



# A French migrant business network in the period of export-led growth (ELG) in Mexico: The case of the Barcelonnettes

José Galindo

Instituto de Investigaciones Histórico-Sociales Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa, Veracruz, México

## ABSTRACT

After independence, Mexico became the destination for a current of migration from Barcelonnette, France. This migration increased between 1870 and 1930. The combination of several conditions, strategies, and characteristics of these businessmen's social networks allowed a significant proportion to become wealthy. This paper uses the example of the Barcelonnettes to show that the development of manufacturing industry in Mexico was not directly dependent on the need for foreign currency generated by exports in this period; however these manufacturers benefited from the growth of the domestic market, which was the result of increase of exports of primary goods.

## KEYWORDS

Barcelonnettes; social networks; export-led growth; manufacturing sector; industrialisation

## Introduction

The author of this article seeks to demonstrate that in the period that has been called of export-led growth (ELG) in Latin America, there were cases of industrialists like that of the Barcelonnettes in Mexico that both benefited from ELG and built a model of development with certain independence from the ELG model.

The Barcelonnettes were French merchants who migrated from the Valley of Ubaye in Barcelonnette, France to many regions in Mexico throughout the nineteenth century after Mexican Independence (1810–1821). Migration increased during the period known as liberal capitalism (1870–1929), which presented favourable conditions for them to succeed in Mexico. Part of the group became very wealthy using specific business strategies and producing manufactured goods for sale in Mexican domestic markets. By the beginning of the twentieth century, these businessmen could count approximately 55 percent of the whole manufacturing industry established in Mexico among their assets, owned almost all the department stores established in this country, and had become the major shareholders of the principal Mexican banks: Banco Nacional de México (Banamex), Banco de Londres y México, Banco Central Mexicano and Compañía Bancaria de París y Mexico, among others. Here, the author will explain the events and key factors that enabled this great economic flourishing for some of these migrants who still remain powerful members of Mexico's economic elite today. For others, their success was only weakened by the triple effect of the Mexican Revolution, the First World War, and the Great Depression. The rest of the group never became rich.<sup>1</sup>

To contextualise this narrative, this article briefly introduces other waves of French migration. More extensively, it questions the direct significance of the export-led growth model on some groups of entrepreneurs such as the Barcelonnettes and their capacity to develop economic power.

There are three main objectives:

- (1) To show an alternative strategy of economic expansion not directly linked to the export-led growth model in detailing the Barcelonnettes' development in the manufacturing sector. Here, the author will try to answer to the question of whether the Barcelonnettes could have flourished in Mexico regardless of the export-led growth model.
- (2) To delve into key aspects that allowed the Barcelonnette communities in Mexico to consolidate their economic power.
- (3) To contrast the business strategies and networks of the first Barcelonnettes who came to Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century with those of the those who came later in that century. In this section, the author will use the example of the Jean family to refute the assertion that Barcelonnette communities employed a uniform set of strategies.

To achieve these objectives, a varied methodology has been used in this work. This article draws on the analysis of primary sources, such as historical and notary archives, as well as the consultation of secondary sources, mainly from the most renowned scholars on the subject. We also analysed data through the UCINET software, which is a platform used for the analysis of social networks.

## **Reflections on the export-led growth model in the Mexican economy between 1870 and 1930**

In order to establish a theoretical background and economic context, we must first examine models such as dependency theory and structuralism. Although there are many differences between them, both structuralism and dependency theory share a negative view of the effect of the export era on Latin American economies. Since export sectors were dominated by foreign capital, and their profits, according to these theories, were invested externally in enclaves, these sectors had few relations with the domestic economies in Latin America. For that reason, they had a very limited impact on the economic development of the recipient economies. In this sense, according to these theories, foreign capital and the enclave economy did not contribute to the formation of capital or to the consolidation of an internal market and that to some extent hampered industrialisation. In some ways, export specialisation and industrialisation were seen as opposing phenomena.

Authors such as Luis Catao and, less significantly, Enrique Cardenas, maintained the idea of the Mexican export sector as an enclave. Cardoso and Faletto, who developed the dependency theory for Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, influenced them. Catao 'attributes the failure of export-oriented growth in Mexico to the enclave nature of the export sector', while Cardenas believes that most of the Mexican export products were unprocessed raw materials which means a lower economic spill-over from the export sector.<sup>2</sup> Although some of the wealth generated in the export sector left the country, it is estimated that a significant part remained in Mexico: 79 percent in 1910 and 66 percent in 1926, 'where it was reinvested, or used to pay salaries and taxes, or purchase supplies. In addition to the spill-overs and linkages, exports had positive externalities on other productive activities such as the electricity

supply, potable water, transport infrastructure, port works; and multiplier effects, by boosting trade and investment in the local areas involved.<sup>3</sup>

There are other interpretations that do not necessarily confront the dependent and structuralist visions, but developed different lines, such as that of Bulmer-Thomas, whose theoretical view does not contradict the perception of the author of this paper. Bulmer-Thomas believes that the export era was not intrinsically negative, however the capabilities of each of the economies as a whole during that period varied widely from one country to another depending on different factors. One was the size and rate of growth of the export sector; another was the degree of diversification: a mono-export economy was much more vulnerable and had less room for maneuver than a diversified economy.<sup>4</sup> In the Mexican case, the ELG period was crucial for the growth of the domestic market.

We will introduce a theoretical approach to the balance of payments (BP). This will allow us in conjunction with other details that will be presented to explain the relationship between the Barcelonnettes and the export sector in Mexico. The balance of payments accounts are the record of a country's international transactions. They register all economic transactions between the residents of the country and the rest of the world in a particular period of time. Any transaction that involves a flow of funds into a country is a credit item and is entered with a plus sign; any transaction that involves a flow of funds out of a country is a debit and is entered with a minus sign. To register these transactions, the balance of payments is composed by two main accounts: the current account and the capital account. The current account (CA), measures a country's trade in currently produced goods and services. The main component of this account is the net exports of a country (exports minus imports). On the other hand, the capital account (KA) mainly registers trade of financial and real existing assets. For example, financial credits received from a foreign bank are represented with a plus sign in the capital account. And, if these credits were used, for example, for buying imported capital goods, these imports would enter with a minus sign in the current account. So, there is a close relationship between the current and the capital accounts of the balance of payments: at the macro level (macro, defined as the whole international transactions in a country in a period of time), 'except for errors arising from problems of measurement, in each period the current account balance and the capital account balance must sum zero'.<sup>5</sup> This relationship is the main reason why recent literature on Mexico that talks about the link between exports of primary goods and imports of capital goods during the 'liberal capitalist era' (1870–1929) has assumed a direct relationship between these imports of capital goods and their funding by foreign exchange obtained from exports of primary goods. If imports were funded with foreign credits, eventually those credits had to be paid using the foreign exchange generated by exports to maintain the logic of the balance of payments equation, which by definition is:  $CA + KA = 0$ . In the strictest sense, this equation holds at the macro level. However, at the micro level there could be many scenarios taking place. We will mention three of them: (a) imports of capital goods that use foreign exchange directly generated by exports. This is usually the case when there is a direct link between exporters and industrialists, who are sometimes the same. For example, the coffee extraction industry in Brazil in the liberal capitalist era was directly related to the export of coffee; (b) imports of capital goods funded by a credit obtained from a local bank, which has collected foreign exchange directly from country's exports; (c) imports of capital goods funded by a credit obtained from a foreign bank not related with the local exports of the country where the importer is established. In this last case, the link between the importer to the export sector of that country, if the earnings of the importer are in local currency, only comes into play when exchanging local currency

to foreign currency to pay for the installments, assuming that partial payments have been made. In each of the three cases exposed, the relationship of the entrepreneur with the local export market is more distant and indirect. We will delve into the case of the Barcelonnettes in Mexico to show how they obtained their credits and how they paid them, as well as how they were substituting imports of some intermediate and final goods, which they began to obtain from the national market or they began to produce directly themselves.

It is undeniable that economic liberalism was the most influential economic thought in the world by the end of the nineteenth century, and that primary goods exports in Latin America were fundamental for the economies in order to succeed at that time. However, the growth of certain sectors of the economy, particularly the manufacturing industry, whose products were produced for the internal market, became significant in this period, predominantly in large countries such as Mexico and Brazil. Yet, most of the literature that has been published on this topic categorises all countries of this region as inserted within a liberal economic current led by the most developed countries, which had a growing industry. In this scenario, 'peripheral countries', including those in Latin America, supplied raw materials to power the industry of the developed world. Indeed, many countries in Latin America contributed to this process.<sup>6</sup> However, in Central and Southern Mexico, there were many agricultural and mining products produced for the domestic market rather than for international trade. Most of the primary goods produced in Mexico were consumed internally, and certain kinds of haciendas,<sup>7</sup> such as corn and agave haciendas, destined all their production exclusively for local consumption. Without denying that some specific products – silver and copper in the mining sector, sisal, coffee and cotton in agriculture, and oil (since 1911) – had a very important role in foreign trade in the period of liberal capitalism, these products were not solely destined for external markets. The Northwest was somewhat exceptional since exports were bigger than internal consumption and the cotton industry, for example, pushed the industrialisation process. This was in part due to the absence of a colonial presence and strong linkages with US communities.

Even though exports were the most dynamic area of the economy in Mexico during this period, other sectors, such as the manufacturing industry, particularly that managed by the Barcelonnette community, were quite independent from the export sector mainly in terms of foreign exchange needed for the importation of production goods. This is not to say that the growth of the domestic market that resulted from the ELG was not positive for the growth of manufacturing production, but that is a different issue, as will be shown below.

