Well, we had no place to go, no facilities for entertainment, etc., we were practically restricted to the camp. Every place was out of bounds to us while it wasn't to the officers and then at nites we could sit on our bunks in the darkness and hear music, laughter, loud drunken voices coming to us from the officers' club. They were having a good time. Dances every Sat. nite. The colored orchestra was up there a couple nites each week. It didn't help our morale any to see that go on. Then the officers had beer (our canned beer) for several months before we ever got any.

Our roofs on our barracks leaked right through the first rain. The officers immediately had their roof tarred—even tho they had tin under their mud roofing while we had straw. It seems to me that the officers should think of their men first, but instead they think of themselves first and never think of us at all.

Only today I saw an officer with a carton of Luckies, some Fig Newtons, and a new cigarette lighter, all three of which our PX has been out of for days. Pabst beer, supposedly the better of the two kinds available here, is always stocked at the officers PX, and seldom at ours. Because of the time wasted during working hours is the reason for throwing that PX off limits to us. Officers who draw many times more pay are therefore costing the government much more in the time they waste during working hours. And yet, our PX is open to them at any time, and they can barge right up to the counters for immediate service. The officers' mess serves fresh eggs any morning they want them, chicken several times a week, and far greater quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables than we ever see, yet the officers and men are supposed to be rationed equally. If whoever reads this were to talk to every enlisted man in this camp, I think the opinion would be basically the same as mine. We have become bitter at the many injustices imposed on us and don't care who knows.

Officers are too much concerned about themselves having a good time and everything they want. It is nothing more than just selfishness they are showing with rank to back it up. One very good example of what I am trying to say is this. In the desert district I have seen a few officers take an ice box unit for an officers' club that rightly belonged to a mess hall that ran day and night and fed around

800 to 900 men, who had to do without cool drinks just so a few officers could have Ice water and cold drinks. That's god dam near just like the *German* army.

The distinction made between officers and men is so great that it spoils any attempt to raise our morale by movies and footballs. All we ask is to be treated like Americans once again. No "out of bounds," no different mess rations, and no treating us like children.

Why should we, as tax payers, after the war pay for that \$75,000 officers' Club they built. And the Colonel with his \$15,000 home. If we are "in the field," let's all be in the field. Why do we have an *enlisted men's* service club with reservations for *officers*? I am not the company's "griper," either. You wanted my honest opinion, so there it is.

Recreation hall is called enlisted men's recreation hall yet best seats are reserved for officers in movie hall. Half of seats reserved for officers at USO shows and enlisted men outnumber at least 10 to 1. Officers have own club, own bar much more expensive than enlisted men's yet they still utilize men's service club. Colonel moves into expensive cottage of stone with two screen porches while men live in mud barracks without screen doors.

I was told one night that only Chelsea and Twenty Grand cigarettes were available, and while I was still at the counter this same clerk sold Philip Morris to officers. I asked the clerk if I might trade for a carton of Philip Morris and he refused me. This was at the hospital PX at Khorramshahr.

I think they are spending far too much money for officers' clubs and quarters and for their personal enjoyment. How about spending some of that on enlisted men. Also I think they should have built the hospital before the officers' club.

Why must the enlisted man be confined to camp as though he were in a concentration camp, when the officers can go where they dam please. The officers go to town, the officers get the few available women; there are several social affairs given from time to time for officers but nothing for the enlisted man unless it be an exciting bingo party. My pet peeve—to see a commissioned officer out with a girl flaunt her in front of enlisted men, who cannot go out with nurses.

The Polish camp is "out of bounds" to enlisted men and still I have seen American officers go right into this camp and pick up women. I am of Polish descent and I believe those boys who can speak the Polish language should be given the privilege of associating with those people right in their camp.

We, as enlisted men, are not allowed to go into the better restaurants, but yet we often stand by and see our superior officers entering such places with nothing less than street walkers.

Too much discrimination between officers and enlisted men in town. "Out of bounds" signs would be a scandal in the U.S.A.

The officers are getting American whiskey and we are not. I do not think it's fair.

The practice of putting every decent nightclub "out of bounds" causes much resentment among EM. In fact we do not believe it would be tolerated in the States.

The operation of the PX in this command is something the responsible officer should be ashamed of. The Exchange that is best stocked and more convenient is out of bounds to enlisted men. Officers may purchase from a much larger assortment of stock. This condition has certainly not helped the morale of the men. The reason given is that men were buying things during working hours. Now the men are working and the officers are keeping the place busy.

There is nothing to do around here but read. Reading is good but it really gets boring. We have no place to go or anything to do. Everything that is worth while is "off limits." Officers have it as nice as they do in the States. Big club and all the American women they want to date.

We in motor transport have many problems which would be straightened out with a little officer interest. We have the pleasure of seeing the side curtains from our trucks on an officer's jeep which sits outside his quarters all night while we are on the road shivering with the cold. When they have an accident they take our trucks and we stay with theirs often as much as twelve hours without food. These are only a few of our troubles.

We see our side curtains and tops on the officers jeeps which are parked outside of their quarters. Meantime we drive on the road with none and make our run shivering with the cold.

I understand that different units of assorted magazines are supposed to be sent for use of the men. I know for a fact that one of these units arrived at our Battalion headquarters where they were immediately appropriated for the officers—none of them ever reached the men.

There is no more flagrant violation of the individual soldier's rights than in this command. One of the first things that most men learn upon induction are these rights. Furthermore, most men realize some of the privileges they must forego when coming into the Army and as Americans they are glad to do so, for they cherish their privileges as civilians. With so many officers I have met I have noted a "privileged class" attitude toward the men. This the men resent very much, for many of them in civilian life have had positions of equal or higher responsibility than some of the officers over them. We are fighting a war to stamp out a clique system and yet we find it in our midst. In this command, officers in authority still consider it necessary to teach military discipline and courtesy. I feel that there are all too many officers who should respect their knowledge a bit more. As a matter of fact I know some Generals and Colonels who need a little training also. If you can't make this a two-way proposition—stop it.

Too many officers have that superior feeling toward their men. Treat them as if they were way below them. Many of the men have just as good an education, if not better, than many officers and also have come from just as good families. What's the matter with us enlisted men, are we dogs?

It is said that the American soldier is fighting for freedom and justice and equality. Somehow the army ways represent the very things we are fighting against. Such as: Everything is special for the officer (as if their bodies are more genteel or fragile than ours); a nurse is frowned upon if she associates with an enlisted man; even the Non Coms are urged to stay in a station above the "common herd." Better establish a little justice and equality.



There is no basis for thinking that the irritations caused by the special privileges enjoyed by the officers were less in other theaters (outside the actual fighting zones) than in the command from which the above excerpts were drawn. It would be easy to multiply the above quotations—differing only in specific detail—many-fold from all over the world.<sup>3</sup>

The significant point is not that individual officers took undue advantage of their rank in certain circumstances, but rather that the Army's aristocratic tradition, described in the chapter, "The Old Army and the New," sanctioned and encouraged a *system* of special privilege. A case also can be made for the hypothesis that the American enlisted man, with his democratic civilian background, resented not so much the fact that superiors could *afford* certain privileges as the denial of his own *right* to enjoy them. As one enlisted man in the Persian Gulf Command put it, "Back in the states if a private had the price he could go to the same place that a general could. I bet the people back home don't know the conditions here." In America economic inequalities result in inequality of consumption, but, except for certain minority groups, there is generally no such pattern of denial of the *right* to consumption as was represented in the system of special privilege in the American Army overseas and, to a lesser extent, in the Army at home.

In spite of the criticism, in all theaters, of excessive special privileges for officers, there were always some enlisted men who found little or nothing to criticize in the general practice. This should be borne in mind, lest the practically complete unanimity of critical comments among men volunteering comments on the subject lead to a misconception. In May 1945, in answer to the question, "Considering their responsibilities, how do you feel about the privileges officers get compared with those enlisted men get?" 18 per cent of the enlisted men in ETO replied that officers "get about the right number of privileges" or "too few," as did about 12 per cent in MTO. Further breakdown of the answers showed, however, that the largest contribution to the approving responses was made by men in front-line combat units. In November 1945, when a cross section of troops in the United States was questioned, the propor-

<sup>3</sup> To cite one other specific example, detailed tabulation was made of free comments at the end of the questionnaires in a survey in February and March 1944 of a cross section of enlisted men (2,353) in the China-Burma-India theater. As in the case of the Persian Gulf Command, over half the men took the trouble to write free comments and the most frequent topic was criticism of officers and officer-enlisted man relations. Complaints about special privileges accorded to officers headed the list of criticisms.

tion who thought officers "get about the right number of privileges" or "too few" was 14 per cent—the men with short service who had not been overseas being those most likely to give this response.

When officers and enlisted men were asked, as they were in a few instances, identical questions as to officer privileges, a wide gulf in opinion showed up between officers and enlisted men, as might be expected. For example, at the end of the war, cross sections of enlisted men and officers in the United States responded as follows to the statement, "If enlisted men have to observe curfew, officers should too":

<i>Per cent "agreeing"</i> <sup>4</sup>	
Among officers	35
Among enlisted men	84

The response was as follows to the statement, "Officers deserve extra rights and privileges because they have more responsibility than enlisted men":

<i>Per cent "agreeing"</i> <sup>5</sup>	
Among officers	67
Among enlisted men	23

Such examples illustrate the fact that the opinion was not unanimous on either side, some officers seeing the matter from the enlisted point of view and some enlisted men seeing it from the officers' point of view.

The higher the rank of the officer, the more likely he was to defend the system of social segregation and special privilege. For example, in response to the statement, "An officer will lose the respect of his men if he pals around with them off duty," we have the following responses, by rank:

<i>Per cent "disagreeing"</i>	
Captains	27
First lieutenants	39
Second lieutenants	54
Enlisted men	82

It is interesting to note that officers who were formerly enlisted men were *more likely* to share the view of enlisted men than were officers who had never been enlisted men. (Forty-four per cent of the for-

<sup>4</sup> S-229.

<sup>5</sup> S-234A.

mer disagreed with the statement, based on 262 cases, as compared with 27 per cent of the latter, based on 52 cases.)

As was shown in Chapter 5, attitudes toward officers appeared to deteriorate throughout the war, in so far as this deterioration is measurable by individual check-list items. Since the absolute percentages checking an item "favorably" or "unfavorably" will vary depending on the wording of the item, there is historical value in attempting by more refined methods to obtain a measure independent of question wording which will tell whether more soldiers actually were, in general, unfavorable than were favorable to officers at the war's close. By this time, the somewhat elaborate scaling methods described in detail in Volume IV and illustrated in Chapter 5 had been sufficiently developed in the Research Branch to justify their use on this problem.

The sample comprised 2,827 enlisted men representing a cross section of soldiers in the United States—returnees from overseas and men who had never been abroad. The scale of attitudes toward officers comprised eleven questions, and for each question there was a related question on intensity of feeling, permitting the construction of a scale of intensity as well as a scale of content.

Chart III, based on Table 1, shows how the curve of intensity varied with degree of favorableness or unfavorableness of attitude.<sup>6</sup>

1. How much did you personally like your officers?

Very much  
 Pretty much  
 Not so much  
 Not at all

2. How much did you personally respect your officers?

Very much  
 Pretty much  
 Not so much  
 Not at all

3. How many of your officers took a personal interest in their men?

All of them  
 Most of them  
 About half of them  
 Few of them  
 None of them

4. When you did a particularly good job did you usually get recognition or praise for it from your officers?

Always  
 Usually  
 Rarely  
 Never


<sup>6</sup> The list of items comprising the scale of attitudes toward officers, in their scale order and with scale categories indicated by an X, is as follows:

5. How did you feel about the officers that had been selected by the Army?
- They were the best ones that could have been selected  
 They were as good as any that could have been picked  
 Somewhat better ones could have been picked  
 Much better ones could have been picked  
 Undecided
6. Do you think that your officers generally did what they could to help you?
- Yes, all the time  
 Yes, most of the time  
 No, they often did not  
 No, they almost never did
7. On the basis of your Army experience, do you think relations between officers and enlisted men were satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
- Very satisfactory  
 Fairly satisfactory  
 Undecided  
 Fairly unsatisfactory  
 Very unsatisfactory
8. How many of your officers used their rank in ways that seemed unnecessary to you?
- Almost all of them  
 Most of them  
 Some of them  
 Only a few of them  
 None of them
9. Did your officers give you a good chance to ask questions as to the *reason why* things were done the way they were?
- Yes, always  
 Yes, usually  
 Undecided  
 No, not very often  
 No, almost never
10. When you are discharged from the Army, do you think you will go back to civilian life with a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the officers in the Army?
- Very favorable  
 Fairly favorable  
 About 50-50  
 Fairly unfavorable  
 Very unfavorable
11. In general, how good would you say your officers were?
- Very good  
 Fairly good  
 About average  
 Pretty poor  
 Very poor

Those who had the most unfavorable attitude scores tended to be intense in their views. Intensity gradually declined, not reaching a minimum until 75 per cent of the sample is included, and then rose again as those with the most favorable attitudes manifested higher

intensity. The curve clearly shows that at this time and in this sample there were more soldiers with unfavorable than with favorable attitudes. The ratio of unfavorable to favorable would be about 3 to 1 if the minimum intensity point were used as a cutting

CHART III  
ATTITUDE TOWARD OFFICERS—CONTENT BY INTENSITY SCORES



Data from S-229B, October 1945

point. An alternative interpretation would be to classify as definitely unfavorable the 40 per cent in the negative content score groups with intensity above the median, as definitely favorable the 10 per cent in the positive content score groups with intensity above the median, and as intermediate those in content score groups with

TABLE 1  
ENLISTED MEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICERS—CONTENT BY INTENSITY SCORES

Intensity Score	CONTENT SCORE											Total	Cumulative per cent	
	(Neg) 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			11
(High) 9	53	76	64	48	35	30	17	21	20	15	5	17	401	100
8	21	85	40	29	37	20	28	16	15	12	17	6	275	86
7	15	27	44	35	32	20	22	17	18	13	6	4	253	77
6	10	16	45	35	29	33	30	24	18	12	12	6	268	66
5	10	20	30	25	36	35	26	17	15	11	10	1	236	58
4	6	10	32	39	43	39	41	21	23	14	5	1	274	50
3	1	9	31	34	29	34	29	57	33	11	5	2	255	40
2	1	4	12	17	47	52	28	32	31	13	6	1	244	31
1	2	—	8	26	32	32	52	37	32	20	4	3	248	22
(Low) 0	2	8	6	33	32	56	62	65	59	40	9	1	373	13
Total	121	205	310	321	352	351	335	287	264	161	79	41	2,827	
Cumulative per cent	4	11	22	33	46	58	70	80	89	95	98	100		
Cumulative per cent at mid-point of content score interval	2	7.5	16.5	27.5	39.5	52	64	75	84.5	92	96.5	99		
Median intensity value	84	82	66	55	49	41	40	34	35	39	60	81		

Data from S-229B, October 1945.

intensity below the median. Whichever interpretation is used, we must conclude that those with unfavorable attitudes toward officers outnumbered those with favorable attitudes.

There is little doubt that the soldiers upon discharge tended to communicate their unfavorable attitudes to their civilian friends, especially with respect to the special privileges allotted to officers in the Army. A year after VE Day, the American Institute of Public Opinion found among discharged veterans that 86 per cent of the former enlisted men as contrasted with 50 per cent of the former officers answered "good idea" to the question: "Do you think it would be a good idea or a poor idea if Army officers and enlisted men had the same food, clubs, and social privileges?" The civilian public was pretty definitely on the side of the enlisted men, the proportion answering "good idea" in the American cross section being 72 per cent.

The attention given in the press, following victory, to complaints of soldiers about officer-enlisted men relationships strengthened the hands of progressive leaders within the Army who wanted to see the system reviewed and where necessary overhauled. The Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Men's Relationships, headed by General Doolittle, held hearings in the spring of 1946. The main findings in the present chapter were among the items of evidence made available to the Committee. The conclusions and recommendations of this Committee represent a considerable departure from traditional military thought. Their relevance to the present review is sufficient to justify reproduction in some detail:

### PART III. CONCLUSIONS

Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants unearned privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the Army.

There were irregularities, injustices in handling of enlisted personnel, and abuses of privileges in the recent war to such an extent as to cause widespread and deep-seated criticisms.

The causes of poor relationships between commissioned and enlisted personnel are traceable, in general, to two main factors:

- a. Undeniably poor leadership on the part of a small percentage of those in positions of responsibility;
- b. A system that permits and encourages a wide official and social gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

There is need for a new philosophy in the military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the "ranks," in terms of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does not permit full recognition of the dignities of man. More definite protection from the arbitrary acts of superiors is essential.

Under the present system enlisted men are dependent for the satisfaction of many of their needs upon the behavior and attitudes of their officers, but are denied a feeling of security and opportunities for development and self-realization. Despite the procedures established for this purpose, enlisted men and junior officers have actually not enjoyed complete freedom in presenting their grievances. One of the most lacking yet important phases of the military structure is an alert and effective internal policing service and an agency providing a practical means of redress.

#### PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

##### *Orientation and indoctrination*

That sufficient time be expended in order to inculcate thoroughly:

- (1) A sound appreciation of responsibilities, and especially to subordinates.
- (2) The intelligent use of authority.
- (3) The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsibility are established to better enable an individual to perform his duties effectively and efficiently and are *not* for the purpose of improving his own personal interest.
- (4) An appreciation of the military service and its mission.

##### *Training*

That, in addition to the training in technical subjects, each candidate, whether at West Point, an ROTC unit, or Officer Candidate School, receive much more comprehensive instruction in command responsibility, personnel management, and human relations.

That all military personnel be allowed, when off duty, to pursue normal social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life.

That the use of discriminatory references, such as "officers and their ladies; enlisted men and their wives," be eliminated from directives and publications issued in military establishments.

That there be definite equality of treatment of both enlisted and commissioned personnel in the administration of military justice, making all equally liable under military law for errors and faults; that the higher the rank the more severe be the punishment; that there be a review of all cases where war-time operations necessitated very strict handling, in order that there be due reconsideration and clemency bestowed where warranted; that enlisted personnel be permitted on courts, but that every member of a court be senior to the accused.

That the hand salute be abandoned off Army installations and off duty, *except* in occupied territories and under conditions where the procedure might be deemed necessary to properly convey military dignity to local populations, but be employed in all official greetings in the line of duty and continue to be manifest at ceremonial occasions and when the national anthem is played or the colors pass by.

That all regulations and instructions be so written that they not only stipulate the limited "privileges" which are essential to the performance of duties in positions of responsibility but also will be regulatory in that they will prohibit or minimize possible abuses of authority and the prestige that goes with higher rank and responsibility.

The abolishment of all statutes, regulations, customs, and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers of similar likes and tastes, because of military rank.

That necessary steps be taken to eliminate the terms and concepts, "enlisted men" and "officers," that suitable substitutes be employed (e.g., members of non-



commissioned corps, members of commissioned corps, etc.), and that all military personnel be referred to as "soldiers."

These recommendations are revolutionary. The fact that the official board was composed of both officers and enlisted men represented in itself a radical departure from a philosophy which had ruled that only officers were competent to sit in a court-martial. There can be little doubt that the "invasion" of the Regular Army by masses of civilian soldiers constituted a challenge to the traditions of professional military society. The extent to which the "cake of custom" will be broken remains to be seen. In this connection, it is significant to note a report to the Secretary of War on "The Relation of Officers and Men in the A.E.F." by Raymond B. Fosdick after World War I. This report made more than twenty-five years ago, stated:

. . . . While there are many causes of this dissatisfaction, one of its main roots, I believe, is to be found in what may be called a misfit in the relationship between officers and men. This misfit cannot easily be defined under one formula, but it manifests itself in ways that are galling to the democratic spirit of the troops. . . . The difference between officers and men in point of the privileges and social position conferred upon the former has been emphasized to what seems to me a totally unnecessary degree. Under foreign service conditions, both officers and men are limited to practically all the same public facilities for their means of recreation and relaxation. Yet the possession of a Sam Browne belt in the A.E.F. has carried with it advantages out of all proportion to disciplinary requirements or the needs of the occasion, and officers have been allowed and encouraged to claim and even monopolize such advantages in ways that have shown a total lack of the spirit of fair play.

. . . . It would be possible to multiply instances of the kind above cited. They can be found by any observer. At first I was inclined to believe that they represented cases of bad manners, bad taste, or bad judgment on the part of individual officers.

After four months of living with the Army I am not in a position to claim that they represent much more, but they are so widespread and the bitterness which they have created is in some quarters so real that I am forced to the opinion that there must be something fundamentally wrong in our system of selecting and training officers.

It seems to me that the fault lies in the first place with the Regular Line Officer who does not realize that the army of America which this war called into being, is made up of men of a far different stripe and calibre from those represented by the post and garrison troops whom he was accustomed to command in pre-war days. . . . They are not willing to subordinate themselves in order that a few men wearing Sam Browne belts, coming from the same environment in America from which they come, shall have special privileges and a superior social status which is denied to them. These young men are doing a good deal of quiet thinking, and they see clearly enough that such privileges as I have enumerated above have nothing whatever to do with the efficiency of the military machine of which they

willingly made themselves a part. They realize, too, that these privileges suggest a caste system which has no sanction in America and against which they instinctively rebel.

. . . . The second reason for the existence of unfair privileges in our new army is to be found, I believe, in the inadequate and hasty training of those officers who, until this war broke out, had never had any military experience. . . . The relevant point is that these schools with their hasty training too often turned out officers with no well-developed sense of responsibility, officers to whom the Sam Browne belt and the epaulets were merely the badge of a superior social class, the symbol of rights and privileges jealously to be guarded even at the expense of the welfare and morale of the men of their commands. The new status meant to them not so much an opportunity for larger service, as an escape from disagreeable kinds of work, and an easier approach to entertainment and diversion. It meant, too, in many cases, a certain immunity from the consequences of misconduct—a fact eloquently borne out by the sights one sees daily in Paris and occasionally in other large centers.

Social change is usually a slow process. And when the change must take place in an institution which is so deeply rooted in historical tradition as the Army, the process is at its slowest. Mercenary armies may give way to civilian conscript armies, local armies to national armies, hand-to-hand combat to wars of materiel, but as stated by one professional soldier, "Army regulations on discipline remain unchanged, in all essential respects, from those of 1821, and those were copied from the regulations of the noble and peasant army of royal France of 1788. In theory man is the one unchangeable element in war."<sup>7</sup>

## PART 2. Attitudes as Related to Specific Leadership Practices

There can be little doubt that attitudes toward officers represented a generalized attitude toward a system of special privilege alien to democratic civilian folkways. But to stop with this statement is to tell only a part of the story. There also can be little doubt that there were very great unit differences in attitudes, from one company to another—differences of the kind one would expect if there were relevant differences in the personalities of officers and in their leadership practices.

All studies in which small units, such as companies or squadrons, can be compared show unit variations in the percentage of men making favorable responses to questions about their officers. More or less typical is the frequency distribution, by units, shown in Table 2. This study, made in the ground crews of 27 fighter squadrons

<sup>7</sup> Colonel Thomas R. Philips, "Leader and Led," *Infantry Journal Reader*, p. 290 (Infantry Journal, Washington, D. C.).

in ETO in the spring of 1944, showed that the squadrons varied widely in the extent to which they spoke favorably of their squadron commander—from one squadron in which less than 10 per cent of the respondents said the men “would do almost anything for him” to another squadron in which over 90 per cent said so.<sup>8</sup>

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION, BY SQUADRONS, OF PERCENTAGE OF MEN IN EACH SQUADRON, WHO IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, “DO YOU THINK THAT MOST OF THE MEN IN YOUR SQUADRON WOULD GO TO BAT FOR THEIR SQUADRON COMMANDER?” ANSWERED “YES THEY WOULD DO MOST ANYTHING FOR HIM”  
(9th Air Force Fighter Squadrons, ETO, March 1944)

<i>Percentage of men who made the favorable response indicated</i>	<i>Number of squadrons</i>
90-99	1
80-89	2
70-79	3
60-69	2
50-59	4
40-49	2
30-39	6
20-29	4
10-19	2
0- 9	1
	—
	27

Data from S-113.

Similar results appeared among companies in Ground Forces or Service Forces, at home and overseas. Unit variability, greatly in excess of chance expectation, appeared in attitudes toward officers, in whatever form the questions were asked.

Table 3 provides an interesting example. In a study of 55 Infantry rifle companies in training in the United States in the spring of 1944, the men were asked three questions about their company commander—whether he took a lot of interest in what his men were thinking, whether he knew his stuff, and, finally, whether he was the type of commander under whom they would want to serve in combat. As Table 3 shows, there was wide variation from company to company on each of the three questions. At the same time, as the table also shows, if men in a company tended to agree that their

<sup>8</sup> There were about 75 cases in the sample from each squadron and the variance in Table 2 greatly exceeds, by the F test, the variance which might have been expected by chance.

officer "did not know his stuff" they also tended to agree that he did not take a great deal of interest in what his men were thinking, and vice versa. For example, there are 4 companies in Table 3 in which less than 20 per cent of the men said that the CO knew his stuff. In 2 of these companies, less than 20 per cent said he took a lot of interest in his men and in the other 2 companies less than 40 per cent made this response.

Also we see in Table 3 that, as we might expect, the men in such companies were not inclined to say that their CO was the type they would want to follow in combat (only 8 and 9 per cent, respectively,

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGES OF ENLISTED MEN WHO APPROVE THEIR COMPANY COMMANDER AS A FUTURE COMBAT LEADER, DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO THE PERCENTAGES IN EACH COMPANY WHO SAY "HE KNOWS HIS STUFF" AND WHO SAY "HE TAKES A LOT OF INTEREST IN WHAT HIS MEN ARE THINKING"  
(Infantry Companies in the United States)

		<i>Per cent who say "CO is the type I would want to serve under in combat."*</i>				
<i>Per cent in each company who say "CO takes a lot of interest in what his men are thinking." †</i>	81-100	—	—	—	—	—
	61-80	—	—	—	61 (2) ‡	90 (3)
	41-60	—	—	58 (1)	59 (7)	72 (3)
	21-40	9 (2) ‡	31 (2)	35 (7)	54 (3)	66 (1)
	0-20	8 (2)	10 (5)	32 (4)	43 (3)	—
		0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81-100
		<i>Per cent in each company who say "CO knows his stuff." §</i>				

Data from S-121, April 1944.

\* The question was: "In your opinion, is your Company Commander the kind you would want to serve under in combat?"

† The question was: "Do you think your Company Commander takes much interest in what his men are thinking?"

‡ Figures in parentheses indicate the number of companies in each group. About 60 enlisted men (1 out of 3) comprised the sample in each company.

§ The question was: "In your opinion, does your Company Commander know his stuff?"

in the two pairs of companies just described, would say this). At the other extreme, in 3 companies in which there was high agreement that the CO's both knew their stuff and took an interest in their men, 90 per cent said that their CO's were the kind of men they would want to serve under in combat.

It would be particularly interesting to see whether favorable responses to the latter question were more closely related to responses as to personal interest than to responses as to ability. Unfortunately, there are no instances in which an officer was rated high on

personal interest and low on ability. There were some companies which rated their CO's low on personal interest and high on ability, and those companies tended to be intermediate in favorableness to the CO as a combat leader. Evidently there is a considerable halo effect in questions such as these in Table 3, and the responses can hardly be taken as representing much more than a generalized opinion of the particular commanding officer. Only by detailed case studies within the companies, using careful ratings by outside observers, could the variables be effectively separated from each other.

That such variables as taking personal interest in the men were recognized by officers themselves to be important elements in combat leadership is seen from a study made in spring 1944 of several hundred company grade Infantry and Artillery officers who had led their men in combat against the Japanese. They were asked: "Consider the following statement: 'Company grade officers who have shown *little* concern for the welfare of their men before combat often turn out to be successful leaders of men in battle.' What have you observed on this point?"

Only 5 per cent of the officers replied that they had observed this, 70 per cent said it seldom or never happened, while the remainder claimed not to know any officer who showed little concern for his men before combat.

There is no doubt that enlisted men placed large weight on this factor of personal concern for the men in evaluating leadership. Several hundred enlisted men who were veterans of the North African and Sicilian campaigns were asked in 1944 to write their own ideas in response to this question:

If you were a company commander in combat and had been given authority to do anything you felt would make your company better in working together and doing its job—

a. What are some of the things you would do to get more wholehearted cooperation from the men?

Some sample responses were as follows:

I would be democratic. Act like a human being and that would remedy everything.

Stop and pass the time of day occasionally. Make the men know you're a regular guy and that you have more respect for them.

I'd be more cooperative with the men; treat them more like men, not as a bunch of pawns.

I wouldn't keep harassing them. I wouldn't be too GI. I'd give them more passes and time off when possible and I know I would get more work out of them when the time comes.

I'd accept more suggestions from the men. Officers seldom listen to better and quicker ways of doing things, and after a while a man gets discouraged.

I'd be as close to the men as possible. Let them know that you are there enduring the same things.

I would not let the men see me getting any privileges that they couldn't have at the same time and I wouldn't make them do anything you wouldn't do yourself.

As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the only sure way to evaluate the relative importance of specific leadership practices is by controlled experiment. Particularly, one must study units, then deliberately shift officers or deliberately introduce certain practices, and finally measure the results in restudies of such units. At the present time, about all that can be said is that the descriptive studies made during the war provide little more on the question of effective leadership practices than illustrations of the conventional stereotypes.

One of the better studies of the descriptive type came from a survey made in 34 Army Service Force companies in the United States in the spring of 1944. Ratings of company "morale" for each company were obtained independently from three sources: (1) post or battalion officers, (2) the company officers, and (3) the enlisted men in the company. Six companies were then selected concerning which there was the most agreement from all three sources that company "morale" was high, and six companies were selected concerning which there was the most agreement that company "morale" was low. The men in each of these companies were asked 15 questions about specific "leadership practices" in their company. If two thirds or more of the men gave a favorable response with respect to a particular leadership practice, that fact has been indicated in Table 4 by an X.

An examination of Table 4 will show that in the "high morale" companies, out of  $6 \times 15 = 90$  possible checks, 77 actually occur. By contrast, in the "low morale" companies only 12 such checks occur.

It is of interest to note that the kinds of leadership practices recommended by the men themselves or reported by the men to prevail in outfits which, by consensus of independent ratings, had relatively "high morale," are also the kinds of practices recommended in offi-

cial Army manuals. Consider, for example, some excerpts from an official War Department manual, FM 21-50, "Military Courtesy and Discipline," June 15, 1942:

There is a tendency on the part of a few officers to think too much of the personal benefits which they might derive from their status as an officer. In the interests of good discipline, officers are required to wear distinctive uniforms, to live apart from their men in garrison, and to confine their social contacts to other

TABLE 4  
APPROVAL OF COMPANY LEADERSHIP PRACTICES IN COMPANIES RATED HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN MORALE

(X) indicates companies in which  $\frac{3}{5}$  or more of the men expressed favorable opinions of indicated practice

Company practice	The six companies rated highest in morale					The six companies rated lowest in morale						
	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
1. Officers interested in men	X	X	X	X	X	X						
2. Officers understand men's needs	X	X	X	X	X	X						
3. Officers are helpful to men	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
4. Officers recognize men's abilities	X	X	X	X		X						
5. Officers are willing to back men up	X	X		X	X							
6. Fair share of off-duty time given men	X	X	X	X		X		X				X
7. Men given authority to do their jobs	X	X	X	X	X							
8. Best use made of training time	X	X	X	X		X	X					X
9. Fair furlough and pass policy	X	X	X	X	X	X			X			
10. Fair promotion policy	X	X	X	X								
11. Good selection of noncoms	X	X	X	X	X	X			X			
12. Officers give talks on importance of outfit's job	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
13. Personal talks by officers on men's progress		X	X	X		X						
14. Men given opportunity to know the "why" of things	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
15. Punishment meted out fairly	X	X		X								

Data from S-107, March 1944. The sample averaged about 50 cases per company.

officers. But do not make the mistake of thinking of yourself as a superior individual; rather regard yourself as one who has been accorded certain aids in order that he might best carry out the responsibilities of his office. In your relations with your men in the field never demand any bodily comforts for yourself which are denied to them. Think of yourself only after your men have been cared for. Through unselfish service, earn the respect and loyalty of your men, and they will cheerfully and willingly "take care of the old man"—that is the essence of the American system.

A courteous manner in dealing with your men will increase their self-respect and increase their respect for you.

The environment and education of the average American soldier have laid great emphasis on his value as an individual; in order to get the most out of him, you must treat him as such.

A good officer takes care of his men. . . . It is your duty to insure that every provision is made for their comfort.

Discipline cannot be founded on the fear of punishment alone—such discipline seeks to compel adjustment and only arouses opposition. True discipline is based on willing cooperation, which springs from knowledge, idealism and a sense of duty.

While it can be argued with some justice that Army doctrine and especially Army tradition and practice are ambivalent and at points self-contradictory on the matter of officer-enlisted man relations and leadership practices, it seems clear that pictures of the ideal officer which can be constructed on the one hand from enlisted men's comments and on the other from official Army publications are closely similar. Yet the volume and persistency of volunteered complaints on this subject provide impressive evidence of the wide gap between the ideal and the performance.

It seems likely that part of this gap was due to difficulties and inadequacies in the leadership training of officers. An enlisted man in the Persian Gulf Command who wrote, "Officers have not the training to handle the men in the correct way. Here is what they should remember: Men are human beings and not beasts and I expect to be treated like a man," was voicing a sentiment which could be replicated by comments, some even more vigorously expressed, from all over the world.

Officers themselves tended to recognize the inadequacy of their training in this respect. For example, in a survey of 538 company and platoon line officers in three Infantry divisions in the United States in December 1943, 97 per cent of the officers responded "absolutely necessary" or "very important" to the question, "How important do you think it is for enlisted men to feel that their officers have a personal interest in their individual welfare?" Yet, 59 per cent of these same officers responded "much too little" or "not quite enough" to the question, "In your opinion, how much emphasis do most officers in your arm or service put on taking a personal interest in their men?" And 71 per cent said they "should have had more training," in response to the question, "Do you think you should have had more instruction or less instruction in what to do about personal problems affecting the welfare of the individual soldier?" A similar proportion felt a lack of training in how to handle specific problems such as men's dissatisfaction with job assignment.

By contrast, only 3 officers in 10 said they had too little instruction



in how to teach military courtesy, and only 2 in 10 said they had too little instruction in how to teach close-order drill. Training in teaching close-order drill, use of weapons, and tactical movements certainly was more explicitly and systematically organized in Officer Candidate Schools than training in how to handle men as men and not just as impersonal parts of a military machine.

A case might be made for the hypothesis that the experiences of a candidate in Officer Candidate School not only did not involve much explicit instruction in handling enlisted men, but actually contributed indirectly to making it harder for the new young officer to see the enlisted viewpoint. The Officer Candidate School could be conceived of as an ordeal, with some functions not dissimilar psychologically—in their emphasis on hazing and attention to minutiae—to those of ordeals involved in a college fraternity initiation. How this high anxiety situation could have contributed ultimately to making it more difficult for the officer to put himself in the enlisted men's role in dealing with their problems is suggested by the following psychological analysis of officer candidate training written by a member of the Research Branch after he himself had successfully completed such training and won his commission.<sup>9</sup> This formulation may be overdrawn; its hypotheses have not been subjected to systematic research; but as a tentative formulation of the psychological aspects of the process it is worth reproducing at some length as a document on the transmission of culture:

Officer candidates are subjected to intensive training, a great part of which is directed toward molding a man's social attitudes to conform to the traditional stereotypes of the officer. There probably is considerable variation from one OCS to another, but many of the practices discussed below are common in Ground Force and Service Force schools and doubtless also in West Point, which provides many of the models.

The practices start with the assumption that self-selection has been effective to the extent that candidates are highly motivated to become officers. The hopeful candidate is now subjected to a nearly catastrophic experience, which breaks down to a large extent his previous personality organization. His previous valuations fail him and in order to find a basis for self-respect, he must adopt new standards or escape from the field. His high motivation to become an officer usually rules out the latter alternative. At the same time new, appropriate attitudes are built up and established. The catastrophic experience provides a kind of purgatory, a definite demarcation from the candidate's enlisted incarnation that puts a barrier between the new officer and his enlisted memories. It has some of the characteristics of a conversion experience, or the ordeal of the medieval knight.

The effect of this ordeal on the officer candidate is not only to attack his previous personality, but to exert a positive influence in the desired direction. The ex-

<sup>9</sup> By M. Brewster Smith.

tremely rigorous training and the tremendous pressure resulting from the number that are failed mainly serve to induce the critical situation. The constant threat of "washing out" of OCS serves to increase subjective pressure and provide a most effective punishment for stamping in correct behavior. Other features of the ordeal are an extremely "GI" atmosphere, giggling, hazing, "bracing," and a general apotheosis of "chicken" (that is, petty detail). Aside from constituting a frontal attack on any civilian residue in the candidate's personality, these practices also involve the learning of new habits and values. Becoming oneself "GI," identifying with rather than resisting "chicken" values, is an adjustive response. The situation induces the candidate to identify with the source of his immediate frustrations; he wants to be an officer, and officers are people who can inflict "chicken." Since the length of the time that he must be on the "taking" end is definite and short, the cost of this identification is not too great.

So far, OCS training has been described mainly as an attack on the candidate's personality; the other phase of building up a positive officer's personality is equally important. Mere acceptance of "GI" ways is not enough. This would result more in an "ideal" enlisted personality than in the creation of class consciousness as an officer. This latter is attempted in two ways: by exhortation, and by progressive occasions for identification and practice with the officer role.

Exhortation is rarely very effective. This seems to be why the principle of "noblesse oblige," which is strongly rooted in official Army doctrine, has taken so little root in practice. Even in training this principle receives mainly lip service.

Progressive identification with the officer role is most adequately fostered in schools which have graded classes in various stages of training. Upper-class men have high status; they can assume part of the officer role toward lower-class men. The "giggling" and personal degradation of the lower-class man become tolerable to him when he sees them as a necessary condition for the existence of a status position he himself will someday occupy. The personal indignity of the lower-class man, and later of enlisted men as a whole, is thus established for him as one of the status rewards of the position toward which he is climbing. The graded class system gives opportunity for practice at progressively larger portions of the officer role, and, by providing sub-goals and intermediate rewards, makes the metamorphosis easier. The period of unalloyed ordeal is thus limited to the lower-class man phase of training.

An additional mechanism involved in the determination of the officer personality is the passing-on of aggression. As a lower-class man, or in broader terms, as an officer candidate, the would-be officer cannot respond with aggression to the affronts of upper-class men and officers in general. To do this would jeopardize his ambitions, and conflict with the identifications sustained by his goals. This fund of repressed aggression is one of the features of the ordeal contributing to personality disorganization. By the time he is an upper-class man, and especially when he has become an officer, he can take advantage of his higher status to express some of this pent-up aggression. His ego is impoverished by inwardly directed aggressive trends. To feel himself a man again and to reduce his insecurity, he seeks aggressively to assert his superiority over someone else. The existence of his thwarted aggressive tendencies makes him more likely to assume an autocratic role in accordance with traditional army structure.

The new officer, somewhat insecure in his role and perhaps a little guilty at his favored status over his previous enlisted confreres, reactively asserts his status, and finds in the OCS ordeal a justification for his new prerogatives; he *earned* them. The means whereby he earned them come to have special value for him. He puts a high value on official "GI" ways of doing things, and rationalizes that what was good for him must be good for those under his command.

Subsequent research on this subject, at West Point, or in the peacetime Army may show that this hypothetical construct of the psychological role of the ordeal is in error either in content or in emphasis or both. But there is enough plausibility in this account of the transmission of culture to suggest that we have in this process an explanation of why so many officers, themselves formerly enlisted men, seemed to fail as officers to carry over their enlisted experience and try to see the enlisted men's point of view in handling their men. It also provides a background with which to view Part 3 of this section on "Barriers to Understanding Between Officers and Enlisted Men."

As the war progressed, the need for systematic instruction in handling men as personalities with human problems became more acutely recognized, but there was no such traditional background of experience on which to build such instruction as there was, for example, for building a program for training officers how to put men through military drill. The Army Service Forces in the United States enlisted the aid of the Research Branch in the preparation of materials for a leadership training course which was given to thousands of officers on duty in the United States in 1944 and 1945, but such a course could not, in the nature of things, have been as effective as a program planted directly in the Officer Candidate Schools. Moreover, until social psychology has contributed a systematic body of theory from which deductions can be made to practical situations, with reasonable assurance from past experimental research that the predictions will be verified, such programs will be only minimally effective. Here is an area of future research in which concentrated and sustained effort is necessary. Only as a result of many experimental studies can it be expected that the gap between accepted stereotypes of good leadership behavior and actual practice will be materially narrowed.

### PART 3. Barriers to Understanding Between Officers and Enlisted Men

In the preceding section we have seen how the training of the officer was not well designed to help him see the point of view of enlisted men. He was taught how to *command*, not necessarily how to *lead*. Let us now examine in somewhat greater detail the barriers to understanding between officers and enlisted men.

Although the Army's social system was such that officers with the best will in the world would find it difficult to bridge the gulf which

separated them from the thoughts and feelings of the men under their command, one of the surprises experienced by the observant social scientist in the Army was the number of officers who assumed, apparently quite sincerely, that they succeeded in so doing.

All comparative studies made by the Research Branch showed that officers tended to believe that their men were more favorably disposed on any given point than the men's own anonymous responses showed the men to be.

Table 5 presents a typical illustration of this wishful thinking on the part of officers. In each of 53 Infantry rifle companies in the United States, the company commander was asked a question like the following:

How many of your enlisted men would you say feel proud of their company?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Almost none of them  
 \_\_\_\_\_ About one fourth of them  
 \_\_\_\_\_ About half of them  
 \_\_\_\_\_ About three fourths of them  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Almost all of them

TABLE 5

ACCURACY OF ESTIMATES BY COMPANY COMMANDERS OF FAVORABLE ATTITUDES AMONG MEN IN THEIR OWN COMPANY

<i>Attitude area</i>	NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN WHICH THE CO:			<i>Total</i>
	<i>Over-estimated</i>	<i>Estimated correctly</i>	<i>Under-estimated</i>	
Pride in outfit	43	8	2	53
Desire to be a soldier	42	4	7	53
Satisfaction with job	33	18	2	53
Importance of Infantry	31	14	8	53

Data from S-121, United States, April 1944.

The men in the same company were asked:

Do you feel proud of your company?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Yes, very proud  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Yes, fairly proud  
 \_\_\_\_\_ No, not proud  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

If over 87½ per cent of the men checked either "very proud" or "fairly proud," the CO was considered correct if his answer was "almost all of the men" would say they felt proud of their company.

If 62½ to 87½ per cent of the men checked "very proud" or "fairly proud," the CO was considered correct if he checked "about three fourths." Enlisted checks by 37½ to 62½ per cent were equated with officers' checks of "about half"; enlisted checks by 12½ to 37½ per cent of the unit sample were equated with officers' checks of "about a fourth," and enlisted checks by less than 12½ per cent with officers' checks of "almost none."

As Table 5 shows, 8 of the 53 officers estimated their men's responses correctly by the above definition. But 43 *overestimated* the proportion of their men who would say they were proud of their company, as contrasted with only 2 who *underestimated*. The same tendency is seen with respect to other items shown in Table 5.<sup>10</sup>

The same tendency was observed in studies overseas as well as in the United States.

Psychologically, one of the elements in this habit of officers of overestimating their men's favorable attitudes was a product of the tendency to project one's own attitudes upon the men. Overseas studies of officers and men who were veterans of Infantry campaigns showed that if officers felt in rather low spirits they tended to think that enlisted men did also, while if the officers manifested high spirits they tended to think enlisted men did the same. How much this represents projection only and how much, if at all, it represents some possible causal connection (e.g., if officers have low spirits this will infect the men) or some other association (e.g., officers and the men they know best have shared very similar experiences), cannot be separately determined from the data.

In so far as the tendency to projection existed, the net effect ordinarily would be to lead officers to overestimate the favorableness of men's attitudes—for the reason that officers' own attitudes generally were more favorable than the men's.

Characteristic differences in attitudes between officers and enlisted men are evident in almost any area one could mention. With very few exceptions, officers tended to have more favorable attitudes toward all aspects of the military system than enlisted men. They

<sup>10</sup> These items were:

"If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or as a worker in a war job?" (As a soldier, as a war worker, undecided.)

"How satisfied are you about being in your present Army job instead of some other Army job?" (Very satisfied, satisfied, makes no difference, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied.)

"How important a part do you think the Infantry will play in winning the war?" (A very important part, a fairly important part, not a very important part, not important at all.)

were more content with Army life; they were more satisfied with their jobs; they had greater pride in being soldiers; they had less aggression against the Army, and so on through the whole gamut of attitudes toward the structure and functioning of military society.

In Table 6 are presented some of these comparisons in attitudes drawn from scattered studies in which, in each case, cross sections of officers and enlisted men in the same units were asked parallel questions. In no case can the observed differences in response be accounted for simply in terms of differences in background charac-

TABLE 6  
COMPARISON OF OFFICERS' AND ENLISTED MEN'S ATTITUDES ON SELECTED SUBJECTS

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted men</i>
QUESTION: "How interested are you in the work you are doing in your present Army assignment?" *		
Per cent saying "Very much interested"	82	50
QUESTION: "In general do you feel that you yourself have gotten a square deal from the Army?" *		
Per cent saying "Yes, in most ways I have"	65	41
QUESTION: "In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits?" †		
Per cent saying "I am usually in good spirits"	53	24
QUESTION: "What do you think of military control and discipline at this post?" †		
Per cent saying "It's about right"	62	42
QUESTION: "How many of your officers are the kind who are willing to go through anything they ask their men to go through?" †		
Per cent saying "All" or "Most"	92	37
QUESTION: (On the whole do you agree or disagree with the statement) "The Army would be a lot better if officers and enlisted men were more friendly with each other." §		
Per cent saying "Disagree"	47	15

\* Cross section of 5,000 officers and 3,500 enlisted men in the United States surveyed in February 1945. (S-198-O and E)

† Cross section of 595 officers and 808 enlisted men in the India-Burma Theater surveyed in July 1945. (S-219 and 220)

‡ Cross section of 444 officers and 4,078 enlisted men in two Infantry divisions in the South Pacific Theater surveyed in March 1944. (S-124)

§ Cross section of 323 officers and 954 enlisted men in the United States surveyed in November 1945. (S-234B)

teristics. It is difficult to account for such differences in attitudes except in terms of a class patterning of views.

Apparent class differences in thinking between officers and enlisted men extend, as has been indicated, to many different areas. It is interesting, however, to note one bit of evidence that these differences appear to be sharpest on matters which tend to reflect on those aspects of the military system which place the enlisted class at a disadvantage relative to the officer class and for which officers are likely to feel some responsibility. In the February 1945 survey of 5,000 officers and 3,500 enlisted men in the United States, cited in Table 6, the following question was asked: "Below is a list of things enlisted men commonly gripe about. In your experience which of these do you think enlisted men usually have good reasons to gripe about?" Table 7 shows the percentages of officers and men who said they think enlisted men usually have good reason to gripe about each item. It will be noted that the first four gripes on the list, where the differences in attitudes are the sharpest, all relate to matters in which enlisted men are disadvantaged relative to officers and for which officers are likely to feel some direct responsibility. The last two gripes on the list, concerning which there are practically no differences in attitude between officers and men, are matters for which officers are less likely to feel responsible and from which they are likely to feel they themselves suffer almost as much as enlisted men.

From the same study on which Table 7 is based comes an exemplification of the point illustrated earlier, in Table 5, of the tendency for officers to overestimate the favorableness and underestimate the unfavorableness of enlisted men's responses. Both officers and men were asked to check the following statement: "Most enlisted men do *not* respect their officers.—Agree—Disagree." Only 25 per cent of the officers agreed, as contrasted with 54 per cent of the enlisted men.

While psychological interpretations in terms of projection will help explain the discrepancy between what officers thought men felt and what the men felt, it must be recognized that the basic social system of the Army impeded rather than facilitated a meeting of minds. Not only were the experiences of officers and men different, but also the barriers of power and social distance were almost insurmountable.

The power relationship was an obvious barrier. A considerable

difference in perspective between officers who exercise authority and men over whom the authority is exercised is probably inevitable, at least in an organization operated on an authoritarian basis. And whether in the Army or elsewhere, completely candid interchange of attitudes on all subjects does not ordinarily occur between those who wield power and those who are subject to that power.

