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In memory of my parents,
Kikuno and Niichi Najita

support. The ideographs for the academy, used for the frontispiece, are from a photoprint, courtesy of the Kaitokudō tomo no kai—Kaitokudō Association of Friends.

PROLOGUE

ON THE SIDE OF AN IMPOSING MODERN BUILDING IN THE CENTER OF DOWNTOWN OSAKA—THE HIGASHI-KU OR EAST DISTRICT—A SMALL, ODD-SHAPED, STONE SLAB INSCRIBED WITH ARCHAIC Chinese ideographs marks the site where the Osaka Merchant Academy once stood. The Kaitokudō flourished during the eighteenth century of the Tokugawa era (1600–1868). With the demise of the Tokugawa Bakufu in 1868, the academy, chartered by that regime, also closed its gates to further instruction.

In the early 1900s, after Japan's industrial revolution was well under way, the memory of the Kaitokudō was revived by leading intellectuals and writers such as Kōda Rohan (1867–1947), Naitō Kōnan (1866–1934), and Nishimura Tenshū (1867–1924). Nishimura, an aficionado of Chinese intellectual history and feature editor of the prestigious newspaper *Asahi*, was especially instrumental in this effort. His public lecture in 1910 on Goi Ranju's (1697–1762) contribution rekindled the interest of Osaka's intellectual and business communities in the Kaitokudō. A commemorative association of "friends" was formed to sponsor regular meetings, and the lectures and proceedings from these meetings were published in the journal *Kaitoku*. With funds provided by Sumitomo and other Osaka commercial houses, all seeking no doubt to reclaim an intellectual history out of twentieth century, postindustrial needs, the academy was renovated to resemble its former dignified self. Tragically destroyed by the firebombings toward the end of the Pacific War, the academy has not been rebuilt. Its impressive library, however, which somehow survived the fires of war, is housed as a research archive at Osaka University. Although physically destroyed, the academy still re-

mains deeply etched in the cultural memory of Japan and especially of Osaka.¹

Despite common references to Osaka as the ancient city of Naniwa, it was not of the same order as Kyoto, the early capital of Japan, and only developed into a major metropolis during the warfare of the sixteenth century. Osaka became a castle city undergirding the forces of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98). After the defeat of Hideyoshi and his descendents and with the unchallenged rise of the Tokugawa house in Edo, Osaka was transformed from a military city into a commercial and banking center which served the needs of the new Tokugawa Baku-han order—especially as a center for converting rice to silver and distributing goods to the rest of the country. Of the population of 450,000, ninety-five percent were merchants. Regional barons and their retinues converted their rice into cash in Osaka but were forbidden to enter the city and take up residence there. A representative of the baron, usually a servitor of lowly samurai status assigned mercantile duties, managed the baron's granary and dealt with merchants to gain a favorable cash income. As a city of merchants, Osaka came to be known as “the kitchen of the nation”—*tenka no daidokoro*—where merchants greeted each other with the salutation, “How are your earnings today?”—*mōkarimakka?* The crass “bourgeois” reputation notwithstanding, Osaka was also a culturally diverse and complex city which served as the creative home base for such literary giants of the Tokugawa era as Ihara Saikaku (1642–93), Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724), and Ueda Akinari (1734–1809). The Kaitokudō occupied an especially distinguished place in a diverse cultural context as a center of scholarly learning.²

This intellectual history of the academy will focus especially on the period of the academy's greatest creative achievements that lasted approximately one hundred years following its official founding in 1726. It is a history identified with the founders Miyake Sekian (1665–1730) and Nakai Shūan (1693–1758) and such subsequent scholars and teachers as Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–46), Goi Ranju (1697–1762), Nakai Chikuzan (1730–1804) and his brother Riken (1732–1817), Kusama Naokata (1753–1831), and Yamagata Bantō (1748–1821). Named with classical ideographs that mean a school “to reflect deeply into the meaning of virtue,” the Kaitokudō was in those years a proud and thriving educational institution of higher learning that was open to all classes and to the merchants of the Osaka area in particular. As a legally chartered academy—*gakumonjo*—it came to anchor a good deal of scholarly exchange in all of west central Japan. Although it was referred to in the early years espe-

cially as a school that fostered an “Osaka-type merchant learning”—*Osaka-ryū chōnin gakumon*, an epithet not without a grain of truth to it, during the course of the eighteenth century the Kaitokudō gained the respect of teachers and scholars throughout the country as an academy devoted to the serious study of “virtue.”

The Kaitokudō was one among a number of “regional” academies founded in the Osaka area at about the same time. It is clear from the case of the Gansuidō of Hirano (where impressive records were kept and are also housed at the Osaka University), that these regional academies related to the Osaka Kaitokudō as the scholarly center. Although continuous interactions went on between these academies throughout the eighteenth century, a fundamental difference distinguished the Kaitokudō from the others. Unlike the other academies, the Kaitokudō's special legal and public status allowed it to address issues concerning the wider polity, and it thus provides us with conspicuous evidences as to how commoner intellectuals conceptualized the political economy of the nation.³

Aside from its legal status, the attractiveness of the Kaitokudō as a center of scholarship was unquestionably reinforced by its being located near the wealthy establishments of Osaka. It was situated several streets inland from the principal marketplace that set wholesale prices on all goods received through the Inland Sea, including import items shipped to Nagasaki such as valuable medicinal herbs from China and Korea and scientific books and implements from the West. It was located, moreover, in the shadows of the copper mint—*dōza*—where the distribution of copper was managed. It was nestled among the leading financial and trading houses such as Kōnoike, Masuya, Sumitomo, Tennōjiya, and Hiranoya. A walking tour of the area today still apprizes one of the powerful convergence of economic and intellectual forces. The former residence of the great merchant intellectual, Yamagata Bantō of Masuya, is located only a few minutes away from the site of the academy as well as the copper mint. His personal library remains in an elementary school serving the area, the Aijitsu shōgakkō—meaning a school that reveres the light of day—that Masuya helped to establish in the early 1870s of the modern Meiji era when Japanese intellectuals first engaged with the Western ideals of Enlightenment and *Aufklärung*.

The mansion of the banking house of Kōnoike, similarly situated as Masuya's, readily conveys an impressive sense of financial might and philanthropic capacity. Kusama Naokata, who studied at the Kaitokudō, served this banking house and was known as Kōnoike Isuke. Aristocratic exiles such as Kaiho Seiryō (1755–1817), Hirose Kyokusō (1807–63),

younger brother of the influential Tansō (1782–1856), and Asada Goryū (1734–99) sought refuge nearby in order to teach privately among commoners. A colleague of the Kyushu philosopher Miura Baien (1723–89), Asada in particular established his school in scientific study—the Senjikan—with the aid of men at the Kaitokudō. More significant, the influential academy of Dutch Studies in late Tokugawa era, the Tekijuku of Ogata Kōan (1810–63), was located hardly a stone's throw away from the Kaitokudō. Unlike the Kaitokudō, the Tekijuku survived the Pacific War intact, and its location suggests that its reputation in the sciences paralleled the Kaitokudō's reputation in the letters. Some six hundred students, mainly from the samurai aristocracy and “physicians” from regional domains, are known to have come to the Tekijuku to study Dutch language, medicine, and engineering science in this intellectual universe dominated by merchants. Among these students were Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1902), Ōmura Masujirō (1824–69), and Hashimoto Sanae (1835–59), important figures during the revolutionary upheavals of the Meiji *Ishin* of the 1860s. In addition, some sixty students from the key western domain of Chōshū alone were known to have studied there.⁴

From its inception, the Kaitokudō attracted leading scholars to it and its immediate environs, sometimes to exchange ideas on poetics and history and to enjoy Osaka hospitality, and on other occasions, to take up residence at the academy for a longer period of study. Traveling scholars often combined their visit to the Kaitokudō with stopovers at other places of intellectual interest in Osaka. At one of these, the Kontonsha, a society that specialized, as its name indicates, in unraveling the mysteries of archaic poetics, the seminars that lasted well into the night offered both serious study and good food and drink. Another favorite place, the residence of Kimura Kenkadō (1736–1802), the eccentric merchant intellectual who devoted much of his life to collecting unusual fauna, herbs, and foreign gadgets, provided visitors with a veritable museum unlike anything known elsewhere in Japan. A perusal of some of the materials at the Kaitokudō archives as well as the general history of the academy by Nishimura Tenshū, *Kaitokudō kō* (1923), quickly reveals the names of scholars of national prominence following a course of travel that invariably included a visit to Osaka and the Kaitokudō. In the 1720s and 1730s, Itō Tōgai (1670–1736) from Kyoto and Miwa Shissai (1669–1744) from Edo frequented the academy to deliver lectures and conduct seminars. In the 1750s and 1760s, Koga Seiri (1750–1817), Shibano Ritsuzan (1736–1807), and Bitō Nishū (1745–1813), academic leaders in Edo, often visited to establish a firm and lasting friendship between them and men at the Kaitokudō. Toward the end of the century, Satō

Issai (1772–1859) studied at the Kaitokudō for the better part of a year before moving on to become the head professor at the Bakufu College in Edo. Similarly, Rai Shunsui (1746–1816) and his famous son, Sanyō (1780–1832), always boarded at the Kaitokudō on their journeys from Hiroshima to Edo and back. Rai Sanyō was read by all of the young radicals of the 1850s who were discontented with the old order. From Kyushu, the disciples of Miura Baien, Waki Guzan (1764–1814), and Hoashi Banri (1778–1852), key scientists in the late Tokugawa period, as well as a dozen of their students, especially Miura's, studied at the academy for lengthy periods. And within Osaka, Ōshio Heihachirō (1794–1837), the philosophical radical who would turn against many of the basic concepts taught at the academy, labored at the Kaitokudō over the methods of decoding classical Chinese grammar. To round out this abbreviated list, the powerful chief councillor of the Bakufu himself, Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758–1829), visited Osaka in 1789 to hear in exhaustive detail the views of Nakai Chikuzan of the Kaitokudō on the state of political economy in the nation—an effort that resulted in Chikuzan's great work, the *Sōbō kigen*,⁵ which is dedicated to Sadanobu.

Mention is made of these examples at the outset simply to suggest the discursive implication of our subject. Like any “framed” structure of knowledge, the Kaitokudō as an “academy” was not merely an exclusive and enclosed space unto itself. Its intellectual history, therefore, must be understood in terms of a wider set of conceptual relationships that cut across regional and class lines. Indeed, the academy was enmeshed in some of the major intellectual debates of the day which, in brief, centered on the question of epistemology—whether the basis of firm, reliable knowledge was to be located in “history,” in recorded human experience, or in “nature,” in a universal system that preceded and transcended “language.” While seemingly abstract and detached from human actualities, the epistemological alternatives relate to how human “virtue” would be defined and translated, in turn, into action, as in rectifying the faltering conditions of political economy. In small and large doses, these issues were debated in castle towns, cities, and in village councils; they most assuredly flowed into the intellectual life of the Kaitokudō.

The importance of the physical “walls” of the academy must of course be emphasized, for they marked the internal space that was defined as a “legal sanctuary” where merchants as commoners could pursue, with impunity, moral and practical knowledge. No outside authority could forcibly interfere with the inner workings of the academy; here merchants sought universal ideas that confirmed their “virtue” as marketmen and, in turn, made ideological claims about the special knowledge they pos-

essed, especially regarding the economy. As a source of complex treatises and textbooks, the academy was at the same time engaged in broad polemical issues. It served the intellectual and moral needs of merchants by drawing on available concepts, but the Kaitokudō was also the locus of a conceptual *network* that encompassed different regions and social groups. It was in this sense a “center” and not simply an enclosed “sanctuary.” The academy’s dual identity gave the development of the Kaitokudō as an educational institution a special dynamism.

The relationships that linked the Kaitokudō to a wider universe of thought suggest the need to reassess our understanding of the intellectual history of Tokugawa merchants, especially with regard to their consciousness of politics and political economy more generally. For example, historians have long contended that the merchant class in the Tokugawa era lacked political consciousness and hence remained inert during the upheavals of the Meiji *Ishin* while dissident groups in the samurai aristocracy revolted against and dismantled the *ancien regime*. They therefore concluded that Japan’s modern revolution was an aristocratic affair engineered entirely from above, and the merchant class occupies a historical place consistent with that interpretation. Demeaned as an inferior class for over two hundred years, the merchants at the end of the Tokugawa era were manipulated and coerced by various contending political alignments to make, at best grudgingly, monetary contributions to causes of little concern to them.

While not entirely incorrect, this overview probably needs some rethinking. By narrowly defining politics according to who seized power and redistributed it and analyzing the disorderly events of the late Tokugawa era with this framework, the political dimensions of merchant thought and action are obscured. This is particularly true of the economic view of politics formulated by merchant thinkers in the eighteenth century. The diverse involvement of merchants in late Tokugawa and early Meiji is suggestive of a conceptual consciousness grounded in an earlier intellectual development. There is, of course, no problem more elusive to historians than that of “consciousness,” especially when causal links between one point and the next can rarely, if ever, be uncovered. Historians and social scientists are, therefore, tenaciously reluctant to engage with a subject that is thought to be too annoyingly imprecise to be researched. Sharp identifiable events and creative geniuses may not delineate the intellectual landscape. Yet historians are constantly reminded in their researches that bits and pieces of thought from previous ideological systems may be reassembled and put to new uses, particularly in the process of shaping ideological visions of the future. In

this regard, the Meiji *Ishin* was a crucial “threshold” or revolutionary “moment” for modern Japan.⁶ Received concepts from diverse indigenous sources were pieced together in a manner that summarized the past in a radically reductive manner and projected a new future of “national wealth and power”—*fukoku kyōhei*. This ideological formula was recognized by all Japanese citizens as they were mobilized by it, and historians of Japan are well aware of it. Glimpses of merchant involvement can be gleaned by examining this historical process which involved men taking enormous risks without the benefit of a blueprint to chart the course of development.

The merchant Shiraishi Shōichirō (1812–80) worked closely as a supporter and confidant of Takasugi Shinsaku (1839–67), the organizer of the Chōshū rebel army that toppled the Bakufu. Iwasaki Yatarō (1834–85) allied himself with political causes and founded the Mitsubishi combine on behalf of the “public good.” Shibuzawa Eiichi (1840–1931) turned his talents as a country merchant to designing the modern banking system. The merchant houses of Mitsui and Sumitomo adapted their investment goals and became powerful modern industrial firms. Regional merchants of obscure backgrounds who remain nameless supported the rebellion of Hirano Kuniomi (1828–64). Godai Tomoatsu (1834–85) devoted his energies to rallying the merchant houses of west central Japan and founded the Osaka Chamber of Commerce to promote this cause. And throughout the country literally thousands of middle-sized and small merchant houses and peasant families banded together into local “trust banks”—*shinyō kinko*—in order to fend for themselves and control their livelihood under conditions of extreme political and economic turmoil.

The list most assuredly can be expanded and, although the various items do not fall comfortably within a political narrative of events, they do not appear as merely sporadic and fortuitous occurrences. What conceptual resources were available to men of the *Ishin*, regardless of class location, and which ones did they draw from? From this perspective, it is far less important that the thought of a Nakai Chikuzan or a Yamagata Bantō, both men of the Kaitokudō, had direct consequences a generation or two later than it is to establish the structural basis of conceptualization from which fragmented bits were later reassembled into new analytical and critical perspectives. It is undeniable that the writings of Nakai and Yamagata were not isolated and unique events but were enmeshed in a broader intellectual engagement with issues of knowledge and polity. In this respect, their writings were also among the epistemological resources from which men later drew.

My readings of Tokugawa intellectual history, and recently that of the

Kaitokudō especially, suggest to me the greater utility of a less restrictive perspective than the narrow political one. There is the possibility of “alliances” across lines that stemmed from a complex set of conceptual events that I have provisionally called the “Tokugawa discourse on political economy.” This study will elaborate on this discourse with regard to the formation of merchant thinking. The term “political economy” is a translation of the ideographic compound *keisei saimin*, which was often elided into *keizai*. *Keizai* came to mean “economics” in modern times. The conceptual and ethical foundations of “economics,” in other words, are grounded in Tokugawa thinking on political economy or *keisei saimin*. This ideographic compound, it must be emphasized, meant more than economics in the specialized modern sense of the word and included within it broader spheres of political ethics, the art of administration, and epistemology. It connotes the acquisition of the proper knowledge needed to “control” external events both at the personal and public levels. The entire compound may thus be rendered more precisely as “ordering the social world”—*keisei*—and “saving the people”—*saimin*.

The main integrating idea in this cumbersome though often used maxim was this: How might governments and social institutions perform in ways that were ethical both in purpose and consequence, hence the importance of “saving the people” as the aim and consequence of the “means” of governance—“ordering the social world.” As a dynamic intellectual concern that spanned the entire spectrum of the literate strata of society without regard to personal affiliation to school of thought, the discussion of political economy addressed problems of objectivity in evaluating institutions and the flow of historical events not only in domainal administration but in the workings of market, money, and trade. The result was a complex discursive interaction between a “political” view of economics and an “economic” view of politics in which merchants, far from being excluded, played a key role. Historians have not given adequate attention to this influence. As actors dominating the marketplace in cities and the finances of domains, merchants also developed an articulate grasp of how the nation ought to be administered, especially by locating economics as being central to the entire problem. We may see this broadly as the “bourgeois” input into the ideological dictum of “wealth and power” that undergirded Japan’s first industrial revolution in the 1880s.

We have not on the whole been inclined to think of Tokugawa history in this manner. “Politics” and “economics” do not appear in monographic literature on late Tokugawa as dynamically interdependent elements within a coherent system of action but almost entirely in a superior-

subordinate relationship. This despite our awareness that the late Tokugawa had generated two comprehensive and overlapping visions for national independence: political centralization and economic transformation through trade, both of which were steeped in the language and conceptualizations of Tokugawa political economism. Our view may in fact be obscured by the perception of classes as being authentic to the extent that they relate to each other in a conflictual manner, a legacy obviously drawn from interpretations of the French Revolution and the subsequent rise of industrial classes in Europe. A mechanical use of this formula, however, may be distortive in preindustrial contexts such as Tokugawa society in which class consciousness may be seen being shaped more properly out of “functional interdependencies.”⁷

Although the superior-inferior relationship between samurai and merchant may never have been in doubt, the ideologies produced empowered certain kinds of perceptions and actions that allowed, over the long run, the inferior to assume dominance in certain ways, such as the management of industrial capitalism and the organization of regional and local investments. Far from being uninvolved in acts of ideological production, Tokugawa merchants offer historians impressive evidences of conceptualizations about political economy that carried important long-term consequences. We are aware that although merchants were viewed by the official class as being “inferior,” they were nonetheless called upon by domainal lords and by the Bakufu to provide guidance in economic matters. Developing in the interstices of class interdependence, Tokugawa merchant ideology defined politics and economics as being entirely intertwined. If the aristocracy was to be responsible for bureaucratic administration, merchants came to see their rightful place in the political order as specialists in economic management. In other words, merchants developed an ideology that justified their acting economically in the public realm, thereby rendering their analysis and insights into the plight of the economy as being political ones. The intellectual history of the Kaitokudō clearly reveals this dynamic line of development.

Tokugawa history has not been narrated in terms of such conceptual interdependencies. The tendency has been instead to rely on conventional distinctions in dividing historical experiences: political and economic, samurai and merchant, high and low, urban and regional, mainstream and fringe, and so forth. While convenient, these divisions are also unstable and under close scrutiny do not hold up firmly as fixed boundaries. It would be wise to maintain a healthy skepticism about the adequacy of such distinctions in studying historical texts, for the utility of drawing from social, institutional, temporal and geographical markers in

the enterprise of studying intellectual history is indeed dubious. Clusters and fragments of conceptual language tend to move about in a variety of reassembled forms, taking analytical directions unintended in their earlier incarnations. In other words, as conceptual fragments and formations “migrate,” in the wording of J. G. A. Pocock, over geographical spaces and forward over time, they assume a life as epistemological instruments that often conceals their structural sources from immediate view.⁸ Conceptual acts take on new meaning in an apparently unrelated context and arena. Peasants, we know, used the concepts of political economy to improve their lot. Due to the movement or “spillage” of ideas across social and geographical lines, overlapping conceptual spaces are shaped, suggesting the possibility of interdependencies and a much broader sense of social “participation” than might otherwise seem possible. Thus, whether located in a scholarly “treatise” or an “academy,” the ideas found there must in the first instance be seen as “social,” which is to say closely linked to a universe of language and moral and theoretical concepts.

The Kaitokudō, in this respect, may be framed together with segments of other classes, as with agronomists among the peasantry and political economists of the aristocracy. The education advanced at the Kaitokudō appears in a “graded” relationship with the ideas of these other social groupings and not as neatly enclosed and pertinent only to Osaka. Nor should it be concluded that the acceptance of widely available concepts at the Kaitokudō were simply attempts at emulating the aristocracy, for the reassembled ideas were put to creative use to confirm the work and moral worth of Osaka merchants and commoners more generally.

It is also a central contention of this book that the Kaitokudō is best situated in the continuous discourse on knowledge during the eighteenth century between those who claimed that “nature” was the ultimate source of knowledge and those who claimed “history” was the source. In addressing these two epistemological propositions, the Kaitokudō came to formulate a clear position for itself based on a theory of natural ontology. This informed the academy’s intellectual history, especially in the latter half of the century. Although a good deal of Tokugawa thinking about political economy was identified with thinkers such as Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) and Dazai Shundai (1680–1747) who analyzed problems of politics and trade with reference to a refined historical norm that was argued to be located in an ancient beginning, it was also the case that, among commoners especially, the more influential system of thought was grounded in a principle of nature as a fundamental premise to accurate knowledge. While nature could never be comprehended in its totality since nature was infinite and the human mind finite, it was reasoned that

nature encompassed all visible and nonvisible phenomena and included, therefore, human beings and their internal virtue. This alternative epistemology based on nature played a central role in the evolution of merchant ideology at the Kaitokudō.

The development was not readily evident at the outset when the Kaitokudō was founded, and a number of moral concepts were presented to merchants, but it became increasingly important soon thereafter as the principle underlying the academy’s curriculum and, in turn, as the basis upon which to critique the state of political economy. While obvious, the point should be emphasized that education at the Kaitokudō did not lead immediately to such criticism. Rather, as the title of this book suggests, it was to provide instruction based on concepts generally agreed to be of the highest scholarly standard that would confirm the “virtue” of merchants as members of the human community. How this subject of human “virtue” was worked out at the Kaitokudō, therefore, serves as the key subject in our analysis. It was over this very issue of “virtue” that scholars at the Kaitokudō turned against the thesis that “history” ought to be the sole source of moral norms, for this thesis was then formulated by Ogyū Sorai into saying that human virtue was not universal but highly particular to each individual. Political virtue, as well as the virtue of acquiring moral knowledge through scholarly inquiry, therefore, was said to be specific to a few individuals only and not intrinsic to the capabilities of all human beings. Scholars at the Kaitokudō, speaking for commoners in general, objected strenuously to this limited understanding of virtue and held consistently to a theory of virtue in which all human beings, regardless of class, possessed the capacity to *know*, albeit in relative degrees, the form and substance of external moral and political norms. It is this assertive claim to knowledge that shapes the critical thinking of merchants such as Kusama Naokata and Yamagata Bantō toward the end of the eighteenth century.