There is also a false interpretation related to the construction of the Mexican railway system in this period. This interpretation asserts that the construction of railways in Mexico followed export needs. However, new research, conducted by scholars such as Sandra Kuntz,<sup>8</sup> has shown that there was an intention to build the internal market with the construction of railways by making it cheaper and easier to transport the most consumed goods, like corn. Actually, with some important exceptions, such as that of the railway built to export cotton between Yuma, Arizona to Calexico, California by Mexican territory, the construction of railways in Mexico was planned more for the internal than for the external market. Even so, the construction of the internal market was a difficult task. Access to railways was not available to everyone. Despite this, most of the products transported on Mexican railways were destined for the internal markets, not for international markets, as John Coatsworth suggested in a work published in 1984.

In the map below, it can be observed how the first Mexican railways, constructed mainly between the 1880s and 1910s, linked the internal markets and also provided access to the northern border and some ports (Map 1).



commercial protection, as well as the explicit governmental tariff policy that was implemented.<sup>9</sup>

The Mexican industrialisation process, which intensified during the Porfiriato (1876–1911), was more profound than that experienced in other Latin American countries such as Brazil that were simultaneously developing their industries.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the type of industry that developed in Mexico was more balanced than elsewhere, except for capital goods, which mostly remained as imports.

The diversification of manufacturing was an important factor in the formation of new economic elites. Essentially there were three groups of elite industrial capitalists in Mexico:<sup>11</sup>

- (a) Capitalists born in Mexico, who had accumulated wealth in trade, mining or agriculture and then later became interested in manufacturing. These industrialists settled mainly in the northern border states of Mexico. One significant example is the Garza Sada family, who began in the grocery industry and then founded important steel, cement and beer companies in the northern city of Monterrey.
- (b) Capitalists born in the United States, who had the know-how of the most advanced technologies or specific markets, and formed alliances with the other two industrial groups, especially those established in the North.
- (c) Capitalists born in Europe who began as traders. This activity took them into banking and later to manufacturing and industry. Companies owned by individuals within this third group predominated in the centre of the country, especially in Mexico City, Puebla and Veracruz, and included textiles, cigarettes, paper mills, breweries and other products.<sup>12</sup>

This article studies the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group that belongs to the third category of capitalists, those born in Europe. This group of immigrants were not involved in the production of agricultural goods nor linked to the export sector in Mexico. They initially began as traders, selling their goods in the domestic market, where they generated their original wealth, and then produced manufactured goods also for the internal market.

### **Brief classification of the Barcelonnettes within the currents of French migration to Mexico**

In the second half of the eighteenth century, French migration to Mexico became more significant than ever before, as a result of the Bourbons replacing the Hapsburgs on the Spanish throne. However, since no strict censuses were undertaken for statistical purposes at that time, it is difficult to accurately estimate the size of the French community in Mexico during this period. In fact, according to Jean Meyer, in those years one would only hear French names when French individuals had problems with the Inquisition. The size of the French colony in Mexico began to increase after independence in 1821. During the nineteenth century, scholars have identified four main currents through which the French arrived to Mexico:<sup>13</sup>

#### First: Military

Soldiers and generals of the French Army who stayed after the Pastry War of 1838 and after the French intervention and empire that occurred between 1862 and 1867. This intervention brought new French migrants due in part to army desertions and special requests for permission made by militiamen to remain in the Mexican territory.

#### Second: Expeditionary

Other migrants arrived in expeditions planned to colonise lands. During the 1820s and 1830s, the Mexican government implemented migration policies to encourage foreign immigration

to the country.<sup>14</sup> The idea was to populate certain regions of Mexico and to achieve racial diversification. During these expeditions, French immigrants established rural colonies in the state of Veracruz; for example San Rafael, and they later expanded to neighbouring states.

#### Third: Chain Migration

Other immigrants arrived in a chain migration that came from the region of the French Alps, mainly from the town of Barcelonnette and its surrounding area.

#### Fourth: Other

French people also arrived as part of other dispersed currents, which have not been studied in depth. The sum of these dispersed currents represents more than half of the French immigration to Mexico during the nineteenth century.

It is important to note that the French community in Mexico in the nineteenth century consistently averaged between 6,000 and 8,000 individuals, whereas the average population size in Mexico was 7.5 million (12.6 million by 1895, according to the first modern census conducted in Mexico). Moreover, the size of the French colony did not grow in the first half of the twentieth century. French immigration in Mexico was small and did not represent a demographic colonisation. In contrast, in Argentina for example, the French were far more numerous, not to mention the Spanish and Italians. In that sense, French immigration in Mexico during the Porfiriato can be described as qualitative rather than quantitative due to its economic achievements.<sup>15</sup>

The Barcelonnettes' migration was eminently urban.<sup>16</sup> They settled mostly in Puebla, Guadalajara, Zacatecas, Hermosillo, Saltillo, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, León y Cuautla, and Mexico City. This wave of migration began in the early nineteenth century with the arrival of the Arnaud brothers – Jacques, Marc-Antoine and Dominique in 1821. The arrival of these brothers meant the beginning of a new era of French migration to Mexico, linked mainly to trade, banking, and industry.

This specific era of migration was unique in that most of it came from the same region, the Ubaye Valley in the French Alps, and the economic success that some (though not all) of the immigrant families reached. The initial economic successes led to a chain of migration from that region, characterised by specific values and practices, which eventually generated a unique identity within the group. By 1850, the Barcelonnettes had already established nine retail stores in Mexico. Five were located in Mexico City and the rest were in other major cities in the states of Zacatecas, Jalisco, Puebla, and Mexico. However, one should not exaggerate the importance of the Barcelonnettes' stores by the mid-1860s. In 1864, they were still simple retail shops that sold fabrics at low prices to the lower classes.

The French intervention in Mexico that began in 1862 favoured the Barcelonnettes. First, during the war of intervention, their French origin allowed them to supply the French army with uniforms. In fact, many large fortunes were consolidated at this time. Moreover, after the war, the Barcelonnettes were able to maintain a good relationship with the Mexican government, since they declared themselves friends of liberalism and opposed their own country's intervention in Mexico. The French intervention also resulted in the creation of a sea route between the ports of St. Nazaire and Veracruz in 1863. This represented a turning point for the development of the Barcelonnettes, because they could now buy products directly from Europe to sell them in Mexico.

Between 1870 and 1880, the Barcelonnettes were focused on commerce. They also began to venture into the textile industry with the goal of controlling production. After 1881, they entered the formal banking system in Mexico. By 1910, 70 percent of the total capital in Banamex, the most important Mexican bank, belonged to the French. As both a public and

private bank, Banamex played a double role in the Mexican economy with specific functions of a central bank such as issuing coins and bills. The Barcelonnettes also invested in smaller banks such as the Compañía Bancaria de París y México (CBPM), which was founded in 1909. The Jean family, our case study, was involved with this bank. The CBPM focused on short-term operations and solving liquidity issues for its own partners.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the total of French investment in banks in Mexico was around MX\$100 million. It was distributed among commercial banks in the capital (51 percent), commercial banks in the states (8.5 percent), mortgage, real estate, and other financial sectors (35.5 percent) and other areas (5 percent). Other countries' bank investments in Mexico were far behind. The United States, for example, had MX\$34 million. England had MX\$17 million and Germany had MX\$12 million. France took first place with around 60 percent of the total capital in the banking sector.<sup>17</sup> It is important to note that in this period, banking regulation was limited and the banks mainly served to fulfil the interests of the banks' partners. This allowed them to invest in manufacturing, beginning with the production of cotton textiles in Mexico.

The biggest textile conglomerate owned by the Barcelonnettes, Compañía Industrial de Orizaba, S.A. (CIDOSA), was founded in 1889 when it began operating four large cotton textile mills.<sup>18</sup> Some of these were new and some were remodelled. Other Barcelonnettes emulated this model and began buying old factories and creating new ones. In a short time period, through this strategy, the Barcelonnettes had passed from being retailers to wholesalers, bankers, and industrialists. The Barcelonnettes made other important investments in the textile industry during the 1890s:

- The Compañía Industrial de San Antonio Abad (CISAASA), founded in 1892, managed the Miraflores and La Colmena mills in the state of Mexico and the San Antonio Abad mill in Mexico City.
- The Compañía Industrial de Atlixco (CIASA), founded in 1899, held one of the biggest mills in the country, the Metepec Mill.
- The Compañía Industrial Veracruzana SA (CIVSA) was founded in 1896. CIVSA built another giant factory named Santa Rosa, capable of competing with Río Blanco. It was inaugurated in 1898, 11 kilometres from Río Blanco. Their leaders were two prominent Barcelonnettes: Alexandre Reynaud and Sébastien Robert.

In 1907, the CIDOSA, the CISAASA, the CIVSA and the CIASA accounted for 35 percent of the total Mexican cotton textile industry. The Río Blanco and Santa Rosa mills accounted for the remainder of the Mexican production of high-quality textile products<sup>19</sup>.

Some Barcelonnettes expanded their activities to the production of wool textiles and other manufacturing sectors such as paper, cigarettes, a preserved food factory (that still exists), glass, and dynamite and other explosives. In 1910, the French possessed 55 percent of foreign investments in the Mexican manufacturing industry. At the time that Porfirio Díaz was ousted, a group of great department stores, comparable with the most important department stores in the world, had just been established. Their operation was innovative, modern, and provided an image of power, luxury, and beauty. One of these department stores, Liverpool, is still operated by descendants of Barcelonnettes today.

## **The importance of export-led growth in the Barcelonnettes' rise to economic prowess**

Due to the importance of CIDOSA in terms of size and the fact that its business strategies were emulated by most of the Barcelonnettes' conglomerates by the turn of the twentieth

century, we will explore this case more deeply to answer the question of whether the Barcelonnettes could have prospered in Mexico regardless of the export-led growth model.<sup>20</sup> That is, could the growth of the manufacturing industry in Mexico have taken place without the export-led growth trend in this period?