But in the Army this inescapable barrier was augmented by the fostering of status differences and physical as well as social distance between officers and men. Officers could be easily misled by the rituals of deference exacted from all enlisted men. They were

TABLE 7  
COMPARISON OF OFFICERS' AND ENLISTED MEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD  
ENLISTED MEN'S COMPLAINTS\*

	PER CENT WHO THINK ENLISTED MEN "USUALLY HAVE GOOD REASON TO GRIPE" ABOUT LISTED COMPLAINT		
	<i>Among enlisted men (N = 2577)</i>	<i>Among officers (N = 5000)</i>	<i>Difference</i>
"Discipline too strict about petty things"	51	23	28
"Not enough passes and furloughs"	53	28	25
"The wrong men get the breaks"	53	28	25
"Too much 'chicken' to put up with"	71	49	22
"Work too hard or hours too long"	23	9	14
"Too much time wasted during the day"†	48	59	-11
"Wrong job assignment"	64	59	5
"Promotions frozen or too slow"	69	68	1

Data from S-198-O, EA and EB, United States, February 1945.

\* The question asked was, "Below is a list of things enlisted men commonly gripe about. In your experience which of these do you think enlisted men usually have good reasons to gripe about?"

† It is possible that officers and men interpreted this item differently. Enlisted men commonly gripe about their time being wasted by officers requiring them to wait, a complaint epitomized in the Army expression, "Hurry up and wait." Officers, on the other hand, are more likely to be critical of time wasted by enlisted men through goldbricking and dilatory tactics.

"sirred" and saluted and rarely answered back. It is easy to understand how during the course of time they could come to mistake these compulsory outward symbols of deference for voluntary respect and fail to perceive underlying hostilities and resentments. Officers were practically entrapped into assuming that they were symbols of respected authority.

It is easy to understand, too, how the different treatment accorded to officers because of their different status blurred their insight into some typical enlisted attitudes and the reasons for those attitudes. Some flavor of the status difference between officers and enlisted



men and of one type of difference in treatment that went with it is revealed in the following account written for the Research Branch by an officer commissioned directly from the ranks. The actual episode may have been an unusual one, but it is illustrative of some common underlying attitudes:

After being commissioned and discharged as an enlisted man I was transferred to station complement to be sent from camp. I had to check over some items of clothing with the supply sergeant of the new assignment. Not wishing to put on my uniform until I was ready to go, I was wearing the clothes of a private. As I stepped into the supply room the Sergeant was not there, but a few privates were waiting. Being in a hurry I started to look for him in the next room. Just as he came into the room, leaving me and a couple of other privates a little ways in the supply room, his opening remark, with a belligerent glare, was: "How about over there behind that counter" and without waiting for compliance, "and what's the matter with you getting out of there too," was directed at me, I being a little further in the room than the other two. I moved out and said nothing.

The first man to the desk was handing in laundry. The Sergeant took the slip. "God damn, this isn't the way to make out a laundry slip. Haven't you been shown how to make this out right?" The man said "no." "Yes you have, by God, and don't tell me you haven't. Weren't you in that formation yesterday? Yes, I thought so. I told everyone of you how to do this right. By Jesus, you haven't any more brains than a frog on a railroad track. Now you take that slip and you make it out right." Here was the noncom in perfect form and attitude. He turned to me next. "Now what the hell do you want?" It was a little extra strong. He remembered I had gotten in his way a moment before. I wanted to see what would happen so I quietly told him that I had been commissioned an officer and transferred prior to leaving camp and that I'd like to check some clothes off. "Oh yes sir, I'll take care of that right now." He was all courtesy and service. He wanted to fix things about himself and ended up with an apology for treating me as he had, saying "I certainly wouldn't have if I'd known." The fact is that he hadn't been out of form at all. I just occupied two roles which brought out the contrast sharply.<sup>11</sup>

In view of the barriers to communication between officers and enlisted men imposed by power and status, strengthened by the psychological stresses of officer training described in Part 2, and enforced by physical as well as social separation, it can hardly be surprising that officers were often so inadequately aware of what enlisted men were thinking. As a partial corrective to this situation, the Chief of Staff ordered the Director of the Information and Education Division to prepare for distribution to field grade officers a monthly publication called *What the Soldier Thinks*. The first issue appeared in December 1943 and the publication continued throughout the war. After the first three issues appeared, the distribution was ordered extended to company commanders through-

<sup>11</sup> By William Reeder.

out the world. This publication, mentioned in Chapter 1 of this volume, was prepared in the Research Branch.

Another source of information from which officers could get a flavor, if not always a representative sampling, of enlisted men's thinking was in enlisted men's publications, like *Yank* and *Stars and Stripes*. The attitudes expressed in many cartoons and stories were unmistakably clear. The mail columns were full of letters setting forth the views of enlisted men in no uncertain terms. But such sources of information, whether in the Army or out, are of dubious reliability and easily challenged. The Army had two somewhat contradictory but widely accepted antidotes: (1) the old Army tradition that griping is a universal form of amusement among enlisted men, ordinarily harmless and without specific meaning and, hence, not to be taken seriously unless it becomes excessive, and (2) the conviction of many officers that any expression of opinions they dislike must represent only the unjustified extreme views of a small minority of disgruntled troublemakers and that such expression is likely to damage the morale of the great majority who are good soldiers and, hence, such expressions should be suppressed. In this connection it is revealing to compare the answers of cross sections of 300 officers and 2,000 enlisted men in the European theater to this question asked in October 1945: "If someone back home—not in the Army—were to read B-Bag [an enlisted men's gripe column which was frequently highly critical of officers] every day, how true a picture would he get of the problems of most soldiers in the European theater?" 58 per cent of the officers as compared with 16 per cent of the enlisted men replied "very untrue" or "fairly untrue."

From time to time, the vigorous character of enlisted criticisms drew down fire from high commanders. But at the very top the freedom of B-Bag and of cartoonists like Mauldin was vigorously protected during the war. And it is something of a tribute to the officers in the ETO study just reported, that in spite of the critical character of B-Bag, 69 per cent of them said they liked B-Bag "very well" or "fairly well," and only 19 per cent felt that articles in the *Stars and Stripes* which criticized the Army had, in general, done more harm than good.

Traditionally, the most important formal Army machinery for facilitating communication upward from enlisted men to officers was the Inspector General system. Any enlisted man had the right to talk to a representative of the Inspector General. Since this officer was outside the soldier's immediate chain of command, the

soldier could, in theory, talk with him with impunity and voice any complaints he chose.

At the end of the war in 1945 a survey of a cross section of 2,908 soldiers in the United States<sup>12</sup> was made to ascertain how the system worked, as viewed by the men. About half of the men said that during their Army careers they had felt the desire to bring a complaint to the attention of the Inspector General. Yet only 1 in 5 said they actually took their stories to the IG. Why did the majority not exercise their prerogative? The men were asked to tell their reasons, which fell into three groups:

1. *Difficulty in getting to see the Inspector General*

Too much red tape to go through to see him.

You have to get permission from your 1st Sgt. to see the CO. Then permission from the CO to see the IG.

Unable to obtain information or permission as to the routine or place to take complaint.

The day our officer found out as to my and others' going we were forced to fly eight hours and could not get to see the IG. This took place when the IG visited our field.

2. *Uselessness of seeing the Inspector General*

I didn't think it would do me any good.

Because I did not think they would act on it anyway.

Because I spoke to him once, then nothing happened.

It would be futile.

I've taken complaints to them before and no action was taken whatever. So the hell with it.

3. *Fear of reprisal*

For the simple reason that if my CO found out he would have made it hard for me.

Being afraid of punishment after doing so.

Because figuring we will get it later from the CO.

Afraid of kickback.

Because of being threatened by another officer not to.

Because in almost every instance company brass finds out and you suffer more.

Because the IG gave our names over to the officer we bitched about on a prior occasion.

Men who had taken their complaints to the IG were more likely to be critical of the IG system than men who had not. Only 33 per cent of the former said the system worked "very well" or "fairly well" as compared with 53 per cent of the latter. This may merely reflect the possibility that the kind of men who took complaints to

<sup>12</sup> S-229A.

the IG were the kind of men who were more critical of Army organization in general, a hypothesis supported by the fact that the better educated men were both more likely to see the IG and to be more critical of the IG and the Army in general. Nevertheless, such figures are hardly a testimonial to the effectiveness of the system as a method of channeling complaints upward.

The chaplain also was a repository of confidences, and Research Branch representatives, in going from post to post in the United States and overseas, met with instances in which a chaplain with a particularly effective personality played an apparently significant role as a channel of communication. No study is available as of the end of the war, but evidence from a survey made in 1942 indicates that most men were not as likely to go to their chaplain with a personal problem as to their own commanding officer. For example, among 751 soldiers with over 1 year of service, only half of the men said they had ever consulted an officer about a personal problem, 33 per cent mentioning their commanding officer and 13 per cent mentioning the chaplain as the one to whom they went, with scattering mentions of other officers. Catholics were a little more likely to mention the chaplain—17 per cent as against 11 per cent for Protestants.<sup>18</sup> In some organizations, the medical officer was an important channel of communication—notably in the Air Forces with relation to flying personnel.

The problem of establishing locally a really effective means by which unit officers could be apprised of what their men were thinking was never effectively solved in the Army. A promising procedure was tried out in 1944–1945 in the Redistribution Centers in the United States. Group sessions were held at which enlisted men (all of whom were returnees from overseas) were invited to voice their complaints and discuss them with one another and with the officers. The same procedures also were tried in some other situations, where commanding officers were sensitized to the importance of better rapport.

Need for maintaining effective lines of communication upwards from men to officers at the unit level is not unique to the Army. It has its parallel in civilian industry. But in industry the organized labor movement has achieved formal recognition of rights of workers to have spokesmen, and behind the exercise of those rights stand the sanctions of the privilege of striking or of quitting one's job per-

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<sup>18</sup> Planning Survey II.

manently. Since such sanctions are inadmissible in an Army, it becomes all the more important for the Army to review its methods for transmission of attitudes upward and to conduct in peacetime controlled experiments to measure the effectiveness of new procedures which might be proposed.

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In this section of Chapter 8 we have reviewed attitudes toward officers, attitudes as related to specific leadership practices, and barriers to understanding between officers and enlisted men. We turn next to a brief analysis of the noncommissioned officer as the intermediary between officers and the men in lowest grades.

## S E C T I O N I I

### NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS

The basic cleavage between officers and enlisted men is further illuminated by an examination of attitudes of and toward noncommissioned officers whose function it was to bridge the gap between officers and men.<sup>14</sup> This bridge carried traffic in both directions. On the one hand, the NCO functioned as the representative of official authority in receiving orders from the officers and transmitting them to the other enlisted men under him. On the other hand, the NCO also served as the representative of the enlisted men in presenting their point of view to the officers. An officer was advised against going directly to his enlisted men without first consulting his noncoms, while an enlisted man was required to see his noncom before approaching his officer. The noncom thus served as a very important communication link between the officer and the other enlisted men. The importance of the role played by the noncom in military society is attested by the fact that when asked at the end of the war, "Which of the following kinds of outfits would you personally prefer to be in?" cross sections of both company grade officers and of enlisted men split about evenly in preferring "an outfit with good noncoms, but poor officers" and "an outfit with good officers but poor noncoms." As might be expected, noncoms them-

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<sup>14</sup> The following analysis will apply mainly to *line* noncoms actually in charge of a group of men. Many NCO's in the Army were technicians who had very little to do with leading men. These men were given higher ratings as a reward for greater technical skill and responsibility, but did not necessarily occupy a leadership position. Whenever possible we will attempt to eliminate these technical NCO's and deal with leader-led relations among line NCO's only.

selves were the most impressed with the importance of good noncoms. It is interesting that among the officers, captains were relatively most inclined to prefer companies with good officers and second lieutenants to prefer companies with good noncoms. The data are given in Table 8.

TABLE 8  
OPINIONS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN ABOUT RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF OFFICERS AND NONCOMS

	PER CENT REPLYING:				
	<i>An outfit with good noncoms but poor officers</i>	<i>An outfit with good officers but poor noncoms</i>	<i>No answer</i>	<i>Total per cent</i>	<i>Total cases</i>
Officers	46	48	6	100	616
Captains	40	54	6	100	156
1st Lieuts.	45	49	6	100	290
2nd Lieuts.	55	39	6	100	169
Enlisted men	50	42	8	100	2,047
Noncoms	61	32	7	100	951
Privates	43	49	8	100	1,096

S-234 A and B.

The dual role and intermediate position of the noncommissioned officer were so pronounced it is not surprising that they are reflected, as will be seen, in the attitudes both of the noncoms themselves and of privates toward the noncoms. As members of the official command hierarchy, charged with seeing that orders were carried out, noncoms exercised a great deal of direct authority over their men both as agents of the officer class and in their own right. Moreover they shared with their officers a good deal of responsibility for the execution of official Army policies and for the success of their organization in the eyes of higher headquarters. These factors would have tended to identify the NCO with his officers. But he was still an enlisted man and was subject to most of the inequalities of enlisted status. Moreover he lived and worked among his men and as a member of the enlisted class was subject to all the continuous informal pressures of other enlisted men—pressures which often were directed against the officer class and official Army policies. As was seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the NCO reacted to these informal pressures and to his continued membership in the enlisted class by

adopting, for the most part, enlisted class attitudes. But the identification of NCO's with the rest of the enlisted class was by no means complete.

Noncoms as symbols of authority were targets, along with officers, of the resentment and criticism of privates. It would appear from one extensive study of a cross section of troops in the United States during the summer of 1943<sup>15</sup> that, as shown in Table 9, based on scale scores, privates' attitudes toward officers and toward noncoms were rather closely related. Those unfavorable toward their officers tended to be unfavorable toward their noncoms also and vice versa, though there were sizable groups with favorable attitudes toward one and unfavorable attitudes toward the other.

TABLE 9  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICERS AND  
ATTITUDES TOWARD NONCOMS  
(Among Privates Only)

<i>Position on scale of attitudes toward officers</i>	<i>Number of privates</i>				
4 (Pos)	66	144	265	411	886
3	151	337	608	325	1,421
2	286	402	315	117	1,120
1 (Neg)	470	219	89	42	820
Total	973	1,102	1,277	895	4,247
	1 (Neg)	2	3	4 (Pos)	Total
	<i>Position on scale of attitudes toward noncoms</i>				

S-64.

Privates' attitudes toward officers and toward noncoms are found in this same study to be related both independently and cumulatively to other attitudes measured by scale scores. These relationships are shown in Table 10, where it will be seen, for example, that the proportion of privates with high rating on an attitude scale testing pride in outfit varies directly with favorable attitudes toward either officers or noncoms. This same independent relationship of attitudes toward either officers or noncoms with the proportion having high scale scores in other attitudes reflecting adjustment appears in every case. It is interesting to note that in every case also attitudes toward officers bear a higher relationship to other

<sup>15</sup> S-64.

morale attitudes than do attitudes toward noncoms. More privates who approve of their officers but disapprove of their noncoms have high ratings on attitude scales in all other morale areas than do privates who disapprove of their officers but approve of their noncoms.

Two other studies provide interesting data on differences in attitudes between officers and privates and indicate that attitudes of noncoms occupy an intermediate position though tending to agree

TABLE 10  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICERS, ATTITUDES TOWARD  
NONCOMS, AND OTHER ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADJUSTMENT\*  
(Among Privates Only)

Attitude area†	ATTITUDES TOWARD:			
	Officers favorable noncoms favorable (1,033)	Officers favorable noncoms unfavorable (527)	Officers unfavorable noncoms favorable (295)	Officers unfavorable noncoms unfavorable (962)
Pride in outfit				
Per cent high score	84	61	53	33
Personal adjustment				
Per cent high score	80	62	60	43
Feeling of Army interest				
Per cent high score	76	60	49	34
Attitude to discipline				
Per cent high score	69	60	35	29
Job satisfaction				
Per cent high score	69	44	40	32
Criticism of Army				
Per cent high score	49	32	20	18

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

\* 8-64

† Attitudes in each of these areas were determined by means of several questions which formed a scale. For a more complete discussion of these scales, see Volume IV.

more closely with attitudes of privates than with those of officers. During the late spring of 1943 all available line officers of company grade (2,265) from six Infantry divisions—two of which were in an early stage of training, two in an intermediate stage, and two in the last stage of training before going overseas—and a cross section of enlisted men (3,029) from the same divisions<sup>16</sup> were questioned about the abilities they considered important in noncoms. Officers and men were given this statement: "Listed below are five abilities that a good noncom is supposed to have. Put a number '1' in front of the one you think is most important, then put a number '2' in


<sup>16</sup> This sample is representative only of divisional troops in training.



front of the one you think is second in importance. . . ." Chart IV shows the percentages of officers, noncoms, and enlisted men rating each of the abilities as either first or second in importance.

Officers and privates differ sharply in their conception of what makes a good noncom. Officers stress the formal "executive" abili-

CHART IV  
JUDGMENTS OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED NONCOM LEADERSHIP ABILITIES



ties of noncoms, such as "the ability to carry out orders promptly and accurately" and "the ability to think for himself," while privates stress the informal "personal relations" qualities, such as "the ability to help and advise the men under him," "the ability to explain things clearly," and "the ability to gain the personal liking of the men under him."

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In the case of each ability, the opinion of the noncoms themselves falls between those of officers and privates. Similar differences between the opinions of officers and men about the relative importance of the various abilities exist in divisions in each stage of training—early, intermediate, and late.

It is interesting to note that education has a pronounced effect on privates' judgments of the importance of the ability of noncoms to explain things clearly and the noncom's ability to think for himself. Clear explanations are most important to poorly educated men, but better educated men consider the noncom's ability to think for himself more important. Among the privates with only a grade school education, 52 per cent give chief importance to "the ability to explain things clearly" as compared to 22 per cent among high school graduates, while "the ability to think for himself" is mentioned by 15 per cent of the less educated group and 33 per cent of the more educated group. Education seems to have little effect upon men's opinions regarding the other three abilities. All these relationships hold at each of the three stages of training.

Men in divisions in a late stage of training put more stress on the noncom's "executive" abilities (ability to carry out orders and to think for himself) than do men in earlier stages of training. Thus the long-service privates swing more nearly into agreement with the officers' attitude on noncom abilities. However, privates even at the late training stage do not place nearly as much stress on executive abilities as do officers. The ratings given by privates in three stages of training to various abilities of noncommissioned officers are shown in Table 11 according to educational level. The shift from stress on the noncom's personal to executive abilities occurs among men at all educational levels, but is more pronounced among the better educated privates. The opinions of officers on the importance of the various abilities of noncoms do not change significantly as the training of their outfits progresses.

The tendency for the attitudes of officers to reflect viewpoints more favorable to the Army than those of enlisted men was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 and in earlier parts of this chapter. The correlative tendency for attitudes of officers to reflect viewpoints more in line with traditional and official Army policies than those of enlisted men is found in a study of the kinds of noncom behavior approved by officers and privates.<sup>17</sup> This study, made during September 1943, of two combat engineer regiments in training, pre-

<sup>17</sup> 8-76.

sented the officers, noncoms, and privates with a series of specific questions dealing with the actual behavior of the noncom on the job. While the sample for this survey was very small and representative of only these two regiments, the findings clearly illustrate the different frames of reference from which officers and privates view their noncoms. This difference between officers and privates extends to almost all aspects of the noncom's behavior and nearly always reflects the difference in the class positions of officers and enlisted men. And in most cases the noncom himself appears to

TABLE 11

PREFERRED NONCOM ABILITIES ACCORDING TO STAGE OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION  
PERCENTAGES OF PRIVATES AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF TRAINING AND DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EDUCATION WHO RATE THE VARIOUS NONCOM ABILITIES AS OF FIRST OR SECOND IMPORTANCE

<i>Stage of training and education</i>	<i>Carry out orders promptly and accurately</i>	<i>Think for himself</i>	<i>Help and advise the men</i>	<i>Explain things clearly</i>	<i>Personal liking of the men</i>
<i>Late</i>					
High school graduate (144)	58	48	41	15	38
Some high school (179)	53	30	39	31	47
Grade school (238)	45	20	42	48	45
<i>Intermediate</i>					
High school graduate (183)	48	31	50	19	52
Some high school (204)	44	26	52	29	49
Grade school (320)	39	17	45	52	47
<i>Early</i>					
High school graduate (365)	40	28	56	26	50
Some high school (287)	43	15	59	34	49
Grade school (260)	42	9	50	52	47

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

identify with the enlisted class position. There were 21 patterns of behavior studied in which there was disagreement between the officers and the privates. In 16 of them, the noncoms tended to align themselves with the privates, and in 5 of them with the officers.

The main findings of this survey are summarized by means of illustrative statements in Table 12. In general, privates were more likely than officers to approve noncom behavior which reflected: (1) intimate social relations with their men, (2) lenient interpretations of rules and regulations, (3) sympathetic, indulgent policies in the supervision of their men, and (4) lack of emphasis, in social and working relations, on formal status differences between themselves

and their men. As indicated above, the noncom himself tended to side with the enlisted point of view.

The tendency for the officers to approve a more "official" point of view on the part of the noncom, and the opposite tendency for the enlisted man to approve informal cooperation from the noncom in escaping official regulations, is clearly brought out in Table 13

TABLE 12  
COMPARISON OF PRIVATES, NONCOMS, AND OFFICERS ON ATTITUDES  
TOWARDS NONCOM BEHAVIOR

	Privates (384)	Noncoms (185)	Officers (31)
	<i>(Per cent who agree with each statement)</i>		
<i>Social Relations</i>			
"A noncom will lose some of the respect of his men if he pals around with them off-duty"	13	16	39
"A noncom should not let the men in his squad forget that he is a noncom even when off-duty"	39	54	81
<i>Disciplinarian</i>			
"A noncom has to be very strict with his men or else they will take advantage of him"	45	52	68
"A noncom should teach his men to obey all rules and regulations without questioning them"	63	81	90
<i>Work Supervisor</i>			
"A noncom should always keep his men busy during duty hours, even if he has to make them do unnecessary work"	16	22	39
"The harder a noncom works his men the more respect they will have for him"	10	18	42
"On a fatigue detail, a noncom should see that the men under him get the work done, but should not help them do it"	36	37	68

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases.  
Data from S-76.

comparing what members of each group said they would do if they were noncoms in specific situations. Again the noncom shows his basic class position by tending to favor the enlisted point of view.

These examples also serve to illustrate a difference between formal and informal control, a problem which will be discussed in Section III of this chapter. Unlike the officer who is fairly well removed from social pressure on the part of the enlisted men under him, the noncom is very susceptible to such informal group pressure. The

TABLE 13

COMPARISON OF PRIVATES, NONCOMS, AND OFFICERS ON WHAT THEY SAY THEY WOULD DO AS NONCOMS IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS

<i>Hypothetical situation</i>	<i>Privates (384)</i>	<i>Noncoms (196)</i>	<i>Officers (31)</i>
"SUPPOSE you were a platoon sergeant and found that there was a cigarette butt in the latrine urinal after you've told the men again and again not to throw them there. You can't find out who did it. What do you think you would do?"			
Per cent saying: "Punish the whole platoon"	35	39	77
"SUPPOSE you are a noncom in charge of a detail to police-up the company area and after the men have finished the job and you have dismissed them, you find a few cigarette butts that they missed, what do you think you would do?"			
Per cent saying: "Pick them up yourself"	44	39	6
"SUPPOSE you are a squad leader. One night you go into town and find one of your men lying drunk in the gutter. What do you think you would do?"			
Per cent saying: "Take him back to camp, and not say anything about it"	51	52	19
"SUPPOSE you are a noncom who is in charge of quarters on Sunday night and a buck private comes in an hour after you have made bed check. No one knows about it. What do you think you would do?"			
Per cent saying: "Report to the First Sergeant in the morning that the man missed bed check"	32	50	74
"SUPPOSE you are a platoon sergeant and you find that one of the men in your barracks has brought a bottle of liquor into camp. What do you think you would do?"			
Per cent saying: "Warn him to be careful and not to do it again"	70	59	35
"SUPPOSE you are a noncom in charge of a ditch-digging detail which is supposed to take all day. Your men work hard and finish up <i>early</i> in the afternoon. Nobody is going to check up on you. What do you think you would do?"			
Per cent saying: "Let the men take off or take it easy for the rest of the afternoon"	73	55	32

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases.

noncom finds himself in a conflict situation involving official responsibility to his officer on one hand and unofficial allegiance to the other enlisted men on the other hand.<sup>18</sup> It is probably easier for the noncom to give way to the internal social pressure of the enlisted group and to avoid conflict with his officers by diplomacy and outward obedience than to accept the official point of view and be in continuous conflict with his social group. That many noncoms actually did make the former type of adjustment has been illustrated in Tables 12 and 13.

### S E C T I O N I I I

#### SOCIAL CONTROL—ATTITUDES REFLECTING ADHERENCE TO INFORMAL CODES AS WELL AS TO FORMAL CODES OF BEHAVIOR

The preceding sections have dealt with attitudes toward officers and noncoms. We turn now to a somewhat more general review of some of the attitudes toward social control in the Army. It was not the function of the Research Branch, nor is it the objective of this report, to make a systematic sociological analysis of social control in military society. Some of the attitude material incidentally collected, however, is useful in throwing light on this subject.

Few social institutions, unless it would be monastic organizations, have such an elaborate body of formal rules and regulations to anticipate all the minutiae of life as does an army, with punishment specified for infraction. Yet these codified rules and regulations backed by authoritarian power and enforced in extreme cases by formal court-martial proceedings can be ineffective as devices for social control unless those who enforce them are indoctrinated in their enforcement and those who obey them are indoctrinated in obedience. By indoctrination in enforcement and obedience is meant not merely knowledge of the official penalties for infraction, but rather willing acceptance of the necessities of enforcement and obedience. It means the development of a social climate in which one's *fellows* as well as one's *superiors* serve as checks on a tendency to infraction and, ultimately, the internalization of the controls such that an individual's "conscience" inhibits infraction even when there is no likelihood of detection by either superiors or fellows.

An illustration from civilian life will make this clear. The average person would be "ashamed" if a friend of his saw him shoplifting

<sup>18</sup> The analogy between the noncom in the Army and the foreman in civilian life will, of course, have occurred to the reader.

in a store, even if there were no likelihood of detection by the store management (control by one's fellows), but he would also not be tempted to shoplift even when alone with no likelihood of detection (internalization of control). By contrast, consider the possibility of driving through a red light in a car full of friends, where there is no cross traffic in sight. Most drivers would be inhibited and stop, but there are probably wide individual differences in the degree of internalization of the controls. For some, the main inhibiting force may be the possibility that a policeman might show up and make an arrest. For others, the inhibition might be mainly the expected reaction of the fellow passengers in the car. For others, the inhibition might be mainly "conscience"—that is, the driver even if all alone with no policemen or friends in sight would feel "guilty" if even by inadvertence he went through a red light.

Where the formal controls—as represented by the policeman or in the Army by the military superior or the military police—are not supported by the informal social pressures of one's fellows, not to mention internalization which operates even in the absence of one's fellows, there is almost certain to be widespread violation of the rules. One of the most celebrated civilian examples in American history was the case of the prohibition of intoxicating liquor; an American Army example in World War II was the case of the prohibition of fraternization with German civilians in the early days of occupation of enemy territory.

The problem of developing appropriate psychological tools for measuring the extent to which an individual's behavior toward a particular rule has been "internalized" remains largely for the future. With the advent of these tools, a vast area of sociological research in the study of institutions should open up.

To return to the Army's problem of indoctrinating its leaders and its "led," we repeat that the critical problem was to mobilize informal pressures of the soldiers in support of their fellows who conformed and against the nonconformist, and to maximize the internalization of the controls through habituation. Moreover, unlike society at large, which has the entire period of childhood to mold the plastic youth into the image of a citizen, the Army had to move very fast indeed.

The basic training period was, therefore, not one of gradual inculcation of the Army *mores*, but one of intensive shock treatment. The new recruit, a lone individual, is helplessly insecure in the bewildering newness and complexity of his environment. Also he is

a man; he must show that he is tough enough to "take it." He is an American; the Army is a means to winning the war; he must do his best or lose face at home. With personal insecurity on the one hand, and the motivation to "see it through" on the other, he is malleable to the "discipline," which consists of a fatiguing physical ordeal and a continued repetition of acts until they become semi-automatic, in an atmosphere dominated by fear. As one recruit put it, perhaps with exaggeration, "The recruit is warned and threatened, shouted at and sworn at, punished and promised further punishments, with such frequency and from so many sides that he gets to be like the rat in the neurosis production experiment. He soon comes to fear the Army and his superiors who represent it." The individual recruit is powerless. He finds solace in the company of his fellows, who are new and bewildered like himself, but who now, with all escapes blocked by fear of formal punishment, further each other's adjustment to the inevitable by applying sanctions of their own to those who "can't take it." The fear of being thought less than a man by one's buddies can be as powerful a control factor as the fear of the guardhouse. When the former is socially directed to reinforce the latter, the Army has begun to succeed in building a soldier—a process which continues until as much as possible is internalized and automatized in the form of "conscience."

The learning process was complicated by the fact that the formal rules, detailed and elaborate as they were, and embodying the past experience and long traditions of the Regular Army, were progressively inundated by a flood of new and rapidly modified enactments required to meet the ever-changing situation presented by the rapid growth of the civilian Army and by the new demands of World War II. Simultaneously, ever larger and larger proportions of both commissioned and noncommissioned officers comprised hastily trained civilians who could hardly have mastered all the old Regular Army rules and regulations, much less the new ones. Little wonder, under these circumstances, that the rules and regulations with which the bewildered recruit frequently found himself confronted were those improvised, remembered, or looked up for the occasion by the current commander, sometimes in support of his personal predilections or purposes. Moreover, the formal rules were interpreted and applied within the context of a body of unwritten tradition with which they were overlaid. And they were enforced by officers and noncoms who held very extensive arbitrary power over their subordinates, power which could be used to punish those who



fell into disfavor. Sometimes the formal rules conflicted with each other, sometimes with tradition, and sometimes with the demands of superiors. The recruit had to learn a pattern of successful adjustment which might or might not conform to the formal rules. He had to learn "expedient behavior" in relation to those who exercised authority over him and "proper behavior" in the eyes of his fellow enlisted men.

"Expedient behavior" may require the soldier to do things for his superiors beyond what the rules and regulations specify, from fear of punishment by his superiors for noncompliance. Or, he may be required, in conformity with "proper behavior," to curb a desire to be industrious or efficient, desire to compete or to get ahead, from fear of informal punishment from his fellows as well as from his superiors. These the recruit had to learn, as is illustrated by the following excerpts from a personal document written by a member of the Research Branch just after completing basic training as a private in the Army:

The formal rules of the Army acknowledge the leadership tradition, but they also limit it by setting up boundaries to the authority of a superior. On the other hand, the tradition is even more powerful than the limiting rules: Theoretically an inferior can appeal to the rules above the head of his superior. Actually, except for appeal to the chaplain, he cannot, since he must make his appeal through the very superior he is appealing against. Further, should an inferior succeed in getting a superior reprimanded, the superior can make it hard for the inferior in many ways, since the rules give him so much control over the inferior.

Of course, the inferior need not seek to get the superior reprimanded for violating the rules but can simply refuse to obey the order which violates the rules. This occurs more frequently, probably, among men who have been in the Army for some time than among new recruits, who are told, "If you are ordered to do something against the rules, obey the order and then object." The man who refuses to obey an order which goes against the rules also subjects himself to the displeasure of a man who legally has control over most phases of his life. This can be very unpleasant. A friend of the writer, a private, was ordered by his commanding officer to subscribe to a \$10,000 insurance policy. The private already had a \$5,000 policy, had no dependents, came under a medical category which prohibited him from going into a danger zone overseas, knew that his officer was going against the rules, and for these reasons refused to obey the order. He was subsequently denied any pass or furlough to leave the camp, which it was in the officer's power to grant or refuse. This went on for 3 months until the private gave in.

Sometimes an illicit order is not phrased as an order but the sanctions behind a genuine order are applied. While the present writer was "room orderly" one day, he was ordered by one noncom to wash the noncom's work clothes, ordered by another noncom to shine this noncom's shoes, requested by a lieutenant to wash the lieutenant's leggings. In doing this, the officer and the noncoms were violating an Army regulation, the officer acting just as much in violation of the rules even though he only made a request rather than gave an order. My experience

was duplicated by half the room orderlies in my barracks—the violation of the rule is customary. Not one of the room orderlies refused to obey the order or fulfill the request. Their reasons were the same as mine: you cannot go against a person who has so much control over so many phases of your life. If one should refuse to do this small illegitimate task, he would be given many and difficult legitimate tasks and would also incur the enmity of noncoms even in the regular training situation.<sup>19</sup>

The examples cited above illustrate one type of informally sanctioned behavior which had to be learned by the new recruit. Perhaps more important, the recruit had to learn to curb his desire to do a job exceptionally well, lest he incur the disapproval of his fellows. Quoting from the same source as above:

Sanctions against ambition or manifestations of superiority come from fellow privates. This is not simply a matter of jealousy, although this may occur in a few instances, but it arises out of close and common living under difficult circumstances. It is impossible for the recruit to do everything that is expected of him. If one is so favored by nature or training that he gets much more done, or done better, than his neighbor, he shows up that neighbor. The neighbor then gets rebukes or extra work. One cannot do this to any decent fellow who is trying his best, especially when you have to live side by side with him and watch his difficulties and sufferings. Therefore, the superior person—if he has any heart at all and if he is sensitive to the attitudes of his barracks mates—will help his less able neighbor to get along. The life is hard enough for any one of us, unless “he has it coming to him.” An esprit de corps develops in the group, directed not so much in favor of group achievement—although there is pride in group achievement which is a hangover from civilian attitudes—but against the common enemy, viz., the noncoms or the officers, as the case may be.

The group sanctions against an ambitious fellow member—a familiar phenomenon in civilian industry, as well as in the Army—were probably reinforced in the recruit’s training by the punishment which the recruit risked from leaders as well as fellows if he became too conspicuous. To quote again:

The man who wants to get ahead necessarily makes himself conspicuous—to get ahead one must stand out from the crowd. In doing this, the ambitious recruit gets his name or face well known to the noncom, who therefore most easily remembers him when there is an extra detail to be done. Too, the mistakes—all recruits make scores of mistakes in learning their new culture—of the conspicuous recruit are more easily associated and remembered than those of the inconspicuous recruit, and so the former gets more punishment and more rebuke.

It may be wondered why the enlisted group’s social pressure against conspicuous effort could not have been more successfully

<sup>19</sup> By Arnold M. Rose.

countered by the Army through manipulating the reward system so that outstanding achievement by a recruit was encouraged. A plausible hypothesis may be advanced that the reason lies in the *absence of valid criteria of outstanding achievement*. It seems to be much easier to punish for failure to comply with a certain minimum than to reward for superlative performance. It is easy to establish criteria for punishing a man who has dust on his shoes at inspection time; it is difficult to establish criteria for determining just which man has done the best job of polishing his shoes. The traditional criteria of "spit and polish" are negative, but they also have the virtue of objectivity. If there is rust on the rifle barrel or dirt on the barracks windowpane, this can be demonstrably pointed out in meting out punishment.

Once a soldier was past the basic training stage and was eligible for promotion, a reward system began to operate. But, as we saw in Chapter 6 on social mobility, the Army was not too successful in convincing the men that promotions were based on merit or were the reward for exceptional achievement. The same may perhaps be said as to decorations.

The above remarks are sketched in to introduce the reader to some attitude data, collected as a by-product of Research Branch activity. In view of the fact that the Army is so conspicuous among social institutions for the multiplicity and minuteness of its formal rules and regulations, it may be felt that undue emphasis has been placed in this discussion on the power of tradition and of extra-legal personal controls by those in authority, which might or might not coincide with the current formal rules, and on the power of informal social control by one's fellows in reinforcing the formal controls by the leaders and in setting limits within which the formal controls could operate effectively. Certainly, the individual soldier's fear of court-martial and the guardhouse could have been a powerful restraint in itself. The attitude data to be reviewed testify to the strength of both the formal and informal sanctions and add some specific basis for inference as to how they operated in World War II.

In November 1945 a representative cross section of enlisted men in the United States and of company grade officers at the same installations were asked a long series of simple "agree-disagree" questions covering a wide range of topics about Army life. Some of these same questions and answers were discussed in a different context in Chapter 5, Section III, in the general analysis of resentment

against the Army. Included in the list were a number of questions seeking opinions about discipline. Two questionnaires were used, each form being given to one half of the sample selected at random.<sup>20</sup> About three fifths of the officers and a half of the enlisted men had served overseas. By this late period—three months after VJ Day—attitudes toward the Army had deteriorated as compared with earlier in the war, as we have seen in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, this survey, because of the nature of the specific questions asked of both officers and enlisted men, is one of the best sources of information on several of the topics with which the present section is concerned. We have here the responses of mature soldiers at the end of their military career, responses which reflect long and varied experience, but which also reflect somewhat greater cynicism than might have been found at earlier periods in the war. The “agree-disagree” questions used do not provide very accurate instruments for registering opinion, and attention should be focused on the direction of majority response and on officer and enlisted differences rather than on exact proportions.<sup>21</sup>

Only a small minority of either officers or enlisted men believed

<sup>20</sup> Actually, the two questionnaires were interleaved, approximately every other person in a given assemblage being given a different form. Thus, the two subsamples were kept as nearly identical as possible. Form A was filled out by 318 officers and 1,035 enlisted men; form B by 326 officers and 1,033 enlisted men.

<sup>21</sup> The parallel forms of the questionnaire contained approximately opposite wordings of most of the “agree-disagree” questions. Often there was close consistency in the responses of the parallel samples to corresponding questions despite the inversion in wording. For example:

	QUESTION WORDING	PER CENT RESPONDING		
		<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>No answer</i>
<i>Form A:</i>	“On the whole, I think the Army has helped me more than it has hurt me”	39	58	3
<i>Form B:</i>	“On the whole, I think the Army has hurt me more than it has helped me”	58	40	2

Frequently, however, the agreement was not so close:

	QUESTION WORDING	PER CENT RESPONDING		
		<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>No answer</i>
<i>Form A:</i>	“The Army encourages a soldier to think for himself”	38	59	3
<i>Form B:</i>	“The Army discourages a soldier from thinking for himself”	73	24	3

Where only one wording of the question is reported in this section no alternative wording was used or differences in response were negligible.

that punishment was necessarily the best way to insure good behavior:

The best way to get most soldiers to behave is to punish them every time they don't behave.

	<i>Agree</i> <sup>22</sup>
Officers	23%
Enlisted men	20

On the other hand, it was the opinion of about half of the officers and of two thirds of the enlisted men that fear of punishment was the main reason for obedience in the Army.

The main reason most soldiers obey rules and regulations is because they are afraid of being punished.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	46%
Enlisted men	67

Relatively few believed that obedience had been "internalized" at least to such an extreme degree that men conformed because they really wanted to rather than because they had to:

The main reason most soldiers obey Army rules and regulations is because they really want to and not because they have to.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	31%
Enlisted men	19

Some success in "internalizing" Army controls—or perhaps some carryover of civilian attitudes—is suggested, however, by the sizable proportions who agree it is wrong for a soldier to break Army rules and regulations even if he doesn't get caught.

It is wrong for a soldier to break Army rules and regulations even if he doesn't get caught.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	84%
Enlisted men	72

<sup>22</sup> The alternative categories in this and other items in this survey were "Agree" and "Disagree." "No answers" averaged about 2 per cent and did not exceed 4 per cent on any items cited in this section.

Only 4 per cent of the officers and 27 per cent of the enlisted men in the parallel sample agreed with the reversed statement, "It is all right for a soldier to break Army rules and regulations if he doesn't get caught."

Both officers and enlisted men, as would be expected, testified to the importance to the soldier of the opinions his fellow soldiers hold of him, 93 per cent of the officers and 90 per cent of the men agreeing that "most soldiers care a great deal about what the rest of the men in their outfit think of them," while only 5 per cent of the officers and 15 per cent of the enlisted men in the parallel sample agreed with the extreme statement "Most soldiers don't give a damn what the rest of the men in their outfit think of them." There was also agreement between officers and men on the proposition that an enlisted man is usually more concerned with what other enlisted men think of him than with what his officers think:

An enlisted man is usually more concerned with what other enlisted men think of him than with what his officers think.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	78%
Enlisted men	89

The alternative wording of the question in the parallel sample yielded essentially the same result:

An enlisted man is usually more concerned with what his officers think of him than with what other enlisted men in his outfit think.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	22%
Enlisted men	20

This concern of the enlisted man to win the respect of his fellows implies, of course, that in any situation in which there is a conflict between the officers and the group, his identification will tend to be with the group, not the officers. From this it also follows that if the group as a whole supports an order, he will be in an untenable position in not obeying. If the group as a whole does not support an order, he will be in a weak position if he is conspicuous in obedience.

A large proportion of the enlisted men were critical of the Army for what they thought was overemphasis on military courtesy and

“spit and polish.” Officers, on the other hand, tended to look upon these traditional Army practices more favorably.<sup>23</sup>

The Army places too much importance upon military courtesy.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	23%
Enlisted men	74

The Army places too much importance on “spit and polish.”

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	40%
Enlisted men	74

For enlisted men who identify too closely with the official rules, especially as applied to petty details, there is the epithet that a man is “too GI.” It is interesting to note that many officers did not seem to have insight into the standard enlisted reaction toward such a soldier:<sup>24</sup>

Most soldiers lose respect for a man who is too GI.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	52%
Enlisted men	82

Officers who overrated soldiers’ respect for the deviant who is “too GI” were perhaps projecting their own status identification with practices like military courtesy.

When the deviance from group norms manifests itself by too conspicuous “bucking for promotion” there is recognition by officers and enlisted men alike that such behavior is unpopular.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Only 15 per cent of the enlisted men and 52 per cent of the officers in the other sample agreed with the negative statement, “The Army does *not* place too much importance upon military courtesy.”

<sup>24</sup> Both officers and enlisted men in the parallel sample agreed with the negative of this statement in too high proportions for complete consistency with this result—perhaps because of confusion over the double negative. The discrepancy between officer and enlisted responses remains, however:

Most soldiers do *not* lose respect for a man who is too GI.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	64%
Enlisted men	35

<sup>25</sup> The negative statement, “Most soldiers do *not* lose respect for a man who is always bucking for promotion” received agreement from 30 per cent of the officers and 20 per cent of the enlisted men in the corresponding sample.

Most soldiers lose respect for a man who is always bucking for promotion.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	75%
Enlisted men	87

A form of deviance, study of which throws particularly valuable light on the processes of social control in the Army, is "goldbricking." Here one finds a certain ambivalence on the part of enlisted men. "Goldbricking" means "dodging work," "lying down on the job," doing less than the minimum normally expected. It can be one of the most effective forms of aggression against the Army—particularly against a disliked order or a disliked leader—which can be indulged in by soldiers. "Goldbricking" when practiced by consensus as a group enterprise can be a game, even conducive to high spirits in a group. But the attitude of the group toward one of its members who is a chronic "goldbricker" is something else again. For he doesn't carry his share of the load and accordingly tends to become an object of scorn. It is not likely that simple agree-disagree questions of the type used here bring out the nuances of the attitudes, but it is interesting to note that enlisted men make a sharper distinction than officers between situations in which "goldbricking" is wrong. Both agree on the chronic goldbricker:<sup>28</sup>

Most soldiers lose respect for a man who is always trying to goldbrick.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	95%
Enlisted men	84

But note the differences between officer and enlisted responses to the following:

It is all right for a soldier to goldbrick if he doesn't get caught.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	4%
Enlisted men	31

It is all right for a soldier to goldbrick, if it doesn't make more work for the men.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	20%
Enlisted men	53

<sup>28</sup> In the parallel sample, 5 per cent of the officers and 22 per cent of the enlisted men agreed with the negative wording, "Most soldiers do *not* lose respect for a man who is always trying to goldbrick."



As would be expected, there was near unanimity on the proposition that goldbricking by a soldier is wrong where it does make more work for the men:

It is wrong for a soldier to goldbrick if it makes more work for the men.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	90%
Enlisted men	95

While the goldbrick deviates in seeking to do less than is called for by group norms, there is some evidence that the norms themselves tended to be set at a fairly low level. We have already noted that, as in civilian industry, negative sanctions are sometimes applied by the group against the "eager beaver." Moreover, officers and enlisted men tend to agree, in about the same proportions, that most soldiers usually were putting in little more than minimal effort:

Most soldiers usually work just hard enough to get by.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	74%
Enlisted men	78

The parallel sample, on the different form of the question, yielded a somewhat larger proportion who took a positive view of enlisted men's effort.

Most soldiers usually put all they have got into their work.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	34%
Enlisted men	39

As was suggested in the introductory remarks in this section, one of the basic problems in getting work done is how to manipulate the reward system such that effort and achievement will be stimulated. While officers and men both agreed that enlisted men don't work too hard, there was sharp disagreement on the question of whether good work is rewarded in the Army:

The harder a man works in the Army, the better chance he has of succeeding.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	65%
Enlisted men	30

The Army tries its best to praise and reward the soldier who has done an exceptionally good job.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	57%
Enlisted men	35

The negatively worded form of the latter question, on the parallel sample, brought out somewhat larger proportions testifying against the reward practices:

The Army does *not* try its best to praise and reward the soldier who does an exceptionally good job.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	52%
Enlisted men	72

One of the most important mechanisms of reward is through the promotion system, attitudes toward which are analyzed in some detail in the chapter on social mobility. The majority of officers tended to share, though in smaller proportion, the enlisted men's dissatisfaction with the promotion system. For example:

Promotions in the Army are based on *who* you know, and not *what* you know.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	60%
Enlisted men	80

In the parallel sample, the results are:

Promotion in the Army is based on *what* you know and not *who* you know.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	31%
Enlisted men	24

One of the essentials of a reward system is that a promised reward be *given*. Too often, in soldiers' experience, the leader making the promise was not in a position to carry it out or else neglected to do so. This topic will be discussed further in connection with group punishment and reward. Sometimes, of course, no explicit promise may have been made, but it may have been interpreted as such. Officers were apparently less likely than enlisted men to be skeptical of Army promises to enlisted men:

When the Army *says* it will do something the men want, most of the time it ends up by *not* really doing it.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	41%
Enlisted men	76

In the parallel sample, the following is seen :

When the Army *says* it will do something the men want, most of the time it ends up by really doing it.

	<i>Agree</i>
Officers	60%
Enlisted men	26

As was mentioned above, the forms of questions used in the November 1945 study do not provide very precise instruments for registering attitudes. But, taken as a whole, they do provide a good deal of insight into the Army's problems of getting men to obey orders and to work with zest.

Some special data, not extensive and insufficiently replicated to provide bases for substantial generalizations, are available on the subject of group rewards and group punishments. Because such group sanctions are explicitly intended to utilize the informal controls of the group to enforce some formal order, they are of unusual interest to the social psychologists. This is an area of research which lends itself well to systematic experimentation. Different theories could be explicitly tried out on different groups of men and the results evaluated. Although this was not deemed feasible within the wartime Army, it would seem that an organization like an army is well adapted to such studies and one may hope that they will be undertaken in peacetime.

For the present, only rather scanty descriptive reports are available. In a study made in the United States in the summer of 1945 of 2,881 officers, of whom a third were returnees from overseas, brief descriptive accounts were obtained in response to the following: "Please describe an instance where group punishment was used and tell how it worked out." "Please describe an instance where group reward was used and tell how it worked out."

An analysis of the types of situations in which each type of sanction was reported as used, in terms of its reported success or failure, can contribute something to an understanding of the principles

which may be involved. With respect to group punishment the officers were asked the following additional question:

Some officers think it is good leadership and some think it is bad leadership to punish a group or unit for something done by a single individual within the group. What is your experience?

	<i>Percentage responding</i>
I think group punishment is <i>sometimes</i> a good idea	42
I think group punishment is <i>never</i> a good idea	58

It will be seen that opinion was split on this question, with the majority leaning toward a negative opinion.

Analysis of reported situations when group punishment was tried shows that it tended to fail in situations like punishment of a group for an individual who went AWOL, punishment of a group for a barracks theft (often as a means of getting the group to locate the guilty person), or punishment of a whole detachment because one subunit failed to pass inspection. On the other hand, punishment of a small subgroup of men, because quarters or equipment for which they were responsible as a whole failed to pass inspection, tended, if the practice of such sanctions were a regular thing, to induce men to react with a "righteous sense of indignation" toward those individuals who failed to do their share in a *group* task.