It should also be mentioned that the affirmation of virtue based on natural ontology is directly linked with the general eighteenth century Tokugawa problematic of engaging with Western science, and in turn, “technology.” Again, the intent behind the reliance on this theory of nature was not, initially, to better understand Western science. The purpose as already mentioned, was to provide moral certitude among merchants—and to commoners more generally. The interest, we may say, was not in “applied” but in “moral” science. The theory of inexhaustible nature, however, lent itself to a certain tolerance toward those who experimented with nature. Since nature was absolute and universal, the human mind, it was argued, would constantly know more about it although al-

ways in an incomplete manner. Knowledge acquired in one era was thus seen as “relative” to that gained in the next, history providing not so much fixed norms as evidences of the continuing human effort to gain deeper insights into nature. On the one hand, therefore, the philosophical ideas of Chu Hsi, the main theoretician behind the system of thought known as Neo-Confucianism, were embraced as valid despite certain well-known limitations to his metaphysics. On the other hand, however, the scientific insights developed by Western scholars, and Dutch ones in particular, were similarly given due recognition as being “relative” but important and worthy of note and then, subsequently, as perhaps even being “superior” to that of scholars in Japan and continental Asia in the approach to scientific knowledge. It is certain, in any event, that in the late eighteenth century, such thinkers as Yamagata Bantō of the Kaitokudō had conceptualized their perceptions of money, market, and trade in terms of universal “mathematics” or “astronomy.”

Equally worthy of note to further affirm the theoretical point made earlier, the concepts identified with natural ontology formed a tradition that embraced major figures of diverse social backgrounds. The pivotal philosopher in this tradition, Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714), and his colleague, Miyazaki Antei (1623–97), devoted their attention to the development of agronomy, the science of agriculture, and lived and taught among the peasantry. Nishikawa Joken (1648–1724) and Goi Ranju were of merchant background and involved themselves in the education of commoners. Goi in particular played a decisive role in the intellectual development of the Kaitokudō. Mentioned earlier, Miura Baien lived among the peasantry in Kyushu and sought from within that agrarian context new ways of thinking about the objective study of nature. Sugita Genpaku (1732–1817) and his colleagues in Dutch studies of diverse social origins revolutionized medical practices through their study of Western anatomical science. Ninomiya Sontoku (1787–1856) envisioned from within the peasantry the eradication of poverty in the nation through scientific farming and communal effort. Kaiho Seiryō abandoned his status in the aristocracy to live among merchants and peasant entrepreneurs to locate in their work the principle of “mathematics” and “calculation” that he believed foretold the future course of history. The Osaka financier, Yamagata Bantō, turned to astronomy and the heliocentric view of the universe to frame his view of received history. To round out this abbreviated list, Sakuma Shōzan (1811–64), while remaining firmly within the aristocracy, similarly identified a scientific principle, “mathematics,” to argue the accessibility of universal knowledge regardless of the particular character of historical culture; science was not the privileged

possession of certain nations—a view, as is well known, that had a far-reaching impact on Japan’s emergence as a modern, industrial nation.

As these examples clearly suggest, the intellectual history of the Kaitokudō cannot be disengaged from a broader set of conceptual developments. Goi Ranju and Yamagata Bantō, noted above, were conspicuous figures at the Kaitokudō, and their ideas overlap unmistakably with those held by other thinkers occupying different spaces and social statuses. This phenomenon is in keeping with our view of Tokugawa thought as possessing a lively capacity for movement, adaptation, recombination, and transformation often concealed by formal status distinctions. The conceptual consciousness of thinkers in diverse classes reveals this pattern. From aristocrats to merchants to now nameless itinerant teachers in small country towns and villages armed with handbooks on agronomy and ethics, a dynamic articulation and dispersion of key epistemologies can be discerned. As participants in this broad intellectual history, the merchant scholars at the Kaitokudō provide us with a particularly clear set of texts that show the creative metamorphosis in the assembling of ideas for instructional use among commoners. By placing the conceptual events located at the Kaitokudō within a wider intellectual mapping, the academy sheds its often misrepresented position of being an institution serving the narrow needs of the “high commerical bourgeoisie” in their strivings to emulate the aristocracy.

The question still arises however, as to what might have triggered merchant leaders in Osaka to engage in scholarly and instructional activity. There is no simple response to this issue as it is open to interpretive disagreement. Although the subject will be dealt with later, suffice it to say here that the concerns that led to the creation of the Kaitokudō were intertwined with self-conscious reflections that took place in the aftermath of the commercial revolution of the late seventeenth century during the Genroku era (1688–1704). It hardly needs much emphasis to observe that merchants were thoroughly enmeshed in the turbulent events unleashed by that economic transformation. Questions arose as to the ethicality of economic passion and, more broadly, whether the course of history in the context of the new commerce might be properly grasped and brought under effective management.

From the early 1700s, and especially in the Kyōhō era (1716–36), strains generated by the uneasy structural relationship between agricultural production and commerce in the cities had rendered the celebration of “passion” and burlesquing of “virtue”—as in Ihara Saikaku’s ribald novellas—to be somewhat inappropriate in light of the troubled conditions of the landscape. Spurred by poverty in the countryside, for ex-

ample, peasants were known to spontaneously “pull out” of their villages to join religious pilgrimages—called *nukemairi*—to revered national shrines located far away. Outwardly joyous, these pilgrimages were rooted in famine and near-famine conditions that recurred in the countryside and reached disastrous proportions in west central Japan in the 1720s and early 1730s. At the most practical level, merchants in Osaka responded by establishing “relief food stations”—*sukuigoya*—to help combat famine. But at a deeper level, and especially in face of criticisms from indebted aristocrats that the cause of much of the misery was passion and greed, merchant leaders perceived that the problem at hand must also involve the establishing of moral and epistemological control of the unsteady present.

While available systems of thought did not offer simple solutions, they nonetheless provided merchants with the conceptual tools and the basic vocabulary about knowledge—often referred to comprehensively as “Tokugawa Confucianism”—that guided the search for intellectual order in the swiftly changing historical present. The question raised was how might the seemingly unpredictable and passionate fluctuations in the fortunes of men be brought into a moral perspective that would demonstrate knowledge to be accurate, truthful, and thus a reliable basis of action. The purpose here was to affirm that external evidences could be organized and controlled and to deny skeptical theories of knowledge that demeaned merchants or that claimed reality, as in Buddhist philosophy, was in a constant state of random flux and thus ultimately illusory and chaotic, something that men ought not rely on for order. Epistemologies that prescribed such a reliance were seen as merely the arbitrary handiwork of passionate and ambitious men; hence, such systems were considered deceptive devices that caused suffering among human beings who wished for order when there was only ceaseless flux. To claim, as the early Tokugawa leaders and scholars did, that order was indeed possible, thus allowing for the prediction of peace well into the future did not, however, overcome the actual evidences of disorder and unease generated by the commercial revolution. The general discourse on knowledge, within which the founding of the Kaitokudō should properly be situated, sought to extract from the intellectual universe concepts that affirmed “reason” and the logicity of external phenomena and events and denied the mere ephemerality of social existence. It was agreed all along the intellectual spectrum that human beings, regardless of particular cultural circumstances, lived in a process of historical time (*toki*), a physical location that was a predetermined condition (*tokoro*), and a place or status within a general social order (*kurai*).

These “names,” it was further argued, were not merely passionate contrivances aimed at fabricating order out of disorder but were “universal” to the human condition and were thus references to truthful realities that persisted despite the seasonal and life cycles that suggested constant change. The basic proposition that “names” could fix and order things into place, that “language” was not simply an artificial construct, clarified the project of controlling one’s political and personal universes in ways that were predictable and thus ethical. The general consequence that ought to ensue from this epistemology was the alleviation of suffering among the people. The theory, however, was much more readily argued than realized in actuality. Poverty in the countryside, indebtedness among the aristocracy, and helter-skelter commerce in the cities all provided ready evidences of a severe discrepancy between ethical theory and historical actuality. Yet the crisis in knowledge that resulted was not over the question of whether “names” and actual “things” and “events” were, in theory, in accord with each other. The reasoned relationship here was not challenged. Rather, the issue centered on what should be the ultimate epistemological proposition upon which the meaning of “names” rested. Should it be anchored fundamentally in historical “text” or in natural “principle”? Over this alternative was then debated the meaning of human “virtue”—*toku*. Most crucial for merchants was the relationship between virtue and “righteousness”—*gi*—meaning “accuracy” and thus also “fairness”—*shin*—the entire ethical basis upon which a network of social and economic relationships might be articulated as ethically viable. As already noted, although the need to clarify that choice was not fully appreciated at the outset, the necessity to do so would become clear in the early decades of the Kaitokudō’s existence.

In the chapters that follow, the conceptual metamorphosis at the Kaitokudō will be outlined beginning with a discussion of the epistemologies available to merchant scholars in the 1710s and 1720s. Although quite obviously many diverse intellectual fragments were melded into a whole, the emphasis will be placed on two authoritative claims to knowledge that served as the baseline to the Kaitokudō and much of eighteenth-century thinking. As already alluded to, one of these was the historicist claim formulated by Itō Jinsai (1627–1705) that contained extremely pertinent ideas for commoners; the other was the naturalism identified with Kaibara Ekken and Nishikawa Joken, which also was oriented in good measure to the moral concerns of the lower classes. The syncretic conjoining of these positions in the hands of the first professorial head, Miyake Sekian, and his colleague, Nakai Shūan, would come under severe attack from within the academy in the radical historicism of

the merchant scholar Tominaga Nakamoto. Using philological strategies, Tominaga denied the validity of *all* historical texts due to their competitive and passionate character whose historicity was no longer relevant to the present. Tominaga's expulsion from the academy would then be followed by polemical attacks on Ogyū Sorai's historicist theory of knowledge and virtue. The affirmation of natural ontology as the pedagogical principle of instruction at the academy was established by Goi Ranju in the mid-1730s through the 1750s.

The middle sections turn to the alternative visions that emerged from within that curriculum as embodied in the critical writings of brothers Nakai Chikuzan and Riken. Chikuzan shaped an expansive and radical vision of the academy within a reordered political system that would include universal education. Riken would see only continued historical decline, project the dissolution of the aristocracy, and seek refuge in an autonomous "kingdom of dreams" of his own making to pursue his scholarly curiosities in "science" and "texts."

The final portion of this book addresses the merchants' reintegration of the teachings at the academy into coherent ideological formulations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The key texts here are those of Kusama Naokata of Kōnoike on the "history of money"—*Sanka zu'i*—and Yamagata Bantō of Masuya on universal knowledge in his great opus, *In Place of Dreams—Yume no shiro*. In the latter in particular the theory of natural ontology that Goi taught can be seen as re-integrated into a worldview that includes the merchant critique of political economy.

It is of course hardly innovative to examine the lectures and treatises of critical and persuasive teachers in an academy in order to argue for the breadth of Tokugawa intellectual history. There is a great deal more to be done, needless to say, especially regarding the thinking about political economy among commoners in the lower strata of society. Yet, the case needs to be made that merchants developed a consciousness of politics and were not merely devotees of the new art forms, although they were indeed that; their engagement with Confucian epistemologies did not simply make them stodgy moralists, although they were mocked by critics such as the popular novelist Ueda Akinari. Obviously many diverse aesthetic and philosophical elements went into the making of what came to be called comprehensively as "The Way of the Merchants"—*Chōnin dō*. The task set here, however, is not to discuss this "way" in all of its cultural complexity but to isolate the ontological boundaries within which merchants thought about their place as marketmen in the political order of things and to discuss the conceptual strategies they employed within

those boundaries to make their claim. It is this intellectual history that allowed merchants to absorb ethical and scientific ideas about political economy and to see critically beyond even that to distant lands and the universe of science. It was this history that generated the lively curiosity among merchants about natural history and world geography—about unusual fauna and animals found in Japan and elsewhere and the scientific instruments that Westerners employed to study the stars and the microscopic world of minute creatures. One can sense in all of this an intellectual history in which merchants acquired a conviction about the "virtue" of their work and their epistemological capacity to explore and control expanding spheres of knowledge.

Sun Goddess Amaterasu, or in the universal spiritual essence in Neo-Confucian thought, is a manifestation of the Way of Heaven—*Tendō*—and thus ought not be differentiated with doctrinal sophistry. Relying on this religious syncretism, Ishida affirmed some of the same ideas taught at the Kaitokudō: All individuals regardless of status are endowed with a universal essence that is sagely and that goodness is to be acted out in the everyday world of work. In their work, moreover, merchants contributed through trade to the well-being of the whole. The ethics of trade are accuracy and thus the affirmation of human trust. The labor of commoners, in short, was not morally inferior to that of the aristocracy, and the “profit” of merchants was no different from the “stipend” of samurai as both are forms of “gifts” from Heaven—*Tenka no onyurushi no roku nari*.⁵⁰

Despite certain similarities between Miyake and Ishida, especially regarding the virtue of marketmen, crucial differences also stand out. While in Shingaku economic action is viewed as a means through which to transform the spiritual self toward “goodness”—*zen ni kasuru*—by defining itself as a religious and introspective movement, the idea of spiritual self transformation was not a central concern at the Kaitokudō. Goodness, it is true, is a sagely possession at birth. But it is to be expressed in ways that are objective and fair and that can be calculated in accordance with the norm of righteousness. The emphasis at the Kaitokudō, therefore, fell on the problem of acquiring knowledge outside of the virtuous self in ways that were not arbitrary thus to place the virtue of “fairness” in an objective social setting. Claims to intuitive self awareness as taught in Shingaku were viewed with deep skepticism, since “righteousness” depended on what men “knew” and not how they “believed.” Syncretism that included religious ideas drawn from Buddhism came under especially harsh treatment at the Kaitokudō, beginning with Miyake and continuing throughout the eighteenth century in the thinking of Goi Ranju and Yamagata Bantō.

It was entirely consistent with the foregoing that the Kaitokudō would place a special weight on objective scholarship—reading, commenting, writing, and so on—which contrasted with Shingaku, where scholarship was downplayed. Students were not to meditate on their inner goodness but to confirm it through the actual engagement with difficult texts. Thus, while scholars at the Kaitokudō did not espouse philological theory as absolutely essential in the manner of Itō or Ogyū, much of the academic training did in fact focus on reading classical texts, including ancient ones. Unlike Shingaku, which held that spiritual self-awareness was transcendent of the world of form and change and resembled the Zen

conception of enlightenment (thus it could be taught to commoners without concern as to their literacy), the Kaitokudō set its goals on scholarly excellence and proceeded to collect a library to support such a vision.

Thus, while the Kaitokudō as a public academy was limited by its “territorial” warranty and could not duplicate itself physically in the manner that the Shingaku could as a spiritual movement, it stood quite importantly for another kind of principle. Stable and predictable academic space would promote the study of moral philosophy in an “eclectic” manner that, at the same time, would not “retreat” to meditation and spiritualism. Individuals from all classes were welcomed to study there within this limit, as many from within Osaka and the regions in fact did. The institutional self-perception, based on a theory of righteous knowledge, moreover, stirred scholars within the academy to see the “objective” problems beyond the enclosed sanctuary in more abstractly conceived terms, including problems of political economy and educational structures. In time, a conception of the Kaitokudō’s “place” within a broadly conceived educational order would be shaped. It is quite plain that the emergence of such an institutional projection rested firmly on the prior awareness of the need to manage the academy in an orderly and self-reliant manner that accorded with the epistemological commitment to “righteousness.”

The systematic avoidance of haphazardness in the instructional program and the insistence on regularity as a matter of maintaining the public trust were clearly related to the “limit” drawn against spiritualistic eclecticism. Within the boundaries drawn to exclude that religious view, a wide variety of concepts could be discussed and critiqued in formal and informal seminars. Even here, however, crucial problems remained. While ideas such as those identified with Shingaku could be kept at arms length outside the walls of the academy, other equally “threatening” concepts could not be excluded quite as neatly. In particular, there was the matter of how much tolerance the Kaitokudō should allow in the “objective” reading and interpreting of “texts.” Should the academy tolerate eccentric historical interpretations that through “righteous” reading of texts directly questioned the central philosophical propositions of Miyake’s teachings? The ideological character of the academy emerges with stark clarity over this issue much more so than it did by defining the boundaries against religious movements such as the Shingaku. The test to this question would arise quite unexpectedly soon after the instructors had regularized the curriculum, and since the issue involved in this instance

was not introspection and meditation but the objective reading of texts and the ethical meaning of this exercise, it carries special significance for the subsequent intellectual life of the Kaitokudō.

The case involved the brilliant young scholar Tominaga Nakamoto. The son of Tominaga Hōshun of Dōmyōjiya, one of the “five colleagues” that had funded the academy to begin with, Nakamoto, in a precocious outburst, utilized the knowledge he had acquired at the academy to challenge the textual resources upon which basic moral claims were being made by leading scholars of the day, including his mentor Miyake Sekian. A clear and decisive line would be drawn against Tominaga Nakamoto. Yet in doing so, the Kaitokudō would also move toward elaborating how limits were to be determined in the pursuit of knowledge; how, in short, intellectual permissiveness might be regulated in terms of a rational epistemology. This development owed much to the instructional presence of Goi Ranju. Indeed, it was out of the decisive impact of his teaching that the scholarly life of the academy would undergo redefinition and serve as the basis for the reflective visions that would be shaped by the brothers Nakai Chikuzan and Riken.

FOUR

□ BETWEEN ECCENTRICITY AND □

□ ORDER: HISTORY OR NATURE □

□ AS FIRST PRINCIPLE □

IN RETROSPECT, THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LEGALLY STABLE ACADEMY PROVED TO BE FAR LESS CONTROVERSIAL THAN THE MAINTENANCE OF CLEAR INTELLECTUAL LIMITS WITHIN THAT space. Practicing his syncretist approach to Neo-Confucianism, Miyake Sekian continued to lecture formally on Mencius and Confucius while conducting specialized seminars on the idealistic writings of Ōyōmei (Wang Yang-ming) that he preferred. Among the guest lecturers, moreover, Itō Tōgai presented his father's extremist position on ancient studies while Miwa Shissai addressed himself to the contrastive theme of the introspective Confucian idealism of the more recent past. Among the assistant instructors, Inoue and Namikawa were protégés of Itō Jinsai's historicism while Goi Ranju was skeptical of that approach and preferred to base his thinking on universal “principle” in nature. To the extent that there was agreement on “compassion” and “righteousness,” with the epistemological emphasis on the latter, a clear boundary could be set between the academy and Buddhism with its teachings on meditation, faith, and salvation. This was a line, as we shall see, that would be reconfirmed consistently.

Of more pressing importance was the development of controversial and “irregular” conceptual tendencies shaped within the framework of permissive syncretic “righteousness” and which required critical reflection and ideological monitoring. While Buddhism could be kept at arms length as being “external” to the Kaitokudō, “heterodox” ideas developed within the academy could not be ordered philosophically within Miyake's syncretism. That there should be confusion among onlookers as to the real banner under which the academy sailed can be thus readily appreciated. Looked at favorably, it meant the intellectual life at the

academy was tolerant and permissive, allowing for exploration into a variety of intellectual areas, as indeed was the case to a significant degree. Viewed unfavorably, the academy seemed to lack coherence and, hence, intellectual integrity. The question was sure to be raised as to where the limits of "tolerance" were; whether the "walls" of the academy stood as conceptual markers or merely as protective barriers; and whether these walls were indicators of what would be disallowed without standing as obstacles to the pursuit of appropriate scholarly study. At issue, of course, was the intellectual identity of the Kaitokudō. If extreme intellectual irregularity was not to be allowed despite the spirit of tolerance, then would this require a conceptual clarification of the interior itself?

Beginning in the 1730s, and especially in the two decades after that, a sturdy tradition, which the academy would come to be identified with, took shape. External boundaries would indeed be set; certain kinds of conceptual propositions would be judged inappropriate; and within those guideposts, a wide variety of intellectual pursuits would nonetheless be encouraged. The outer limits would be drawn with the expulsion of the merchant student Tominaga Nakamoto from the academy as *persona non grata* in 1730 for proposing a theory of history believed to be intolerable to the scholarly life of the academy. The critical work of defining the internal intellectual space would fall on the instructional shoulders of Goi Ranju. The academy would have to make a stand between eccentric irregularity and intellectual order. Tominaga and Goi, each in his own way, however, were "eccentric" and articulated polemical positions that would both come to be identified over the long run as parts of a related history of the Kaitokudō. Excluded from the academy, Tominaga would leave behind an intellectual legacy and would be remembered and admired, especially in modern times, as the *enfant terrible* of the Kaitokudō. Goi who shaped the intellectual destiny of the academy would live on especially through the thinking of his students Nakai Chikuzan and Riken.

The tense demarcation that we see being drawn between Tominaga and Goi should not be viewed in terms of a personal dispute. Although Tominaga studied at the Kaitokudō when Goi was an assistant instructor, no mention is made by one of the other. There is no record of a face-to-face debate. At issue here, from the point of view of the intellectual history of the Kaitokudō, is the conceptual choice offered by two contrasting approaches to knowledge best articulated by Tominaga on the one hand and Goi on the other. Each tries to answer the question of what, in the final analysis, should constitute the ultimate field of human knowledge and hence of moral reference. Tominaga oriented his thinking with scru-

pulous consistency toward "history" and language texts while Goi, with equal coherence, devoted his mind to universal "nature."

Due to his historicist preference, Tominaga's ideas clearly overlapped with the theoretical views advanced by Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai; yet his thinking contained a radical eccentricity unique to himself. Had he remained at the Kaitokudō, he probably would have steered the intellectual life there in an iconoclastic direction. The history of the Kaitokudō would in all likelihood have been a stormy one indeed. Goi possessed a rigorously logical position as well, but his ideas were less reductive and extreme, exposing an open-ended view of knowledge from which new visions might be shaped. His juxtapositioning of the limited mind and the vast universality of nature produced a variant of rational evidentialism, akin to that of Kaibara Ekken, that would come to permeate the Kaitokudō and be realized as a full statement in the grand synthesis provided by Yamagata Bantō at the end of the century. Yet, in this conceptual interfacing of reductive philologism and open-ended rationalism, we see the creation of a merchant intellectual history that would go far beyond the ideas outlined by Miyake in his opening lecture. In this respect, Tominaga's position, being shaped just beyond the shadows of the academy, and Goi's position within its gates, deserve our attention one next to the other.

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TOMINAGA NAKAMOTO
(1715-46)

Although only the bare outlines of Tominaga Nakamoto's brief and meteoric life are known to us, the ideas he recorded in his writings testify to a precocious brilliance which has assured him a firm place in Japanese intellectual history. He was the son of Tominaga Hōshun, known also as Dōmyōjiya Kichizaemon, one of the five merchant colleagues directly responsible for the establishment of the Kaitokudō and its earlier incarnation at the Tashōdō. His father's financial contributions to the Kaitokudō were vital to the academy's survival, and both Miyake and Nakai Shūan trusted Tominaga Hōshun as a close confidant. Nakai even took him to Edo to assist him in the negotiations to gain the official charter for the Kaitokudō. Through his father, Tominaga Nakamoto's education at the Kaitokudō began at an early age, and it was no doubt expected of him to further strengthen the intimate ties with the academy that his father had established. He studied under Miyake from about 1725 until his expul-

sion from the academy in 1730. His fall from favor was severe and final, as evidenced even by the conspicuous absence of his grave in the family burial ground.¹

During his studies at the Kaitokudō, Tominaga Nakamoto quite obviously read deeply into the historicist writings of Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai and was greatly influenced by their approach to scholarship. The key to moral knowledge, these thinkers had said, was to be found in human experience as recorded in historical texts; the method of analysis was to be philological, the precise and critical scrutinization of language. The conclusion Tominaga drew from this general approach, however, would hardly have pleased either Itō or Ogyū, as he came to reject the idea that ethical norms were embedded in ancient sagely articulations for scholars to uncover. In his first essay, completed at about the age of fifteen, a work called *Setsuhei*, meaning roughly "a critical discrimination of doctrines," he challenged the integrity of the classical texts upon which the entire Confucian moral tradition rested. The empirical scrutiny of ancient texts did not justify the conclusion accepted by most scholars that moral norms could be found in ancient texts. On the contrary, these texts, without exception and hence including those held to be sacred at the Kaitokudō, the *Analects* and *The Book of Mencius*, were all polemical, passionate, and unreliable as sources of norms for later history.