The most important effect of increased exports in Mexico was the expansion of the domestic market. Communications also improved, partly as a result of the development of the export sector in Mexico. For these reasons, the demand for manufactured goods produced by the Barcelonnettes increased, while the distribution of their products was also expanded by these channels that were strengthened by the export boom.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the sale of manufactured goods increased, as explained above, from the protection provided by the depreciation of the real exchange rate and tariffs, which limited imports of manufactured goods.<sup>22</sup>

However, a number of general conclusions about the link between export development and industry development do not apply to the specific case of the manufacturing industry in Mexico.

One of the most widely accepted conclusions about the export-led growth model in Mexico is that the expansion of exports was [almost] a precondition for the early growth of modern manufacturing, since only they could provide the means of payment used to import capital goods necessary for the establishment of an industrial plant. It was, in essence, a process of industrial development that took place as a result of export development.


Accepting the fact that both phenomena were not mutually exclusive but complementary,<sup>23</sup> and considering that this represents a clear advance from the dependency school, what really happened in Mexico with manufacturing industries is more complex. When they arrived, relatively poor, in Mexico, the Barcelonnettes first established small retail clothing stores that were supplied by wholesale stores established in Mexico. They began generating their wealth by buying their products in Mexico and commercialising them inside the country rather than exporting their products. In this sense, they never established a direct relationship with the export sector. Subsequently, the opening of a line of communication between Nazaire and Veracruz, which was complemented by the 1873 inauguration of a railroad line that connected Mexico City and the Port of Veracruz, underpinned the development of the Barcelonnettes in Mexico since their dependence on intermediaries disappeared. They began to buy merchandise directly from Paris and Manchester and became the main intermediaries in Mexico themselves. In order to purchase their merchandise, the Barcelonnettes needed foreign currency. Rather than obtaining this from Mexican exports of primary goods, they utilised foreign credits obtained directly from Europe. At that moment, some Barcelonnettes had even established offices in Europe to simplify this process. In addition, some of the wealthy Barcelonnettes began to trade shares on the Geneva and Paris Stock Exchanges to fund their commercial activities.<sup>24</sup> Even though the Mexican economy was growing fast, in part as a result of the export sector, which could have created confidence on the international capital markets, the network the Barcelonnettes built and maintained with French bankers was strongly based on mutual support and family ties.

The displacement of the Germans and the British as commercial intermediaries represented the beginning of the real success of the Barcelonnette colony in Mexico. In fact, it can be considered that the Barcelonnettes' phase of capital accumulation in Mexico began during the 1870s. Their accumulation of capital in Mexico is what allowed them to venture into banking and manufacturing. This contrasted with other, generally foreign investors who were involved in the oil, railways and mining sectors, who accumulated their original capital outside of Mexico.

The involvement of the Barcelonnettes in the Mexican banking sector also became a key strategy for them to obtain capital directly from Europe in order to fund their businesses. One of many examples was the foundation of the Sociedad Financiera para la Industria en México (SFIM), in 1898,<sup>25</sup> which became an indispensable intermediary for obtaining funds directly from the European financial market.<sup>26</sup>

Before, when they had needed additional capital to establish expensive modern factories, like Rio Blanco in 1892, they resorted to long-term loans from bankers close to them in Europe, using the same scheme as when they had previously imported merchandise.

In addition to banks, diversification into other economic activities was also fundamental for the Barcelonnettes in funding their manufacturing businesses. Diversification made the money market cheaper. In other words, small businesses funded big businesses, without the necessity of having to obtain foreign currency from external markets. This means that diversification allowed for a decrease in costs through an increase of economies of scale. The next chart shows the corporate business network of the main owners of CIDOSA. This network of companies where the Barcelonnettes were shareholders, allowed them to decrease the cost of funding. At the top of the chart are the commercial houses, at the center, the financial institutions, and at the bottom, different manufacturing businesses as well as other companies that produced other types of goods and services such as sugar and electricity (Chart 1).



**Chart 1.** Interinstitutional business network of José Signoret, Enrique Tron and José Ollivier (1889–1920). Source: Own elaboration based on Arnaud, Galán, Proal, Gamboa, and Perez-Siller.

The foreign credits requested by the Barcelonnettes directly from Europe were mostly long-term credits.<sup>27</sup> They were paid in instalments over a long period of time. Capital was paid gradually, or credits were restructured and new external credits were requested to pay the previous ones. For example, in 1905 CIDOSA requested a reduction on its credit amortisations to 5% annually in a period of 10 years, which represented a common practice.<sup>28</sup> In fact, in the years after Joseph Olliver, one of the heads of CIDOSA, died in 1910, a CIDOSA debt cut was made, which showed the company's significant external debt and the need for restructuring credits. The amortisations of these credits were restructured (reduced) even more, and in 1931 the company even considered declaring a moratorium on its foreign debt.<sup>29</sup>

When necessary, domestic sales of products made in Mexico also played a partial role in the payment of part of the imports and part of the amortisation of credits (fixed costs resulting from obtaining credits). At board meetings, they argued about the need to increase sales to pay off debts.<sup>30</sup> Here, CIDOSA relied mainly on 'simply asking one or another local bank to place funds in a particular foreign bank (taken from a deposit they had previously made in a local bank specifically for that purpose, or moved from their current accounts in that local bank) where they converted to the currency there – with commissions of the banks on both sides – and the foreign banks were in charge of paying the goods acquired in the specific foreign country.'<sup>31</sup> In the bank's accounting documents of the Barcelonnettes the practice of 'placing' (*situar*) money abroad through the banks was commonly mentioned. When the exchange of domestic to foreign currency took place in Mexico through intermediaries, this did not exempt the Barcelonnettes from using the foreign exchange available in Mexico in an indirect manner, which likely came from exports of primary goods.<sup>32</sup>

However, it is not necessarily the nonexistence of primary goods exports, resulting from the ELG boom, that would have made it so the Barcelonnettes could not have continued developing the manufacturing industry in Mexico. Without the specific exports that came from the ELG boom, imports of capital goods (temporary fixed cost, nonpermanent) could have been obtained with the same external credits. This would probably have created pressure on the exchange rate (by exchanging local currency for foreign currency locally to make payments) that would eventually have led the fiscal authorities to need to seek a compensatory macroeconomic mechanism. That is, an economy can not borrow permanently to cover trade balance deficits, where traditional exports had not covered at least an important percentage of those deficits, which is another very possible scenario in the period when the Barcelonnettes most needed foreign credit in order to cover the largest purchases of capital goods to modernise the Mexican industry in the 1890s.<sup>33</sup> The author does not deny the importance of exports, which in fact were highly valued by the government, to have an equilibrated balance of trade and to be able to avoid depreciations of the exchange rate, which played in favour of the payment of external loans at a better price in local currency. However, these macro factors would not have been a limit on the impulse of this group of entrepreneurs, who had several connections to financial markets abroad, much capital accumulated locally, and a long-term business strategy not related to the export sector, which began long before the liberal capitalism era, and which became increasingly more focused on the importance of the expansion of the country's manufacturing industry.

Once involved in the textile industry, the Barcelonnettes continued to import from Europe only the few high-quality products sold in their stores in Mexico. However, these products were gradually replaced by products of similar produced in Rio Blanco and Santa Rosa. Both factories were responsible for the production of the high-quality products elaborated in Mexico.<sup>34</sup> In addition, from the mid-1880s, the imported cotton used to produce textiles in the Mexican mills had been replaced by domestic production initiated in the Laguna region, which was well below the cost of the imported product and payable in Mexican currency. In spite of its lesser quality, domestic production was preferred because it was cheaper and could avoid the costs of transport and tariffs associated with imports.<sup>35</sup>

Both of these actions: the eclipse of imported high-quality products by local production and the use of Mexican rather than imported cotton, played in the direction of reducing foreign exchange needs associated with variable costs to these entrepreneurs.

Bulmer-Thomas mentions in his book, *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence*, that 'in any (Latin American) country the origin of modern factories in the late nineteenth century could be related with the industries that appear earlier in the century. On the contrary, modern factories were often direct competitors and significantly contributed to the loss of importance of the artisanal sector from 1870. In addition, this author also states that 'the absence of protoindustrialisation (the transformation of the traditional handicraft sector to the modern industrial sector) in Latin America, the transfer of productivity gains from the export sector to national branches of manufacturing could only be achieved by investing in modern factories'<sup>36</sup>.

These statements in the case of Mexico will be analysed exploring the case of CIDOSA; and CIDOSA was not the only Barcelonnette conglomerate to have a similar situation.

The Cocolapan factory was inaugurated in 1836 and modernised by CIDOSA, who acquired it from the Escandon family in 1899. In turn, CIDOSA bought and modernised the factories of San Lorenzo and Cerritos in 1881 and 1882, and in 1892 built Rio Blanco, then the largest and most modern factory in Mexico. It is clear that there was a process of transformation within the traditional textile factories in Mexico. Many were modernised and became more productive, while at the same time new factories were constructed. All this occurred within the same business conglomerate, so that competition between traditional and new modern factories did not occur, at least in the factories owned by the Barcelonnettes, who were the primary owners of the cotton textile industry in Mexico by the 1890s.

This goes to show that with the exception of the expansion of the domestic market and communications (which were very important), exports did not contribute directly to the creation of the Barcelonnettes' manufacturing industry in Mexico. Indirectly, exports were needed to maintain a trade balance when importing production goods to avoid an unsustainable process of increasing external debt. However, in the case of the manufacturing industry, this relation was not as direct as with many other sectors of the Mexican economy. So, even though the export-led growth model by definition, generated foreign currency, there is no evidence that this model was employed for funding the manufacturing industry in Mexico. If at some point it was used for this purpose, it must have been relatively insignificant, due to all of the other funding alternatives the Barcelonnettes had.