A common-sense analysis of the problem of group punishment suggests the following points, some of which are self-evident but seem to be easily overlooked in practice, and some of which need future experimental testing:

Group punishment is most likely to be effective when:

- (1) The men learn that punishment for the act is highly probable. (This would require *regular* and *consistent* punishment for the offense.)
- (2) The men are able to distinguish clearly between acts which are likely to elicit the punishment and acts which are not likely to elicit it.
- (3) The men learn not only that the act is likely to be punished but also that the punishment will affect the *entire group* rather than just the offenders. (This requires consistent use of *group* punishment for the offense.)
- (4) The men are able to identify potential offenders in a group situation so as to apply group pressure.

The above four conditions would seem to be necessary, while the following would seem to be helpful:

- (5) The offense is of a type disapproved not only by the authorities but by most of the men in the group.
- (6) The men are given specific advance warning about the consequences of an occurrence of the offense, since most men consider fair warning as a condition for fair punishment.
- (7) The offense is of the type which the men feel that they could have done something about—either by their own behavior or by prodding others to behave differently.
- (8) To the extent that the men perceive the punishment for the offense as an institutionalized practice ("legal") and as specifically prescribed ("necessary"), they will tend not to conclude that the leader is indulging a whim or attempting to satisfy some ulterior personal motive (e.g. "bucking").

As an example, take a report by a second lieutenant in the study above mentioned: "Because one man had gone AWOL one night the entire outfit was restricted for several nights. That lowered the morale of the unit and gave the men a feeling of disrespect for the CO." It is instructive to apply the above points to this illustration, which, as in most instances of group punishment of AWOL, indicated failure. The men probably felt there was nothing they could do about it, other than by not going AWOL themselves (7). They probably tended to disapprove of the offense (5), but it was not easy to identify potential AWOL's in advance (4). Since they knew the Army did not consistently punish the group for individual AWOL's (3), they could bear increased resentment against the CO's behavior as personal and whimsical (8).

By contrast, consider another illustration: "An entire barracks was restricted for not passing inspection. This seemed to work." Punishment for such an offense was common practice in the Army (3) (8). The men were in a position to influence the behavior of others in the group (4) and they recognized that this was the case (7). Most of the instances where group punishment for failures on inspection was reported to have elicited resentment were either of the type where men in neighboring units were punished in addition to the offending group or of the type where the failure was due to personal dereliction of one or two men with respect to behavior generally regarded as a matter of individual rather than group responsibility (personal inspection of fingernails, shoes, buttons, etc.).

In reporting on successful and unsuccessful uses of group rewards, the officers studied tended to give illustrations of success rather than failure. This is in marked contrast to the answers given on group punishment and tends to conform to psychological theories

of the relative efficacy of rewards. However, this should not be taken as clear-cut evidence that group reward as used in the Army actually was more effective than group punishment; the instances selected by the officers to report could simply reflect their own attitudes toward these sanctions.

Group rewards may be thought of as indulgence granted to some or all members of a group which are perceived by the group members as opportunities for special gratification which are not to be expected in the normal course of events. If the indulgence is one which the men perceive as something to be expected without necessitating any special effort on their part, then the attempt to require special performance of the men for the obtaining of this indulgence would constitute a case of *punishment* for failing to achieve some new requirement rather than reward. Thus, for example, if the men in a company have been regularly granted one day off per week, the leader who "promises" his men their one day off, provided that they pass the weekly inspection of their living quarters, would be said to be employing group punishment rather than group reward, since he is not offering a new indulgence but, rather, threatening to deprive the men of an indulgence which they have taken for granted.

The suggested criterion for distinguishing between group reward and group punishment, therefore, is whether the members of the group perceive the promised state of affairs as the granting of a new indulgence or as the withdrawal of a hitherto normally expected indulgence (or some other form of deprivation). In general this criterion may be applied readily if there is an adequate description of the social situation to which the group reward or punishment is applied.

Examination of the illustrations of unsuccessful use of group rewards reported by the officers indicates that the failure is attributable in almost all cases either to not giving the reward promised or to giving a lesser reward than promised. Examples are:

A group was promised passes on a week-day for working on Sunday. Later passes were cancelled without reason—demoralized morale.

The men were promised the afternoon off if they passed the physical fitness test and nobody fell out during the hike. This was accomplished beautifully. Pass didn't come off until barracks were GI'd and men got off at 1600. [4 p.m.]. Morale very low.

There was widespread cynicism in the Army, as we have seen, both among officers and enlisted men, about Army promises. It

was reported earlier in this section that 41 per cent of a cross section of officers and 76 per cent of a cross section of enlisted men agreed with the statement, "When the Army *says* it will do something the men want, most of the time it ends up by not doing it." Approximately the same proportions, respectively, agreed with the statement, "You can't trust the Army to keep a promise." Throughout the world, this was a frequent criticism in the soldiers' free comments. Sometimes the comments tell of explicit instances of frustration because promised group rewards were not forthcoming. The following, from a corporal in an Infantry division in the South Pacific, is an example:

My outfit has been promised so many beautiful thoughts of going home and then disappointed. Such as Guadalcanal. We were told that if we took a certain hill it was a one way ticket to Frisco. Five miles past the hill we were still pushing forward until we took Kokumbona. After this the battle for Guadalcanal was over and we rested ten days and then started to unload boats, build roads, and dog rob for other outfits plus the Navy. . . . When a division fumbled the ball in Munda, we went over and finished their job and then were promised a rest. What a pack of lies. Ten days later we fought on Arundel and then another promise. More shit! Why promise things and then back out of it. Don't promise, just show action.

From what is known about policies and practices of higher echelons of the Army, it may be presumed that very few commanders of combat units were ever in a position to promise a group reward of this type with any degree of certainty that the reward would be granted. Many such reports from overseas involved alleged promises of rotation home. In some instances, the "promise" may not actually have been given but may have been misunderstood or exaggerated.

From an examination of the illustrations of officers indicating situations in which group rewards were used successfully, it would seem that this technique of group control was applied on a rather limited scale and usually confined to situations which were relatively isolated from daily activities. It is not likely that it was used often to provide sustained job motivations or to build up informal group patterns which would make for increased effort to perform well on Army tasks in general. In about half of the successful instances reported by the officers, the situation involved competition among units, usually in inspections or in performance on some training activity such as rifle marksmanship. Such competitions, if properly safeguarded, would seem to lend themselves particularly well to this form of social control.

If we may, as in the case of group punishment, suggest some points about the conditions for success of group rewards (some of which are fairly obvious but too often forgotten and some of which call for experimental testing) we would suggest the following:

Group rewards, having as their aim not merely to increase the motivation of each individual in the group but also to develop informal group pressures so that those who are least motivated will be influenced by those who are highly motivated, would seem likely to be most effective when—

- (1) The men learn that if a reward is promised for a high level of performance, it is highly probable that the reward will be forthcoming if they achieve the required level. This would require confidence in the leader who makes the promise and in the authorities whom he represents, built up by continual experiences in which promises are kept, and that when rewards are given they be perceived by all to be the rewards which were promised.
- (2) The men are able to distinguish clearly between performances which are likely to be rewarded and those which are not. In the case of competition for group reward, it is necessary for the criteria to be sufficiently objective so that the majority of men in the losing groups will recognize that the "winning" group was correctly selected for the reward.
- (3) The reward is highly desirable to the men so that they will be willing to expend a high degree of effort in order to achieve it.
- (4) The men learn to expect that everyone in the group will be benefited by the group reward, rather than just a few individuals. This is primarily a function of the type of reward which is promised (e.g., everyone will be given time off versus increasing the number of men who will be given furloughs). One of the major ways in which this condition may be expected to facilitate group pressures is by eliminating the suspicion that those members of the group who are most active (the "informal organizers") are expecting to obtain the reward just for themselves.
- (5) The activities which lead to the reward occur in a group situation where each individual's performance can be perceived by other members of the group, so that group sanctions can be applied to those whose performance is inadequate.
- (6) In the case of competition for a group reward, either good performance of the task is perceived as necessary or else the achievement is inherently rewarding to the men in all of the groups who make an effort to attain the group reward (e.g. cleaner living conditions). This is necessary to reduce the feeling that the expenditure of effort was a complete waste of time, among the large proportion of men comprising the groups which failed to win the competition.
- (7) In the case of competition for group reward, the groups involved in the competition are small enough and in sufficient contact so that a competitive team spirit will develop, of the pattern which many American men have



previously experienced in sports competitions. One of the major advantages of developing or making use of a pre-existing competitive "team spirit" is the likelihood that the men will apply the code of "good sportsmanship" to the group reward competition. This would increase the probability that the losing teams would be "good losers," that there would be no "hard feelings" against other teams or the judges and that one group would not attempt to win "unfairly" by sabotaging the efforts of another group.

It is interesting to note that an analysis of the illustrations provided by the officers shows that few of the successful uses of rewards involved performances lasting longer than a few hours or a full day. It is particularly difficult to establish sustained incentives meeting the condition of point 3. An example from an officer: "Reward: ride in liaison plane for platoon with best performance on menial jobs each week. Result: good KP's, latrines, and CQ's until novelty wore off." Study of competitive situations indicates that boomerang effects are inherent and that forethought in satisfying conditions (2), (6), and (7) is particularly necessary. In view of the strong civilian traditions of competition in sports, it may seem surprising that competition was not used more frequently in the Army than probably was the case. It is not unlikely that the fear of boomerang effects was an inhibiting factor. However, the testimony of the officers in this study is encouraging as to the success which may be achieved, with proper planning, in mobilizing informal group pressures such that men induce their least motivated fellows to work for a group goal.

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This chapter, analyzing attitudes toward leadership and social control in the Army, has presented data in three sections: (1) *Officers*—general attitudes toward them, attitudes toward specific leadership practices, and barriers to understanding between officers and enlisted men; (2) *Noncoms*—analysis of their intermediate role and attitudes of and toward them; (3) *Social control*—attitudes reflecting problems of adherence to informal as well as formal codes of behavior, with some attention to the use of group punishments and rewards. This field, as was indicated, is one which lends itself well to experimental study in a peacetime Army.

*THE ORIENTATION OF SOLDIERS  
TOWARD THE WAR<sup>1</sup>*

**I**N EARLIER chapters it was made clear to the reader that much of the dissatisfaction with the Army current among the men who comprised it could be traced to resentment of the deprivations—whether material comforts, symbols of status, or loss of freedom of action—which being an enlisted man in the American Army entailed. Since we customarily think of war as a collective enterprise whose successful prosecution demands the subordination of such personal goals to the common goal of winning the war, it is pertinent to examine why it was that in many instances personal considerations of this order were not in fact subordinated. One answer has been previously suggested in earlier chapters, especially Chapter 8, viz: that men felt resentful about those deprivations and thwartings of personal goals which were not, or at least were not perceived by the men to be, in any way necessary to the attainment of the group goal. While this explanation is correct as far as it goes, it is the intent of this chapter to go further and question the basic assumption: to what extent can it be assumed that the men of the United States Army were in fact willing to subordinate their personal aims to the goal of winning the war?

In asking such a question, we are, of course, proposing an excursion into the intellectual and moral history of our times, an examination of the American value system, in so far as such an entity exists, and a dissection of the relation of group values to individual motivation in general as well as in a time of group crisis. We cannot for a moment pretend that our data constitute an adequate basis for formulation of all the important problems which would come within the scope of such an investigation, but so much of the interpretation of the socio-psychological adjustment of men in the

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Shirley A. Star. It draws not only upon a considerable range of survey materials but also on experimental studies carried out under the direction of Carl Hovland by the Experimental Section of the Research Branch.

Army comes back, in the last analysis, to factors deriving from this area of general orientation toward the war that some attempt must be made here to deal explicitly with them.

This chapter is organized in three sections. Section I deals, in general, with attitudes toward the war. Section II examines more specifically data on personal identification with the war, a subject which has already been treated broadly, along with other attitudes, in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this volume. Section III analyzes explicit efforts to raise the level of personal commitment by changing attitudes toward the war.

## SECTION I

### ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR

If we seek to define the area of consensus with regard to the war among Americans, both in and out of the Army, it lies simply in the undebatable assumptions that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor meant war, and that once in the war the United States had to win. The very fact that alternative assumptions were not discussed may be taken as an indication of the essential patriotism of the American people and their fundamental acceptance of the necessity of the war. Indeed, on this level, the war might be deplored, but it could not be opposed. Beyond this basic unanimity, however, there appears to have been more an absence of thinking about the meaning of the war than any clearly distinguishable differences in orientation.

This point is illustrated by the responses, presented in Table 1, which men made to a series of statements about the war chosen from the press, political speeches, and similar sources as typical formulations of conflicting points of view. After complete agreement on the war as a matter of defensive necessity, the men went on to apparent disagreement on questions of the idealism of American motives in the war. But when an attempt is made to use these responses to classify men into types of war orientations, it becomes obvious that there was little consistency in men's views, but rather a tendency to accept momentarily any plausibly worded interpretation of the war. In this case, about two thirds of the men either accepted or were undecided about at least one of the three rather critical views of how the war came about ("Big business," "the British Empire," "Imperialism in Asia"). And yet, this apparent cynicism certainly cannot be taken at its face value, especially when we note that among these men, who apparently

were dubious about the morality or wisdom of American motives in the war, 60 per cent nevertheless agreed that America was in the war to "guarantee democratic liberties to all people."

TABLE 1  
SOLDIERS' ACCEPTANCE OF VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF THE WAR  
(Responses of a Cross Section of 5,880 White Enlisted Men in the  
United States, August 1942)

	PERCENTAGE SAYING:			Total
	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Agree</i>	
a) "Whatever our wishes in the matter, we have to fight now if we are to survive."	2	7	91	100
b) "We are not fighting to dominate the world; we are simply fighting to keep what we have."	4	8	88	100
c) "We are in the war to fight until we can guarantee democratic liberties to all peoples of the world."	22	13	65	100
d) "This war is the old story over again. Europe gets itself into a mess and then yells for Uncle Sam to help set things straight again."	36	12	52	100
e) "We are not responsible for saving the world. We are in this war solely to defend the United States of America."	38	16	46	100
f) "We are actually fighting for the economic interests of American Big Business."	55	23	22	100
g) "This war is being fought by Americans to make the world safe for the British Empire."	66	17	17	100
h) "We are in this war because we refused to give up our economic and political advantages in Asia."	65	20	15	100

Data from Planning Survey III.

These statements were introduced as follows: "Here are some quotations from speeches or the press, representing very different views expressed by different people. You will agree with some and disagree with others."

If we set as our definition of a consistent, favorable, intellectual orientation to the war the requirements that men (a) accept the defensive necessity of the war, (b) repudiate such critical or cynical views as are implied in explaining the war in terms of the British Empire, big business, or economic imperialism, and (c) dismiss the superficial theory of causation implicit in describing the war as

America straightening out Europe's messes, then less than a fifth of the men could be classified as having a consistent, favorable, intellectual orientation to the war. These criteria, however, imply an essentially negative approach in terms of what the war was *not* about. If we add to them the additional criterion that men accept some positive formulation—that is, that they either agree that the war was solely a defensive one, fought with no thought of saving the world; or that the war was being fought to guarantee democratic liberties to the world, but that they do not accept both formulations, since, interpreted literally, they are inconsistent—then the proportion classified as viewing the war from a consistent and favorable intellectual position is reduced to less than a tenth of the men.


There are, of course, serious objections to this procedure. First, it may be said that statements of the kind presented in the previous table oversimplify the issues, so that the very men who did have highly consistent, carefully thought-out views of the war would be most hard put to express themselves within their framework, and it is certainly true that better educated men were more likely to disagree with each of these formulations (see Chart I). In addition, many of the statements used have the persuasive ambiguity of political utterances, so that men might not have interpreted them as they were later interpreted for classifying purposes or might have been lulled into endorsing views they did not really accept. Finally, it is possible to question the criteria of consistency used here.

On the other hand, evidence from attempts to use somewhat different approaches tends to support the conclusion that, beyond acceptance of the war as a necessity forced upon the United States by an aggressor, there was little support of attempts to give the war meaning in terms of principles and causes involved, and little apparent desire for such formulations. For example, in the summer of 1943, at a time when government information agencies had been trying to popularize the "Four Freedoms" concept of war aims which had been stated in the Atlantic Charter, over a third of a sample of 3,139 men in Continental United States admitted that they had never even heard of the Four Freedoms, and actually only 13 per cent could name three or four of them.<sup>2</sup> We do not mean to

<sup>2</sup> The reason for limiting attention to those who knew at least three of the Four Freedoms is that it was discovered in scoring men's answers that many men appeared to be confusing the Four Freedoms with the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Men who simply named these—freedom of speech, religion, assembly, press, etc.—automatically scored correctly on two of the Four Freedoms. It was therefore decided that men must name at least one of the two more novel freedoms proposed in the

CHART I

EDUCATIONAL VARIATIONS IN ACCEPTANCE OF VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF THE WAR (August 1942)



Data from same source as Table 1.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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imply that men had only the alternatives of adhering to this statement of war aims or being unconcerned with such issues, but it seems not unreasonable to assume that men who were concerned with the ideological meaning of the war would at least be familiar with the Four Freedoms concept even if they did not find it a satisfactory formulation.

At the same time, men were asked to write freely, in their own words, what it was they personally thought the United States was fighting for. As is frequently the case with this type of question, a large number of the men made no attempt to answer, a fact which may be variously interpreted as inarticulateness or lack of interest. Another group replied only with one-word, slogan-like concepts—"Freedom," "Peace" and the like—from which, again, it is impossible to conclude what lay behind them, that is, whether they were used to conceal a lack of thought or to summarize a real orientation with respect to the war. But together these two groups account for over half of the men, which itself suggests that sheer inarticulateness alone is an inadequate explanation. Another quarter of the men answered in the pragmatic terms of defense against attack and national survival, 5 per cent expressed negative attitudes about the war, and 2 per cent admitted to confusion and concern, leaving about 15 per cent who attempted to define the war for themselves in terms of the moral principles involved (Table 2).

While none of these data are conclusive, they are consistent with one another and with what other observers have reported to have been the attitudes of Americans toward the war.<sup>3</sup> Certainly, in the light of the divided attitudes of the American people toward entry into the war up to the Pearl Harbor attack,<sup>4</sup> it was not to be expected that there would be consensus about the war on any level other than that of a patriotic rallying to the country when it was attacked. Bruner has summarized the conflicts in American opinion as they were reflected in civilian public opinion polls in these terms:

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Four Freedoms—freedom from want and freedom from fear—to be considered as exhibiting a real acquaintance with the Four Freedoms. In practice this meant naming at least three of them correctly.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Herbert Blumer, "Morale," in William F. Ogburn (ed.), *American Society in Wartime* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943).

<sup>4</sup> For an interpretive summary of the findings of civilian public opinion polls with respect to attitudes in this period, see Jerome S. Bruner, *Mandate From the People* (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1944).

The answer to the following question is characteristic of our thinking in the mid-thirties: "If one foreign nation insists upon attacking another, should the United States join with other nations to compel it to stop?" Does it seem out of character now that only slightly more than a quarter of us were prepared to see the United States join in sanctions against aggressor nations? And of that mi-

TABLE 2  
CLASSIFICATION OF MEN'S OWN FORMULATIONS OF AMERICAN WAR AIMS\*  
(Cross Section of Troops in the United States, July 1943)

<i>Type of formulation</i>	<i>Percentage of men giving each formulation</i>
No response to question	36
One-word, slogan-like concepts (E.g., freedom, peace, democracy, victory)	16
Relatively defensive concepts	24
To keep the U.S. the way it is	(11)
To protect national security and/or existence	(7)
To prevent dictatorship in the U.S.	(3)
Just because we were attacked	(3)
Relatively idealistic concepts	15
To rid the world of the Fascist threat	(7)
To preserve and extend American blessings to others	(4)
To make this a better world	(3)
To help the underdog	(1)
Cynical attitudes (E.g., capitalists, politics, England is responsible for America's being at war)	5
Expression of bewilderment or skepticism	2
Unclassified	2
Total	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	2,125

Data from S-64E.

\* The question to which men wrote their replies was: "Different people have different ideas about what the U.S. is fighting for in this war. What is your *own personal opinion* about what the United States is fighting for?"

nority who favored American intervention at that date, over two-thirds would have confined our activities to the nonmilitary!

The fact of the matter is, that of all the alternative ways of assuring our future national security, we were prepared to accept none of them. We did not want to arm; that smacked too much of war. We did not want to join the League, even if the League proved that it could work successfully. We did not even believe, in 1937, that the dissolution of the League would make any difference to the future peace of the world. We did not believe that it was the President's responsibility to try to interfere with the armament race going on in Europe. That was our feeling in 1937. It was also our opinion in pre-war 1939.



. . . . We knew that there would be a war. But our blindness was too comforting to abandon. Yes, said America, war there will be, but not for us. That was the last barrier between inaction and action. . . . Had we not been conditioned by our history to such a strong faith in our impregnability, in our geographical isolation, in the inherent stability of things political, perhaps we might have abandoned the notion that war did not threaten us. Because we did not see our own danger, we did not feel that the problems brewing in Europe needed a solution here. Why get entangled gratuitously in an affair which can only hurt one? <sup>5</sup>

In addition to the divided attitudes of that time, the intellectual history of the period between the two world wars was one of a developing climate of opinion distrustful of committing oneself to causes. In the course of the re-evaluation which followed the First World War, many Americans were exposed to a debunking process which challenged the worth-whileness of the most recent major cause to which they had given their allegiance. The moral drawn from this was that people became converted to supporting causes by a kind of trickery—"propaganda"—and that it was, therefore, wise to be on one's guard against being taken in by propaganda. As a result, the very discussion of abstract ideas, especially where they concerned themselves with values, was suspect. If a label has to be put to it, it might be said that the dominant philosophical tone of the period was a variety of positivistic materialism which belittled if it did not deny the validity of any concern with values.

It is in some such terms as these that not only the absence of a generally accepted formulation of the war which would go beyond its concrete immediate exigencies, but also the lack of much individual seeking for such interpretations may be understood. And yet it must be emphasized again that for most men this state of affairs did not imply either opposition to the war or much subjectively felt confusion about their lack of ideological orientation. Whenever and wherever questions in this area were asked, majorities in the neighborhood of 90 per cent said that they felt the United States was fighting for things they personally felt were worth fighting for.<sup>6</sup> Similar proportions of men said that it was of great importance to them to understand why the war was being fought, and

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20. The footnotes giving the exact questions leading to these conclusions, included in the original text, have been omitted here.

<sup>6</sup> While it may be objected that any other answer might be considered treasonable and so would be suppressed, the fact remains that men did express critical attitudes about officers and various Army policies, for example, when far swifter and more sure reprisals would probably have been expected by the men had they ever become identified. If they were frank about such things, there is little reason to believe that there would have been conscious misreporting about these more remote questions.

just as many men reported that they did in fact have at least a fairly clear idea of what the war was all about despite the evidence previously presented of inconsistencies and lack of information. That the men were relatively satisfied with respect to their understanding of the issues of the war is further supported by the data presented in Table 3, which indicate that, in comparison with such

TABLE 3  
TOPICS CHOSEN BY ENLISTED MEN AS THOSE THEY WOULD MOST LIKE TO  
KNOW MORE ABOUT

Topic chosen	Enlisted men in United States, July 1943	Enlisted men in China-Burma-India, February 1944
	%	%
What plans are being made for after the war	47	43
What is going on at the fighting fronts	31	22
What our allies are doing to help win the war	10	11
What is going on at home	8	17
Why we are fighting the war	4	7
Total	100	100
Number of cases	3,139	1,052

Data from S-63D and S-127.

The question asked was: "Of all the questions in the list below, which one would you most like to know more about?"

topics as postwar plans and news of the fighting and home fronts, men in the United States and in at least one overseas theater evinced little interest in further information about the causes involved in the war.<sup>7</sup> In other surveys in which men were asked to indicate the several subjects they felt were important for an Army orientation program to cover, a similar ordering of topics was found with special military problems like the relative strategic importance of Ground and Air Forces as well as the topics just enumerated appearing more important to the men than a discussion of war aims.

It was, no doubt, psychologically important to men in the Army to feel that they did understand why they were there. This may,

<sup>7</sup> The technique employed here of asking men to choose the one topic they were most interested in does not permit the conclusion that they were uninterested in the other topics, but simply that they were less interested in them than in the one they chose. The same qualification applies to the other surveys referred to in the paragraph, even though in these men were instructed to select two or three topics from a somewhat longer list.

in itself, explain why it was that the more important that men said it was to have such understanding, the more likely they were to say they did, in fact, understand. As Table 4 shows, there is, as well, a tendency for a somewhat higher proportion of men familiar with the Four Freedoms concept to feel that they were clear about the

TABLE 4

PROPORTION OF MEN SAYING THEY ARE "NOT SO CLEAR" OR "NOT CLEAR AT ALL" ABOUT WHY WE ARE FIGHTING THIS WAR, CLASSIFIED BY THEIR EVALUATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH UNDERSTANDING AND THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS

(Cross Section of Enlisted Men, July 1943)\*

Knowledge of Four Freedoms	PERCENTAGE SAYING THEY ARE NOT CLEAR ABOUT WAR AIMS AMONG MEN WHO HAVE INDICATED KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS AND WHO SAY UNDERSTANDING WAR AIMS IS:		
	<i>Of medium, little, or no importance</i>	<i>Of great importance</i>	<i>Absolutely necessary</i>
Name Four Freedoms correctly †	13 (61)	8 (144)	4 (211)
Have heard of Four Freedoms but cannot name them correctly	22 (170)	10 (571)	6 (327)
Have not heard of Four Freedoms	30 (197)	13 (592)	13 (562)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based. Data from S-63D.

\* The exact wordings of the questions asked and the combinations made in this table are:

- a) How clear an idea do you have of why we are fighting this war?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ I have a very clear idea
  - \_\_\_\_\_ I have a fairly clear idea
  - \_\_\_\_\_ I am not so clear
  - \_\_\_\_\_ I am not at all clear
- b) How important is it to you personally to have a clear understanding of why we are fighting this war?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ It is absolutely necessary
  - \_\_\_\_\_ It is of great importance
  - \_\_\_\_\_ It is of medium importance
  - \_\_\_\_\_ It is of little importance
  - \_\_\_\_\_ It is of no importance at all
- c) Have you ever heard of the "Four Freedoms"? How many of the Four Freedoms can you name? Write down the names of as many of the "Four Freedoms" as you can remember.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Yes { Names three or four correctly
  - Names two or less correctly
  - \_\_\_\_\_ No
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Don't know

† For the definition of "correct," see footnote to text accompanying Chart I.

meaning of the war. But these data also suggest that there was little subjective uneasiness even among men whose expressed desire to understand the war did not square with their objective lack of acquaintance with idealistic conceptions of the war.

It seems reasonable to conclude that, when men talked of understanding the war, they were not so much concerned with explana-

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
tions of this order, but rather were satisfied to regard the war as an unavoidable fact—a fact because it was presented to them as *fait accompli*, and unavoidable because their love of country required that foreign aggression be opposed.

On the other hand, men's acceptance of the war depended primarily on excluding from consideration everything but the immediate events surrounding America's entry into the war. Thus

CHART I

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "DO YOU EVER GET THE FEELING THAT THIS WAR IS NOT WORTH FIGHTING?"

(World-wide Cross Section of Enlisted Men, June 1945,  
Classified by Type of Service)



Data from S-205.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

viewed, the war made sense, but once their attention strayed to what had gone before or would come after, most men found themselves without a consistent rationale by which to justify the war, and many at least occasionally questioned the value of the war. In Chart II we see that over half the men reported feeling from time to time that the war was not worth fighting.<sup>8</sup> Although these data are based on a survey made shortly after VE Day, this question

<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that for some men, at least, this response was simply a convenient way of expressing their exasperation with the way things were going. Interviewers reported instances in which enlisted men closed the recital of their grievances by saying in effect, "When they treat you like that, you sometimes wonder if the war really is worth fighting." This point will be discussed in greater detail in Section III.

had been asked many times previously, and always with substantially the same results.

As these data also indicate, the more closely men approached the real business of war, the more likely they were to question its worthwhileness. There was a certain amount of revulsion to war as men were more and more forced to look upon it. A revulsion to war also followed upon its ending, as indicated by an upswing after VJ Day in the proportion questioning the value of the war. An intensive study of a sample of 301 overseas veterans medically discharged during the war showed that one of the major reservations they had about the war was its cost in human lives and resources. Apart from the feeling of some men that nothing could justify the expenditure of human lives involved, those veterans who had reservations about the war were plagued by a "backward look" which concluded that, though the war was in an immediate sense necessary, it was a high price to pay for what could from a long run point of view have been prevented. And, finally, the sense of futility about the war rested, for some of these veterans, on a conviction that, though winning the war saved the United States from a worse evil, there would be little in the way of positive gains and, especially, there would be other wars.

It is regrettable that we have no comparable data on the soldiers in World War I. In the absence of data, one can only guess about comparative attitudes in the two great conflicts. From at least one standpoint, the situation was structured better for belief in the necessity of World War II than in the case of World War I. The Pearl Harbor attack and subsequent declaration of war by Germany had a dramatic finality not matched by any single event which pulled the trigger for our entry into the earlier war. On the other hand, the Wilsonian phrases of "make the world safe for democracy" and "the war to end war" had a fervor in World War I which no phrases could match in its successor. These were positive goals worth dying for. Years of disillusionment following the defeat of the Kaiser reached their climax of disillusionment when war again engulfed the world, and it would hardly be surprising if the positive incentives in World War II were weak as compared with their predecessors.

Particularly, this would be expected with respect to the concept of a "war to end war." Such a war had been fought once within recent memory; there was no magic in a slogan like this in World War II. Not only was there the most painful past evidence of the

potential deceptiveness of such an idea; in addition, there was another concrete reason, not present in World War I, for skepticism. When the First World War ended, there was no possible enemy whose power the democracies of America, Britain, and France need fear—unless it might be Japan, which hardly could be expected to challenge all mankind. Germany was defeated; Russia was in the turmoil of the early years of her revolution. But soldiers well knew that victory in World War II would mean not only victory for countries like America and Britain but also victory for a country whose ways of life differed greatly from ours and whose power might be tremendous—namely, Russia.

Distrust of Russia, though by no means universal in the Army, was common enough to cause anxiety among those responsible for orientation of the troops. The film, "The Battle of Russia," prepared by the Information and Education Division, did its best to create a sympathetic understanding not only of Russia's valor, as at Stalingrad and Leningrad, but also of Russia's foreign policy, explaining away the Russo-German pact and the seizure of Finland as defensive moves to cushion the Soviet Union from Hitler's inevitable onslaught. War Department orientation discussion sessions also were directed at reduction of anti-Soviet prejudice though not, of course, endorsing Communism or totalitarianism in the Russian form.

Along with distrust of Russia, though perhaps negligible in comparison, was distrust of Great Britain—mainly, perhaps, on the ground that the British had allegedly already embroiled us in two World Wars and might be expected to do it again sometime in the future. But, as we shall see, few of those who envisaged a future war in concrete terms saw Britain as our enemy; rather, Britain was expected to be again our ally.

Let us turn now, to an examination of the data on attitudes toward a future war. The reader must remember that these are responses made by soldiers during World War II, long before the deterioration in Soviet-American relations which has characterized the period since the end of hostilities. These responses go a long way to explain why there was a lack of idealistic convictions in the men, or, at least, why there was no fervor in the thought that their personal sacrifices in World War II had meaning as ushering in a period of enduring peace.

In June 1945 a survey of a cross section of enlisted men made just after VE Day showed that about two fifths of the men expected an-

other war in twenty-five years or so, another two fifths were undecided, and only one fifth felt that peace would last at least that long. While this study was made as the war neared its end, an analysis of surveys made earlier in the United States and overseas indicates that there was little tendency for these answers to change through time. The educational pattern of respondents is interesting; the only group which had a substantial proportion of optimists in response to the question, "Do you think there will be another war in 25 years or so?" was the college men:

	<i>Grade school</i>	<i>Some H.S.</i>	<i>H.S. graduates</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>All men</i>
Yes	34	39	41	41	39
Undecided	46	42	40	21	39
No	20	19	19	38	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>538</i>	<i>670</i>	<i>875</i>	<i>438</i>	<i>2,521</i>

The same general educational pattern in response was seen overseas and in earlier studies in the United States. While the college men were the most likely of any to say that there would not be another war, they were also less likely than others to be undecided in their outlook; consequently, the proportion of averred pessimists was just as high among college men as in any educational group. (Nearly half of the grade school men checked the "undecided" category.)

The evidence from this same study, corroborated in other studies, also shows that men who expected other wars were most likely to express doubts about the value of this one. Since the better educated tended, less frequently than others, to say that they never had doubts about this war, it is of interest to note that, as Table 5 shows, the relationship between doubts about this war and expectation of another war holds within each educational group taken separately. It should also be noted that the anticipation of enduring peace was associated with a much greater difference in the less educated man's evaluation of the war than in the evaluations of those with more education. As these data show, among the less educated, the proportion who never get doubts about the worth-whileness of the war increased from 49 per cent of those who lacked confidence in future peace to 75 per cent of those who were sure that there would not be another war in the next quarter century. Among the

college educated, however, the corresponding increase was only from 40 to 52 per cent. This suggests that the mere expectation of enduring peace was not as effective in justifying the war to the better educated, perhaps because they were more likely than the less educated to take both the "backward look" of feeling that this war could have been prevented and the "forward look" of anticipating little in the way of positive gains.

Evidence is unmistakable that the belief that World War II would not put an end to wars for even a quarter of a century reflected largely a distrust of America's major Allies. When the men

TABLE 5  
PROPORTIONS WHO NEVER HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE WORTH-WHILENESS OF THE WAR, CLASSIFIED BY EXPECTATION OF ANOTHER WAR, AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  
(Cross Section of White Enlisted Men in the United States, June 1945)

Educational level	PERCENTAGE WHO NEVER HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE WAR AMONG MEN WHO:		
	<i>Thought there will be another war in the next 25 years or so</i>	<i>Were not sure</i>	<i>Thought there will not be another war in the next 25 years or so</i>
Some college	40 (181)	45 (89)	52 (168)
High school graduation, no college	41 (357)	49 (348)	55 (170)
Some high school, but not graduation	49 (256)	60 (285)	67 (129)
Grade school only	49 (184)	58 (247)	75 (107)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.  
Data from S-212.

who believed there would be another war were asked to name the probable antagonists, over 80 per cent replied. Less than 1 per cent outlined a war which did not involve any of the Big Three—the United States, Great Britain, and Russia—and only another 14 per cent visualized wars in which members of the Big Three would participate without fighting each other. Eighty-five per cent, then, expected trouble between Allies, among whom the most frequent expectation, as shown in Table 6, was that the United States with or without Great Britain's help would fight Russia. There are no particular educational differences in this respect, except for a greater tendency on the part of the better educated to assume that Great Britain would be allied with the United States when the United States and Russia came to fight. The less well educated



more often implied Britain's neutrality, perhaps because of their failure to be as detailed in their accounts of future wars.

In their discussions of these future wars, men of all classes were practically unanimous in locating responsibility for them away from the United States. Less than 5 per cent felt that the United States would be to blame for any war in which she was involved; the majority felt these wars would be Russia's fault, with England placing a low second.

**TABLE 6**  
**PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEXT WAR AS PREDICTED BY THOSE WHO EXPECT ANOTHER**  
**WAR WITHIN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS**  
 (June 1945)

<i>Expected participants: *</i>	<i>Percentages expecting each type of future war among men who expect another war and name the participants in it</i>
None of the Big Three participates	1
One or more of Big Three participates, but no conflict between members of Big Three	
United States involved	7
United States not involved	7    14
Conflict among members of Big Three	
United States and Great Britain fight Russia	38
United States fights Russia	25
United States fights Great Britain (with or without Russian assistance on either side)	10
Great Britain fights Russia	12    85
<b>Total expecting war and naming participants:</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>790</i>

Data from S-212.  
 \*Based on the question: "If you think there will be another war, who do you think will be fighting whom?" (Show in the blanks below the countries that will be fighting each other.)

\_\_\_\_\_ will be fighting \_\_\_\_\_

In these classifications non-Big-Three allies and enemies have been omitted for simplicity.

For further analysis of attitudes toward our Allies, as well as toward the enemy, the reader is referred to Volume II, especially Chapter 12, "The Aftermath of Hostilities." Incidental to the experimental studies in communication, described in Volume III, is a considerable body of data on information about and attitudes toward Allies, constituting evidence as to the efficacy of films in imparting information and changing attitudes.

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As further documentation of the fact that men did not feel that they were engaged in a war to end war, one may note that the large majority of soldiers whenever and wherever polled throughout the war favored peacetime universal military training after the war. With some variation, depending on how the questions were phrased, about 70 per cent of the men expressed this opinion. For example, in a United States cross section of enlisted men in February 1944, among those who said they expected another war in twenty-five years or so 75 per cent favored peacetime compulsory military training. Even among those who were "undecided" as to whether there would be another war or who did not expect one, 64 per cent favored such training.<sup>9</sup> The fact that even those optimistic about future peace tended in the majority of cases to favor compulsory military training indicates an absence of certainty about future peace. Further breakdown of the data, according to reasons for favoring peacetime compulsory military training in this study, showed that, even among the 64 per cent of the optimists about peace who favored conscription, 5 out of 6 checked reasons directly related to guarding our national security rather than reasons exclusively related to vocational education, physical training, etc.<sup>10</sup>

Whatever the nature of the doubts held by men as to the positive worth-whileness of the war, they could not, however, escape the conclusion that there was nothing to be done but fight the war once it had begun. Their doubts, vain regrets, and uneasiness therefore led to ambivalence rather than to disaffection, as may be seen

<sup>9</sup> From S-95. The question was: "After the war, do you think the U.S. should draft all young men for a certain amount of Army training during peacetime or should we go back to taking volunteers only?" The percentages noted in the text responded "Draft all young men for a certain amount of training." Other answer categories were "Undecided" and "Go back to taking volunteers only." The sample comprised 3,594 cases.

<sup>10</sup> These results are all the more striking when viewed against the background of resentment against the Army evidenced by enlisted men throughout the war. As Chapter 5, Section III, clearly brought out, the majority of the men had unfavorable attitudes toward the Army. Some of them, in favoring peacetime conscription, may have simply wished to see to it that others were forced to share some of the deprivations of military life which they were experiencing. This would help account for the fact that, even among men hostile to the Army, the majority favored peacetime conscription, though this majority was somewhat smaller than among those with favorable attitudes toward the Army (both among optimists about a future war and among pessimists). However, it is quite probable that the main factor in the support of postwar military training was the belief in the necessity of strong American defense against future aggression, and it should be noted that civilian polls conducted in the same period showed almost as strong support for peacetime conscription as was found within the Army itself.

clearly in the two following excerpts from interviews with medically discharged veterans:

(Do you think this war is different from other wars as far as what we're fighting for is concerned?)<sup>11</sup> Some say we are fighting to protect the rich man; others say we were forced into it when we were attacked at Pearl Harbor. (Which do you believe?) Personally, I don't know what to say. We *were* attacked, but we could have took different measures to prevent it. I disapprove of war altogether. There should be a more diplomatic way of settling things. Now, like the Japanese have silk; we have cotton. Why not trade? If Germany needs more land, why not let her buy some from France and Poland. I just can't see war. (In the long run, do you think it will be worth the sacrifice?) No, I don't. Well, being as the war began, yes. We couldn't sit back and let Japan swarm all over us. But it shouldn't have started from the beginning. There should be a different way of settling this. (Do you think we should have fought?) Oh, yes, they would have bombed San Francisco and then invaded us.

I don't mean to bring up politics, but I think somebody was laying down on the job there at Pearl Harbor when we were attacked. . . . (Do you think this war is different from other wars as far as what we're fighting for is concerned?) Well, it's practically the same old story. It started back there in Germany when Hitler started running the Jews out of Germany. In that respect you would call it a religious war. I think myself it's the same thing; other countries are fighting for territory and raw materials and different important bases. I can't see any sense in us being in it. The only reason we're in it is because we were attacked by Japan. We won't get anything out of it except blood and sweat. We only want freedom of the seas and freedom of imports and export; and we don't want any territory over there, except in the Philippines and the South Seas, yes, but not in Europe. (In the long run do you think it will be worth the sacrifice?) Well, I don't think it's worth it, like Mrs. Jones having four sons and having them reported missing in action. But you can't fight a war without losing lives. I don't say it should have happened, but it has happened. There's nothing you can do about it. . . . (Repeating previous question) Well, I do. I think things will turn out. They always have. Of course there will be a lot of bloodshed, and the war debt will be tremendous. . . . And I do hope they can keep us from having inflation after this war is over with. (Then, do you think it will be worth the sacrifice or not?) I do, in a way. The whole idea is to gain peace again.

## S E C T I O N I I

### PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WAR

Though the war was accepted by American soldiers, there were, as we have seen, reservations. In addition, their acceptance of the war was a rather passive one. Since the only universally agreed-upon war aim was to put an end to the threat to American existence, it would follow that the more vivid the threat appeared, the more

<sup>11</sup> These are verbatim interview records. The remarks in parentheses are those of the interviewer, using informal interview methods.

deeply people would be stirred to action on its behalf. And, while the Pearl Harbor attack did kindle this kind of rallying, the shock, indignation, and real sense of national danger soon faded. By early 1943, when the question was first asked, over 90 per cent of a cross section of troops in the United States felt sure that the United States would win the war and only 1 per cent conceded the other side a chance of winning. Accompanying and reinforcing this attitude was a complete confidence, at least among troops in training in the United States, in American superiority in material and fighting ability. The resultant overoptimism about the ease of winning the war can best be illustrated by estimates of its probable length that were made in the early days of the war. In October 1942, when the only American engagements in the war had been in the Pacific, and, aside from the Guadalcanal invasion, had consisted mostly of withdrawals in the face of superior Japanese forces, and when the Nazis were proceeding almost unchecked in Europe, rolling the Russians back, a quarter of the men in the Army in the United States nevertheless thought the war would be all over in a year or less. A month later, following the news of American landings in North Africa, this proportion rose to 42 per cent. Quite consistent with this was the belief expressed by two thirds of a sample of new recruits surveyed in November 1942 that the Axis would give up and ask for peace as soon as the going got tough. It is easy to see how the immediacy of the threat to America faded in the face of attitudes like these and how getting the war over with became the primary if not the exclusive war aim.

Overoptimism about the duration of the war was a continuing phenomenon, not confined to the early phases. From 1942 on, questions were asked about men's expectations of the length of the war, and later the questions were altered to obtain separate estimates of the length of the war with Germany and with Japan. As is shown in Table 7, the men continually underestimated the time it would take to win the war in Europe. Estimates of the length of the war in the Pacific do not show the overoptimism so clearly because the war ended so suddenly that the predictions of men who seemed most overoptimistic at the time came true. Nevertheless, it will be seen in Table 7 that majorities underestimated the Pacific war throughout 1943, and that up until the last few months before the Japanese surrender sizable minorities did so.

This translation of the goal from preventing conquest of the nation to getting the war over with so that normal life could resume

implies certain things. First of all it means that, in a sense, the war was without a context—that, except for the fact that the resumption of prewar life was contingent on successful completion of the war, it had no relation with anything that had gone before or would come after it. From this point of view, the war was simply a vast detour made from the main course of life in order to get back to that main (civilian) course again, and taking this detour could be regarded as an intelligible procedure only in so far as it was unavoidable.

TABLE 7  
ACCURACY OF SOLDIERS' GUESSES AS TO THE LENGTH OF THE WAR, AT  
DIFFERENT PERIODS

Cross section of troops in:	Date	PERCENTAGES UNDERESTIMATING LENGTH OF WAR:				Number of cases
		In general	With Germany	With Japan		
U.S. (Panel Survey I)	September 1942	89	—	—	3,196	
U.S. (Special Survey I)	November 1942	94	—	—	2,927	
U.S. (Planning Survey V)	December 1942	90	—	—	3,474	
U.S. (S-35)	January 1943	92	—	—	4,296	
U.S. (S-32)	March 1943	86	—	—	4,800	
U. S. (S-63E)	July 1943	—	93	76	2,125	
Europe (S-92)	November 1943	—	84	62	2,262	
Caribbean (S-115A)	Jan.-Feb. 1944	—	84	40	1,695	
India-Burma (S-131)	Feb.-March 1944	—	86	42	1,172	
South Pacific (S-124)	Feb.-March 1944	—	70	36	2,509	
Central Pacific (S-125)	March 1944	—	75	36	5,793	
Europe (S-134)	May 1944	—	81	45	1,030	
India-Burma (S-210)	March 1945	—	—	6	887	
World (S-205)	June 1945	—	—	2	7,329	
World (S-218)	July 1945	—	—	0	3,892	

Since the feeling of national peril quickly died, and the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion, there was little to impel men to take the detour except external factors. It may be said that except for a very limited number of men, *little feeling of personal commitment to the war emerged*. The war was accepted passively as a national necessity, but this acceptance was not internalized as a sense of personal responsibility. It was not that the men were not patriotic—we have been at some pains to point out that they were—but simply that, once the winning of the war came to be viewed as certain, the felt need to subordinate individual concerns to the prosecution of the war was seriously impaired.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 the attitude of personal commitment to

the war was one of four attitudes reflecting general adjustment to the Army which were analyzed in detail. The other three were personal esprit, satisfaction with status or job, and approval or criticism of the Army. It was shown in Charts VIII and IX in Chapter 5 that the proportion who said that they thought they could be more useful as a soldier than as a war worker dropped from 40 per cent in March 1943 to 19 per cent in July 1945 (among cross sections in the United States) and from 41 per cent in March 1944 to 19 per cent in July 1945 (in India-Burma, the only theater in which an adequate trend on this item happened to be available). As the data in Chapter 5 further showed, a primary concern of the soldiers overseas was to get back home. Once this goal was achieved, the men hoped to get out of the Army. In fact it may be said that for men in the Army, the goal of getting the war over with came to be regarded as a means of getting out of the Army. Most men went into the Army reluctantly, the rate of volunteering was low, and, as we saw in Chapter 5, at least a third of those drafted stated, in a study of 3,729 representative enlisted men in the United States in January 1944, that they did not think they should have been drafted when they were. Nevertheless, there was a basic acceptance of the war, and the machinery of Selective Service was regarded as necessary to it. There was no widespread violation of the law, and, as we have just implied, the majority of draftees did concede the fairness of its administration. The men in the Army who did object to having been drafted had only highly personalized rationales for their position; there was no consensus among them. In other words, men were not eager to enter the Army for a variety of personal reasons, which offered no basis for organized opposition. They might try, individually and legally, to avoid induction for as long as they could. But once they were caught up in the machinery, the general consensus about the necessity of prosecuting the war and the indispensability and equity of Selective Service as a means to that end compelled their acquiescence, and they went into the Army without much fuss.

Certainly, the concept of "total war" so effectively propagated stressed the doctrine that each person in his niche, whatever it was, was making a contribution to victory. Undoubtedly many of the men who said they could do more for the war effort in war jobs than in the Army were sincerely convinced that they could make a greater contribution in a civilian capacity and the "soldier-war worker" question cannot be taken simply as a measure of the extent of per-

sonal zeal for the war. But the same criticism cannot be made of two questions, reviewed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, reflecting the concept of having done one's share. These questions merit some further discussion in the present context.

Informal interviewing, as early as the spring of 1943, on the general subject of ideological factors and their relationship to personal commitment, suggested that a kind of *limited commitment* had emerged. While civilians talked of *doing their part*—by which they meant to imply that they were doing everything they could for the duration—soldiers had begun to speak, in the past tense, of *having done their share*. Thus, combat soldiers, when asked how they felt about going into combat again, would frequently reply, "I've done my share; it's someone else's turn now." This phrase served both to express the feeling that limits should be set to what was demanded from the individual in the way of sacrifice, and at the same time to shift the emphasis away from an admission of personal lack of zeal to a more respectable concern with considerations of abstract justice.

Fundamentally, however, the feeling that one has done one's share and ought not be sent into combat again, or kept overseas any longer, or even retained in military service—to enumerate the three situations to which this feeling was usually referred—can only imply that the desire to be safe, or to be home, or to be free to pursue civilian concerns, was stronger than any motivation to make a further personal contribution to winning the war. True, the mode of expression was one which implied that the men who felt this way had already made their personal contribution to winning the war, but the tabulations in Chapter 5 showed how little service, objectively, it took to produce this conviction, and in any event the very fact that enlisted men were disposed to weigh and measure what they had done in itself suggests the not ungrudging nature of their Army service.