Ancient virtues, Miyake Sekian had said, echoing a position held by Itō Jinsai as well, could be identified in certain classical texts and these could serve as moral norms for commoners to identify with in the contemporary world in order to guide their actions. It was this basic proposition that Tominaga found uncritical and deceptive. His readings into ancient texts indicated to him that such a transference of value from the past to the present was to use fabricated ideas as though they were normative in an abstract moral sense when, in fact, what is truly normative in ancient texts cannot be determined since ideas undergo constant distortion over time. For this appallingly disrespectful theory, Tominaga was forced to leave the Kaitokudō. The strange disappearance of his *Setsuhei* at this time points to the likelihood of it being destroyed, although he incorporated the thesis of that essay into his two main subsequent works, the *Shutsujō gogo*—"Interpretations Subsequent to Origination"—and *Okina no fumi*—"Jottings of an Old Man." Worthy of note is the fact that Tominaga then enrolled in a nearby school under one Tanaka Tōkō (1667–1742), a disciple of Ogyū Sorai, where he pursued his philological studies for several additional years before taking on employment at about the age of nineteen at the Zen temple in Kyoto, Manpukuji, to assist in the preparation of a new edition of the Tripitaka. Most of the materials

on Buddhist history that he used in the *Shutsujō gogo* were drawn from his work on that editorial project. Both the *Shutsujō* and the *Okina* were published in 1745, a year before his death at the age of thirty-one. In his last few years, he is said to have turned to writing a history of Japan, which, had his health not failed him, would certainly have resulted in a most interesting work given his clearly defined theoretical orientation toward historical knowledge.²

Shutsujō gogo and *Okina no fumi* are provocative treatises. In a style that manifests a fresh sense of intellectual discovery, Tominaga proposes that historical texts invariably embody a silent polemical intentionality that cannot be readily detected on the surfaces of the pages and which reveal upon closer examination an ambitious contestation on the part of the author vis-à-vis another point of view against which that author wishes to gain intellectual advantage and supremacy. The sages of the past, he argued, did not compose their so-called classics divorced from some sort of doctrinal contest, and this invariably involved rival claims as to the exact meaning of the original principle or vow and thus as to what constituted the true tradition that ought to prevail in the present. To achieve persuasive advantage, the sages, without admitting to doing so, embellished received ideas with interpretive excesses and extraneous glosses, thus distorting the very tradition they claimed to be true. Sectarian and factional lines were then formed around the various contending claims. Their varying views were then "anthologized" and imputed to contain authoritative moral truths. Each successive era repeated this polemical distortion of received ideas and anthologized positions as being the authoritative interpretation of true tradition, further distorting moral precepts in the process. "It is invariably the case," Tominaga observed in *Okina*, "that one who expounds on an ancient philosophy always founds his own school of philosophy . . . and seeks to improve on the positions of his predecessors. His own view in turn becomes part of tradition, and later generations follow this derivative philosophy without knowing its origin."³ The history of moral ideas, in other words, is not at all the unfolding of insights into what is true, but ambitious struggles over orthodoxy that produce falsifications and that render them utterly unreliable as a stable source of ethical authority for the present. To teach these ideas as though they were unshakable certainties is to deceive well meaning and unsuspecting human beings in the everyday world.

In Tominaga's view, all of the major religions were vulnerable to the same set of charges. The entire history of Buddhism (the central subject of his *Shutsujō*) is one of polemical contention based on mystical distortions and ungrounded speculations, all of which began over a struggle as

to whose position was heterodox—*gedō*—literally, “outside of the way.” After the historical Buddha had formulated his religious ideas, he is said to have conveyed their basic meaning to his disciples shortly before his death. Nothing but disagreement ensued as to what exactly had been said. Some say he made a “vow” that all would be saved; others said he conveyed all he had to say without words. After centuries of inconclusive debates, sectarian lines hardened into what is sometimes called the “greater” and “lesser” wheel, or Mahayana and Hinayana, within which the disputes were carried on. Even within a major contending tradition, sectarian lines developed—Ritsu, Tendai, Shingon, Shin, Zen, etc.—with each sect striving to outdo rivals as the recipient of true history and relying on devious intellectual methods to deceive the ordinary people.⁴

Confucianism too, while not given to the mystical and superstitious excesses of Buddhism, reveals a similar history of ambitious sectarian debate. Here again the contention down through the centuries has revolved around what is true history which is based on what exactly the sages might have said and over which scholars argued and formed sectarian lines to establish the supremacy of their views over those of others. Confucianism thus reveals a history of deception through dogmatic overemphasis, convenient deletions, and excessive generalization. The tradition, Tominaga observed, has reached the Tokugawa intellectual world itself, as witnessed in the polemical writings of Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai.

Referring to Ogyū's critique of the *Analects*, the *Rongo chō*, as entirely a “subjective” interpretation and no different in its polemical distortions than those whom he attacked, Tominaga accused Ogyū of presenting ideas that looked attractive but in fact were not the views of the ancients as he claimed them to be—*koi ni arazaru nari*. In particular, Ogyū had committed the fallacy of reducing all of the key concepts into creations of the ancient kings—*sen'ō no gi*—thus offering “laughable” arguments such as the absence of a stable thesis in the *Analects* and excessively distorting the views of other scholars. From Tominaga's viewpoint, Ogyū, to defend his absurd thesis, was compelled to argue that “righteousness” and “principle” and “accurate center”—*gi, ri, chū*—were not relevant to the ancient classics that the Sung scholars such as Chu Hsi (1130–1200) had relied on. Yet anyone reading those texts, Tominaga argued, could readily detect these concepts in them, as in the *Book of Songs*, *Analects*, and the *Doctrine of the Mean*. By accusing Ogyū of being mistaken in not accepting the “center” of a fact as being “principled” and claiming this to be a nonargument—*ri arazaru nishite nanzo*—we detect Tominaga defending the Kaitokudō epistemology of objectivity and of “righteousness” possessing a calculable and “principled” center. It was this defense of the ethic

of “righteousness,” or “truthfulness” as his preferred term would put it, however, that was the premise of Tominaga's theoretical position that no historical text or scholarly interpretation of it were reliable sources of stable knowledge for men to resort to in grasping the meaning of action in the present.⁵

He summarized his overall view of Confucianism in the following manner:

Kao Tzu said ‘human nature is neither good nor evil’ to improve on Shih Tzu's theory that ‘human nature is partly good and bad.’ Mencius' view of innate human goodness is a betterment of Kao Tzu's view of human beings as being neither good nor evil. Hsun Tzu, meanwhile theorized on the innate evil character of men to outdo Mencius. Yueh Cheng Tzu singled out the idea of filial piety, based on the dialogues of Tseng Tzu, to write a canon on the subject, and thereby abandon a wide range of previous doctrines. Unaware of the details of this history, the Sung philosophers took all of these various doctrines as parts of a single orthodoxy. More recently, Itō Jinsai observed that only Mencius had a true insight into Confucius and that the views of the others were all heterodox. And Ogyū Sorai argued that the ideas of Confucius were actually part of the Way of the Ancient Kings and that Tzu Ssu, Mencius and others taught things that were adverse to that Way. So many of these views are mistaken as they fail to see the real truth.⁶

With relentless consistency, Tominaga leveled his defiant attack against Shintoism. He refused to romanticize it as later scholars of national studies would. Nothing in its history moved Tominaga to modify his critical evaluation of religious history. The same kinds of distortions spawned by competitive polemics are to be found in the religious history of his own land as in Buddhism and Confucianism. It too unveils a history of deception. His language from *Okina*, voiced through the “old man,” leaves little doubt as to his harshly negative opinion of Shintoism as a history of polemical distortions.

As for Shinto, people several hundred years ago called it the ancient way of Japan, and superior to Confucianism and Buddhism. . . . Clearly both [Confucianism and Buddhism] were formulated by later thinkers for their own particular age. Now Shinto too did not have its genesis in divine antiquity. It was first taught as Dual Shinto, combining elements from Confucianism and Buddhism in ways that were convenient and suitable for the time. Then came Honjaku Engi Shinto, which reflected the attitude of Buddhists who envied the growing popularity of Shinto and outwardly taught Shinto while ac-

tually reducing it to the stature accorded to Buddhism. There followed Yūi Shinto, which separated itself from Confucianism and Buddhism and claimed to be the pure Shinto. These three forms of Shinto all flourished several hundred years ago. Recently a new type of Shinto called the Imperial Way has gained prominence. Except to say the Imperial Way is Shinto, it lacks specific doctrines. There is also a teaching which claims to be Shinto, but is essentially the same as Confucianism. None of these types of Shinto is derived from divine antiquity. As just outlined, they competed for superiority under the pretense of teaching the people. Unaware of this fact, the foolish in the world believed them to be true, practiced their erroneous teachings, and invariably quarreled among themselves. The old man thought this to be pathetic and laughable.⁷

The main thrust of Tominaga's iconoclastic and critical ideas about history are easy enough to discern as the previous passages cited from his writings clearly reveal. His thinking, however, takes on added complexity in the simultaneous introduction of concepts about language and culture. Tominaga was squarely within the broad framework of eighteenth-century historicism in exhibiting these interests. The supposition that firm knowledge is to be located in history, which Tominaga shared with his predecessors Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai, led scholars of the historicist persuasion to an intense interest in language itself as an objective datum and, in turn, to the related matter of distinguishable uses of language in different cultures. Tominaga, as already emphasized, had oriented himself toward the historicist position which argued that the proper object of knowledge is history. He deduced from this approach the lesson that fixed moral norms could not be located there. Assertions to the contrary were irresponsible, and to make such claims such as Itō and Ogyū had done, therefore, was to simply repeat the ambitious polemics of their predecessors. The problem remained, however, that the language that human beings used was inherited from the past, and if language is manipulable according to emotive human intent, how is the ethical person in the present to avoid the excesses to which received language has been subjected? In other words, if moral language is encased in sectarian exaggeration, how does one then disengage himself from that reality?

Tominaga does not provide us with a clearly defined solution to this knotty problem embedded in critical historicism. In pursuing his study of "one-upmanship" in religious history, however, he had begun to address the possibility that language revealed regularly repeated patterns of use through which emotive purposes were articulated and which could be objectively identified. The idea being suggested here was not that the study of "language" could show "norm" but that it could clarify how distortions

took place. Sectarian contention, in short, does not occur haphazardly but within identifiable contexts and also with a reliance on rhetorical strategies that were repeated in the various historical eras. Although Tominaga did not formulate a comprehensive theory of language, his historicist reasoning went beyond the debunking of religions to an analysis of patterns in the use of language, a discussion that situates him in the wider eighteenth-century intellectual concern with this problem.

Tominaga outlined his conception of language in his *Shutsujō gogo*. Language consisted of three distinguishable elements—*gen ni sanbutsu ari*. He called the first of these the "human" dimension, by which he meant the subjective, individualized, and hence relative perspective found in the use of language. Language always expresses a discrete point of view, and in its polemical form this is a sectarian view. Language, in this sense, is never neutral and therefore varies in rhetorical content depending on the context and thus must not be thought of as being the bearer of fixed truths. Applying this thesis to show the revision of Buddhist concepts over the centuries, Tominaga concluded with a few terse lines: "These are all sectarian words [*kagon*]. The variety of views we see expressed illustrates the observation that a human viewpoint is embedded in the language"—*iwayuru gen ni hito aru nari*.⁸

A related dimension is "historical time." While the subjective element refers to the individualized use of language representing different viewpoints in a certain situation, the dimension of historical time points to language change in a broad and comprehensive sense. Thus, while language ostensibly remains similar in external form, as Japanese remaining Japanese over time, it nonetheless does not remain static and in fact undergoes substantial alteration in both sound and meaning from one epoch to the next. Again, while this idea reinforces the point that moral concepts do not remain unchanged over time, the emphasis here is not on sectarian differences but on the inexorable change in language as history passes comprehensively from one era to another. Despite certain obvious continuities, for example, the language of ancient Japan, Heian, and Tokugawa is quite distinctive to each respective period. Evidences from the history of Buddhism demonstrate, Tominaga observed, that Sanskrit terms from the immediate post-Han period (ca. fourth century A.D.) are quite different from those of the early Sui three centuries later, and these are not merely cases of differing dialects but of actual language change. "These differences," he observes, "are often referred to as one of dialect. But language in fact differs with each age, so that pitch and voice undergo change as language changes with time. The so-called dialect is not at all a true dialect and should be seen as embodying the history of an

era"—*gen ni yo aru nari*.⁹ Thus, differences *within* an age as manifested in doctrinal contests and similarly *between* disparate time periods, as evidenced in the dynamic change of language, combine to relativize moral assertions made in the past. All human beings, even the greatest of sages, must rely on the language of their day, not that of another era in the past. Each historical present, in short, must deal with the contentions of the time and the language available to it. However, quite aside from the specifics of any given historical context, certain functional, rhetorical patterns are observable, Tominaga noted, that make it possible for scholars to see language in terms of these regularly repeated patterns and thereby enhance one's critical understanding of how language is used in any given historical situation, including the present.

In this third and most intriguing of Tominaga's ideas, he referred abstractly to language as containing "patterns"—*gen ni rui aru nari*—that clarify how concepts are presented. Tominaga's discussion unfolds rather casually, as if this theory of language came to mind somewhere midstream in his composition of *Shutsujō*. Moreover, while he spoke of "five patterns," he discussed only four in one place and belatedly introduced the fifth in the very last section of the treatise, practically as an afterthought. The evidences are also cryptic and presented as though they should be obvious to the reader, which hardly seems to have been the case then, and obviously less so for the modern historian. Yet, a provocative intellectual drive at work is discernible in this discussion that goes considerably beyond the previous two elements in theoretical curiosity. We see an attempt being made by Tominaga to abstract from his use of the philological method a broadly applicable set of rhetorical categories that transcend the constraints of polemics and historical change. We see a theoretically bold turn of mind displayed as he groped for ways to deal with language as an objective problem of knowledge.

Tominaga's basic thesis may be summarized as follows: If distortion is endemic to the history of moral ideas, certain basic rhetorical patterns that are related but distinguishable in function should be discernible. Following this line of inquiry, he then proceeded to identify "five" such patterns, all of which add up to impressive evidence that he had taken his historicist reasoning quite far indeed into the area of language study.

In the first of these patterns, Tominaga perceived "expansive"—*chō, haru*—use of language. The meanings of terms are stretched far beyond the limits of their original identification with a specific, physical object. Metaphoric references are used to facilitate this "stretching" process. In Buddhism, for example, a term that literally means "physical arena"—*dōjō*—is used metaphorically to depict a spiritual or religious state, so

that a term used conventionally to describe a concrete empirical object is distorted through this rhetorical mode of "expansion" into an abstract religious concept denoting a spiritual world of saints and bodhisattvas. Similarly in Shinto, the physical reference to the "high plains"—*Takama no hara*—is extended to mean the heavenly realm of the gods and, in turn, as the source of spirituality in all things. Regardless of the philosophical content or the historical context, religions exhibit this rhetorical pattern of exaggerating the concrete or the actual—*jitsu*—into an abstract concept without verifiable empirical reference, and thus, he concluded, "Examples of this kind all belong to the pattern of expansiveness"—*kaku no gotoku no rui wa mina chōsetsu nari*.¹⁰

Precision is sacrificed in the next pattern as well, although the nuance here is somewhat different. While in the previous pattern concrete terms were extended in meaning, in this second variant abstract and all-inclusive terms—hence, *han*—are used from the outset to define the particular. Discrete physical references are not used metaphorically to make abstract claims. Through the argumentation from the general, all particularities are invested with spiritual meaning. Thus in Buddhism, the universal absolute is authoritatively presented without the mediation of empirical references and is claimed to have a cosmic reality prior to experience and to the emergence of differences in the universe. It is said to precede even moral distinctions of good and evil. As the absolute pervades the universe, it is said also to reside as an essential spirit in each particular individual as his "buddha-hood" or "buddha-nature." Here, neither the authoritative premise nor the particular embodiment is verifiable in terms of empirical references. However, by arguing that the spiritual essence of the particular is identical with the universal, by underlining spiritual similitude over particular physical differences, the idea can then be advanced that all human beings were endowed with a spirit of goodness or a buddha-nature that could transcend the physical and attain salvation. All of the particulars are thus made to seem to be "afloat"—*ukabu*, an alternative reading of *han*—on a common spiritual sea, eradicating in the particular the blemishes of age, poverty, lowliness of status, and so forth and thus dignifying all in terms of the assertion of universal spirit. It is an argument that is captured best, in Tominaga's view, in the phrase, "The entirety of humankind each and all is blessed with a buddha-nature"—*Issai shujō wa mina nyoraizō*.¹¹

The third pattern is a direct extension of the previous one and is distinguishable from it in intensity and hence in quality. The pattern may be thought of as being a form of logical reductionism, or taking an authoritative premise to its logical limit—hence, *ki* or *uchitsukeru*. Whereas the

former pattern is somewhat static in its description of the spiritual commonality of all beings, in this particular pattern a dynamic dimension is made to intervene in the form of concrete human action. Similitude is replaced by differentiation through this. The idea of universal Buddhahood is now expressed in terms of the individual realization of moral virtue in concrete ways as in acts of compassion and mercy, or simply "good works." Ultimate spiritual essence comes to be expressed in terms of concrete virtues. The individual is no longer only blessed with buddha-nature, he is now also a "scholar" or a "saint." As the universal is taken to its logical limits in the form of concrete human action, distinctions emerge between the wise and the ordinary, the imperturbable and the passionate, the saint and the vulgar, the high and the lowly. Thus, while all particulars may be said to be afloat on a vast infinite sea, some are claimed to be enlightened, others ignorant. The rhetorical function of language used in this manner to show qualitative differences is to elevate those who understand true tradition from the heretical and unenlightened, from those who grasp the way and those who remain outside it.

Yet another rhetorical strategy, the use of ironic opposites—or *han*—is used to distort language. As in the previous case, the universal is reduced to the level of the particular. Here, however, language is twisted so that conventional terms are made to mean something other than usually expected. The device is used when concrete acts presumed to be good become habitual and customary and lose their ethical significance. Conventional language no longer suffices to convey what is good. The device of twisting and reversing the meaning of terms is thus relied on as argumentative strategy. "The term *jishi*," Tominaga writes, citing from Buddhism, "originally meant something evil as in passionate self-indulgence. But this was used instead to mean goodness. Among the patterns in language, this is called the use of opposites."¹² Tominaga might well have drawn additional examples from Zen Buddhism in which opposites are juxtaposed to transform meanings, in asymmetry being symmetry, the bent straight, the aged beauty, the rustic pure, the blind having true sight, and so forth. In all of these, what is true in the conventional and empirical world of meaning is transformed through the device of ironic reversal—or perversion if one is reconstructing the history of polemical contestation and intellectual distortion. In other words, one of the key patterns by which language and moral ideas undergo change is through the conscious twisting of conventional meanings for, at first, purely rhetorical effect but which, in its perverted form, comes to be conventionalized.

At the end of his treatise, Tominaga introduced a fifth pattern he re-

ferred to as "transformation" or "change"—*ten*—which is linked directly to his discussion of ironic opposites. While in the previous pattern the passionate is said to be good, the angular straight, the blind sightful, in the fifth pattern or "transformation" evil is said to *become* good. The emphasis here is on *process* rather than ironic effect. Language is thus employed to convey change from one state into another that is totally different: a hopeless and totally passionate person transforms himself into his opposite being; from absence of spirit, one is delivered into total spirituality. "Is it not said," Tominaga thus writes, "that a thoroughly evil person devoid of buddha-nature nonetheless transforms himself? And this is said to be realized on one's self-strength and not on the aid of others. Indeed, is it not here that the source of buddha-nature is said to be found even though such a buddha-nature is said not to have been there? The use of language in this manner is transformation."¹³

Drawn from Zen Buddhism, Tominaga's example points to the argument that rejects the idea of a universal spiritual essence as an authoritative given and places the generating source of religious deliverance in the concrete individual, thus transforming the individual from one totally devoid of buddha-spirit to a saintly bodhisattva. Tominaga's main point, however, was that in this rhetorical strategy language was used to focus on the process of change from one state to another, and this pattern was thus distinguishable from the other ones and should be included as one of the ways in which religious ideas were shaped into polemical form historically.

These examples provide suggestive evidence as to the analytical orientation of Tominaga's thinking. Disputes over moral ideas may be endemic to all histories, but they occur for different individualized purposes in different times and through distinguishable patterns. Rhetorical patterns in particular may be utilized in distinct religious histories, as in Buddhism and Shintoism, and as they are regularly repeated in different times and places may in this sense be said to be "universal." To be sure, the net effect is always the same: ordinary human beings are deceived into believing religious and moral assertions that have no grounding in existential human reality.

In contrast to rhetorical patterns that may be universal, Tominaga also advanced the theory that language systems contained within themselves certain characteristics that were culturally specific and not universal. Thus while arguments of "expansion," "universal authority," "logical differentiation," "ironic opposites," and "change" may be utilized in a number of different contexts, certain basic cultural characteristics that are historically particular cannot be transferred and grafted into other con-

texts through rhetorical devices. In short, Tominaga superimposed yet another dimension to his understanding of language, that of *cultural distinctiveness*. While this view was consistent with his overall historicist mode of reasoning, he used it to argue that change and distortion over time took place in historical time sequences that were parallel and distinct and not interactive. Attempts at grafting religious systems across these distinct lines were thus totally artificial and arbitrary and a major source of distortion. Tominaga found it ludicrous, for example, that the Ōbaku Zen sect at Manpukuji, where he had been employed as an editor, was a thoroughly sinicized form of Buddhism in which the monks in Japan continued to wear Chinese-style mandarin dress while living within a Japanese language and cultural context. He took to task his fellow countrymen who deluded themselves into believing that foreign customs could be duplicated in Japan. "Buddhists in Japan," he observed, ". . . are intent on emulating the customs of India. Indulging in practices that are inappropriate to this country, they fail to understand the meaning of the true way. The old man detested this and ridiculed it." Similarly, he went on, "Confucianists in Japan . . . are unquestioning in their emulation of Chinese manners and customs. To imitate Chinese customs that are foreign to this country is to misunderstand the essence of Confucianism."¹⁴

Each historical sequence, Tominaga reasoned, contained within itself a comprehensive quality informing the process of change, creation, and distortion. Buddhism was produced within a dynamic cultural context specific to India and similarly Confucianism to China and Shintoism to Japan. Except through drastic distortion, Buddhism could not be transplanted into China, nor Confucianism into Japan. And since each sequence changes in terms of a momentum specific to it, religious forms of the past are no longer relevant to the respective present, certainly not to his Japan. Tominaga set forth his thoughts by arguing that Buddhism is the way of India; Confucianism is the way of China; and as one country differs from the other, so the teachings of these countries are not the way of Japan. Similarly, Shinto is the way of Japan, but time changes and Shinto is no longer the way of the present. What we perceive here is the use of disparate historical development to further reinforce the argument that history is relative. Exogenous history is unrelated to Japan; ancient Japan is irrelevant to the present. Tominaga's purpose in making history relative in order to affirm the judgmental capacity of ordinary individuals in the social world of the present is clear enough. The idea of cultural distinctiveness, however, was a potent concept that was subject to appro-

priation by later thinkers to reaffirm the uniqueness of Japanese culture and language, even though it does not appear to have been Tominaga's main aim to privilege Japanese history.