The distribution of foreign investment in Mexico by countries and sectors at the height of the Barcelonnettes' development was as follows Table 1:

**Table 1.** Foreign Investment per Country and per Sector (1911) (thousand pesos).

	France	%	USA	%	Great Britain	%	Germany	%	Other countries	%	Total per Sector	% Total
Public Debt	328,132	65.88	59,322	11.91	82,760	16.62	2,000	0.4	25,800	5.18	498,014	100
%	36.1		1.9		8.4		3.0				14.6	
Mines and Metallurgy	179,552	21.97	499,000	61.06	116,887.1	14.31	–		21,759.9	2.66	817,199	100
%	19.8		38.6		11.8		–				24.0	
Railways	116,240	10.29	534,683	47.29	401,396	35.5	18,720	1.65	59,506	5.27	1,130,545	100
%	12.8		41.4		40.6		28.5				33.2	
Banks	99,994	60.28	34,328	20.69	17,558	10.59	12,000	7.24	2,000	1.2	165,880	100
%	11.0		2.7		1.8		18.3				4.9	
Commerce	80,000	65.5	8,960	7.34	280	0.23	–	0	32,890	26.9	122,130	100
%	8.8		0.7		0.0		–				3.6	
Industry	71,932	54.9	21,200	16.2	10,856	8.3	26,960	20.6	–	0	130,948	100
%	7.9		1.6		1.1		41.0				3.9	
Real Estate	16,000	8.2	81,420	41.9	90,990	46.8	6,000	3.1	–	0	194,410	100
%	1.8		6.3		9.2		9.1				5.7	
Public Services	10,040	4.22	13,473	5.68	211,558	89	–	0	2,640	1.1	237,711	100
%	1.1		1.0		21.4		–				7.0	
Oil	6,800	6.54	40,000	38.46	57,200	55	–	0	–	0	104,000	100
%	0.7		3.1		5.8		–				3.1	
Total	908,690	26.72	1,292,387	38	989,485	29.1	65,680	1.94	144,146	4.24	3,400,388	100
%	100		100		100		100				100	

Source: Data obtained from various sources such as *Turlington; The Economist* (London); *Liste Approximative*.

## The main elements of the Barcelonnettes' success

From the moment they arrived in Mexico, the Barcelonnettes had several advantages. They were easily able to integrate due to their identity as Europeans and Catholics. They came from a materially and culturally advanced country, which was a cause of admiration and, for many, was something to be imitated. Members of this French group also benefitted from the colonial heritage that existed in Mexico, which not only placed them in a middle strata of society, but also protected them from other competitors as the majority of Mexicans were kept out of the capitalist arena saving the French from other competitors.

Another advantage was their own internal organisation. The first shops established by Barcelonnettes were very structured, disciplined and hierarchical. The founding partners were the bosses, who shared the management of the shops. Below them were the employees, who had the right to profits, and those who received a regular salary. At the end of the chain of command were the recently arrived immigrants. In addition, there was a very well-established recruiting system. Newly arrived immigrants worked at least a year in simple jobs for extremely low wages. When they had a clear understanding of both the Spanish language and business operations, and had gained the favour of their bosses, they moved up to work behind the store counter. They could later be promoted to accountants or travel agents. Several years later, they had the opportunity to become business partners or establish their own businesses. In fact, after their arrival in Mexico, on average it took them four to six years for newly arrived Barcelonnette immigrants to start their own businesses, which began on a small scale. With any luck, after 15 or 20 years they could return to France, marry a French woman, and live off their fortunes.

The life of the Barcelonnette immigrant employees was characterised by austerity and hard work. They lived and worked in an environment that kept them dependent on their employer and somewhat isolated from the reality of Mexico. However, this lifestyle helped them enjoy the confidence of their suppliers because they acquired a reputation for being honest and reliable payers. This allowed them to obtain sufficient capital to start their businesses despite initially arriving in Mexico without resources.

A majority of scholars have found consensus around the fact that social networks were fundamental for the Barcelonnettes' economic success. Social networks allowed entrepreneurs to overcome the limits of Mexico's institutional framework (weak enforcement of contracts and restricted capital markets). In the particular case of the Barcelonnettes, they built an interwoven and concentrated social and economic network where most of the members were French. Only 14 percent of the partners had last names that were not French<sup>37</sup>. This network served as an important factor in supporting the economic consolidation of this group in Mexico.

Although French migration in Mexico cannot be considered a demographic expansion, as was the case for other European migrations to other Latin American countries during this period, (for example, the Italian, French, and Spanish populations in Argentina were much more important than any colony of foreigners in Mexico) the significance of this small French community established in Mexico lies in its contributions to the Mexican domestic economy. They rose to economic success at a strategic moment in Mexican history. During the Porfiriato period they focused on internal consumption in the country, growing the domestic market and transformed commerce, manufacturing, electricity generation, housing, and finance markets in Mexico.

The Barcelonnettes can be considered network entrepreneurs, which is a common immigration pattern employed by different ethnic communities:

Through this network entrepreneur system, a group of immigrants is drawn to a specific country with the help of friends and family members who have previously achieved success as businessmen in that specific country. After an initial period of difficulty, hard work, and low wages, some of these newcomers begin to develop their own businesses, either due to having received a family inheritance or gaining the financial backing of the community, this support being the result of a promise made on hire for a prolonged and loyal service with the firm.<sup>38</sup>

As we can observe, in the Barcelonnettes' case, well-integrated and talented French immigrant community members received their bosses' support in creating businesses of their own, despite the fact that there was no direct blood relationship between supervisors and employees.<sup>39</sup>

Due to the extensive social and political networks utilised by the Barcelonnettes, the term crony capitalism is occasionally used to describe their economic consolidation. Crony capitalism is more difficult to analyse, since this is a topic of much debate. In his book, *Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship*, Armando Razo points out that President Porfirio Díaz offered private rather than universal protection to a limited group. This author mentions that concessions granted from the government to private companies varied, even when similar companies operated in the same industry.<sup>40</sup> Razo summarises his contribution by saying that Díaz's network was not particularly extensive but included central actors powerful enough to keep the dictator in check.<sup>41</sup> This argument clearly shows the neo-institutionalist influence of the author, since it was not the law but the network that controlled the dictator and maintained balance within the system.

Aurora Gómez published a highly critical review of Razo's book. She says, 'the Porfiriato did not resemble the dictatorship in Razo's model as much as the author would like' because 'recent historiography has shown ... that Porfirian Mexico's institutional framework was more complex and that there existed stronger legal and political constraints to the dictator's power, than the author acknowledges'.<sup>42</sup> Gómez mentions that the significant presence of public officials in the network Razo outlines is largely the product of the sources he used, which are strongly biased toward large companies in sectors where government concessions were necessary and where foreign investment was usually present. She explains that in order for a public concession to be given to a foreign investor, federal laws required that the company have at least one public official on its board.

Edward Beatty's book, *Institutions and Investment: The Political Basis of Industrialization in Mexico before 1911*, is more in sympathy with Gómez's arguments, and questions the idea that the Porfiriato represented a case of crony capitalism. Beatty shows that Díaz's government favoured the development of a national industrial sector through a carefully planned and administered series of laws and policies, including a trade policy (import tariffs), a law of intellectual property (patents), and a program of new industries that provided tax incentives to employers who established these new industries. Beatty argues that these formal institutions (laws and policies) played a crucial role in the formation and behaviour of investment in Mexico at this time.<sup>43</sup>

Sandra Kuntz also affirms that during the Porfiriato, the rules undoubtedly improved, and proposes to analyse crony capitalism over a longer term. According to Kuntz, 'if we analyse history from a period prior to the Porfiriato, it allows us to better appreciate the institutional development that took place.'<sup>44</sup>

In this author's view, the reality is in between the arguments about crony capitalism made by neo-institutionalists, including Razo, and what Beatty, Gómez-Galvarriato, and Kuntz consider. Crony capitalism was not as strong as the neo-institutionalists assert but stronger than some other authors acknowledge. In fact, if, under certain conditions, federal laws required that some companies have at least one public official on their board, these officials must have obtained some economic benefits and thus the economic incentives in these sectors may have been distorted.

Moreover, during the Porfiriato, law in Mexico had more weight than the neo-institutionalists recognise. However, the formulation of laws and policies in this period was often a product of the mixed interests of the political and business elites, which is an important step to pass from cronyism to crony capitalism. A clear example of this is found in the construction of the General Law of Credit Institutions of 1897. This was the product of a consensus between the federal government and the few banks that existed. This law, in fact, contributed to a highly concentrated banking sector that, as mentioned in the previous section, led to a highly concentrated industrial structure. Finally, government officials were found in most of the banks where the Barcelonnettes owned shares and, in this particular case, law did not require the presence of these officials.

In the case of the Jean family that this author has focused on, evidence of insider lending and crony capitalism were found in a bank where the family members were partners: the CBPM, founded in 1909. The founding date was one year before the start of the Mexican Revolution, hence this case exemplifies crony capitalism as tied to revolutionary governments.