Of course, this attitude of limited commitment was also often rationalized in terms of the "total war" doctrine previously discussed, but the evidence to be presented later<sup>12</sup> indicates that soldiers did not really believe that the home front's contribution compared with theirs, except when they were so rationalizing their desires to be civilians. Finally, this attitude tended to be bolstered by assertions of "fact" about the military situation: that the Army

<sup>12</sup> See Volume II, Chapter 6, for a discussion of attitudes of combat troops toward the "home front" and civilians.

could replace men overseas with men who had not served overseas, or that the Army did not really need so many men to win the war. These recurrent relationships between desire and belief have often been taken to suggest that misinformation lies at the basis of undesirable opinions so that supplying "the facts" would improve attitudes. An evaluation of this assumption, which was in large measure that made by the Army's program of orienting troops, will follow in a later section of this chapter. For the moment it need only be pointed out that the kinds of "fact" appealed to in defense of limited commitment were really matters of opinion derived in large part from desires, rather than from misinformation. A good example of what we mean here is furnished by an analysis of the fact that men who did not want to be sent to the Pacific after VE Day were more likely to feel that they would not really be needed there. An information program on this specific point attempted to correct this situation by removing "misinformation" by showing men what a hard struggle lay ahead in the Pacific, how many men it would take to man the extended supply lines, and so on. But, as it turned out, these were not the facts at all; the atomic bomb made the views of those who said a large number of men would not be needed into the fact. It is true that on the basis of what was known then the conclusion drawn by informed opinion that a long, hard war still remained seemed more logical and probable than the opposite view, and certainly in most instances of this sort informed opinion was not upset by a completely unpredictable event like the atomic bomb. Nevertheless, since the issues at hand were not "facts" but contingent predictions of the future course of events (e.g., "If we don't send more troops to the Pacific, the Japanese will win"), there was a large enough element of indeterminacy in them so that men who wanted to could refuse to accept the conclusions of informed opinion. The orientation problem in a case like this was not really so much one of supplying facts as it was one of persuading men to face their implications and thereby to accept an interpretation which ran counter to what they wished to believe.

The "done my share" attitude, then, seemed to offer a new approach to evaluating the extent of personal commitment among enlisted men. Several questions designed to embody this concept were formulated and employed. In a survey made throughout the world about three weeks after VE Day two of these questions were asked:



- (a) How do you feel about what you've done in this war?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I feel I've done my share as a soldier and should be discharged  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I feel I've already done my share, but I'm ready to do more  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I don't feel I've done my share yet
- (b) Considering everything, how do you feel about further service in the Army?  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I should be discharged now  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I should serve a while longer but I should not have to stay in until Japan is defeated  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I should be discharged as soon after Japan is defeated as possible  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I want to remain in the Army after the War

On the basis of these questions, the men in the Army after VE Day with point scores under 85<sup>13</sup> may be classified into 33 per cent who felt they had done their share and should be discharged right away; 24 per cent who felt that while they might serve a while longer, they too had done their share and should not have to remain in the Army until the end of the war;<sup>14</sup> 29 per cent who were willing to stay in the Army until the end of the war even though they felt they had done their share; and 14 per cent who thought they had not as yet done their share and should stay in the Army until the end of the war.<sup>15</sup> In other words, over half the enlisted men in the Army felt justified in wanting discharges before the end of the war, and most of those who said they should see the war through thought of themselves as thereby doing more than their share.

What, then, seemed to the men to be the cogent considerations in determining how much was enough? First of all, there was the progress of the war. It has just been noted that the proportion of men choosing to be soldiers appears to decline progressively through time. And as Table 8 shows, when the attitudes of selected groups of men before VE Day are compared with those of matched groups after VE Day, there is a notable increase, on the average, in the proportion of men who feel entitled to be discharged immediately, and a lesser increase in the feeling that one's share has been done.

<sup>13</sup> The Army interim discharge plan for the period between VE and VJ Day officially defined men with 85 points or more as those who had done their share and who could, with a few exceptions, expect discharge, so these men are excluded from consideration here and in other tables employing these questions.

<sup>14</sup> Three per cent expressed a desire to be discharged either right away or before the end of the war, even though they said they had not done their share. These men are included in the first two groups.

<sup>15</sup> The last two groups contain the small proportion of men who wanted to stay in the Army after the war.

Especially for the men who had already served overseas, VE Day served as a convenient point on which was focused the desire for discharge of men who already felt before that date that they had done their share.<sup>16</sup>

Aside from the impact of VE Day, men's evaluations of how much they had done were, as was shown in Chapter 5, closely related to three major measures of the amount and rigor of Army service: total service, overseas service, and combat duty.<sup>17</sup> Interestingly enough, there were no differences in attitudes as between men stationed in Europe where a war had ended and men stationed in the

TABLE 8  
CHANGES FROM APRIL 1945 TO JUNE 1945 IN ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL  
ROLE IN THE WAR AMONG SELECTED TROOPS IN THE UNITED STATES\*

	INCREASE IN PERCENTAGES SAYING:		N†
	"I have done my share"	"I should be discharged now"	
<i>Men with no overseas service</i>			
In Air Forces	+18	+11	326
In two Service Force branches	+10	+6	272
<i>Men with overseas service</i>			
In Air Forces	+3	+31	408
In two Service Force branches	+5	+20	379

Data from S-186B and S-205.

\* Based on four pairs of samples. The two samples within each pair are matched to one another in personal characteristics, but no attempt has been made at matching among the pairs.

† This figure represents the size of the samples at each time period.

Pacific where a war was still going on. This convergence in attitudes in the face of very different objective situations may be traced in large part to the differential interpretation of the significance of VE Day by men in the two areas. To the men in Europe, it meant that they had accomplished their mission, won their war, and so were justified in wanting their release. The men in the Pacific tended to feel, however, that the ending of the war in Europe made available plenty of men to relieve them of the burden they had been carrying alone.


<sup>16</sup> See Volume II, Chapter 10, for a discussion of attitudes of returnees.

<sup>17</sup> It will be noted, of course, that these factors which influenced men to feel that they had done their share are those which formed the basis of the Army discharge plan. As might be expected, however, they were related in much the same way even before the Army plan was announced, since the factors used were those favored by the men.

Chart III and Tables 9 and 10, based on the percentages of men, in various classes by Army experience and by background characteristics, who said they should be discharged before the end of the war, supplement in several respects the findings already reported in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. They further document the relationship between length of time in the Army, overseas service (and especially

CHART III

PROPORTIONS WHO BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE DISCHARGED BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF ARMY SERVICE AND LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY  
(World-wide Cross Section, June 1945)



Data from S-205.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

overseas combat service), and this attitude, as well as the variations by personal background characteristics of the men. As Chart III shows, except for the men overseas with less than 1 year of service and for those never overseas with less than 3 years of service, a clear majority of all soldiers felt they should be discharged before the end of the war.

Operating independently of this rough estimating of the amount of contribution to the war already made were the host of personal considerations by which men tended to delimit, from the standpoint of the cost to the individual, how much should be expected from them. This is indicated in Tables 9 and 10. Older men, who saw

TABLE 9

PROPORTION AMONG COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT MEN WITH 1-3 YEARS OF SERVICE WHO BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE DISCHARGED BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR, CLASSIFIED BY PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (World-wide Cross Section, June 1945)

<i>Personal characteristic:</i>	PERCENTAGE SAYING THEY SHOULD BE DISCHARGED BEFORE END OF WAR AMONG MEN WHO HAVE HAD:		
	<i>No overseas service</i>	<i>Overseas noncombat service</i>	<i>Overseas combat service</i>
<i>Age</i>			
35 and over	91 (157)	85 (162)	83 (52)
30-34	60 (170)	71 (239)	83 (131)
25-29	45 (188)	55 (330)	67 (194)
20-24	30 (334)	41 (773)	54 (818)
Under 20	13 (36)	22 (50)	41 (74)
<i>Marital status</i>			
Married, one or more children	62 (257)	72 (273)	76 (182)
Married, no children	59 (254)	59 (340)	71 (166)
Single	33 (399)	45 (954)	54 (724)
<i>Education</i>			
High school graduate and college	41 (510)	47 (322)	53 (545)
Some high school	56 (219)	55 (470)	64 (316)
Grade school	68 (172)	60 (347)	70 (269)

Data from S-205.

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

the years when they should be establishing themselves slipping by, married men and especially fathers, and men in poor enough physical condition to be classified unfit for overseas duty<sup>18</sup> all were more likely to say they had done their share and should be discharged than were other men with the same amount of service.<sup>19</sup> In Table

<sup>18</sup> In part this may be regarded as a service-connected variable since it limited service to the United States. But in so doing, it placed men in those assignments which seemed most remote from the main task of winning the war, and, therefore, least clearly useful. This sense of futility, as was pointed out earlier, may well have been a factor in some men's desire to get out of the Army.

<sup>19</sup> Only one of these three factors was given weight in the Army discharge system. Older and limited-service men failed to get extra points because they were a minority and only they favored it. The presentation in this chapter differs from the point

10 these data are, for simplicity, presented only for men who had never served overseas, but the same relationships hold for other men as well.

The data by education in Tables 9 and 10 call for a special word of interpretation in this chapter on orientation toward the war. As these tables show and as all other data on personal commitment in

TABLE 10  
 PROPORTION AMONG MEN WITH NO OVERSEAS SERVICE WHO BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE DISCHARGED BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR, CLASSIFIED BY LENGTH OF ARMY SERVICE AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 (United States, June 1945)

<i>Personal characteristic:</i>	PERCENTAGE SAYING THEY SHOULD BE DISCHARGED BEFORE END OF WAR AMONG MEN WHO HAD SERVED FOR:		
	<i>One year or less</i>	<i>One to three years</i>	<i>More than three years</i>
<i>Age</i>			
35 and over	*	91 (157)	*
30-34	49 (43)	60 (170)	65 (57)
25-29	32 (113)	45 (188)	48 (132)
20-24	26 (88)	30 (334)	*
Under 20	11 (264)	13 (36)	*
<i>Marital status</i>			
Married, one or more children	37 (137)	62 (257)	67 (73)
Married, no children	*	59 (254)	53 (78)
Single	15 (316)	33 (399)	52 (100)
<i>Physical condition</i>			
Fit for overseas service	17 (303)	35 (472)	47 (150)
Not fit for overseas service	48 (42)	66 (318)	76 (72)
<i>Education</i>			
High school graduate and college	20 (262)	41 (510)	51 (137)
Some high school	19 (141)	56 (219)	61 (61)
Grade school	30 (120)	68 (172)	56 (50)

Data from S-205.  
 Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.  
 \* Too few cases to report a percentage.

Chapter 3 showed, the better educated men consistently made more favorable responses than the less educated on items reflecting personal commitment. Their tendency to accept the prosecution of the war as a personal responsibility more often than men with less education would not, however, appear to be a result of any deeper

system in that it is concerned with what men wanted for themselves irrespective of whether any consensus existed as to its equity, while the point system attempted to base discharges on a broad base of men's ideas of fairness both to themselves and others.

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intellectual convictions about it. As was shown in Chart I, the better educated men tended to be less ready than others to agree to either idealistic or cynical formulations as to the war's objectives. The only item on the list of war objectives in Chart I to which a larger proportion of college men than of grade school men agreed was "Whatever our wishes in the matter, we have to fight now if we are to survive." As was evidenced in Table 5, replicated in other studies, the better educated were more likely than others to admit to doubts that the war was worth fighting, yet tabulation of other items shows, for example, that they were just as likely as others to feel that the war should be prosecuted until unconditional surrender. Perhaps the better educated men's greater acceptance of the idea that they personally would have to see the war through reflected their greater willingness to accept logical consequences or at least their lesser ability to avoid facing unpleasant facts. That is, everyone defined the war as a necessity and everybody agreed that a great many men were needed in the Army. The educated man, however, was likely, somewhat more often than his less educated fellow soldier, to draw from these two premises the conclusion that he personally was needed and to reconcile himself to the results of his logical reasoning.

On the other hand, while Tables 9 and 10 do establish the existence of these educational differences in commitment, they also clearly show that at all educational levels the predominant tendency was to think in terms of a limited commitment. That is to say, the deterioration in commitment with increased amounts and rigor of Army service is, within each educational level, far more outstanding than the variations among educational groups. In other words we can conclude that among the men who did feel a sense of unlimited commitment to the war, there was a disproportionate number of men from the better educated group, but the better educated group as a whole, like the rest of the men, did not generally show this kind of complete acceptance of the war as their personal responsibility.

### SECTION III

#### EFFORTS TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF PERSONAL COMMITMENT BY CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR

The pervasiveness of the attitudes we have been describing was the subject of enough official concern to the Army to call forth efforts to indoctrinate the men explicitly, with the purpose of

strengthening their convictions and promoting a stronger sense of personal commitment.

There was never much doubt as to the fact that men with strong convictions about the war not only tended to have a stronger sense than others of personal commitment, but also that they were more favorable on other attitudes reflecting personal adjustment.

Table 11 illustrates the kind of relationships between these attitudes which existed, as of July 1943, among troops in the United States, and is replicated at other times and places with the same or different items. Men who said they never had doubts that the war was worth fighting had more favorable attitudes reflecting personal adjustment than other men. For example, among those claiming never to have doubts, 37 per cent said they were usually in good spirits, as compared with 25 per cent among those admitting doubts. The same type of relationship existed in other areas, including that of criticism of the Army not shown in Table 11.<sup>20</sup>

In particular, there was concern over the relationship between attitudes toward the war and such expressions of personal commitment as are shown in Table 11.

If, it was reasoned, attitudes toward the war could be improved, then personal commitment would be heightened. Some of the reservations which made the men's commitment a limited one might be removed.

This became one of the primary missions of the program of the

<sup>20</sup> For detailed check lists on which all but three of the items are based see Chapter 3. The items not listed in that section are:

Are you ever worried and upset?

- I am hardly ever worried and upset
- I am sometimes worried and upset
- I am often worried and upset

Which of the following statements best tells the way you feel about getting into the fighting?

- I'm ready to go and I want to get into the real fighting soon
- I'd like to get in on the fighting before it's over, but I don't think I'm ready yet
- I hope I won't have to go, but if I do, I think I'll do all right
- I hope I won't have to go, because I don't think I'll ever be good as a fighter
- None of the above fits me. My feeling is this . . .

Do you think a soldier with ability has a good chance for promotion in the Army?

- A very good chance
- A fairly good chance
- Not much of a chance
- No chance at all
- Undecided

Information and Education Division. The Division's policy was to avoid, in so far as possible, direct propaganda, and to seek, rather, to strengthen convictions about the war by an appeal to the facts. In other words, the theory was that if the men had the facts about

TABLE 11  
RELATIONSHIP OF DOUBTS ABOUT WAR TO OTHER RESPONSES REFLECTING  
PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT  
(United States Cross Section, July 1943)

	<i>Among those who said they never had doubts the war was worth fighting</i>	<i>Among all others</i>
<i>Personal Esprit</i>		
Percentage who said:		
They are "usually in good spirits"	37	25
They have "a pretty good time in the Army"	29	21
They are "hardly ever worried or upset"	41	27
<i>Personal Commitment</i>		
Percentage who said:		
They are more useful as soldiers than as war workers	40	27
They would rather be in a combat outfit overseas	48	34
They "want to get into the real fighting soon"	26	16
<i>Satisfaction with Status or Job</i>		
Percentage who said:		
They are giving them a "very good" or "good" chance to show what they can do	57	42
They consider their present Army job "very important"	42	28
They think what they are doing is "worth while"	63	47
They think a soldier with ability has a "very good chance of promotion"	41	31
They are "very much interested" in their Army job	55	38
They "usually put all" they have into their Army job	58	47
They do not want to change to another Army job	28	18
They are "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with their present Army job	41	31
<i>Number of cases</i>	1,446	678

Data from S-63E.

the war, they would draw the desired inference that the war had a meaning going far beyond the mere necessity of a militant answer to Pearl Harbor. This assumed (1) that the "facts" were really such as to lead reasonable men to make the "correct" inference and (2) that the rank and file of soldiers were *capable* of enough rationality to make the inference.



Actually, of course, facts were not always presented abstracted from emotional content. The series of "Why We Fight" films, for example, produced by the Information and Education Division under the direction of Colonel Frank Capra were not cold recitals of history but very moving interpretations of events from the point of view of our side in the war. Since they were almost entirely based on newsreels, many of which had been captured from the enemy, they were factual, indeed, but the highly skillful organization of the material was designed to make an appeal to the heart as well as the head.

Early in the war, the Research Branch addressed itself vigorously to the task of evaluating the effects of films (and other media) in changing opinions about the war. The analysis of that experience is of much significance, not only for practitioners in the field of education through mass media, but also for social psychologists studying the theory of communication. Much of Volume III in this series is devoted to this analysis, and for details the reader is referred to that volume.

The findings of Volume III are of methodological significance far beyond the immediate subject matter which they cover, because they illustrate a fact of which some social psychologists are still only dimly aware—namely, how extremely dangerous it is to translate a correlational finding into a system of causation. The more mature sciences demand, where possible, evidence based on controlled experiment, before saying "If you change  $X$ , then  $Y$  will change." In Volume III, we have a report based mainly on controlled experiments.

To those who believed that information media would have a marked effect on attitudes toward the war and in turn on personal commitment, the results of the carefully designed experimental studies analyzed in Volume III were somewhat disappointing.

Consider the effects of films like the "Why We Fight" series. The general findings are summarized in Volume III, Chapter 3, as follows:

The "Why We Fight" films had marked effects on the men's knowledge of factual material concerning the events leading up to the war. The fact that the upper limit of effects was so large, as for example in the cases where the correct answer was learned and remembered a week later by the majority of the men, indicates that highly effective presentation methods are possible with this type of film.

The films also had some marked effects on opinions, where the film specifically covered the factors involved in a particular interpretation, that is, where the

opinion item was prepared on the basis of film content analysis and anticipated opinion change from such analysis. Such opinion changes were, however, less frequent and, in general, less marked than changes in factual knowledge.

The films had only a very few effects on opinion items of a more general nature that had been prepared independently of film content, but which were considered the criteria for determining the effectiveness of the films in achieving their orientation objectives.

The films had no effects on items prepared for the purpose of measuring effects on the men's motivations to serve as soldiers, which was considered the ultimate objective of the orientation program.

Why such a result? In the same chapter of Volume III several contributory factors are suggested and discussed in some detail:

1. *Previous indoctrination as civilians.* One important possibility is that the men may already have been subjected to such an extensive information program from civilian sources that about the maximum effect had already been achieved in moulding their opinions related to orientation objectives. The Army orientation objectives were similar to the objectives of the Office of War Information, and civilians were exposed to newsreels, documentary films, documentary radio programs, newspaper and magazine articles, etc., which provided material similar to that presented in the orientation films. Since the men used in the study were nearly all trainees with only a few weeks' service in the Army, they would be expected to show the effects of all the civilian information media. For example, religious intolerance under Hitler was highly publicized, and in the study of "Prelude to War," 75% of the men believed at the outset that Hitler would "close all our churches" if he could conquer America. Similarly, 82% believed Hitler would "persecute and torture Jews and other minority groups," another highly publicized topic. It is obvious in these examples from the "Prelude to War" questionnaire that the great majority of the men had already been convinced of the point of view the film was trying to put across, and little further effect could be expected.

The high initial frequency limits the size of effect which is numerically possible. If 82% of the men are already sold on the idea that Hitler would persecute minority groups, the maximum difference between control and experimental group that it is possible for the film to produce is 18%, that is, only 18% of the men could change their opinions in the desired direction. This is quite a different situation from the case of a fact question for which only 10% initially check the correct answer, leaving room for 90% of the men to change to the correct answer.

The actual difference obtained between control and film groups on the question about persecution of minorities was +2%, which was too small to be reliable with the size of samples used. Nevertheless it was 1/9 of the total change possible. But a change of 1/9 of the total possible change would, on our hypothetical fact question, be an increase from 10% to 20% checking the correct answer, a difference of 10% which would be highly reliable with the size of control and experimental samples used in the study. Thus if we think not in terms of the total sample but rather in terms of that portion of the sample which has the undesirable opinion—which is the group to which the film is actually directed—a reason for the lack of effects on orientation objectives could be that civilian indoctrination made that group so small that even if a sizable portion of these men changed it would still be an insignificant proportion of the total sample. Even where the difference is reliable, it is not likely to be impressive in size. Thus the item in the questionnaire about Hitler "closing our churches" showed a difference of +8%

between control and film, which was a reliable difference but not very large. However, from the standpoint of the small group (25% of the men) who did not check this response initially, it was a difference affecting 8/25 or 32% of those who could change. This difficulty—that only those who do not initially give the desired response can be changed in the desired direction—is a recurrent problem. . . .

In addition to this purely statistical restriction, it would also be expected that a selection process would have been operative so that those who could still change their opinions in the desired direction would be more resistant to change. If a great majority of the total audience had been convinced of a particular point of view that is well publicized it is likely that the remaining proportion of the population, which still does not accept the view of the majority, contains the "die-hards" who are particularly resistant to (or incapable of) having their opinion changed. . . . It should be noted that wherever the ceiling and selection factors do apply, one of the assumptions of the orientation program—namely that a sizable proportion of the Army held misinformed opinions—did not apply. Wherever the civilian sources had already done the maximum orientation job, further material was not needed except on the possibility of influencing the remaining "die-hards."

It should also be noted, however, that these factors do not apply in all cases. This is particularly true in the area of willingness to serve—the main target of the orientation program. Here the usual result was that less than half of the men checked the desired response, which left considerable room for changes due to the films. This was also true of other of the general questions dealing with sub-objectives of the orientation program. Thus other factors must also be involved.

2. *Conflicting motivation.* Another hypothetical factor that might have applied in the case of some of the orientation objectives is the possibility of resistance to change because of motivations running counter to the implications of the orientation content. This would be particularly expected in such areas as willingness to go overseas or serve in combat, where the audience might have a large number of reasons for not wanting to fight to offset anything presented in the "Why We Fight" films. Fear of injury, pressure from a wife or mother, and so forth, would be strong motivations to compete with the motivating effects of the film. Or, as another example, the audience might have considerable resistance to accepting the idea that the war will be long and difficult. If they wanted to be out of the Army soon, if they hoped they would not be needed for combat, or if they hoped that even in combat they would not run many risks, they would have strong motivation to resist evidences for a long and difficult war.

By contrast, the audience might have little or no motivation to reject, for example, the idea that the British blocked an invasion attempt. Some ethnocentric or anti-British individuals might be unwilling to give the British credit for a victory, but most individuals would see in this interpretation no conflict with their own interests and would accept the film's interpretation if it were convincingly presented. This strong motivation to resist acceptance of certain of the orientation objectives may have accounted in part for the lack of motivating effects of the films.

3. *Ineffectuality of a single 50-minute presentation.* It might be argued that sizable changes in motivation as a result of a single 50-minute film are very unlikely simply because the film is such a small influence relative to perhaps years of exposure to points of view contrary to material presented in the film. For example, exposure to various patriotic communications over a period of years might convince a man that America is unbeatable; the interpretations in a film that real peril existed would be relatively too small a portion of the total indoctrinational influ-

ences to change his mind to the point of view that America was in real danger.

This suggests the possibility that while a single orientation film might not produce effects large enough to be statistically reliable, the entire series of seven "Why We Fight" films might have produced definite changes in motivation. A study along these lines was contemplated but never carried out, largely because of a number of practical considerations. . . .

The nearest approach to such a study was the experiment testing the cumulative effects of two films. These cumulative effects were not at all impressive, although the joint exposure to these two films produced the only reliable change obtained on an item dealing with resentment of the enemy. Unfortunately, this same item was not used with other films and it was an item in which sensitivity to change was increased through a comparison of the relative resentment for Nazis versus the Japanese. It is significant that other resentment items, that had been used in the other film studies, showed no reliable cumulative effects of the two successive presentations.

4. *Lack of specific coverage.* Another possible factor which might account for lack of effects on general questions designed to measure attitudes related to orientation objectives is lack of specific coverage in the material presented by the film. There are some lines of suggestive evidence pointing in this direction. For example, fact-quiz items, all of which dealt with material specifically covered in the film, were nearly always reliably affected by the film. Moreover, in nearly all cases opinion changes were found on questions related to main themes of the films. Nearly all of the opinion changes found were on questions that had been prepared on the basis of film-content analysis. On the other hand almost no changes were found on opinion items prepared independently of film content. It is interesting that the largest opinion change obtained on an independently prepared "scale" area question was the 12% difference between control and film groups in rating the German air forces as first or second strongest in the study of "Prelude to War." In the film the Luftwaffe had been shown in action and was specifically described as "the world's largest air force."

Another line of evidence that specific coverage is important was found in a study of several radio transcriptions. Sizable effects were obtained with specific coverage of an orientation topic which none of the films had significantly influenced. . . . The orientation objective in this study was the difficulty of the job of winning the war; the main question used was the men's estimates of the probable length of the war. This question is not subject to ceiling effects because answers along a time continuum can be dichotomized at any point and individual changes of any size determined. In this study single radio transcriptions (15 to 20 minutes in length) devoted to discussion of enemy strength as related to the probable length of the war were found to cause about 40% of the men to revise their estimates upward by at least six months. By contrast the show of Nazi strength in "Prelude to War" and succeeding films had no reliable effects on such estimates. Precise comparison of the results of the transcriptions (which had specific coverage) and the films (which did not have specific coverage) cannot be made because of differences in the two media and because the above-mentioned figure of 40% effect was obtained under conditions of immediate measurement whereas film effects were measured four to seven days after presentation. Nevertheless, the result definitely suggests that, for this orientation objective at least, the lack of film effects was due to lack of specific coverage.

In the preparation of the radio transcriptions the script writers and the producers were in on the experiment almost from the beginning. They drew their material from an outline of relevant factual information prepared by Research Branch personnel and they knew at the outset the actual wording of the main

question to be used in testing the effectiveness of the programs. The success of these programs at changing opinions on an independently prepared question aimed at one of the orientation objectives suggests not only the importance of specific coverage, but also the possible importance of the production personnel's having in mind at the outset of production the criteria they are striving to influence.

The whole question of "specific coverage" raises the interesting research problem of whether or not effects are generally possible in a communication that carries an implied rather than a stated "message." To expect that the orientation film would cause changes in certain of the criterion questions involves the assumption that opinions will change as a result of the *implications* of factual material even though the inference is not explicitly drawn and stated in the communication. In these terms the expectation that a show of Nazi strength would increase estimates of length of war rests on the assumption that the audience would make the inferential step involved. It may be that only a limited number actually do this without help. . . .

5. *Need for a "sinking in" period.* In all of the orientation-film findings discussed thus far the experimental measurements were made from four to seven days after the film showings. It was thought that this would select a point on the forgetting curve at which the relatively lasting effects of the films could be determined. However, it is possible that this was not a long enough period for some of the films' effects to be felt. Perhaps, for example, the influence of factual information is not in the immediate changes in opinion produced but in its effect—as a store of knowledge—in affecting the interpretations of subsequently learned facts. Or perhaps the implications of facts are not seen immediately but instead require a period to think them over or see their relevance in subsequent discussions. The main point being made is that films may have delayed or "sleeper" effects that require a lapse of time to become evident, and this may be particularly true of opinion changes of a more general nature such as were involved in the orientation objectives.

Bearing directly on this problem is a study of the time factor after presentation as a variable influencing the effects of a film in changing opinion and factual knowledge. Some fairly clear-cut cases of "sleeper" effects were obtained in this study, and several possible mechanisms that could bring about such effects are discussed.

A further, and perhaps more basic question, is raised in Volume III, Chapter 3: Is it possible that a program relying primarily on factual information simply cannot affect attitudes and motivations, except among a small percentage of individuals whose attitudes are primarily determined by rational analysis of the relevant facts? For the majority of individuals, it is suggested, it may be true that motivations and attitudes are generally acquired without regard to rational considerations and are practically impregnable to new rational considerations.

How shall we conceive of the relationship between (1) information, (2) specific opinions, and (3) general attitudes such as willingness to fight?

On the one hand, we could conceptualize the relationship as a simple two-step chain sequence: Changes in information change

specific opinions; changes in specific opinions change general attitudes. Or, on the other hand, we could conceptualize the relationship as one of mutual interaction. Change any of the three components and a system of effects takes place which operates directly on the other components, reacts back through them upon the component initially changed, and continues until some equilibrium is reached.

As is indicated in Volume III, a definitive test of such schemes poses difficult methodological problems: "Even if there had been changes in opinion and motivation it would be difficult to know whether to attribute the change in motivation to the change in opinion. This difficulty cannot be overcome by controlled experimentation since it is difficult to see how the relevant experiment could be performed. The methodological difficulty is created by the problem of varying independently the variables in the hypothetical causal relationship. In this situation the independent variables are themselves *reactions* of the individual and as such require a stimulus; by consequence it is difficult or impossible to know whether the dependent variable was affected by this reaction or whether it was directly affected by the stimuli used to bring about the reaction. For example, if a movie altered attitude toward the justice of America's cause in the war and it is found that the altered attitudes are accompanied by increased motivation, how does one know the movie did not affect the motivation directly rather than that the change in motivation was caused by the improvement in conviction that our cause is just?"

The evidence reviewed in Volume III does not, however, make too encouraging a case for a close sequential relationship between changes in factual information and changes in motivation, at least in the case of the war material. As was shown in Table 11 in this chapter, there was a correlation between opinion about the war and attitudes reflecting personal adjustment, including personal commitment. Further studies, reported in Volume III, Chapter 3, show that not only did such static correlations exist but also that dynamic correlations existed. Changes over time in opinions about the war were positively correlated with changes in response on items involving personal commitment, though the correlation was lower than in the static case. However, both the static and the dynamic correlations between information and specific opinions about the war were very low and the correlations between information and

personal commitment were practically zero, when educational level was held constant.

If the chain relationship of the type information  $\rightarrow$  opinions about the war  $\rightarrow$  personal commitment existed, it is easy to show that it would require a large change in opinion pursuant to a large change in information to have any appreciable effect on personal commitment. Suppose that a 50 per cent improvement in information is accompanied by a 10 per cent improvement in opinions about the war so that the change in opinion would be only one fifth of the change in information. Similarly, suppose a change of 60 per cent in opinion score is accompanied by a 20 per cent change in personal commitment, or in other words, the change in commitment is about one third the change in opinion toward the war. If, then, the relationship between information and commitment is the product of the two preceding relationships, the change in commitment would be one fifteenth as great as the change in information.<sup>21</sup> Thus a 100 per cent improvement in knowledge would lead to an expectation of only a 7 per cent improvement in personal commitment. But if, in practice, a good information program increased information by only, say, 25 or 30 per cent, then the corresponding expected change in commitment would be only about 2 per cent.

It is noted in Volume III that some few opinion items actually had a small but significant *negative* correlation with information. For example, the better informed, according to an information test described in Volume III, were *less* likely than the relatively uninformed to believe that Hitler had the conquest of the United States in his original plans. Yet men who, even though uninformed, as measured on the information test, held opinions like this tended to manifest higher personal commitment than other men. This suggests the possibility that some men with high motivation to serve may have "projected" their motivations and adopted opinions consistent with their motivations. At the same time, if the better informed simply did not believe that Hitler had the conquest of the United States in his original plans, it would not be too surprising if an information policy of "let the facts speak for themselves" tended to decrease rather than increase the number of men holding such a

<sup>21</sup> This assumes that the only effect information has on commitment is through its effect on opinions about the war. Stated algebraically,  $r_{12,3}$  must equal zero, where  $x_1$  is information,  $x_2$  is opinions about the war, and  $x_3$  is commitment. For only then does  $r_{13} = r_{12}r_{23}$  and  $x_3 = b_{12}b_{23}x_1$ , as assumed in the text.

belief, and thus had the opposite ultimate effect on personal commitment from that intended.

The film program was only a small part of the total effort of the Information and Education Division. Another and much more complex activity was represented by the orientation courses instituted by the Division. These were weekly discussion groups, conducted at a small unit level, for the guidance of which printed materials were prepared by the Division. It is not the purpose of the present chapter to assess in full the accomplishments of this program, but rather to use the research findings concerning it for the light they may throw on the dynamics of attitudes toward the war.

As in the case of the films, we shall see that the measurable effects of the orientation program on general motivations, such as personal commitment, may have been rather slight. Before reviewing the evidence, however, it is important to see some of the administrative problems involved.

First, one must keep in mind the fact that the sole responsibility of the Division was for staff planning, preparation of materials, and training of part of the field personnel, while the execution of the plans in the field was the responsibility of the field command. There were administrative problems both at the staff level and in the field. At the staff level, there was a series of reorganizations all aimed at clarifying the status of orientation activities and placing them in a better strategic position for the accomplishment of the orientation mission. It was not until after the end of the war that the Information and Education Division was made directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. During most of the war, it was under Army Service Forces, which was one of three major subdivisions of the Army and operated with an authority which was not always clear with respect to Air and Ground Forces.

Because the execution of plans was outside the Division's control, as was also a large part of the responsibility for getting supplies to the field, the orientation program was unevenly complied with in different parts of the world and at different times. Under the pressure of heavy training or duty schedules, commanders who were indifferent or hostile to the concept of mental conditioning of soldiers simply failed to comply with the requirement that one undivided hour per week during duty hours be set aside for orientation. Whether we turn to the testimony of the men, as in Table 12, or to the reports of the officers in charge of the program, presented in Table 13, the conclusion is that only a minority of the units in the



Army were allotting to orientation the minimum time authorized. While these data are for active theaters,<sup>22</sup> the situation was no better in inactive theaters. In India-Burma, for instance, only one of thirty-five organizations surveyed in March 1945 was found to be conducting a weekly discussion program on duty time. And even

TABLE 12  
NUMBER OF UNITS IN WHICH A MAJORITY OF THE MEN REPORT  
ORIENTATION MEETINGS  
(Mediterranean Theater)

<i>Time of survey</i>	<i>Number of units surveyed</i>	<i>Number of units in which half or more of the men said their outfit had had an orientation meeting in the past week*</i>
December 1944	50	21
June 1945	41	24
September 1945	64	37

\* Based on the question: "During the past seven days, has your outfit had any orientation lectures or discussion hours?"

- Yes, we had lecture only
- Yes, we had discussion only
- Yes, we had both lecture and discussion
- Yes, we had an orientation movie (with or without discussion after it)
- No, we had none

TABLE 13  
OFFICERS' REPORTS OF THE FREQUENCY OF DISCUSSION GROUP MEETINGS  
(European Theater, April 1945)

<i>Frequency of discussion group sessions*</i>	<i>Number of units</i>
At least once a week, on duty time with the majority of men in the unit attending	13
Once every two weeks, or oftener, but not on duty time or not having majority attendance	10
Less frequent than once every two weeks	9
No discussion groups held in unit during last three months	19
Unclassified, e.g., "Once a week until two months ago, none since"	6
<i>Total units surveyed:</i>	<i>57</i>

\* Based on interviews with the Information and Education Officers or Commanding Officers of units surveyed during cross-section study (S-223).

<sup>22</sup> Theater directives permitted combat units to omit discussion groups while they were engaged in operations, but the record of noncombat units in active theaters is not essentially different from that of combat units.

where the time was allotted, it was sometimes used for lectures on topics unrelated to the orientation program, such as the reading of the "Articles of War," or the periodic sex hygiene lecture.

The indifference, misunderstanding, and hostility which the orientation program sometimes encountered from commanding officers resulted in another great handicap: relatively poor personnel were sometimes assigned to the program in the field. In view of the crucial importance of qualified and interested personnel to the success of a program based, as this one was, on securing attention and participation from the men who attended the discussion sessions, the frequent assignment of officers who knew little and cared less about what orientation was trying to accomplish was an inestimable burden. While careful discussion guides were frequently prepared and accompanied by painstaking instructions for their use, always stressing that a "canned" or read talk should not be used, their usefulness could be completely undone by unconcerned officers who permitted performances like the following reported by a Research Branch Officer in India: "An enlisted man read *CBI Talks* [a discussion guide pamphlet] to the men, somewhat in the manner of the compulsory reading of the 'Articles of War.' In this case, the uninstructed enlisted man actually read to his audience every word in the booklet, including all the boxed notes for the discussion leader, and the section (including the caption!) entitled 'Special to the I & E Officer.'" <sup>23</sup>

The reader can imagine the effects that were achieved in cases where the officers in charge themselves held cynical or apathetic attitudes either about the war or about the usefulness of orientation. While performances were often perfunctory (though probably not as bad as the example just cited), there were, of course, also many examples of splendid execution.

An attempt to evaluate the importance of the discussion leaders, criticisms of whose ability always led the list of negative comments about the orientation program, was made in a little study in July 1945 of fifteen of the discussion groups which met at one camp in the United States. In this study, men were asked to name the two men in their outfit who, in their opinion, would make the best orientation discussion leaders, and discussion groups were then classified on the basis of the relative vote given to the man who acted as a discussion leader. After being matched with respect to the relevant

<sup>23</sup> Quoted from *A Study of Orientation Media in the India-Burma Theater*, Research Branch Report No. IB-29, p. 4.

background considerations, primarily education, the groups were compared with regard to their attitudes toward the orientation program. As the data in Table 14 show, men in discussion groups conducted by men who were also chosen for the leadership roles were more likely to feel that they were getting something out of their attendance at these meetings. These figures support the conclusion that orientation was better liked when it was directed by personnel who were liked, respected, or admired, but unfortunately we

TABLE 14  
 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION OF DISCUSSION LEADERS AND  
 APPROVAL OF ORIENTATION  
 (695 Army Service Force Men in the United States, July 1945)

<i>Evaluation of discussion leader*</i>	<i>Number of groups†</i>	<i>Average percentage in each group who say they get a lot out of orientation discussions‡</i>
Group's discussion leader is first choice of the group	3	39
Group leader is among top choices of the group, but not first	3	23
Group leader is not among top choices of the group	3	14

\* Based on the question: "In your opinion, taking everything into account, which two men in your outfit would make the best orientation discussion leaders?"

† Six of the original fifteen groups were eliminated in the matching process, so these figures should not be interpreted as the actual frequency of the several ratings of leaders.

‡ Based on the question: "Do you personally think that you get anything out of these talks and discussions?"

- Yes, I get a lot out of them
- Yes, I get something out of them
- No, I don't get much out of them
- Undecided

have little or no information on what qualities men admired in the preferred leaders except for the fact that these leaders did tend to be better educated, and therefore, inferentially, better informed and more articulate, than the group which chose them.

Quite apart from its operational shortcomings, orientation had as well the inherent weakness of being an official part of the Army, which meant that there was a tendency for the men to regard it with the same hostility and distrust that they had for the Army as a whole. And suspicion was increased whenever the official character of the program required that it support official policies. As the Technical Guide for Information and Orientation Officers pointed out: "In such matters [policies of the Government and

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regulations and directives issued by the War Department] the discussion leader [Information and Education Officer] has a clear responsibility for explaining to the soldier the reasons for the majority opinion, and the reasons for acceptance by the soldier of the majority decision. The soldier may discuss matters pertaining to governmental and military policies, understanding, however, that these are policies to which he must, perforce, conform. The unity which is essential to success in war can be obtained only by cheerful obedience to commands."<sup>24</sup> In practice, however, this position required that orientation must, for example, justify nonfraternization in Germany to the men while it was the policy and then defend fraternization when the policy changed. As occasional apologist for the Army, the orientation program was more than ever open to the charge of "propaganda" and special pleading which men were already accustomed to level against any attempt to influence their thinking.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, even when it operated well, orientation was an isolated hour a week in an environment in which almost every other influence ran counter to its ultimate goals. While, for example, the orientation program had for its purpose, among other things, the reaffirming of the values of democracy and the integrity of the individual, the ordinary enlisted man returned from his discussion hour to the depersonalized world of the Army in which he found little democracy and not much regard for him as an individual. Little wonder, then, if enlisted men accepted the larger part of their Army lives as the reality and took orientation with a large grain of salt.

It was with all these continuing difficulties that the Army orientation program undertook the task, which would in any case have been gigantic, of remolding some of the rather basic attitudes described in earlier sections. When we view the long years of pre-military experience which went into the formation of the point of view of the men who made up the American Army, we may wonder how much an orientation program, however ideal, could be expected

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<sup>24</sup> *War Department Technical Manual 23-210*, War Department, July 1945, pp. 7 and 8.

<sup>25</sup> The personnel in the Orientation Branch of the Information and Education headquarters sometimes found their position difficult because they were not located in a staff position where they could effectively influence the formulation of overall policies of this kind. It could happen that they were called on to justify policies of which they themselves disapproved as having a harmful effect on their primary goals. In such cases they were at the same time forced to further a disapproved-of policy and to risk undermining the confidence of the men on which the success of their general program depended.

to achieve in a one-hour-a-week attempt to reverse cultural trends. What can the program be said to have accomplished in the way of its avowed purpose of promoting conviction and zeal for the war through a controlled program of information and discussion?

In a study made in Europe in April 1945, men in units which were conducting discussion sessions were compared with equated groups of men in comparable units in which orientation sessions had not been held at least in the three months prior to the study. A whole range of attitudes, the influencing of which was either a long-run or a then-current objective of the on-going orientation program, were examined. Included among them were: factual information about the war; evaluation of the worth-whileness of the war and its outcome; attitudes toward the Army and toward personal participation in the Army; attitudes toward international relations, treatment of enemies and relations with Allies, attitudes toward the home front; and concern with domestic problems, the treatment of veterans and personal readjustment to civilian life. In none of these attitude areas were any significant consistent differences found as between men in units conducting an orientation program and men in the other units. The more than one hundred questions examined in this analysis cannot be presented here, but for the convenience of the reader the areas covered and a question typical of those employed in each area are summarized in Table 15.

While this study suggests that in the large the orientation program as it was carried out had little effect, there are inadequacies in its design which qualify the validity of conclusions drawn from it. We do not know, for example, to what extent men in units with no orientation programs may have transferred from units having orientation, nor to what extent transfers in the other direction took place. If an appreciable proportion of the men in units with programs were in fact newly encountering orientation, while some of the men in units without orientation had experienced the program elsewhere before joining their present unit, then the static analysis just presented would not really be controlling the factor of exposure to orientation, and the lack of differences reported might simply be an artifact of the imperfect controls.

On the other hand, a rigorous evaluation of the long-time effects of a program is a very difficult undertaking. We all know and can easily outline the design of such a study: the selection of matched groups which have not as yet taken part in the program, preliminary measurement of their information and attitudes, exposure of

the experimental groups to the program with no such exposure of the control groups, and finally a remeasurement of the information and attitudes of both sets of groups and a comparison of the changes taking place. But applying this framework to the Army research situation was not so easy.

In the first place, the groups selected for the study would have to follow Army organizational lines, since policies were adopted and practiced for the whole organization, and administrators in the field would not be friendly to the suggestion that a program which they wanted to institute be withheld for research purposes from half the men in their jurisdiction. This in turn implied that a relatively few large units would have to be worked with, since the relevant policies were largely executed on a regimental or even a divisional level. As a result of the small number of independent *units* involved, regardless of the number of men studied, the assumption of controlled observations of this kind—that the effect of influences other than the one being studied may be ignored since on the aver-

TABLE 15  
SELECTED COMPARISONS OF ATTITUDES OF MEN IN UNITS HAVING AND  
NOT HAVING ORIENTATION PROGRAMS  
(European Theater, April 1945)

Area	No. of questions asked	Example*: respondents say that	AVERAGE PERCENTAGE GIVING INDICATED RESPONSE AMONG MEN IN GROUPS†	
			Without unit orientation	With unit orientation
Factual information about the war	7	Allies landed in North Africa in the latter part of 1942	50	49
Worth-whileness of war	12	They are very or fairly sure that good peace terms will be worked out	66	65
Attitudes toward the Army and Army service	18	They worry about not getting a fair break in getting discharged from the Army	57	60
The need for postwar international cooperation	5	We should send food to needy Allies even if it means more rationing in the U.S.	58	53
Attitudes toward Germany	20	Germany should be governed by a strong occupation force for at least four years	39	42

TABLE 15 (Continued)

Area	No. of questions asked	Example*: respondents say that	AVERAGE PERCENTAGE GIVING INDICATED RESPONSE AMONG MEN IN GROUPS†	
			Without unit orientation	With unit orientation
Attitudes toward Allies	26	We can count on Russia to help us defeat Japan	62	62
Interest in current events and postwar problems	11	They think they'll be more interested in problems of national government after they return to civilian life than they were before the war	78	79
Concern about personal postwar adjustment	8	They think it will be very hard or fairly hard to get the kind of jobs they want after the war	38	38
Attitudes toward government programs for veterans	6	The government is doing a good job in seeing that veterans get needed help to start them in civilian life	41	40
Attitudes toward the home front	11	Most or all of the people back home are doing all they should to help win the war	66	65

Data from S-223.

\* While only one question is presented for each area for the sake of brevity, each area was analyzed separately in terms of the consistency of the set of differences and of deviations of individual units from the means for the group of units and no statistically significant differences or patterns of differences were found.

† These percentages are based on 29 units, 15 of which had discussion programs and 14 of which had not. The men in these two sets of groups were closely equated in age, education, marital status, length and branch of Army service.

age they affect both control and experimental groups alike—would be no longer tenable. That is, it could not be assumed that the effect of a policy action taken in one unit used as a control group would necessarily be offset by some other influence in the experimental unit; for that assumption is only reliable when the sample of *units* is large. Thus in one case, a study had to be abandoned when the control unit was suddenly alerted for overseas service, an action which might reasonably be supposed to affect men's attitudes and whose effect could not be measured and eliminated.

Related to this was the fact that the policy actions were not really subject to research manipulations. Though the orientation pro-

gram was a matter of Army regulation, the degree of compliance with it, as we have pointed out, varied with the wishes of commanding officers. A unit which had no program, therefore, most likely had none because its commander was out of sympathy with the idea, and if he did not want orientation in his outfit he was even less likely to cooperate with research about orientation. Hence securing a unit with no orientation program which would install one and act as the experimental group could not be done routinely. It was primarily a matter of discovering a unit that was about to set up an orientation program for one reason or another, and securing its cooperation. In other words, research was not in a position to manipulate but had to look for and adapt itself to opportunities.

Even assuming that suitable units could be found, it would still be practicable to evaluate only the short-run effects of orientation. For, if too much time elapsed between test and retest, the units would have moved around, personnel would have shifted, and, even if they could be located and retested, the probability of unique experiences, like those referred to above, affecting the final results would have increased with time. Moreover, if the effectiveness of orientation were measured over, say, a three-month period, and if no effects were found, these findings could easily be dismissed, since a basic assumption of orientation was that changing fundamental attitudes was a slow process.

At any rate, this was not a pressing problem of research, since the important question was not so much whether the admittedly imperfect program was having an effect as it was whether the most ideal program would have an effect. As long as orientation seemed potentially useful, it justified the efforts made to improve its practice. In line with this position, a controlled experiment was attempted in April 1944 to compare the effectiveness of a model program with that of an average program, but as we shall see practical difficulties made even this experiment inconclusive.

Two Infantry regiments in training in the United States in about the same state of training and comparable in background were selected for study. The first was judged to have a rather poor orientation program, as indicated by the ratings of field inspectors from the Orientation Branch of the Information and Education Division and by men's questionnaire responses about orientation practices in their outfit. The second regiment was judged by the same criteria to have a fairly good program as such things went in the field. In the first regiment, following a preliminary questionnaire, a



trained orientation officer was detailed from headquarters to execute a carefully planned, model orientation program. In the second, no attempt was made to alter the program. Four months later both regiments were resurveyed.

The data shown in Table 16 make it clear that the intensification of the orientation program in the regiment into which the "model" program was introduced greatly increased the men's exposure to orientation. But it is also clear that as far as these relatively objective criteria go, the program in the "experimental" regiment was only brought approximately to the level of that in the regiment having a mediocre program. While no means were available to evaluate more subtle aspects of the programs—the caliber of discus-

TABLE 16  
CHANGES IN VARIOUS ORIENTATION PRACTICES IN THE REGIMENTS WITH THE  
"MODEL" AND "TYPICAL" ORIENTATION PROGRAMS  
(April to August, 1944)

<i>Percentage of men reporting that</i>	REGIMENT IN WHICH A "MODEL" PROGRAM WAS INSTALLED			REGIMENT IN WHICH AN AVERAGE PROGRAM CONTINUED		
	<i>April</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>Change</i>	<i>April</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>Change</i>
<b>Their outfits had orientation talks at least weekly</b>	33	59	+26	53	65	+12
<b>Their officers used <i>Newsmap</i> in their talks about war news</b>	45	88	+43	77	81	+4
<b>They themselves saw <i>Newsmap</i></b>	76	98	+22	89	95	+6
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>482</i>	<i>482</i>		<i>639</i>	<i>639</i>	

Data from S-121.

sion leaders or the extent to which men were stimulated to take part in the discussions they attended—still these data suggest that a really "model" program was not installed, even though they do not settle definitely whether the model program was in fact superior to the typical one.