The ambiguity can be traced to Tominaga's discussion of cultural types in the *Shutsujō gogo*. He discussed this problem in terms that were not entirely negative, suggesting for example that the use of language to persuade the people had to be in accord with the cultural preferences of the populace at large and that each society possessed a "preference"—*sono minshin no konomu tokoro*—that was distinctive to itself. "The custom of India is an extreme attraction to mysticism," Tominaga thus wrote, "and it is analogous to the fondness for scholarly studies in China. In general those who prepared the teachings and explained the way invariably proceeded with these [customs] in mind. Were it not so, the people would not have believed in them." In discussing Japan, he presented what he saw as the people's cultural preference in a positive light.

In contrast to the mysticism and scholasticism of India and China respectively, the Japanese prize "direct, unadorned, honest language"—*seikai shitchoku no go o konomu*. As already alluded to, however, Tominaga lodged this cultural preference in the general populace as a customary value belonging to the people and thus set it apart from the formal religion or the elitist schools of scholarship. The idea is tantalizingly presented here that popular preferences are not simply flawed "habits" continued over time but also the source of cultural virtue. Although irrelevant to other societies, India's mysticism is essential to India. The same may be said of scholasticism for China. And so too the Japanese attraction to the straightforward spirit—*naoki no kokoro*; *makoto no kokoro*, etc.—and to the down-to-earth ethic of precision—*kō*, *shimeru*. These may be taken to represent, in Tominaga's eyes, the cultural resources for Japan's own "virtue." Tominaga seems, therefore, to have erected a dichotomy between formal or doctrinal religions, which although intertwined with distinctive cultures were nonetheless fabricated over time, and popular cultural orientations or preferences, which were not in and of themselves flawed and which constituted the basis of divergent cultural virtues.¹⁵

His general thinking on this interpretive twist deserves recounting, especially his scathing denunciation of organized or "fabricated" religions, as this then sets the stage for the presentation of his view of "virtue" as being the way of "truthfulness"—or, in short, the Japanese cultural preference for "straightforwardness" and "precision." He began in his *Okina* with this irreverent attack on Indian Buddhism:

The flaw of Buddhism is its reliance on magic. By this is meant the use of chicanery to create illusions. India is a country that finds fascination with sorcery, even as a means with which to explain the Way. When magic is not woven into religion, the people will not be responsive to it. Because he knew this, Buddha taught himself the techniques of sorcery, engaging in six years of ascetic exercises in the mountains to learn the art of creating illusions. The miracles and supernatural events that are described in the various sutras are all magical illusions. . . . All sorcery. To add still another point, Buddhists believe in the transmigration of the soul and invent stories about the previous lives of the Buddha's disciples and of Buddha himself, and then they explain the truth of these stories with various supernatural means. While these were all devices to convert the Indians to Buddhism, surely they are unnecessary to the Japanese.¹⁶

Predictably, the denunciation of Chinese Confucianism is equally vehement:

Confucianism is excessively scholastic. Our society thinks it is eloquence. The Chinese adore it. Even in explaining an idea to the people, if the language is not proper, the audience will not be responsive to it. Take for example the explanations of the meaning of rites. Originally the term for rites meant those ceremonies performed at puberty, marriage, mourning, and at festivals. Today it is used to mean the duties of a son to his father and of a retainer to his lord. It is tied to the moral character of human nature, as it is to sight, sound, speech, and action. As you are well aware, it is even said to transcend heaven and earth and to embrace all things. . . . All of these examples show how in Confucianism commonsensical things are explained with rhetorical excess and verbosity so as to attract a popular following. Like Indian sorcery, Chinese verbosity is unnecessary.¹⁷

Tominaga then plunges his sword with unflinching consistency into the religion of his own land:

The blemish of Shinto is obscurantism, the reliance on mystical formulae and injunctions that conceal reality. It is the source of deception and thievery. In the least, sorcery and rhetoricalness may be worth either seeing or listening to and hence may be tolerable. But obscurantism has no such redeeming features. Since people in ancient days were simpleminded, obscurantism may have been useful for purposes of instruction. When corruption, lying, and stealing are as rampant as they are today, the teachings of Shinto priests reinforce these tendencies. . . . Even teachers of the lowly No drama or the tea ceremony are influenced by them. They sell certificates for profit.

How wretched they are. . . . Any doctrine . . . that is obscure, demands a price, and is mystical, cannot be thought to be the way of truthfulness.¹⁸

Having totally rejected historical religions, foreign and domestic, as irrelevant to Japan in the present, Tominaga then proceeded to "the way of truthfulness" which he prescribed as the only realistic alternative available to his society as it was deeply enmeshed in the commonsense mentality of the people. The "way" is not to be identified with moral absolutes and philosophical truths but closely to the individual self in everyday life, a view that closely reflects Itō Jinsai's philosophy. "The way of truthfulness," he thus comments, began as practice. "A way that cannot be acted out is not the way of truthfulness . . ." Tominaga then goes on to elaborate what he means:

The answer is simply doing what is reasonable, making daily work in the present to be of highest importance, and being correct in thought, careful in speech, discreet in conduct, filial to parents. With diligence one should serve masters, educate one's children, guide those below, respect older brothers, be kind to younger relatives, care for the aged, be warm to children, remember ancestors, promote harmony in the home. One should be honest among men and avoid debauchery, respect superiors, and be compassionate to the foolish. Most of all, we should not do to others what we should not want done to ourselves. . . . Do not steal even a grain of sand. Give when you must without the fate of the kingdom in mind. . . . Do not immerse yourself in wanton pleasure and drink. Do not kill a living thing that is not harmful to human life. Nourish your own individual self. . . .¹⁹

Underlying this brisk endorsement of conventional ethics as taught at the Kaitokudō and understood by the world around him is Tominaga's central existential thesis. One ought to do these things not because it is sanctioned by tradition to do so, or because a wise sage prescribed them, or that a classical text explains their meaning, but simply because they are essential to human life in the present, making human interaction regular and orderly rather than violently chaotic which is intolerable. Moreover, if one were ethical in these practical and commonsensical ways without indulging in time-consuming debates as to their ultimate underpinning in the cosmos or in historical texts, then one could, in fact, devote himself to an intellectual or aesthetic pursuit of his own interest. "When one has time to spare," he notes, "he should study a special art and thereby seek to realize excellence. . . . Commenting on this

view, the old man observed that the *Analects* advises one to do what should be done and then apply himself to an art."²⁰ Even in the Buddhist tradition, Tominaga politely observed, monks were encouraged to study literature and mathematics: "These too are insights into the way of truthfulness."

By disengaging the self from all of the "useless" things of the past and not making of ethics any more than what they were, that is, practical guidelines for human existence, the individual could then realize his own particular talent or what Ogyū Sorai had called the distinctive "little virtue" that each individual was blessed with at birth and which should be developed to its fullest expressive potential. Believing that the essential purpose of kingly benevolence was to allow human beings to do this, Ogyū also had written toward the end of *Bendō* in language that clearly resonated with Tominaga's. In the "way of human nourishment"—Ogyū reasoned, one relies on "benevolence" and gains mastery of an art. As Confucius taught, all human beings possessed a virtue that was distinctive to themselves so that by relying on the way of peace and benevolence of the ancient kings, everyone could realize fully their personal virtues." It is this idea of immersing oneself in the "enjoyment" of and "devotion" to a special art—*gei ni asobu*—that is woven into Tominaga's ostensibly commonsensical idea of "truthfulness." In Tominaga's eyes, a mathematician and a student of literature were worthy of respect, but not a scholarly monk, for while the latter claimed to teach about grand, ultimate truths, the former were devoted to their personal "virtue" writ small.

Tominaga's idea of "goodness" would also be writ small in the manner of Itō Jinsai. Being good is doing the obvious—*sono atarimae*—in the actual world of daily work and play, being compassionate to others and supportive of one's self. It means doing good "in countless little ways"—*moro moro no yoki o okonau*—and from doing these things goodness is generated—*okonawaruru yori idetaru*. Truthfulness, then, as it is articulated as part of the world of commoners in daily life, resembles closely the ethics of Itō. Although Itō relied on Mencius as a source of norm and Tominaga did not, both men nonetheless immersed themselves in textual analysis to emphasize the ethical potential of commoners in the present. To both of them, goodness is not a distant absolute but a way of life that is close at hand in the narrow byways of the immediate world. Goodness and truthfulness are thus generated from below by commoners who possess the capacity to know and to judge and not imposed from above as a fixed absolute. Ethical potential, in this important respect, belongs to everyone, not to sages or men with high status, and it is rooted in the cultural pref-

erence of the Japanese people as a whole for honesty, precision, straightforwardness—in sum, "the way of truthfulness," *makoto no michi*.²¹

The convergence of Tominaga's ideas with those of Itō and Ogyū is grounded in a skepticism toward the use of cosmology to anchor moral absolutes. It is a skepticism that led them intellectually to history, or concrete human experience, as the primary field of knowledge for scholars and to rely on philology and textual criticism as their method. From their reading of history, they formulated ethical perspectives into the present. In the case of Itō and Ogyū, the intellectual procedure of leaving indigenous history and returning to it after identifying with a normative basis in an alternative tradition is of vital significance, as evidenced by the crucial role that "Mencius" and the "ancient kings" play in their respective systems of thought. They shared a tendency to seek out a universalistic norm by which to explain history and ethical action in the present, seeing all histories, in this regard, as being comparable at some deep moral level, thus justifying the transference to Japan of norms drawn from an unrelated historical past.

As already emphasized, Tominaga strenuously denied that such transference was valid. Changes within a single sequence were too extensive and the cultural difference between parallel cultures too deep. In the final analysis, Tominaga did not believe in the comparability of historical experiences and denied the utility of introducing refined norms uncovered in ancient texts into the present. Itō and Ogyū had erred in trying to do that and thus revealed themselves to be in that unfortunate historical stream of polemical scholarship. These critical reservations notwithstanding, Tominaga most certainly shared a related epistemology and methodology with Itō and Ogyū. Like them he exhibits a logical inclination to take a particular philological method and hold firmly to a clear set of conclusions rather than to indulge in eclecticism. In these various respects, Tominaga was not a unique and isolated figure, detached from the historicist discourse on knowledge that captured the attention of the scholarly world in the early eighteenth century. However eccentric and nonconformist he may have seemed to colleagues at the Kaitokudō, beginning with Miyake and subsequent historians, he shared a broad common ground with Itō, Ogyū, and their historicist schools of thought.²²

It is not mere coincidence, therefore, that his thinking should parallel that of his contemporary Dazai Shundai, Ogyū's leading student of political economy.²³ Both share a decided impatience with historical texts as sources of truth. Although Dazai retained Ogyū's idea of kingly benevolence, he, like Tominaga, tended to use historicist reasoning to deem-

phasize the authority of the past and to comprehend the present in terms of current realities. There is a coherent relationship in their thinking that situates them within a common frame of reference, even though the emphasis of Dazai was on assessing the state of the economy while Tominaga was concerned primarily with ethics for commoners, especially those in the commercial world of Osaka where he lived.

Equally intriguing, although here again hardly accidental, is the admiring evaluation of Tominaga's ideas by leaders of the National Studies Movement—*Kokugaku*—notably Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843). These thinkers also sought to bring to present reality what they believed to be its true meaning without the mediations of foreign religions, language, and aesthetics. Tominaga's idea of cultural distinctiveness and the nontransferability of values across parallel historical lines certainly found a sympathetic response from advocates of national cultural uniqueness. The fact that Tominaga did not spare Shinto from his caustic comments went unnoticed while his attack on Buddhism in *Shutsujō gogo* offered the leaders of national studies a scholarly critique that reinforced their dislike of that religion as being foreign and intrusive to indigenous culture. Motoori certainly was deeply impressed by the *Shutsujō* and recorded his evaluation of it in his intellectual autobiography *Tamakatsuma* (1799):

In nearby Osaka there lived a person by the name of Tominaga Nakamoto. During the Enkyō years [mid 1740s] he published a work called *Shutsujō gogo* in which he discussed the way of Buddhism. Drawing on a wide variety of canonical texts from that tradition, he presented detailed documentation many of which are wonderful to read. It seems to begin with that this person [Tominaga] felt it fruitful to study Confucianism as well, so that his Chinese-style prose is also quite polished. Though himself not a Buddhist priest, his extraordinarily lucid insights into Buddhist texts reveal a depth of knowledge that is not to be found in the various sects. How truly impressive his method is.²⁴

Brushing aside the attempts of Buddhist scholars to refute Tominaga (such as Musō Bunyū in *Hi Shutsujō gogo*, 1759) as “frankly speaking, useless”—*muge ni iu kai naki mono nari*—Motoori concluded that, try as these critics might, they would not be able to undo or contain the importance of Tominaga's scholarship, which is the literal meaning of these words—*Kono 'Shutsujō' oba, eshimo yaburaji to koso oboyure*.²⁵

Motoori's elegant words of praise could not escape the attention of his protégé Hirata Atsutane. “Our teacher,” Hirata wrote, “read this book,

and in his collection of scattered essays, *Tamakatsuma*, praised it over and over again”—*kaesu gaesu homeokaretaru de gozaru*. Hirata then began a search for the *Shutsujō* in Osaka and Edo bookstores and, after initial difficulties, ended up with more copies than he needed and went to construct from it his own denunciation of Buddhism, which he called *Shutsujō shōgo* (1817). The title itself is obviously drawn directly from Tominaga's work, save for the insertion of the term “words of laughter”—*shōgo*—for ironic spice. Hirata, in any event, left no doubt in the introduction to his own work as to his indebtedness to Tominaga:

How marvelous it is that there should be written during the reign periods of Kanpō and Enkyō for which the Emperors of Sakuramachi are known, a fine scholarly thesis by a merchant scholar, one Tominaga Kichiemon of Naniwa in the region of Settsu. At first he studied with the widely known Miyake Mannen [Sekian] a great Confucian scholar of the time, and discovered in the course of his learning the great harm brought upon our country by Chinese scholarship. He wrote this in a book now lost entitled *Setsuhei*, which he showed to Miyake only to incur the latter's wrath as he, Miyake, was a Confucian scholar. His relationship with Miyake ended thus, Tominaga proceeded to read Buddhist canons and turned the extraordinary talent he possessed to study all the various texts. With reference not only to Buddhist scholars in China and Japan but India itself . . . he presented an insight that had not been expressed or thought of before him. He said that every single one of the Buddhist scriptures did not contain the true view of the Lord Buddha and that they were all falsifications of later ages. Thus even the title of his book is called *Shutsujō gogo*, meaning to make verbal pronouncements long after having departed from the original law. Tominaga refers to himself in the introduction of the edition published in the first year of Enkyō as having attained the advanced age of thirty, so that it would seem likely that he had not yet approached being forty . . .²⁶

Although Hirata found Tominaga brilliant just as Motoori had, he also felt that most scholars would find the *Shutsujō* too difficult to read and doubly so for ordinary readers. Its relative lack of readership, he thought, was due to a high level of complexity, which he believed should be corrected by adding phonetic Japanese comments—*kana no chū*—so that it would receive the popularity it deserved. It should be noted that due to his desire to simplify the *Shutsujō* for a popular readership, Hirata tended to underestimate the accessibility of the work for scholars. While it is unlikely to be counted among the most widely read works of the Tokugawa period, it was still republished a dozen times following its first

appearance in 1745.²⁷ Of greater importance is the fact that, intricate as it may have been, the *Shutsujō* presented little difficulty to Motoori and Hirata who proceeded to appropriate Tominaga's work for their mission in national studies, in Hirata's case, emphasizing his agreement with Tominaga that Buddhism was a hindrance—*samatage*—to Japanese culture.

Despite this important appropriation of his ideas, it is best not to connect Tominaga with the National Studies Movement. His unflattering comments on Shinto, as noted earlier, were passed over without comment by Motoori and Hirata. The theoretical drive in Tominaga's thinking was to disengage the present from all religious systems including ancient Shinto, which was a point of view decidedly at odds with national studies. In the final analysis, it would seem to be far more appropriate to place Tominaga near the Kaitokudō and its intellectual environs. The unexplained disappearance of his essay, *Setsuhei*, is evidence that he represented an eccentric and iconoclastic historicist dimension that the academy, despite its eclecticism, would not formally acknowledge. It was a well-known fact, however, that Tominaga had incorporated the main ideas of that maiden work in his subsequent writings, the *Shutsujō* and *Okina*, both of which were included in the academy's library.

In point of fact, despite his iconoclastic use of historical texts, Tominaga's ethics were not by any means totally unrelated to the views discussed at the academy, namely that the mind of ordinary commoners in the present could organize the external world and "know" what was accurate and valid and thus make judgments on what might be fair, just, and "truthful." This proposition that endorsed the epistemological potential of commoners was central to the ethic of the Osaka commercial bourgeoisie and had found expression in Miyake Sekian's concept of "righteousness." Tominaga called this human capacity to know "the way of truthfulness." These concepts are closer to each other than they are sometimes thought to be, although Miyake, reacting to Tominaga's iconoclastic procedure, could not appreciate that possibility. Thus while Tominaga's interpretation of history was not likely to be discussed openly within the academy, the awareness of his works persisted, and it is thus best that he be situated in the course of Tokugawa intellectual history as being just beyond the walls of the academy where his scholarly life was placed. The line drawn against him (and the historicist mode of reasoning more generally) would be scrupulously maintained, but it placed him in a curiously vital relationship with the history of the school.

Maintaining that demarcation and defining the nature of intellectual order within the Kaitokudō would be taken up by the scholar-teacher Goi

Ranju whose task it was to keep the academy's scholarly life consistent with the public trust it had received. A highly complex and individualistic intellectual, Goi would exercise decisive influence in establishing the theoretical basis for the line drawn against iconoclastic historicism.

GOI RANJU
(1697–1762)

In the view of the journalist-historian Nishimura Tenshū, who wrote in the early twentieth century what is still the most elegant historical account of the Kaitokudō, it was Goi Ranju, more than any other scholar, who gave decisive intellectual direction to the academy (following a period of uncertain leadership through the better part of the 1730s) and thereby established its prestige as a place of learning. Among Tokugawa scholars too, Goi was acknowledged as having been a much more influential intellectual presence at the academy than the earlier founders, Miyake Sekian and Nakai Shūan. The third son of Goi Jiken, a scholar of commoner background of considerable reputation in Osaka, Goi Ranju was an assistant instructor to Miyake Sekian in the early years of the Kaitokudō even before it had gained official status. Partly out of a sense of uncertainty with Miyake's approach to scholarship, Goi took leave of the academy in 1727 to further his studies in Edo. Following this he served sporadically for periods amounting to two years as an instructor in the domain of Tsugaru in northern Japan. It has been said that this was a most trying experience since the young lord entrusted to him for instruction was poorly motivated in matters of learning. He returned to Osaka in the late 1730s (the exact time is not known) and rejoined the Kaitokudō with an invitation from Nakai Shūan who was concerned about the lack of intellectual purpose at the academy. As Nishimura records it, Goi returned and corrected that situation before his death in 1762.²⁸

Little more that is factually reliable is known of Goi's life. Although he emphasized the importance of maintaining one's house from one generation to the next in his personal teachings, he himself, for reasons that are not clear, did not do that. His only offspring, a daughter (Setsu), was born out of wedlock. He was, however, deeply affectionate toward her throughout his life; he educated her personally, and the last poetic lines he wrote at his death bed were of her sad and tender presence. Frankly critical of the self-denying views of Buddhism, Goi apparently enjoyed life with a certain philosophical exuberance, though he felt that the clever writings of the "floating world" such as those of Saikaku were "useless." One gets a sense from scattered bits and pieces of information that Goi was an intense and outspoken scholar, unafraid to voice his

to know things beyond the immediate physical interests of the self to broader issues of society and beyond that to nature. That capacity was not a sagely property but a human one; a concept vital obviously to the Kaitokudō's project of scholarly education among merchant commoners.³⁹

It was in this broad epistemological frame of reference that Goi endorsed the general position of Mencius against that of Hsun Tzu over the basic nature of human personality. While the endorsement of Mencius makes it evident that Goi remained within the received moral framework of the Kaitokudō, clearly he had also shifted the philosophical foundation for it. Nature is the decisive mediating construct for Goi in a way that it was not for Miyake. To Goi, goodness is not simply penetrating such classical texts as the *Analects* and *The Book of Mencius* and uncovering in them a timeless moral principle that might be acclimated to the present. These classics are obviously valuable because they provide insights about human "life" and its "continuity" in social form within the broader natural order. But it is this latter that is absolute; the former, the writings of the sages, is relative and limited despite the creative intelligence manifested in them for which they deserve deep reverence and scholarly concentration. The view, however, that moral norms are embodied in perfect form in the classics required modification in Goi's view because nature as a universal reality could not be totally known by the human mind which is always limited.

However, it would be fallacious to assume that because men cannot know all there is to know about nature that some phenomena transcend reason, as in afterlife or immortality and an assortment of other myths and superstitions. It would be equally erroneous to conclude from the fact of limited human intelligence, as Hsun Tzu tended to, that men have no choice but to rely on what the ancient sages said and be good thereby. More appropriate Goi felt was the view that since the human mind, including those of the sages, is always limited, men in every historical present must strive to constantly seek to understand more of what there is to know in the universe, recognizing all along that the limited mind can never fully fathom its workings. Goi cites, by way of example, the phenomenon of thunder. "We do not know what this is," he writes, "because our intelligence has not yet reached the level to understand it"—*kore o shiranu wa waga chi no imada itaranu yue nari*. He went on to comment that after much observation and study, men would someday be able to explain thunder as a phenomenon of nature. It is most surely the case that the ancient sages did not understand it and indeed were not knowledgeable about many other things as well—*seijin to iedomo shirazaru tokoro ari*. Had they known what thunder was, they would have explained

it. Sages of more recent times did not do much better: "Even Chu Hsi did not possess the intelligence to understand it, and thus harbored superstitious views." The human mind, however, has already gone beyond the ancient and more recent sages in certain areas of knowledge and will no doubt continue to do so as it explores new areas of a limitless natural universe.⁴⁰

Goi's expansive view of knowledge based on nature as the first principle, and the human mind as being always limited and relative to it, undergirded his discontent with scholars who sought refined moral truths in classical texts, a viewpoint already mentioned in his critique of Hsun Tzu. One of the clear boundaries that Goi drew from his philosophical stance, therefore, was vis-à-vis the historicist school and that of Ogyū Sorai in particular. Consistent with this position, he did not question the demarcation that had been established between the Kaitokudō and Tominaga Nakamoto, who had received methodological inspiration from Ogyū. When Goi returned to Osaka, Tominaga had already left the Kaitokudō. Tominaga was frail and died young, while Goi continued beyond the former's death for another seventeen years as a teacher. Given these sets of facts, it is unlikely that there were close personal interactions between them, although in retrospect this is not as important as the conceptual tension arising from their divergent epistemological propositions and which, as previously noted, remained part of the intellectual history of the academy.

The significant areas of overlap between Goi and Tominaga should of course be underlined. Both were deeply distrustful of Neo-Confucian cosmology as intellectually unreliable; Buddhism and other religions dealing with afterlife and mysterious spirits were discounted as totally irrational; the purely subjective and idealistic philosophy of the Ōyōmei school that Miyake tended to favor was also kept at arms length as unpredictable and unsound as a theory of action; but, most importantly, and on the positive side, they affirmed the evidentialist position regarding knowledge that the human mind possessed the capacity to judge external things and to reach reasoned conclusion that were, if not perfect, nonetheless fair and truthful. In other words, they believed that the mind observes, organizes, and makes judgments and that this was the bedrock of scholarship. Tominaga would not have found Hsun Tzu's philosophy any more acceptable than Goi did, for it denied analytical human intelligence to commoners. Both men in this respect were grounded in the intellectual environment that had produced the Kaitokudō in the first place. But the conceptual division between them was very deep indeed, separating the "inner" from the "outer" as far as the Kaitokudō was concerned, and Goi made certain

that that line was maintained. The heart of the matter was their disagreement as to what ultimately constituted the proper object of knowledge to be cognized, ordered, and evaluated.