## The Frenchification of Mexico

As mentioned earlier, the material and cultural progress of France was a cause not only of admiration but also for imitation in parts of Mexican society. The Maximilian Empire (1863–1867) allowed for the development, especially among the Mexican elites, of a taste for luxury. When it came to luxury goods, France was the main reference point for many countries across the world, and Mexico was no exception. This is clearly expressed by one Barcelonnette, Emile Chabrand:

The eagerness of the Mexican elites to participate in the French culture is amazing, ridiculous and pathetic. The members of the elite speak a Spanish full of Gallicisms, and walk in the afternoon, especially on Sundays, wearing crinoline dresses, tuxedos and top hats ... Clothing and military uniforms are tailored to what Paris fashion dictates. Mexican elites also bring French hairdressers, dressmakers, tailors shoemakers and chefs to cook for them. The cafes, such as La Concordia and El Progreso, car rides, dances in halls, so similar to ours, (says the Barcelonnette) ... are all product of Frenchification. There is when the bourgeois, or the elegant woman wearing a fur coat, dreams with the Bois de Boulogne.<sup>45</sup>

A public notary of French origin, Arnaud, affirmed that 'from 1863 to 1864, French silk exports to Mexico in francs grew dramatically from 2,959,329 to 9,653,999; French cotton fabrics increased from 1,823,047 to 4,782,177; wool fabrics increased from 2,855,318 to 15,309,351; and linen fabrics grew from 155,083 to 310,946.<sup>46</sup>

To the great benefit of the French population settled in Mexico, Mexican liberal presidents Benito Juárez (1867–1871), Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (1871–1876) and Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) did not associate the actions of Napoleon III, who attempted to establish a French

empire in Mexico, with these French immigrants. France remained the symbol of freedom and the country whose 1789 Revolution resulted indirectly in the independence of the Latin American continent in the early 1800s. Furthermore, French liberalism significantly influenced these Mexican presidents. Indeed, Díaz proclaimed that foreigners be treated with absolute respect. Progress and modernisation became a priority for these Mexican leaders, and the Barcelonnettes fit perfectly into their paradigm.

## Social Clubs

The Barcelonnette community in Mexico became more cohesive due to the creation of institutions and social networks such as charity societies (e.g. Asociación Franco Mexicana, Suiza y Belga de Beneficencia [AFMSB]), created in 1841; a cemetery, El Panteón Francés, founded in 1865, which is still under the administrative structure of the AFMSB; and a school, Liceo Franco Mexicano, where most of the French community in Mexico studied up to high school level following its foundation in 1937. The Barcelonnettes also established relationships in social clubs, particularly in Club France, a sports club, and Club Hípico Francés, an equestrian club.

The origins of Club France can be traced back to 1870, when a group of seven French families founded the French Circle of Mexico in downtown Mexico City. The aim of this circle, as it was referred to at that time, was to promote relationships between all levels of employees, but specifically those of French origin. In 1928, the circle was transformed into a sports club, Club France, and moved to a new location in southern Mexico City. By that time, the club decided to accept members of other nationalities as well. 'The main goal of the club was to provide the French and Mexican communities with a large area in which they could enjoy sports, as well as a place where families and young people [from both countries] could meet and get to know each other better.'<sup>47</sup>

Club Hípico Francés was founded in 1933, between Chapultepec and Reforma in Mexico City. Although its links to Club France are not clear, by the mid-1940s members of one Barcelonnette family had also become involved in directing this second club. As mentioned earlier, the AFMSB and Club France were institutions that served as de facto private social security organisations prior to state-provided social security. Similarly, the Barcelonnettes accelerated the construction of housing for their workers in the areas surrounding their factories, and organised sports teams when the labour movement gained strength in Mexico during the 1920s. Although they were tough bosses, they were innovative with different methods of increasing productivity both in and out of the workplace environment.

Before beginning to contrast the business strategies among different Barcelonnettes in different periods, it is important to mention that for some prominent Barcelonnette families of the Porfiriato, their success came to an end as the result of the combined effects of the Mexican Revolution, the First World War, and the 1929 economic crisis. In addition, some of these businessmen were incapable of successfully delegating the control of their companies to the next generation of their families causing businesses to close.

For others, progress in labour organisation and the passing of new legislation in the 1920s that did not promote technological advancement of textile mills, drastically affected their survival. As a result, by the second half of the twentieth century, several traditional textile companies had to close their doors. This was also partially a consequence of the introduction of synthetic fibres on the national market, which changed the patterns of consumption in Mexico.

**Table 2.** Large Textile Companies in Mexico in 1912.

Company	Founding date	Textile mills	Stores	Partners
Compañía Industrial de Orizaba S. A. (CIDOSA)	1889	Cerritos Cocolapan San Lorenzo Río Blanco	El Palacio de Hierro El Puerto de Liverpool La Ciudad de Londres El Gran Oriental El Puerto de Veracruz El Correo Francés	Tomás Braniff; J. Ollivier y Cía.; JB Ebrard y Cía; J. Tron y Cía; Signoret, Honnorat y Cía; Lambert, Reynaud y Cía; Garcin, Faudon y Cía; and Juan Quinn
Compañía Industrial Veracruzana S. A. (CIVSA)	1896	Santa Rosa El León	Las Fábricas Universales La Ciudad de México El Centro Mercantil La Reforma del Comercio La Reforma del Comercio	A. Reynaud y Cía; S. Robert y Cía; F. Manuel y Cía; P. y J. Jacques y Cía; and Paulino Richaud
Compañía Industrial de San Antonio Abad S. A.	1892	San Antonio Abad La Colmena Barrón Miraflores Meteppec	La Reforma del Comercio	Iñigo Noriega; Adolfo Prieto; Agustín Garcin; Enrique Mojardin
Compañía Industrial de Atlixco S. A.	1902	Hércules San Antonio La Purísima La Sultana La Teja Río Grande	Las Fábricas Universales La Reforma del Comercio La Ciudad de Londres (Guadalajara)	B. Rovés y Cía; A. Richaud y Cía; S. de Juanbelz y Cía; Solana Barreneche Cía; Antonio Basagoiti; Luis Barroso Arias; Agustín Garcin; Leopoldo Gavito; Félix Manino; Benjamín Oncins; Iñigo y Constantino Noriega; Sotero de Juanbelz; Emilio André; Eduardo Vega and Santiago Aréchaga
Compañía Industrial Manufacturera S. A.	–	Río Blanco (Jalisco) Atemajac La Escoba	Las Fábricas Universales La Reforma del Comercio La Ciudad de Londres (Guadalajara)	Agustín Garcin; Joseph Signoret; Brun; Lerdo de Tejada; Cuzin, Fortuol Bec; Lébre y Cía
Compañía Industrial de Jalisco /Compañía Industrial de Guadalajara S. A.	1899	San Ildefonso	La Ciudad de Londres (Guadalajara) Las Fábricas de Francia (Guadalajara)	Fortoul Chapuy y Cía; Gas y Cía; Laurens Brun y Cía; Bellon Agorreca y Cía; E. Lébre y Cía
Compañía Industrial de San Ildefonso S. A.	–	La Magdalena Santa Teresa	El puerto de Liverpool La Francia Marítima	J.B. Ebrard; H. Reynaud y E.Pugibet
Veyan Jean y Compañía (VJC)	1898			Partners in 1912: Luis Veyan; Adrián Jean; Camilo Jean; Alfonso Jean; León Meyran (silent partner)

Source: Galindo 'The Economic Expansion', 772.

## New families and different business strategies in a changing environment

The first generation of Barcelonnettes in Mexico, at least in the centre of the country, associated in large conglomerates. Each had several French and, sometimes, Spanish partners. They usually associated with other companies, and they generally managed several factories and various shops. Table 2 shows the specific case of the textile industry.

Some of the later generations of Barcelonnettes that came to Mexico implemented a different strategy. As can be seen from the table above, in the case of the last company, Veyan Jean y Cía, individuals, rather than companies, constituted the companies' partners, and most of them were family members. This was not the only case of this type, but the most studied. In this particular case, the Jean family experience ran counter to that of other Barcelonnettes. They did not enter into the textile industry until the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century as secondary partners (Table 3):

**Table 3.** Centrality of Entrepreneurs within the Firms in which the Jeans Participated, 1891–1907.

Entrepreneur	nEigenveca
Antonio Donnadiou	53.165
León Meyrán	53.165
Sebastián Donnadiou	38.469
Luis Veyan	27.342
José Meyran	14.696
Adrián Jean	14.555
Luis Veyan Jr.	14.555

Source: Own elaboration using UCINET.

<sup>a</sup>This centrality measurement includes the number of connections of a given member of the network and the connections of those to whom that member is connected.

The table shows that Adrián Jean was not a central individual in the companies where he first became a partner. After other Jeans came to Mexico and acquired the majority of the capital of the companies where they participated in partnership with their oldest brother, they kept them as family companies. As the main and more central members of the boards of directors of these companies, they kept over 50 percent of the shares. In addition, in contrast with other Barcelonnettes, their family companies experienced constant expansion after 1914, even during the most violent years of the Mexican Revolution (1914–1917) (Table 4).

**Table 4.** Centrality of Entrepreneurs within the Firms in which the Jeans Participated, 1908–1931.

Entrepreneur	nEigenvec
Adrián Jean	43.054
Camilo Jean	42.197
Alfonso Jean	32.772
José Jean	27.105
Camilo Reynaud	26.737
Luis Vernier	23.883
Pedro Guzzy	23.883
León Meyran	14.813
Luis Veyan	8.778
Luis Veyan Jr.	41.55
Pedro Fortuol	4.001

Source: Own elaboration using UCINET.

In contrast, the conglomerates of the other Barcelonnettes typically maintained their original members, who had already generated substantial capital in other businesses when they decided to join together in corporations. Additionally, only 24 percent of the textile

firms in Mexico that were managed by Barcelonnettes that came to Mexico earlier had more than half of the partners with the same family name<sup>48</sup>.


The new strategy of considering individuals rather than companies as partners gave families such as the Jeans more flexibility and adaptability in decision-making with regard to their companies while also reaping the benefits of belonging to a large social network. These benefits were apparent in the way these new companies obtained credit while participating in the banking system.

After consolidating their power in the core company under their control, the Jean brothers renamed their enterprise 'Jean Hermanos.' During the 1930s, they reopened their network to external partners and members of the next generations of their family, as can be observed in the table 5 below:

**Table 5.** Centrality of Entrepreneurs within the Firms in which the Jeans Participated, 1931–1938.


Entrepreneur	nEigenvec
Camilo Jean	38.938
Alfonso Jean	38.446
Pedro Guzzy	38.446
Camilo Reynaud	38.446
Luis Vernier	35.442
Casimiro Jean	26.961
Adrián Jean	25.165
Pedro Fortoul	20.618
Camilo Alfonso Jean	16.589
Heriberto Faudrin	16.465
Pablo Jean	13.281

Source: Own elaboration using UCINET.