In Tables 17, 18, and 19 are presented the changes in information about the war, attitudes toward the war, and zeal for the war occurring in the two regiments over the four-month period. The information in these three tables is summarized in Chart IV. As we see in detail in the tables and in summary in Chart IV, in both regiments there were small but significant gains in information and in

attitudes toward the war, but no increase in zeal.<sup>26</sup> The differences between the regiments are so slight, however, that the interpretation of these changes is ambiguous. As far as this study goes, it may be that the ordinary and the so-called "model" program (which it should be remembered was superficially at least no better than the ordinary program) were about equally effective in communicating information and in influencing attitudes toward the war, or it may be that these changes are not attributable to the orientation program but to influences not under consideration. To settle this point, the study would have had to include another group in which there was no program at all, and this was not feasible.

TABLE 17  
CHANGES IN INFORMATION AMONG MEN IN REGIMENTS WITH "MODEL" AND  
"TYPICAL" ORIENTATION PROGRAMS  
(April to August, 1944)

	PERCENTAGE ANSWERING CORRECTLY IN					
	<i>Regiment in which a "model" program was installed</i>			<i>Regiment in which an average program continued</i>		
	April	August	Change	April	August	Change
Who wrote <i>Mein Kampf</i> ?	83	88	+5	82	83	+1
Is Brazil at war against Axis?	65	73	+8	66	68	+2
Who is Tito?	56	77	+21	58	69	+11
How many United Nations are there?	54	59	+5	58	60	+2
What is the Atlantic Charter?	57	55	-2	59	60	+1
Who are the Junkers?	57	75	+18	51	64	+13
What act of aggression marked beginning of present war?	52	62	+10	50	60	+10
Who is De Gaulle?	93	95	+2	90	93	+3
What are the Four Freedoms?	24	31	+7	25	32	+7
Average	60.1	68.3	+8.2	59.9	65.4	+5.5
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>482</i>	<i>482</i>		<i>659</i>	<i>659</i>	

Data from S-121.

<sup>26</sup> The three questions indexing personal zeal individually show significant differences but in opposite directions. These opposite tendencies—an increased willingness to go overseas and a decreased acceptance of Army values—are, however, exactly the types of trends in attitude shown in Chapter 5 to occur as men progressed from new recruits to trained soldiers, and the data probably reflect this process rather than an effect of the orientation program.

As shown in Tables 17, 18, and 19 and summarized graphically in Chart IV, the gains accruing from the orientation program are not impressive. In these studies there was evidence that not all men were being exposed to orientation and that the best orientation techniques were not uniformly employed. The analysis of the assumptions of orientation, however, as illustrated earlier from the film studies, suggests that even under ideal conditions only a small increment of improvement might have been expected. The relationship between information, specific opinions about the war, and attitudes like personal commitment was perhaps not such that an increase in information would operate via an improvement in specific opinions to enhance personal commitment appreciably.

TABLE 18

CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR AMONG MEN IN REGIMENTS WITH  
"MODEL" AND "TYPICAL" ORIENTATION PROGRAMS  
(April to August, 1944)

<i>Percentages agreeing that</i>	REGIMENT IN WHICH A "MODEL" PROGRAM WAS INSTALLED			REGIMENT IN WHICH AN AVERAGE PROGRAM CONTINUED		
	<i>April</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>Change</i>	<i>April</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>Change</i>
Britain will help us fight Japan	78	85	+7	81	81	0
Russia will <i>not</i> make a separate peace	71	90	+19	73	89	+16
Hitler has always planned to conquer the U.S.	67	81	+14	72	80	+8
We should fight until unconditional surrender	73	85	+12	78	87	+9
We would <i>not</i> have been better off by just defending our own shores	92	92	0	93	95	+2
Britain can be trusted	64	64	0	67	66	-1
Russia can be trusted	39	54	+15	41	52	+11
I never get the feeling the war is not worth fighting	44	40	-4	52	47	-5
Germans wanted to rule the world	60	74	+14	70	72	+2
Just making the U.S. safe from attack is <i>not</i> enough	84	88	+4	83	89	+6
<b>Average</b>	<b>67.2</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>+8.1</b>	<b>71.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>488</i>	<i>488</i>		<i>639</i>	<i>639</i>	

Data from S-121.

Even though the accomplishments of the orientation program in altering personal commitment were somewhat disappointing, there were other ways in which orientation served a useful purpose. It may be argued that in the Army of a democracy every soldier should be given access to the news and a chance to express his views on it. Certainly, the orientation program fulfilled these functions. And even with its imperfections, a majority of the men who encountered the program liked it.

TABLE 19  
CHANGES IN PERSONAL ZEAL FOR THE WAR AMONG MEN IN REGIMENTS WITH  
"MODEL" AND "TYPICAL" ORIENTATION PROGRAMS  
(April to August, 1944)

Percentages saying that	REGIMENT IN WHICH A "MODEL" PROGRAM WAS INSTALLED			REGIMENT IN WHICH AN AVERAGE PROGRAM CONTINUED		
	April	August	Change	April	August	Change
It is important to be a good soldier	66	48	-18	66	55	-11
They usually put all they have into their jobs	53	39	-14	56	53	-3
They want to serve overseas	23	48	+25	25	38	+13
Average	47.3	45.0	-2.3	49.0	48.7	-0.3
Number of cases	482	482		639	639	

Data from S-121.


About two thirds of the men who had attended discussion groups in such widely separated places as Italy and the Central Pacific said they found the meetings worth-while. In Alaska, too, a majority approved of the *idea* of group discussions, even though more than a third of those approving felt that so far none of the meetings they had attended had been good.<sup>27</sup> The reasons for these favorable reactions are not far to seek. At the very worst, the weekly discussion session meant one hour of duty in which men were not required to do anything more onerous than sit. But usually the topics covered had a certain amount of interest for the men. Such subjects as the GI Bill of Rights, what to do about Germany after the war, postwar military conscription, of plans for international organiza-

<sup>27</sup> These were men whose outfits had orientation meetings and who checked an answer category which read: "The orientation meetings are a good idea, but we have not had any good meetings in this outfit."

tion had a certain current events quality about them and could capture men's attention, even though one of the recurrent difficulties of the orientation program was how to get the discussion aids prepared and distributed before the topic became stale.

CHART IV

CHANGES IN INFORMATION AND ATTITUDES AMONG SAME MEN IN REGIMENTS WITH "MODEL" AND "TYPICAL" ORIENTATION PROGRAMS



Data from Tables 17, 18, and 19.

The numbers at the bottom of the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

Perhaps of considerable psychological importance in men's enjoyment of the orientation sessions was the status they accorded him as a person. In the vast impersonal mill of the Army, there was, as Chapter 8 pointed out, no effective official means for enlisted men to express their opinions. True, they could attempt to get permission to see their commanding officers, or visit the Inspector General, or take their troubles to the chaplain, but each of these procedures had its limitations. In an informal way, the correspondence columns of the Army newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, were used as a forum, but almost the only official place in the Army in which an enlisted man was not only permitted but was usually encouraged to have his say was at his orientation sessions.<sup>28</sup> The effectiveness of this sort of outlet was, of course, limited by the fact that such sessions were frequently conducted by officers, in whose presence enlisted men might not feel really free to express themselves. Where the discussion groups were directed, as they often were, by the men's own company officers, there was certainly a theoretical possibility that what a man said in the orientation class would be remembered and used against him. This would not seem to have been a very serious limiting factor in the men's eyes, since they themselves tended to name either an officer or anyone, regardless of rank, who had special qualifications as their preference in discussion leaders.

Another psychological satisfaction which enlisted men derived from attendance at orientation sessions was the feeling it gave them that serious efforts were being made to keep them well informed, quite apart from any measurable gain in information. For example, in the 19 units reported, in Table 13, to have had no discussion groups, an average of 38 per cent of the men said that as much as possible was being done in their outfits to keep them informed.<sup>29</sup> In the 13 units at the other extreme, where weekly discussions were held on duty time (and which did not differ much in composition from the first group of units), this proportion rose to 58 per cent on the average. Yet, as was shown in Table 15, no differences were found to exist between these two types of units in the men's atti-

<sup>28</sup> In this connection, it might be suggested that the cordial reception of questionnaires by the men is no doubt in part attributable to the relief they offered from the Army's extreme devaluation of the individual.

<sup>29</sup> The question asked was: "How much is done in your outfit to keep men informed about the news and what it means?"

- \_\_\_\_\_ As much as possible is done to keep men informed
- \_\_\_\_\_ Quite a bit is done, but more could be done
- \_\_\_\_\_ A lot more could be done to keep men informed

tudes and information about subjects with which the orientation program was concerned. By way of further illustration, it is shown in Table 20 how at every educational level men who had attended discussion groups frequently were more likely than others to feel that they knew quite a bit about the San Francisco Conference

TABLE 20  
THE RELATION OF FREQUENCY OF DISCUSSION GROUPS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE  
(Europe, September 1945)

Educational level	PERCENTAGES WHO SAY THEY HAVE HEARD OR READ QUITE A BIT ABOUT THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE*		PERCENTAGES WHO ANSWER A FACTUAL QUESTION ABOUT THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE CORRECTLY†	
	Among men reporting‡			
	Two or more discussion groups a month	Less frequent discussion groups	Two or more discussion groups a month	Less frequent discussion groups
College	72 (208)	64 (184)	86	90
High school graduate	46 (461)	36 (407)	73	74
Some high school	40 (432)	26 (331)	51	53
Grade school	36 (387)	29 (355)	29	38

Data from S-235.

\* Based on the question: "Have you heard or read anything about the San Francisco Conference?"

- Yes have heard or read quite a bit about it
- Have heard of it, but don't know much about it
- Haven't heard of it at all

† Based on the question: "As you understand it, which of the following statements best describes the San Francisco Conference?"

- A conference of Stalin, Churchill, Attlee and Truman to discuss the future course of the war and make plans for it
- A conference of leading U.S. statesmen and public figures to discuss national problems
- A conference of representatives of the United Nations to set up plans for a post-war organization of nations
- Haven't any idea which of these statements best describes it

‡ Based on the question: "During the last few months, about how often has your unit had talks and discussions on duty time about how the war is going, what the war is all about and topics like that?"

- About once a week
- Two or three times a month
- About once a month
- Less than once a month
- We never have any talks or discussions

even though they were, if anything, less likely to answer a factual question about the conference correctly. The very change in the direction of the differences on these two questions makes it most improbable that such a result can be attributed to chance or to compositional variations between men having frequent discussion meetings and men who did not. These data would seem rather clearly to indicate that subjectively experienced concern about one's

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state of knowledge could be and was relieved by the orientation program, quite independently of any objectively detectable improvement in information.

In these ways, then, the orientation program served the useful purpose of reassuring men and reducing somewhat their feeling that the Army was not concerned for the welfare of the individual. Though these may not have been deliberate goals in setting up the orientation program, they were certainly desirable results.

But there is little positive evidence that the Army succeeded in altering basic orientation toward the war such as to increase personal commitment to the task of winning it. There is some reason to believe—given the intellectual history of the period preceding the war and the course of military events which precluded further galvanizing experiences like the Pearl Harbor attack—that no other development could have been expected, even if a more frankly propagandistic program of indoctrination had been pursued instead of the “appeal to facts” upon which the Army sought to depend.

It would be dangerous to conclude this chapter, however, by leaving the inference that convictions about one’s cause are of negligible significance. First, relationships of the type shown in Table 11 of this chapter cannot be brushed off because explicit efforts to improve personal commitment by improving information and opinions about the war were not strikingly successful. Second, given other historical contexts, it is possible, indeed probable, that convictions about a war would play a still greater role than among Americans in World War II.

John Dollard’s study of veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, made up of Americans who volunteered to fight in the Spanish Civil War, provides documentation on this second point.<sup>30</sup> Here ideological convictions appeared to play a much more powerful role than in the American Army. Dollard describes its role by saying: “The soldier is not forever whispering, ‘My cause, my cause.’ He is too busy for that. Ideology functions *before* battle, to get men in, and *after* battle by blocking thoughts of escape. . . . Identification with cause is like a joker in a deck of cards: it can substitute for any other card. The man who has it can better bear inferior material, temporary defeat, uneasiness, or fear.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> *Fear in Battle* (Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, New Haven, 1943). While this study was privately financed, it was made in close cooperation with the Research Branch in which the author was one of the principal consultants.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.



It would be invaluable if we had information, comparable to our data on American soldiers, on the attitudes of Russian, British, or German soldiers. The general picture in this volume of men preoccupied with minimizing their discomforts, acquiring higher rank or pay, securing safe jobs which would offer training useful in civilian life, displaying aggressions against the Army in many different ways, and in getting out of the Army as fast as possible does not suggest a particularly inspired work performance in the American Army. But Americans fought, and fought brilliantly and tenaciously when they had to, usually aided, except in the early days in the Pacific, by superior materiel. The attitudes of these combat troops we shall analyze in detail in Volume II. It is possible that the minimal character of ideological motivation increased the psychological cost of the war. Army psychiatrists thought so and the Surgeon General's Office cooperated energetically with the Information and Education Division in seeking to help men merge personal desires with the issues of the war. Moreover, the high psychological cost to the individual was found, in a Research Branch study of medically discharged veterans described in Volume II, to carry over into civilian life, as a strong sense of society's indebtedness to them, accompanied by some expectations of privileged status and by some difficulties in being reassimilated into civilian life.

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## CHAPTER 10

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### *NEGRO SOLDIERS*<sup>1</sup>

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#### *Introduction*

**I**N EARLIER chapters, the Army has been viewed as a social institution with a status system and a set of traditions whose deviations from those of the larger society underlay many of the conflicts between the new soldiers and the Army institution. Though the emphasis there was on the points of difference rather than resemblance between the Army and civilian culture, it was apparent that the Army also reflected in some ways the society of which it is a part and was, in fact, both during and after the war, subject to modifications which moved it closer to consistency with the rest of American life.

It was inevitable that an institution, most of whose membership was involuntary and temporary, would not develop a set of values which departed radically from the earlier orientation of its members, especially where broad social issues were concerned. And it is natural that even the members of the professional nucleus of the Army should have been influenced primarily by the values of the social order from which they had been recruited so far as their approach to many problems for which the Army had no special traditions is concerned. Hence the discussion of intellectual views of the war and the motivations of men where the war was concerned had to be traced back to elements in American society generally rather than to the peculiar nature of the American Army. Similarly, merely to entitle a chapter "Negro Soldiers" is to imply that the same phenomena of racial subordination and superordination, ideologies and counterideologies, distrust, tension, and friction, which are such ever-present aspects of contemporary American society, were to be found in the Army. America is known for its compromises in the field of race relations: When an Army was to be raised, Negroes

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter was written by Shirley A. Star, Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Samuel A. Stouffer. In addition to the authors, analysts who did major work in this area include Lyonel C. Florant, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Dean Manheimer, William W. MoPeak, Arnold M. Rose, and Robert N. Ford.

were needed and were not excluded, but neither were they fully integrated or fully accepted. Compromises improving the Negroes' position came about, on the one hand, because of the conscience of white America, which, as delineated by Myrdal and his associates,<sup>2</sup> leads to gestures in the direction of conforming to the American creed, and, on the other hand, because they represented concessions extorted by a group well on its way to becoming a self-conscious minority which in many localities holds a strategic position politically. Yet tensions remained—on the white side for fear, perhaps, of more “demands”; on the Negro side because gains fell short of goals.

The Army inherited profoundly difficult problems in race relations, just as do most institutions in American life which are forced in one way or another to deal with the conditions which a disequibrated system of race relations has created for American society. This chapter is a report on attitudes of and toward Negro soldiers—not in any sense a systematic treatise on the Negro in the Army or a history of Army social policies. Therefore, the discussion which follows does not attempt to pronounce on what the Army could or should have done in its racial policy.<sup>3</sup> From the point of view of those who believe that the Army could and should have eliminated all or most racial distinctions, the Army's policies and practices were timidly conservative and ineffective. From the point of view of those who feared any change in the status quo, the Army took some dangerous and unnecessary chances with the mores in its attempt to use its Negro man power effectively.

It may well be that there is little that is unusual in the pattern of race relations in the Army—that the Army in World War II was merely a new setting for an old conflict. With all the analyses of the structure of race relations in America which have already appeared, it might then seem that this chapter is supererogatory were it not for the following facts. First, the war and the Army have played such a large part in life during the period just ending that an analysis of race relations in the Army is justifiable even if it serves only to underline the similarities of this aspect of Army life to the normal pattern of life in America. But beyond sheer historical documentation of how the Army approached its Negro sol-

<sup>2</sup> G. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944).

<sup>3</sup> For one evaluation of Army racial policies during World War II, see Charles Dollard and Donald Young, “In the Armed Forces,” in *Segregation, Survey Graphic*, January 1947, p. 66.

?  
report  
on  
Attitudes  
of and toward  
Afro-American  
Soldiers

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diers and what Negro reactions were, there is the fact that new settings are often the best situations in which to see and understand old problems. Moreover, to say that race relations in the United States represent an old conflict is not to say that nothing ever changes. Some of the issues raised by the Army's use of Negro soldiers in the war were new and, being new, they were different, even when positions and solutions with regard to them were completely consistent with approaches to more conventional situations. Since America has not reached a stable status system where her racial minorities are concerned, future evolutions in race relations may well prove to have been in some measure conditioned by developments in attitudes and values which took place in the Army, even though most of the Army's problems of race can be understood simply in the context of the broader cultural conflict.

The facts contributed by this chapter are derived primarily from an elaborate survey of attitudes of Negro troops made in March 1943 concurrently with a survey of attitudes of white troops.<sup>4</sup> Data are used also from subsequent studies of Negro troops, especially in August 1944 and June 1945, with comparative figures from surveys of whites.

Eliciting information from Negro troops constituted a special problem. Because so many Negro soldiers had a low educational level, it was necessary to interview personally a much larger proportion of the sample than was the case with white soldiers, most of whom could write responses to questionnaires administered in a group situation. It was found desirable, moreover, to train Negro soldiers to serve as interviewers rather than to use white interviewers. Finally, it was found that a sample which would serve as a representative cross section of Negro soldiers was often even more complicated and difficult to obtain than a sample of white soldiers permitting the same precision—because of the unusual distribution of units in which Negroes tended to be concentrated. Due to the great expense involved, relatively few surveys made a systematic attempt to obtain representative cross sections of Negro troops, and on most surveys in the United States studies were limited to white troops only. Overseas the practice of inclusion or noninclusion

<sup>4</sup>S-32. Data presented in charts and tables throughout this chapter are from this study unless their source is otherwise indicated. While the sample included a representative cross section of 3,000 Negro and 4,800 white troops in the United States which are used for all cross-section comparisons, the Negro sample was augmented to a total of 7,438 to provide additional cases of better educated and of Northern Negroes in order to permit comparisons of these subgroups within the Negro sample.

*Educational  
bias* →

sion of Negroes varied with the purpose of the survey. In view of the fact, as will be shown subsequently, that there was little difference between the attitudes of Negro and white soldiers, on the average, on many types of subjects not related to specifically racial questions, whether or not Negroes were included in their correct proportion in samples of American soldiers ordinarily was negligible in effect on the overall results.

The special methodological problems involved in the surveying of Negro soldiers are reviewed in some detail in the appendix to Volume IV. Evidence is there presented which shows that the precautions taken to insure understanding and frankness succeeded, as far as can be discerned, about as well among Negroes as among white soldiers. There is every reason to believe that the data in this chapter provide a trustworthy historical report on the opinions and sentiments of this minority group in the Army in World War II.

See Vol IV

S E C T I O N I

THE NEGRO SOLDIER POPULATION  
AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

Before discussing the attitudes of Negro troops, it will be profitable to consider briefly some of the statistical facts about the Negro soldier population, who comprised between 8 and 9 per cent of the Army.

One of the most striking single facts—one which sometimes was inadequately appreciated by those whose experience with Negro soldiers derived from World War I—was the remarkable change in educational level among Negro troops in a single generation.

uses education as a variable


As Chart I shows, in World War I 86 per cent of the Negroes from the North and 97 per cent from the South had received only a grade school education or less. Early in World War II, the majority of Negro soldiers from the North actually had attended high school—only 37 per cent having received a grade school education only. Among Negro soldiers from the South, the proportion with only a grade school education dropped from 97 per cent in World War I to 67 per cent in World War II. Moreover, the proportion of Negroes from the North increased markedly, reflecting the great northward migrations during the past generation.

The illiterate plantation hand from the cotton belt was no longer the typical Negro. Yet the Negro's educational level, on the average, was still far below that of the average white, who also, as we

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have seen, tended to be much better educated than his father in World War I. A special tabulation made for the Research Branch by the United States Bureau of the Census (Chart II) shows that, at the younger age groups, the proportion of Northern Negro males in the American population in 1940 who had gone beyond the eighth grade in school was as high as or higher than that of Southern whites.


CHART I  
CHANGES IN THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF NEGRO ENLISTED MEN



Sources: World War I. Percentages at each educational level, for North and South separately, from *Memoirs of National Academy of Science*, xv, Table 302, p. 753. Percentages from North and South from figures for total enlistments from North and South, supplied by World War Information Section, AGO.

World War II. Percentages at each educational level, for North and South separately, from special tabulations made for Research Branch, Special Services Division, by the Machine Records Branch, AGO. Percentages from North and South from strength of the Army figures as of December 31, 1941, continental U.S. troops only, provided by the Miscellaneous Branch, AGO.

CHART II  
 PERCENTAGE OF UNITED STATES MALE POPULATION AT EACH  
 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1940  
 (Whites and Negroes, by Region and Age)



Source: Special Sample Tabulation, Bureau of the Census.

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But the Northern Negro fell below the Northern white in education and, especially, the Southern Negro fell far below the Southern white. Consideration must be given also to the probability that the quality of education received by the Negro was inferior, grade for grade, to that received by whites.

A corollary of the lower average educational level of Negro troops relative to white troops—in spite of the great strides made since World War I—was the lower average level of performance on the Army General Classification Test. The following data, from an AGO 2 per cent sample of the Army in March 1945, shows that 28 per cent of the Negro enlisted men, compared with only 3 per cent of the white enlisted men, were in Class V, the lowest group:

<i>AGCT class</i>	<i>Negro</i>	<i>White</i>
I	1%	6%
II	6	32
III	14	32
IV	45	23
V	28	3
Unknown	6	4
	100%	100%

The relationship between the proportion of Negroes in Class V and grade completed in school is shown graphically in Chart III. Since Northern and Southern Negroes are shown separately, an effect of difference in the quality of education in the two regions can be investigated. As Chart III shows, at each educational level there was a larger proportion of Southern than of Northern Negroes in Class V. A much larger proportion of Southern than of Northern Negroes were in the lower educational groups; hence the overall North-South difference in AGCT scores for Negroes as a whole was even more pronounced than in Chart III, where grade completed in school is held constant.

In evaluating AGCT test scores of Negroes, caution is necessary. The subject goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but it may be noted that the atmosphere in which Negroes took the tests was not always satisfactory—as doubtless was frequently the case with whites. For example, Selective Service officials, noting that at induction stations a larger proportion of Negroes failed to pass standardized tests than would have been expected on the basis of educational level, said in explanation: "This has been found to be due in part to the conditions under which the tests were given and,

*what was the AGCT Test?*




*Actual  
Resistance*

in some cases, to the attitudes of the testers. Community morale and Negro soldier morale entered into the problem by creating non-cooperative attitudes on the part of registrants.”<sup>5</sup>

Selective Service statistics show that the Negroes in the Armed Forces were the survivors of a process which rejected a much larger

CHART III  
RELATIONSHIP OF NEGRO AGCT SCORES TO GRADE COMPLETED IN SCHOOL, BY REGION OF ORIGIN



Source: Special tabulation by Research Branch of data collected in field while sampling for survey in March 1943. All points based on at least 300 cases, except for Northern men with less than 8th grade education (under 5th grade, 202 cases; 5th grade, 79 cases; 6th grade, 122 cases; 7th grade, 169 cases).

proportion of registrants than among whites. As of May 1, 1944, for example, 33 per cent of the Negro registrants had been rejected as 4-F, as compared with only 16 per cent of white registrants. For most types of physical ailments except venereal disease, the rejection rate of Negroes was generally lower than that of whites, and the difference is mainly attributable to the Negroes' relative failure

<sup>5</sup> *Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns*. The 3rd Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1945, p. 208.

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to meet minimum educational requirements. The higher rejection rate of Negroes was only in part compensated for by a lower deferment rate—17 per cent of the Negroes as compared with 28 per cent of the whites held occupational, dependency, or other deferments. Hence the proportion inducted among Negroes of military age was lower than that for whites. Moreover, the proportion inducted

TABLE 1  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE STRENGTH OF ARMY BY BRANCH

	TOTAL				NEGRO			
	1942	1943	1944	1945	1942	1943	1944	1945
Air Corps	18	25	25	23	2	13	12	9
Ground Combat Arms	47	35	33	34	38	26	15	12
Armored	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	*
Cavalry	3	1	1	1	3	2	1	*
Coast Artillery	10	8	8	4	10	7	5	2
Field Artillery	10	7	6	6	7	5	2	2
Infantry	24	19	18	22	18	12	7	8
Services	29	36	38	39	48	56	67	75
Corps of Engineers	5	7	8	9	17	15	17	20
Medical Department	8	8	8	8	3	4	2	3
Corps of Military Police	1	3	3	3	1	1	1	1
Ordnance Department	2	5	4	4	2	3	4	4
Quartermaster Corps	8	7	6	6	24	24	29	32
Signal Corps	4	4	4	4	*	2	2	2
Transportation Corps	—	1	3	3	—	5	10	12
All other sources	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1
No branch or unassigned	6	4	4	4	12	5	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Data from the Adjutant General's Office. The observations in each year are as of March.  
\* Less than 0.5 per cent.

was substantially lower among Southern Negroes than among Northern Negroes. The same Selective Service sources cited above show that Northern Negroes constituted nearly one third of all Negroes in the Armed Forces, although they constituted less than a fourth of all Negro registrants.

The proportion of the Army which was Negro increased from 6.03 per cent in March 1942 to 7.79 per cent in March 1943 and 8.74 per

cent in March 1944, varying around this figure in the closing months of the war. In March 1945, the proportion was 8.62 per cent.

While Negroes in the Army were assigned to every branch, it was the practice to assign them primarily to branches of the Service Forces. As shown in Table 1, in 1942, 48 per cent of the Negroes were in the Service Forces, which made up only 29 per cent of total Army strength. This tendency intensified during the war. By mid-1945, three fourths of the Negro soldiers were in Service Force

TABLE 2  
PROPORTION NEGRO AMONG MALE STRENGTH OF ARMY BY BRANCH\*

	PER CENT NEGRO AMONG MALE STRENGTH			
	1942	1943	1944	1945
Air Corps	0.73	3.93	4.16	3.40
Ground Combat Arms				
Armored Force	—	—	—	1.97
Cavalry	6.48	11.04	5.90	0.79
Coast Artillery Corps	6.30	6.83	5.65	4.30
Field Artillery	4.57	5.48	3.30	2.45
Infantry	4.63	5.13	3.21	3.05
Services				
Corps of Engineers	20.67	17.06	18.62	20.31
Medical Department	2.03	4.30	1.84	3.23
Corps of Military Police	5.76	2.83	2.46	2.50
Ordnance	5.66	5.88	8.23	8.49
Quartermaster Corps	20.00	28.50	40.39	44.41
Signal Corps	0.35	2.85	3.35	4.65
Transportation Corps	—	30.62	32.16	33.08
Total male strength	6.03	7.79	8.74	8.62

\* Data from the Adjutant General's Office.

branches, which had expanded to 39 per cent of the Army's strength. In fact, three branches—the Quartermaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, and the Transportation Corps—alone accounted for two thirds of the Negroes in the Army. This trend was, of course, accompanied by a corresponding decline in the proportion of Negroes in the combat arms. By 1944, as can be seen in Table 2, Negroes were heavily overrepresented in the three branches just cited and underrepresented in every other branch of the Army, including the other Service Force branches.

The three branches which contained the bulk of Negro troops were traditionally those with many unskilled labor jobs to be performed,

such as roadbuilding, stevedoring, laundering, and fumigation. Assignments like these, as well as truckdriving, were the primary functions of Negroes in the Engineer, Transportation, and Quartermaster branches. These, of course, were not the only jobs these branches performed, and not even the only jobs Negroes in these branches performed. Both Negroes and whites served in units of Engineers which went in in the first wave of an invasion as mine

TABLE 3  
AUTHORIZED PHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTED SERVICE FORCE BRANCHES\*

Service	Race	PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY PHYSICAL TYPES†			Total
		Profile A or better	Profile B up to A	Profile C up to B	
Corps of Engineers	White	65	10	25	100
	Negro	20	60	20	100
Quartermaster Corps	White	25	25	50	100
	Negro	55	15	30	100
Transportation Corps	White	5	40	55	100
	Negro	0	70	30	100
Ordnance Department	White	5	45	50	100
	Negro	0	10	90	100
Medical Department	White	35	20	45	100
	Negro	25	30	45	100
Chemical Warfare Service	White	10	65	25	100
	Negro	0	75	25	100
Signal Corps	White	25	50	25	100
	Negro	30	55	15	100

\* Source: ASF Circular No. 175 (1944), Part VII. Enlisted men—classification and assignment based upon physical capacity or stamina.

† These types are defined, in terms of physical stamina, as:

A—Able to perform sustained effort over long period.

B—Able to perform sustained effort for moderate periods.

C—Below minimum current standards for induction (but to be retained in the Army).

In addition to this criterion, ratings of hearing, vision, and emotional stability entered into the profile.

detectors, bridge builders, etc. These branches had a good many technical jobs as well. Nevertheless, there was a tendency for the work performed by Negroes and whites in the same branch to be of different kinds, as can be inferred from the authorized physical composition of the various Service Force branches shown in Table 3.

We see in Table 3, which shows requirements by "physical profile," that there were sharp differences in the requirements as to physical stamina of whites and Negroes assigned to the Engineer,

Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps. Since these allocations were based on an analysis of type of jobs performed and the stamina required for them, it is obvious that whites and Negroes were performing different types of jobs, and that, in the Quartermaster and Transportation Corps, the jobs Negroes did called for more stamina than those done by whites. In the Corps of Engineers, on the other hand, the jobs performed by whites more often called for the greatest amount of stamina. Since this branch, like the Ordnance and Medical Departments which follow the same pattern in regard to the racial distribution of physical types, would have a number of units attached to combat troops, it indicates that white troops in these branches were assigned disproportionately to the combat-supporting type of unit.

But if Negroes were largely confined to the Service Forces, this did not limit them to service in the United States. At the close of 1941 there were few Negroes serving overseas, but the proportion gradually increased until by 1943 Negroes were overseas in proportion to their percentage in the Army, and by 1944 and thereafter a higher percentage of Negroes than whites in the Army were serving overseas (see Table 4). Shortly after VE Day, in fact, close to

TABLE 4

PROPORTION OF ARMY STRENGTH SERVING OVERSEAS, TOTAL AND NEGRO STRENGTH\*

		PER CENT OF ARMY STRENGTH SERVING OVERSEAS	
		<i>Total strength</i>	<i>Negro strength</i>
1941	December	11.4	0.0
1942	March	13.8	2.1
	June	19.6	19.0
	September	20.7	17.6
	December	19.7	14.0
1943	March	19.4	15.7
	June	23.4	22.5
	September	28.0	28.0
	December	35.0	33.8
1944	March	43.1	46.7
	June	48.6	51.7
	September	54.6	58.6
	December	61.3	69.0
1945	March	66.2	72.6
	June	63.4	73.4

\* Source: Data from the Adjutant General's Office. Strength here includes all Army personnel: Officers, enlisted men, nurses, WAC, etc.

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three fourths of Negro strength was overseas as compared with just over three fifths of white strength. Although the figures shown in Table 4 are for total Army strength and therefore include groups like officers, who were both disproportionately white and disproportionately to be found in the United States, if the comparisons are limited to enlisted men the same picture results: by June 1945, 74 per cent of Negro enlisted men were overseas as compared with 67 per cent of white enlisted men.

While these figures show that at any given month, in the later stages of the war, a disproportionately large number of Negroes were overseas, they must not be taken to show that during the total time elapsed a corresponding larger proportion of Negroes saw overseas service. The figures in Table 4 make no distinction between returnees and men who had never left the States. As of June 1945, almost a quarter of the enlisted men in the United States had served overseas. In a Research Branch survey made at that time, 24 per cent of a cross section of white enlisted men reported that they had served overseas as compared with 11 per cent in a Negro enlisted cross section. If these sample figures are reliable estimates, then it would seem that Negroes serving overseas were less likely to be sent home under the rotation plan, which is quite possible since the plan usually gave preference to combat men. Using these figures, we can estimate that about 75 per cent of the white enlisted men in the Army just after VE Day were either serving or had served overseas, while the corresponding figure for Negroes was almost identical—77 per cent.

The policy which the Army generally followed of separate units for Negro soldiers meant that there were as many possibilities for Negro enlisted men to become noncommissioned officers as there were for white enlisted men in comparable units, since Army tables of organization prescribed the number of noncommissioned positions on the basis of the type of unit without reference to color. To what extent commanding officers may have refrained from using all the ratings permitted by their tables of organization is not known. However, the types of units Negroes were in generally were not the kinds which had a large number of skilled, rated jobs, so that, overall, Negroes were somewhat less likely than whites to hold ratings.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> These data are derived from a survey of a world-wide cross section of enlisted men made in June 1945 (S-205). It would obviously be more desirable to have the actual population statistics on this point, but the War Department reports that these are not available. However, the distribution by rank for the entire sample without respect to color checks to within 3 per cent of the actual population distribution.

	<i>Negro enlisted men</i>	<i>White enlisted men</i>
Sergeants	18%	31%
Corporals	24	21
Pfc's	35	31
Privates	23	17
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100%	100%
<i>Number in sample</i>	735	6,532

When we compare Negroes and whites in the same type of units, however, these differences vanish. For example, in a study of 7 white and 34 Negro port companies working in three French ports in March 1945, the differences are small:

	<i>Negro</i>	<i>White</i>
Sergeants, all grades	19%	21%
Corporals	28	22
Privates and Pfc's	53	57
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100%	100%
<i>Number of men</i>	2,611	502
<i>Number of companies</i>	34	7

In some degree, both the branch assignments and the ratings of Negro troops can be traced back to the low educational level of Negroes, which meant that most of them had to be assigned to unskilled jobs which carried low ratings. However, little attempt was made to assign Negroes differentially among the branches in such a way as to take their education into account. As shown in Table 5, Negroes who were high school graduates were assigned to about the same branches as Negroes with at most only grade school graduation. (This table was compiled early in the war, but there is no reason to think that the educational picture changed materially.) Although educated Negroes were assigned to the branches best suited to their less educated fellows, they were not employed there in exactly the same capacity. As with white enlisted men, the better, higher ranking jobs within a unit tended to go to the better educated Negroes (see Table 6).

It may be noted, however, that at practically every educational level, the opportunities for Negroes to become noncommissioned officers were somewhat poorer than the chances of comparable white enlisted men. An apparent exception is seen among Negroes with

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college education since the sample shows a higher proportion of them holding ratings than among the college-educated whites, but this single reversal is based on too few cases to be statistically significant.

TABLE 5  
BRANCH OF SERVICE OF NEGRO MEN BY EDUCATION,\* DECEMBER 31, 1941

Branch	Grade school %	High school nongraduate %	High school graduate %
Air Corps	3	2	4
Infantry	21	21	22
Field Artillery	10	11	10
Coast Artillery	13	14	14
Corps of Engineers	20	18	16
Quartermaster Corps	19	20	18
All others	14	14	16
	100	100	100

\* Based on a special sample tabulation made by AGO for the Research Branch.

The opportunities for Negroes to become commissioned officers in the Army were quite limited. When the war began, in December 1941, slightly over 7 per cent of the white males in the Army were officers as compared with less than one half of 1 per cent of the Negro males. In both groups, the proportion of all males who were officers increased with the course of the war,<sup>7</sup> until by March

TABLE 6  
RELATION BETWEEN RANK AND EDUCATION AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN, WORLD-WIDE CROSS SECTION, JUNE 1945

	PER CENT CORPORALS AND ABOVE	
	Negro	White
College	70 (101)	63 (1,183)
High school graduate	47 (123)	60 (2,041)
Some high school	44 (191)	48 (1,796)
Finished eighth grade	38 (89)	41 (816)
Finished seventh grade	38 (66)	38 (298)
Finished sixth grade	21 (70)	35 (151)
Less than sixth grade	25 (116)	29 (158)

Data from S-205.

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

<sup>7</sup> The low rate of commissioning Negro officers during 1941 and 1942 may have been due in part to the Army's slowness in organizing Negro units.



1945, 11 per cent of the white males were commissioned officers, but among Negroes the proportion was still less than 1 per cent. (See Table 7.) Part of this difference goes back once again to the educational handicap of the Negro soldier, but this cannot be the whole explanation.

The minimum formal requirement for becoming an officer candidate was an AGCT score of Class I or II. If we assume that all

TABLE 7  
PROPORTION WHO WERE OFFICERS AMONG MALES IN THE ARMY,  
NEGRO AND WHITE\*

		PER CENT OFFICERS AMONG MALES IN ARMY	
		<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
1941	December	0.47	7.38
1942	March	0.37	6.31
	June	0.33	6.71
	September	0.60	7.57
	December	0.48	7.55
1943	March	0.55	7.87
	June	0.64	8.50
	September	0.71	9.19
	December	0.79	9.53
1944	March	0.79	9.80
	June	0.81	10.08
	September	0.78	10.45
	December	0.85	10.84
1945	March	0.87	11.01

\* Data from the Adjutant General's office.

officers met or could have met this requirement, about a fourth of the whites in the Army who met the requirement actually became officers as compared with a tenth of the Negroes. If some of the Reserve officers or National Guard officers (who were predominantly white) could not have met the requirement, the estimated discrepancy between Negroes and whites might be even larger.<sup>8</sup>

Negro officers generally served only with Negro units, while Negro units might have either Negro or white officers. The number of Negro officers fell far short of the number who would have been required if the Negro units had been officered throughout at the com-

<sup>8</sup> Other criteria used by boards for the selection of officer candidates—for example, physical fitness, personal appearance, poise, leadership qualities, athletic experience, etc.—no doubt account for some of this difference.

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pany level by Negroes. In the Research Branch survey of March 1943, 58 per cent of the Negro troops reported that all of the lieutenants in their companies were white, 30 per cent said some were white and some Negro, while only 12 per cent reported that all their company lieutenantcies were held by Negroes.

Summarizing this section, one may say that the Negroes in the Army were of lower educational level and had lower AGCT scores than whites, although the picture in World War II represented a vast difference from that in World War I. Nearly a third of the Negroes in World War II came from the North, with its superior educational advantages, but both Northern and Southern Negroes had benefited from the marked educational advances within a single generation. The Negroes in the Army tended to be concentrated in the Service Forces branches. They saw overseas service in proportions as great as or greater than whites. Because the units in which they were segregated tended to have fewer noncommissioned ratings, *Na!* the Negroes were less likely than whites to become NCO's, although among units doing comparable work Negroes had NCO ratings similar to whites. Negroes, even those of equal educational and AGCT level, had much less chance than whites to become officers.

We turn now to a review of some of the findings with respect to Negro attitudes.

## SECTION II

### NEGROES DEFINED SITUATIONS IN RACIAL TERMS

*Questionable* In surveying the attitudes of Negro soldiers, a central point to keep in mind is the great extent to which Negro soldiers defined situations in "racial" terms. *Cultural*

This point of view is sometimes difficult for those who are not Negroes to appreciate. Yet a careful analysis of interview materials, of the questionnaire responses, and especially of the free comments which were sprinkled liberally among the answers to check-list questions, makes the point evident. Many complaints common to soldiers of both races acquired a special significance among Negro soldiers by being invested with the quality of racial discrimination. Thus it became not merely a matter of lack of recreation facilities, poor food, slowness of promotions, and so on—all such specific points of dissatisfaction took on the potentiality of being regarded as instances of discrimination against Negroes.

It is noteworthy that the phrases which white enlisted men used to express their dissatisfaction with the military system were in many instances exact duplicates of phrases which some of the more vocal Negro civilians have been using for years with reference to their treatment at the hands of white society. When white soldiers wrote about authoritarian practices in the Army, "They treat us like dogs," or "This is supposed to be a democracy," or "Why don't they treat us like men?" the phrases have a familiar ring to those acquainted with Negro protests. It becomes understandable how situations which called forth in whites reactions similar to those of a discriminated-against minority might be interpreted by that minority as another manifestation of the unequal treatment accorded Negroes, rather than as a general problem common to all soldiers.

This fact about Negro attitudes must make one cautious in ascribing to all complaints about discrimination a literal and specific cause in a given local situation. We must ever keep in mind the fact of the basic "racial" orientation with its long history in civilian life. At the same time, of course, we must not go to the other extreme of assuming that all or even most Negro complaints in the Army involved *merely* the imputation of racial discrimination.

An example of the tendency of the Negro soldier to react not just as a person but as a member of a minority group is seen in the free responses of a representative cross section of Negro soldiers in March 1943 to the question: "If you could talk to the President of the United States, what are the three most important questions you would ask him about the war and your part in it?" Four out of five Negroes come forward with at least one question, the same proportion as in a cross section of white soldiers queried at the same time. As Table 8 shows, half of the Negroes who responded with questions to the President wrote explicit questions or protests about racial discrimination. Of the remaining comments, an unknown proportion were stated in terms which at least implied a racial emphasis but could not clearly be placed in this category on the basis of explicit statement. For this reason, the proportion of men reported as making racial comments is a minimum estimate of the racial response to the question. It will be noted that the question was so worded as to encourage focusing attention on the war and contained no manifest reference to race. While the results must be interpreted in the light of evidence (reviewed in the appendix to Volume IV) that the better educated and more critical were more

likely to offer free answers, the fact that four fifths of the Negroes volunteered at least one response means that a correction for non-respondents would not alter the picture much. The high incidence

TABLE 8  
WHAT NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS WOULD LIKE TO ASK THE PRESIDENT,  
MARCH 1943

"If you could talk with the President of the United States, what are the three most important questions you would want to ask him about the war and your part in it?"	<i>Negro soldiers</i> %	<i>White soldiers</i> %
Questions and protests about racial discrimination	50	*
Questions about the progress and probable duration of the war	23	40
Questions and criticisms of Army life	13	31
Questions about the postwar world and the future of veterans	10	46
Questions concerning the strategy and conduct of the war	6	23
Questions and criticisms about civilian support of the war effort	*	11
All other types of questions	11	11

Percentages add to more than 100 per cent because individuals could ask more than one type of question.  
\* Less than 0.5 per cent.

of "racial" comments, therefore, is evidence of the Negro soldiers' concern with racial questions.

The flavor of the questions and comments which Negro soldiers offered in their "questions to the President" may be illustrated by a few quotations in the men's own words.

*Per cent of  
Negro soldiers  
who asked each  
type of question\**

1. *Will There Be Less Discrimination After the War?*

29

Will I as a Negro share this so-called democracy after the war?

Will it make things better for the Negro?

Will colored people be given a fair chance of employment?

Will colored people be continually subjected to the humiliating law of Jim Crow and segregation as before the war?

Will the South treat Negroes like human beings? Will lynching cease?

\* Adds to more than 50 per cent because an individual often asked more than one type of question.

*Per cent of  
Negro soldiers  
who asked each  
type of question*

2. *General Protests Against Present and Past Discrimination* 15
- Why dont he stop so much lynching? Our life is worth as much to us as the Whites' life is to them.
- I would ask him about Jim Crow in the South.
- Why dont they make the people in the South treat the Negro right & then try to make the people in other countries do right?
- Why do white people hate the Negro when they hire them to cook & wash & care for their children?
3. *Discrimination in the Army* 14
- Why arent Negro troops allowed to fight in combat as much as white troops?
- If the white and colored soldiers are fighting and dying for the same thing, why cant they train together?
- Why is there discrimination even in the Army?
- Why aren't Negro soldiers given the same chance of advancement as white soldiers?
- Why can't we be trained by commissioned officers of our own race?
- Why cant the Negroes have fine things like the white boys in the Army?
4. *What Does the Negro Have to Fight For?* 6
- I would want to know what have we got to fight for?
- Why are we in it—we don have any rights?
- Why must I fight for freedom when there is no such thing for a Negro?
- What are we fighting for, we as a Negro race?
5. *Equal Duty to Fight Should Bring Equal Rights* 4
- If its not going to benefit our race, why should we be called on to shed blood?
- After the Negro men go & fight to their best, would they have equal rights?
- I dont mind fighting to defend this country if I was sure of freedom.
- Why the colored man is not equal to the white man everywhere? He die for the same thing.

*Per cent of  
Negro soldiers  
who asked each  
type of question*

6. *What Is the Negroes' Part in the War?*

4

What part will the Negro take during the war?

What part are the Negro troops playing in this war?

If he thought the Negro was doing his part in this war?

Are you satisfied with the way the Negroes are doing in the army?

7. *Camp Location*

1

What are the chances of moving Negro troops from the South?

The foregoing example is only one of a good many which might be cited as illustration of the concern of Negroes with problems involving them not just as members of the larger society but as members of a subordinated minority group. The concern expressed in these comments is hardly consonant with the view that most Negroes were satisfied with the status of their group in American society. Yet two thirds of the Southern white soldiers and over half of the Northern white soldiers expressed this opinion: in response to the question, "Do you think that most Negroes in this country are pretty well satisfied or do you think most of them are dissatisfied?" these proportions checked the category "most of them are satisfied." Only a tenth of the Southerners and a seventh of the Northerners said "most are dissatisfied"; the rest checked intermediate answers. This apparent lack of awareness on the part of whites of attitudes which are rather widespread in the Negro group tends, in part, to result from cultural isolation which minimizes personal contacts between the races and thereby reduces opportunities for whites to learn the thoughts and feelings of Negroes. This process is augmented by the tendency on the part of the Negroes to conceal their attitudes protectively from whites.<sup>10</sup> But, beyond these elements, there lies a tendency on the part of the dominant white majority to view the race problem with complacency, to avoid believing what it is uncomfortable to believe.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> A striking illustration of this protective concealment is afforded by a comparison of the responses of Negro soldiers to white and to Negro interviewers. See Appendix to Volume IV.

<sup>11</sup> It has been pointed out, by Myrdal among others, that white society experiences a moral conflict over these issues—an observation which does not seem consistent with complacency about them. In many instances, however, the expressed complacency

This underlying theme of Negro protest against and white complacency toward the racial status quo can, in broad and somewhat oversimplified fashion, be perceived in almost every aspect of Negro-white relationships. As will be seen, almost no facet of the attitudes of Negro troops is fully intelligible without reference to the Negroes' basically racial orientation on the one hand and to the gulf between Negro and white evaluations of that orientation on the other.

Let us first examine the evidence with respect to Negroes' attitudes toward the war.

### SECTION III

#### HOW NEGRO SOLDIERS VIEWED THEIR STAKE IN THE WAR

In the attitudes of Negro soldiers toward the war may be seen several conflicting elements which very often left men ambivalent. In the first place, Negroes were themselves products of American culture and responded to much the same symbols and values as did white Americans. From these roots, Negroes derived attitudes of patriotism and loyalty, as well as acceptance of the generalized issues of the war as their culture defined them. Reinforcing these positive attitudes toward the war were, as will be shown below, Negro group aspirations which, in combination with certain general assumptions common in American culture, led many Negroes to welcome the chance to prove their loyalty and fighting ability in the belief, or at least the hope, that such efforts would be rewarded. Countering these forces, however, was bitterness over the treatment Negroes had received and were receiving at the hands of their country both in and out of the Army, cynicism over expressions of war aims in view of traditional deviations from these professed principles in American racial practice, and skepticism about whether Negroes would in fact receive recognition for the efforts they put forth.