Although not opposed to the study of history by any means, Goi, like Kaibara, understood the *ultimate* object of human knowledge as being “nature,” as already emphasized. Historical texts must always be seen in relation to that vast backdrop and hence as *fragments* of human insights into it and through that of the human self or “human nature.” All of the major texts down through the ages that shed light on this problem were valid objects of study, not because they contained fixed norms, but because they informed the ongoing effort in the present to gain new human understandings of nature, which is vastly more universal than man. The idea set forth by Ogyū and others that moral norm could be located in a single set of texts in an ancient epoch was to Goi a reckless and irresponsible claim, an argument he dealt with at some length in a piece he wrote against Ogyū Sorai.

Although this polemic against Ogyū Sorai, *Hi-Butsu hen* (“Butsu” being a pen name by which Ogyū was known), was edited by Nakai Chikuzan and Riken and first published in 1766,⁴¹ it had been written a good deal earlier, probably sometime in the late 1730s, and had already been read in manuscript form in the various academic circles, especially in Edo and Osaka. From the perspective of this study, this work is of considerable significance as a defense of the basic precepts subscribed to at the Kaitokudō. More than the scholastic question of whose readings of the texts were philologically more accurate, this critique by Goi is what concerns us here. A set of persistent arguments can be detected that provide a structure to his criticism of Ogyū. Much of Ogyū’s scholarship, Goi reasoned, was inspired by an antipathy to Itō Jinsai to whom Ogyū in fact owed a great deal intellectually. Driven by this passionate aim to surpass Itō by denigrating him, Ogyū had proposed a theory of Confucianism that was argued to absurdity. If accepted, this theory would cause extensive damage, Goi believed, to Confucian moral philosophy.

Goi began by observing that Ogyū had rejected Itō’s claim that the basic perspective into the Confucian morality should be through Mencius to Confucius’s *Analects*. Quite aside from denying the stability of Mencius as a guideline, claiming it to be subjective and thus unreliable, Ogyū went on to question the normative importance of the *Analects* itself as the text of ultimate importance as Itō had claimed it to be. And with unshakable dogmatism, at least in Goi’s eyes, Ogyū went on to locate the source of all Confucian norms in the great ancient kings who had first created society. Thus benevolence itself was no longer the “principle of human empa-

thy” but the great virtue of the ancient kings and, as Goi quoted from Ogyū, “Righteousness is the Righteousness of the Ancient Kings. Reverence is the Reverence of the Ancient Kings. Mercy is the Mercy of the Ancient Kings.” Ogyū had removed all of these values from the human interior and with a single-minded consistency, had invested all virtues containing general human moral meaning into the kings. And, finally, his assertion that these virtues of the kings were all to be understood as being part of the way of governance made their importance ultimately political. The Way of the ancient kings was the Way to govern the people—*tami o yasunzuru*. The “base”—*hon*—of Confucian knowledge, therefore, was nothing other than the way to order the kingdom—*Tenka kokka o osameru no michi o iu*. It followed that “scholarship” must have as its sole purpose the examination of the textual basis when that original concept of the “way” was first formulated, as in the ancient classics of Songs, History, and Rites.⁴²

Goi objected to Ogyū’s entire structure of reasoning. By imputing all ethical norms beginning with “righteousness” into the ancient kings, Ogyū had committed a number of fallacies. All human beings, like physicians, in all times and places, use “norms,” and this is not a matter that can be reduced to several texts identified with the ancient kings. To deny a normative content in Confucius’s *Analects*, is therefore, highly prejudicial and idiosyncratic in the extreme. Secondly, Ogyū had forced a thesis that scholars like himself could penetrate the spirit of ancient language in its totality. Aside from specific errors that demonstrate that Ogyū himself was flawed in this effort, the fact was that the language of ancient China and that of Japan could not ever be in perfect accord—*gengo awazu*. The search for spiritual identity through “language,” therefore, was an extremely deceptive idea and ultimately irrational.

Indeed, Goi went on, there is an element of irrationality running all through Ogyū’s historical theory. His “purpose” is to venerate the “spirit”—*kishin*—of the ancient kings by claiming a transnatural intelligence on their part to grasp the mandate of heaven at the beginning to bring peace among men. In this manner, Ogyū imputed into original structures created by the ancient kings a “Divine Gift”—*Tenpu*—an assertion that could not be documented and had to be accepted on faith because Ogyū had said so. This irrational dimension went even further. To Ogyū only few could know this historical truth, since it would be beyond the intellectual grasp of ordinary human beings—*bonjin*. For himself, however, Ogyū claimed the mental powers of a genius and likened himself to Confucius, as a “sage” born in the wrong age, after the created fact, and distanced from the actualities of doing creative political deeds.

be observed, cognized, ordered, and determinations made about it as to what was fair, just, truthful and so forth, then how does one explain the dream that is *beyond* observation, is sometimes remembered, yet for which concrete evidences do not remain. Chikuzan dealt with this problem as he had the question of superstition, affirming to young students what might best be termed commonsense reasoning:

There are no clear explanations among previous scholars as to dreams. The confusion brought about by the comment of Chuang Tzu that a sage does not dream has made it almost impossible to understand even the dreams of the Duke of Chou . . . To begin with, one must examine very closely the true nature of dreams. Generally, when the human body falls asleep, its spirit does so too. When the spirit awakens so does the body. On occasion, however, the body awakens while the spirit is still in sleep, and the person either sleep talks animatedly or gets up and thrashes about. Youngsters often do not remember anything at all about it the next day. We call this sleep-drunkenness in everyday language. At times the body is fast asleep but the spirit alone awakens. This is the dream. While one in this state goes forth to other places and back, or talks about all sorts of things, or converses with others, the body does not move at all. Only the spirit is awake and moves about. When one is fatigued and in deep sleep, one tends not to dream. Dreams often occur just before one is about to awaken.¹⁷

This commonsensical discussion of dreams, however, contained within it a didactic message based on an experiential view of knowledge. There were limits, Chikuzan argued, as to what one dreamt. And the limits were determined by daily life, that is, by what men did and hence “knew,” not what they did not do and hence had no knowledge. In his words, “A farmer dreams about harvesting his crops; a merchant about his enterprise; a craftsman about his wares . . . A farmer does not dream about manufacturing wares, a craftsman or merchant about harvesting crops.” Dreams, in short, are grounded in concrete human reality. A king does not dream about living in a village, nor a fisherman or lumberjack about life with horse-drawn carriages. And so the dreams of the sagely prince in the classics are made to make sense:

Thus it is entirely appropriate for the Duke of Chou to dream about spreading the way of the sages to all in the kingdom for it was about this that he was so deeply concerned. In old age when such aims were no longer uppermost in his mind, the Duke no longer dreamed this. . . . Dreams are the shadow of one's spirit.¹⁸

Dreams, then, are not evil, or mysterious, or ominous signs, or predictive in significance; but they are connected to human reality, and hence limited by the experience of that reality. Chikuzan's analysis also confirms the authenticity of ambition as revealed in the Duke of Chou's dream. The Duke's dream is not a mere “dream” or total chimera as Chuang-tzu tried to make it out to be but grounded in a credible vision in which he had sought to provide moral order to a chaotic land.

While “rational,” Chikuzan's analysis of dreams also reveals his identification with the reformist vision of the Duke. Chikuzan too was ambitious. He too sought to prescribe ways, which he would outline in his writings, to alter the course of history from its unsteady course to one that would bring justice and order to the populace. Chikuzan's conception of dreams, in short, was somewhat different from Goi's, whose classical reference was not the Duke of Chou but Mencius and the joy he expressed in encountering the light of day when reason could once again rule.

In all of these themes—the rejection of miracles, heaven and hell, magical foxes and badgers, the mystery of dreams, and finally, in the reliance on an ontological premise of reason encompassing the universe, Chikuzan held to a set of presuppositions that were very close indeed to the teachings of his mentor Goi. It was, however, in his extremely hostile view of the historicist ideas advanced by Ogyū Sorai that Chikuzan took Goi's rationalistic humanism to its most contentious and polemical limit. Goi's opposition to Ogyū was well known to Chikuzan through his essay against him, *Hi-Butsu hen*, which Chikuzan and his brother Riken had edited and to which Chikuzan added his own scathing summation of the Kaitokudō's antagonism in his *Hi-Chō* (1785).¹⁹ The particular emotional vehemence with which Chikuzan couched his criticisms is worthy of some attention here since it speaks to a passionate defense of the Kaitokudō's ideal of the moral education of commoners.

Scattered throughout Chikuzan's writings is his impatience with Ogyū Sorai's restrictive view of human epistemological and moral capacity, which he believed ought to be refuted head-on. Thus, while he felt little sympathy for Yamazaki Ansai's school of Neo-Confucianism, particularly in its disdain for complex scholarship and its favoring of the repetition of carefully preselected sacred phrases, Chikuzan was far less disturbed by it than by Ogyū Sorai precisely because the latter had formulated a philosophy that contained demeaning implications for the bulk of society. Taking the proposition that the moral classics were entirely “language”—*rikkei wa mina bun nari*—a view that Chikuzan accepted as well, Ogyū pro-

ceeded to draw a set of conclusions: that Chikuzan found totally repugnant individuals were denied the internal potential to transform themselves, thus limiting them to their "little virtue," which may be taken to mean a natural talent and disengaging them intellectually from general moral norms. Having separated internal knowledge and external norm, Ogyū had further argued that human beings by and large were incapable of comprehending the organizing principles of society and hence had no alternative but to "rely" on them without seeking to identify with them internally, a proposition that appeared to Chikuzan as an enormously problematical position that challenged the very foundation of the *Kaitokudō*.²⁰

Vital to Chikuzan's thinking was the idea that subjective and objective spheres of knowledge be rendered consistent philosophically. The cognition of virtue ought not be exclusively internal as claimed by idealists, nor totally external, the result of direct experience only. Since action must be accountable in terms of certain identifiable norms, their externality cannot be denied: "Thus one should first gauge carefully the clear rules of the *Great Learning* and then grasp the truthfulness of one's action."²¹ Tominaga had said that such norms were unreliable; and Ogyū said that ordinary human beings could not discriminate and "know" them and that even if they did, most of the so-called norms were faulty. Realizing this latter to be the case, Tominaga had emphasized direct experience as the only guide to truthfulness while Ogyū set out to find the one unshakable norm in history that men in history might rely on—the way, in his favorite phraseology, of the ancient kings. While Chikuzan, like Goi, held to the need for textually grounded references to serve as ethical guides, he also insisted in the general capability of the human self to know which norms were valid and what their purposes were, in short, acquiring knowledge to apply personally and as a basis to discriminate the actions of others—the theme of "governance" mentioned earlier in connection with scrolls. Thus, while Ogyū believed such an approach to scholarship was a wasted effort for most of society, Chikuzan adamantly held to the view that all human beings innately possessed the capacity to know the universal moral norms of compassion, fairness, truthfulness, and the like. One's "imperative" in life, in his eyes, was not to be a "merchant" but an individual who knew "virtue." And precisely because Ogyū Sorai denied the internal human capacity to know universal morals, Chikuzan perceived him as a fraudulent thinker:

Sorai simply discarded the ideas about the internal capabilities of human beings to judge truthfulness, honesty and rectitude and callously talked about the economy. How can this be in keeping with

the teachings of the ancient kings? He simply asserted this view as the norm proposed by the ancient kings. One is reminded of a showman who paints an eagle on the signboard when there is only a simple kite behind it to see. The audience cannot help but feel cheated by such a fraud.²²

Moreover, Ogyū's denial of interior moral potential left him with only "rites and rules," entirely external norms that for Chikuzan were totally unacceptable. The following lines clearly indicate the displeasure he conveyed to his students:

As for rites and rules we must think of them in the broadest sense of the basic principle pervading the universe and see them as essential to all things in life, from the insignificant individual spirit to the vast kingdom, from the weighty matters of ethics to household manners. These serve as standards of virtue . . . Sorai [however] detested discussions of the human spirit and universal principle. As his rites and rules were all about external activities, they end up only as jewel and fine fabric, as bells and drums, leaving for later generations nothing to identify with when those rites and rules no longer hold sway. All of this stems from his idle talk about rites and rules . . . being situated in the Western Chou the spirit of which he believed to be embedded in the language of the ancients of that time. He thus divested the individual self of any center. . . ."²³

Left only with ancient rites and rules, empty historical artifacts—jewels and fabric, bells and drums—containing little of persuasive moral value, human beings in the present would be denied by Ogyū their most precious gift of all, to discriminate and understand "virtue" and render ancient norms relevant to the vastly different circumstances of the continuing present.

Believing then that Ogyū's historicism posed a major challenge to the *Kaitokudō*, Chikuzan launched a sweeping polemic, best outlined in his *Hi-Chō*, a critical review of Ogyū's commentary on the *Analects*, the *Rongo chō*, and rearticulated in other places as well. Of the several strategies Chikuzan employed, one was to repudiate Ogyū's claim to originality. Ogyū, Chikuzan claimed, owed all of his ideas to Itō Jinsai and to late Ming textual scholars. Conceptually and methodologically he did not go beyond Itō, for example, in the identification of history as the primary field of knowledge and the seeking of basic concepts in explicit texts through the philological method. However, while Itō had concluded in a humanistic manner with ideas drawn from Mencius, Ogyū had taken Itō's approach to extreme and unwarranted conclusions. This fallacious tendency toward extremism in argumentation, moreover, was based entirely

inforce the supremacy of the aristocracy is readily apparent in certain key interpretations he chose to make. A well-known set of lines in the *Analects* suggest that those above the median line in society—*chūjin ijō*—should address themselves to those above while those below that line—*chūjin ika*—should refrain from doing so. The usual instruction drawn from this passage was that only those in the upper levels of society should involve themselves with advising those on high while commoners should not since, being lowly, they lacked the appropriate knowledge to do so. Riken challenged that interpretation on the ground that the verb “should not,” as in commoners “should not” advise those on high, was an inappropriate reading and that it meant rather “cannot”—*fuka*—or even “forbidden from”—*kinji*. The line should more properly be understood to mean that those below the median line, referring to commoners in general, do have appropriate knowledge and do speak but “cannot” be heard or alternatively are “forbidden” from communicating with those on high. The emotive drive of that passage, Riken thus reasoned, was not that commoners are ignorant and should not speak, but *how lamentable it was* that their voices could not be heard. The interpretation rendered by Sung philosophers that Confucius had thus meant that commoners should study diligently and advance upward beyond the “median line” in order to be heard was to Riken, a completely fanciful misreading of the text. Riken’s argument that commoners indeed possessed the capacity to know, judge, and speak, it should be emphasized, contained long-term political significance especially as it was rigorously consistent with the rest of Kaitokudō thinking that endorsed ordinary human beings acquiring moral knowledge without regard to questions of status and hierarchy.⁸¹

Riken’s impatience with the elitist view of Confucianism can be discerned in the following example as well. He objected strenuously to the reading of the opening passages of the *Great Learning* to mean that the ordering of “self,” “house,” and “nation” would result from intense and disciplined scholarly effort, an effort, moreover, that was said to involve the prolonged observation of nature. After gaining deep insight into the self and the universe from these exercises, it was proposed, one then gained clear understanding of self, society, and government. Riken flatly denied any grounding in the text for such an abstract philosophy relating “nature” and “governance.” On the contrary, the entire orientation of the *Great Learning* was its focus on the mundane and stress that “grand” knowledge was not in the distant and abstract cosmos but in the immediate and close at hand. The idea of “observing things” as set forth in that text, therefore, did not constitute a prescription for prolonged study, but the commonsensical idea of ordinary human beings relying on the natu-

ral characteristics of particular objects with which they happened to be working; and the suggestion that this engagement should be done intentionally is simply to emphasize the importance of care and accuracy involved in it. Thus, for example, a farmer works with nature by calculating its regularities, the time of day, the seasons. And similarly, through practical “observation” one learns that a bridle works with a horse but not a cow. Nature cannot be altered completely into something that it is not, however much human beings may wish it to be so. Now it is this simple idea that things cannot be bent and distorted by the human will beyond certain “natural” limits that, if properly understood, then serves as a lesson on governing the self and others: One ought not regulate the self in terms of what he is not; and similarly the king and those on high ought not govern according to what the people are incapable of achieving. The suggestion, however, that all human beings, commoners and aristocracy alike, must engage in exhaustive and disciplined study of nature and the universe to gain moral self awareness was a severe distortion of the textual source.⁸²

We may interpret this tendency noted in Riken’s criticism along with his denial of a philosophical separation between inner and outer—*naigai mukan*—as being strategies to affirm the capacity of commoners to acquire moral knowledge. Knowledge was not to be gained with prolonged, strenuous, and anxiety-ridden exercises in order to “overcome” the perceived discrepancy between subject and object, interior self and external things, as taught in Neo-Confucian philosophy. Nor was it valid for Ogyū Sorai to say that since the subjective self was infinite in variety it could not be a source of general moral knowledge and that the bulk of society therefore ought to rely on externally given norms and not be taught about their inner meaning—*shirashimubekarazu*. Riken saw these exclusivist interpretations of Confucian moral thought that denied commoners their active intelligence regarding general moral problems as intellectually repugnant. Thus, although hardly a “populist,” Riken’s philosophical position rested decidedly with the cause of the commoners in his society. Focusing on the issue of epistemology rather than on the idea of spontaneous compassion that Itō Jinsai had, Riken provided reinforcing scholarly endorsement to human beings universally possessing the intelligence to shape moral purpose from within and to choose a proper moral mark or center without. It was a vastly more sophisticated scholarly variant of the concept of accuracy or “righteousness” than had been taught at the Kaitokudō to merchant audiences at its inception.

Riken’s thinking bore a coherent relationship with the historicist ideas of the merchant scholar Tominaga Nakamoto who had also concluded

that ordinary human beings possessed a commonsense intelligence to know the "truthfulness" of human events. While it is of course true that Tominaga did not anchor his existential ethic in a classical text, as he thought them all to be unreliable, he too had advanced the idea that being reasonably true to the mark was the key to ethical existence, not trying to identify action with religious and philosophical abstractions. Despite Riken's positive reading of the ancient text, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, that Tominaga would not have accepted, both shared a related understanding of the concept of "truthfulness" as a universal human possession and from this point of view rejected the idea of prolonged scholarly training as a prerequisite to moral knowledge. They may be seen therefore as being in a discursive relationship with each other, as well as with Itō Jinsai, in orienting their scholarly ideas to the formulation of moral philosophies appropriate to commoners.

Riken's thinking differed from Itō and Tominaga, however, in one very important respect. His ideas contained in them an unmistakably "political" significance in a way that was not apparent in his predecessors. Riken's retreat into his "kingdom of dreams," after all, was an active choice, and it colored his scholarly findings in interesting ways. His accusation that scholars had erroneously separated inner and outer, and had created a needless sense of distance between high and low, carried political meaning. Confucian scholars, he believed, should not deal with an "outer" world that was inconsistent with "inner" moral knowledge. They should discard the mistaken, and ultimately immoral, idea that commoners below "ought not be taught" because of the futility of it and, instead, side with them as they could not be heard by those on "high." Riken's political concern, therefore, was quite distinct from Ogyū's focus on governance by those with exceptional talent who would bring peace and well-being to society. Whereas the critical thrust of Ogyū's thinking had been that much in the present should be changed so that the norm of benevolence of the ancient kings could become a reality in the present, Riken utilized the theory of rational epistemology and the disjunction between inner and outer to assess his own history, the distant as well as the recent past, as it continued through his own times. He utilized, in sum, the moral concept of "truthfulness" to shape a critical perspective into history and politics, giving full credence to the view that his historicism, far from being an antiquarian immersion in ancient philology to show textual authenticity was, in fact, part and parcel with an effort at understanding his own present. Indeed, following his own prescription that the inner capacity to gain knowledge involved the ability to judge,

Riken judged his own history, pointing to its failings; and, in his utopian kingdom where he was free to think the unthinkable, he dreamed, as Itō and Tominaga had not done, of the dissolution of the political world around him.

The accurate evaluation of history precluded for Riken the reliance on two widely utilized approaches: one being the beautification of the ancient origins of Japan by scholars of national studies; the other being the misrepresentation through idealization of more recent political history. Regarding the former, Riken criticized as totally untenable the efforts of scholars such as Motoori Norinaga of national studies to mystify in religious terms the birth of Japanese civilization. Their depiction of the ancient Japanese people living in harmony within the comforting embrace of nature all under the benevolent rule of the early emperors was entirely fallacious and deceptive in the extreme. Equally absurd is the assertion that the monarch ruled "naturally" without providing moral instruction to the people—*oshiezu shite kuni onozukara osamaru to iu*. That beginning, Riken argued, was anything but beautiful, being in fact primitive, uncivilized, devoid of written communications. Even after language and law were introduced from China in the sixth and seventh centuries, he went on, it was not humane Confucianism that was made to prevail but rather harsh governance based on "legalism." Far from being harmonious and natural, conditions under those so-called great ancient emperors were, in fact, quite wretched and filled with treacherous rebellions, assassinations, and ambitious coups. Where, he asked indignantly, are the historical evidences that say otherwise: *nani shōko to shite iu ni ya aran*. Thus Riken had nothing praiseworthy to say of the pivotal figure in the shaping of this romantic historicism: "Motoori is a deeply ambitious and deceptive person, as he seeks to create a religion with mystical arguments. To him everything foreign is bad and things of Japan good. . . . Now this is being dishonest."⁸³

The failing could be traced, according to Riken, to a blindness to the fact that virtually every nation had a sacred myth about its beginning, invariably identified with a divine source in heaven. Whether the country in question was India or any of the lands of the "red beards" the same could be said. The conclusion to be drawn from this general truism, therefore, was not that Japan was unique in having a sacred myth about its beginning, but precisely the opposite—that such a myth had nothing to do actually with uniqueness or superiority since that myth was merely part of customary folklore and unrelated to objective happenings. Thus, although Riken, like his mentor Goi, retained a deep fondness for Japa-

was used with reference to the intangible force in "things." It was used in this manner in the *Doctrine of the Mean*. But, Yamagata insisted, this language simply referred to nature—*Tennen shizen no i*—much in the manner that Sung philosophers theorized on the "principle" of "heaven."

In the case of the *Doctrine of the Mean*, the language of spirit, or life in things, was a metaphor to mean the "truthfulness" of any given object including the human self. The moral teaching there was to insist on the importance of being "respectful" of truthfulness. Thus the text spoke of hearing the "voiceless" and seeing the "shapeless," and it rendered life and death as being "godlike"—*kami no gotoshi*. These were references to the human perception of truthfulness in the world within and without, the visible and the invisible, life and death. More often than not, "spirit" referred to an individual's "power" to govern self and polity and had no bearing on immortality or magic. Nowhere does the text say that "spirits" actually exist disembodied from the universe of natural phenomena. In the ancient world of the Chou Dynasty, Yamagata explained, paper images—*katashiro*—were erected to stand in place of the deceased. This practice provides conclusive evidence that the ancients did not believe in spirits and thus created a paper image "in place"—*shiro*—as in the title of his opus—of the spiritual life of the deceased. The images of parents are similarly preserved to remember the departed spirit and thus, these paper emblems stand in place of the actual spirit that once was.