**Chart 2.** Change of Partners within the Jean Family Companies, 1891–1939. Source: Own elaboration using UCINET.

The chart 2 above shows the redistribution of internal power in terms of the number of shares owned by Jean family members and other partners within their businesses between 1891 and 1940. However, as mentioned above, the Jeans never associated with large textile conglomerates belonging to other successful Barcelonnettes; their only interactions were in the context of banking (CBPM) and in power and electricity generation companies (Chart 3):



**Chart 3.** The Jean Family General Social Network. Source: Own elaboration based on public notary archives.

An important finding regarding the Jean family is that their economic success occurred in a period (1910–1950) in which most Barcelonnettes are considered to have almost completely lost their economic power. This detail makes this family one of the exceptions to the traditional historiography. In this sense, it is important when studying this group, to differentiate between the traditional Barcelonnettes associated in large conglomerates and those that arrived later and implemented different and more flexible strategies in order to thrive.

The families that arrived later on faced a new and different environment that led to a different story. They faced the new institutional system that came out of the Mexican revolution and also began participating in different sectors of the economy. The traditional cotton and textiles industries became much less productive, and banks were not entirely in their hands as was the case before. However, some of the families were still prominent by the mid-1940s, and some are still prominent today. For particular families, social networks and the diversification of activities allowed some of their members to remain a part of the Mexican economic elite. Real estate and the electricity generation industry compensated for the losses in the textile industry, as they began to construct housing developments after the mid-1920s. This proves that the Barcelonnettes were capable of adapting to changing social and market conditions.

Some members of other Barcelonnette families who were not among the founding families of the social clubs had become involved by the 1920s. For example, Camilo Jean was president of the Club France from the mid-1930s until the end of the 1940s. Similarly, Emilio Jean, a grandson of Adrián became the director of the club in the 1960s. Thierry Jean is currently one of around 40 members on the board of directors for the club. The membership of the club has changed over the years, today it is composed of around 80 percent Mexicans and 20 percent French, some of whom work in French companies such as Peugeot and Renault.

In the 1940s, the president of Club Hípico Francés, one of the main equestrian clubs in Mexico, was Casimiro Jean. He was also the owner of Arete, a horse trained at the Hípico and ridden by Humberto Mariles Cortés in the London Olympic Games of 1948. Mariles won two gold medals using Casimiro Jean's horse. In the mid-1940s, when members of the Jean family become involved in the administration of both clubs, top members of the business elite in Mexico frequented these clubs. This allowed the Jean family and the French community in Mexico in general, to expand its social network. When the Hípico Francés ceased operating in 2009, the Jean family still owned 52 percent of the shares.

Some of the main personalities that attended this club were:

- (a) In its early years: Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, Luis Barragán, Joaquín González, Elena Poniatowska, the Renault family, Agustín Legorreta, Pablo Macedo and Fernando Senderos.
- (b) In the last years: Guillermo Williams, Diego Creel, Lecuona family, Manuel and Alia Saborit and Max Michel.

In the 1960s the president of the Club Hípico was Pablo Jean, a member of the second generation of the Jean family. It was here that Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, the son of the founder of Televisa (the most important Latin American media company), met Pablo's daughter, Nadine. They married in 1965 and their son, Emilio Azcárraga Jean, is currently the president and major partner of Televisa. In this case, the relationship that developed between the Jeans and the Azcárragas at the club was fundamental for the Jean family's continued presence within the Mexican economic elite at a time when economic conditions of the textile industry were more challenging.

Two other successful families from the Barcelonnette Valley whose members are still prominent within the Mexican elite, are the Michel and the Ebrard families. In 1847, Jean Baptiste Ebrard founded the store *El Puerto de Liverpool* as well as the corporation J. Ebrard and Company. Like many of his countrymen, Ebrard established relationships with other major employers. By 1881, Ebrard and Co., Gassier, and other Barcelonnettes joined with Manuel Ibáñez of Spain to found Banco Mercantil Mexicano. Edouard Ebrard, with other Barcelonnettes, founded Robert, Tron and Company shortly thereafter. By 1889, J. Ollivier and Co., J.B. Ebrard and Co., and J. Tron & Co. founded CIDOSA and were its major partners from 1889 to 1930.

In addition to the department store, *El Puerto de Liverpool*, J.B. Ebrard and Co. (which later became J.B. Ebrard y Compañía, Sucesores) also participated as a shareholder in Banco Central Mexicano and in other manufacturing companies including Compañía Explotadora

de las Fuerzas Hidroeléctricas de San Ildefonso SA, Fábrica de Papel de San Rafael y Anexas SA, San Ildefonso Fábrica de Tejidos de Lana SA, and the Compañía Bancaria de Paris y Mexico<sup>49</sup>.

The name Ebrard remains a familiar one as Marcelo Ebrard Casaubon was the Mayor of Mexico City from 2006–2012. He became involved in the political life of the country after he studied international relations at El Colegio de México between 1977 and 1981, and he has held several positions with the support of different political parties (Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM), and Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)) such as federal deputy, undersecretary of foreign relations, and secretary of public security in the government of Mexico City. Marcelo Ebrard has continued participating in political life and has had support from leftist parties to eventually become a presidential candidate.

The Michel family is the only family originally from the Barcelonnette valley that remains commercially successful in Mexico under the same business name established in the Porfirian period. In the late nineteenth century Alphonse Michel was a partner in J.B. Ebrard and Co. in the operation of El Puerto de Liverpool, and was a shareholder in various industries and banks with which that business was associated.<sup>50</sup> According to *Forbes* magazine, Max Michel Suberville was the thirteenth richest billionaire in Mexico, until his death in February 2016. He had a large stake in Coca-Cola and in the convenience store chain Fomento Economico Mexicano, known as FEMSA. He was the honorary chairman of Liverpool and one of the biggest shareholders of the company.

The Barcelonnettes living in Mexico today outnumber those living in the Ubaye Valley in France. Many married Mexicans and adopted Mexican culture. Many remain very active in the institutions created by their ancestors and continue to run Club France, Panteón Francés, and the Liceo Franco Mexicano. In an interview, Henri Bremond, president of the Liverpool council estate, shareholder in Banamex and Aeromexico, and Chairman of the Patronato de la Asociación Franco Mexicana y Belga, said that the presence of the Barcelonnettes in the Patronato remains very noticeable even today. In fact, the Panteón Francés provides an important and growing source of income for some of them; its clientele is comprised of elites.

When Bremond was asked what the secret to maintaining the only department store of its size still controlled by the Barcelonnettes was, he said they had been careful with the handling of labor issues and had kept the anarcho-syndicalist presence weak, at least in the department store. They also currently have no union. He said that they had skilled and constant workers, in addition to having an excellent human resources department that focuses on maintaining a strong culture and hiring carefully. This has allowed them to expand their retail business into a financial business, through the credit they provide to their customers. They additionally own insurance and real estate companies and multiple stores across the country that include not only Liverpool but also Fábricas de Francia. He also said they have opened an online store that has a wide range of products and whose only true competitor is Amazon.

Finally, he mentioned another key factor for their continued economic prominence: 'We have always gotten along with the government. I visit President Peña Nieto fairly often, but this is historic; we hardly would have survived without it.'<sup>51</sup> Minouche

Suberville, founder and director of Raíces Francesas en Mexico, concluded an interview in July 2012 by saying something very similar, 'whoever tells you that the Barcelonnettes did not have links or were not closely connected with the government is lying. During the Porfiriato signatures of politicians would be seen linked with the banks controlled by Barcelonnettes. In other economic sectors controlled by the French, even though the politicians do not appear on the board of directors and do not sign, many of them were closely linked to the businesses. She also confirmed that when Porfirio Diaz died in France, the Tron family, of Barcelonnette origin, whose wealth was accumulated in Mexico, lent its tomb to Don Porfirio to be buried initially, before being transferred to the Montparnasse Cemetery.

## Conclusions

During the period where the Barcelonnettes consolidated their economic power between 1870 and 1910, there is an exaggerated notion regarding the key role played by the export-led growth in the development of the Mexican manufacturing industry. In this article we showed that the role of the export-led growth model in Mexico was not as strong as it appeared to be in other Latin American countries in terms of its direct relationship with the development of the manufacturing industry. During those years, the Mexican economy became more complex and balanced in terms of the diverse economic sectors that emerged. Not all these sectors necessarily came about due to the direct link with ELG. For example, the manufacturing industry, in particular the one developed by the Barcelonnette community, originated without the direct necessity of the foreign exchange obtained from the export sector. One of the main strategies the Barcelonnettes employed, among others, was obtaining foreign exchange, when needed, in the form of long-term credits, directly from French bankers who were part of a network of friends and/or family. Taking this into account, this article proves that the ELG model was not a direct determinant for the success of the Barcelonnette community in Mexico. In other words, the origin of the Barcelonnette manufacturing industry was more independent from the ELG than what other studies tend to assume.

This paper also highlights the importance of the domestic market for the French migrant community's businesses in Mexico, proving that the export-led growth model in the country was able to promote the growth of the internal market. Instead of denying the potential of the ELG model, this article adds new evidence in favour of one of its effects: the promotion of the domestic market. By doing that, it refuses the dependentist and structuralist points of view on the export-led growth model. Although the foreign origin of the Barcelonnettes could be supportive for the dependentist theory, an important part of this community, mainly those that arrived in the last third of the nineteenth century is that they adopted Mexico as theirs and began breaking some of their own informal rules such as not marrying Mexicans. Consequentially, by the end of the Porfiriato there were more Barcelonnettes living in Mexico than in Barcelonnette, France.