In view of these conflicts, the fact that Negro soldiers were less likely than whites to express a sense of identification with the war or to endorse idealistic views of the war (Chart IV) is not at all surprising; nor, in the light of the basically American character of the Negro population, should it be any more surprising that the major-


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may be a reassuring device, an attempt to ward off guilt feelings by convincing one's self that no real conflicts between whites and Negroes exist.

It is interesting to note the similarity between the tendency for whites to take an overly optimistic view about the attitudes of Negroes and the tendency, described in Chapter 6, for officers to be overly sanguine about the attitudes of enlisted men.

### CHART IV

### COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN TOWARD THE WAR (March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.



ity of Negro opinion was on the same side of these issues as white opinion, accepting the war and idealistic formulations of it. There is no evidence that Negroes, in overt behavior, were less loyal than whites—for example, that they were draft evaders or political conscientious objectors or allies of enemy agents more often than were whites. If Negroes less often made verbal protestations of deep motivation where the war was concerned, it must be remembered that—as discussion in an earlier chapter<sup>12</sup> made abundantly clear—despite their tendency overwhelmingly to endorse verbal statements indicating high acceptance of the war, few white enlisted men really had much concern with ideological issues or had strong feelings of personal commitment. Nevertheless, white enlisted men in general probably can be said to have done what they were called upon to do in the war, and the same can be said for Negro enlisted men.

The analysis in this section is based primarily on data from a single survey made in March 1943. But the same type of differentials in Negro and white identification with the war appears in subsequent surveys. To cite one example: in response to the question, "Do you ever get the feeling that the war is not worth fighting?" the comparative percentages of Negroes and whites responding "No, never" in a world-wide survey made just after the German surrender,<sup>13</sup> were as follows, by theater:

	Negroes*	Whites*
United States	36% (1,053)	51% (2,213)
European theater	47 (232)	43 (2,759)
Mediterranean theater	40 (272)	44 (1,777)
Pacific Ocean areas	40 (443)	46 (3,226)
India-Burma theater	37 (276)	47 (1,521)

\* In the United States and in some of the overseas theaters it was sometimes the practice to draw samples of Negroes larger than their share in total Army strength, to get a better basis for calculating Negro percentages. While the total number of cases shown here for whites and Negroes does not represent the relative numbers in the universe, the sample of each race within a given theater is thought to be representative.

Returning to the March 1943 survey, in the free comments which were invited to explain verbal acceptance or rejection of identification with the war, many of the roots of the conflict which beset Negroes were laid clear. More than four out of five made comments. The majority of the men who accepted the war as being as much their affair as anybody else's did so with simple affirmations of patriotism and identification with the country ("This is my country,"

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter 9, "The Orientation of Soldiers Toward the War."

<sup>13</sup> S-205.

"I am an American," etc.); but even in this group, there were those who added a qualification: "[It's my affair because] The constitution says I'm a citizen even though our race is discriminated against and deprived of privileges." Among the minority who said they did not feel that the war concerned them equally with other citizens, comments and protests over the status of Negroes accounted for over 80 per cent of the remarks (see Table 9). These comments

TABLE 9

PROPORTIONS CITING THE TREATMENT OF NEGROES AS THE EXPLANATION OF THEIR FEELING THAT THE WAR IS NOT AS MUCH THEIR AFFAIR AS ANYONE ELSE'S AMONG NEGROES WHO TOOK THIS POSITION AND GAVE A REASON FOR IT, MARCH 1943

<i>Educational level</i>	PERCENTAGE CITING THE TREATMENT OF NEGROES:	
	<i>Northern Negroes</i>	<i>Southern Negroes</i>
College	88 (83)	90 (58)
High school graduate	89 (135)	88 (82)
Some high school	82 (189)	80 (127)
Grade school	80 (217)	78 (415)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

indicated plainly that questions of fundamental loyalty to the country were seldom involved. Almost invariably, they indicated a sense of not fully belonging, or not having an equal stake in the American social order, rather than any positive loyalties lying elsewhere:

I am colored and so friendless; we don't have anything so it's not our war.

The white man brought us here and he should do the fighting if he does not want us.

I don't have a country.

The observation that Negroes were basically Americans finds support in the reactions of those who reported they found it hard to accept the war because of the treatment their group received. Their solution, on the whole, was not to ignore or resist the war, but to press harder for Negro rights in it: to agitate against discrimination in the Army and for opportunities to serve in elite and combat branches, and in general to win for themselves more of a feeling that the war was "their affair."

Both whites and Negroes more often gave a favorable opinion of

their own group's part in the war effort than of the contribution of the other group (Table 10). However, Negroes were more likely than whites to say that their own group was "doing more than its share" (37 per cent as compared with 20 per cent). Here is a suggestion of the "moral claim" which Negro soldiers felt Negroes were acquiring, which will be discussed more fully presently, and of the tendency for whites to agree that Negroes were making the contribution which they should make.

TABLE 10

OPINIONS OF WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS AS TO WHETHER NEGROES AND WHITES WERE DOING THEIR SHARE IN THE WAR EFFORT,\* MARCH 1943

Check-list categories	PERCENTAGES GIVING EACH ANSWER			
	Negro soldiers' answers concerning:		White soldiers' answers concerning:	
	Negroes	Whites	Negroes	Whites
Doing more than their share	37	13	9	20
Doing just about their share	52	58	67	61
Doing less than their share	2	15	12	13
Undecided	9	14	12	6
Total per cent	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	3,000	3,000	4,800	4,800

\* The questions were identical except for the group named: "Do you think that most (Negroes) (white people) are doing more than their share or less than their share to help win the war?"


The replies to the foregoing questions must be appraised in view of the tendency of Negro soldiers to feel that Negroes did not have a fair chance to participate in the war effort and the counterview of whites that they did. Perhaps the most striking example of the divergent premises and ensuing valuations between Negroes and whites is supplied by their answers to the question, "Do you think that most Negroes are being given a fair chance to do as much as they want to do to help win the war?" The percentages giving each answer were:

	Negro soldiers	White soldiers
Yes	35%	76%
No	54	12
Undecided	11	12
Total per cent	100%	100%
Number of cases	3,000	4,800

Back of these responses lie divergent cultural premises, including on the one hand the stereotype of the "contented Negro" and on the other the "striving" psychology and sense of injustice of a group becoming sharply conscious of its position as a disadvantaged minority. The variations in replies to this question among men of differing backgrounds are consistent with the history of these two

CHART V

PERCENTAGES OF WHITE AND NEGRO ENLISTED MEN WHO SAID MOST NEGROES WERE BEING GIVEN A FAIR CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WAR EFFORT, CLASSIFIED BY EDUCATION AND REGION OF ORIGIN



Percentages and numbers of cases:

Southern Whites, 87 (69)	74 (286)	82 (247)	76 (312)	79 (391)	73 (196)
Northern Whites, 68 (61)	80 (319)	78 (573)	75 (933)	72 (939)	57 (462)
Southern Negroes, 54 (913)	50 (1,449)	42 (701)	31 (734)	24 (461)	14 (389)
Northern Negroes, 40 (232)	30 (432)	28 (444)	19 (306)	17 (532)	13 (321)

orientations. Chart V is quite instructive in this respect, comparing the proportions within each racial group by region of origin and educational level who said that most Negroes were being given a fair chance to participate in the war effort. Among whites there is only a slight difference in response, by education or regional origin. Northern college men were the least likely of any white group to endorse the proposition that Negroes were getting a fair chance.

Among Negroes, there is a steady drop as education increases and the gap between Southern and Northern Negroes narrows at the higher educational levels.

Negroes who said that Negroes were not getting a fair chance to do as much as they wanted to do to help win the war tended, on the one hand, to be somewhat more cynical than others about the war, and on the other to claim that Negroes actually were doing more than their share to win it. Moreover, these relationships existed at all educational levels. While this pattern of responses reflects strong racial loyalty, it is not possible to determine from the present data the extent to which respondents were aware of possible inconsistencies in their position. Some of the more articulate soldiers, however, elaborated views which imply a line of thinking that might be summed up somewhat as follows: Since white people won't let us do as much as we want to do to help win the war, the war *cannot* be as much our affair as theirs. Therefore, though we may not be contributing proportionately, it is because of denial of opportunity rather than lack of willingness and, considering the treatment Negroes receive, we are doing more than white society has a right to demand or expect.


Other expressions make it clear that some of the insistence on the part of Negro soldiers that Negroes were doing their share or more, as well as their concern that Negroes be given a fair chance to help win the war, reflects not simply Negroes' loyalty to the war on the one hand nor their alienation from it because of their disadvantaged status in the United States on the other, but a feeling of many Negro soldiers that the contributions made by Negroes to winning the war would earn for them a moral claim to improved postwar conditions. One cannot overlook the fact that Negro support of the war derived in part from special "racial" hopes for the future which were bound up in it. On the one hand, war-induced social changes were bringing about some improvements, at least temporarily, in employment, for example, where man-power shortages and the efforts of the Fair Employment Practices Commission were giving Negroes job opportunities they had not had before. On the other hand, many Negroes were adherents of the doctrine which held that improved status for their group would follow upon demonstration of their loyalty and ability, and the war seemed to offer an ideal situation in which to demonstrate these qualities. Let us now examine the Negroes' hope for the future and its relationship to attitudes toward the war.

There was a tendency among Negro soldiers to expect or hope for

an increase in rights and privileges, improved treatment, and better economic status after the war. (See Chart VI.) The comparisons with the predictions of white soldiers about their own future, which indicate that whites were much less inclined to expect improvement in their status, serve to underscore the relativity of such judgments to the prewar level to which they were being referred. Negroes, in looking back on their prewar status below that of whites, saw more room for improvement for their group than whites could see for themselves. It is possible, of course, that among some Negroes the optimism may have been more apparent than real, in so far as it may have reflected a bargaining psychology which made them reluctant to admit they believed that anything other than improvement could occur.

## CHART VI

COMPARISON OF OPTIMISM ABOUT FUTURE AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN  
(March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

Four other questions, asked of Negroes only, reinforce the impression given by Chart VI:

Do you think that after the war you will be treated better or worse by white people than before the war?

Better	30%
About the same	44
Worse	8
Undecided	18
	<hr/>
	100%

Do you think that in the long run Negro soldiers will be better off or worse off after they get out of the Army than they were before they went into the Army?

Better off	42%
About the same	31
Worse off	11
Undecided	16
	<hr/>
	100%

Do you think that in the long run Negro civilians will be better off or worse off after the war than they were before?

Better off	42%
About the same	32
Worse off	10
Undecided	16
	<hr/>
	100%

Do you think that after the war Negroes in this country will have more rights and privileges or less rights and privileges than they had before the war?

They will have more rights and privileges than before the war	43%
About the same	33
They will have less rights and privileges than before the war	6
Undecided	18
	<hr/>
	100%

These four questions, in addition to the two shown in Chart VI, together formed a scale of optimism about the future which was used to divide the men into five types for convenient reference: men who gave "optimistic" answers ("easier," "better," "more") on all six questions are referred to as *extreme optimists*; those optimistic on a majority but not all questions are called *optimists*; those who

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made predominantly noncommittal or status quo responses ("same," "undecided") are so labeled, while the men who made primarily pessimistic responses ("harder," "worse," "less") are divided into *pessimists* and *extreme pessimists*, depending on whether they were pessimistic on most or all questions. It should be remembered that the size of these groups is a function of the particular questions asked, but the groups themselves constitute a useful ranking of men along a continuum of optimism.

The men's orientation to the future, as measured by this scale, was relatively independent of both the region from which they came and the amount of formal schooling they had received. There was only a slight tendency for Negroes from the South to express greater optimism and, within each region, there was little variation in opinion among the various educational levels.

What Negroes expected or hoped for made a difference in the way they viewed the war. An example of this difference may be seen in the attitudes they expressed about the two prongs of the "Double-V"—victory in the war and victory on the home front.<sup>14</sup> Men were asked whether, at that time, Negro civilians should concentrate their efforts on making things better for the Negro, on winning the war first, or on doing both at the same time. As shown in Chart VII, it was only among the optimistic men that the recommendation to concentrate on winning the war first was endorsed by a plurality of men. The plurality of pessimists, on the other hand, favored devoting first efforts to race improvement. In all groups, a large minority felt that it was preferable to work for both at the same time. The defenses given for these positions make it clear, however, that a racial element was prominent in these attitudes. The leading explanation of the "both" position, for example, was that the war should be exploited to bring Negro gains, and this was also the most frequent argument of those who recommended concentrating on Negro rights. For example, a man who recommended doing both said: "Fight both wars now or it will be the same story over again. If gains are hoped for, fight for them as we go and not hope to make gains after the war." While a man who favored putting race improvement first said, "They need us to win, so now's our chance." The position of the men who put the war first ran

<sup>14</sup> This slogan, promulgated by the *Pittsburgh Courier* as best representing what Negro attitudes toward the war should be, attained a good deal of popularity among Negroes during the war.




the gamut from "If we lose, the Negro's lot can't improve; if we win there is a chance" to attitudes which put the war first because gains for the Negro were seen as following automatically from it (e.g. "By virtue of our valor, courage, and patriotism, things will be better for the Negro").

Table 11 shows the relationship between attitudes on the scale of

CHART VII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGRO SOLDIERS' POSITION ON A SCALE OF OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM AND ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ATTENTION TO WAR OR TO NEGRO RIGHTS (March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

optimism-pessimism and several other expressions of attitude. For example, among men classified as very optimistic, 89 per cent said the "war is as much my affair as anyone else's," as contrasted with only 26 per cent among the small minority classed as very pessimistic. Among the extreme optimists, only 34 per cent thought "Negroes were doing more than their share to win the war" as against 71 per cent among the extreme pessimists. The opti-

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mists tended to agree with the idealistic formulations in the last three questions in Table 11; the pessimists tended to disagree. The pattern of contrast between the attitude of the optimists and pessimists would still be seen if educational level or regional origin of the respondents were held constant. There can be little doubt as to the greater cynicism of the pessimists—some of whom could not feel much concern about sacrificing for a war which seemed to them to offer little hope of righting their grievances against white society. Moreover, there is additional evidence that many of the optimists,

TABLE 11  
RELATION OF NEGRO SOLDIERS' HOPES FOR THE FUTURE TO THEIR  
ORIENTATION TO THE WAR, MARCH 1943

<i>Paraphrase of attitude expressed</i>	PER CENT EXPRESSING INDICATED ATTITUDE AMONG MEN CLASSIFIED ON SCALE OF OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM				
	<i>Very pessimistic</i>	<i>Somewhat pessimistic</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>Somewhat optimistic</i>	<i>Very optimistic</i>
The war is as much my affair as it is anyone else's	26	44	61	79	89
Negroes are doing more than their share to help win the war	71	54	36	36	34
The United States is fighting to give everyone a fair chance to make a decent living	23	35	56	82	93
The United States is fighting to protect the right of free speech for everyone	25	41	65	84	92
The United States is not fighting mainly for the benefit of the rich people	25	31	53	69	78
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>139</i>	<i>651</i>	<i>4,235</i>	<i>1,741</i>	<i>664</i>

in turn, based their optimism on the hope of white recognition of their claims. This evidence comes from an analysis of free comments. Among the 43 per cent of all Negroes who predicted, as shown in Chart VI, that they would have more rights and privileges after the war, nearly three out of four made free comments. Most frequently mentioned were comments of the type, "We are helping win the war so we will be treated better"—the idea that virtue will be rewarded.

## Negroes will have more rights and privileges because:

Deserved because of Negro contributions to the war effort	13%
Negroes will demand them, take them, fight for them	4
Our war aims imply it	3
It is the historical tendency	2
Other comments	8
No comment	13
	<hr/>
Total	43%

The doctrine that "virtue will be rewarded" is a cultural premise with deep historical roots in American society.<sup>15</sup> It is the doctrine which has played an important part in the development of a social structure which in its main features has emphasized free vertical mobility based upon achievement, especially occupational achievement. When Negro soldiers hoped for, expected, or claimed greater opportunities for Negroes because of their part in the war, they were accepting and appealing to values which, on the level of lip service at least, have high acceptance in American society.

On the other hand, the currency of this creed did not necessarily mean that whites would extend the doctrine to Negroes, or that they would see the Negroes' service in the war as something calling for a reward, as many Negroes did. Table 12 shows that the majority of white soldiers both predicted and favored for Negroes a continuation of things-as-they-were, and among the reasons they advanced for this was that Negroes were doing no more than anyone else in the war and so had no right to gain disproportionately. The comments made by white soldiers—or the very lack of them—serve to underscore both the tendency to overlook the "American creed" where Negroes are concerned and the rather complacent assumption that a state of equilibrium satisfactory to both sides has been reached. Thus, among the 64 per cent who said Negroes should have about the same rights as before, 47 per cent did not comment on their answers, 7 per cent made simple assertions of approval for the status quo (e.g., "We get along fine with the Negro, why change?" "They're satisfied with the way they are now," etc.), 3 per cent said Negroes couldn't be trusted with more rights, 2 per cent implied Negroes had the same rights as whites already, and 2 per cent denied the validity of the Negroes' claims on the ground that they were not sacrificing disproportionately, the re-

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Max Weber's discussion of the development of the Protestant ethic in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930).

maining 3 per cent made other comments. Among whites who favored an increase in Negroes' rights, the leading comments subscribed to some aspect of the "American creed," either the broader equalitarian doctrines, e.g., "all men are created free and equal," or the view that the Negroes' part in the war should bring a reward. It should be noted that only 7 per cent of the white soldiers thought Negroes *should* have less rights and privileges after the war and only 3 per cent predicted that Negroes *would* have less.

Whatever the likelihood that the white majority in America would act in a way to justify Negro hopes, there can be little doubt

TABLE 12  
ATTITUDES OF WHITE SOLDIERS TOWARD THE POSTWAR STATUS OF NEGROES,\*  
MARCH 1943

Check-list categories	PERCENTAGES SAYING NEGROES	
	Will have	Should have
More rights and privileges	29	20
About the same	57	64
Less rights and privileges	3	7
Undecided	11	9
	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	4,800	4,800

\* Based on the question: "Do you think that after the war Negroes in this country will have more rights and privileges or less rights and privileges than they had before the war?"

- \_\_\_\_\_ They will have more rights and privileges than before the war
- \_\_\_\_\_ They will have less rights and privileges than before the war
- \_\_\_\_\_ About the same
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided


"Do you think that after the war Negroes in this country should have more rights and privileges or less rights and privileges than they had before the war?"

- \_\_\_\_\_ Should have more rights and privileges
- \_\_\_\_\_ Should have less
- \_\_\_\_\_ Should have about the same
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

that Negro attitudes toward the war were bound up with such hopes. We may conclude this section by repeating that while the war received compliance from Negroes in any case, it tended to receive enthusiastic support only from those Negroes who could identify the interests of their group with the war. Most Negroes were "patriotic" and knew that a United Nations victory was preferable to an Axis triumph, but the emotional support tended to be fully rallied only by hope for positive racial gains.

We see, then, in this section of the chapter, that Negroes, on the average, tended to show less enthusiasm for the war than did whites,

and we shall see in the next section a correlate of this attitude, in the Negroes' greater reluctance to go overseas or to fight in actual combat.

SECTION 

REACTIONS TO PROSPECTS OF OVERSEAS AND COMBAT DUTY

In keeping with the mixed feelings with which Negro soldiers regarded the war, Negro soldiers were far less likely than white enlisted men to express a desire for action in the war. The two questions indexing the desire "to get in the fight," shown in Chart VIII, indicate that Negro soldiers expressed a preference for being in an outfit that would stay in the United States, and, if the outfit went overseas, for having some assignment other than a fighting job.

Chart VIII is based on the survey made in March 1943. Subsequent studies did not alter this general picture. Consider some findings from a world-wide survey made in June 1945 just after the surrender of the Germans but before the defeat of the Japanese.<sup>16</sup> In answer to the question, "How do you feel about being sent to an overseas theater which is fighting against the Japs?" the proportion of Negroes and whites, respectively, who answered, "The Army should not send me at all" was as follows:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
Soldiers in the United States	64% (1,053)	41% (2,213)
Soldiers in the European theater	56 (232)	47 (2,759)
Soldiers in the Mediterranean theater	62 (272)	54 (1,777)

The Negroes in the survey also were more likely than whites to say "I feel I have done my share as a soldier and should be discharged" in response to the question, "How do you feel about your share in the war?" The percentages making the response are shown below:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States	51% (1,053)	34% (2,213)
European theater	57 (232)	49 (2,759)
Mediterranean theater	60 (272)	52 (1,777)
Pacific Ocean areas	52 (443)	52 (3,226)
India-Burma theater	58 (276)	35 (1,521)


Because of the relatively large number of Negro cases available in the March 1943 study and because it was specifically designed to

<sup>16</sup> S-205.

probe into racial attitudes, the data presented in Chart VIII are selected for more detailed analysis.

The two questions shown in Chart VIII are not—as no small group of questions could be—ideal indicators of personal commitment to the war. There were reasons other than a desire to make

CHART VIII  
ATTITUDES OF NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN TOWARD OVERSEAS  
AND COMBAT DUTY  
(March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

one's contribution to winning the war which might lead men to express a preference for overseas service: curiosity, adventurousness, a desire to travel on the one hand or boredom and desire to escape from the domestic military situation on the other. As for the question of having a fighting job if one's outfit went overseas, it might

at first glance appear to be applicable only to men who were in combat outfits. However, in the training period and especially in the early days of the war in which this study was made, men could not have a realistic notion of what was involved in combat, and each branch stressed to its men its combat mission (e.g. "The Fighting Quartermasters"); hence the question probably was subjectively meaningful to most men regardless of their particular outfits. Nevertheless, the choice of a nonfighting job did not necessarily indicate a lack of zeal where the war was concerned. It might, for example, represent a man's sincere judgment that he was, for any number of reasons—health, skill, etc.—more useful to the Army in a noncombat capacity.

Whatever the motives for desiring or not desiring action, however, these two questions do provide a measure useful for comparative purposes. It is important also to note that, while the two questions are correlated, the relationship is by no means perfect. Thus, we have:

	<i>Negro cross section</i>	<i>Matched white group</i>	<i>White cross section</i>
Choose an outfit overseas and a fighting job	15%	33%	40%
Choose an outfit overseas, but not a fighting job	12	13	16
Do not choose an outfit overseas, but if sent overseas want a fighting job	13	12	10
Do not choose an outfit overseas and if sent overseas do not want a fighting job	60	42	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>3,000</i>	<i>1,000</i>	<i>4,800</i>

From this cross tabulation we see (a) that 15% + 12% = 27% of the Negroes preferred an outfit that would go overseas, (b) that 15% + 13% = 28% chose an outfit in which they would have a fighting job, and (c) that 15% chose both an overseas outfit and a fighting job.

Using these three indexes, let us compare Negro and white attitudes as related to a variety of factors in the backgrounds of the men. The data are summarized in Table 13.

In Table 13 we see that among Negroes, as among whites, there is a substantial correlation between most of these background variables and attitudes toward overseas service and combat. And

among both racial groups, the direction of the relationship is approximately the same. Relatively most willing to choose overseas and combat service are: volunteers, men in Army longest, noncoms, Ground or Air Force men, youngest men, best educated men, single men, Northern men. All these relationships hold for Negroes as

TABLE 13  
RELATIONSHIP OF BACKGROUND AND ARMY EXPERIENCE TO CHOICE OF OVERSEAS  
OUTFITS AND FIGHTING JOBS AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN,  
MARCH 1943

	PERCENTAGE CHOOSING:						Number of cases	
	Overseas outfit		A fighting job		Both an overseas outfit and a fighting job			
	Negro	White	Negro	White	Negro	White	Negro	White
<b>Type of enlistment</b>								
Volunteers	46	68	37	59	26	49	441	1,180
Selectees	23	51	23	41	10	30	2,496	3,373
<b>Length of time in Army</b>								
Over 2 years	44	68	34	65	24	53	165	453
1 to 2 years	31	65	28	54	15	45	554	753
6 months to 1 year	27	55	25	43	12	33	777	1,280
Under 6 months	23	51	23	43	11	31	1,432	2,239
<b>Rank</b>								
Sergeant	41	68	34	60	22	50	298	774
Corporal	28	64	29	49	15	39	376	625
Private or Pfc	25	50	23	43	11	32	2,302	3,374
<b>Force</b>								
Ground	30	54	29	52	16	40	947	1,294
Air	26	58	27	52	12	41	407	1,365
Service	26	55	22	39	11	30	1,652	2,135
<b>Age</b>								
30 and over	23	50	19	36	9	28	859	1,215
25-29	26	56	26	44	13	34	713	1,140
20-24	30	59	28	53	15	41	1,293	2,187
Under 20 years	34	60	41	53	23	43	96	231
<b>Education</b>								
College	44	66	34	47	24	40	174	653
H.S. graduate	36	62	35	55	22	43	306	1,331
Some high school	34	58	30	47	17	37	723	1,241
Grade school	20	42	20	36	8	25	1,796	1,563
<b>Marital condition</b>								
Married	25	46	25	41	12	29	1,107	1,431
Single	29	61	26	48	14	39	1,827	3,227
<b>Regional origin</b>								
North	36	59	32	47	20	37	947	3,232
South	22	50	22	45	9	33	2,056	1,502



well as whites. But, without a single exception, in every subgroup the percentage of Negroes expressing a preference for overseas service, for combat, or for both, is smaller than the corresponding percentage for whites who were surveyed at the same time.

Since none of these background variables in Table 13 can account for the Negro-white differences in attitude, one is forced to consider the differences as some kind of manifestation of the different positions of the two races in the social structure of the United States. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Negroes, dissatisfied with the prevailing system of race relations and their inferior status, were less likely than whites to accept official formulations of war aims and to view the war as of central concern to them. For Negroes there were two struggles—the war which preoccupied the nation and their own endeavor to achieve higher status in that nation. If, from this conflict, they emerged less certain than whites that they wanted to see action in the war in an Army which offered little support to their hopes that winning this war would mean a victory for their racial aspirations as well, this alone would go far to explain their attitudes. But, besides the general orientation of Negro soldiers to the war, there probably were also certain rather general differences in personality structure between Negroes and whites as a result of the different cultural worlds in which they lived.

It is, of course, obvious that individual behavior tends to conform to group norms. Neither the white soldier nor the Negro soldier was particularly eager for combat. But for the white soldier, society set certain standards of behavior: he was expected to see the war through, and, even aside from the war, such values as bravery and success were highly emphasized. If white soldiers did fear or have reluctance to go into combat, their own values defined it as cowardice or failure, and they could anticipate disapproval from their own group if their attitudes were known. Consequently, in the training period, where fear was not so immediate and overmastering as in combat, white soldiers often did not admit their reluctance even to themselves or, if they did, felt ashamed and denied it. And, on the positive side, white soldiers could expect rewards from their society for acquitting themselves well. In other words, white soldiers had status which could be enhanced in their own eyes and in the eyes of their society if they lived up to the standards both it and they accepted and which could be lost if they violated those standards. It is probable that the pronounced differences in their expressions about seeing action noted previously among the various

educational levels were due only in part to greater concern about war aims among the better educated men. The better educated among white soldiers probably tended also to be more sensitive and responsive to these intangible pressures and to come from subgroups whose expectations about the performance of their members (and consequently the demands the members made on themselves) were higher.

But the Negro's position was not the same. Individual failure in general was less stigmatized, both within the Negro group because it often seemed to be less a function of the individual's qualities than of disadvantages based on treatment of his race,<sup>17</sup> and within the white group because whites assumed that the Negro was inferior and expected less from him. Moreover, the standards of behavior to which the Negro was expected to conform in the Army were the values of the white group—his own group was less wholeheartedly behind the war and, therefore, less likely to disapprove of his failure to conform. It could easily appear to the Negro soldier that he had no status to lose in the white society for failure to conduct himself by the whites' standards and little likelihood of acquiring status by means of his individual performance—and at the same time his self-regard and his position within his own group were not as crucially bound up with his war performance as was the case for white soldiers. So it would follow that Negro soldiers were not only less motivated to get into action but also less inhibited from admitting it to themselves and to others.<sup>18</sup>

Acceptance of existing Army policy in race relations was least common among those Negro soldiers who exhibited greatest willingness to get into action overseas. Chart IX brings out this fact. Although resentment over segregation of Negroes might hardly seem likely to provide combat motivation for Negro troops, nevertheless the minority of Negro soldiers who did report themselves as willing to get into combat tended to come disproportionately from

<sup>17</sup> For white men, too, success or failure is often in fact not a matter of individual effort as, for example, being unemployed in the midst of depression, but the culture tends to define it individualistically.

<sup>18</sup> Some part of the Negroes' reluctance for overseas service may have been a response to a threat sometimes heard from hostile white officers: "Just wait until we get those so-and-so's overseas." As will be discussed later in this chapter, Army treatment of Negroes in its ranks compared favorably with corresponding treatment of Negroes in many civilian communities, particularly in the South. It was widely believed that this relatively favorable treatment was due to constant public surveillance, particularly through the Negro press, which might operate much less effectively outside the country.

among the men who were opposed to racial separation in the Army. This was true among both Northern men and Southern men and at every educational level. As will be seen in Table 14, the Negroes who chose combat were also more likely than others to be distrustful of the likelihood of the Army's actually using its Negro combat troops, and to be critical of the chance Negroes were being given to help win the war. On the other hand, they tended more than others to accept the ideological formulations of the war and to feel that Negroes had a stake in the war and would make postwar gains. Most of the differences in Table 14 are not large, but it should be noted that they are not confined to one educational level or to Northerners only. They are found at all educational levels, regardless of regional origin. Of the 54 differences shown in Table 14, 51 are positive, 1 is zero, and only 2 are negative.

It is not to be expected that a critical orientation toward whites' segregation of Negroes would serve in general as a positive motivation impelling men toward combat. Against such a suggestion, there lies the fact that resentment among Negro soldiers on these matters was relatively frequent and motivation for combat relatively infrequent. But what does emerge from the relationships just described is that among the opponents of the status quo in race relations there were a group of men whose answer to what they regarded as injustices to their race was to press harder for an opportunity to demonstrate their abilities and to win for their group by their combat services a valid claim for greater rights and privileges. It is precisely because resentment could lead either to alienation from the war or to this "striving" attitude, while resignation to the status quo left men more passive in their attitudes, that the men motivated to get into action came disproportionately from the racial militant.


One aspect of this situation revolves around the "right to fight." For Negro soldiers, unlike whites, this was a group problem, and some Negroes viewed the tendency to concentrate Negro soldiers in the Service Forces as presumptive evidence that Negroes were deliberately being denied the opportunity to fight,<sup>19</sup> with the further

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<sup>19</sup> There is some evidence to support this charge in the statement contained in an official report of the War Department, which, in referring to the fact that Negro soldiers were eventually used in supporting type combat units (field artillery, tank destroyers, etc.) says, "This condition apparently resulted from the pressure initiated by the Negroes themselves." War Department Circular No. 124 (April 1946), *Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy*.

CHART IX

DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD COMBAT BETWEEN NEGROES WHO REJECT RACIAL SEPARATION IN THE ARMY AND THOSE WHO DO NOT, BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  
(March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

TABLE 14

DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES BETWEEN NEGRO SOLDIERS WHO WANT COMBAT DUTY AND ALL NEGRO SOLDIERS OF SIMILAR REGIONAL ORIGIN AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, MARCH 1943

Opinion area and selected response	DEVIATION IN PROPORTION GIVING STATED RESPONSE AMONG THOSE MEN WHO CHOOSE FIGHTING JOBS IN OVERSEAS OUTFITS FROM PROPORTION IN ENTIRE REGIONAL-EDUCATIONAL GROUP*					
	Northern men			Southern men		
	Grade school	Some H.S.	H.S. grad.	Grade school	Some H.S.	H.S. grad.
<i>War Ideology</i>						
The United States is fighting to give everyone a fair chance to make a decent living	+4	<u>+8</u>	+3	<u>+7</u>	+7	+1
The United States is fighting to protect the right of free speech for everyone	+6	+4	+2	<u>+8</u>	+7	+1
The United States is not fighting mainly for the benefit of the rich people in this country	<u>+17</u>	<u>+11</u>	<u>+8</u>	<u>+12</u>	<u>+11</u>	+5
<i>Negroes and the War</i>						
The war is as much my affair as anyone else's	<u>+11</u>	<u>+14</u>	<u>+11</u>	<u>+15</u>	<u>+16</u>	<u>+8</u>
It is more important now for Negroes to help win the war than to try to make things better for Negroes	<u>+8</u>	<u>+12</u>	<u>+11</u>	<u>+10</u>	+6	0
Optimistic about postwar gains for Negroes	+1	+5	+3	<u>+10</u>	+6	+1
Negroes are not being given a fair chance to help win the war	<u>+10</u>	+1	+3	+4	+5	<u>+13</u>
Negroes are doing more than their share to help win the war	-1	+3	-1	+2	<u>+13</u>	<u>+12</u>
Few or none of the Negro soldiers being trained as combat troops will actually be used in combat	<u>+17</u>	+4	+5	+5	<u>+11</u>	<u>+10</u>
<i>Number of cases</i>						
All men in given regional-educational group	1,106	807	848	3,111	733	833
Men in given group who want fighting jobs in overseas outfits	158	188	226	246	90	136

\* Underscored differences are significant at the .10 level.

implication that this assumed policy was intended to prevent them from establishing a claim for better postwar treatment of Negroes. Research Branch studies did not approach directly the question of whether Negroes thought they were unjustly barred from combat branches. It may be noted in passing that although Negroes much less than whites were likely to prefer overseas service or a fighting job, at least as high a proportion of Negroes as of whites in the Service Forces indicated a preference for being in a Ground Force branch (Negroes 13 per cent as compared with whites 11 per cent). Of Negroes in Ground Forces, 51 per cent preferred Ground Forces as compared with 35 per cent among whites in Ground Forces. Among Negroes and whites in Air Forces, there was no appreciable difference, only 7 per cent of the Negroes and 8 per cent of the whites preferring Ground Forces.

Concern over the right to fight, in so far as the concern existed, hardly could have been lessened by occasional incidents during the war which received much publicity. One of the best known was the history of the Second Cavalry Division. A study which the Research Branch made of troops from this division in the Mediterranean during the summer of 1944 affords an illustration of what happened when getting into action became defined among Negroes, not only as a matter of personal preference, but also as a matter of principle involving the right to fight.

The Second Cavalry Division was a Negro unit containing regiments with a history dating back to the Civil War. It was one of two horse cavalry divisions activated in World War II; the other, white, discarded its horses before going into combat operations. After cavalry training, which was quite similar to infantry training plus training with horses, the Second Cavalry was shipped overseas to North Africa, the men having been told that they would there receive further training for infantry combat and then go into action. Early in 1944 the division arrived in North Africa and was broken up into various service units. The merits of this action need not concern us here—on the one hand, it has been argued that the secrecy with which the action was taken (mail censorship rules technically prevented news of it from reaching the United States) pointed to a deliberate policy of barring Negroes from combat, but, on the other hand, it was maintained that the division was so poorly trained that it would have been unwise to send it into action. At any rate, the story did become known and was widely interpreted in the Negro press as an affront to the race.

In June 1944, a few months after the breakup of the division, when it appeared that the Second Cavalry affair was on its way to becoming a *cause célèbre*, the Research Branch was officially requested to conduct a survey to determine the attitudes of former Second Cavalry men toward the inactivation of their division and, more specifically, whether they were dissatisfied with their service assignments and eager to get into combat. In an attempt to get as realistic an answer as possible, the study was divided into two phases. In the first phase, it was indicated to the men that Negroes would be transferred to combat service if enough men in a unit wanted it—a promise backed up by the theater commander. It was also made clear to the men that adequate training would be given them before they were sent into combat. The men were then presented with a simple anonymous ballot which contained only one question:<sup>20</sup>

Would you rather stay in the kind of work your outfit is now doing or would you rather get into front-line fighting in a combat outfit?

\_\_\_\_\_ I would rather stay in the kind of work my outfit is now doing

\_\_\_\_\_ I would rather get into front-line fighting in a combat outfit

In other words, the question was made to resemble as closely as possible a situation of actually volunteering.

In this situation, 27 per cent of a cross section of 1,854 Negro enlisted men representative of the former Second Cavalry Division<sup>21</sup> voted for front-line fighting. In a sample of 1,640 white enlisted men selected to match the Negro sample as closely as possible with respect to present type of outfit, command, location, and physical fitness for combat duty, only 10 per cent wanted to leave their service jobs.<sup>22</sup> If both these percentages seem low, it should be remembered that, in addition to the realistic context in which the question was asked, these men were overseas and had had an opportunity to discover what a gruelling experience combat was. Actually, men stationed closer to the front were less likely to choose combat than men in the rear, but if the comparison is limited to ex-members of the Second Cavalry stationed in Italy, for none of the white units

<sup>20</sup> In half the ballots the order of choices was reversed in both the check list and the question itself.

<sup>21</sup> The sample was drawn so as to be representative also of the service units to which the men had been assigned.

<sup>22</sup> Data from MTO-3.

surveyed were stationed in North Africa, the proportion choosing combat among Second Cavalry men was still twice as large as among comparable white soldiers—20 per cent among Negroes as compared with 10 per cent among whites.

In a supplementary study, a parallel cross-section sample of 867 former members of the Second Cavalry Division was asked to make the same choice as has been described above, and also was asked a series of supplementary questions. (The accuracy of the sampling is attested by the fact that the vote for combat duty was almost identical in the two samples.) The supplementary study showed that there were background differences in attitude between Negro and white soldiers in educational level, marital status, and so on. Overseas these background factors operated in much the same way as Table 13 has shown for troops in training. Controlling them only serves to increase the percentage of Negroes choosing combat as compared with whites. There remain two factors in which the Second Cavalry men differed from the white sample with whom they were compared: *they were Negroes and they were former members of a combat outfit*. It has been shown that in ordinary circumstances Negroes did not exceed whites in their desire to get into combat, but there is no way of knowing positively how white soldiers trained for combat duty who witnessed the breakup of their division would have reacted since no opportunity for such a study was presented. But there is no doubt that a good many of the Negroes in the Second Cavalry tended to interpret their change in status as a matter of discrimination and a denial of the Negro's right to fight.

When men who chose to be placed in combat units were asked to indicate their reasons, 87 per cent responded. As shown in Table 15, the three major groups of reasons given were dissatisfaction with present outfit or job, zeal to use their training in action, and reaction against prejudice toward Negroes.

The men were asked, further, to give their own reasons why they thought the Second Cavalry Division was broken up. These are summarized in Table 16. In the entire sample, 23 per cent made free comments which are classified in the category "prejudice against Negroes." But among those who volunteered for transfer to combat duty, 42 per cent made such comments. This underscores the findings reported for the training situation (for example, Chart IX and Table 14) that the Negroes who were most racially militant also were those most likely to want active combat duty. Their attitudes were explicitly spelled out in comments like the following:



[The Division was broken up because] someone had to be a stevedore, longshoreman, etc. It was a simple matter—give it to the colored man. After the war is over demands couldn't be so great, didn't his white brother(?) die on the front line, while he was comparatively safe in the rear echelon; that's right, isn't it?

The reason why I prefer combat is because we all are supposed to be American citizens and there aren't any of us Negro people fighting in this war. Since we are citizens we should be granted the privilege that the rest are getting because we are just as good as the next man. Under the condition it will better our status after the war.

It must be remembered, as Table 16 shows, that such comments could be typical only of a racially militant minority. Nevertheless,

TABLE 15

REASONS GIVEN BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION WHO WISHED TO VOLUNTEER FOR COMBAT, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, SEPTEMBER 1944

	<i>Percentage of all responses</i>
Dissatisfaction with present outfit or job	34
Dislike of officers or outfit	(17)
Dislike or disrespect for present job	(11)
Feeling that they would be better off in combat outfit	(6)
Zeal to use training in action	26
Trained or best suited for combat	(22)
Desire to see action	(4)
Reaction against prejudice toward Negroes	19
Challenged by breakup of Second Cavalry or other alleged insults to Negroes	(12)
Desire to advance position of Negroes	(7)
Patriotic or idealistic reasons (without explicit reference to racial problems)	14
Miscellaneous	7
<b>Total responses*</b>	<b>100</b>
<i>Number giving reasons</i>	<i>204</i>
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>234</i>

Data from MTO-5.

\* Some men gave more than one response.

the experiences of the Negroes in the Second Cavalry Division were sufficiently disillusioning to account for the following difference in proportion answering affirmatively to the question, "Do you think Negro soldiers who are being trained as combat troops will get a chance to use their combat training against the enemy?"

	<i>Percentage answering "most of them will" or "a good many will"</i>
Negroes in the United States (March 1943)	71
Negroes from Second Cavalry (September 1944)	29

In other words, less than half as many Negro soldiers in the special Mediterranean survey as in the United States cross-section survey of a year and a half earlier believed in the sincerity of the Army's intention to use combat-trained Negro soldiers in actual combat. Moreover, the proportion who answered "yes" to the question, "Do you

TABLE 16  
REASONS GIVEN BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SECOND CAVALRY AS TO WHY THE  
DIVISION WAS BROKEN UP, SEPTEMBER 1944

	PERCENTAGE OF MEN GIVING EACH REASON	
	<i>All men</i>	<i>Men who chose combat</i>
Prejudice against Negroes	23	42
Inadequate training	21	12
Need for service troops	9	6
Uselessness of horse cavalry	5	6
Miscellaneous	7	6
Statements of lack of knowledge of the reason	22	24
No response	16	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>103*</b>	<b>104*</b>
<i>Number of men</i>	<i>867</i>	<i>234</i>

Data from MTO-5.

\* Percentages add to more than 100 because some men gave more than one reason.

think that most Negroes are being given a fair chance to do as much as they want to do to help win the war?" was 36 per cent among United States Negro soldiers in March 1943 and only 17 per cent among this special sample in the Mediterranean in September 1944.

This section on the reactions of Negroes to the prospect of overseas and combat duty has shown the relatively low motivation on the part of Negro troops in general for service overseas or in fighting jobs.<sup>23</sup> While neither the white soldier nor the Negro soldier was

<sup>23</sup> Despite the exception of the special case of the Second Cavalry Division.

particularly eager for combat, Negro soldiers generally appeared to be even less eager than whites. There is evidence that those Negroes who reacted most militantly against white prejudice tended, in disproportionate numbers, to be found among the minority of Negroes most likely to prefer overseas service and fighting jobs. This was seen in the training situation and again evidenced in the special study of the Second Cavalry Division in Italy.

## S E C T I O N V

### GENERAL ADJUSTMENT OF NEGRO SOLDIERS IN THE ARMY AT HOME AND OVERSEAS

In a very general way—if we leave out for the moment issues directly in the area of Army racial policies—Negro soldiers did not show evidence on Research Branch surveys of much worse adjustment to the Army than white soldiers. In some respects their attitudes toward Army life were worse than those of whites, in some respects better. It is interesting to observe that overseas, as well as in the United States, the tendencies were much the same, although as the war progressed some attitudes of both whites and Negroes deteriorated.

In expressions of pride in his outfit, sense of importance of his Army job, and interest in his job, the Negro soldier's attitudes were generally somewhat more favorable than the white soldier's. In attitudes toward his physical condition and in the related attitudes of general sense of well-being, the Negro soldier tended to be somewhat less favorable than the white soldier. And, as the war ended, the Negro was somewhat less likely than others to think he had had a square deal from the Army.

Data illustrative of these findings will be drawn principally from three surveys, widely spaced in time—surveys made in the United States in March 1943 and the summer of 1944 and a survey made throughout the world in June 1945.<sup>24</sup> The first survey was the only one designed primarily as a study of race relations, and there is not very much overlap between the questions asked in the three studies. Moreover, in the world-wide study only a few questions were asked

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<sup>24</sup> S-32, March 1943, S-106 for whites, June 1944 and S-144 for Negroes, August 1944 (using the same questionnaire as S-106) and S-205, June 1945. Answers to some of the questions were tabulated for only a fraction of the white sample in S-106.

in all theaters. Spotty as the data are, they nevertheless seem quite adequate to document the principal statements made.

Let us consider first some types of questions on which Negro respondents were more favorable than white respondents, beginning with pride in outfit.

In response to the question, "Do you feel proud of your company?" the percentages of Negroes and whites, respectively, checking "Yes, very proud" <sup>25</sup> in the first two United States studies and in the one theater which included the question in the third study were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, March 1943	56% (3,000)	50% (4,800)
United States, summer 1944	43 (3,000)	29 (2,700)
India-Burma, June 1945	37 (276)	31 (1,521)

On a somewhat similar question asked in March 1943, namely, "Do the men in your company cooperate and work well together?" 33 per cent of the Negroes as compared with 23 per cent of the whites checked "Yes, all of the time."

On the importance of his Army job as seen by the soldier, the following data may be cited. Asked, "How do you feel about the importance of the work you are doing right now as compared with jobs you might be doing in the Army?" the percentages checking "It is as important as any other job I could do" <sup>26</sup> were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, summer 1944	55% (3,000)	50% (10,599)
United States, June 1945	52 (1,053)	46 (2,213)

The percentages responding "I usually feel *it is worth while*" <sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> The complete check list was:

- Yes, very proud
- Yes, fairly proud
- No, not proud
- Undecided

<sup>26</sup> The complete check list was:

- It is as important as any other job I could do
- It is fairly important, but I could do more important work
- It hardly seems important at all

<sup>27</sup> The complete check list was:

- I usually feel *it is not worth while*
- I usually feel *it is worth while*
- Undecided

to the question, "Do you usually feel that what you are doing in the Army is worth while or not?" were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, March 1943	68% (3,000)	66% (4,800)
United States, summer 1944	71 (3,000)	61 (10,599)

In June 1945 in India-Burma, 52 per cent of the Negroes, as contrasted with 25 per cent of the whites, answered "very important" to the question, "How important do you consider your own Army job in the total war effort?"

In all these questions on worth-whileness of jobs there is a tendency for the better educated man to evaluate the importance of his assignment less highly than the less educated, and this is especially true in situations like India-Burma, where by June 1945 the theater's mission actually had diminished in its relative significance to the total war effort. However, if education is controlled, the Negroes still tend to rate the importance of their Army assignments higher than whites do theirs.

Negroes not only were more likely than whites to view their jobs as important, but were also more likely to view them as interesting. When asked "How interested are you in your Army job?" the percentages checking "Very much interested"<sup>28</sup> were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, March 1943	78% (3,000)	64% (4,800)
United States, summer 1944	57 (3,000)	49 (10,599)

One source of interest in an Army job might be the fact that from it one might learn something which would be useful after the war. In March 1943, in answering the question, "Do you think that after the war the training you are getting in the Army will or will not help you to get a better job than you had before you went into the Army?" among Negroes 61 per cent checked the response "Will help me to get a better job" as contrasted with 39 per cent among whites.

In spite of the greater sense of importance felt by Negroes in their jobs and greater interest expressed, there is no evidence that Negroes' general level of job satisfaction was higher than that of whites.

<sup>28</sup> The complete check list was:  
 Very much interested  
 A little but not much  
 Not interested at all

As Chapter 7 on "Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction" has shown, satisfaction with job is compounded out of many elements, among which is one's general level of adjustment. As we shall see, Negroes tended somewhat less frequently than whites to express themselves as satisfied and in good spirits, and this may be reflected in their answer to general questions about job adjustment. In the United States in July 1944, 60 per cent of the Negroes as compared with 57 per cent of the whites said they would change Army jobs if they had a chance, while in June 1945 the figures were 52 per cent and 46 per cent. In India-Burma in June 1945, a different question showed that 58 per cent of the Negroes and 56 per cent of the whites expressed themselves as "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with their Army jobs. In view of the small differences and conflicting data, no conclusion can safely be drawn as to the comparative general level of job satisfaction, although there would seem to be little doubt that the Negro was somewhat more prone to regard his job as important and interesting.

Let us turn now to the type of questions in which the Negroes' attitudes were less favorable than those of whites. We have seen in previous sections of this chapter that Negroes tended, on the average, to be less strongly committed to the war and less anxious to go overseas or into combat. Let us now look at the data which suggest that they may have been somewhat less prone to say that they were in good spirits or that they were having a good time in the Army.