It was this perception of ritual as rational and knowable by the cognizing mind, much in the manner that Chikuzan had sought to ground "dreams" in actual human experience, that informed Yamagata's "replacing" of spirits and dreams with rational metaphoric image. The creation of paper images of the departed individual had nothing to do with the existence of that individual's spirit but with the "truthfulness" of the inner feelings of "respect" that one had for that deceased person. It was this perception that closely dovetailed with Riken's thinking; Yamagata believed he must "replace dreams" and this idea remains, captured at the very heading of his work.⁷⁰

When this intellectual insight is substituted for dreams and illusions and other superstitious excuses, one is then left with the lasting legacy bequeathed by Mencius: "Heaven does not speak. It expresses itself only through actions and deeds." Thus while the great Confucian scholars from the Han Dynasty on, including Chu Hsi and his colleagues of the Sung, Arai Hakuseki, Yamazaki Ansai, Ogyū Sorai and others in more recent times in Japan, have all dealt with "spirit," attributing to it a non-rational force, their teachings on this matter are entirely misleading and deceptive and should be rejected. Men should accept the truth that so-

cial rituals may reveal the truthfulness in individuals, but they do not contain a spiritual force that can help men rule themselves or the people. At the individual level, one ought to be filial by extending affection and respect to parents while they are alive but not believe that ceremonies after their death sustains in actuality a spiritual communion. And at the national level, rituals dealing with filiality and other customary practices count for precious little:

Though rites may be diligently practiced, a nation that should flourish flourishes, a nation that should decline declines. Let it be observed that this has nothing to do with spirits, but completely with the virtue of men who govern.⁷¹

We need not catalogue in great detail here Yamagata's invectives against all forms of religious thinking and superstitions which he consistently labeled and debunked as foolish—*mina gu nari*—the Sun Goddess in Shinto, the Buddhist pantheon of gods and the fantastic imagery of infinite paradisiacum, Christian theological preachings about salvation in heaven, as well as popular folk beliefs about the magical powers of beasts, mountain goblins, and unusual creatures. Suffice it to say that in presenting his case against spirits, he drew on the thinking of his predecessors, as he readily admitted. His impatience with the superstitious fascination among commoners about foxes and badgers turning into or possessing human beings is clearly reminiscent of the teachings of Goi and Chikuzan, as the following passage suggests:

Human beings are said to possess a superior spirit among the ten-thousand things. If they do not examine things, however, they do not possess knowledge; without hearing sounds they cannot speak; without special training, they cannot write; without studying medicine they cannot heal; without acquiring things they have nothing to give others. . . . Foxes and badgers do not know about such matters. They cannot speak, write, read, cure . . . Human beings alone give names to things. Although it is true that names differ among the various nations, the birds and beasts do not assign names to things.⁷²

And similarly, his critique on Buddhism as being largely fabrications and mystifications well after Shakamuni's time bear the markings of Goi and also of Tominaga Nakamoto's iconoclastic treatise against Buddhism. He broadens Tominaga's comparative perspective, however, into a global one, reflecting the new knowledge of geography that was within his intellectual grasp but was not available to Tominaga. After recounting the

spread of Buddhism from South India to cover the better part of Asia, Yamagata went on in this vein:

Those who know Buddhism are limited to this area of the world only. This being the case, it is not known in five of the other great continents. If only a portion of one continent knows about heaven and hell as taught in Buddhism, these should not be understood as global norms. Furthermore, most of the nations from Europe up to India believe in Christianity . . . And then there are the American continents about which details are altogether unclear, though surely the ideas of heaven and hell such as believed in Asia are not to be found there. When considered in this manner, Buddhism obviously cannot be taken to be the universal moral law of all the lands.⁷³

In the place of believing in such unwarranted religious claims, Yamagata reaffirmed the scientific approach to knowledge and the application of this for the social good. Through science, he emphasized again toward the end of the treatise, the ravaging effects of epidemics such as measles and small pox would be kept in control and infant mortality reduced. Having perused with conscientious interest Udagawa Genzui's translation of the eighteen volume Dutch work on internal medicine by Johannes de Gorter—rendered as *Naika sen'yō* (1793)—Yamagata identified the basis of Western science as the precise search for primary causes.

Western works on medicine all have as their primary concern the search for the cause of an illness. Experiments are carried out by the individual alone. Yet if he is not intellectually satisfied he seeks the advice of others. And when he finally has established the cause and sets out to treat it at its root, he is in control of all the little details. The Western approach to knowledge is almost entirely infused by precise calculation [*menoko zanyō*]. In astronomy, medicine, craftsmanship, the Japanese and Chinese do not come close to it.⁷⁴

This passage contains the critical vision informing the entirety of the *Yume*. In organizing knowledge one begins with the general truth, the underlying cause, ultimately the universe as ontological premise, rather than the aimless tampering with details. When the root cause is established, as he noted, the parts fall into place. It may appear at a glance that Yamagata had proposed this approach as “replacement” not only of “dreams” but all East Asian modes of objective inquiry. Although this was not the case, clearly he, and merchant colleagues around him studying Dutch medicine, had reached a conceptual accommodation with Western science as a coherent approach to knowledge about the universe and human life. Yamagata did not intend to replace the intellectual tradi-

tion that he had received from the Kaitokudō, but he had dramatically shifted the terms of the concepts he had received, a theme that will be addressed again in the epilogue. His synthesis, it should be emphasized here, was of the main ideas he had been taught. It is undeniable, for example, that in his attack on superstition and on assertions about “spirit” that went beyond the verifiable, Yamagata had taken to task the great Confucian thinkers of the past, including Chu Hsi, Ogyū Sorai, and Arai Hakuseki, by identifying himself with the teachings of the Kaitokudō:

When I speak in this manner, I do not mean to denounce the great Confucian scholars as though I had come to this view on my own. I also was given instruction on it. The school of Miyake and Nakai never muddied its teachings with ideas about the spirit. So quite the contrary, how can this view be mine alone after having been taught in close personal manner by great scholars of the stature of Chikuzan and Riken.⁷⁵

Thus, while noting at the end of his opus that nature was universal and devoid of moral preferences and social schemes of reward and punishment, he also affirmed that among the various systems of moral thought in the human world, Confucianism was superior to all of them. This was so because of its clarity in discussing human relations in society and, more generally, because of the insights it provided for understanding political economy in the present, or history as an ongoing reality, without the glossings of mystifications and fantasies of previous ages. It taught compassion and righteousness, grasping the emotive truthfulness in others and in things and innocent creatures, and knowing the accuracy of external events. It taught, in short, the theory of action that led men of virtue to act on behalf of others in society—ultimately the people as a whole. This he believed to be the way of all virtuous men, regardless of status.

Yamagata makes this point in a conversation with Riken about the allegedly indecisive character of Hayashi Razan, one of the key exponents of Confucianism in the early Tokugawa period. When asked by the shogun as to how “the way of the sages” might be realized in the present, Hayashi is claimed to have said that this was not possible. In Yamagata's eyes, Hayashi had failed by not prescribing at that juncture precisely how the shogun ought to act to make compassion and righteousness a reality for all in the land. Riken's comment to Yamagata is also worth reporting: “Like a cook without the skills to prepare a dinner, when ordered unexpectedly to prepare a splendid feast with the appropriate utensils provided, Razan shrunk from the task. Though knowledgeable and eloquent, scholars are not capable of preparing such a meal.” Yamagata left

late into the night with food and drink and in which Nakai Chikuzan actively took part and Riken sarcastically did not. Kimura also developed an early dislike for ancient poetics and turned the empirical concerns with “language” to the study and documentation of natural history, a branch of knowledge known as *honzōgaku*. Besides writing such histories, he also collected material objects and displayed them in a systematic manner. It was this Kimura Kenkadō that Ueda admired, for he had collected objects for their intrinsic significance and not because they could be sold for profit. Yet Ueda was fascinated, most of all, by the fact that Kimura Kenkadō invented a new meaning for an ancient Japanese term.

Read in Sinic manner, “Kenkadō” referred to the Japanese term for “read” or “rush”—*ashi*—which was no doubt expressive of the setting of the “museum” in the marshes along one of the Osaka waterways. From Kimura Kenkadō’s day, the term for “reed” in its predicative form took on the meaning of the systematic observation, collection, and documentation of things as of natural and scientific objects—*ashikabi*. A nativist interested in Japanese literary imagination, Ueda wrote a poetic song of praise to Kenkadō—*Kenkadō o tataeyoru uta*.⁴ Given this interest of his, Ueda did not refer to the “scientific” dimension of Kenkadō’s museum project and how, intellectually, this was in fact close to the scholarly concerns of the men at the Kaitokudō. He seems to have been unaware of Kusama and Yamagata, and makes no mention of other merchants such as Hashimoto Sōkichi who pioneered the development of Dutch studies in Osaka. Nakai Chikuzan and Riken also visited Kenkadō often, as documented in the previously mentioned diary. Having little interest in the new sciences that used the telescope and microscope, (and thus quite unlike Yamagata, Riken, and Kimura Kenkadō in this regard), Ueda offered a view distinctive to his personal intellectual interest. His acerbic comment about the Kaitokudō being “the gates of hell” should for this reason be taken with a generous sprinkling of salt. Yet, even with these allowances, it is incontestable that Ueda had seen through to the declining future of the academy.

The difficulty at the Kaitokudō was due in some measure to the lack of strong intellectual leadership after Chikuzan. The principle enunciated when the academy was first founded that “blood” lineage would not determine the head of the academy could not, in fact, be sustained in practice. Local notables in late Tokugawa, relying on the Kaitokudō as a model for their own school, would refer to it as the academy headed by the Nakai family “from one generation to the next”—*Nakai ke dai-dai*. However, after Chikuzan and Riken, no one of outstanding intellectual strength came from that family. Chikuzan’s son Sekka (1772–1840) and

Riken’s Yūen (1796–1831) were men who could do the formal lectures and administer the academy from day to day, but they were not innovative thinkers. The library, it is said, continued to improve under them. The same was true of their successors who ran the academy over the last years—1840–1869—Namikawa Kansens (1796–1879), Sekka’s adopted son, and descendant of Namikawa Seisho, who had assisted Miyake Sekian when the academy was founded and who now served as head professor, and Riken’s grandson Tōen (1822–81), who oversaw the academy’s administration. Under them, the academy would continue to teach merchant students in comparable numbers as in the past, but the intellectual vibrancy was no longer as it had been. The firm intellectual “place” the academy held as part of a “network” was no longer secure; and the productive and expressive scholars that had linked themselves with the Kaitokudō as part of an articulate grouping were also not replaced because those capable of doing so turned their sights to other ventures.⁵

The passing away of Chikuzan in 1804, Riken in 1818, and Yamagata in 1820 coincided with the deaths of the outstanding and visible scholars who had frequented the Kaitokudō. Between 1800 and 1820, the years known as Bunka and Bunsei or simply Ka-Sei, these men who had dominated much of late eighteenth-century scholarship left the scene along with the leaders of the Kaitokudō: Asada Goryū in 1799 at the age of 65; Hosoi Heishū in 1801 at 74; Minakawa Kien in 1808 at 74; Shibano Ritsuzan in 1808 at 75; Bitō Nishū in 1814 at 69; Waki Guzan in 1814 at 50; Rai Shunsui in 1817 at 71; and Kaiho Seiryō who had lived in the environs of the Kaitokudō, studying Yamagata and other merchants, in 1817 at 62.

Yamagata Bantō belonged to this generation of intellectuals. More importantly, his *Yume* appears at the extreme outer edge of the rational approach to knowledge to which they all subscribed. By deemphasizing classical texts as the primary source of knowledge and imposing a scheme of knowledge arranged from the most universal to the particular, cognizing mind, and redefining thereby the basis of “righteousness,” Yamagata had shaped out of eighteenth-century thought a radical position beyond which there could only lie further extreme acts in scientific study or political management. An extension of his intellectual heritage, Yamagata’s dynamic vision, however, could not be sustained by the academy where he had acquired his knowledge.

The conceptual position staked by Yamagata was, in this respect, as “eccentric” as that of his predecessor of two generations earlier, Tominaga Nakamoto, and it thus makes eminent sense that modern historians should anthologize them together. Just as Tominaga’s iconoclastic histori-

cism could not be promoted within the academy, Yamagata's new science based on "astronomy" could not be dealt with there in a systematic way. The matter of "expulsion," however, was not an issue in the case of Yamagata, and he would not be sent into exile. But just as Tominaga's radical position could not be comfortably housed within the "official academy," so too, Yamagata's grand reorganization of knowledge could not be effectively integrated within the curriculum. Asada Goryū taught, in the shadows of the Kaitokudō in his small private school, the Senjikan, the study of astronomy along with the reading of texts, more or less in harmony. But Yamagata's division of knowledge into pre- and post-astronomy, was a new conception of knowledge as to what was "righteous" and "truthful" that the Kaitokudō could not absorb within its original "chartered" aim. As a public academy, the Kaitokudō could not now declare itself a center to study the meaning of "virtue" through Western science, just as earlier it could not admit to being a school of "ancient studies" to show classical sources to be polemical tracts inappropriate to the present. Despite the enormous expansion in intellectual fields, as exemplified in Yamagata's own thinking, the Kaitokudō remained, finally, a "public" academy chartered by the existing source of law, the Tokugawa Bakufu. Although interested in some aspects of Western science (as in making calendars), the Bakufu was distrustful of this knowledge and had begun, in the early 1800s, to systematically hunt down and imprison outspoken advocates of it.

Yamagata's synthesis, in sum, had created intellectual demands that had outgrown the instructional capacities of the Kaitokudō. In reintegrating within a scientific worldview the intellectual legacy of the Kaitokudō to which he was self-consciously and reverentially indebted, Yamagata ironically had also rendered its teachings obsolete. It is therefore doubtful that the Kaitokudō could have adapted and expanded the range of the curriculum any more than it had.

Indeed, standing at the outer edge in the metamorphosis of Kaitokudō thought, Yamagata's ideas may better be seen as now melding with a broader flow of conceptual events cutting across social strata and class lines that eighteenth-century academies such as the Kaitokudō could no longer effectively mediate. As we see the Kaitokudō in a pattern of decline in late Tokugawa history, it is important, therefore, that we also juxtapose that development in relation to two events in Osaka of momentous importance. One of these was the devastating rebellion led by Ōshio Heihachirō in 1837. The other was the construction, a year after Ōshio's rebellion, of the Tekijuku, a major school of Dutch Studies by Ogata Kōan, to which the intellectual vitality anticipated in Yamagata's *Yume*

would in fact shift. While these two events are not causally tied to each other, nor for that matter, extensive of the internal history of the Kaitokudō, they resonate with that history and deserve brief elaboration here in closing out our account of the academy in the waning decades of the *ancien regime*.

* * *

Soon after Yamagata's death and especially with the Tenpō era (1830–44), Osaka and much of west-central Japan surrounding the city was in a state of siege.⁶ Famines and peasant rebellions rocked the countryside during these years. As Yamagata had suspected would happen, much of the blame for the general economic crisis would be placed before the gates of the merchant houses of Osaka. While commoners could be pardoned for this one-sided view, Yamagata had pointed out, such should not be tolerated of educated men in power who ought to know better. The Bakufu's decree in the 1840 Tenpō Reforms dissolving the monopolistic guilds, however, confirmed the view anticipated by Yamagata that merchants would be called to task for the ailing economy. And, just as he and Kusama had feared, the Bakufu and domainal lords resorted to authoritative exactions of monetary contributions that would damage, in their view, the circulation of much needed capital. At the house of Sumitomo, for example, some thirteen such exactions were made between the crisis ridden years of 1837 and 1841; and over the next decade up to the eve of Perry's decisive entrance into Edo harbor in 1853, another ten or so were levied.⁷

But by far the event that severely shocked Osaka and brought it and the Kaitokudō to a standstill was Ōshio Heihachirō's rebellion of 1837.⁸ Convinced that the dissonance between moral "ideal" and "law" was too great to be breached, Ōshio, a former servitor of the Bakufu, sold his library to purchase guns and launch an attack from within Osaka. Made up of only twenty or so students from his "school to cleanse the inner spirit"—*Senshindō*—the rebellion set fires in Osaka in order to summon the peasantry in the countryside to join in a general populist revolt against the existing order. Although this did not happen, word of the revolt spread and sporadic uprisings were launched in Ōshio's name by peasants believing that the rebel leader had not died as reported and that his followers had scattered into the countryside to lead further revolts. The fires of rebellion ravaged more than one-fourth of Osaka. The areas singled out for attack, moreover, were those populated by the leading merchant houses, many of which were patrons of the Kaitokudō. The distinguished houses of Kōnoike, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Hiranoya, Tennō-

taught at the academy for over 100 years. After a night of inexplicable dreams and unhappy nightmares that played tricks on the human mind, youngsters were taught that the human sage welcomed and enjoyed the light of dawn and did not speculate in a superstitious manner what reason could not unravel. As noted in the discussion on Goi, this instruction was drawn initially from Mencius and interpreted to say that not even the ancient sages knew what "dreams" were about, and had they known, they would not have kept it a secret. The sages, as it ought to be with men in all times, admitted what they did not know. Acknowledging ignorance, these sages simply welcomed the universe of light that came with dawn when once again reason could govern. The little school that loves the light of day, in short, is a restatement of Yamagata's more provocative expression about displacing dreams with the "light" of science that had been suggested to him by Riken.

As mentioned at the beginning, the Kaitokudō would be renovated in the 1910s after the industrial revolution was firmly underway. It would be destroyed during the Pacific War and its library was relocated in the post-war era as an important archive at Osaka University. It is absolutely consistent with the history of the Kaitokudō, however, that Yamagata's own personal library still remains housed in the little elementary school near the Masuya household. Despite the absurdity of this situation at first glance, since young students in Japan are no longer trained to read the complex books that Yamagata had used as references to write his treatise against *dreams*, this library, located specifically where it is, in a school dedicated to young minds embracing the light of dawn, serves as a quiet metaphoric reminder of the link between the intellectual world of Yamagata's Kaitokudō and the continuing discourse on reason in modern Japanese history.

NOTES

One

1. Nishimura's lecture "Goi Ranju" referred to here was republished in *Kaitoku* 37 (1966): 18–37, and its main idea is incorporated in his elegant and concise history of the Kaitokudō: *Kaitokudō kō* (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1923). Naitō Kōnan's reflective series of essays on Tokugawa thinkers "Sentetsu no gakumon" are in his collected works, *Naitō Kōnan zenshū*, 14 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1970) 9: 319–519; Kōda Rohan's best known work on Osaka is his historical novel of 1910, *Ōshio Heihachirō*. For important essays on themes related to Osaka intellectual history, see Takeuchi Yoshio's collected works, *Takeuchi Yoshio zenshū*, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1978–79), especially vol. 10. Of interest is the special issue on Osaka intellectual history in *Nihon shisō shi* 20 (1983), which contains essays by well-known Osaka scholars: Miyamoto Mataji, the eminent doyen of Osaka social and cultural studies; Sakudo Yotaro; Wakita Osamu; Umetani Noboru; and Tokinoya Masaru. A good example of recent interest in Osaka is the set of lectures, by some of the scholars just noted, presented on the Kinki radio station and published by Osaka University as *Osaka no gakumon* (Osaka, 1980). Essays of interest are included in Miyamoto Mataji and Nakagawa Keiichiro, eds., *Nihon keiei shi kōza*, v. 1: *Edo jidai no kigyōsha katsudō* (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbun sha, 1977). I have written "Kaitokudō ninshikiron to jūhasssei ni okeru hihanteki buijyon no sōzo," *Kaitoku* 53 (1984): 38–51. Other more journalistic examples of essays on the Kaitokudō are in: *Tōyō Keizai* 11–21 (1980), and *Senba* 5 (1983). In Western language, an informative analysis of the economic history of Osaka as seen through the cotton industry is William B. Hauser, *Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa Japan* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

2. Especially informative on the subject of the Kaitokudō within the Osaka context is Miyamoto Mataji, *Chōnin shakai no gakugei to Kaitokudō* (Tokyo: Bunken shuppan, 1982); and *Osaka keizai bunka shi dangi* (Tokyo: Bunken shuppan, 1980). Beginning with such well-known works as *Kinsei shōnin ishiki no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1941), Miyamoto has written steadily and extensively on merchant consciousness and culture and his collected works add up to ten

volumes. Also see Nakazawa Morito and Mori Kazuo, *Nihon no kaimei shisō* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya shinsho, 1970).

3. On regional academies, with a special emphasis on the Gansuidō, see Tsuda Hideo, *Kinsei minshu kyōiku undō no tenkai* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1978).

4. Ogata Tomio, *Ogata Kōan den* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1963); and Ban Tadayasu, *Tekijuku o meguru hitobito—Rangaku no nagare* (Osaka: Sōgen sha, 1978).

5. Miyamoto, *Chōnin shakai*, 209-15; the most detailed source for the social interactions of the Kaitokudō with the wider intellectual world is the official history of Osaka, Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi shi*, 7 vols. (Osaka: Seibundō, 1978; first published 1911-15). Also informative are Fujii Sadayoshi, *Kaitokudō to keizai shisō* (Osaka: Osaka furitsu daigaku keizai kenkyū sōsho, 1975) and Oya Shinichi, *Nihon keizai gaku shi no tabi* (Tokyo: Kōwa shuppan, 1980) in which Kaitokudō scholars are included.

6. Theoretically suggestive is Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 166-77.

7. I have found suggestive the essay by Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (New York: Free Press, 1963); and also, Colin Sumner, *Reading Ideologies* (New York: Academic Press, 1979). Among Japanese historians, the writings of Nishikawa Shunsaku point to complex intermixing across class lines: *Edo jidai no poritokaru ekonomii* (Tokyo: Kōhoku shuppan, 1979).

8. J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 3-41. The arguments for "social capitalism" in preindustrial Japan—*saiminron*—provide interesting comparisons with Albert O. Hirschman's *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

Two

1. Amino Yoshihiko, *Muen, kugai, raku* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1978).

2. The structural foundations of this system are analyzed in Wakita Osamu, *Kinsei hōkensei seiritsu shi ron* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1977).

3. The *Chōnin kōken roku* is included in Nakamura Yukihiko, ed., *Nihon shisō taikai*, 59: *Kinsei chōnin shisō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1975), 175-233.

4. Ihara Saikaku's *Nippon eitaigura* has been translated by G. W. Sargent, *The Japanese Family Storehouse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).

5. The *Shison kagami* is in Nakamura, *Nihon shisō taikai*, *Kinsei chōnin*, 17-84.

6. *Ibid.*, 34-35 passim.

7. I have relied primarily in my analysis on Yoshikawa Kojiro and Shimizu Shigeru, eds., *Nihon shisō taikai*, 33: *Itō Jinsai—Itō Tōgai* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1971). Also useful are: Yoshikawa Kojiro, *Jinsai-Sorai-Norinaga* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1975) and the English translation with that title (Tōhō gakkai, 1983); the biographical essay by Ishida Ichiro, *Jinbutsu sōsho*, 39: *Itō Jinsai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1980); and the stimulating recent work by Koyasu Nobukuni, *Itō Jinsai—Jinrinteki sekai no shisō* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan, 1982).

8. Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8 (1969): 3-53.

9. Itō's key statements are *Gomō jigi*, his textual critique of Confucius and Mencius (in Yoshikawa and Shimizu, *Itō Jinsai—Itō Tōgai*, 11-113; and his "lec-

tures" for beginners, *Dōjimon*, in Ienaga Saburo, Shimizu Shigeru et al., *Nihon koten bungaku taikai*, 97: *Kinsei shisōka bunshū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1966), 49-200.

10. See Yoshikawa, *Jinsai, Sorai, Norinaga*, 1-63; or his analysis in *Itō Jinsai—Itō Tōgai*, 565-621; and also Takeuchi Yoshio, "Jinsai no keigaku," *Takeuchi zenshū* 10: 301-17.