By focusing on the case of the Jean family, this article has also explained how this group of French immigrants, who were the main manufacturers in the Porfiriato, were favoured by specific conditions, some self-created by them, and others coincidental. Both allowed

them to develop an economic empire in Mexico and monopolise certain sectors of the Mexican economy, particularly the manufacturing industry, banking and commerce. However, this article also proves that not all of them employed the same strategies to succeed, as has been previously claimed by different authors. In addition, not all of them became rich and not all of them were able to remain part of the economic elite after the Porfirian era.

## Notes

1. Gamboa, *Los Barcelonnettes en México*, 13–15; D'Anglade, *Un Gran Patron Barcelonnette*, 545–548.
2. Kuntz, *Comercio Exterior México*, 359, 406–444. A recent study analyses in detail the most exported Mexican products between 1870 and 1929. This study reveals that in no case could any Mexican export product be considered as an enclave in this period. In the case of sisal, which was the most important exported agricultural product, its production was almost entirely in the hands of Mexicans. As a result, this product had a high return value for the Mexican economy. In the case of mining, although the mining boom was the result of foreign capital investments, wage spill-overs in the Mexican territory were very important. According to this study, wage spill-overs could have represented 27 per cent of the value of all mineral production in the country in 1907. The mining sector also had major fiscal spill-overs through taxes. In addition, before they were exported, most Mexican metals were processed within the country. This generated important positive impacts on the local economy. Finally, in the case of oil, although exports didn't begin until 1911, and the companies that extracted it were foreign, the contribution of the oil sector to the Mexican economy increased during the 1920s due to the establishment of refining plants. In addition, an important and growing share of oil production in Mexico remained there for internal consumption.
3. Kuntz, 'De las reformas liberales', 326.
4. Bulmer, *Economic History Latin America*.
5. Abel and Bernanke, 151.
6. Bulmer, *Historia Económica América Latina*, 78, 474. In Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America, there was a significant increase in the share of exports in the GDP over this period. Mexican exports represented 9.6 percent of GDP in 1877, and reached 16.6 percent in 1895. Subsequently, they stabilised at around 12 percent by the end of the Porfiriato and during the decade of the 1920s. This represented a standard figure in many countries that have been classified as having a modern developing economy. Some examples are: Switzerland, Australia and Canada. That is, these countries were living their industrial revolution. (For the whole Latin American region on average exports represented 10 percent of GDP in 1850 and 25 percent in 1912.) Additionally, Mexico was particularly favoured by the commodity lottery, which was not the case for most of the other Latin American countries. By 1913 in Mexico two main exports, silver and copper, accounted for only 40 percent of total exports. Outside of Mexico, this exceptional condition was only seen in Argentina (corn and wheat) and Peru (copper and sugar); while in mono-export countries, a single product could come to represent between 60 and 85 percent of total exports in a year; for example, tin in Bolivia; nitrates in Chile; coffee in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Nicaragua; bananas in Panama; sugar in Cuba; and cocoa in Ecuador. The commodity lottery allowed Mexico to incorporate new products into the international market, while maintaining the production of most export products at the early stages, most of which were still demanded abroad.
7. *Hacienda* has been extensively studied, and there are many definitions of the term. In general terms, it is the social and economic institution whose production activity takes place in the agricultural sector, which is defined by the following primary (constitutive) characteristics:

(a) domain over a great extension of natural resources (land, water), (b) domain over the labor force (human resources), with functions and hierarchy clearly defined among them, and (c) domain over regional-local, and sometimes national, markets. They originally developed in Mexico during the colonial period and were consolidated during the Porfiriato period. Nickel. *Morfología hacienda mexicana*, 19; and our own definition.

8. Kuntz, *Expansión ferroviaria*.
9. Márquez, 'The Political Economy'. The mechanism by which some industries obtained protective tariffs (while others did not) seems to have been political. Graciela Marquez argues that, in practical terms, the power to modify tariffs was held by only one person, Jose Y. Limantour, Secretary of Treasury in Mexico between 1893 and 1911.
10. Abreu, et. al., 'Import Substitution', 158–163. In Mexico, industries like steel (which was produced only in this country at this time), cement and glass were established in this period, while industrial growth in Brazil was more associated with the extraction and processing of primary goods. Regarding the Brazilian coffee industry (extraction industry), it has been affirmed that: 'There is ... evidence of considerable involvement of coffee interests in the fast growing Paulista industry already at the turn of the century. About 45 percent of industrial workers in São Paulo in 1901 were employed in firms controlled by coffee interests. This confirms a trend of portfolio diversification by coffee growers which started in the 1870s and extended to investment in the export infrastructure, including railways, and in the processing of agricultural products.' Furthermore, by 1919, 80 percent of the industry in Brazil was concentrated in consumer goods such as food, clothing and textiles.
11. By 'industrial capitalists' we are referring to the new economic elites that emerged as a result of the diversification of manufacturing.
12. Haber, 'Mercado Interno', 421–422.
13. Meyer, *Los Franceses*, 7; Perez-Siller, 'Los franceses', 345–346; Skerit, *Colonos Franceses*, 49.
14. The General Constituent Congress enacted the first law of colonisation on 18 August 1824. The document denoted that the government's main concern was to populate and exploit large areas for increasing agriculture; To avoid foreign invasions by establishing colonies with nationals on the coasts and borders of the country, and to transform traditional Mexican society by encouraging the migration of European Catholic settlers. On the basis of this legislative document other state laws were passed, whose function was to regulate the population, use and distribution of lands to groups of people dedicated to agriculture.
15. Galindo, 'French Migration, Crony Capitalism'.
16. The brief efforts to establish agricultural businesses by the largest Barcelonnettes companies such as CIDOSA failed. This accentuated the urban character and interests of this group. The bulk of the rest of the most successful entrepreneurs of this group never tried to establish businesses of this nature. See D'Anglade, *Un Gran Patrón Barcelonnette*, 373–402.
17. Galindo, *Social Networks*.
18. By conglomerate, we are referring to the association of a number of partners, and different companies that generally handled several mills and various shops.
19. García 'La Construcción de la Fábrica', 64.
20. For a detailed explanation of the importance of CIDOSA in the Mexican manufacturing industry and its influence on the strategies of other Barcelonnettes see D'Anglade, 2012.
21. AGNT, Box 5, File 4, no doc number. Regarding the textile industry the growing demand for textiles was satisfied after 1876 almost exclusively within the existing industrial facilities. For 11 years (from 1877–78 to 1889) the increased demand was met only by increasing the number of operators. This stage allowed the Barcelonnettes to accumulate more financial reserves. It was not until 1889 that new investments were carried out.
22. The Mexican political regime focused on providing moderate levels of effective protection to manufacturers with a limited, though adequate and growing, dispersion of taxes across industries. The commercial protection measures included the application for permits prior to importation, establishing official prices on certain imported goods, and the indiscriminate

import of a number of products bought abroad. Foreign direct investment was highly regulated, was accepted as a minority in non-strategic areas of manufacturing, and excluded from the rest. Industrial policy operated through sector-specific programs, with the purpose of constructing a manufacturing sector capable of producing capital and somewhat complex intermediate investments. To achieve this, the goal of cutting taxes and restrictions on trade were implemented, with strict requirements regarding, for example, the degree of local content and the performance of the export network. These policies were complemented by the intervention of state companies to carry to investment projects that the private sector could not or would not undertake, such as provision of strategic or basic intermediate investments.

23. Kuntz, *El Comercio Exterior*, 285.
24. AHNM, Deed 1972, Vol. 49, Notary 3 by Ramón Ruiz 30 December 1905.
25. Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, year 1897, session April 17, p.532. It is worth mentioning that between the first modern textile factories built by the Barcelonnettes and the involvement of this group in the production of other manufactured goods such as paper, soap, canned goods, beer and tobacco, among others, the Barcelonnettes became deeply involved in the banking sector when several members of this group doubled the capital of the Bank of London and Mexico from MX\$5 to 10 million in 1896, finally taking control of the bank in 1899; although the Barcelonnettes had been partially involved in banking activities since 1881.
26. Morales, *Los Españoles en México*. His book about the Spanish in Mexico arrives at a similar conclusion. He shows that the Spaniards established existing Spanish financial institutions in Mexico to obtain foreign currency directly from abroad to fund their investments in Mexico.
27. Rosenzweig, Fernando, en Cosío Villegas, *El Porfiriato Vida Económica*, Historia Moderna de México, 643.
28. D'Anglade, *Un Gran Patrón Barcelonnette*, 299–300, 405.
29. *Ibid.*, 510.
30. *Ibid.*, 306–307.
31. Personal communication, Leticia Gamboa Ojeda, 17-May-2017.
32. Eventually the economic elite in Mexico agreed on the need to support greater exchange rate stability in the country, especially after 1903, and to support a monetary reform that led in 1905 to adopt the gold standard. Personal communication with, Mussachio, Aldo, 18 May 2018. Previously, under a bimetallic exchange rate, the exchange rate fluctuated several times, partly because of the reduction in the production of gold and the increase in the production of silver, which appreciated and depreciated their value respectively, and partly because of Mexico's international transactions within a more flexible exchange rate regime. D'Anglade, *Un Gran Patrón Barcelonnette*, 405.
33. For a complete and summarised explanation of the evolution of the trade balance in Mexico in the liberal capitalist era see Kuntz, Sandra 'De las Reformas Liberales a la Gran Depresión', in *Historia Económica General de México*, 305–352.
34. D'Anglade, *Un Gran Patrón Barcelonnette*, 307.
35. *Ibid.*, 297.
36. Bulmer, *Historia Económica América Latina*, 156.
37. Gómez, 'Networks and Entrepreneurship', 491.
38. Castañeda, 'The Barcelonnettes', 3.
39. *Ibid.*, 3–4.
40. Razo, *Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship*, 170.
41. *Ibid.*, 171.
42. Gómez, 'Review of Social Foundations' [http://eh.net/book\\_reviews/social-foundations-of-limited-dictatorship-networks-and-private-protection-during-mexicos-early-industrialization](http://eh.net/book_reviews/social-foundations-of-limited-dictatorship-networks-and-private-protection-during-mexicos-early-industrialization)
43. Beatty, *Institutions and Investment*.
44. Interview with Sandra Kuntz, 2014.