When the question was asked, "In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits?" the following percentages responded "I am usually in good spirits":<sup>29</sup>

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, summer 1944	27% (3,000)	35% (10,599)
United States, June 1945	24 (1,053)	35 (2,213)
European theater, June 1945	27 (282)	34 (2,769)
Mediterranean theater, June 1945	26 (272)	31 (1,777)
Pacific Ocean areas, June 1945	20 (445)	23 (3,226)
India-Burma theater, June 1945	17 (276)	33 (1,521)

A variant of this question, which included the words "satisfied and in good spirits," was asked in March 1943. The proportions re-

<sup>29</sup> The complete check list was:

I am usually in good spirits

I am in good spirits some of the time and in low spirits some of the time

I am usually in low spirits

sponding "satisfied and in good spirits" were 36 per cent among Negroes and 44 per cent among whites.

To the question, "In general, what sort of a time do you have in the Army?" the percentages answering "I have a pretty good time" <sup>30</sup> were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, March 1943	29% (3,000)	33% (4,800)
United States, June 1945	15 (1,053)	22 (2,213)

And when asked "Are you ever worried or upset?" the percentages responding "I am hardly ever worried or upset" <sup>31</sup> were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, March 1943	23% (3,000)	29% (4,800)
United States, June 1945	23 (1,053)	30 (2,213)

Although the less educated among the Negroes, as among the whites, were less likely to say they were in good spirits, not worried, etc., level of education does not alone account for the racial differences in responses, which generally remain when education is held constant.

Somewhat the same pattern as just above is seen with respect to questions on one's physical condition. Negroes tended to report themselves in poorer physical condition than whites. In response to the question, "In general, what sort of physical condition would you say you are in at the present time?" the percentages checking "very good" or "good" <sup>32</sup> were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, summer 1944	49% (3,000)	58% (10,599)
United States, June 1945	31 (1,053)	35 (2,213)
Mediterranean theater, June 1945	34 (272)	34 (1,777)

<sup>30</sup> The complete check list was:

- I have a pretty good time
- It is about fifty-fifty
- I have a pretty rotten time

<sup>31</sup> The complete check list was:

- I am hardly ever worried or upset
- I am sometimes
- I am often worried and upset

<sup>32</sup> The complete check list was:

- Very good physical condition
- Good physical condition
- Fair physical condition
- Poor physical condition
- Very poor physical condition

The Mediterranean white sample reflects the presence of numerous combat ground troops who were particularly likely to say they were in poor physical condition. In India-Burma in June 1945, a variant form of the question inquired "How would you rate your physical condition during the past month?" with check-list categories of "very good," "pretty good," "not so good," and "very poor." Among Negroes, 57 per cent checked "very good" or "pretty good," as compared with 71 per cent among whites. The percentages answering "Yes"<sup>33</sup> to the question, "In your opinion, are you physically fit for overseas duty in general?" were:

	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, June 1945	25% (1,053)	41% (2,213)
Mediterranean theater, June 1945	35 (272)	51 (1,777)
India-Burma theater, June 1945	23 (276)	62 (1,521)

This question, of course, reflects not only attitude toward physical condition but also attitude toward going overseas—on which, as we saw earlier in this chapter, Negroes were less favorable than whites. It is interesting to note that to a parallel question, asked in the June 1945 United States study, "As far as you know, are you now classified by the Army as physically fit for overseas duty?" almost exactly the same proportion of Negroes as of whites—28 per cent as compared with 27 per cent—answered "No." But 32 per cent of the Negroes as compared with only 20 per cent of the whites said they didn't know how they were classified.

A question designed rather late in the war to summarize, in so far as possible, soldiers' general attitudes toward the Army, and discussed at some length in Chapter 5 of this volume, is the following:

In general, do you think that you yourself  
have gotten a square deal from the Army?

- \_\_\_\_\_ Yes, in most ways I have
- \_\_\_\_\_ In some ways, yes, in others no
- \_\_\_\_\_ No, on the whole, I have not  
gotten a square deal

Percentages replying, "Yes, in most ways I have" were:

- <sup>33</sup> The complete check list was:
- Yes
  - No
  - Undecided



	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
United States, summer 1944	32% (3,000)	29% (2,700)
United States, June 1945	26 (1,053)	35 (2,213)
European theater, June 1945	28 (232)	35 (2,759)
Mediterranean theater, June 1945	28 (272)	35 (1,777)
Pacific Ocean areas, June 1945	21 (443)	28 (3,226)
India-Burma theater, June 1945	18 (276)	33 (1,521)

It is regrettable that no comparable basing point on this item is available to check against the figure for July 1944, which shows Negroes as slightly though not significantly more favorable than whites at that time. In view of the lack of further evidence, it should not be assumed that white attitudes toward getting a square deal improved in the last year of the war, while Negro attitudes deteriorated. Actually, in view of the evidence reviewed in detail in Chapter 5 and in view of the pattern shown on most of the other questions cited previously in this section of the present chapter, it is more probable that the attitudes of both whites and Negroes deteriorated somewhat, and that the July 1944 figure reported for whites is too low. In any event, the data for June 1945 show consistently in the United States and four overseas areas that Negroes were somewhat less likely than whites to say that they had had a square deal from the Army. Free comments on this question were specifically invited, and, weighting the number of cases from each area to provide a world-wide cross section, we can compare the types of comments made by Negroes and whites.

In rank order of frequency the types were as follows:

<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Whites</i>
1. Racial discrimination	1. Job assignment
2. Discharge policies	2. Promotion policies
3. Job assignment	3. Outfit or branch criticisms
4. Promotion policies	4. Discharge policies
5. Outfit or branch criticisms	5. Rotation, furlough, pass
6. Rotation, furlough, pass	6. Politics and favoritism
7. Officers	7. Officers
8. Miscellaneous	8. Miscellaneous

As would be expected from the Negroes' tendency to see their problems in a racial frame of reference, race discrimination heads their list. The kind of complaints among whites which are classified above under politics or favoritism were usually couched by Negroes in terms of race discrimination. Actually, among both races, the

complaints about officers are underrepresented above, because a complaint was placed in this category only if officers were blamed explicitly in connection with a given practice for which officers were responsible. In general, except for the category of race discrimination, the rank order of frequency of complaints among Negroes was quite similar to that of whites.

We may summarize the evidence thus far presented in this section by saying that the general adjustment of Negroes in the Army, while less satisfactory in terms of many expressed attitudes than that of whites, was not less so in any remarkable or spectacular way. Indeed, as the evidence has shown, in some respects—as in pride in outfit or in sense of importance of Army job and expressed interest in it—the Negro attitudes were somewhat more favorable than those of whites.

Perhaps the most compelling indication that Negroes believed that life in the Army was not so bad for colored men in comparison with civilian life lies in the statistics of volunteer enlistments at the end of the war. In the first six months after the war's close (September 1945 through February 1946) over 17 per cent of the men who signed up voluntarily were Negroes,<sup>24</sup> although Negroes constituted under 11 per cent of the male population 18 to 37. This proportion continued to rise, and at one time, in July 1946, it was announced in the press that, pursuant to the Army policy of including Negro troops in about their population proportion, Negro enlistments were being temporarily halted. However, among Negro as among white enlisted men, re-enlistment was the exception rather than the rule, which suggests that the Negroes' satisfaction with the Army should not be exaggerated. But if Negro soldiers had been much more violently dissatisfied than whites, it seems likely that the picture with respect to postwar volunteering would have been different from that which actually occurred.

In view of Negro resentments toward certain aspects of Army treatment, as well as the greater amount of conflict which Negro enlisted men felt over their role in the war, even greater differentials in general attitudes as between Negroes and whites might have been anticipated than have been shown in this chapter. But one must not forget the wide differences between *levels of expectation* in Negro and white cultures to which attention has already been called in another connection. In earlier chapters in this volume, the impact

<sup>24</sup> Data from the Adjutant General.

of the Army on the individual was analyzed, and it was pointed out to what an extent entering the Army meant adjusting to a system in which, to a large degree, status (and its accompanying rewards) was "ascribed" rather than achieved, and in which individuals were subjected to authoritarian controls which were foreign to their experience and galling to them, and finally a system which many individuals entered at a point relatively lower on the status ladder than their corresponding position in civilian life. Much of this analysis, however, is less applicable to the Negro enlisted man. Negroes were intimately acquainted with a social system in which their position was largely ascribed, where their opportunities for achieving status were sharply limited, and in which they were in many respects subjected to authoritarian control on the part of the group holding the superior ascribed status. On the basis of past civilian experiences, Negro men already knew a set of protective adjustments not too dissimilar from those which white soldiers had to learn. Moreover, the civilian past of most Negroes was not in such sharp contrast to their Army experiences as to invite unfavorable comparisons as a source of discontent with the Army. For more Negroes than whites, the Army was no worse and often much better than their civilian situation in the type of work it gave them to do, in the economic returns it made, and in the amount of individual status it accorded. Thus one might expect decidedly more favorable attitudes on the part of Negroes, if it were not for the fact that the situation with respect to numerous racial practices in the Army was not a very radical departure from civilian situations with which many Negroes were basically dissatisfied. Apparently the relative satisfaction with which many Negroes compared some aspects of their Army experience with their corresponding civilian experience was offset in varying degrees by dissatisfaction with some of the Army's racial practices.

The reader will have noted that the evidence presented in this section does not suggest that Negro attitudes overseas deteriorated any more than white attitudes. This also may be surprising in view of the Negroes' greater reluctance to go overseas. Two factors in particular may be noted in this connection. First, while proportionately no fewer, and perhaps more, Negroes than whites actually went overseas, the Negroes generally were in relatively safe service jobs at the rear. Combat men usually had less favorable attitudes than noncombat men. Second, Negroes often found

themselves in new environments where local race prejudice was much less than that which they had experienced in the United States.

The latter point may be illustrated by the highly favorable opinion which Negro soldiers in England had of the British—more favorable than that of white soldiers. In November 1943, when asked "What sort of an opinion do you have of the English people?" (check-list categories: "favorable," "undecided," "unfavorable") 80 per cent of the Negroes checked "favorable," as compared with 68 per cent of the whites.<sup>35</sup> However, the new-found acceptance by a white society had its bitter aspects as well as sweet, as the attitudes of white American soldiers toward Negroes were made known to local populations. Hence, it is not surprising that most comments made by Negro soldiers about the British people referred, not to their original friendliness, but to the deleterious effects American soldiers were having upon them. Examples of these remarks are the following:

I am a negro over doing my part to help win this war and the American so then white man come here with his prejudice and narrow mind and spread proporganda among the English people.

If the English people would do more towards treating the colored soldiers like human beings it would cut out some of the friction in the British Isle. We are treated not as soldiers but as something to be gaped at and held up for ridicule not by the English people but by the American. They are the ones who are causing us all the trouble.

Instead of leaving our problems of this sort at home the Americans [white] have tried to instill their ways and actions over here and try to make the English do things like they have done and become terribly indignant when they all don't do things like they would see them done.

Here in England a few of the narrow minded possibly Southern White America soldiers have already poisoned the mind of a few of the British people toward us. States that we were "bears without tails," "wild, sex crazy maniacs," etc.

As these comments imply, Americans transported their values as well as their troops overseas. There was so much friction between white and Negro soldiers, and outbreaks of violence, usually arising in English towns when men were off duty and Negro men were seen associating with English girls, were frequent enough so that the Army felt called upon to act. The solution adopted was in the American pattern of enforcing racial separation. Since in this

<sup>35</sup> The sample compared 422 Negroes and 2,262 whites.

case the English could not be separated from colored Americans, the policy took the form of separating white and Negro soldiers by putting restrictions on towns and leave policies to prevent Negroes and whites from spending leave in the same town together.

What the total effect of such experiences was is hard to say. The aspiration of Negro soldiers for a social system in which Negroes are accepted by whites on terms of equality was no doubt reinforced by seeing firsthand a society in which racial practices were closer to that goal than in the United States, but at the same time Negroes must have received a vivid impression of the amount of resistance an attempt to introduce such behavior at home would arouse. Meanwhile, those whites whose answer to any suggestion for improving the status of Negroes is "Would you want your daughter to marry a nigger?" could have felt that they found confirmation of the fears expressed by this *non sequitur* when they observed social relationships between Negro soldiers and English girls.

Another aspect of the influence of racial prejudice on the association of Negro troops with populations overseas appears in a study of the problem of venereal disease. This problem, overseas as well as at home, was of much concern to the Army. This was particularly true with respect to Negroes, among whom the incidence of venereal disease was several times higher than among whites, both at home and abroad. So high was the colored venereal disease rate that the Surgeon General's office made special efforts to conduct among Negro troops intensive programs of education on the subject, through films, posters, and lectures.

Some of the difficulties in the way of a successful program of venereal disease control among Negroes overseas—arising jointly out of factors associated with the cultural background and social attitudes of large numbers of Negroes and of factors associated with the type of women available to them—are illustrated by a study made by the Research Branch unit in Italy in the summer of 1945.<sup>36</sup> Field work on the study was completed just before VJ Day. The survey was made for the Preventive Medicine Branch of the Medical Section at theater headquarters.

Seldom was a study under Research Branch auspices planned and carried out with more meticulous care than this survey; the dangers of obtaining misleading information (either because of reticence or because of its opposite, a tendency to boast of sexual exploits) were well understood in advance. Questionnaires were anonymous, as

<sup>36</sup> S-233.

usual, and the survey was always conducted in an atmosphere of seriousness and dignity. Questions were pretested with more than ordinary care. There were two samples, 863 Negroes, representing an accurate cross section of Negro enlisted men in the theater, and 1,866 white enlisted men, also an accurate cross section. Well-qualified Negro enlisted men were, as usual, trained to interview personally Negroes whose educational level did not permit them to fill out questionnaires under classroom conditions.

The general validity of the findings is attested by the fact that when the incidence of venereal disease reported by the men in the sample for themselves was projected to the theater as a whole, the projected rates agreed almost exactly with the known theater rates, for both Negroes and whites independently.

The study throws a good deal of light not only on the problem of venereal disease control but also on the general problems of Negro troops in an overseas theater.

Among Negroes, 54 per cent said they had had venereal disease at some time in their life, while 21 per cent said they had contracted venereal disease since coming overseas. Corresponding figures among white soldiers were 15 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. Of the 21 per cent of Negroes who had been infected overseas, 16 per cent had become infected more than once (whites, 10 per cent). That the higher venereal disease rate among Negroes was due partly, but by no means wholly, to differences in educational level is seen in the following breakdowns by education of the percentages reporting they had ever had a venereal disease.

	<i>Negro</i>	<i>White</i>
College	43% (102)	12% (225)
High school graduates	49 (161)	12 (560)
High school nongraduates	54 (242)	17 (537)
Grade school	60 (351)	19 (433)
All educational levels	54 (846)	15 (1,336)

Although Negroes constituted only about 15 per cent of the theater strength, they contributed 36 per cent of the venereal disease in the theater during the months of May and June 1945. Why? There appeared to be two main factors: (1) the higher frequency of intercourse by Negroes and (2) the higher proportion of diseased women among the women available to them.

About a third more Negroes than whites reported that they had had intercourse since coming to the theater, and the average fre-

quency of intercourse reported by Negroes having it was 2 to 3 times a month, as compared with 1 to 2 times a month reported by whites. This difference could not alone account for the difference in venereal rates, however, since it could be computed, from the men's confidential reports, that out of every 1,000 sexual contacts made by Negroes in the theater there were 7 cases of venereal disease, as compared with 4 cases per 1,000 sexual contacts among whites.

The antivenereal disease program of the Medical Department, including movies and VD talks, had been much more intensive and continuous in Negro units than in white units. In consequence, it was not surprising to find that a larger percentage of Negroes who had intercourse than of whites said that they always carried a condom or pro-kit when on pass, and that a larger proportion of Negroes said that they always used both condom and prophylaxis. Negroes were less likely than whites to report that they drank liquor before having intercourse or that they "shacked up" all night—behavior normally conducive to a high risk of disease. Although Negroes got to town on pass just as frequently as whites, they were less likely than whites to get overnight passes.

In spite of their lower educational level, Negroes made just about as high scores as whites on a seven-question information test concerning venereal disease. Among Negroes, 88 per cent answered at least four out of the seven questions correctly, among whites 90 per cent. The chief error on the part of both whites and Negroes was in overrating penicillin as a "sure cure," an error made somewhat more frequently by Negroes than by whites.

On the testimony of the men as to their knowledge of preventives and of their actual use of them, and especially on their testimony as to use of liquor before intercourse and as to all-night exposure, there is no basis for assuming that Negroes who had intercourse, on the average, took less precautions against disease than whites. There is, however, no other proof or disproof of this conclusion, which must depend on one's confidence in the skill and care with which the study was conducted.

Since greater frequency of sexual contact by Negroes accounted for a part, but only a part, of the differential in VD rates and since the Army's elaborate educational campaign among Negroes had evidently had an effect, the only other important variable to be considered would be the infection rate among the Italian women consorting with Negro soldiers. There are no objective statistics

on this point, but a higher infection rate would be expected on the basis of the general observations in the theater about the class of women available to Negroes as well as from the circular reasoning that women who associate with men with a high infection rate are more likely than other women to become infected themselves. In turn, when prophylaxis failed or the men did not take all necessary precautions, these women were more likely to spread disease.

Many Negroes, judging by free comments, written at the end of their questionnaires, were not a little bitter about their inability to associate with clean women. Some of these comments are quoted in full, for the light they throw on the general problem of the Negro soldier overseas:

I believe the VD rate would be much lower if the MP's wouldn't classify all of the civilian girls as prostitutes that are caught with a colored soldier.

If the false rumors about the Negro soldier were wiped out it would be much easier for him to get along without a high rate of VD. These awful rumors are spread by our American white soldiers. Resulting from these rumors, the colored soldier has to resort to the scum of the women, and to have sexual intercourse which he knows before he starts is a VD nest.

The reason so many Negro soldiers come in contact with VD is because when a fellow meets a nice girl from a nice family he likes to walk and talk with her and not always at home. But around here when a Negro soldier takes a girl out the MP's look upon her as a whore. They take her down to have a physical examination of her, which she does not like. A lot of the better class girls are afraid they might have to do the same thing, so most Negro soldiers turn to whores, which brings us a higher rate of VD.

Now as to the association of soldiers and Italian women; I have found that there has been quite a bit of propaganda and just plain lies concerning the colored soldiers. This has served to increase the association with the less desirable types of women more than anything else. For instance, in Florence, the girls invited to the rest center are told that if they are seen dancing or otherwise associating with colored soldiers they will never be allowed to return to the rest center. This I got from a girl who had been so ostracized. This is both unfair and very detrimental to the morale of the colored soldier.

If there could be something done about the gossip against the Negro soldier to the Italian people, then a man wouldn't have to have sexual intercourse in the woods or with anything he may find. Personally, I haven't seen a monkey tail on any human, and it really hurts when those damned Italians ask where it is. With rumors like this, how can I associate with anything but the scum of Italy.

How representative such feelings on the part of Negro troops were cannot be determined, since only the more articulate volunteered comments. Moreover, there may have been a tendency to



exaggerate the situation by way of racial apology for the high Negro venereal disease rate. Nevertheless, there can hardly be any room for doubt that Negroes in Italy, and possibly in England and elsewhere overseas, had difficulty in associating with better classes of local women—especially after a few months of experience with American troops had familiarized local populations with American racial attitudes.

Thus we can see why Negro contacts abroad with populations supposedly freer than Americans from anti-Negro prejudice were not as conducive to high Negro morale as might be expected. The Italian study also helps explain why, as has been shown earlier in this chapter, the Negroes were no less eager than the whites to come home. In most respects, the problems of Negro troops overseas were not too different from those of white soldiers in similar service jobs in the rear areas. This is evidenced by the fact that, as already has been shown in connection with specific comments on the "square deal" question, the general pattern of Negro complaints parallels that of whites except for the category of race discrimination. This conclusion is reinforced by miscellaneous sets of Negro free comments tabulated at various periods of the war—for example, in Alaska in April 1944, India-Burma in July 1944, and the Central Pacific in September 1944.

This section has shown that as far as general attitudes toward life in the Army are concerned (apart from explicitly racial questions and questions explicitly related to the war aims), Negro attitudes were not strikingly less favorable than white attitudes. Some were actually somewhat more favorable. These facts are probably explained by the difference in level of expectation in the two races and the likelihood that, relative to civilian opportunities, the average Negro soldier had greater opportunities in the Army than did the average white soldier. The general pattern of adjustment of Negroes overseas as compared with whites was not much different from that at home. Although contact with foreign populations with more liberal racial attitudes than in America had potentialities of lifting Negro morale—we saw, for example, that the Negroes in England thought even more highly of the British than did the whites—Negro spirits were dampened by the influence of white soldiers on foreign populations. The case study in Italy illustrated the Negro's problem, especially as he may have been forced to confine his association with women to a class of foreign women who had a high probability of being diseased. However, all in all, there is

little basis for saying that in general attitudes the Negro at home or overseas made a much worse adjustment to conditions of Army life than did the white soldier. We turn next to a somewhat special consideration of a subject which throws further light on racial attitudes—the problems of Negroes in adjusting to life in Army camps in the Northern and Southern states, respectively, in the United States.

## SECTION VI

### COMPARATIVE REACTIONS TO BEING STATIONED IN THE NORTH AND IN THE SOUTH

The training situation in the United States was one which might have been expected to produce special difficulties in race relations. This was particularly true because of the concentration of Army camps in the Southern and Southwestern areas of the country. Many considerations entered into the location of camps, including, among others, suitability of terrain and climate for particular training needs, location of urban centers, supply and traffic problems, and demands of local groups and their elected representatives. A high proportion of the training centers were placed in the South. At about the time of the March 1943 survey of the attitudes of Negro troops, 47 per cent of the white enlisted men and 55 per cent of the Negro enlisted men in the United States were stationed in the Fourth and Eighth Service Commands. These, together with most of the 7 per cent of white and 10 per cent of Negro enlisted men stationed in the Third Service Command, may be taken as a rough measure of the tendency to train troops in the South.<sup>47</sup> For large numbers of Negro soldiers from Northern regions, this concentration of training camps in the South necessitated not only the uprooting from accustomed locations and social groups which nearly all soldiers experienced; it also meant coming into contact with a system of race relationships which in some respects differed rather markedly from that to which they had hitherto adjusted.

<sup>47</sup> The Service Commands, now abolished Army administrative units, did not correspond with the more conventionally used census regions. The Fourth Service Command was made up of North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi; the Eighth, of New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana; and the Third of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. With the removal of New Mexico and Pennsylvania and the addition of Delaware, West Virginia, Kentucky, and the District of Columbia, these three Service Commands would correspond with the three major census divisions constituting the definition of "South" used throughout this chapter.

To understand what was involved, one has only to imagine the reactions of a well-educated Negro soldier from a large Northern city who for the first time in his life found himself in contact with the social practices of a small Mississippi or Alabama town.

On the basis of such considerations as these, the survey of Negro troops in March 1943 was designed to secure some evidence of attitudes toward camp location. Three direct questions were asked, in the following order:

1. If you could go to any Army camp you wanted to would you rather stay here or would you rather go to some other camp?

I would rather stay here  
 I would rather go to some other camp  
 Undecided

2. If you would like to go to some other camp in the United States, which one would you want to go to?

(Write the name of your choice on this line):

\_\_\_\_\_

3. In general, where would you like best to be stationed?

In a camp in the North  
 In a camp in the South  
 In a camp in the West  
 Undecided

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

Each of the questions was aimed at a somewhat different complex of factors. In the first instance, it was known that soldiers generally tended to state a preference for some camp other than the one at which they were currently stationed; this was partially on the principle of the greener grass in the other pasture and the prevalent conviction that any change could hardly make matters worse, and partially because so many soldiers were at camps far removed from their home locality. The second question was an attempt to force respondents into a *specific* choice. Camps acquired reputations as "good" or "bad," and an individual's choice might be based not only on locality but also upon his estimate of conditions at a particular camp. It was considered best to have respondents commit themselves to these two questions before coming to the choice of location stated in terms of broad regions. Since there is a well-known tendency for the words "North" and "South" to carry symbolic overtones in terms of racial attitudes, the preceding specific

question was considered useful as a partial block against purely stereotype reactions.

Close to two thirds of the men stated a preference for moving to another Army camp, and this proportion was about the same among Negro soldiers as among white troops. Among the Negro soldiers, however, there were significant variations associated with camp location and the individual's own region of origin. This is shown in Table 17. The desire to change camps was most frequent among Northern Negroes stationed in Southern camps.<sup>38</sup> Thus, of the Northern Negroes in Southern camps, only 6 per cent wanted to stay in their present camp; whereas among the Southern men in Northern camps, 30 per cent said they would prefer to stay in their present camp.

When men who said they wanted to move to another camp were asked to name the specific camp of their choice, Table 17 shows that men tended to choose camps located in their home area, regardless of where they were stationed, but it is noteworthy that Northern Negroes were more inclined to their own home region than were Southern men to their own. We can consolidate the data in Table 17 by putting together all men who, by their indirect answers, showed a preference for location in the North and South, respectively. These figures are graphed in Chart X. For example, among Northern Negroes located in the North, 38 per cent preferred to stay in their present camp, according to Table 17, and 37 per cent preferred to move to some other specifically named camp located in the North, using census definition of region. The total of 75 per cent appears, therefore, in Chart X as the proportion of Northern Negroes in Northern camps preferring location in the North. Only 7 per cent both preferred to move to another camp and named a specific camp located in the South, as is shown in both Table 17 and Chart X. The 10 per cent in Table 17 who are listed as undecided as to location preference plus the 8 per cent who pre-

<sup>38</sup> A comparison of the attitudes of men in Northern camps with those of men stationed in the South with the object of drawing inferences as to the effect of location on attitudes requires, of course, that the hypothesis first be ruled out that such differences in attitudes as are observed are attributable to variations between the two sets of camps in population composition. This check has been made and, once the factor of region of residence is controlled, there are no differences in educational level, age, marital status, longevity, rank, or the method by which men entered the Army. That is, Northern men are the same in background, regardless of where they were stationed, and the same may be said of Southern men, while the differences between Northern and Southern men wherever stationed are largely in educational level and such variables as are correlated with education.

ferred to move to another camp but did not specify where comprise the 18 per cent plotted in Chart X as "indeterminate."

From Chart X one can see clearly the fact that Northern Negroes, whether stationed in the North or in the South, were more likely than Northern whites to prefer camps in the North. Likewise.


TABLE 17  
COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE PREFERENCES AS TO CAMP LOCATION,  
MARCH 1943

	<i>Negro</i> enlisted men %	<i>White</i> enlisted men %
<i>Northern men in Northern camps:</i>		
Prefer to stay in present camp	38	25
Undecided	10	11
Prefer to move to another camp and:		
Name a specific camp located in the North	37	40
Name a specific camp located in the South	7	11
Do not name a camp	8	13
Total (516 Negroes, 1,470 whites)	100	100
<i>Northern men in Southern camps:</i>		
Prefer to stay in present camp	6	19
Undecided	8	9
Prefer to move to another camp and:		
Name a specific camp located in the North	63	48
Name a specific camp located in the South	12	9
Do not name a camp	11	15
Total (1,390 Negroes, 1,821 whites)	100	100
<i>Southern men in Northern camps:</i>		
Prefer to stay in present camp	30	15
Undecided	12	11
Prefer to move to another camp and:		
Name a specific camp located in the North	14	14
Name a specific camp located in the South	31	49
Do not name a camp	13	11
Total (871 Negroes, 360 whites)	100	100
<i>Southern men in Southern camps:</i>		
Prefer to stay in present camp	34	42
Undecided	10	8
Prefer to move to another camp and:		
Name a specific camp located in the North	14	8
Name a specific camp located in the South	29	34
Do not name a camp	13	8
Total (2,718 Negroes, 1,143 whites)	100	100

Southern Negroes wherever stationed were more likely than Southern whites to prefer camps in the North.

While methodologically this indirect method of evaluating attitudes toward camp location has much to commend it, since it ex-

CHART X  
COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS' PREFERENCES AS TO CAMP LOCATION (March 1943)



Consolidation of data in Table 17.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

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plicitly avoids use of the stereotype "North" and "South," it is instructive to compare these findings with the results when the direct question was asked of Negroes as to whether they would prefer to be in a camp in the South, North, or West. The comparison is shown in Table 18.

TABLE 18  
NEGRO PREFERENCES AS TO CAMP LOCATION AS DETERMINED BY INDIRECT AND DIRECT QUESTIONING, MARCH 1943

	<i>As consolidated from Table 17 and graphed in Chart X %</i>	<i>Response to direct question %</i>
<i>Northern Negroes in Northern camps:</i>		
Prefer camp in North*	75	90
Indeterminate	18	7
Prefer camp in South	7	3
Total (516 cases)	100	100
<i>Northern Negroes in Southern camps:</i>		
Prefer camp in North*	63	94
Indeterminate	19	4
Prefer camp in South	18	2
Total (1,390 cases)	100	100
<i>Southern Negroes in Northern camps:</i>		
Prefer camp in North*	44	56
Indeterminate	25	9
Prefer camp in South	31	35
Total (871 cases)	100	100
<i>Southern Negroes in Southern camps:</i>		
Prefer camp in North*	14	61
Indeterminate	23	8
Prefer camp in South	63	31
Total (2,718 cases)	100	100

\* Including the West.

Here we see that the direct question elicited a much more decisive preference for the North (and West) than the consolidation from the indirect question. Proportions of Northern Negroes indicating a preference for a camp in the South dropped to 3 per cent among those stationed in the North and 2 per cent among those stationed in the South—on the basis of the direct question. Correspondingly,

the proportion of Southern Negroes in Northern camps expressing preference for a camp in the South increased slightly when the direct question was used, but the most noteworthy difference was the sharp drop in preference for the South among Southern Negroes in Southern camps—from 63 per cent based on the indirect question to 31 per cent based on the direct question.

In any case, Table 18 makes it clear that Chart X presented a conservative picture of Negro attitudes toward camp location. In part the discrepancies may be attributable to differences in definition. For example, a Negro soldier who thought of Maryland or Kentucky as North in comparison with the deep South might name a camp in one of these states and at the same time check "North" on the direct question, but in the indirect analysis he was coded as choosing a camp in the South by census definition. The same was true of a Negro who named a Southern camp without knowing where it was located and at the same time checked "North" in the direct question. Since the indirect analysis imposed an official definition, while the other left the men free to answer in terms of their own varying conceptions, differences are to be expected. Nevertheless, it is quite clear from the reasons which Negro soldiers gave for their choices that men tended to respond to the direct question in terms of the usual stereotypes of North and South and the differences in racial etiquette implied. Thus, as the following tabulation of free comments shows, 57 per cent of the Negroes choosing the North gave better treatment in the North as the reason for their choice, while preferences for the South were defended in terms of home ties and climate:

<i>Reasons given</i>	<i>Preferring North</i>	<i>Preferring South</i>
Home ties—e.g., "My family is there."	14%	43%
Habituation—e.g., "I'm used to it there."	6	16
Sectional differences in racial treatment	57	3
Preferable climate	7	26
All others	16	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<i>Number responding</i>	<i>4,361</i>	<i>1,237</i>

The better educated the Negro soldier, whether from the North or the South, the more likely he was to indicate a preference for a Northern camp on the direct question. Educational differences in response among Northern Negroes were small, since the preference



for the North was so overwhelming in all groups. But, as the following tabulation shows, there was a sharp difference in attitudes of Southern Negroes by education:

	PERCENTAGES PREFERRING CAMPS	
	IN THE NORTH, AMONG:	
	<i>Northern Negroes</i>	<i>Southern Negroes</i>
High school graduates	94	71
Some high school	93	65
Grade school	90	51

Among Southerners the question forced men to choose between their desires to be stationed near their home folk and the wish to be stationed in an area with relatively more desirable Negro-white relationships. It is evident that home ties and local loyalties operated most strongly among the less educated, while consciousness of differences and race relations bulked larger among the better educated.

As we have seen, there was a pronounced preference for the North when the direct question was used, and even on the basis of the conservative indirect analysis, the great majority of Northern Negroes were dissatisfied with the South, while only a third of the Southern Negroes in the North preferred to move to a camp in the South. These reactions to camp location were compounded out of many specific conditions and practices. As two examples of these, let us look at regional differences in reactions to local agents of justice—the civilian and military police—and to local transportation facilities.

Comparative opinions about the town police held by Negro and white enlisted men by region of origin and by region of camp location are shown in Chart XI. Whatever the region of origin and whatever the camp location, Negroes were much less likely than whites to say that the local civilian police were “usually fair” and much more likely to answer “usually not fair.” Compared with the difference in response between Negroes and whites, the differences among Negroes depending on camp location are not so large. But they are by no means negligible. Forty-four per cent of the Northern Negroes stationed in the South said that town police were “usually unfair” to Negroes as compared with only 24 per cent in the North, and the corresponding figures for Southern Negroes were 34 per cent and 25 per cent.


The extent to which these attitudes were based on direct experience cannot be determined. But whether based on direct experience or not, almost all of the men seemed to have definite judgments regarding fairness of treatment, and personal interviews showed that the men often held strong convictions on the subject without ever themselves having had a personal encounter with the town police. But they were asked about the treatment accorded to *Negro* soldiers; their answers correspondingly reflected the generalized pattern of belief which they held concerning Negro-white relationships. A central element that underlies a very large number of the specific opinions expressed by Negro soldiers is the conviction of injustice. Civilian police authority is one of the crucial points of race relations, for in it are embodied and symbolized the repressive functions of the status quo. Generalized protest reactions against "discrimination" thus find a conspicuously suitable focus in the police. But more than a carryover of generalized civilian attitudes was involved. There was widespread knowledge or belief among Negro soldiers concerning the occurrence of "incidents." Actually, such incidents did occur not infrequently. For example, the first issue of the *Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations*, published in August 1943, reported eight outbreaks of violence involving Negro soldiers and white authorities, either military, civilian, or both.<sup>39</sup> But, whatever their source—whether from the Negro press, from grapevine rumors, or from observation—many men who had not been personally involved were convinced that Southern police mistreated Negro soldiers.

Somewhat the same pattern of relationships as seen in attitudes toward the town police also appears in attitudes toward the military police. Chart XII shows that attitudes of Negroes toward Negro military police and attitudes of whites toward the military police in general were rather similar, Negroes being less likely than whites to say that the MP's of their own race were "usually fair," but also

<sup>39</sup> Vol. 1 (1943), pp. 8 and 9. This publication was prepared for the Julius Rosenwald Fund by the Social Science Institute at Fisk University. In summarizing the situation, the editor says: "In recent weeks the incidents of violence involving Negro soldiers with white soldiers, white civilians and civilian police have been increasingly frequent. On the one hand, resentment at apparently unequal treatment accorded Negro soldiers in camp and at lack of protection given to them has spurred some Negro soldiers to take the initiative. On the other hand, it seems that a Negro in uniform has stimulated some white civilians and soldiers to protect the customary caste etiquette of the South. The frequency of violence against Negroes, which in many instances does not get into the press, has prompted several organizations . . . to call upon the President and the Department of Justice to take action against the perpetrators of Anti-Negro-Soldier violence." The same theme is repeated in later issues of the same publication.

CHART XI

COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS' VIEWPOINTS ON TOWN POLICE  
(March 1943)




The numbers of cases on which percentages are based are shown in Chart X.

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CHART XII

COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE OPINIONS AS TO MILITARY POLICE  
(March 1943)



The numbers of cases on which percentages are based are shown in Chart X.

being less likely than whites to call them "usually not fair." In sharp contrast, especially when the more extreme negative attitude is considered, were the Negro attitudes toward white military police—closely paralleling the attitudes toward town police shown previously in Chart XI. Here again we see the contrasts between North and South. Northern Negroes were the more critical of white MP's, while the most critical of all were Northern Negroes stationed in the South. Among the latter, only 13 per cent said that white MP's were "usually fair" in their treatment of Negroes, while 39 per cent responded "usually not fair." The corresponding figures for Northern Negroes stationed in the North were 23 per cent and 26 per cent respectively.

As a second illustration of the kind of situation more productive of tension in the South than in the North, let us examine regional differences in reactions to local bus service.

For soldiers generally, bus service was a matter of considerable importance, because many camps were located at some distance from towns and cities. The quality of bus service offered could be a deciding factor in how the soldier was able to take advantage of his passes from camp. For many soldiers, both white and colored, wartime bus transportation, because of slow or irregular service and because of overcrowding, was a source of irritation.

But for Negro soldiers in Southern areas, the whole problem was intensified and given another quality by the existence of "segregated" seating arrangements. The requirement that Negroes be seated in the rear seats of buses would often mean in practice that the bus filled with whites, leaving the Negro soldiers without transportation. The attempts of civilian Southern bus drivers to enforce in their own way a practice of segregated seating not infrequently led to overt friction. And quite aside from these overt inconveniences and discomforts was the fact that segregation on public transportation facilities was a most visible symbol of the Southern race mores.

These factors are reflected in the way men evaluated the bus service they received. Negro soldiers were considerably more likely than white soldiers to register complaints. (See Table 19.) There was no tendency among white soldiers for those stationed in the South to report poorer bus service than those stationed in the North, which would at least suggest that the bus service available to white soldiers in the two areas may have been about equivalent in quality. Negro soldiers stationed in the South were, however,

more often critical of the service than were soldiers in the North, whether they had come originally from the North or South.

Among Northern Negroes stationed in the North, 63 per cent called the bus service "poor or very poor," and even in the North a fifth of the free comments critical of bus service made by Negro soldiers dealt with alleged racially discriminatory practices. But among Northern Negroes stationed in the South, 80 per cent called the bus service "poor or very poor" and segregation was the most conspicuous object of criticism.

The evidence thus far reviewed in this section shows the comparative extent of Negro dissatisfaction with being stationed in the South instead of the North and cites as illustrations of the roots of

TABLE 19  
COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE OPINIONS OF LOCAL BUS SERVICE

"How do you feel about the bus service to and from camp for soldiers in your outfit?"	PERCENTAGE RESPONDING "POOR" OR "VERY POOR"	
	<i>Negro</i> <i>enlisted men</i>	<i>White</i> <i>enlisted men</i>
<i>Northern men in:</i>		
Northern camps	63	49
Southern camps	80	42
<i>Southern men in:</i>		
Northern camps	40	39
Southern camps	52	38

Based on same number of cases as Table 17.

that dissatisfaction the attitudes toward two factors in the culture widely regarded as symbols of race discrimination—justice as administered by the local police and segregation as practised in public transportation facilities.

It must not be concluded, however, that Negroes stationed in the South were generally more poorly adjusted to the Army than were their Negro comrades in the North. About two thirds of the Negroes stationed in the South came from the South and nearly two thirds of these Southern Negroes preferred their Southern location for reasons, as we have seen, of proximity to their homes, being used to the South, and preferring the climate there. Moreover, more than three fifths of the Negroes stationed in the North also came from the South and while these Southern Negroes were much more likely than those stationed in the South to prefer a camp in the

North (48 per cent versus 14 per cent), a good many of them (29 per cent) still preferred a Southern camp. This preference on the part of many Southern Negroes to be stationed in the South, together with the size of the proportion of Negroes in the Army who came from the South, had the effect of keeping the differential in discontent about location between those stationed in the North and in the South from being as large as might have been expected. While about three out of ten (31 per cent) Negroes stationed in the South reported an explicit preference for a Northern location, approximately two out of ten (21 per cent) Negroes stationed in the North were equally definite about preferring to be in the South.

In addition to the obvious factors mentioned by the men themselves as accounting for the preference of many Southern Negroes for being stationed in the South, it seems likely that both Northern and Southern Negroes may have been considerably influenced in their overall adjustment by other psychological compensations in being stationed in the South, which can be understood if we look at their situation as one of *relative status*.

Relative to most Negro civilians whom he saw in Southern towns, the Negro soldier had a position of comparative wealth and dignity. His income was high, at least by general Southern standards. Moreover, in spite of the Army carryover of many civilian practices of segregation, the Negro soldier received treatment more nearly on an equality with the white soldier than the treatment of the Negro civilian in the South as compared with the white civilian. Officially, the Army policies always insisted upon equality of treatment of the races, even when this meant separate treatment, and throughout the war repeated though often unsuccessful efforts were made by the War Department to translate these policies into practice and to enforce them even against the private wishes of some white commanding officers.

Consider, on the other hand, the Northern Negro stationed in the North. The differential in income and status between soldier and civilian was not the same as that in the South. The industrial earning power of one's Northern Negro civilian acquaintances was at an all-time high, very often far exceeding that of the Negro soldier. Moreover, the contrast between the racial practices of the Army and the racial practices of Northern civilian society was, frequently, the reverse of the contrast in the South. Although the Northern Negro was accustomed to countless irritations and instances of discrimination in Northern civilian life, he was not con-

fronted to the same extent with official policies of racial segregation as existed in the Army.

Putting it simply, the psychological values of Army life to the Negro soldier in the South *relative to the Southern Negro civilian* greatly exceeded the psychological values of Army life to the Negro soldier in the North *relative to the Northern Negro civilian*.

How generally applicable the foregoing analysis is cannot be established from data of the Research Branch, but such an analysis might account for a part of the preference of some Negro soldiers for a Southern location in spite of their criticism of Southern camps and for the relatively good adjustment to the Army of other Negroes in the South in spite of their preference for the North. In any event, the Negro soldiers stationed in the South tended in general to show no less favorable attitudes reflecting general adjustment to the Army than Negro soldiers stationed in the North.

Drawing upon the three United States surveys cited in the section of this chapter on general adjustment to the Army, we have the following examples of Negro responses, by camp location:

In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or low spirits?

Percentage answering "I am usually in good spirits":

	<i>Northern camps</i> <sup>40</sup>	<i>Southern camps</i> <sup>40</sup>
March 1943 <sup>41</sup>	32	38
August 1944	28	28
June 1945	22	25

In general, what sort of time do you have in the Army?

Percentage answering "I have a pretty good time":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
March 1943	29	26
June 1945	17	15

Are you ever worried or upset?

Percentage answering "I am hardly ever worried or upset":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
March 1943	22	23
June 1945	20	24

In general, do you think you yourself have gotten a square deal in the Army?

<sup>40</sup> Numbers of cases were: Northern camps, March 1943, 850; August 1944, 1,690; June 1945, 248; Southern camps, March 1943, 2,150; August 1944, 2,988; June 1945, 805.

<sup>41</sup> In March 1943, the question read "satisfied and in good spirits."



Percentage answering "Yes, in most ways I have":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
August 1944	33	28
June 1945	24	26

How interested are you in your Army job?

Percentage answering "Very much interested":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
March 1943	71	73
August 1944	54	63

How do you feel about the importance of the work you are doing right now as compared with other jobs you might be doing in the Army?

Percentage answering "It is as important as any other job I could do":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
August 1944	51	54
June 1945	48	52

Do you usually feel that what you are doing is worth while or not?

Percentage answering "I usually feel it is worth while":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
March 1943	68	69
August 1944	70	72

Would you change to some other Army job if given a chance?

Percentage answering "No":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
August 1944	18	27
June 1945	23	25

Do you feel proud of your company?

Percentage answering "Yes, very proud":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
March 1943	54	57
August 1944	40	43

If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as a soldier or as a worker in a war job?

Percentage answering "As a soldier":

	<i>Northern camps</i>	<i>Southern camps</i>
March 1943	22	29
June 1945	15	13

Almost all the differences shown above between responses of Negroes in Northern and Southern camps are small, and they are not consistently in either direction. Further breakdowns, holding education and region of origin constant, do not alter the general conclusion, namely that the Negroes in Southern camps made no worse a general adjustment to Army life than those in Northern camps. When we take into account not only the large number of Negroes who lived in the South and wanted to be near home but also the previously discussed point about relative status—that the Army gave Negro soldiers in the South relatively higher position than Southern society gave to Negro civilians, while the contrast was much less or even reversed in the North—it may even be surprising that the Negro soldiers in Southern camps were not actually much better adjusted to the Army than Negro soldiers stationed in the North. But we also have seen how general was the resentment against Southern policies and practices of differential treatment of whites and Negroes—as seen, for example, through attitudes toward civilian and military police and toward bus transportation. Whatever psychological compensations they may have found in experiencing in the South a status superior to that of civilians of their own race, many Negro soldiers still preferred life in the North.

## SECTION VII

### ATTITUDES OF NEGROES AND WHITES TOWARD RACIAL SEPARATION IN THE ARMY

Among all the technical problems of measurement and analysis encountered in the course of studying the attitudes of Negro soldiers, few were more formidable than that of obtaining dependable records of attitudes toward racial separation in the Army. Not only is the issue of segregation subject to emotional loading and to the coexistence of differing “public” and “private” attitudes which characterize Negro-white relations generally, but it is also peculiarly complicated by the variable and often conflicting standards upon which opinions are predicated. Among both Negroes and whites there is often a sharp cleavage between what is regarded as “necessary in practice” and what is considered to be “right in principle.” The word “segregation” itself has come to represent to Negroes a crucial symbol of white attitudes of superiority. Any question, therefore, which explicitly mentioned “segregation” would pose itself to Negro informants as a question of principle; it is likely that

any Negro who would explicitly and publicly sanction segregation as a principle of behavior would be widely regarded as a "traitor to his race."

Because of the limitations of purpose which occurred in an Army-sponsored study directed to immediate problems of Army policy, the questions actually administered represented a compromise between the theoretically possible polar types. Attitudes of white and Negro enlisted men were recorded as answers to three questions:

1. Do you think it is a good idea or a poor idea for white and Negro soldiers to have separate PX's in Army camps?

2. Do you think it is a good idea or a poor idea for white and Negro soldiers to have separate Service Clubs in Army camps?

3. Do you think white and Negro soldiers should be in separate outfits or should they be together in the same outfits? <sup>42</sup>

These questions were chosen to sample Army situations which conceivably covered a wide range of social implications. The PX (Post Exchange) was selected as an example of a commercial, relatively impersonal situation, in some respects analogous to that found in civilian stores and market places. The analogy was not perfect because the PX sometimes served as a place for casual social meeting, conversation, drinking or eating together, but in the main it was simply a place where goods were purchased. The Service Club was a different type of installation, serving as a sort of "social center." It usually provided some facilities for eating and drinking, such as a cafeteria or soda bar. It had facilities for writing letters, places for lounging, often a piano or music room. It was also the place in which such functions as company dances were held. Thus, the Service Club situation was the one example in the life of an Army camp in which purely "social" male-female relations could occur. The third question was designed to probe attitudes toward "mixed" units. To have Negro and white soldiers together in the same outfit would entail working and training together for long periods and, unless special arrangements were provided, would imply sleeping in the same barracks and eating in the same mess hall. Thus it was

<sup>42</sup> The check-list categories were the same for the first two questions:

- \_\_\_\_\_ It is a good idea
- \_\_\_\_\_ It is a poor idea
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided


The check list for the third question ran as follows:

- \_\_\_\_\_ They should be in separate outfits
- \_\_\_\_\_ They should be together in the same outfits
- \_\_\_\_\_ It doesn't make any difference
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undecided

initially conceived that the three questions taken together would provide fairly adequate descriptive materials.

Chart XIII summarizes the responses of the Negro and white soldiers on social separation in the Army. Here is demonstrated first of all the existence of value conflicts which divide the Negro population into opinion blocks, just as they occasion strain within

CHART XIII  
ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL SEPARATION IN THE ARMY, BY RACE  
(March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

the personalities of individuals. Even with the crude and ambiguous measurements available, it is clear that there was no simple, clear-cut preponderance of opinion in one direction or the other. Other questions could undoubtedly be devised which would secure more highly skewed distributions of answers: as has been pointed out above, the blanket issue of "segregation" would provide such a distribution. In terms of the specific queries utilized in this study, however, the colored soldiers as a whole divided rather evenly, though actually, as shown in Chart XIV, acquiescence in prevailing racial practices came preponderately from the Southern Negroes with little education.

Charts XIII and XIV show that, in contrast to the Negroes, the overwhelming majority of white soldiers, whether from South or North, and at whatever educational level, expressed approval of separate facilities and separate outfits. Northern white soldiers, as Chart XIV indicates, were somewhat less likely to approve separation than Southern white soldiers, and this was true at all educational levels, but the differences, while significant, are not large.