11. The classic study on these intellectuals is Maruyama Masao, *Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1952) and translated by Mikiso Hane, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). Also, the pioneering study by Honjo Eijiro, *Kinsei no keizai shisō* (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron sha, 1931) and his essays in the English version, *Economic Theory and History of Japan in the Tokugawa Period* (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1965). The theme of rationalistic thought, which much of my study is about, is treated in a broad and synthetic manner by Minamoto Ryoen, *Tokugawa gōrishisō no keifu* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1972). On Tokugawa "historicism," see Noguchi Takehiko, *Edo no rekishika* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1979). Also informative is Matsumoto Sannosuke's collection of essays, *Kinsei Nihon no shisōzō* (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1984); and the special issue on "ancient" and "national" studies, *Nihon shisō shi* 8 (1978).

12. Tahara Tsuguo and Morimoto Junichiro, eds., *Nihon shisō taikai* 32: *Yamaga Sokō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970). A key essay is "Seikyō yōgo," 7-28.

13. The analysis of Ogyū here is based mainly on his pivotal text, *Bendō*, available in Yoshikawa Kojiro, Maruyama et al., eds., *Nihon shisō taikai*, 36: *Ogyū Sorai* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1973). See also Bito Masahide, ed., *Nihon no meichō*, 16: *Ogyū Sorai* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1974). The same themes presented here can also be gleaned from Ogyū's *Benmei*, found in these same anthologies.

14. Ogyū, *Bendō*, section 20.

15. *Ibid.*, section 7.

16. *Ibid.*, section 14.

17. *Ibid.*, sections 1 and 6.

18. Nakae Chōmin, *Ichinen yūhan* (Tokyo: Hakubun kan, 1901), 26-30.

19. This is a theme scattered throughout Itō's *Gomō jigi*, (Yoshikawa and Shimizu, eds., *Nihon shisō taikai* 33: *Itō Jinsai—Itō Tōgai*) as well as *Dōjimon* (Ienaga and Shimizu, eds., *Nihon koten bungaku taikai*, 97: *kinsei shisōka bunshū*).

20. Itō's views on the *Great Learning* are in *Gomō jigi*, 98-106; and on the *Doctrine of the Mean*, in his "Chūyō haiki," in *Nihon no shisō* 11: *Itō Jinsai bunshū*, edited by Kimura Eiichi (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 253-311).

21. Itō, *Gomō jigi*, 19; 73-77.

22. Itō, *Gomō jigi*, 54-58, 74-75; and *Dōjimon*, 138-42.

23. Itō, *Dōjimon*, 73, 80-95.

24. Itō, *Gomō jigi*, 15-19, 56-59; and *Dōjimon*, 73-75, 143-44.

25. Itō, *Dōjimon*, 108-9; and *Gomō jigi*, 73-81.

26. Itō, *Dōjimon*, 84-85, 89, 93.

27. Itō, *Dōjimon*, 94; *Gomō jigi*, 64-65, 69-78.

28. Itō, *Dōjimon*, 81; *Gomō jigi*, 104-5.

29. Araki Kengo and Inoue Tadashi, eds., *Nihon shisō taikai* 34: *Kaibara*

Ekken—Muro Kyūsō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970). I have written on Kaibara in “Intellectual Change in Early Eighteenth-Century Tokugawa Confucianism,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 34 (1975): 931–44.

30. The *Taigi roku* maybe found in: Araki, *Nihon shisō taikai* 34: 9–64.
31. Nishikawa's *Chōnin bukuro* is in Nakamura's *Nihon shisō taikai* 59: *Kinsei chōnin shisō*, 85–174; and the *Hyakushō bukuro*, Takimoto Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten*, v. 4 (Tokyo: Meiji bunken, 1967).
32. Nishikawa, *Chōnin bukuro*, 105.
33. *Ibid.*, 138.
34. *Ibid.*, 101.
35. *Ibid.*, 88–89, 95–98, 101–5, 116.
36. For both quotes in the paragraph: *Ibid.*, 133–34.
37. *Ibid.*, 143, 168; and also, *Hyakushō bukuro*, 3–6.
38. *Chōnin bukuro*, 153, 161.
39. *Ibid.*, 160–65; and *Hyakushō bukuro*, 2–4.
40. *Chōnin bukuro*, 147; and *Hyakushō bukuro*, 5–10 passim.
41. *Chōnin bukuro*, 143 passim.
42. *Ibid.*, 115.
43. Dazai's *Keizairoku shūi* is contained in Rai Tsutomu, ed., *Nihon shisō taikai*, 37: *Sorai gakuha* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972), 45–47. I have written on Dazai in “Political Economism in the Thought of Dazai Shundai (1680–1740),” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31(1972): 821–39.

Three

1. Tsuda Sōkichi, *Shina shisō to Nihon* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1938); and *Bungaku ni arawaretaru kokumin shisō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1969).
2. I have edited with Irwin Scheiner essays on this general subject in *Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). See also Peter Nosco, ed., *Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
3. Hirose Tansō's piece “Jurin hyō” is in *Kinsei juka shiryō*, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Hanchō shobō, 1942), 1: 1–22.
4. Tsuda Hideo, *Kinsei minshu kyōiku undō no tenkai* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1978), 77–92. The most complete reference to the Gansuidō is Umetani Noboru and Wakita Osamu, eds., *Gansuidō Tsuchihashi bunkō mokuroku* (Osaka: Osaka daigaku toshōkan, 1971); and they have compiled key documents in *Hirano Gansuidō shiryō* (Osaka: Seibundō, 1973).
5. Umetani and Wakita, *Hirano Gansuidō shiryō*, 322. Tsuchihashi's general account of the founding of the Gansuidō is his *Gansuidō ki* (*Ibid.*, 260–63), which is sometimes credited to Miwa Shissai.
6. *Ibid.*, 323.
7. *Ibid.*, 325.
8. *Ibid.*, 260–63.
9. *Ibid.*, 329.
10. Of particular significance is Munenobu's (Tsuchihashi's son) discussion of the *Great Learning* which clarifies the differences with Itō: “Daigaku shigi,” written around 1747, (*Ibid.*, 328–30).
11. Tsuda, *Kinsei minshu kyōiku undō no tenkai*, 233.

12. *Ibid.*, 225–70.
13. Umetani and Wakita, *Hirano Gansuidō shiryō*, 229–30.
14. Tsuda, *Kinsei minshu kyōiku undō no tenkai*, 187–90.
15. Umetani and Wakita, *Hirano Gansuidō shiryō*, 260; and Tsuda, *Kinsei minshu kyōiku undō no tenkai*, 98–138, 175–84, 202.
16. Miwa's generous views on the Kaitokudō are documented in Umetani and Wakita, *Hirano Gansuidō shiryō*, 260. See also Miyamoto Mataji, “Miwa Shissai no gakufū to Kaitokudō,” *Nihon shisō shi* 20: 3–19.
17. Nishimura Tenshū, *Kaitokudō kō* (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1923), 22–23. An account by a scholar intimate with the history of the Kaitokudō and its environs is Suenaka Tetsuo's “Kaitokudō gakuha no hito-bito,” in *Edo no shisōka tachi*, 2 vols., edited by Sagara Toru, Matsumoto Sannosuke, and Minamoto Ryoen (Tokyo: Kenkyūsha shuppan, 1979), 2: 73–96. Also very informative are lectures published by Osaka University: Umetani Noboru, Wakita Osamu, Sakudo Yotaro et. al., *Osaka no gakumon* (Osaka, 1980). One of the best recent collaborative studies of the Kaitokudō by scholars close to Osaka historical scholarship is Kobori Kazumasa, Yamanaka Hiroyuki, Kaji Nobuyuki, and Inoue Akihiro, *Nihon no shisōka 24: Nakai Chikuzan–Nakai Riken* (Tokyo: Meitoku shuppan sha, 1980), especially 114–40. A suggestive essay is Wakita Osamu, “Chōnin gakumonjo to shite no ‘kō,’” *Nihon shisō shi* 20: 20–31. Important materials as well as essays are in journals and in pamphlets published by the Kaitokudō Association as in special issues such as *Kaitokudō yōran* (1942); and Kaitokudō Kinenkai, ed., *Kaitokudō no kako to genzai* (Osaka: Kaitokudō Kinenkai, 1979).
18. All of the accounts of the Kaitokudō invariably refer to the five merchant comrades who played a crucial role in founding the Kaitokudō. See especially, Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi shi*, 7 vols. (Osaka: Seibundō, 1978), 5: 1077–78; Kobori, Yamanaka et al., *Nakai Chikuzan–Nakai Riken*, 12–30; and Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, passim; Miyamoto Mataji, “Kaitokudō to Osaka no chōnin tachi,” *Kaitokudō no kako to genzai*, ed. and published by Kaitokudō Kinenkai, 31–40.
19. The *Naijiki* and *Gaijiki*, internal and external affairs respectively of the Kaitokudō and known jointly as “Gakumonjo konryūki,” are reproduced in Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi shi*, vol. 5 and *Kaitoku* 12 (1934). Most of the basic documents, including these, were reissued in original form by Nishimura Tenshū and others in the commemorative collection known as *Kaitokudō ishō* (Osaka: Matsumura bunkaidō, 1911). I have relied heavily on this collection at the Kaitokudō archive in Osaka University. The details are also in “Kaitokudō kyūki shūi” reproduced in *Kaitoku* 14(1936): 15–16.
20. The details are in “Kaitokudō kyūki shūi,” *ibid.*
21. Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi shi*, 1: 795–96 and 5: 1076–79; and *Naijiki*.
22. *Gaijiki*.
23. “Kaitokudō kyūki shūi,” *Kaitoku* 14: 11; and also Kobori, Yamanaka et al., *Nakai Chikuzan and Riken*, 52–55.
24. The letter is dated “sixth month, third day,” probably of 1725; in *ibid.*, 13–14.
25. *Ibid.*, 9–12.

26. Ibid., 11.
27. Ibid.; and *Naijiki*.
28. A great deal has been written on the religious and communal form of the *kō*. Its relationship to the intellectual history of political economy remains to be analyzed. A good collection of essays is Sakurai Tokutaro, ed., *Sankaku shinkō kō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Meichō shuppan, 1976); a standard work, also by Sakurai Tokutaro, *Kō shudan seiritsu katei no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kōbunkan, 1962); also useful: Suzuki Eitaro, *Nihon nōson shakaigaku genri* (Tokyo: Jikōsha, 1940).
29. Tsuda, *Kinsei minshu kyōiku undō*, 3–48; Ishikawa Ken, *Nihon shomin kyōiku shi* (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1929); and Shibata Minoru, *Baigan to sono monryū* (Kyoto: Mineruba shobō, 1977).
30. “Kaitokudō teiyaku” and “fuki,” *Kaitokudō isho* and Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi shi* 5:1083–90. Some of these documents as well as discussions are in pamphlets published by the Kaitokudō Association, *Kaitokudō yōran* (1942); and also Wakita Osamu, “Kaitokudō no seiritsu to sono keiei,” *Kaitokudō no kako to genzai* (1979), 19–30.
31. “Kaitokudō teiyaku,” *Kaitokudō isho* (see note 19 above).
32. Kobori, Yamanaka et al., *Nakai Chikuzan–Riken*, 52–55, 150–58.
33. The addendum to the basic rules, “Kaitokudō teiyaku fuki,” is in *Kaitokudō isho*.
34. Ibid.
35. “Kaitokudō teiyaku,” in *Kaitokudō isho* and *Osaka shi* 5:1083.
36. “Kaitokudō teiyaku fuki,” in *Kaitokudō isho* and *Osaka shi* 5:1088.
37. Ibid.
38. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan–Riken*, 39–42.
39. Miyake’s “Ron-Mō Shushō kōgi” is included in *Kaitokudō isho*, 12 pp.
40. Ibid., “Ron-Mō,” 2–4.
41. Ibid., 5.
42. Ibid., 7.
43. Ibid., 8.
44. Ibid., 9–10.
45. This is Nakai Shūan’s “Towazu katari,” included in Hayakawa Junzaburo et al., eds., *Nihon zuihitsu taisei*, 3d segment, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Nihon zuihitsu taisei kankōkai, 1933), 443–70.
46. Ibid., 460–61.
47. Nakai Chikuzan’s “Kayōhen” is included in *Kaitokudō isho*.
48. See Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan–Riken*, 150–58.
49. See Nakazawa Morito and Mori Kazuo, *Nihon no kaimei shisō* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya shinshō, 1970), p. 61.
50. Ishida’s *Tohi mondo* has been anthologized in numerous places. A good reference is in Ienaga et al., *Nihon koten bungaku taikei* 97: *Kinsei shisōka bunshū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1966), 370–499, especially 399–434. The landmark analysis of Ishida’s religious ideas is Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957).

Four

1. See Ishihama Juntaro’s discussion of Tominaga and his writings in Ienaga et al., *Nihon koten bungaku taikei* 97: *Kinsei shisōka bunshū* (Tokyo: Iwanami

shoten, 1966), 519–36; and also his earlier *Tominaga Nakamoto* (Osaka: Sōgen sha, 1940). Generous words of praise for Tominaga were written by the eminent scholar of Chinese history Naitō Kōnan in his essays on Tokugawa thinkers, “Sentetsu no gakumon,” *Naitō Kōnan zenshū*, 14 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1970), 9:315–519, especially on Tominaga, 370–93; and also by Takeuchi Yoshio, “Tominaga Nakamoto ni tsuite,” *Takeuchi Yoshio zenshū*, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1978–79), 10:318–37.

2. The *Okina no fumi* is in Ienaga et al., *Nihon bungaku taikei* 97, *Kinsei shisōka bunshū*, 539–61; and the *Shutsujō gogo* is in Mizuta Norihisa and Arisaka Takamichi, *Nihon shisō taikei* 43: *Tominaga Nakamoto–Yamagata Bantō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1973), 11–138. See also Nakamura Hajime, *Kinsei Nihon no hihanteki seishin* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1965), 171–240.

3. Tominaga, *Okina*, section 9, 554.
4. Tominaga, *Shutsujō*, section 1, 14–20.
5. Tominaga’s original language on Ogyū is reproduced in Yoshida Toshio, “Tominaga Nakamoto no Rongochō bassetsu,” *Kaitoku* 11(1933): 86–95.
6. Tominaga, *Okina*, section 11, 556–57.
7. Ibid., section 12, 557–58.
8. Tominaga, *Shutsujō*, section 11, 51.
9. Ibid., 51–53.
10. Ibid., 52.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 104.
14. Tominaga *Okina*, sections 3 and 4, 548–50; and Tominaga, *Shutsujō*, sections 8 and 24, 38–42 and 88–92.
15. Ibid., 38–40.
16. Tominaga, *Okina*, section 14, 558–59.
17. Ibid., 559–60.
18. Ibid., 560–61.
19. Ibid., section 6, 551–52.
20. Ibid., 551.
21. Ibid., 552–53.
22. For Tominaga’s views on Itō and Ogyū, Tominaga, *Okina*, section 6, 556–57 and Tominaga, *Shutsujō*, 88–92.
23. See my “Political Economism in the Thought of Dazai Shundai,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 31(1972): 821–39.
24. Quoted in Mizuta Norihisa, “Shutsujō gogo to Tominaga Nakamoto no shisōshi kenkyūhō,” in *Nihon shisō taikei* 43: *Tominaga*, edited by Mizuta and Arisaka, 653–84, esp. 679.
25. Ibid. For Musō’s piece, see Shirao Junkei, ed., *Nihon shisō tōsō shiryō* (Tokyo: Tōhō shoin, 1930), 3:239–66.
26. Mizutani, “Shutsujō gogo to Tominaga Nakamoto no shisōshi kenkyūhō,” *Nihon shisō taikei* 43: *Tominaga Nakamoto*, edited by Mizuta and Arisaka, p. 680; Hirata Atsutane, *Shutsujō shōgo* in *Hirata Atsutane zenshū*, 14 vols. (Tokyo: Meichō shuppan, 1977), vol. 10; and *Nihon shisō tōsō shiryō*, 8:1–299, especially 1–2.
27. Umetani Fumio, “Shutsujō gogo no hanpon,” *Nihon shisō taikei* 43: *Tominaga*, edited by Mizuta and Arisaka, 685–92.

28. Nishimura Tensū, *Kaitokudō kō*, 37-45 and also his "Goi Ranju" *Kaitoku*, 37(1966): 18-37. The high evaluation of Goi can be seen also in commentaries by his contemporaries: *Sentetsu sōdan*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Shōeidō, 1892), 2: 83-85. See also Haga Yoshichiro, "Goi Ranju to Yamazaki Ranhū," *Nihon rekishi* 166, 4(1962): 87-100; and Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nihon no shisōka* 24: *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 49-52.

29. Nakai's letter is the addendum of documents "Kaitokudō kyūki shui," *Kaitoku* 14(1936): 9-12.

30. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 31-32.

31. *Ibid.*, 37-45.

32. Goi's *Meiwa* is included among the basic texts in the collection of documents, *Kaitokudō isho*. These texts are reproduced in the original Tokugawa print form and not published in modern form.

33. Goi, *Meiwa*, bk. 1, 28.

34. *Ibid.*, 11 and also bk. 2, 24.

35. *Ibid.*, bk. 2, 18.

36. *Ibid.*, 9 and also bk. 1, 12, 25-26.

37. *Ibid.*, bk. 2, 15.

38. *Ibid.*, bk. 1, 27; bk. 2, 15.

39. *Ibid.*, bk. 9, 1-5.

40. *Ibid.*, bk. 1, 4 passim.

41. Goi's *Hi-Butsu hen* unfortunately has not been transcribed and reprinted in modern type, and the only edition available is the 1766 version, a set of which is in the Kaitokudō archive at Osaka University.

42. Goi, *Hi-Butsu hen*, bk. 1, 13-14; bk. 6, 14-17.

43. *Ibid.*, bk. 6, 23-24.

44. *Ibid.*, bk. 1, 8; bk. 3, 28-29; and bk. 5, 4-5, 14.

45. *Ibid.*, bk. 6, 33, passim.

46. *Ibid.*, bk. 6, 16; bk. 5, 2-5.

47. Goi's view on nature is scattered throughout the *Hi-Butsu hen*: bk. 1, 14; bk. 2, 18; bk. 4, 4-8; bk. 6, 27-28.

48. *Ibid.*, bk. 6, 27; bk. 4, 4-7; and bk. 5, 2-5.

49. From Ogyū's *Bendō*, section 17.

50. Goi, *Meiwa*, bk. 2, 19 and 36-37.

51. Ishida Baigan, *Tohi mondō* in *Nihon koten bungaku taikai* 97: *Kinsei shisōka bunshū*, edited by Ienaga et al., eds., 373-500, especially 435-62. Also, Iwahashi Junsei, *Dai Nihon rinri shisō hattatsu shi*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Meguro shoten, 1915), 1: 781-828; and Ishikawa Ken, *Ishida Baigan to "Tohi mondō"* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968).

52. "Kaitokudō teiyaku fuki", Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi* 5, 1083-90.

53. Goi, *Meiwa*, bk. 1, 16 passim. A few of the literary texts with Goi's critical annotations, texts used in his seminars, are included in the *Kaitokudō isho*.

54. Goi, *Meiwa*, bk. 1, 1-2; Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 38.

55. Goi, *Meiwa*, bk. 2, 28.

56. *Ibid.*, bk. 1, 4 and bk. 2, 37.

57. *Ibid.*, bk. 2, 22.

58. *Ibid.*, bk. 2, 27-28.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*, bk. 1, 28.

Five

1. Nishimura Tensū, *Kaitokudō kō* (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1923), 43; Kobori Kazumasa, Yamanaka Hiroyuki et al., *Nihon no shisōka* 24: *Nakai Chikuzan-Nakai Riken* (Tokyo: Meitoku shuppansha, 1980), 46-52.

2. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 55.

3. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 46-147, 179-278.

4. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 54-55.

5. See "Kaitokudō kyūki shūi," *Kaitoku* 14 (1936), addendum, 9-12.

6. *Ibid.*, 10.

7. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 55-78.

8. *Ibid.*, 64-79; Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 58-59.

9. Nakai Chikuzan's account of the founding of the Kaitokudō, "Gakumonjo konryū ki," is in the commemorative collection of original documents, *Kaitokudō isho* (Matsumura bunkaidō, 1911). See also, Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Nakai Riken*, 89-94.

10. "Teiyaku fuki" in *Kaitokudō isho*; and Osaka shi sanjikai, ed., *Osaka shi* 5: 1083; and also Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō* 59, 73-74.

11. Nakai Chikuzan, "Keizai yōgo," Takimoto Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten*, 60 vols. (Tokyo: Meiji bunken, 1966) 23: 585-94, especially 585. This basic theme runs through Chikuzan's "textbook" for teaching youngsters, Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku* (publication date not known), in *Kaitokudō isho*.

12. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 3-4.

13. *Ibid.*, bk. 1, 17.

14. *Ibid.*, 18.

15. Hino Tatsuo, *Edojin to yūtopia* (Tokyo, Asahi shinbun sha, 1977).

16. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 19-20.

17. *Ibid.*, 10.

18. *Ibid.*, 10.

19. Chikuzan's introduction to his *Hi-Chō*, in which he states his major arguments, is included in Nakamura Yukihiko and Okada Takehiko, eds., *Nihon shisō taikai* 47; *Kinsei kōki juka shū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972), 43-62. See also, Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 132-47.

20. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 11-12, 29.

21. *Ibid.*, 21.

22. *Ibid.*, 31.

23. *Ibid.*, 32.

24. See Chikuzan's *Hi-Chō* in Nakamura and Okada, *Nihon shisō taikai* 47: 50, 45-58 passim.

25. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 26-28.

26. Nakai Chikuzan, *Hi-Chō*, in Nakamura and Okada, *Nihon shisō taikai* 47: 55-56.

27. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 2, 22; Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Nakai Riken*, 301-9.

28. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 28. This view is also stated

in Nakai's "Kankyō yohitsu," Seki Giichiro, ed., *Nihon jurin sōsho*, 14 vols. (Tokyo: Hō shuppan, 1927-38), 4: 18 pp.

29. Nakai Chikuzan, "Kankyō yohitsu", Ibid., 4-6, 14.
30. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 7-8 and bk. 2, 12-13.
31. Ibid., bk. 2, 15 passim.
32. Ibid., bk. 1, 7-8.
33. Ibid., bk. 2, 33.
34. Ibid., bk. 2, 33.
35. See Chikuzan's "Kezai yōgo," in *Nihon Keizai taiten*, 60 vols., edited by Takimoto Seiichi, 23: 585-94, especially 587, (Tokyo: Meiji bunken, 1966).
36. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 1, 22-23.
37. A well-known piece, the *Sōbō kigen* has been anthologized in numerous collections. I have relied on Takizawa Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten* 23: 315-543.
38. Ibid., 343-46 and 356-63.
39. The discussions here and below on the economy are mainly from Chikuzan's *Sōbō*, 444-55, 449-55, 458-64, and 465-68.
40. Ibid., 412-15.
41. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujidoku*, bk. 2, 24.
42. Ibid., bk. 2, 37-43, especially 38.
43. Ibid., 37.
44. Ibid.
45. Nakai Chikuzan, *Sōbō*, 405-12; also, Takeiwa Hiroshi, *Nihon shomin kyōiku shi*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Rinsen shoten, 1970), 1: 403-14.
46. Nakai Chikuzan, *Sōbō*, 410-12.
47. Ibid., 413-15.
48. For various ideas on schools and educational reform, Nakaizumi Tetsuya, *Nihon kinsei gakkōron no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kazama shobō, 1976), especially 283-301 on the Kaitokudō, and also, 471-81 on Shōji and 510-20 on Hoashi; Ishikawa ken, *Nihon shomin kyōiku shi* (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1929), 67-75, 98-100, 260-67; and Takeiwa Hiroshi, *Nihon shomin kyōiku shi*, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Rinsen shoten, 1970), 1: 403-14. Also for Hoashi, "Nyūgaku shinron" in Nakamura Yukihiro and Okada Takehiko, ed., *Nihon shisō taikai* 47: Kinsei kōki juka shū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972), 163-220; and his biography by Hoashi Tonaji, *Hoashi Banri-Waki Guzan* (Tokyo: Meitoku shuppan sha, 1978). Waki Guzan's respectful comments about the Kaitokudō based on his study there at about age 24 are in his "Mishi yo no hito no ki," in *Zoku Nihon zuihitsu taisei*, edited by Mori Senzo and Kitakawa Hirokuni, 41 vols. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbun kan, 1927-31), 3: 3-29, especially 12-16.
49. Hoashi's ideas on education are included within a lengthy treatise on many subjects, including the coming of Western science, *Tōsenpu ron*, in *Nihon keizai taiten* 38, edited by Takimoto Seiichi. See also Nakamura, ed., *Nihon shisō taikai* 47: 163-220.
50. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 74-77. A much abbreviated version of Chikuzan's *Isshi* is in *Nihon keizai taiten*, edited by Takimoto 51: 417-18. See also Tokinoya Masaru, "Kaitokudō no rekishi kan," *Nihon shisō shi* 20(1983): 32-57.
51. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken* 140-44; and Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 77.

52. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 65-75, 88-89; and also Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 114-47 passim.
53. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 101.
54. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 203; and Naitō's "Riken gaku no eikyō" in his collected works, *Naitō Kōnan zenshū*, 9: 434-46, especially 446.
55. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 104.
56. The sense of restless "discontent" and "curiosity" that all of the late eighteenth-century eccentrics shared is a subject that deserves close historical analysis. Interpretive beginnings have been made by Haga Toru, *Watanabe Kazan* (Tokyo: Tankō sha, 1974) and, edited by the same author, *Nihon no meichō* 22: *Sugita Genpaku, Hiraga Gennai, Shiba Kōkan* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1971). Also of interest is "The Western World and Japan in the Eighteenth Century" in *Hikaku bungaku kenkyū* 16(1978): 1-27, in which he suggests an approach to the poet Yosano Buson. An excellent essay that discusses the concept of "play" in Kaiho is Shiraishi Naoki, "Kaiho Seiryō no shisōzō," *Shisō* 11(1980): 47-65. Yasumaru Yoshio has written "Kaiho Seiryō no rekishiteki itchi," *Meijō daigaku jinbun kiyō* 1(1963): 1-23; and I have discussed Kaiho in "Method and Analysis in the Conceptual Portrayal of Tokugawa Intellectual History," in *Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period*, edited by Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 3-38.
57. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 111; and Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 196-221.
58. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 105.
59. Hino Tatsuo, *Edojin no yūtopia* (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun sha, 1977).
60. These are Riken's *Nanakei hōgen* and companion *Nanakei chōdai*, multi-volumed textual studies of the "seven" ancient classics. I have relied on the key studies such as on the *Great Learning*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, *Mencius*, and the *Analects* that are included in Seki Giichiro, ed., *Nihon meika shisho chūshaku zensho*, 3 vols. entitled *Rongo-bu*; *Moshi-bu*; *Gaku-Yō bu* (Tokyo: Tōyō tosho kankō kai, 1923-26).
61. Takeuchi Yoshio, "Kaitokudō to Osaka no jugaku," *Takeuchi zenshū* 10: 338-60. See also Sagara Toru, *Kinsei no jukyō shisō* (Tokyo: Kōshobō, 1966), 200-207; and Naitō Kōnan on Riken in his "Sentetsu no gakumon," *Naitō Kōnan, Naitō Kōnan zenshū*, 14 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1970), 9: 434-47.
62. For example, his study of the *Analects*, *Rongo hōgen*, Seki, ed., *Nihon meika shisho chūshaku zensho: Rongo-bu* 22, 30-31, 58, 99, 107, 129, 139, 179, 226; and the same pattern can be discerned in his work on the "Mean," *Chūyō hōgen*, Seki, ed., *Nihon Meika shishō chūshaku zensho: Gaku-Yō bu*, 19-25.
63. Nakai Riken, Ibid. *Chūyō hōgen*, 71.
64. Ibid., 72.
65. Ibid., 74-75, 78.
66. On "study" as compared with "learning," Nakai Riken, Seki, ed., *Nihon meika: Rongo-bu, Rongo hōgen*, 10-22.
67. Ibid., 197.
68. Ibid., 2-11.
69. Nakai Riken, *Mōshi hōgen*, in Seki, ed., *Nihon meika shisho chūshaku zensho: Mōshi-bu*, 13-14.
70. Takeuchi Yoshio, "Kaitokudō to Osaka," in his collected works, *Takeuchi*

zenshū 10:338–60, especially 345–47; and “Eki to Chūō no kenkyū”, 323–335. Also pertinent is Sagara Toru, *Kinsei no jukyō shisō*, 200–206.

71. Nakai Riken, *Chūyō hōgen*, in Seki, ed., *Nihon ōeika shisho chūshaku zensho: Gaku-Yō bu*, 105 pp.

72. Ogyū's thinking on this is best stated in section 3 of his *Bendō*, available in Yoshikawa Kojiro, Maruyama et al., eds., *Nihon shisō taikēi*, 36: Ogyū Sorai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1973).

73. Nakai Riken, *Chūyō hōgen*, 4–5.

74. Nakai Riken, *Chūyō hōgen*, 4–5, 18–19, 24, 6; and *Rongo hōgen*, 179, 225.

75. This passage is translated from Sagara's citation in *Kinsei no jukyō shisō*, 201.

76. Nakai Riken, *Chūyō hōgen*, 62; and also his brief analysis of the *Great Learning*, *Daigaku zatsugi* in Seki, ed., *Nihon meika: Gaku-Yō bu*, 1–24, especially 13–17.

77. Nakai Riken, *Rongo hōgen*, 272.

78. Nakai Riken, *Chūyō hōgen*, 62–63.

79. Nakai Riken, *Daigaku zatsugi*, Seki, ed., *Nihon meika: Gaku-Yō bu*, p. 18 and Nakai Riken, *Rongo hōgen*, Seki, ed., *ibid: Rongo-bu*, p. 225.

80. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 109.

81. Nakai Riken, *Rongo hōgen*, 107, 179.

82. Nakai Riken, *Daigaku zatsugi*, 16–17.

83. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 271.

84. *Ibid.*, 268–70.

85. *Ibid.*, 217, 265–71; and Tokinoya, “Kaitokudō no rekishikan,” *Nihon shisō shi* 20(1983):39–44.

86. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 118–21, 268–70. I have touched on the Meiwa Incident in “Restorationism in the Political Thought of Yamagata Daini (1725–1767),” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 21(1971):17–29.

87. The various incidents are described by Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 119–23.

88. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 124; and Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Riken*, 243.

89. Nakai Riken, *Kashokoku monogatari*, in Takimoto Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten* 23:735–45.

90. *Ibid.*, 743–45 passim. Also of interest is Naitō Kōnan, *Naitō kōnan zenshū* 9:434–46.

91. Summarized here are: “Nensei roku,” “Kinden bōgi,” “Yodogawa bōgi,” and “Jukkei bōgi,” all of which are in Takimoto, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten* 23:597–714.

92. Goi's *Meiwa*, bk. 1, 28 and bk. 2, 8–9, (in collection of documents, *Kaitokudō isho*; and cited in chap. 4 above).

93. Nakai Riken, *Chūyō hōgen*, 19–25; Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Nakai Riken*, 247–49.

94. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan-Nakai Riken*, 214–17.

95. *Ibid.*, 214.

96. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 127–29.

97. *Ibid.*, 106.

Six

1. The most detailed study of the various editions of this work is by Suenaka Tetsuo, *Yamagata Bantō no kenkyū*, 2 vols.: *Yume no shiro hen* and *Chosaku hen* (Osaka: Seibundō, 1971 and 1978). It is also anthologized in Takimoto Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten* v. 37 (Tokyo: Meiji bunken, 1969); Mizuta Norihisa and Arisaka Takamichi, eds., *Nihon shisō taikēi* 43: *Tominaga Nakamoto-Yamagata Bantō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1973), already used with reference to Tominaga, and from which the citations on Yamagata will also be drawn; and in somewhat abridged form in Minamoto Ryoen ed., *Nihon no meichō* 23: *Yamagata Bantō—Kaiho Seiryō* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1971). Interest in Yamagata Bantō in the modern era was generated via the writings of Naitō Kōnan and Kōda Rohan for the *Osaka Asahi* in 1910. As journalists, they were also involved in the compilation of the history of Osaka in which materials about the Kaitokudō were conspicuous. In Western language there is Albert Craig's “Science and Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan” in *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, edited by Marius Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 133–60. A full bibliographical survey of works on Yamagata is in Suenaka, *Yamagata Bantō no kenkyū—chosaku hen*.

2. Kusama's *Sankā zu'i* is in Takimoto Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai taiten*, vols. 39 and 40.

3. *Osaka shi sanji kai*, ed., *Osaka shi shi*, vol. 5 (Osaka: Seibundō, 1978), 973–1027 passim.

4. Kaiho's *Masuko dan* is in the Takimoto Seiichi, ed., *Nihon keizai sōsho*, 36 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon keizai sōsho kankōkai, 1914–17), vol. 18, and summarized in his larger synthesis, *Keiko dan*, Tsukutani Akihiro and Kuranami Seiji, eds., *Nihon shisō taikēi*, vol. 44.

5. See the introduction to *Sankā zu'i* in, *Nihon keizai taiten*, vol. 39. Also, Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 53–60 and 90.

6. Compiled at about the same time as his *Sankā*, this work remains unpublished in modern form.

7. The best coverage is Nakamura Kōya, *Genroku oyobi Kyōhō ni okeru keizai shisō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kokumin bunka kenkyūkai, 1927). The classic study on this general subject is Honjo Eijiro, *Kinsei no keizai shisō* (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron sha, 1931). See also Takao Shimazaki, “Kinsei kaibutsu shisō no ichi kōsatsu,” *Mita gakkai zasshi* 71, no. 5 (1978): 20–42; and also “Introduction to the Economic Thought of Japan,” *Keio Economic Studies* 5(1968):11–34.

8. Nakamura, *Genroku oyobi Kyōhō*, 460; also Honjo, *Kinsei no keizai shisō*, 1–42.

9. Nakamura, *Genroku oyobi Kyōhō*, 498–512; Honjo, *Kinsei no keizai shisō* 43–62. Ogyū Sorai's economic prescriptions are in his *Seidan*, Yoshikawa, Maruyama et al., *Nihon shisō taikēi* 36:260–445.

10. Saigusa Hiroto, ed., *Miura Baien shū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1953), 37–82; and Nakamura, *Genroku oyobi Kyōhō*, 545–52.

11. Miura Baien, *Kagen*, Saigusa, ed., *Miura Baien shū*, 40–42 passim.

12. Nakamura, *Genroku oyobi Kyōhō*, 513–21, 556–79. I have written, “Political Economism in the Thought of Dazai Shundai (1680–1747),” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31(1972): 821–39.

13. See selections of Dazai's writings in Rai Tsutomu, ed., *Nihon shisō taikai* 37: *Sorai gakuha* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972), 18–56.
14. Kusama, *Sanka zu'i*, Takimoto, ed., *Nihon leizai taiten* 39: 326.
15. Ibid., 39: 259.
16. Ibid., 39: 170–72 passim.
17. Ibid., 39: 262–63.
18. Ibid., 39: 281–86.
19. Ibid., 40: 3–17.
20. Osaka shi sanji kai, ed., *Osaka shi*, 5: 789–971. Also, Kusama, *Sanka zu'i*, 40: 156–57, 184–202, 223.
21. Kusama, *Sanka zu'i*, 39: 145–50; 40: 156–57, 184–202.
22. Kusama Naokata, "Kusama Isuke hikki," in Osaka shi sanji kai, ed., *Osaka shi*, 5: 842.
23. Kusama, *Sanka zu'i*, 40: 183–202.
24. Ibid., 40: 12–13.
25. Ibid., 40: 10–12, 437–48.
26. Ibid., 40: 1–12, 437.
27. Ibid., 40: 5–6.
28. Ibid., 40: 1–2.
29. Ibid., 40: 1–2.
30. Ibid., 39: 285; 40: 53, 146.
31. Ibid., 39: "Introduction."
32. Ibid., 39: 1–14.
33. The details of Yamagata's biography are in Suenaka Tetsuo's *Yamagata Bantō no kenkyū*, *Chosaku hen*. Also valuable are Kamata Jiro's pioneering study, *Yamagata Bantō* (Osaka: Zenkoku shobō, 1943) and Naitō Kōnan on Yamagata in "Sentetsu no gakumon," in his collected works, *Naitō kōnan zenshū*, 9: 448–64.
34. Arisaka Takamichi, "Yamagata Bantō to 'Yume no shiro,'" in *Nihon shisō taikai* 43: 693–728, especially 707.
35. Ibid., 707–10.
36. My essay, "Method and Analysis in the Conceptual Portrayal of Tokugawa Intellectual History," in *Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period*, 3–37, especially 23–36, outlines Kaiho's description of Yamagata. Yamagata's straightforward advice and prescriptions to the leaders of Sendai are in his "Itchi kyōwa taisaku ben," with accompanying letter, in *Kinsei shakai keizai sōsho*, 12 vols. edited by Honjo Eijiro (Tokyo: Kaizō sha, 1926–27), 5: 295–324. The ideas set forth in these are incorporated in his *Yume*.
37. Arisaka, "Yamagata Bantō to 'Yume no shiro,'" 43: 711.
38. Yamagata, *Yume no shiro*, in *Nihon shisō taikai*, vol. 43, edited by Mizuta and Arisaka, 141–616, especially 616. All subsequent citations of *Yume* are from this collection.
39. Ibid., 142.
40. Ibid., 146.
41. Suenaka, *Yamagata Bantō*, *Yume no shiro hen*, 354–490 and his afterword in English, 1–22.
42. Yamagata, *Yume*, 216.
43. Ibid., 149 passim; and also for the genealogy of scholars of Dutch Studies in Osaka, inclusive of Yamagata, see Fujino Tsunezaburo, ed., *Ogata Kōan to*

- Tekijuku* (Osaka: Tekijuku kinen kai, 1980), 6–13; and Miyamoto Mataji and Sakudo Yotaro, "Tekijuku to Osaka chōnin," *Osaka no gakumon* (Osaka: Osaka daigaku, 1980), 149–70. A technical study that looks at "science" rather than "ideology" is Shigeru Nakayama's *A History of Japanese Astronomy, Chinese Background and Western Impact* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
44. Yamagata, *Yume*, 213; and also 153–57, 171, 187–88, 193–99.
 45. Ibid., 245, 253–54, 263–69.
 46. Ibid., 286.
 47. Ibid., 293.
 48. Ibid., 270–98.
 49. Ibid., 297–98.
 50. Ibid., 298.
 51. Ibid., 304–9, 323–24.
 52. Ibid., 333.
 53. Ibid., 334.
 54. Ibid., 340.
 55. Ibid., 335–36; and also Dazai's "Keizairoku shūi," in Rai, ed., *Nihon shisō taikai* 37: 45–56.
 56. Yamagata, *Yume*, 364.
 57. Ibid., 353–57.
 58. Ibid., 367.
 59. Ibid., 370.
 60. Ibid., 372–73.
 61. Ibid., 375–76.
 62. Ibid., 378–85.
 63. Ibid., 378–79.
 64. Ibid., 383, 397–400.
 65. Ibid., 389.
 66. Ibid., 410.
 67. Ibid., 424.
 68. Ibid., 427; and also 425–26.
 69. Ibid., 448–583.
 70. Ibid., 487–99, 506 passim.
 71. Ibid., 509.
 72. Ibid., 571; also 520–40 and 550–51.
 73. Ibid., 582–83.
 74. Ibid., 594.
 75. Ibid., 507.
 76. Ibid., 432.
 77. The text of Miura's agreement for his village cooperative, "Jihi mujin" is in Shinozaki Tokuzo, *Jihi mujin no sōshisha*, *Miura Baien* (Tokyo: Chūō shakaijigyō kyōkai shakai jigyō kenkyūjo, 1936), 53–57.
 78. A fine presentation of Miura's basic ideas, as well as texts, is Yamada Keiji, ed., *Nihon no meichō 20: Miura Baien* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1982), especially his thorough introduction, 3–295. See also Taguchi Masaharu, *Miura Baien no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Sōbun sha, 1978); and Saigusa Hiroto, *Miura Baien no tetsugaku* (Tokyo: Dai ichi shobō, 1941). I have relied here on Miura's own explanation of his basic thesis in *Gengo*, as written to one of his students in 1776, that has been

compiled as "Taka Bokkyō kun ni kotauru sho," in *Miura Baien shū*, edited by Saigusa, 9–31.

79. Miura, "Taka Bokkyō kun," 12.
80. *Ibid.*, 13–14.
81. *Ibid.*, 15.
82. *Ibid.*, 15–25, *passim*.
83. *Ibid.*, 27.
84. Yamagata, *Yume*, 616.

Seven

1. From Ueda Akinari's memoirs, *Kandai shōshin roku* as quoted in Kobori Kazumasa, Yamanaka Hirōyuki et al., *Nakai Chikuzan–Nakai Riken* (Tokyo: Meitoku shuppan sha, 1980), 149.

2. Ueda's views are documented in Shikada Seishichi, *Kenkadō shi* (Osaka: Shōundō, 1901), 10–21. See also Takahashi Mitsuji, *Kenkadō shoden* (Tokyo: Kenkadō kinen kai, 1926); and Osaka shi sanji kai, ed., *Osaka shi shi*, 7 vols. (Osaka: Seibundō, 1978), 1:1158–60 and 2:139 *passim*.

3. Kimura's diary is *Kenkadō nikki* (Osaka: Kenkadō kinen kai, 1970).

4. Shikada, *Kenkadō shi*, 12.

5. Nishimura Tenshū, *Kaitokudō kō* (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1923), 133–44.

6. The monographic literature on the Tenpō period is extensive and deserves systematic attention among Western historians. Most social and economic histories of the Meiji Restoration by Japanese historians, quite correctly it seems to me, begin with this Tenpō reference. A suggestive collection of essays in this regard is Nishikawa Shunsaku, *Edo jidai no poritikaru economee* (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron sha, 1979), 114–38. The subject retains its importance in general historical accounts, as for example: Tsuda Hideo, *Nihon no rekishi 22: Tenpō kaikaku* (Tokyo: Shōgakkān, 1975); Aoki Michio and Yamada Tadao, eds., *Tenpō ki no seiji to shakai* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1981); and Aoki Michio, *Tenpō sōdō ki* (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1979). Informative scholarly essays, especially with regard to social responses in Kyoto, are in Hayashiya Tatsusaburo, ed., *Bakumatsu bunka no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978); and also Hongo Yakamori and Fukaya Katsumi, eds., *Kinsei shisō ron* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1981). Apropos these various works are many of the essays by Ichii Saburo on "tradition" and "transformation" in his *Kinsei kakushin shisō no keifu* (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1980). An extensive and detailed eyewitness account of some of the events of this period is *Ukiyo no arisama*, compiled by an anonymous author, probably a physician in Osaka (*Nihon shomin seikatsu shiryō shūsei*, 20 vols., Tokyo: Sanichi shobō, 1970, 11:1068).

7. See for example Nakase Juichi, "Ōshio jiken to Izumiya Sumitomo no 'kaji kaikaku'—Tenpō kaikaku zenyā o chūshin ni—," *Ōshio kenkyū* 9(1980): 1–14.

8. Discussions of Ōshio's rebellion are in the citations in the previous two notes. A fine discussion of Ōshio and his ideas is in Miyagi Kimiko, ed., *Nihon no meichō 27: Ōshio Chūsai* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1978). I have written "Ōshio Heihachirō (1793–1837)" in *Personality in Japanese History*, edited by Albert Craig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 155–79. There has been a revival of interest in Ōshio in recent years in the Osaka area as wit-

nessed in the periodic publication of a journal devoted to that subject: *Ōshio kenkyū*.

9. Nakase, "Ōshio jiken to Izumiya Sumitomo," *Ōshio kenkyū* 9: 1–14.

10. "Kaitokudō yawa," *Kaitoku* 15 (1937): addendum, 19.

11. Nishimura, *Kaitokudō kō*, 137.

12. Najita, "Ōshio," 158–70.

13. Miyagi, *Nihon no meichō* 27: 73–273.

14. Kobori, Yamanaka, *Nakai Chikuzan–Riken*, 171–78.

15. Najita, "Ōshio," 175.

16. Ogata Tomio, *Ogata Kōan den* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1963); Ban Tadayasu, *Tekijuku o meguru hito bito—Rangaku no nagare* (Osaka: Sōgen sha, 1978); and Tekijuku kinen kai, ed., *Ogata Kōan to Tekijuku* (Osaka: Tekijuku kinenkai, 1980); and Naramoto Tatsuya, ed., *Nihon no shijuku* (Tokyo: Tankō sha, 1969), 232–48. A stimulating work on Dutch Studies, including about Ogata Kōan, is Akagi Akio, *Rangaku no jidai* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha, 1980).

17. Ogata, *Ogata Kōan den*, 81.

18. Ban Tadayasu, "Tekijuku no enkaku," *Osaka no chōnin gakumon* (Osaka: Osaka University, 1980), 77–92, especially 82. Especially insightful is Kurauchi Kazuta, "'Teki tekisai juku' to 'Kaitokudō,'" *Tekijuku* (Tekijuku kinen kai, 16, 1980), pp. 3–11.

19. Ogata, *Ogata Kōan den*, 146.

20. Miyamoto Mataji and Sakudo Yotaro, "Tekijuku to Osaka chōnin," *Osaka no gakumon*, 149–70, especially 150–53.

21. Ogata, *Ogata Kōan den*, 16–19.

22. Tekijuku kinenkai, ed., *Ogata Kōan to Tekijuku*, 15, 55–57; and also Ban Tadayasu and Umetani Noboru, "Tekijuku no hito bito," *Osaka no gakumon*, 127–44.

23. Shiba Tetsuo and Matsuda Takeshi, "Nihon no kindaika to Osaka no gakumon—Seimikyoku—Osaka igakkō nado—," *Osaka no gakumon*, 171–88.

24. Ban, *Tekijuku o meguru hito bito*, 88–116.

26. *The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa*, translated by Eiichi Kiyooka (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 58–92.

26. *Ibid.*, 13.

27. *Ibid.*, 68–71, for Fukuzawa's language against superstitions and dreams. Also of interest is Nishikawa Shunsaku's "Fukuzawa Yukichi," *Keizai seminaa* 19(1983): 72–79.

28. See Harry D. Harootunian's excellent discussion of Sakuma in his *Toward Restoration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 129–83; and also directly pertinent is the chapter on Yokoi Shōnan, 321–79.

29. The entire second volume of Shibuzawa's collected works, *Shibuzawa Eiichi zenshū*, 6 vols. (Tokyo: Heibon sha, 1930) is his *Jikken Rongo*. Written toward the end of his career it is a complex statement that deserves close analysis. Also suggestive for this theme is Cho Yukio, ed., *Gendai Nihon shisō taikai 11: Jitsugyō no shisō* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1964).

30. Cited in Tokinoya Masaru, "Kaitokudō no enkaku," *Kaitokudō no kako to genzai* (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1979), 6–18, especially 18. Also, Kimura Hideichi, "Kaitokudō to wa nanika," *Kaitokudō no kako to genzai* (Osaka: Kaitokudō kinenkai, 1953), 1–18, especially 12.

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