45. Chabrand. *De Barcelonnette au Mexique*.
46. Arnaud, *Les barcelonnettes au Mexique*, 63.
47. From Club France's website: <http://www.clubfrance.org.mx/historia-del-club-france/>
48. Calculation made using a database of Mexican entrepreneurs shared by Gómez-Galvarriato, elaborated with primary information from several Mexican Historical Archives; and Galindo, 2013.
49. Mexico City Notarial Archive, Notary's office 444, Notary Rafael Morales, Fondo Antiguo, deed 56, 28 March 1888; and deed 102, 14 March 1893.
50. Mexico City Notarial Archive, Notary's office 444, Notary Rafael Morales, Fondo Antiguo, deed 102, 14 March 1893.
51. Interview with Henri Bremond, 2015.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

## Notes on contributor

**José Galindo** is an economist graduated with honors from the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. He obtained an M Phil degree in Latin American Studies from the University of Oxford in 2002. And he holds a PhD in history from UNAM, where he graduated with highest honors in 2009. Before he became a full-time professor at the Instituto de Investigaciones Histórico-Sociales at the Universidad Veracruzana in 2014, he spent two years as a postdoctoral research scholar and Temporary Specialist in Latin American History at the Department of History of the University of California, Berkeley. He has published extensively. Some of his last publications are:

Books:

Mexico in Focus: Political, Environmental and Social Issues, published by Nova Science Publishers in 2015;

*La CNDH: una consecuencia de la política económica y social de México (1970–1990)*, published by The Mexican Federal Congress and Miguel Ángel Porrúa in 2011;

Articles in indexed journals:

*The Economic Expansion of an Elite Business Family of French Origin in Central Mexico in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, published by Enterprise & Society in Dec, 2013; 794–828

*Some considerations regarding the Persistence of the Economic Elite in Mexico in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, published by Bulletin of Latin American Research in April, 2013; 149–162.

## References

- Abel, Andrew, and Ben Bernanke. *Macroeconomics*. 2nd ed. United States: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1995.
- Abreu, Marcelo, Alfonso S. Bevilaqua, and Demostenes M. Pinho. "Import Substitution and Growth in Brazil, 1890s–1970s." In *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Latin America; Volume 3: Industrialisation and the State in Latin America: The Postwar Years*, edited by Enrique Cárdenas, José Ocampo, and Rosemary Thorp. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. 154–175.
- Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo de Trabajo (AGNT).
- Archivo Histórico Nacional Mexicano.
- Archivo Histórico de la Ciudad de México.
- Archivo Notarial de la Ciudad de México.

- Arnaud, Francois. *Les barcelonnettes au Mexique: Extrait des documents et notions historiques sur le vallée de Barcelonnette* [The Barcelonnettes in Mexico: Extract of Documents and Historical Notions on the Valley of Barcelonnette]. France: Barcelonnette, 1891.
- Beatty, Edward. *Institutions and Investment: The Political Basis of Industrialisation in Mexico before 1911*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. *The Economic History of Latin America since the Independence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. *La Historia Económica de América Latina Desde la Independencia*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2010.
- Castañeda, Gonzalo. "The Barcelonnettes: An Example of Network-Entrepreneurs in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: An Explanation Based on a Theory of Bounded Rational Choice with Social Embeddedness." *Document de Treball* 4, no. 2 (2004).
- Chabrand, Emile. *De Barcelonnette au Mexique*. 1–48, Paris: Plon, 1892.
- Coatsworth, John Henry. *El Impacto Económico de los Ferrocarriles en el Porfiriato: Crecimiento Contra Desarrollo*. México: Era, 1984.
- D'Anglade, Jean-Louis. *Un Gran Patrón Barcelonnette en México: Joseph Oliver y su Familia 1850-1932*. México: Balzac, 2012.
- Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados.
- Florescano, Enrique (coord.). *Atlas Histórico de México*. México: Siglo XXI, 1983.
- Galán, Erika. "Los Barcelonnettes en México. Un ejemplo de espíritu empresarial (1821–1913)." Masters Degree Dissertation, UDLA-P, México, 2002.
- Galindo Rodríguez, José. "The Economic Expansion of an Elite Business Family of French Origin in Central Mexico in the First Half of the Twentieth Century." *Enterprise and Society* 14, no. 4 (2013). 794–828.
- Galindo Rodríguez, José. "French Migration and Crony Capitalism during Porfirian Mexico 1876–1911." Conference Paper, Miami, Florida, 2015.
- Galindo Rodríguez, José. *Social Networks, Corruption, and Economic Success in Mexico: A Revision of the Porfiriato Period and the Persistence of Its Conditions in the Present Day*. Arizona: Book in process, 2016.
- Gamboa, Leticia. *Los Barcelonnettes en México: Miradas Regionales, Siglos XIX y XX*. Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2008.
- Gamboa, Leticia. *Personal Communication*, May 17, 2017.
- García Díaz, Bernardo. "La Construcción de la Fábrica y la Invención del Pueblo de Santa Rosa, Veracruz." In *México Francia: Memoria de Una Sensibilidad Común Siglos XIX–XX*. II vols., edited by Javier Pérez Siller and Chantal Cramaussel. Puebla: BUAP, 2004. 61–80.
- Gómez Galvarriato, Aurora. "Networks and Entrepreneurship: The Modernisation of Textile Business in Porfirian Mexico." *Business History Review* 82, no. 3 (2008): 475–502.
- Gómez Galvarriato, Aurora. "Review of Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection During Mexico's Early Industrialisation by Armando Razo." *Economic History* September (2008). [http://eh.net/book\\_reviews/social-foundations-of-limited-dictatorship-networks-and-private-protection-during-mexicos-early-industrialization/](http://eh.net/book_reviews/social-foundations-of-limited-dictatorship-networks-and-private-protection-during-mexicos-early-industrialization/).
- Gómez Galvarriato, Aurora. "Los Barcelonnettes y la Modernización de la Comercialización y de la Producción de Textiles en el Porfiriato." In *Los Barcelonnettes en México: Miradas Regionales, Siglos XIX y XX*, edited by Leticia Gamboa. Puebla: BUAP, 2008. 189–232.
- González, Guillermina, Lilia Romo, Elvira López, Ernesto Lemoine, Humberto Sánchez. *Atlas de la Historia de México*. México: ENP-UNAM, 2004.
- Haber, Stephen. "Mercado Interno, Industrialización y Banca, 1890–1929." In *Historia económica general de México: De la colonia a nuestros días*, edited by Sandra Kuntz (coord.), 411–436. México: El Colegio de México/ Secretaría de Economía, 2010.
- Kuntz, Sandra. *El Comercio Exterior en México en la Era del Capitalismo Liberal, 1870–1929*. México: El Colegio de México, 2007.
- Kuntz, Sandra (coord.). *La expansión ferroviaria en América Latina*. México: El Colegio de México, 2015.

- Liste Approximative des Intérêts Français Engagés au Mexique*. MS of the "Asociación Nationale des Porteurs Français de Valeurs Mobilières" (at Banco de México).
- Kuntz, Sandra. "De las reformas liberales a la gran depresión, 1856–1929." In *Historia Económica General de México: De la Colonia a Nuestros Días*, edited by Sandra Kuntz (coord.), 305–352. México: El Colegio de México/Secretaría de Economía, 2010.
- Márquez, Graciela. "The Political Economy of Mexican Protectionism, 1868–1911." PhD dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 2002.
- Meyer, Jean. *Los Franceses en México durante el siglo XIX, Relaciones*, vol. 1, no. 2. Translated by Pastora Rodríguez. Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, 1980.
- Morales, Humberto. *Los Españoles en México, 1880–1948*. México: CICEES/Centro de Iniciativas Culturales, 2010.
- Mussachio, Aldo. *Personal Communication*, May 18, 2017.
- Nickel, Herbert J. *Morfología social de la hacienda mexicana*. México: FCE, 1996.
- Perez Siller, Javier. 1999. *La migración francesa de los siglos XIX y XX, una contribución a la modernidad*. [www.culturadf.gob.mx/babel/fran/Siller.htm](http://www.culturadf.gob.mx/babel/fran/Siller.htm).
- Perez Siller, Javier. "Los Franceses en México: Una comunidad, su estudio y sus problemas." In *Extranjeros en México: Continuidades y nuevas aproximaciones*, edited by Ernesto Rodríguez Chávez, 331–365. México, DF: Instituto Nacional de Migración/SEGOB, 2010.
- Perez Siller, Javier. "De mitos y realidades: La emigración barcelonnette a México. 1845–1891." In *Los Barcelonnettes en México. Miradas regionales, siglos XIX-XX*, edited by Leticia Gamboa (coord.). México: UNAM, 2009. 103–138.
- Proal, Maurice, and M. Pierre Charpenel. *Los Barcelonnettes en México*. México: Clío, 2008.
- Razo, Armando. *Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection during Mexico's Early Industrialisation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Rosenzweig, Fernando. *Vida Económica del Porfiriato*, en *Historia Moderna de México*. México: Editorial Hermes, 1965.
- Skerritt Gardner, David. *Colonos Franceses y modernización en el Golfo de México*. Veracruz, Mexico: Universidad Veracruzana, 1995.
- The Economist*, London Newspaper.
- Turlington, Edgar. "Foreign Investments in Mexico." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* March (1940). 208: 103–111.