In interpreting Charts XIII and XIV, one must exercise special caution, since the field work and subsequent analysis of the data revealed a number of ambiguities in the responses. The first was a "misunderstanding" of the item categories on the part of Negro soldiers—a misunderstanding which is in its own right significant evidence of the basic orientation of the Negro population. Interviews and comments which men wrote into questionnaires showed that some respondents interpreted "It is a good idea" as meaning "It is a good idea to have *common* facilities." This happened among men whose initial set toward the questions was that of such complete support for a policy of nonsegregation that it did not occur to them that the questions could be posed with separation as the "good idea" alternative, rather than vice versa.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> In editing the questionnaires for tabulation, all cases in which the comments showed that the categories had thus been erroneously checked were corrected on the basis of the comments. Where no comments had been recorded, it was of course impossible to edit the responses, and the check-list answers had to be taken at face value. The unavoidable error so remaining in the data is fortunately not large enough to destroy the usefulness of the materials. To take the question on service clubs, for example, only 6 per cent of the cases in which comments were recorded were clearly instances of mischecking. In all, 51 per cent of the men commented on the question, so that overall percentages were altered by about 3 per cent. Assuming that the proportion of error among those not making comments was the same as among men who recorded remarks, the total additional shift in responses because of mischecking would have been only 3 per cent. And, of course, the different set of categories used in the third question eliminated this particular type of misinterpretation.

CHART XIV

ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL SEPARATION IN THE ARMY BY RACE, ACCORDING TO REGIONAL ORIGIN AND EDUCATION  
(March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

A second source of ambiguity was the indeterminate interpretation which some informants placed upon the idea of "separate" facilities. Among some Negroes who had no easy access to PX or Service Club, responses were given in this wise: no facilities are at present available; I would like to have access to such installations; therefore, it is a "good idea" to have a separate PX or Service Club. Men in the group, of small but unknown size, who answered in this fashion were not thinking of *separate* facilities but rather of the desirability of having any facilities at all. Among white soldiers there was another type of indeterminateness in answer to the question on Service Clubs. A few soldiers who had checked opposition to separate clubs did so on the grounds of avoiding duplication of facilities, but on the assumption that "social" functions such as dances would be separate. Similarly, a few white soldiers who said that white and Negro soldiers should be together in the same outfits gave comments indicating that they were thinking of larger units such as battalions containing colored companies rather than of intermingling within smaller units. On the other hand, some of the Negro soldiers who checked, "It doesn't make any difference" regarding the question of mixed outfits had crossed out "doesn't" and written in "should not." Here again, however, the proportion of cases of this sort was negligible.

This detailed consideration of variations in respondents' interpretations of the questions is necessary only to establish the point that the absolute percentages giving each response should not be taken at face value. The proportions of variant interpretations are small enough so that the data serve fairly well to describe the more important comparisons and gross relationships. But, as in the case of many other responses to specific questionnaire, interview, or test items, it is a serious error to assume that the resulting percentage distributions of answers represent a definitive "vote" on the issues involved.

One must also keep in mind the historical context in which the answers were made. Respondents were aware not only of the existence of patterns of segregation in civilian life, but also of the fact that Army policy maintained racial separation within the military service. The Army policy of separate units was basic, and continued throughout the war except for the special instance of mixed companies in the European fighting which will be discussed in a later section. Formal policy, dating from March 1943 and reiterated in July 1944, directed, however, that all personnel, regardless

of race, be afforded equal opportunity to enjoy recreational facilities in Army camps. While such facilities as post exchanges and theaters might be designated for the use of particular areas or military units (a practice which substantially achieved separation without declaration of intent), no personnel of any race were to be denied access to any such facilities whether in their area or not.<sup>44</sup> Practical separation would have ensued, in any event, because camps usually covered so much ground that ordinarily it was inconvenient to make use of facilities outside one's own unit area. But beyond this, there were frequent local violations of these orders, both before and after the reiteration of policy in 1944, which had been occasioned by such violations. Such episodes as the arrest in March 1945 of 101 Negro Air Force officers for refusing to obey an order barring them from the white officers' club, when no facilities for Negroes were available, as well as lesser incidents, were constantly reported in the Negro press.<sup>45</sup>

Analysis of the free comments makes it quite clear that the data in Charts XIII and XIV cannot be taken as expressions of attitudes toward segregation as a principle of behavior. They represent, rather, expressions as to Army policy, given the existing traditions. Of all classes of remarks made by Negroes in connection with these questions, the most frequent were those which indicated concern over white reaction and the possibility of trouble. Only a few scattered deviates indicated a positive liking for separation. The comments were often outpourings of hopes and protests; they also revealed, oftentimes in considerable detail, the cultural postulates which men regarded as justifying or explaining their attitudes.<sup>46</sup> Three main types of orientation are apparent:

1. Acceptance of separation out of deference to the presumed customs and prejudices of white people.
2. Opposition to separation on the grounds of beliefs constituting the so-called "American creed": democracy, equality of rights, status based on achievement rather than birth, etc.
3. Opposition to separation based upon beliefs or hopes that closer association would lead whites to better understanding of

<sup>44</sup> See War Department Letter AG3538 (5 July 1944), Subject: Recreational Facilities.

<sup>45</sup> For a summary of some of these, see *Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (April 1944), p. 18.

<sup>46</sup> It may be well to remind the reader again that comments come disproportionately from those opposed to current practices. In this instance of racial separation, opponents of separation and better educated men were more likely to write comments.



Negro characteristics and aspirations, and thus to improved Negro-white relations.

These main types of attitudes are in their turn subject to analysis in terms of still more specific beliefs, expectations, and evaluations. Comments regarding the question of separate or mixed outfits provide the most complete materials for examination.

Table 20 presents the overall distribution of Negroes' free comments about mixed or separate outfits. Of the 37 per cent who accepted the idea of separate outfits, approximately half made comments. The largest number of comments came from the 36 per cent who opposed the idea of separate outfits, two thirds of the men making comments. Such a disproportion in comments would be expected in view of Chart XIV, which showed that the least educated (who, of course, are least prone to add remarks) were most likely to be found among those accepting racial separation.

TABLE 20

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANSWERS BY A CROSS SECTION OF 3,000 NEGRO ENLISTED MEN TO THE QUESTION: "DO YOU THINK WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD BE IN SEPARATE OUTFITS OR SHOULD THEY BE TOGETHER IN THE SAME OUTFITS?"  
(March 1943)

<i>Check-list categories and classification of free comments</i>	<i>Percentages giving each answer</i>	
"They should be in separate outfits":	37	
With no comment		18
With comments on the existence of prejudice		13
With comments of approval in principle		1
With other comments		5
"It doesn't make any difference":	17	
With no comments		11
With comments indicating approval of nonsegregation on grounds of democracy, equality, etc.		3
With comments indicating acceptance of separation because of the existence of prejudice		1
With other comments		2
"Undecided"	10	
"They should be together in the same outfits":	36	
With no comments		13
With statements about democracy, equality of sacrifice, etc.		15
With statements of belief or hope that closer association would bring improved understanding between the races		5
With other comments		3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	

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Let us look more closely at the comments themselves.

As Table 20 shows, almost all the remarks made in support of the pro-separation position revolved around the acceptance of separation as a matter of expediency in view of white prejudice. The comments by the 13 per cent thus classified in Table 20 may be broken down further as follows:

**Fear of overt interracial friction. Examples:**

A white soldier would call a colored soldier "nigger" and it would be a fight.

There is too much chance of trouble and misunderstanding.

It may still be necessary in the South. Too many of these people might try to shove the colored boys around.

**Withdrawal from situation of not-being-wanted. Examples:**

Whites for some reason don't seem to want to be with colored.

So long as there are so many prejudiced white people, it would be too unpleasant. We want to be treated like men, not like dogs.

**Belief that white soldiers would get a disproportionate share of recognition and privileges in a mixed outfit. Examples:**

Whites would be sure to get all the best privileges if we were together.

All the good things whites get credit. All the bad things, colored would be blame.

The Negro soldier would not have a fair chance for promotion.

**Desire to prove that Negroes can match the achievements of white groups. Examples:**

Then white people will see that we are good Americans and good fighters.

By being in separate outfits, we can show that the Negroes can do as well as the whites. It is about time the white people learned the truth about this "superiority" business.

Unfortunately it is the only way at present the Negro soldier can get credit for what he is doing and sacrificing for his country.

**Desire to associate with those who share one's situation and values. Example:**

I had rather be with my own color. Then I know where I stand.

As shown in Table 20, there were two main types of comments made by Negroes in support of mixing the races in the same outfits. One type, involving by far the largest proportion, made a justification in terms of principles of democracy and equality of sacrifice. The other main type, involving about a third as many men as the former, expressed belief or hope that closer association would bring improved understanding between the races.

Examples of comments of the first type, with emphasis primarily on the democratic principle, are:

This is a democratic country. Or is it?

Separate outfits shows that the Army condones segregation and discrimination. Is this the Democracy we are told we are fighting for?

Let's practise what we preach. All the colored Americans ask for is to be treated as citizens.

Separate outfit mean the white think the Negro is not good enough for him. All should be the same.

Why not? Aren't we Americans too?

Many of the comments in this general category also contained explicit references to the belief that common sacrifices and purposes should bring common rights:

If we are good enough to fight and die for our country, we are good enough to be together in the same outfits.

We are all fighting for the same cause.

We are all American soldiers. An enemy bullet doesn't know whether your skin is white or black.

Here we have an expression of the "moral claim," discussed in some detail earlier in this chapter, which many Negroes saw being established by war service.

While in the minority, the comments expressing explicit belief or hope that closer association would bring improved understanding between the races are interesting as revealing a not insignificant prevalence among Negroes of faith in the "sense of fair play" of their white countrymen. In a number of cases, Negroes said that ignorance and lack of understanding rather than positive dislike or ill will lay at the basis of white prejudices.

Throughout these comments, among those either accepting or opposing separation, there were very few indications of a desire not to participate in the "white" society. It would be fair to say that in their expressions of basic values and aspirations even the less articulate followed traditional American patterns and the central motif of their expressed aims was to participate in American life on the basis of "equality." Whether or not, in the short run, Negro soldiers would have "liked" mixed outfits is independent of their desire to have the *right* to participate on this basis. Among the best educated and most articulate this distinction between patterns of association determined by formal rights and those based on diffuse personal preferences was explicitly spelled out. This view may be paraphrased as follows: "We do not want to associate with white people unless they want us. But the choice should be on a voluntary and individual basis, not a matter of formal rules. What we ask is to have the same rights as other American citizens. Natural personal preferences will take care of the 'social' side of things."

Men with such attitudes saw in enforced racial separation in the Army the imputation of undeserved inferior status for the Negro. Particularly in the eyes of better educated Northern Negroes who felt they were conforming to the basic rules of conduct of the larger society, the symbol of racial separation in the Army produced what might be called a "hurt-angry" reaction. They were conforming, they were participating in the war, but where were the rewards? This view was not confined to the educated. As one semi-illiterate respondent phrased it, "What do a man have to do to be treated like a man?" Such a "hurt-angry" reaction represented an inability to see how white people could "justify" separation—in other words, such Negroes did not see in the white culture an ethical rationale for segregation.

While Negro soldiers were expressing their attitudes toward racial separation in the Army, representative groups of white soldiers were meeting in their separate units to record their answers to identical questions. We have seen the results in Charts XIII and XIV, where the decisive majority of whites were shown to support racial separation in the Army. It will be instructive to examine the free comments of the white soldiers and, as in the case of Negroes, remarks on the question of separate Negro and white units in the Army will be used. The free answers are summarized in Table 21.

As this table shows, the problem was of so little concern to whites that relatively few wrote comments. While only 4 per cent in

Table 21 indicated by their comments that they approved segregation in principle, it is not unlikely that a considerable proportion of the 60 per cent who favored separate outfits but who made no comments also would have been found to support segregation in principle if further direct questions had been asked. Of those who supported separate outfits and who did make comments, almost all represented statements of expediency, not too unlike statements made by the Negroes who accepted separation. Most frequent was

TABLE 21

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REPLIES BY A CROSS SECTION OF 4,800 WHITE ENLISTED MEN TO THE QUESTION: "DO YOU THINK WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD BE IN SEPARATE OUTFITS OR SHOULD THEY BE TOGETHER IN THE SAME OUTFITS?"  
(March 1943)

<i>Check-list categories and types of free comments</i>	<i>Percentage giving each answer</i>	
"They should be in separate outfits":	84	
With no comment		60
With statements of expediency		14
a. Because intermingling would or might lead to friction, trouble, violence		7
b. Because it is necessary to defer to Southern customs or prejudices		4
c. Because whites dislike or are unwilling to associate with Negroes		1
d. Because Negroes, or both Negroes and whites, prefer separation		2
With statements of personal dislike of Negroes		3
With assertions approving segregation in principle		4
With other comments		3
"It doesn't make any difference" or "Undecided"	4	
"They should be together in the same outfits"	12	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	

the fear of friction. Among the minority of white soldiers who made comments, there was some evidence of the possible vulnerability of segregation as a democratic principle and there were occasional indications of value conflicts induced by Negro participation in the war. Men would say, "A soldier is a soldier, but . . .," or "We are fighting for the same cause but the Southern boys don't like Negroes," or, more frankly, "I know this is a democracy, but I still have my prejudices."

Army service in the South seemed to have the effect, among white

and Negro respondents alike, of increasing the support for racial separation, both in facilities and in units. This is shown in Table 22. In the surroundings of Southern civilian racial practices, men were more likely to take the view that a liberalization of the Army racial policies would be resented in the South and be a source of

TABLE 22  
ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL SEPARATION IN THE ARMY BY RACE, ACCORDING TO  
REGIONAL ORIGIN AND CAMP LOCATION  
(March 1943)

	Negro	White
<i>Percentage who checked "it's a good idea" to have separate PX's</i>		
Northern Men		
In Northern camps	24	75
In Southern camps	30	79
Southern Men		
In Northern camps	33	85
In Southern camps	52	90
<i>Percentage who checked "it's a good idea" to have separate Service Centers</i>		
Northern Men		
In Northern camps	33	77
In Southern camps	39	84
Southern Men		
In Northern camps	39	87
In Southern camps	60	95
<i>Percentage who checked Negro and white soldiers "should be in separate outfits"</i>		
Northern Men		
In Northern camps	27	79
In Southern camps	29	80
Southern Men		
In Northern camps	35	87
In Southern camps	44	92

Based on same number of cases as Table 17.

friction. Also, there is a possibility which cannot be proved or disproved from the present data that some Northern white soldiers stationed in the South may have come to acquire a conventional Southern view, and vice versa that some white Southerners who came to Northern Army camps may have had their viewpoint liberalized.


The white tendency to rationalize attitudes toward Negroes by

claiming no personal prejudice and arguing in terms of expediency because of the prejudice of others can be illustrated with particular clarity from a study made among Air Force enlisted men in September 1942.

The question was asked, "Do you think white soldiers and Negro soldiers in the Air Force should be in the same or separate ground crews?" The answer to be checked was "same" or "separate."

CHART XV

ATTITUDES OF WHITE ENLISTED MEN IN AIR FORCE GROUND CREWS TOWARD SEPARATION OF RACES IN GROUND CREWS



Data from Planning Survey III.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

This was followed by the question, "Would you have any personal objection to working in the same ground crew with Negro soldiers?" The respondent checked "yes" or "no."

The pattern of responses to the first question is almost identical with that shown in Chart XIV on the attitudes of a cross section of all white enlisted men toward mixing Negroes and whites in the same units.

But it is the cross tabulation of the two questions which is of par-

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ticular interest. The results are shown in Chart XV, by region of origin. While the Northern white soldiers were almost, but not quite, as likely as the Southerners to favor separate ground crews for Negroes and whites, only about one third of the Northerners, as contrasted with three fifths of the Southerners, professed personal objection. The picture is not altered when education is held constant.

In general, we may summarize this section by saying that Negro opinion on separation of the races was divided. Acceptance of separation was on the grounds of expediency, not of principle, while opposition to separation tended to be defended on the basis of principle. There was a proportion of white soldiers, including many from the South, who professed no personal disapproval but defended their support of separation as in deference to the opinions of others.

## SECTION VIII

### OPINIONS AS TO LEADERSHIP

A common belief revealed in informal interviews with commanding officers was the idea that Negroes preferred to serve under white officers. If the officer was from the South, he would often add that Negroes preferred to serve under white officers from the South, because Southerners understand Negroes and their problems better than Northerners. How general was this impression in the Army cannot be shown statistically, but there can be little doubt that this impression was based on erroneous inferences about what Negro soldiers really wanted and preferred.

There is only one study in which specific questions were asked of Negroes as to their preferences in officers. Since these questions specified lieutenants, the responses, strictly speaking, cannot be generalized to higher officers, although the answers were so overwhelming with respect to lieutenants that a reversal in attitudes toward captains or higher officers would be very surprising.


Chart XVI makes clear the fact that the Negroes in large majority preferred to serve under Negro lieutenants rather than under white lieutenants and that they preferred Northern white lieutenants to Southern white lieutenants. This tended to be true whether the Negro respondent came from North or South.

Few findings of the Research Branch are more decisive than this. Considering the question on lieutenants from the South only, just 4 per cent of the Northern Negroes and 6 per cent of the Southern



## CHART XVI

### PREFERENCES OF NEGRO ENLISTED MEN AS TO COMPANY LIEUTENANTS (March 1943)



The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

Negroes preferred a white Southerner to a Negro Southerner. The corresponding figures in the case of Northern lieutenants were 8 per cent and 10 per cent. Considering white lieutenants only, we see that just 1 per cent of the Northern and 4 per cent of the Southern Negroes preferred Southern white officers to Northern white officers. Both groups of Negroes also preferred Negro officers from the North to Negro officers from the South.

When the two questions on white as compared with Negro officers are cross tabulated, one can compute the proportion who preferred Negro to white officers in both cases—that is, they preferred Negro officers no matter where the officers were from, North or South. About half of the Negroes are in this group. The remainder included those who answered “no difference” on either question as well as the very small minority shown in Chart XVI who preferred whites to Negroes.

TABLE 23  
PROPORTION PREFERRING NEGRO TO WHITE LIEUTENANTS BY REGION OF  
ORIGIN, EDUCATION, AND LENGTH OF TIME IN THE ARMY  
(Percentages Derived from Cross Tabulation of Two Questions, See Text)

	PERCENTAGE PREFERRING NEGRO OVER WHITE LIEUTENANTS AMONG:	
	<i>Men with less than six months of service</i>	<i>Men with six months or more of service</i>
<i>Northern Negroes</i>		
High school graduate or above	51 (314)	53 (535)
Less than high school graduate	47 (784)	49 (1,108)
<i>Southern Negroes</i>		
High school graduate or above	54 (326)	54 (494)
Less than high school graduate	47 (1,746)	47 (1,974)

Table 23 shows that the better educated Negroes, from both the North and the South, were somewhat more likely than the less educated to prefer Negro lieutenants to white lieutenants. The table shows also that increased length of Army service was not accompanied by an increased incidence of approval of the prevailing Army system, which in most instances provided white officers for colored troops. Among Northern men, at each educational level, the Negroes with 6 months or more of service were slightly, though not significantly, more likely than those newer in the Army to prefer Negro lieutenants. Among Southern men there were no differences by length of service.

Reactions to these questions illustrate the fact that for Negroes there are conflicting orientations centering on the problem of group solidarity versus attempts toward assimilation. Is it better, and in what sense, for the minority group to attempt to live as a society-within-a-society, or should it attempt to have its members engage in a maximum of interaction with white people and avoid, wherever possible, racial identification? Although few Negroes probably rationalized their choice in this manner, the preferences in Army leaders took the path of group solidarity. One of the factors encouraging this choice is the personal ambition of the Negro for status as an individual within the Negro society as well as within the larger social system.

TABLE 24  
 DESIRE FOR FORMAL MILITARY STATUS AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN  
 CLASSIFIED BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL  
 (March 1943)

<i>Educational level</i>	PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATES WHO WANT TO BECOME NONCOMS*		PERCENTAGE OF ALL MEN WHO WANT TO BECOME OFFICERS	
	<i>White</i>	<i>Negro</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Negro</i>
High school graduate or college	79 (1,199)	80 (939)	58 (1,766)	66 (1,683)
Some high school	72 (864)	78 (1,099)	40 (1,124)	56 (1,543)
Grade school	60 (1,175)	73 (3,519)	26 (1,440)	43 (4,220)

The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.  
 \* The questions asked were: "Do you want to be a noncom?" and "Do you want to be a commissioned officer?"

The stereotype of the shiftless, ambitionless plantation hand did not, as this chapter has already suggested, characterize the Negro soldier, although examples of this stereotype were not too hard to find. Nowhere is this fact better illustrated than in the Negroes' expressions of aspirations for leadership. Not only did they prefer Negro officers to white officers, but also they exhibited ambition for personal advancement themselves.

Table 24 shows that, at every educational level, Negro enlisted men were even more likely than white enlisted men to express the desire to become an officer or noncom. This result is somewhat puzzling in view of the fact that Negroes tended to rate actual promotion chances of Negroes as relatively low. Whereas 49 per cent of the white cross section studied in March 1943 checked "a very good chance" in response to the question, "Do you think a soldier

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with ability has a good chance for promotion in the Army?" only 32 per cent of the Negro cross section checked the same response to the question, "Do you think a Negro soldier with ability has a good chance for promotion in the Army?"<sup>47</sup> When education is held constant, the Negro-white differences remain essentially unchanged, although Negro pessimism was somewhat less among the less educated than among the better educated.

Among white soldiers, as Chapter 6 on "Social Mobility in the Army" has shown, there was a certain amount of realism in expressions of ambition for promotion, since those with the best educational qualifications and hence best chances for promotion were the most likely to express a desire for it. Among Negroes, this also was true. But as between Negroes and whites, the group with the worse objective chances of promotion, especially to the officer level—namely the Negroes—was more likely to express status aspirations than the white group.

While the so-called "striving psychology" of Negroes, which puts great stress on achieving success in the white scale of values<sup>48</sup> must not be discounted, a more plausible explanation would be in terms of differential reactions to frustration. Thus it might be that Negroes, more used to encountering frustration, tend to make a less clear-cut association than whites between what they want and what they expect to get; hence questions couched in terms of desires get a larger vote from them than from whites who may tend more than Negroes to rationalize what they can't get as something they don't want. This is speculation, however, and no evidence is available to probe the point further.

That there was some element of realism in the Negro aspirations is suggested not only by the fact that the expression of aspiration was higher at each educational level, as Table 24 shows, but also by the fact that the expression of aspiration was higher among those, at each educational level, who rated Negroes' promotional chances as "good" than among those who were less optimistic about the chances.

Firsthand experience with the status accorded Negro officers by white officers also may have had some influence on aspirations to become officers—in this case as a depressant of aspiration. Let us

<sup>47</sup> The other categories were "a fairly good chance," "not much of a chance," "no chance at all," and "undecided."

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, S. C. Drake and H. R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1945).

confine our analysis to Negro college men and high school graduates, who almost alone had any chances of attaining a commission. Table 25 shows that, among both Northern and Southern Negroes, college men and high school graduates alike, the proportion wanting to become officers was highest among those serving under white officers only, somewhat lower among those serving under Negro officers only, and lowest of all among those serving under mixed officers. In the mixed situation, where their outfit had both Negro and white officers, men were in the best position to observe occasions in which the formal bestowal of officer status on Negroes did not mean that white officers accepted them as equals. In fact, a quarter of the

TABLE 25

PROPORTIONS OF NEGRO SOLDIERS WHO WANT TO BECOME OFFICERS, CLASSIFIED BY REGION OF RESIDENCE, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, AND RACE OF PRESENT OFFICERS (March 1943)

<i>Region of residence and educational level</i>	PERCENTAGE WHO WISH TO BECOME OFFICERS AMONG:		
	<i>Men serving under all white lieutenants</i>	<i>Men serving under all Negro lieutenants</i>	<i>Men serving under white and Negro lieutenants</i>
<i>Northern men</i>			
College	78 (150)	73 (66)	64 (103)
High school graduate	69 (235)	57 (89)	47 (207)
<i>Southern men</i>			
College	78 (168)	76 (69)	62 (128)
High school graduate	71 (235)	64 (54)	57 (166)

Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of cases on which the percentages are based.

Negro college men and high school graduates who advanced reasons for not wanting to become officers made such comments as "No matter what your rank is, every white rates over you" and these comments were especially frequent from men in companies with both white and Negro officers.

This section has shown that Negro soldiers, by overwhelming vote, preferred Negro lieutenants to white lieutenants and preferred Northern lieutenants to Southern lieutenants. Also evidenced was the strong status drive of the Negro enlisted men, in spite of their greater pessimism about promotion possibilities. Although there may have been less realism in the status aspirations of Negroes than of whites, the evidence shows that, in general, those who by educational status were objectively best qualified were the most likely to express desire for promotion. It also shows that the desire to be-

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come an officer was least among those who had the best opportunities to observe the discrepancy between official and actual status often accorded to the Negro officer by his white fellow officers.

## S E C T I O N I X

### A NOTE ON NEGRO TROOPS IN COMBAT

Although, as an earlier section of this chapter has shown, Negro soldiers were even less eager than whites to be sent overseas, they actually went overseas in as large if not larger proportion than whites. This will be recalled from Table 4, which showed that three fourths of the Negro soldiers were overseas by VE Day. Few were in combat, but all over the world Negroes were hard at work toiling on the supply lines of our vast military organization. They were cutting a road through the Burmese jungles, building airports all over the globe, unloading ships in European, African, and Asiatic harbors, repairing bridges and highways behind the front lines, scrubbing the floors of hospitals and emptying the bedpans, and driving trucks loaded with supplies for the fighting men at the front.

The Negro units in combat were, in the main, token forces of little significance in the total combat picture, but of great significance to the racially conscious Negro press. The performances of Negro units like the 92nd Division or the 99th Fighter Squadron in Italy were matters of controversy which are outside the scope of this chapter. A board of officers charged with reviewing the facts concluded that all-Negro divisions gave the poorest performance of Negro troops,<sup>40</sup> but spoke favorably of the performance of Negro Infantry platoons fighting in white companies.

The report placed a major responsibility for the showing of all-Negro units on the Army's lack of preparation and planning:

Although it was definitely known that Negro manpower would be approximately 10 per cent of the manpower available for war, plans were not prepared prior to World War II for mobilization and employment of major units of all arms. This resulted in some instances in a disproportionate allocation of lower bracket personnel to combat elements. . . . No provisions were made initially for utilizing the Negro manpower in supporting type combat units. . . . The initial lack of plans for the organization and utilization of the wide variety of combat units was reflected in frequent reorganization, regrouping, and shifting from one type of training to another. . . . In some instances units were organized without definite Tables of Organization and Equipment and without a general prescription as to

<sup>40</sup> The so-called Gillem report. See War Department Circular No. 124 (April 1946), *Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy*.

the missions for which organized. This was an expediency to offset the lack of plans when manpower was suddenly made available in large numbers. . . . Definite lack of information as to ultimate time and place of assignment and mission to be assigned the various units was undoubtedly confusing. . . . An over-all far-reaching factor which affected adversely the efficiency of combat units of all types was the shortage of trained subordinate leaders. This shortage stemmed directly from limitations for which the Army was only partly at fault. Environment and lack of administrative and educational advantages in prewar days greatly handicapped the Negro in the performance of his wartime duties.

As a partial offset to these handicaps, the Board cited first-class equipment and materiel, favorable training areas, extension of training beyond the normal time period, and the assignment of experienced white commanders to Negro troops.

The report makes no direct mention of problems of orientation and motivation of Negro troops. As the earlier discussion in this chapter has shown, Negro soldiers did not feel that they had as much at stake in this war as white soldiers did, they could not assume as readily as whites that societal rewards for combat services would come to them, and, in higher proportions than white soldiers, they did not come from a cultural milieu which imbued them with exacting standards of personal responsibility for success and punished failure to conform to these standards.

It has been noted that the Gillem report spoke favorably of the experiment in Europe of incorporating Negro Infantry platoons into white companies. Since the Research Branch unit in Europe made a firsthand study of reactions of white soldiers to this interesting and significant experiment in race relations, it is pertinent to give it some detailed attention in these pages.

As soon as it became clear that the Army was going to follow a general policy of racial separation, leading Negro spokesmen, as well as some white liberals, began pressing for the creation of at least a few voluntary mixed Negro and white units. In July 1943, for example, the Southern Regional Conference recommended: "Create experimental mixed units of volunteers in the Army and Navy. No one need be forced into them. But there are plenty of Americans, white and black, who want to give democracy a chance in the Armed Forces."<sup>60</sup> No action was ever taken by the Army on these proposals until the exigencies of combat in Europe created such a need for Infantry replacements that it was decided to accept Negro volunteers and organize them as separate platoons within

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<sup>60</sup> Quoted in *A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations*, Vol. I, No. 1 (August, 1943).

white Infantry companies with white officers and white noncoms.<sup>51</sup>

Shortly after VE Day, a survey was undertaken by the Research Branch in Europe to evaluate how this program had worked out. Seven of the eleven divisions containing Negro platoons were visited, and interviews were conducted with officers and enlisted men. The sample included three highly experienced divisions and four with less combat experience. Two of the divisions were predominantly Southern in background. The range of experience sampled was thought to be representative of what would have been found if all eleven divisions had been investigated.

At the outset, one must keep in mind the fact that the Negro platoons were *volunteers* for combat, and to say this is to imply a difference from the rank and file of Negroes in orientation and motivation, even though they came from the same service branches and the same sorts of relatively unskilled jobs as those who did not volunteer. No data on the attitudes of these Negro volunteers exist, but in view of previous discussion in this chapter it is safe to assume that they were motivated by convictions about the war, and by desires to prove the ability of their race and to make this "experiment in race relations succeed," as well as by the many individual motives which led men to choose combat. The Negro Infantry volunteers were, like other volunteers, younger on the average than white infantrymen. More important, probably, for their subsequent relationships with white infantrymen, the Negro volunteers were somewhat better educated than Negro troops generally and had somewhat better AGCT scores. These differences, however, can easily be exaggerated; compared with the greater differences between white infantrymen and the Negro volunteers, they represent only minor fluctuations.<sup>52</sup>

	<i>Percentage who were high school graduates</i>	<i>Percentage with AGCT scores of I, II, or III</i>
White riflemen in ETO	41	71
Negro riflemen in white companies	22	29
All Negroes in ETO	18	17

In the companies in which Negro platoons served, the overwhelming majority of white officers and men gave approval to their per-

<sup>51</sup> Since many activities in the Army—messing, recreation, housing, for example—were on a company basis, this arrangement meant a limited amount of integration.

<sup>52</sup> Data from ETO-82.



formance in combat. This is shown in Table 26. As some of the respondents indicated in their comments, the Negro troops were fighting for a relatively short time during the closing, victorious stages of the war and did not have to meet the test of long continued stalemate fighting with heavy casualties, but the same was true of some of the white troops with whom they fought and were compared.

TABLE 26  
EVALUATION OF NEGRO INFANTRYMEN BY WHITE OFFICERS AND  
ENLISTED MEN SERVING IN SAME COMPANIES WITH THEM  
(Europe, June 1945)

	<i>White company officers</i>	<i>White platoon sergeants and other enlisted men</i>
<b>QUESTION: "How well did the colored soldiers in this company perform in combat?"</b>		
Percentage responding		
Very well	84	81
Fairly well	16	17
Not so well	—	1
Not well at all	—	—
Undecided	—	1
	100	100
<b>QUESTION: "With the same Army training and experience, how do you think colored troops compare with white troops as Infantry soldiers?"</b>		
Percentage responding		
Better than white troops	17	9
Just the same as white troops	69	83
Not as good as white troops	5	4
No answer	9	4
	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>195</i>

Data from ETO-82.

And there was some indication in the data that the performance of Negro troops was rated highest by the officers and men in the companies in which the colored platoons had had the most severe fighting. The comments of their leaders indicated again and again, however, that in bestowing this praise, they were strongly aware that these men, as volunteers, were special cases. For example, as a company commander from Pennsylvania said: "Would do equally

well with the best of the whites. Our men are good because they are volunteers, but an average of Negroes would probably do as well as the average of white soldiers." And a platoon sergeant from North Carolina comments: "I don't think you can say about all of them. These are volunteers, and most colored men wouldn't be as willing to fight. These here are just the same as we are in combat."

As might be expected from these results, almost all the officers and enlisted men endorsed the idea of having Negroes used as Infantry, sometimes with qualifications like "if they are volunteers" or "only while we're in combat, but not in garrison," a point which will be discussed more fully later. And these men favored the organization they then had of separate Negro platoons within the same company as the best arrangement for the utilization of Negro infantrymen. These facts are shown in Table 27. It should be remembered, however, that not all the white support of using Negroes as infantrymen necessarily reflected "democratic" or "pro-Negro" attitudes. It could be simply a reflection of the desire of combat men to have their own burden lightened by letting others do part of the fighting; it might even conceal the most extreme attitudes of racial superiority leading to the reasoning that inferior Negro lives should be sacrificed before white lives. Moreover, the Negroes were still in separate platoons, which, to some Southern respondents, preserved at least the principle of segregation.

In fact, the reasons advanced for favoring the "separate-platoon/same-company" pattern of organization clearly show that there were at least two points of view involved. The five leading reasons, in order of their frequency, were:

- (1) *Competition-emulation* ("encourages friendly competition, each tries to make a good showing"; "gives them something to come up to").
- (2) *Avoidance of friction* ("saves any chance of trouble to have them in their own platoon," "because of the old feeling of boys from the South").
- (3) *Better discipline and control among the Negro soldiers* ("whites have a steadying influence on them"; "colored boys feel more secure in combat this way").
- (4) *Feeling of participation or nondiscrimination on part of the Negro soldiers* ("gives them the feeling of being with the white boys"; "avoids that feeling of being set apart and discriminated against").

(5) *Improved interracial understanding* ("work close enough together so they can get to know the other better and see what they can do").

It may be seen here that some men accepted the platoon idea and assimilated it to usual white views by regarding it as a form of separation, as compared with mixing within the platoon, and justifying the interracial contacts it did bring in terms of the inferiority of the

TABLE 27

ATTITUDES OF WHITE OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN SERVING IN SAME COMPANIES WITH NEGRO PLATOONS TOWARD THE UTILIZATION OF NEGRO INFANTRYMEN (Europe, June 1945)

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted men</i>
<b>QUESTION: "On the whole, do you think it is a good idea or a poor idea to have colored soldiers used as Infantry troops?"</b>		
Percentage responding		
Good idea		
Unqualified statement	55	72
Qualified statement*		
"In combat, yes; but not in garrison"	25	26
"If volunteers," "If like the ones we have now"	15	—
Undecided	5	—
Poor idea	—	2
	100	100
<b>QUESTION: "If colored soldiers are used as Infantry, do you think they should be set up by platoons as they are here or would some other way be better?"</b>		
Percentage responding		
In same platoon with white soldiers	7	1
In a platoon within the company	64	85
In separate companies	19	12
In separate battalions or larger organizations	10	2
	100	100
<i>Number of cases</i>	60	195

Data from ETO-82.

\* These percentages represent the number of men who *volunteered* comments. If direct questions had been asked on these two qualifications, the percentages endorsing them might well have been considerably higher.

Negro and his need for white supervision. Other men, however, were in favor of it for opposite reasons: because it seemed to them to do away with enforced separation and encourage understanding.

But, though motives might vary, the white and Negro infantry-

men did get along together amicably. Both white officers and fellow enlisted men reported that the white and Negro soldiers got along well together (93 per cent of the officers and 60 per cent of the enlisted men said "very well"; everyone else said "fairly well"), in spite of the fact that two thirds of each group had begun, according to their own retrospective reports, with relatively unfavorable attitudes toward serving in a mixed company. In a similar fashion, the bulk of both groups (77 per cent) reported that their feeling had become more favorable since serving in the same unit with Negro soldiers. As a platoon sergeant from South Carolina said,

When I heard about it, I said I'd be damned if I'd wear the same shoulder patch they did. After that first day when we saw how they fought, I changed my mind. They're just like any of the other boys to us.

However, many took occasion to note that relationships were better in combat than they were in the garrison situation. Not that there was serious overt friction between Negro and white soldiers. Such instances were, as far as is known, confined to isolated cases and involved white soldiers from other units who did not know the combat record of the Negro men. There were, however, some tensions in companies stationed where friendly contact with liberated populations was possible, and there was some expression of preference for separation in garrison. Some typical comments were:

*Company commander from Nevada:* Relations are very good. They have their pictures taken together, go to church services, movies, play ball together. For a time there in combat our platoons got so small that we had to put a white squad in the colored platoon. You might think that wouldn't work well, but it did. The white squad didn't want to leave the platoon. I've never seen anything like it.

*Company commander from Tennessee:* Good cooperation in combat. They were treated as soldier to soldier. Now they play ball, joke and box together. The colored go to company dances—we've had no trouble, but some of the white boys resent it. In garrison the strain on both parties is too great.

*First sergeant from Georgia:* Got along fine in combat. But we don't like to mix too much now and I think they should be pulled out if we're going to stay in garrison.

*Platoon sergeant from Indiana:* They fought and I think more of them for it, but I still don't want to soldier with them in garrison.

As some of these comments imply, relationships in combat could be regarded as working relationships rather than social relationships. More precisely, they could be confined more narrowly to a function-

ally specific basis than could the contacts involved in community living. In particular, the combat situation was exclusively masculine, and issues of social relationships between men and women did not appear as they did in garrison. Far from being a "test case" in ordinary Negro-white relations, the combat setting may be regarded as a special case making for good relationships, for the sense of common danger and common obligation was high, the need for unity was at a maximum, and there was great consciousness of shared experience of an intensely emotional kind. In many respects the experience of fighting together is analogous to the kind of informal working together that results from any community crisis or disaster: fighting a forest fire or fighting a flood.

Relationships between white and Negro infantrymen turned out to be far better than their officers had expected: 96 per cent of the officers questioned on this point reported themselves agreeably surprised. However, the comments made by the officers indicate that in some instances special precautions were taken. For example, one regimental commander said:

I'm from the South—most of us here are—and I was pretty dubious as to how it would work out. But I'll have to admit we haven't had a bit of trouble. I selected the best company commander I had to put over them.

And a platoon commander from Texas said:

We all expected trouble. Haven't had any. One reason may be that we briefed the white boys in advance—told them these men were volunteers coming up here to fight, and that we wouldn't stand for any foolishness.

In other words, in at least some of these cases there was careful selection of officers and orientation of the white troops. In some instances, the white officers or noncoms who were later to lead the colored platoons went back to the replacement depots and trained the men for combat, thus getting to know and work with their men before they were thrust into combat.


In spite of the qualifications introduced—the volunteer character of the Negro platoons, the fact that the war was in its final successful stages, the peculiar nature of the combat situation, the special reasons for and the precautions taken to insure smooth functioning—there can be little question that these Negro troops performed well by the criteria applied to white troops. Nor can there be any doubt that, *under the conditions specified*, Negro-white relations were

harmonious. Of more interest than this historical conclusion, however, is the question of how far, in the face of these limitations, one can generalize from these data.

From this point of view, perhaps the most illuminating piece of data coming out of the study was the finding, shown in Chart XVII, that the closer men approached to the mixed company organization,

CHART XVII

ATTITUDES TOWARD SERVING IN A COMPANY CONTAINING NEGRO AND WHITE PLATOONS AMONG MEN WHO HAVE DONE SO AND MEN WHO HAVE NOT  
(Europe, June 1945)



Data from ETO-82.

The numbers following the bars are the numbers of cases on which percentages are based.

the less opposition there was to it. That is, men actually in a company containing a Negro platoon were most favorable toward it, men in larger units in which there were no mixed companies were least favorable, while men in all-white companies within a regiment or division containing mixed companies held intermediate opinions. When we note that the proportion of men having no experience with mixed companies who say "they would dislike the arrangement very much" is almost exactly the same (62 per cent) as the two thirds

proportion of white enlisted men in mixed companies who were previously noted as reporting retroactively that they were initially opposed to the idea, we can get some conception of the revolution in attitudes that took place among these men as a result of enforced contacts.

Though this still leaves unanswered the question of whether whites would ultimately adjust to and come to accept enforced interracial contacts under other circumstances, it does show that integration between Negro volunteers and whites could be achieved under the stress of combat. Extensions of this sort of experimentation<sup>63</sup> could show how successfully Negro troops in general could be integrated in white units in combat and how far such integration could be extended into noncombat situations. The results of this experiment suggest that efforts at integration of white and colored troops into the same units may well be more successful when attention is focused on concrete tasks or goals requiring common effort than when it is focused on more abstract considerations of justice or of desirable policy which emphasize the "race issue" and arouse traditional prejudices.

#### *Summary and Conclusions*

The picture of the Negro soldiers revealed by the data in this chapter differs from some of the stereotypes about Negroes.

On the one hand, a concept of the average Negro as a happy, dull, indifferent creature, who was quite contented with his status in the social system as a whole and in the military segment of that social system, finds little support in this study. In the first place, the sheer demographic fact that nearly a third of the Negro soldiers came from the North and that these Northern Negroes had had educational advantages about as good as Southern whites would in itself raise doubts about such a picture. In the second place, the Negro attitudes indicated a basic racial orientation highly sensitized to evidences of racial discrimination, both real and imagined. There was a readiness to protest which was quite inconsistent with the stereotype of happy-go-lucky indifference.

On the other hand, the Negroes were not revolutionaries plotting

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<sup>63</sup> Another experiment in the integration of Negroes and whites into the same unit is sympathetically reported in John Beecher's *All Brave Sailors—The Story of the S.S. Booker T. Washington* (L. B. Fischer, New York, 1945), a Merchant Marine ship with a Negro captain and racially mixed crew. Here the whites as well as the Negroes would appear to have volunteered specifically to demonstrate the feasibility of such interracial cooperation.

the overthrow of the present social system. They were Americans in spirit. They accepted the moral values of the American creed, and they protested where the discrepancies between creed and practice put them in a disadvantaged position. It would be absurd, of course, to attribute to all Negro soldiers a consistent or well articulated ideology. In spite of the great educational progress between World Wars I and II and in spite of the large representation in the Army of comparatively well educated Northern Negroes, the majority were still the products of a system of cultural deprivation. But even the uneducated tended to feel and express resentments at treatment which seemed to them unjust.

We have seen that the Negroes were less likely than whites to feel the war was their war or to want to go overseas or into combat. The more enthusiastic minority was drawn especially from those who hoped that Negro participation would help establish a claim for greater justice to Negroes in postwar life.

Negro attitudes toward Army life had their ambivalent aspects. On the one hand, there were protests against unequal racial treatment and desire for better recognition of Negroes. Belief that Negroes preferred white officers, for example, was shown in this chapter not to be based on fact. On the other hand, the Army policies and frequently the Army practices represented, from the Negro point of view, a considerable advance over those in Southern civilian life, although in some respects less liberal than those in Northern civilian life. Relative to Negro civilians in the South, the colored soldier could feel his status in the Army to be a superior one. Hence, in spite of the very great resentment against differential treatment by the Southern police or by Southern transportation agencies and in spite of a considerable preference for a camp location in the North, the general Army adjustment of Negroes stationed in the South was, on the whole, no worse than that of Negroes stationed in the North. And in spite of the less enthusiastic Negro commitment to the war, there was no consistent pattern of differences in general adjustment to the Army as between Negroes and whites. It was on specifically racial issues that the differences in attitudes were decisively sharp, and even on the matter of racial separation we saw that a very sizable minority of Negroes accepted racial separation on grounds of expediency though not of principle.

In this chapter no effort has been made to review systematically the Army's policies and practices with respect to the Negro during the war. Such a historical account doubtless will be forthcoming



eventually from War Department records. Nor has it been possible to appraise accurately what role the studies of the Research Branch on the attitudes of and toward Negroes played in shaping those policies and practices. Data of the type reviewed in the foregoing pages were made available to responsible War Department officials and Army officers and were used in staff discussions. Some of the data were cited in official Army publications like *Command of Negro Troops*<sup>54</sup> which was distributed to all officers in the Army, white and Negro, and *Leadership and the Negro Soldier*<sup>55</sup> a manual used in training officers for the command of Negro troops. The surveys also provided background information used in preparing the script for the film, "The Negro Soldier," a motion picture made under the auspices of the Information and Education Division and shown widely both throughout the Army and in the country at large.

At the end of the war an official investigating board reviewed the major points of racial friction which Negroes encountered in the Army. The recommendations of this board contained in the Gillem report, so called after the Lieutenant General who was its chairman, were largely adopted as Army policy in April 1946. They touched on many of the grievances of Negro soldiers. Adopted recommendations of the board include:<sup>56</sup>

1. Inclusion of Negroes in the Army in the same ratio as in the civilian population.
2. Assignment of Negroes to both combat and service-type units.
3. Assignment of Negroes to separate outfits to range in size from companies to regiments, some of which units will be grouped together with white units into composite organizations.
4. Establishment of uniform procedures in processing all enlisted men to insure proper classification and assignment of individuals.
5. Gradual, complete replacement of white officers assigned to Negro units with qualified Negro officers.
6. Acceptance of officers into the Regular Army without regard to race and continuation of "the present policy of according all officers, regardless of race, equal opportunities for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion and retention in all components of the Army."

<sup>54</sup> War Department Pamphlet No. 20-6, February 1944.

<sup>55</sup> ASF Manual, M5, October 1944.

<sup>56</sup> Both the official policy and the board's report appear in War Department Circular No. 124 (April, 1946), *Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy*.

7. Continuation of present policies barring segregation in the use of recreational facilities at Army posts.
8. Stationing of Negro units in localities and communities where attitudes are most favorable and in such numbers as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian facilities.

Negro reactions to the report were not entirely favorable. For example, *The Crisis*, official organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, discussed the report in an article entitled "Still a Jim Crow Army"<sup>57</sup> in which the criticisms made of the new policy (as distinct from the findings of the board on the performance of Negro soldiers) were largely limited to an attack on the principle of separate outfits and to pointing out that this principle in effect limited most Negro officers to the rank of captain (the rank of a company commander) or below and set a top ceiling at colonel (the rank of a regimental commander), despite the apparent guarantees of equal opportunity. It also has been noted that the decision that the smallest Negro unit should be of company size would put an end to the experiment of Negro platoons within white companies, which has been discussed in this chapter and to which the board gave praise. Though the announced policy endorses the principle of composite organizations—say, one Negro and three white line companies in an Infantry battalion—the organization of so many Army activities on a company basis means, in effect, that the "compositeness" will be an administrative more than a functional reality.

On the other hand, the reiteration of the ban on complete separation and the apparent intention to minimize the stationing of Negro troops in the South, as well as the decision to give Negro troops Negro officers, all represent measures which bear directly on some of the main problems of tension among Negro soldiers in the Army. These decisions will not be easy to carry out, but, if carried out, some of the specific problems which are reviewed in this chapter will be only of historical interest as far as the Army is concerned. But the evidence amassed in this chapter leads one to temper expectations with a note of caution. For one suspects that a stable solution of racial tensions either in or out of the Army rests ultimately upon the adjustment not of this or that specific grievance but of the basic conflict of which the specifics are just manifestations.

That conflict, as verbalized by the more articulate Negroes, is

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<sup>57</sup> Written by Roy Wilkins. Vol. 53, No. 4 (April 1946), p. 106.

fundamentally a moral issue. It concerns justice. It is not merely that some Negroes receive lesser rewards than some white people; within white society some are more highly rewarded than others. The real question is: What is the *basis* upon which such rewards are made available?

Modern Western societies and, in particular, the United States have operated for several centuries within the framework of a moral order which emphasizes *achievement* as the basic norm for distribution of rewards. Our society has stressed, as has been said, achieved status as opposed to ascribed status. Even when we have recognized that advantages in achieving status are conferred by birth in a particular economic class or racial, religious, or ethnic group, our official creed does not preclude the possibility of achieving upward mobility. Only when the fact of birth becomes in itself the direct determinant of status does a condition exist in which individual effort and achievement become irrelevant—and that kind of closed caste order is not a part of the official American ethic.

As we have seen, the more articulate Negro soldiers in the main put forward their claims and hopes for improved status as aspirations legitimized by the American creed. They were institutionalists, not revolutionaries. They asserted no new principle. They asked merely to have Negroes incorporated into the larger social structure on the basis of widely accepted organizing rules of the game, e.g., formal equality in citizenship, reward according to achievement, and so on.

The problem, then, was one of justice within our existing institutional framework. Defenders of segregation and of other aspects of a system based upon racial categorization were in the difficult position of having no defense on the level of accepted principle against the claims of the Negroes. Their only alternatives were either: (1) to deny that Negroes possessed valued qualities or achievements—an increasingly difficult position to maintain; (2) to repudiate the institutional standards themselves, a course which the national emergency made dangerous; or (3) to ignore the institutional problem and rely upon standards of expediency and upon sentiments attached to local systems of ascribed status, a course which could lead them back again to awareness of the double standards involved. That no more generally satisfactory solution to these conflicts emerged within the Army only reflects the inability of a single segment like the Army to accomplish what the larger society has yet to achieve.

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